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A Thematic Analysis of Ang Bayan Denunciations of the
United States of America and the People's Republic of
China from 2015 to the Present

By

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Introduction

On November the 8th, 2020, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), a Maoist insurgent organisation, issued a statement. This in and of itself was not unusual. The party makes near constant use of its various information organs, celebrating victories, mourning losses, and denouncing enemies. What was unusual was the statements content. The party declared that “the America people deserve praises for voting against US President Donald Trump” in the recent elections.¹ Even more shockingly, they offered some praise for President-Elect Biden, noting that he had “rode on the crest of a gigantic wave of democratic mass movement which has engulfed the entire country”. This statement ignited a firestorm of controversy within the international Maoist community. It was quickly denounced, for example, in *Tribune of the People*, the party magazine of the US based Red Guard organisation, as “totally alien to Maoism”.² This became a running controversy both within American Maoist organisations, and globally.

This incident could mean nothing. Due to his, reciprocated, support for President Duterte, the then ruler of the Philippines, Trump was highly unpopular with the CPP, and so his ousting would be celebrated no matter who accomplished it. However, it raised a question. If there was a lowering hostility, how could it be measured? In a similar vein, the increased hostility of the CPP towards the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was much discussed in this period. With this in mind, I set out to test two theses. The first was that there had been a measurable decline in the hostility exhibited to the United States over the past few years by

¹ Communist Party of the Philippines, ‘On the defeat of Donald Trump in the US presidential elections’ *Philippine Revolution Web Central*, 11/08/2020

² Editorial Board, ‘To Celebrate Biden’s Victory is Incompatible with Anti-Imperialism: An Open Letter to the Communist Party of the Philippines’, *Tribune of the People*, 11/13/2020

the CPP. The second was that there had been a noticeable *rise* in hostility towards the PRC. In order to test this, I have assembled a data set of every available issue of the CPP magazine *Ang Bayan* since 2015. *Ang Bayan*, literally meaning *The Country* in Filipino, is the magazine of the CPP. Published initially in Filipino and various indigenous languages, and later translated into English, it is intended almost entirely for the domestic population of the Philippines. While this makes it no more trustworthy a source in terms of self-perception than any other propaganda outlet, its domestic focus means that it does at least reflect what the CPP more broadly wants its primary audience to think that it thinks, removing the need to parse what is and is not intended for an international audience.

Building on the work of academics like Lorenzo-Dus, J. Droogan and S. Peattie, this is a thematic analysis, breaking down the negative depictions of both countries into a set of themes, and measuring their rise and fall, in order to get a more granular understanding of the depictions of both nations. The period under discussion, 2015 onwards, covers the rise of Duterte all the way to his replacement by “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. this year, and so should provide a representative sample of past and present sentiments on both the United States and the PRC.

Literature Review

In discussing the literature around this issue, one is faced with both feast and famine. It is true that a great deal has been written around the literature of various non state armed groups over the last several years. It is also true that some of it even focusses on the way that literature can change in order to meet different audiences and different targets. However, while there is a large quantity of what might be called generally applicable literature, there is very little specific to the organisation under discussion. The CPP is a profoundly understudied organisation, academic interest in it having peaked in the 80s and 90s, and what scholarship is performed today deals with aspects that are far from what this paper is discussing. Indeed, the literature of underground communist movements in general, especially in the third world, is drastically understudied. What literature exists primarily deals with defunct European groups, such as the Italian Red Brigades. This means that what papers are available are either significantly outdated, having been published in the groups heyday, or deal with the group retrospectively. There is little in the way of studies dealing with contemporary armed leftist groups.

Where there has been a great deal of scholarly attention paid, however, is towards Islamic extremist groups. In particular, Al Qaeda and ISIS have, through their propaganda, created a great deal of literature to analyse. ISIS' Dabiq magazine, for example, represents perhaps the closest counterpart to the CPP's own magazine literature. However, I would argue that there are sufficient differences between the Islamic ideology that inspires these groups and the communist ideology of the CPP that what can be learnt from study of these groups

cannot simply be applied to the Filipino context. With this in mind, it is necessary to thoroughly review the varied academic contributions of academics dealing with the CPP, the past propaganda of leftist groups, and the current propaganda of Islamists.

It is easiest to start with literature relating to the CPP. This is, simply, because it is so sparse. Much of what exists was produced in the years of the party's greatest success, in its struggle against the Marcos dictatorship and immediately following its overthrow. When Marcos fell in 1986, the CPP commanded a fighting force of around twenty four thousand men, and was supported by roughly one million, seven hundred thousand civilian sympathisers.³ This attracted the attention of both sympathizers and detractors. Sympathizers, as Mark R. Thompson points out in "The decline of Philippine communism" were primarily communists themselves, who primarily published within "National Democrat" (here used in the Maoist sense, meaning communists and communist sympathisers) circles, rather than academic presses.⁴ This is very much not the case for the CPP's detractors. These figures were primarily American academics, officially or unofficially involved with various organs of the US state. Understandably, they took a less positive view of the communist insurgency than the communists did. While most authors did not reach the level of condemnation achieved by Ross H. Munro, who claimed that unless the CPP could be stopped the Philippines was heading towards a "Pol Pot future", they are negative by default.⁵ For example, while Carl H Landé may praise the "earnestness and ... dedication" of the members of the NPA and the

³ Rosanne Rutten, 'Popular support for the revolutionary movement CPP-NPA: Experiences in a hacienda in Negros Occidental, 1978-1995' in Patricio N. Abinales (ed.) *The Revolution Falters: The Left in Philippine Politics after 1986* (Southeast Asia Program Publication, 1996) p. 116

⁴ Mark R. Thompson, 'The decline of Philippine Communism: A review essay' *South East Asia Research*, 6(2) (JULY 1998), p. 106

⁵ Ross H. Munro, 'The New Khmer Rouge' *Commentary*, December 1985

National Democratic Front (NDF), this is not done cheerfully. In fact, it is quickly qualified with an assurance that, of course, he does not share their goals.⁶ The growth of the CPP is, in fact, a reason to draw down support for the Marcos regime and begin consideration of a transfer to democracy, before the CPP becomes too powerful.⁷ This conclusion is one shared with Munro, both using the threat of the CPP to advocate for the replacement of Marcos with someone with the moral authority to defeat the communists.

With the fall of the Marcos regime in 1986 and the installation of the democratic pro-American government of Cory Aquino, the tone in American academia shifts. Rather than analysing the successes of the CPP in order to stoke anti-Marcos sentiment and support a transition, the same analysis is used to support the current government. A. James Gregor's article "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Philippines", cowritten with Jose P. Magno, Jr, a commander in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the same figures about the CPP's growth are discussed.⁸ However, rather than ending with an argument that this is a reason to suspend support, Gregor and Magno instead argue that if anything an intensification of support to "secure the future of the island" is needed.⁹ While Alvin H. Bernstein and Armando B. Heredia take a different tack, that instead American troop commitments should be scaled down, this is not intended to support the CPP. Rather, they feel that by lessening American military presence in the country, militant nationalists will be dissuaded from continuing to support the rebels. A non-communist Philippines remains the

⁶ Carl H. Landé, 'Philippine Prospects after Martial Law' *Foreign Affairs*, 59(5) (Summer, 1981), pp. 1163

⁷ *Ibid*, p. 1168

⁸ Jose P. Magno, Jr. and A. James Gregor, 'Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Philippines' *Asian Survey*, 26(5) (May, 1986), p. 501

⁹ *Ibid*, p. 517

primary objective.¹⁰ It is clear that scholarship on the CPP in this period is written primarily through a highly securitised lens, with the primary objective being the defeat or marginalisation of the CPP, and the maintenance of the Philippines within the American sphere of influence.

