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Unrighteous Mammon &
the Death of Leviathan

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Abstract – Hegemony of Suspense

From Yao Lin's critique of Chinese market intellectuals', to Breuer & Johnston's description of the Sino-US relations insecurity spiral, to the death knells of political ideologues, Incels, mass shooters, and culture wars online in fringe spaces, even to the rhetoric of academia, in simplistic hypothesis testing, failing to induce, failing to be creative, the digital era is a "schizoid function" which validates users' ego to the extent of whatever stake they put into myriad platforms. Users narratives' always grow dense, and occupy a hypercharged position in the conduit of American politics; where potential capital is the alt-Right or fringe, who has the motivation to evolve the regnant memes of the contemporary, post-modern, liberal world. The difference between Fringe and Mainstream? Breuer & Johnston ask, "could the so called US-dominated liberal world order be in decline?" Fringe, alt-Right, existential, and Traditionalist ideologues inherently believe yes, mainstream liberalism, no. It is an inverted space: as AH Stuart proposes, users more likely to engage in such binary discourse are nihilistic, egoistical, and motivate massive amounts of potential capital, implying van Ginneken's 2013 conjecture: digital spaces are apogenetic, and cultures, like the US, in endemic decline always irrationally evolve regnant dogma. The digital space is inherently "degenerate", to borrow the alt-Right's own logic. Ergo, Leviathan is too patrician to inherit the vulgar dialect of digital era statecraft, because statecraft inherits the fringe actors of the "schizoid" space (Harris 1995); where each actor intrinsically must offload their fears and distrust of the world itself (ie. Kruger 2021) and justify it under the iconoclasm of politics.

Introduction – the Map is Political Capital




Fig 1. 2-8, respectively, Leftism : {Progressive, left, democrat, apathy, conservative, right, Nationalist}. From the perspective of Traditionalism, all is “Left”. Liberalism is the metaphysical space (i.e. the liberal meme), and a political value describing inert, unmotivated, arbitrary object in political stratum, ie, roads, utilities, or lay voters. The ontological range of politics in the West is liberal politics, and all this space is either “Left” or “Right”. The more fringe, sensational, or further from the Leftist ideal (ie., “agreeable”, polite, mainstream, positivist rhetoric), the more capital it has, ie., the more substantively it influences a subject’s perception of culture, the more Right it is online.

When Mearsheimer 2018 decries liberalism as a delusion, he implies the scandal of capital’s simulation¹, critiquing the fabric of post-modern culture as a whole², occupying “the same deterministic & moralistic position as” nationalist and fringe influencers³, “purging and reviving

¹ Mearsheimer “denounces this relation of [capital’s] force as itself a scandal”, but “Power is unjust, its justice is a class justice, capital exploits us, etc.” (JB 1983), i.e., what the liberal world simulates, and therefore increasingly lacks, is any moral framework to capital’s particular purpose. This is to mean, the implications of society in decline do not reach the public until many generations after its’ decline, as, caught within the dissimulating conduit of capital’s decay, the heightening of “totalitarian affinities” online through “beacons” (Yao Lin 2021), is only totally indicative of civic collapse in retrospect. Capital’s greatest delusion is to insist any capital remains for future generations, not that it is thriftlessly spent now.

² Liberalism is not so much a political ideology but the regnant narratives, memes, and concepts which are the ontological fabric of liberal society itself. All Americans are liberal in the same sense all Chinese are Marxists, as it is an inherent *a priori* of being of that nation-state.

³ “Bowling Alone” Putnam 2000 vs e.g. AH Clark 2018 “Rethinking the decline in social capital”; + IT Thomson 2005 “the theory won’t die” yet this thesis considers the quandary not even from the Realist or influencer stance, but among the public themselves. Clark essentially uses Realist

moral order”, but any justification of a narrative explaining Neoliberalism- and it’s endemic decline- explains what is already inferred by many Americans in the public: “the US world order is collapsing”. Many of the pronouncements of this decline will entirely be the result of how the public engages with this mood.