The other period where a reasonable quantity of scholarly attention was paid to the CPP was after their decline. The organisations strength declined quickly following the end of the Marcos regime and the beginning of democratic rule. Now, rather than attempting to defeat the threat of the CPP, scholars are attempting to understand why it failed. There are two broad camps in this period attempting to explain the CPP's decline. One lays the blame at the foot of the CPP itself. This camp is exemplified by Patricio N. Abinales' edited volume "The Revolution Falters". Abinales et al make the case that the defeat of the CPP was guaranteed not only the battlefield, but due to electoral politics. Their decision to boycott the first post Marcos elections alienated progressive allies and set them on the road to decline as popular sentiment flowed from the guerrillas and to the electoral campaign of Corey Aquino.¹¹ This decision is in turn ascribed to ideological rigidity on the part of the CPP.¹² The other narrative that emerges from this period places the blame elsewhere. Thompson, in his review of "The Revolution Falters" disputes the claim made by Abinales and his collaborators. It was events beyond the CPP's control, rather than the group's mistakes, that led to their sidelining. This does not mean that Thompson is more

¹⁰ Alvin H. Bernstein and Armando B. Heredia 'Communist insurgency in the Philippines', *Comparative Strategy*, 8(3), (1989) p. 292

¹¹ Kathleen Weekley, 'From Vanguard to Rearguard: The Theoretical Roots of the Crisis of the Communist Party of the Philippines' in Patricio N. Abinales (ed.) *The Revolution Falters: The Left in Philippine Politics after 1986* (Southeast Asia Program Publication, 1996) p. 47

¹² *Ibid*, p. 49

sympathetic to the CPP. In fact, his language is if anything harsher, calling the party an embarrassment to progressives and a source of contempt for conservatives, and condemning the “Machiavellian tactics” of Sison.¹³ He makes the case that in fact the decline of the CPP is part of a pattern in Filipino politics. Whenever democracy is under attack, rural insurgencies arise. The CPP’s success was just a manifestation of this tendency, just as the PKP or *Huk* insurgency in the 1930s and 40s was. When democracy was restored and Marcos fled, the decline of the CPP was sure to follow.¹⁴ As this debate marked the end of the CPP as a credible threat to the government of the Philippines, at least at that moment, it also saw the end of significant amounts of academic attention being paid to the Philippines, as it was no longer a national security threat.

It is true that some scholarship is still being done on the CPP, however it is very different to what was undertaken in the organisation’s heyday. Rather than broad scope analyses of the party, its strategy, and its prospects, modern scholarship is more partial, addressing elements of the party rather than the whole. This is both a blessing and a curse. While it can allow for a greater depth of study and an escape from a purely securitised mode of analysis, it does mean that some interesting and important elements are left unaddressed. One area where there has been a reasonable amount of scholarship done on the party is its relationship to LGBT+ issues. From the 1990s onwards, the CPP has been seen as a very progressive force in the Philippines on this issue. For example, the first gay marriage in the country took place in a CPP armed camp.¹⁵ There is some debate within the scholarship as

¹³ Thompson, “Decline”, p. 105, 108

¹⁴ Ibid, pp. 127-129

¹⁵ Kaira Zoe K. Albuero, ‘Brothers, Lovers, and Revolution: Negotiating Military Masculinity and Homosexual Identity in a Revolutionary Movement in the Philippines’, *Asia-Pacific Social Science Review* 11:2 (2011), p. 27

to how progressive the party is in practise. For example Marlon Lacsamana claims that in practise, despite their ideological support for LGBT rights, the CPP remains operating within a highly gendered paradigm.¹⁶ Kaira Zoe K. Alburo is more positive, but still sees the hegemonic masculinity of the NPA as an area of contention for queer insurgents.¹⁷ What both Lacsamana and Alburo do is discuss the CPP as a thing unto itself, rather than purely in relationship to the government of the Philippines and American interests in the region.

However this area of scholarship is more the exception than the rule. Most of the scholarship still being done on the CPP is highly securitised. A good example of this is one of the most recent papers written on the CPP, Malin Åkebo's 'Ceasefire Rationales: A Comparative Study of Ceasefires in the Moro and Communist Conflicts in the Philippines'. While an admirable piece of scholarship, Åkebo like others before them treats the CPP in a purely securitised manner, with their interest being their military actions. Åkebo is focussed on why different conflicts with different insurgent groups lead to different relationships with ceasefires. Åkebo is primarily concerned with what they can learn from the Philippines and apply more broadly into the field of ceasefire studies, which they feel is understudied.¹⁸ The focus of the analysis is of the different conflicts the separatist, Islamist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the CPP are engaged in, and how this affects their approach to ceasefires.¹⁹ Åkebo argues that, due to the different goals of the CPP and MILF, one seeking to separate from the government and the other to overthrow it, as well as the diffuse

¹⁶ Marlon Lacsamana, 'Rainbow Warriors: Strategies of War in the Inclusion of Persons of Diverse SOGIE in the Maoist Insurgency in the Philippines' (Master's Thesis, Central European University, 2015) p. 52

¹⁷ Kaira Zoe K. Alburo, 'Brothers, Lovers, and Revolution: Negotiating Military Masculinity and Homosexual Identity in a Revolutionary Movement in the Philippines', *Asia-Pacific Social Science Review* 11:2 (2011), p. 79

¹⁸ Malin Åkebo, 'Ceasefire Rationales: A Comparative Study of Ceasefires in the Moro and Communist Conflicts in the Philippines', *International Peacekeeping* 28:3 (2021) p. 367

¹⁹ *Ibid*, p. 368

nature of the CPP and the concentrated nature of the MILF, it is natural for the MILF to be more engaged with ceasefires. It is clear that there are gaps in scholarship on the CPP, which have occurred naturally since the groups decline from its heyday. If a paper does not address the groups rise and fall in the 1980s and 90s it is already likely to stand out from much of what has been written. If, beyond that, it is not concerned with the CPP in a military capacity, this is even more the case. That Lacsamana and Albuero's papers stand out so greatly from the others discussed shows how rare it is to discuss the CPP on their own terms, rather than as an antagonist force to the AFP or the government of the Philippines. With this in mind, I will move on to the other portion of the literature review, a discussion of how other papers have dealt with insurgent literature.

Armed group propaganda has, over the past few decades, been subject to a great deal of attention. It is true that some of this attention has been focused on communist groups. One useful example of this is Matteo Re's 2017 article "The Red Brigades' Communiqués: An Analysis of the Terrorist Group's Propaganda". Re demonstrates clearly that as the actions of the Red Brigades changed, so did their propaganda. For instance, as part of the shift from violence towards openly fascist figures and movements towards attacks on the Italian state itself, rhetoric changed. The main topics of propaganda shifted from "a) anti-fascism; b) Repression as a justification for violence; c) the Resistance movement; d) from "armed propaganda" to "attack to the heart of the State"" to instead "a) avant-garde versus armed "spontaneism"; b) the communist traitors; c) the Imperialist Multinational State (SIM); d)

the treatment of victims.”²⁰ In this framing, while rhetoric is secondary to action, it is still linked to it. As the Red Brigades change the targets and intensity of their campaign, the rhetoric changes along with it. In Re’s model, the rhetoric of terrorist propaganda is driven primarily by a need to make excuses. The Red Brigades were attempting to construct their own reality, in which their actions were entirely justified and all blame fell upon their political and ideological enemies. Rhetoric changed in large part as enemies changed.²¹ Ideology is relatively unimportant, relevant only as the register through which intentions are articulated, providing a vocabulary for propaganda. Re is, perhaps unfortunately, more the exception than the rule in his focus.

While there is much written about terrorist propaganda, it is not primarily focused on communists. Instead, it is analysis of Islamist propaganda that dominates. When leftist groups are considered, such as in Max Abrahms, Nicholas Beauchamp & Joseph Mroszczyk’s “What Terrorist Leaders Want: A Content Analysis of Terrorist Propaganda Videos” it often can feel like an afterthought. In their analysis of these propaganda videos, Abrahms et al draw on ten different armed groups. Of these, eight are straightforwardly Islamist. The ninth, Chechen insurgents, are nationalist-separatist Islamists. The tenth, incongruously, is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).²² While the communist FARC are considered, it is clear that the vast majority of focus is on the Islamists. What Abrams et al. propose is in essence a more sophisticated version of Re’s model. They agree that a movement’s actions, particularly its violent actions, inform its propaganda rather than vice

²⁰ Matteo Re, ‘The Red Brigades’ Communiqués: An Analysis of the Terrorist Group’s Propaganda’, *Terrorism and Political Violence* 32:2 (2020) pp. 277-281

²¹ Ibid, p. 289-292

²² Max Abrahms, Nicholas Beauchamp & Joseph Mroszczyk, ‘What Terrorist Leaders Want: A Content Analysis of Terrorist Propaganda Videos’ *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 40:11, p. 906

versa, but that the two are linked.²³ What they add is the idea that these organisations are not monoliths. Re assumes that, broadly speaking, all the violence of the Red Brigades was agreed upon by the membership and leadership of the organization. However, Abrams et al. point out that while the rank and file membership of insurgent groups might favour indiscriminate violence, the more politically aware leadership often favour selective targeting instead.²⁴ Abrams et al. argue that this division can be seen in the propaganda of these groups. The higher production value, and so the closer to the leadership's control, the propaganda video taking credit for a killing, the more likely it is to be selective, aimed at a military target, rather than indiscriminate.²⁵ This shows the differing priorities of the leadership and the rank and file in terrorist groups, both in their relationship to violence and their relationship to the celebration of violence. While this analysis is more sophisticated than Re's, in large part simply because of how many more modes and variations of propaganda exist at the disposal of modern terrorist groups the core conclusion remains the same. Terrorist propaganda is closely related to terrorist actions, and not vice versa.

The most relevant Islamist group to discussions of the CPP, Ang Bayan, and Liberation, is the Islamic State. This is for a number of reasons. Firstly there is the simple fact that, due to its sudden rise and subsequent dramatic fall, the group has generated an enormous quantity of academic interest, in much the same way as the CPP once did. This means that there is more up to date, relevant scholarship than exists about, for example, Boko Haram. Beyond that, there is what that scholarship focussed on. While al-Qaida journals such as Al-Shamika have attracted some attention, it is very little in comparison to Dabiq. Dabiq, named after a town

²³ Ibid, p. 906-909

²⁴ Ibid, p. 900

²⁵ Ibid, p. 911

associated with the apocalypse and the final defeat of the crusader armies, was Islamic State's magazine. While only fifteen total issues were released, it inspired a great deal of attention, and articles from western academia. Given that this paper is concerned with another insurgent magazine, these articles deserve particularly close attention.

One key function of Dabiq is as a tool to build narratives. One key paper on this matter is Nuria Lorenzo-Dus, Anina Kinzel and Luke Walker's "Representing the West and "non-believers" in the online jihadist magazines Dabiq and Inspire". This paper seeks to contrast the magazines, published by Islamic State and al-Qaeda respectively. Their focus is on what either group represents as the fundamental other, against which the group is defined. In turn, this shows which groups are most likely to be targeted by these militants. The division that Lorenzo-Dus et al. find is between targeting the "near enemy", that is, targets local to the militant group, and the "far enemy", targets in American and more broadly "the west".²⁶ In order to establish this, Lorenzo-Dus et al. tracked which groups are "theyified", defined as the automatically excluded other.²⁷ What they found was that Inspire, and by extension al-Qaeda, was far more likely to use "they" in relation to "the West". On the other hand Dabiq was more likely than Inspire to use "they" in discussing either "non-group" or "other-group" organisations.²⁸ This suggests that the two organisations were constructing very different narratives. While both groups claimed to oppose "the West", only al-Qaeda focussed their attention upon the "far enemy". Islamic State, instead, focussed upon the "near enemy",

²⁶ Nuria Lorenzo-Dus, Anina Kinzel and Luke Walker, 'Representing the West and "non-believers" in the online jihadist magazines Dabiq and Inspire' *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 11:3, (2018) p. 524

²⁷ Ibid, p. 526

²⁸ Ibid, pp. 526-527

more frequently discussing non-believers than “the West”.²⁹ The two organisations were using fundamentally different narratives, with fundamentally different targets, and reflecting fundamentally different ambitions. While al-Qaeda is an internationalist terrorist organisation, Islamic State is more driven to build a Caliphate in the Middle East. What Lorenzo-Dus et al. show is that this can be seen even through their magazines.

Julian Droogan and Shane Peattie take a similar approach to Lorenzo-Dus et al. in their study of Dabiq. Like those academics, they see Dabiq as a tool used by Islamic State to form communities. However, rather than forming them oppositionally, by defining an outgroup to rally against, they argue that Dabiq attempts to use the victories of Islamic State to create an in-group, one which includes the whole Muslim world.³⁰ They demonstrate this through an analysis of the organising themes of what is written in Dabiq. Droogan and Peattie argue that these are “‘Religion’, ‘Enemies’, ‘Call to Arms’ and ‘Building the Caliphate’”.³¹ Which themes are emphasised varies from issue to issue, however. Droogan and Peattie claim that this is deliberate. By shifting the targets and rhetoric of Dabiq, Isis is better able to avoid “static counternarratives” from their enemies.³² While Droogan and Peattie do note the statist undertones of Dabiq’s narratives, they place far less emphasis upon it than Lorenzo-Dus et al. To them, the statist goals of Islamic State are just one element of a broader attempt at global group manipulation.³³ It is the global aims of Islamic State, in attracting broad international Muslim support, that they see reflected in Dabiq, rather than the localist

²⁹ Ibid, p. 533

³⁰ Julian Droogan & Shane Peattie, ‘Mapping the thematic landscape of Dabiq magazine, Australian Journal of International Affairs’, 71:6, (2017) p. 591

³¹ Ibid, p. 618

³² Ibid p. 618

³³ Ibid, p. 617

aims Lorenzo-Dus et al. emphasise. Despite similar approaches being taken on the same body of work, the two papers come to drastically different conclusions.

Like Droogan and Peattie, Vladislav Strnad and Nik Hynek's paper relies upon a thematic analysis of Dabiq, using much the same methods.³⁴ However, they differ strongly in their understanding of how Dabiq is depicting the Islamic State. Both Lorenzo-Dus et al. and Droogan and Peattie agree that Dabiq shows the Islamic State in a fundamentally statist light. In contrast to this, what Strnad and Hynek note is that this is only a part of Dabiq's representation of the organisation. In Strnad and Hynek's analysis of the magazine, Islamic State takes on a hybrid role. Its narrative constantly shifts from violent terrorist organisation to legitimate state, without any care for the contradictions inherent to this position.³⁵ Strnad and Hynek emphasise strongly the dishonesty of Dabiq as a magazine. Unlike Lorenzo-Dus et al., who allow that there might be an element of self-perception to Dabiq's depiction of the world and the groups enemies, according to Strnad and Hynek Dabiq's role is solely that of self-representation.³⁶ When it is advantageous to present itself as a terrorist group, it does so, and when it is instead preferable to depict itself as a legitimate state then it did so. This had nothing to do with Islamic State's legal status, or its actual organisation.³⁷ To Strnad and Hynek, there is little that can be learnt about the actual status of Islamic State, or its actual opinions, from Dabiq. What can instead be uncovered is the image of itself that it wants the world to see. That all three papers could, while covering the same magazine, one which only ran for fifteen issues at that, come to such drastically different

³⁴ Vladislav Strnad & Nik Hynek (2020) 'ISIS's hybrid identity: a triangulated analysis of the *Dabiq* narrative', *Defence Studies*, 20:1, p. 84

³⁵ *Ibid*, p. 99

³⁶ *Ibid*, p. 83

³⁷ *Ibid*, p. 99

opinions shows the amount of information that can be found in such publications. Further, that papers that come to such drastically different conclusions do share some common ground, namely that it is possible to learn about Islamic State, either in its intentions or how it wants to be perceived, through its magazine, shows the value of studying insurgent propaganda periodicals.