The unmasking of liberal capital is “only the formula of ideology” (Jean Baudrillard 1983); “vague concepts will not take us very far... we see the inescapable need for theory” (Mearsheimer & Walt 2013). Yet the vagueness of capital’s cruelty is all Existentialism may induce for sure. When Realists pronounce the dynamic of liberal capital’s dissolution as scandal, decrying the decline and fall of America as Rome, “the [true] symbolic violence of the social order is engendered... all capital asks of [realism] is to receive it as rational” (JB 1983)⁴. To Realists, the liberal meme is the ontological fabric of America. The liberal meme is ‘attached at the hip’ to all edifices, cultural dynamics, institutionalism, media-public interaction, etc.; it is the most dominant meme of American political culture. The interaction of any objects in political reality is defined adequality through capital dynamics⁵. Liberal also represents a political value, *itself* mere reference to the liberal meme’s pre-eminence; what is liberal is inert, lumpen, and fully manifestable to the whims of the two symbols, which dictate capital, both political and cultural (for culture inherits economy and market), which is Progress and Tradition, in prescient political thought, Left and Right, an ethical, not ontological difference. The liberal meme is the ontological dynamic of American capital- an image of culture at any time- the iconoclast

logic to disprove a folk-realist “conspiracy” theory, failing to induce that, among the public, any conspiracy can be taken as “real”, which is irrational, but rational within their bounds. In terms of influencers, see D McCann 2017 “Alt-Right v Alt-Left” “Paul Watson”.

⁴ “Watergate is not a scandal: this is what must be said at all cost, for this is what everyone is concerned to conceal, this dissimulation masking a strengthening of morality, a moral panic as we approach the primal (mise en) scene of capital: its instantaneous cruelty, its incomprehensible ferocity, its fundamental immorality...” (JB 1983).

⁵ Bourdieu 1983, “The specific character of every relation of force is to dissimulate itself as such, and to acquire all its force only because it is so dissimulated”.

snapshot- in which the *existential thing itself*, ie., political, social, and economic capital, for each self storyline⁶, unfolds.

In “Enlightened” (i.e., Realist) thought, it is the public, never capital, which is irrational, though from the endemic critique, if liberal capital were rational, it would not decline; yet this view itself is vain, for capital is not a meme, but the dynamic of memes’ interaction. From the perspective of capital, both the public and the Realists are “irrational”⁷, by basing the political spectrum by one’s distance to capital. Capital is equivalent to the word meme’s truest implication- *dynamic*- the symbolic form of object’s interaction, the function of “every relation of force” rather than the practical difference between Left and Right. Liberalism is the ultimate rallying cry of the Leftist publicum; the individualistic form of all citizens merging in particularist goal on a national stage- “the liberal ideal”- utopia. Adam Smith’s dream: selfish capital forging in constructivist entity. To the fringe Existentialists, anyone who still has any hope or regard for society is Leftist. Ergo, anything in the ontological fabric, within the liberal meme, is Leftist. The Left justifies capital in culture, implying the outcome of capital can be put to beneficial usage- an “ontological advancement”.


Baudrillard goes further- “Before, [capital’s] task was to dissimulate scandal⁸; today the task is to conceal that there is none”. The “scandal” of liberalism is its’ inevitable decay, which does not vex the Realist, but ideologues and the fringe of the public, who continue to rhetorize about “if” and “whether” America is in decline on social media, whereas Realism induces *it has*. Fringe culture, especially among the alt-Right, takes a visceral form of game theorizing, attributing the

⁶ (Krebs 2015 *Narrative and the Making*)

⁷ In that, the public must suffer the outcome of liberal capital’s growth and decline as much as academics, implying they are equally as “irrational” in inducing the outcome of capital’s storyline as the Realists, though Realists use much less biased deductive logic.

⁸ I.e., to be put to constructivist (though deontologically dubious) use by political-elite.

fault of liberalism's decay to vague concepts as "Jews" or "Other" (e.g.)⁹. As the cycle of Neoliberalism declines, folk-realists, as on the anonymous social media 4chan /pol/, mythologizing the decline of liberalism as cargo-cult worshipers¹⁰, come to the same, independent theory of liberal capital as Realists. Baudrillard opines, "Capital in fact has never been linked by a contract to the society it dominates. It is a sorcery of the social relation; it is a challenge to society and should be responded to as such. It is not a scandal to be denounced according to moral and economic rationality, but a challenge to take up according to symbolic law".



The public is apogenetic¹¹ online. Demonstrably, nuance and rationality are shed from public engagements, and Kertzer muses "IR scholars have long wondered whether the public is totally devoid of rationality altogether"¹². As Del Vicario 2015 + 2016¹³

shows, conspiracy narratives grow and spread exponentially more than lay narratives, implying the "head space" of individuals who cleave to conspiracy narratives is, likewise, more detailed, self-justifying, and "schizoid"¹⁴, giving folk-realists the pretense of realism, but the whole of the narratives' sum is irrational. Users rarely share memes or narratives outside of isolate social

⁹ ((They)) rule: nebulous othering tuters.