Why the CPP?

There are many insurgent groups in the world currently. With this in mind, why is the CPP particularly worthy of study in this manner? There are many aspects to the CPP that make it a useful case study to understand insurgent propaganda. First is its relative isolation. In many cases insurgencies are overtly or covertly supported by other states. This heavily influences their decision making. In order to understand why insurgent groups without any hope of obtaining material support from a particular state continue to make ideological statements, it is necessary to find a group about which you can say this as firmly as possible. The CPP is one such case. While the party was supported by the PRC under Mao, during the initial stages of its insurgency, this is no longer the case. According to Shen Beili, the director general of the international department of the Bureau of Southeast and South Asian Affairs of the CPC Central Committee, the PRC now has “zero” links to the CPP, and that this has effectively been the case since the 1980s.³⁸ The CPP’s support for Maoist ideology, as well as their opposition to the traditionally American backed government of the Philippines, likewise precludes support from the United States. With this in mind, it is reasonable to suppose that their statements for and against either country is unlikely to be motivated by a desire to solicit support from them.

The other reason the CPP is worthy of discussion is the ideological rigidity of the organisation. Frequently, changes in the propaganda of an organisation reflect a change in the organisations ideology and the adoption of a new rhetorical line to match it. It is highly

³⁸ Jerry E. Esplanada, ‘Chinese communist party says it has disowned local rebels’, *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, <https://globalnation.inquirer.net/21671/chinese-communist-party-says-it-has-disowned-local-rebels> [Retrieved 20th April 2022]

unlikely that this is the case for the CPP. The CPP claims Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, or MLM, as their ideology.³⁹ The extreme nature of this ideology, which upholds not just the necessity but the centrality of the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” to socialism, already indicates that at least some genuine radicalism amongst its adherents.⁴⁰ As well as this, ideological fervour was key to the foundation of the organisation. The party was formed through a split between moderate and radical members of the previous communist party, with both groups being made up of the more radical members. In one of the founding documents of the CPP, *Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party*, the previous leadership of the Philippine Communist Party (PKP) are castigated for taking a “bourgeois reactionary line” which has encouraged them to “disarm and undermine” the revolution.⁴¹

However, there are some organisations that begin with radical dreams, and trumpet an extremist ideology, which end up moderating severely in time. One example of this is the Communist Party of Nepal, which despite similar origins in a radical split from the existing party, and even sharing the same ideology, eventually moderated.⁴² Despite claiming to remain Maoists, this group has shifted ideologically to the point of endorsing, running in, and winning “bourgeois” elections.⁴³ What marks the CPP as different is that they have stayed committed to their ideology throughout their long insurgency, and made active efforts to enforce a strict ideological line. The most salient example of this was the “Second Great Rectification Movement”, the first having been the split from the PKP and the

³⁹ Communist Party of the Philippines, *Constitution and Program* (Central Committee Communist Party of the Philippines, 2018) p. 10

⁴⁰ Communist Party of India (Maoist), *Marxism-Leninism-Maoism Basic Course*, (Foreign Languages Press, 2019) p. 236

⁴¹ Sison, *Foundation*, p. 22

⁴² Prachanda, ‘Marxism-Leninism-Maoism or Revisionism?’ in *PROBLEMS & PROSPECTS OF REVOLUTION IN NEPAL, A Collection of Articles by Com. Prachanda and Other Leaders of the CPN (Maoist)* <https://www.bannedthought.net/Nepal/UCPNM-Docs/1990/MLM-orRevisionism-Prachanda-900600.htm> [Retrieved 10th March 2022]

⁴³ Aditya Adhikari, *The Bullet and the Ballot Box* (Verso, 2014) p. 172

founding of the CPP. This was a sustained campaign, beginning in 1992, against so called “revisionist” elements within the party. The party castigated those “elements who have been hoodwinked by...Gorbachovite [sic] propaganda” into supporting “nothing less than the negation of the basic principles of the party”⁴⁴ *Reaffirm our Basic Principles and Rectify Errors*, the principle document of the movement, claimed that thanks to the “gross deviations and errors” resulting from this revisionist outlook, “grievous damage” had been done “to the Party and the revolutionary mass movement”.⁴⁵ Only a strengthened line against revisionism could put the group back onto the correct road and allow it to continue to struggle for socialism in a post-Cold War world.⁴⁶ In this way, the ideological rigidity of the CPP was affirmed. It is the combination of this rigidity and the lack of state support that makes the CPP the most optimal case study for a thematic analysis of seemingly incentive free insurgent group propaganda.

⁴⁴ Armando Liwanag, *Stand For Socialism Against Modern Revisionism*, (Foreign Languages Press, 2019) p. 10

⁴⁵ Central Committee Communist Party of the Philippines, *REAFFIRM OUR BASIC PRINCIPLES AND RECTIFY ERRORS*, (Central Publishing House, 1992) pp. 1-2

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 19-22

Empirics

In order to better understand the themes used in denunciations of America and the PRC from 2015 to the present date, a detailed and rigorous analysis was required. In order to establish the data set, the sources had first to be obtained. Thankfully, issues of the magazine are stored online in several locations. Philippines Revolution Web Central, a website affiliated with the CPP, hosts PDF copies of most of the available issues.⁴⁷ Many of those not available through this site could be found hosted on bannedthought.net, a site dedicated to hosting literature from various MLM movements across the globe.⁴⁸ Through this, I was able to create an almost complete set of issues for the time period under discussion, with only a few minor exceptions.

In order to identify common themes in denunciations, I first selected multiple issues at random from throughout the period, and examined them for common themes related to the United States and the PRC. Having identified these themes, I then embarked upon a close reading of all 158 available copies, identifying articles denouncing either nation and which of the four themes they fell under. This was repeated, twice, in order to ensure the veracity of the data recorded. Having gathered the data it could be analysed, with the frequency of the use of different modes of denunciation in different periods tracked, in order to better understand their use by Ang Bayan and the CPP as a whole.

⁴⁷ 'Archive of Ang Bayan', Philippine Revolution Web Central, last modified July 21, 2022, <https://cpp.ph/category/ang-bayan/>

⁴⁸ 'Documents and Publications of the Communist Party of the Philippines' BANNEDTHOUGHT.NET, last modified June 21, 2022, www.bannedthought.net/Philippines/CPP/index.htm

The Thematic Landscape of Ang Bayan Denunciations

Initial Findings

Through a close reading of all available issues of Ang Bayan from the beginning of 2015 to the present, I encountered four repeated themes in CPP denunciations. These were Domestic Political denunciations, Economic denunciations, International denunciations, and denunciations of historic crimes.

Domestic Political denunciations discuss intrusions by the American and Chinese governments upon the Philippine political sphere. This would include violations of Philippine national waters, the presence of the military of either nation within the state, and the use of great power influence upon the government of the Philippines.

Economic denunciations relate to the use and abuse of economic power within the Philippines. This can be expressed through critique of unequal trade policies, the abuse of companies run from the United States or the PRC, and allegations of corruption stemming from the economic power of either country.

International denunciations refer to critiques of the actions of either state outside of the borders of the Philippines. While Ang Bayan is primarily intended for a domestic audience, it

does include coverage of what it considers to be the oppression carried out by both states in their roles as imperial powers, both against other nations and their own people.

Denunciations of historic crimes are centred, perhaps obviously, around past actions by either nation that Ang Bayan disapproves of. For the PRC this mainly revolves around their abandonment, in the eyes of Ang Bayan and the CPP, of socialism and surrender to bourgeois rule. For America, this can refer to anything from the initial conquest of the Philippines by US forces, to American support for the Marcos dictatorship.

Throughout the course of the seven and a half years of publications, these four themes were how anger at America and the PRC were expressed. However, not all were equally used. As might be expected, some modes of attack were more popular than others. The average use of different themes varies wildly. As can be seen in Fig. 1, more than half of the total denunciations of America in Ang Bayan relate to their involvement in the domestic politics of the Philippines. Second to that is their actions internationally, as Ang Bayan




Fig. 1 Denunciations of America in Ang Bayan, sorted by theme, 2015-Present

frequently condemns what it sees as America’s oppressive actions outside the Philippines. This includes their occupation of Afghanistan.⁴⁹ After that, comes criticisms on economic grounds. The least frequently utilised denunciation, although still a statistically significant category, is historic crimes. This clearly reflects the focus of Ang Bayan with regards to America, with the primary ire of the publication and the organisation it represents being focussed upon the political domination of the Philippines by the United States. A very different picture emerges from denunciations of China.

When denouncing America, more than half of the total denunciations are made in relation to domestic actions, with almost a hundred and fifty more denunciations than second place, international actions. However, when Ang Bayan denounces the PRC, not only does




Fig. 2 Denunciations of the People’s Republic of China in Ang Bayan, sorted by theme 2015-Present

⁴⁹ “US driven out of Afghanistan, Taliban retakes power” *Ang Bayan*, February 7, 2022, p. 10

domestic critique not predominate, it is not even the most popular theme, as can be seen in Fig 2. Instead, it is denunciations on economic grounds that are most common, moving from third in American denunciations to first in discussions of the PRC. While domestic denunciations are only slightly behind, denunciations on international grounds have fallen from second to third, barely ahead of historic denunciations. Even more dramatically, it has gone from making up around 38% of all denunciations to only around 7%. One key reason for this is the geographic relationship between the Philippines and the PRC, that being that they are close neighbours, far closer to each other than the Philippines is to the United States. This means that expansionist actions by the PRC often affect the Philippines. When the United States acts in what Ang Bayan and the CPP considers to be an imperialist manner, these acts take place all across the globe, leading to denunciation within the international theme. However, Chinese expansionism leads to “the rights of Filipinos to the West Philippine Sea” being violated, amongst other perceived indignities, leading to condemnation being expressed as a part of the domestic theme instead.⁵⁰

Chinese Economic Influence

With this in mind, why does the domestic denunciation theme not dominate in discussions of the PRC the way that it does in discussions of the United States? One key reason for this is the differing way in which American and PRC influence is depicted in Ang Bayan. In discussing the PRC, economic influence is paramount. Chinese “monopolist capitalism” and “imperialist aggression” are closely associated, suggesting that Chinese influence is backed

⁵⁰ ‘United People’s SONA against the national traitor’, *Ang Bayan*, August 7, 2019, p. 8

up by economic coercion.⁵¹ Imperialism is performed through “contracts”.⁵² This means that often when Chinese violations of the sovereignty of the Philippines is discussed, it is twinned with a suggestion that this is allowed due to the adverse influence of PRC loans and business deals. In combination with denunciations of unequal trade relations with the PRC and the actions of PRC owned and operated businesses within the country, this makes the economic denunciation theme the most popular one when discussing the PRC.

The Hyphenated Regime

One key reason for the tendency of denunciations of the United States to focus on the domestic theme is what I have termed the “hyphenated regime” phenomenon. This refers to the tendency of Ang Bayan to refer to the Philippine government as the US-X regime, X standing in for the president at the time. This means that even when there are events that the United States has no overtly recognised roll in, they are still denounced. This terminology has been a constant across governments. They have referred to the government of Benigno Aquino III in this manner.⁵³ They have referred to the government of Rodrigo Duterte in this way.⁵⁴ And most recently they have referred to the new government of Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr in this way.⁵⁵ The addition of the US hyphen acts essentially as an intensifier, adding additional vitriol to any denunciation of whatever action by whatever government is under discussion. While this terminology is not

⁵¹ “The face of capitalism in China” *Ang Bayan*, October 7 2019, p. 6

⁵² “Repudiate deception and oppression” *Ang Bayan*, October 7 2019, p. 2

⁵³ “Close ranks and mount protests to jolt the US-Aquino regime” *Ang Bayan*, January 7, 2015, p. 1

⁵⁴ “End Duterte's terror in Negros & across the country” *Ang Bayan*, August 2, 2017, p. 2

⁵⁵ “Strive for greater unity to fight the US-Marcos regime II” *Ang Bayan*, May 21, 2022, p. 1

used constantly, and in fact there are some issues where the “regime” is referred to repeatedly without the US hyphen, it is used commonly enough to be worth discussing.

This phrase is a very revealing one, as it shines a light on what it is that drives so much hostility from Ang Bayan and the CPP towards the United States. It shows how closely associated the government of the Philippines and the United States are in the minds of these insurgents. Because of this, whenever the AFP launches an offensive, or the national government endorses a new measure to counteract them, there is an understanding that the United States is complicit in, supporting, or even directing these efforts against them.

The consistency of the phrase is also telling. Ang Bayan is, after all, a propaganda magazine, dealing as much in self-depiction as self-perception. That over seven and a half years this terminology has remained in use implies that to at least a section of the Philippines population, it is an effective tactic, or at least not so ineffective that its use has ceased.

Periodisation of Ang Bayan Denunciations

Having learned what can be learnt from treating the data as a single bloc, it is now time to address it temporally. That is, to observe how the data changes over time. I have identified four distinct periods in the data. The first, from January 7th 2015 to May 7th 2016, covers the final months of the presidency of Benigno Aquino III. The second, from May 21st 2016 to June 1st 2017, covers the beginning of Rodrigo Duterte's rule over the Philippines until his declaration of Martial Law in Mindanao and attacks on the city of Marawi. The third, and longest, covers the remainder of Duterte's presidency, from June 21st 2017 to May 7th 2022. The final, shortest period, from May 21st 2022 to the present, covers the beginnings of the Presidency of Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos Jr.

The first period is marked by how overwhelmingly anti-American it is. In 36 issues, the PRC is only mentioned unfavourably in eight of them. When the PRC is mentioned, it is generally as a result of their own actions rather than any allegation of collusion between their government and that of the Philippines. On the other hand, not a single issue lacks a denunciation of the United States in one way or another. This is perhaps natural. This period begins with the so called "Mamasapano operation". While targeting the MILF rather than the CPP, the operation, which resulted in numerous casualties amongst militants, government forces, and civilians, still led to a great deal of criticism. The issue alleging "direct responsibility of Benigno Aquino III and US military officials" has the most articles

devoted to attacking the United States of any published in the period under discussion.⁵⁶

While this might seem odd, it is part of a pattern of supportive rhetoric for the Moro people and the MILF in particular throughout the period under discussion. As well as this, the shocking nature of the attack aroused a significant quantity of public discontent, which the CPP could attempt to capitalise upon. The other reason for the high quantity of anti-American rhetoric, and lack of focus upon the PRC, was that this period ends with the 2016 presidential election. The Ang Bayan line on the election was particularly critical of the incumbent Liberal Party, whose candidate, Mar Roxas, was thought to be the preferred candidate by the United States and its supporters in the country. This led to a great deal of anti-American sentiment, particularly on the domestic theme. Particularly prevalent was the idea that the United States would, somehow, steal the election for Roxas, as the CPP alleged they had for Aquino III before.⁵⁷ The defeat of Roxas at the polls, and the subsequent replacement of Aquino III by Duterte, began the next period.