¹⁰ H Choi 2015 "cargo cult theory of consumption" ir Kruger 2021 "marketization"; Hagan 2020 : ie., 4chan /pol/ users take any objective external phenomenon (e.g. the Covid pandemic) and weave it into a self-justifying narrative, ie., the New World Order is trying to take over the world, and Covid is a ploy to steal civil liberties and impose totalitarian controls. To the psychoanalysts, such narratives may be viewed as a projection of their own "totalitarian affinities" (Yao Lin 2021), which is really just a value of the fringe in general.

¹¹ Self-defeating in the selection of best traits.

¹² JD Kertzer 2012 "Folk Realism: testing the microfoundation..."

¹³ Del Vicario, Michela, Alessandro Bessi, Fabiana Zollo, Fabio Petroni, Antonio Scala, Guido Caldarelli, H. Eugene Stanley, and Walter Quattrociocchi. "The spreading of misinformation online." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 113, no. 3 (2016): 554-559.

¹⁴ Paul Harris "schizoid space", ie., a form of being where there is no discrete essence, merely the dynamic of objects dissimulating and simulating, the dynamic of capital transforming itself in the subject. As Kruger 2021 implies, users quite literally cognitively become their association to capital.

media networks, with the exception of alt-Right and fringe content which tear through the lay masses on Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, or 4chan, implying, ultimately, the more “irrational” a meme is, the more dominantly it spreads online. The public increasingly constructs “ontologically distinct lifeworlds”- totally different perceptions of culture- which have the potential to “metamorphosize”¹⁵ an individual’s relationship to capital, and ideologues; for memes, narratives, and the stream of liquid consciousness fashioned therefrom online for each self¹⁶, are as inducing for each self as sex, memes, or drugs¹⁷. Kertzer declaims, “despite the tendency for realists to portray their body of works as the descendants of an unbroken tradition... contemporary realism comes in so many variations that critics have questioned whether it still makes sense to use the term” (Kertzer 2012).

Realism, then, is founded on the unreal belief that capital dynamics may find moral equivalence in the micro foundations of culture¹⁸, yet the public is uncoupled from the microfoundations of culture itself; the roots of micro foundations are irrational online; in a society where capital¹⁹ exponentially decays, this takes a totalitarian and rhetorical quality, both because the total sum of capital to be spent in political culture has decreased substantively, and because the quality of

¹⁵ Lin, Yao. "Beaconism and the Trumpian metamorphosis of Chinese liberal intellectuals." *Journal of Contemporary China* 30, no. 127 (2021): 85-101.

¹⁶ Breuer, Adam, and Alastair Iain Johnston. "Memes, narratives and the emergent US–China security dilemma." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 32, no. 4 (2019): 429-455. “self/other” dynamics.


¹⁷ Henson, H. Keith. "Sex, Drugs, and Cults. An evolutionary psychology perspective on why and how cult memes get a drug-like hold on people, and what might be done to mitigate the effects." *The Human Nature Review* 2 (2002): 343-355.

¹⁸ I.e., academia, who retroactively deduces about culture, induces the public does this as well, when in fact this is the opposite, for it is the public’s dynamic which induces change in culture. Rather, it is the dynamic of affordance between these two thoughts which is the dynamic of “enlightened” thought.

¹⁹ Capital is a tricky concept, for here it represents the voltage of the circuit as much as the amperage. In this thesis, capital is only used to refer to the amperage of the political circuit (i.e., the dynamic of capital through culture), whereas accumulated capital, or voltage, is always referred to as “sensationalism”, because, this thesis offers, sensationalism is increasingly mistaken in Western political culture for the quality of a meme. The more a meme engenders an individual from mainstream, the more voltage it has, and the more it ingratiates itself in post-modern, liberal society.

critique itself is much too reduced to equate where, for decades prior, memes of much lesser quality motivated substantively higher amounts of capital²⁰. The *fabric of liberalism itself* is dissimulating.