The second period, from May 21st 2016 to June 7th 2017, is one of the most interesting for a number of reasons. It is the only period under discussion when the CPP had anything but an entirely negative relationship with the state, and an at times positive one with the government. These are two very different things, as while Ang Bayan and the CPP might be willing to give Duterte some support, they retained a profound distrust for the AFP, which they alleged to be under the control of “US advisers”, rather than the civilian government.⁵⁸ Despite their later hostility, in the opening days of his reign the CPP and Ang Bayan are

⁵⁶ “Intensify people's struggles in the face of the US-Aquino regime's political crisis” *Ang Bayan*, February 21, 2015 p. 1

⁵⁷ “Protests and mass struggles after 2016 elections” *Ang Bayan*, May 7, 2016, p. 1

⁵⁸ “Heighten the struggle against the more vicious Oplan Bayanihan” *Ang Bayan* November 7, 2016, p. 1

surprisingly positive about Duterte, who is seen as an anti-American figure. Readers of *Ang Bayan* are instructed not to fight against the government, but to “Advance the people's democratic revolution under the Duterte regime”.⁵⁹ Given that this is the case, it might seem likely that the level of hostility in *Ang Bayan* would drop. This is far from the case, however. This period contains some of the most sustained and intense hostility towards the American government. However, it is entirely separated from the government, the only time that this is the case. Not once is the phrase “the US-Duterte regime” used in this period. Duterte is instead understood to be someone who can be pushed by the pressure of the CPP, the NDFP, and *Ang Bayan* in a positive direction.⁶⁰ As it becomes more and more apparent that this is not the case, and that in fact the new government will remain in alignment with the United States, denunciations escalate, as targets such as the AFP and United States backed NGOs are blamed for obstructing Duterte’s agenda and turning him against the CPP.⁶¹ This is also the only period where the PRC is referred to in anything approaching a positive manner. While it is still held to be an imperialist regime, it is depicted as one in a position to help the Philippines, by providing Duterte a counter to US political and economic hegemony. This would allow Duterte, in a “patriotic alliance” with “national-democratic forces” to maintain an independent foreign policy and protect the sovereignty of the Philippines.⁶² As hostility grew between the CPP and the Duterte government, this positivity would soon be replaced by markedly more hostility than had been displayed before Duterte came to power.

⁵⁹ “Advance the people's democratic revolution under the Duterte regime”, *Ang Bayan* May 21, 2016, p. 1

⁶⁰ *Ibid*, p. 1

⁶¹ “Heighten the Struggle” p. 1, 5

⁶² “Tasks after 100 days under Duterte”, *Ang Bayan*, October 7th, 2016, pp. 1-2

The third and longest period under discussion is that from the disillusionment of the CPP and Ang Bayan with Duterte, and the end of his rule. This covers the period from June 21st 2017 to May 7th 2022. In this period, hostility towards the United States remains at, broadly speaking, the same rate. However, criticism has returned to being strongly linked to the government of the Philippines, rather than acting against it. It is at the beginning of this period that the first reference to the “US-Duterte regime” is recorded.⁶³ Having briefly flirted with other orientations, the government of the Philippines is, at least in the eyes of the CPP and Ang Bayan, as “US imperialism’s client state” once again.⁶⁴ What does change in this period is the attitude towards the PRC. It is this period that marks the real growth in hostility towards the PRC. Of the 98 total articles criticizing the PRC, 85 are written after hostilities resume between the CPP and the government of the Philippines. It is also in this period, in the August 7th 2019 issue of Ang Bayan, that we see the first ever case of an issue of Ang Bayan which condemns the PRC without any denunciations of the United States. Duterte’s friendship with the PRC, which had been a mark in his favour showing his commitment to an independent foreign policy, quickly became a negative. Rather than playing both countries against each other, now Duterte is held to have allowed the Philippines to become “a virtual playground” for “big power politics”.⁶⁵ Rather than cancelling each other out, the two compound each other. There is a clear attempt to depict critiques of both nations through a nationalist lens. Duterte is repeatedly criticised for refusing to defend the sovereignty of the Philippines against either the United States or the PRC. In one issue there would be an instruction for the people to “not rely on the United

⁶³ “Raise the militance against the US-Duterte regime” *Ang Bayan* August 7th, 2017 p. 1

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, p. 1

⁶⁵ “Resist US military domination and Chinese intrusions” *Ang Bayan* April 21st, 2019, p. 1

States to defend the Philippines” with the implication that the CPP should fill this role.⁶⁶ The next, the “national treachery” of Duterte for not defending against PRC incursions on the Philippines is denounced.⁶⁷ The defining statement of *Ang Bayan* on Duterte, summing up their opinion of his regime and of the two nations that supported him, is “Duterte is subservient to China and the US”. Published as a part of the June 21 2021 issue, it charges that Duterte has surrendered the naval sovereignty of the Philippines in return for Chinese loans, while at the same time allowing American forces and missiles to be stationed on the island in return for arms for the AFP.⁶⁸ Sovereignty is abandoned in both cases, by the Chinese in return for economic support, and by the Americans in return for military support.

There are two important events that occur in this period that bear further examination. One is the period from May 21st, 2020, to June 7th of the same year. In this time, there are no condemnations of America or the PRC on anything except their international actions. This is because this period marks the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic in the Philippines. That this period lacked any denunciations aside from the international actions of the United States shows two things. One, it reinforces the lessons learned from discussions of the hyphenated regime. That is, that frequently America is invoked and denounced less for its own sake than as an intensifier, designed to attract additional outrage towards the government of the Philippines. When another, greater force arises, like COVID-19, to fill this role, the invocation of America is no longer required. It is not a coincidence that the first issue to return to criticism of America within the domestic theme marks the beginning of the passage of the Anti-Terror Bill, aimed at suppressing the CPP. When military concerns

⁶⁶ “Do not rely on the US to defend the Philippines”—CPP “*Ang Bayan* April 21, 2021

⁶⁷ “Fight and make Duterte pay for national treachery” *Ang Bayan* May 7, 2021

⁶⁸ “Duterte is subservient to China and the US” *Ang Bayan* June 21, 2021, p. 4

are again paramount, discussion of the “US-Duterte regime” resumes.⁶⁹ The other lesson from this period can be found in the fact that denunciations of the actions of the United States outside of the Philippines continued. This reflects that, while the CPP may use the United States to stoke nationalist outrage, their own dislike is not purely nationalist in character. Even when COVID-19 was the dominant issue, critique of American actions outside their own country were still worthy of report and condemnation, even in their almost entirely domestically focussed magazine. While it may be cheap talk, it still reflects a genuine sentiment within the party. The other noticeable event was the election of Joe Biden as president of the United States. Given the CPP’s partial endorsement of Biden, and celebration at his victory, it might be thought that this would lead to a lowering of the hostility towards the United States. However, this was not the case. Perhaps warned by their last bout of enthusiasm towards and elected figure, Ang Bayan intensified its denunciations of the United States, critiquing them 14 times in the three months following his election, having done so 8 times in the three months prior.

The final, shortest, period, lasting from May 21st 2022 to July 21st of the same year, covers the presidency of “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. It is difficult to say anything about this period with certainty, due to its brevity. However, from what can be seen now, it appears that there is a broad continuity between the way in which depictions of both the United States and China from Duterte to Marcos Jr. This should not come as a surprise, as Ang Bayan has stressed the continuity between the two rulers, referring to the “Marcos-Duterte clique” and depicting the diminutive Marcos Jr. sat upon a throne of skulls, with the heads of Duterte

⁶⁹ “Unite against the Anti-Terror Bill! Overthrow the US-Duterte regime!” *Ang Bayan*, June 7 2020, p. 1

and his father flanking him.⁷⁰ With this in mind a maintenance of the status quo in terms of denunciations, with 18 denunciations of the United States and 6 of the PRC, should be expected. The only area where a change can be seen is regarding the use of the historic crimes theme. More than half of the issues since Marcos Jr.'s victory have referred to the historic crimes of the United States. These take the form of references to the original Marcos, critiquing both him and the United States for their complicity in actions taken against the people of the Philippines, such as "The Coco Levy Fund swindle" which crippled the income of many farmers.⁷¹ It is clear that the CPP and Ang Bayan see referring back to the crimes of Marcos Jr.'s father, and the United States' culpability in those crimes, as an effective propaganda tool.