All the public may ever do is evolve the liberal meme's dissimulation; "capital doesn't give a damn about the idea of the social contract that is imputed to it... rather, it is "enlightened" thought which seeks to control²¹ capital by imposing rules on it... it is the Left who holds out the



mirror of equivalence, hoping that capital will fall for the phantasmagoria of the social contract... no need for revolution; it is enough that capital accept the rational formula of exchange" (JB 1983). To Baudrillard and the Existentialists, what is

"Leftist" is anything which equates a moral contract to capital, a positivist fault of conservatives as much as liberals. By this calculation, even libertarians are "Leftist", because they apply the hope of a new social contract unto capital, failing to induce that, because of capital's cruelty, their ontologically distinct lifeworld, a unique vision of politics, will be succored from the mainstream²².

²⁰ i.e., political-elite shortcomings at all hierarchies, "passing the buck", must be viewed as an endemic, as much as intrinsic, fault of liberalism's decline, i.e., it is an a priori given of our contemporary society.

²¹ Evola 1972, "Their situation is as hopeless as trying to distinguish colours with one's eyes covered. And it provides even more evidence regarding the truth about our modern age that such a completely unworthy political role is not repulsive to the majority of the people who are involved in it. On the contrary, they find the same joy in it that they do in extreme sports. They don't suffer in the intellectual desert, but instead recreate it over and over again, making it go deeper and deeper". There is "intellectual", i.e., "enlightened" thought (academics); the folk-realists, who "understand" the descent and decline of the West through some mythologizing narrative; and the lay masses, who are the fabric of ontological capital in media democracy.

²² "Leftism" is synonymous with mainstream. The rhetorical distance between many mainstream groups (i.e., social media influencers to policy makers) is itself vast, meaning that the distribution of users in the sinusoidal function is not equivalently binned. The vast majority of Americans are "mainstream", ergo "Leftist", even the vast majority of Right-winged, conservative ideologues and influencers are, by definition of the

Methodology

In Existentialism as much as Traditionalism, and, as this thesis offers, in Realist thought, the “Left” is anyone who does not denounce cultural dynamics’ (ie. capital’s) inherent cruelty, viscerally, online. Far from the Left being the standard bearers of morality, their morality is always, crucially, a constructivist / positivist / particular one- there is hope that all individuals in culture may be selfish and still, together, be greater than the sum. “Culture is moving somewhere” is the Left’s cultural policy; “the cyclical decline of the Great Recession / Covid-19 is temporary” is their political stance; whereas the Fringe’s is a selfish morality, and, in micro foundations, cannot be particular, only deconstructive, because the only goal of any Fringe narrative is to critique capital, often the capital of other alt-Right users. From the theoretical fringe position, which is the inversion of rationality, all culture mainstream is inherently doomed to fail because it is not likewise selfish, and is therefore ‘weak’ (ie., not based).

Empirically, this thesis offers that, to the fringe, such as 4chan /pol/, Leftism is synonymous with Progress, and carries the implication of a “system equivalent to terror”²³, ie., the thing which must be destroyed. Folk-realism, then, is not so much defined as irrationality (it is true that capital may always investiture “well”), but by a severe disregard for others; only the self is blameless in rhetorical spiral²⁴ (in cyclical decline, even the “best” investiture of capital will

Traditionalist, “Leftist”, because they are composed of the liberal meme, whereas the further from the mainstream one goes, the less the liberal meme has dominance in them. Mainstream is characterized by a diffusion of rational ethics into “advancements of ontology”.

23 “This stylistic device is given explicit expression through the character of the avant-garde filmmaker from Berkeley named Frank Volterra, through whom the visual representation of intimately human “spaces” becomes a crucial theme in the novel... the cult “creates a system equal to the terror” of death-they devise their own plot within which to contain and control death. And as soon as the territory of death is mapped in this way, there is the desire to put it on visual display. Volterra decides he wants to shoot a film of the cult, because, he says, “what they do seems so close to something on film, so natural to film.” His film is an idea they might have thought of themselves, an idea involving languages, patterns, extreme forms, extreme ways of seeing...”(Paul Harris 1993). In a similar way, users of fringe radical spaces, particularly 4chan /pol/, create a ‘theory’ of terror, a form of rhetoric equivalent to academia’s, in ambivalence; whereas academics seek closure from game theory, /pol/ users are induced to the worship of its’ terrorizing, nihilistic, “insecurity spiral” (Breuer & Johnston 2019).