⁷⁰ "Strive for greater unity to fight the US-Marcos regime II" *Ang Bayan*, May 21st 2022, p. 1

⁷¹ "The Coco Levy Fund swindle" *Ang Bayan*, July 21st 2022, p. 7

Conclusion

This research has shown the ways in which Ang Bayan's denunciations have both remained constant and varied over time. The same themes of denunciations have appeared over and over again. Historic Crimes, Economics, Domestic, and International. Anger at either country is expressed within these themes. However, at different times, different themes have dominated discussion, or have been deemphasised. There is clearly a level of self-depiction present within how these themes are used. At different times it is advantageous to deploy different themes, in order to shape narratives around the organisation and its enemies. This analysis has revealed that there have been four key phases where different themes prevailed. First were the Aquino years, where almost exclusively anti-American themes were used. Then the first period of the Duterte regime, where anti-American themes, particularly relating to domestic denunciations, were deployed to support, rather than oppose, the regime, and even some pro-PRC sentiment was allowed. After this came the main period of rule by Duterte, where the use of anti-PRC themes, particularly related to their economic actions, rose enormously. Finally, the for now brief Marcos Jr. rule has been a continuation of Duterte's with the exception of increasing reference to the historic crimes of the United States against the Philippines.

What this analysis has also shown is how different themes predominate in discussions of the two nations. While the United States is primarily associated in denunciations with domestic authoritarianism and military support for the government, this is not the case for the PRC. While its violations of the sovereignty of the Philippines is critiqued, the main theme utilised

to denounce it is its economic role in the Philippines, as a corruptor and swindler, providing monetary support for the ruling regime.

Overall, one of the theses with which I opened this essay is clearly incorrect. Following the loss of the election by Donald Trump, and Joe Biden's ascension to the White House, there has not been an increase in pro-American discussion in Ang Bayan. There has not even been a fall in anti-American discussions. However, the second thesis has been proven correct. It is clear that over the last seven and a half years there has been a noticeable increase in hostility towards the PRC. If this trend continues, and there is no reason to suggest that it should not, it is very possible that, without growing to hate the United States any less, the CPP may grow to hate the PRC more. Through maintaining and expanding this study, both academia and the United States as a whole will be better able to observe this phenomenon, and react accordingly.

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Appendix:

Included here is the raw data set, for replication.

Date Published	Historic Crimes	Anti-American Articles		International
		Economic	Domestic	
Jan 7, 2015	1	0	1	0
Jan 21, 2015	2	2	1	1
Feb 7, 2015	0	0	1	3
Feb 21 2015	0	1	5	0
Jun 1 2015	0	1	3	0
Jun 21 2015	0	1	3	0
Jul 7 2015	0	1	1	2
Jul 21 2015	0	0	3	1
Aug 7 2015	0	1	4	0
Aug 21 2015	0	0	1	1
Sep 7 2015	0	0	2	1
Sep 21 2015	0	1	3	1
Oct 7 2015	0	3	0	1
Oct 21 2015	0	1	3	4
Nov 7 2015	0	1	0	1
Nov 21 2015	0	1	1	1
Dec 7 2015	0	0	2	2
Dec 21 2015	0	0	2	1
Jan 7, 2016	0	1	1	0
Jan 21, 2016	0	0	4	1
Feb 7, 2016	2	0	3	1
Feb 21 2016	1	1	3	2
Mar 7 2016	0	1	2	2
Mar 21 2016	0	0	2	0

Apr 7 2016	0	0	2	0
Apr 21 2016	0	0	2	0
May 7 2016	0	1	1	1
May 21 2016	0	3	1	0
Jun 7 2016	0	0	1	0
Jun 21 2016	1	1	2	1
Jul 7 2016	0	0	1	1
Aug 7 2016	0	0	1	0
Aug 21 2016	0	0	1	0
Sep 7 2016	0	0	0	0
Sep 21 2016	0	0	3	0
Oct 7 2016	2	0	2	0
Oct 21 2016	0	1	4	1
Nov 7 2016	1	0	4	0
Nov 21 2016	0	0	4	0
Dec 7 2016	0	1	3	1
Dec 21 2016	0	0	1	0
Jan 7, 2017	0	0	0	0
Feb 7, 2017	0	0	1	0
Feb 21 2017	0	0	1	1
Mar 7 2017	0	1	1	0
Mar 21 2017	0	0	0	0
Apr 7 2017	0	0	1	0
Apr 21 2017	0	0	1	1
May 7 2017	1	0	0	0
May 21 2017	0	2	2	0
Jun 1 2017	0	0	0	0

Jun 21 2017	0	0	2	0
Jul 7 2017	0	2	4	1
Jul 21 2017	0	0	1	0
Aug 7 2017	0	1	3	1
Aug 21 2017	0	0	4	0
Sep 7 2017	0	0	2	0
Sep 21 2017	1	3	3	0
Oct 7 2017	0	0	2	0
Oct 21 2017	0	1	1	0
Nov 7 2017	0	1	3	0
Nov 21 2017	0	0	2	0
Dec 7 2017	0	0	3	0
Dec 21 2017	0	1	3	0
Jan 7, 2018	0	0	2	0
Jan 21, 2018	0	0	3	0
Feb 7, 2018	0	1	3	0
Mar 21 2018	0	0	2	0
Apr 7 2018	0	0	3	0
Apr 21 2018	0	0	3	1
May 7 2018	0	0	2	0
May 21 2018	0	0	2	2
Jun 7 2018	0	1	1	0
Jun 21 2018	0	1	1	0
Jul 21 2018	0	0	1	1
Sep 7 2018	0	1	1	0
Sep 21 2018	1	2	3	0
Oct 21 2018	0	1	4	0
Nov 7 2018	0	0	2	0
Nov 21 2018	0	1	1	0

Dec 7 2018	0	0	2	0
Dec 21 2018	0	0	1	1
Jan 21, 2019	0	0	2	0
Feb 7, 2019	0	0	2	0
Feb 21 2019	0	1	1	1
Mar 7 2019	0	0	1	1
Apr 7 2019	0	0	3	0
Apr 21 2019	1	1	4	0
May 21 2019	1	0	2	0
Jun 7 2019	0	0	1	0
Jun 21 2019	0	0	1	0
Jul 7 2019	0	0	1	3
Jul 21 2019	1	1	3	0
Aug 7 2019	0	0	0	0
Aug 21 2019	0	0	1	0
Sep 7 2019	1	0	0	1
Sep 21 2019	0	0	1	1
Oct 7 2019	0	0	0	0
Oct 21 2019	0	0	1	1
Nov 7 2019	0	0	2	0
Feb 7, 2020	0	1	1	0
Mar 21 2020	0	0	0	0
Apr 7 2020	0	0	0	1
Apr 21 2020	0	0	0	0
May 7 2020	0	0	0	2
May 21 2020	0	0	0	0
Jun 7 2020	0	0	2	1
Jun 21 2020	0	0	1	1

Jul 7 2020	0	1	2	2
Jul 21 2020	0	0	1	0
Aug 7 2020	0	1	0	1
Aug 21 2020	0	0	0	1
Sep 7 2020	0	0	1	1
Sep 21 2020	1	0	1	0
Oct 7 2020	0	0	0	1
Oct 21 2020	0	1	0	3
Nov 7 2020	0	0	0	2
Nov 21 2020	0	0	0	1
Dec 7 2020	0	0	2	0
Dec 21 2020	0	0	1	1
Jan 7, 2021	0	0	1	0
Jan 21, 2021	0	0	1	0
Feb 7, 2021	0	0	0	1
Feb 21 2021	0	0	2	1
Mar 7, 2021	0	0	0	2
Mar 21 2021	0	1	1	1
Apr 7 2021	0	0	2	0
Apr 21 2021	1	0	2	1
May 7 2021	0	0	0	0
May 21 2021	1	0	1	1
Jun 7 2021	0	0	1	1
Jun 21 2021	1	0	2	0
Jul 7 2021	0	0	1	0
Jul 21 2021	0	1	0	0
Aug 7 2021	0	0	2	0
Aug 21 2021	0	0	1	1
Sep 7 2021	0	0	0	0