²⁴ Adam Breuer & Alistair Johnston Harvard 2019, Users “construct a master narrative emphasizing zero-sum interests, the efficacy of coercion, and the perceived blamelessness of the Self for the Other’s aggressions”.

appear derogatory on the whole). While the majority of Leftism makes pretense to Progress, the Traditionalist ideology grows in popularity among the fringe; in folk-realist and nationalist thought²⁵, a philosophical system similar to Existentialism in its' critique of capital, but whose particularistic vision for the aftermath of liberal decline takes far more visceral, feudal, and racialized form²⁶- a radical transformation with capital which is not at all merely the backlash against "hippy", "degenerate" culture²⁷ which (to the fringe) inherited liberal America from the 1960s onwards; rather, we witness the exact inverse of the trends of the 1960s- a movement toward tradition. Traditionalism becomes the foreword principle for the youth fringe²⁸, implying Traditionalism is the meme most directly inverted against the Liberal meme itself; the fringe comes to reject anything contemporarily mainstream as degenerate, implying the concept of Western civilization's downward arc is more secure in the fringe's headspace. To the fringe, nationalism itself is a "polite" liberal²⁹ manifestation of the far more endemic Traditionalism critique of culture, which is far closer to the theoretical Right.

Methodologically, this thesis reduces culture to capital dynamics among the anonymous digital public. This thesis argues that in the model of "potential capital" measured against "stake put into rhetoric", Realism occupies an optimal position of "some potential capital" & "little stake

²⁵ Teitelbaum 2020 "War for Eternity: Inside Bannon's Far-Right Circle of Global Power".

²⁶ I.e., a hyper patriarchal, toxic masculine, anti-Leftist form: EComan 2020 "From Incels to MGTOW"; Kruger 2021, Tutters & all 2018.

²⁷ "In order to turn to 'protest'... what we observe, instead, are individuals identifying with the instinctive, irrational, and amorphous part of man (his 'underground') — that part which in every higher human being is not stubbornly 'repressed', but rather held at a certain distance and in check. The links between the protest movement and the most spurious and promiscuous aspects of the so-called sexual revolution, just like the fact that it is in cahoots with 'hippie' junkies and other such types, are certainly revealing, as is the spectacle offered by the many sectors in which the repressive 'system' is increasingly being replaced by a 'permissive' one. What use is being made of this new space, this new freedom? Here the symptoms multiply, showing that the 'revolt' as a whole is influenced from below. It is the very opposite of that essentially aristocratic form of revolt that still distinguished some individualists of the previous generation, starting with Nietzsche — the best Nietzsche. It is worth quoting a few lines here from this author (who is never quoted by today's protesters, who at most are hung up on writers like Marcuse, as they instinctively perceive the different nature, the aristocratic character, of Nietzsche's far broader revolt). Zarathustra states: You call yourself free? Your dominating thought I want to hear, and not that you escaped from a yoke. Are you the kind of person who had the right to escape from a yoke? There are some who threw away their last value when they threw away their servitude. Free from what? What does Zarathustra care! But brightly your eyes should signal to me: free for what? —Zarathustra warns us that being free, enjoying an amorphous personal freedom, can amount to doom and catastrophe" (Julius Evola 1972).

²⁸ Hagen, Sal, and Marc Tutters. "The Internet Hate Machine: On the Weird Collectivity of Anonymous Far-Right Groups." *Rise of the Far Right: Technologies of Recruitment and Mobilization* (2021).

²⁹ Tutters, Marc, Emilija Jokubauskaitė, and Daniel Bach. "Post-truth protest: how 4chan cooked up the Pizzagate Bullshit." *M/c Journal* 21, no. 3 (2018).

put into rhetoric”, whereas folk-realists, the fringe, and ‘digital mythologizers’ occupy “all potential capital” & “all stake put into rhetoric”. Functionally, Realism occupies an ambivalent position in capital, whose individuals rarely directly evolve capital, yet whose position is fully moldable along the scale, the most “enlightened” relationship to capital necessary for any game theory analysis within the cultural fabric. The logic drawn from Wittgenstein, Mouffe, and Tuters (ie., the “dyad milieu” empiricists)³⁰ is that each user of digital technologies “advances ontology”, i.e., creates increasingly “distinct lifeworlds”, a unique mythology / image justifying their ethics, and the potential capital of these images is added unto the total sum of potential capital permeating political culture. Most lifeworlds, among the fringes, are entirely synthetic, irrational, and intrinsic to the users’ Ego, and crucially, the more incongruent the lifeworld is to reality (i.e., mainstream reality), the more induced they are to violence. The Empiricists need to bin their taxonomies appropriately; although users on 4chan /pol/ are anonymous, by qualitatively analyzing *flux itself*, the speed at which individual users post memes in a given thread (disregarding which memes the researcher’s believe are empirically noteworthy), a more coherent understanding of which memes motivate users in “insecurity spiral” may be drawn, rather than which memes and narratives grow to be influential, which are only analyzed in retrospect. The conspiracy rhetoric of 4chan /pol/, and other fringe spaces, or the influential dialogue of folk-realists, is fully compatible with Realism, although it is irrational, and is existential philosopher Frederic Jameson’s precise understanding of prediction of “magic realism” in the post-modern age- “a transfigured object world [liberalism] in which fantastic