Sep 21 2021	1	0	1	1
Oct 7 2021	0	0	1	0
Oct 21 2021	0	0	0	0
Nov 7 2021	0	1	2	0
Nov 21 2021	0	0	1	1
Dec 7 2021	1	0	0	1
Dec 21 2021	0	0	0	2
Jan 7, 2022	0	0	1	1
Jan 21, 2022	0	1	1	0
Feb 7, 2022	0	1	2	0
Feb 21 2022	0	0	0	1
Mar 7, 2022	1	0	0	1
Mar 21 2022	1	0	0	0
Apr 7 2022	0	1	2	0
Apr 21 2022	0	0	1	0
May 7 2022	0	0	1	0
May 21 2022	0	0	1	1
Jun 7 2022	0	2	0	1
Jun 21 2022	1	2	1	0
Jul 7 2022	1	2	0	2
Jul 21 2022	1	1	1	1

Date Published	Historic Crimes	Anti-PRC Articles		
		Economic	Domestic	International
Jan 7, 2015	0	0	0	0
Jan 21, 2015	0	0	0	0
Feb 7, 2015	0	0	0	0
Feb 21 2015	0	0	0	0
Jun 1 2015	0	0	0	0
Jun 21 2015	0	0	1	0
Jul 7 2015	0	0	0	1
Jul 21 2015	0	0	1	0
Aug 7 2015	0	0	0	0
Aug 21 2015	0	0	0	0
Sep 7 2015	0	0	0	0
Sep 21 2015	0	0	0	1
Oct 7 2015	0	0	1	1
Oct 21 2015	0	0	0	0
Nov 7 2015	0	0	0	0
Nov 21 2015	0	0	0	0
Dec 7 2015	0	0	0	0
Dec 21 2015	0	0	0	0
Jan 7, 2016	0	0	1	0
Jan 21, 2016	0	0	1	0
Feb 7, 2016	0	0	0	1
Feb 21 2016	0	0	0	0
Mar 7 2016	0	0	0	0
Mar 21 2016	0	0	0	0
Apr 7 2016	0	0	0	0
Apr 21 2016	0	0	0	0
May 7 2016	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0

May 21 2016				
Jun 7 2016	0	0	0	0
Jun 21 2016	0	0	0	0
Jul 7 2016	0	0	0	0
Aug 7 2016	0	0	0	0
Aug 21 2016	0	0	0	0
Sep 7 2016	0	0	0	0
Sep 21 2016	0	1	0	0
Oct 7 2016	0	0	0	0
Oct 21 2016	0	1	0	0
Nov 7 2016	0	0	0	0
Nov 21 2016	0	0	0	0
Dec 7 2016	0	0	0	0
Dec 21 2016	0	0	0	0
Jan 7, 2017	0	0	0	0
Feb 7, 2017	0	0	0	0
Feb 21 2017	0	0	0	0
Mar 7 2017	0	0	0	0
Mar 21 2017	0	0	0	0
Apr 7 2017	0	0	0	0
Apr 21 2017	0	0	0	0
May 7 2017	0	0	0	0
May 21 2017	2	1	0	0
Jun 1 2017	0	0	0	0
Jun 21 2017	2	1	0	0
Jul 7 2017	0	0	0	0
Jul 21 2017	0	0	0	0
Aug 7 2017	0	0	0	1
Aug 21 2017	0	0	0	0

Sep 7 2017	0	0	0	0
Sep 21 2017	0	0	0	0
Oct 7 2017	0	0	0	0
Oct 21 2017	0	1	0	0
Nov 7 2017	0	0	0	0
Nov 21 2017	0	0	0	0
Dec 7 2017	0	0	0	0
Dec 21 2017	0	0	0	0
Jan 7, 2018	0	0	0	0
Jan 21, 2018	0	0	0	0
Feb 7, 2018	0	1	1	0
Mar 21 2018	0	0	0	0
Apr 7 2018	0	0	0	0
Apr 21 2018	0	1	0	0
May 7 2018	0	0	0	0
May 21 2018	0	0	1	0
Jun 7 2018	0	1	0	0
Jun 21 2018	0	0	0	0
Jul 21 2018	0	0	0	0
Sep 7 2018	0	0	0	0
Sep 21 2018	0	0	0	0
Oct 21 2018	0	0	0	0
Nov 7 2018	0	0	0	0
Nov 21 2018	0	2	2	0
Dec 7 2018	0	0	0	0
Dec 21 2018	0	0	0	0
Jan 21, 2019	0	0	0	0
Feb 7, 2019	0	0	0	0
Feb 21 2019	0	1	0	0
Mar 7 2019	0	0	0	0

Apr 7 2019	0	1	0	0
Apr 21 2019	0	3	3	0
May 21 2019	0	0	0	0
Jun 7 2019	0	0	0	0
Jun 21 2019	0	1	1	0
Jul 7 2019	0	1	2	0
Jul 21 2019	0	1	1	0
Aug 7 2019	0	1	2	0
Aug 21 2019	0	0	0	1
Sep 7 2019	0	0	0	0
Sep 21 2019	0	1	1	0
Oct 7 2019	0	1	1	0
Oct 21 2019	0	0	0	0
Nov 7 2019	0	0	0	0
Feb 7, 2020	0	0	0	0
Mar 21 2020	0	0	0	0
Apr 7 2020	0	0	0	0
Apr 21 2020	0	0	0	0
May 7 2020	0	0	0	0
May 21 2020	0	0	0	0
Jun 7 2020	0	0	0	0
Jun 21 2020	0	0	1	0
Jul 7 2020	0	1	2	0
Jul 21 2020	0	0	0	0
Aug 7 2020	0	1	0	0
Aug 21 2020	0	0	0	0
Sep 7 2020	0	2	1	0
Sep 21 2020	0	0	0	0
Oct 7 2020	0	0	0	0

Oct 21 2020	0	0	0	0
Nov 7 2020	0	0	0	0
Nov 21 2020	0	0	0	0
Dec 7 2020	0	0	0	0
Dec 21 2020	0	0	0	0
Jan 7, 2021	0	0	0	0
Jan 21, 2021	0	0	0	0
Feb 7, 2021	0	1	1	0
Feb 21 2021	0	1	1	0
Mar 7, 2021	0	0	0	1
Mar 21 2021	0	0	0	0
Apr 7 2021	0	0	1	0
Apr 21 2021	0	0	1	0
May 7 2021	0	1	1	0
May 21 2021	0	0	1	0
Jun 7 2021	0	1	2	0
Jun 21 2021	0	4	2	0
Jul 7 2021	0	1	1	0
Jul 21 2021	1	1	0	0
Aug 7 2021	0	0	0	0
Aug 21 2021	0	0	0	0
Sep 7 2021	0	1	0	0
Sep 21 2021	0	0	0	0
Oct 7 2021	0	0	0	0
Oct 21 2021	0	1	0	0
Nov 7 2021	0	1	0	0
Nov 21 2021	0	1	0	0
Dec 7 2021	0	0	0	0
Dec 21 2021	0	0	0	0
Jan 7, 2022	0	0	0	0

Jan 21, 2022	0	1	0	0
Feb 7, 2022	0	1	0	0
Feb 21 2022	0	2	0	0
Mar 7, 2022	0	0	0	0
Mar 21 2022	0	0	0	0
Apr 7 2022	0	0	1	0
Apr 21 2022	0	0	0	0
May 7 2022	0	0	1	0
May 21 2022	0	0	0	0
Jun 7 2022	0	1	0	0
Jun 21 2022	0	2	1	0
Jul 7 2022	0	0	1	0
Jul 21 2022	0	0	1	0