³⁰ “our intent is not to minimise individual agency, but rather to emphasise the ways in which computational systems can be conceptualised in terms of an individual-milieu dyad where the “individual carries with it a certain inheritance [...] animated by all the potentials that characterise [...] the structure of a physical system” (Simondon 306)” (Tuters et. all 2018 post-truth protest).

events are also narrated... realism would appear to have shifted to what must be called an anthropological perspective: magic realism". As Kruger 2021 implies, 4chan /pol/ users mythologize their relationship to Neoliberal capital. Ergo, fringe political capital increasingly references "a kind of narrative [form] derived essentially from peasant society", a reduction to social feudalism, at every discrete hierarchy³¹.

Theoretically this thesis offers that each user is a unique ontological lifeworld; the space between metaphysics and ethics shrinks, each user makes increasingly immediate and biased judgements of the world at each discrete digital interaction which has nothing to do with capital's realism, merely its' simulation within their hypothetical lifeworld. Users drag their mood through different lifeworld's; and come to recognize that their "map" of real is not at all similar to mainstream's. Their lifeworld conflicts against the horror of liberal capital's realism- *tromper-a-l'oeil*³²- *the existential thing itself*-, more inducing than Hegel's scenes, because it is not discrete, continuously re-constructed and deconstructed by capital's cruelty. The more "stake" a user puts into their lifeworld, which can only be measured through the flux, not quality, of engagement, the more incongruent the lifeworld is with capital's reality, which is in decline, whereas the fringe's social capital is always rising.

³¹ Tuters, M., & Hagen, S. (2020). ((The))) rule: Memetic antagonism and nebulous othering on 4chan. *New Media & Society*, 22(12), 2218-2237.

³² Fredric Jameson 1986, *magic realism*, "Glossiness, on the other hand, characterizes the print as a whole, smearing its varied contents together in a unified display and transferring, as it were, the elegant gleam of clean glass to the ensemble of jumbled objects-bright flowers, sumptuous interiors, expensively groomed features, period fashions-which are arranged together as a single object of consumption by the camera lens." A remarkable comment of Lacan is apt here (from the very different context of his meditation on the "scopic drive" in the Eleventh Seminar); the example is meant to illustrate what is for him a crucial distinction between the eye and the gaze (le regard): In the classical tale of Zeuxis and... Parrhasios, Zeuxis has the advantage of having made grapes that attracted the birds. The stress is placed not on the fact that these grapes were in any way perfect grapes, but on the fact that even the eye of the birds was taken in by them. This is proved by the fact that his friend Parrhasios triumphs over him for having painted on the wall a veil, a veil so lifelike that Zeuxis, turning towards him said, Well, and now show us what you have painted behind it. By this he showed that what was at issue was certainly deceiving the eye (tromper l'oeil). A triumph of the gaze over the eye." Essentially synonymous with Baudrillard's definition of an iconoclast (Sim. & Sim. St. 4 von 45.)- the "big lie", more inducing than Hegel's scenes.

Section I: I fuzz ontology



A 4chan /pol/ meme. See “pedophilic Hillary Clinton pizza” (M Tuters, E Jokubauskaitė, D Bach - M/c Journal, 2018 - journal.media-culture.org.au), Alex Jones, “gay frogs” (H Van den Bulck, A Hyzen - International communication ..., 2020).

To understand the Traditional meme that “Leftism describes conservatives as much as liberals”, ie., 98% of the population is Leftist, this thesis defines that “The Left” maintains a positivist position, that society can be improved through progressive efforts, by improving from the capital that has accumulated already in society; the symbolic Right rejects culture outright. Evola states, “According to [mainstream thought], the Right is more or less the conservative idea, which manifested in order to confront Left-wing, revolutionary ideas. But here we immediately face the question of what is it that the Right is protecting, conserving, and guarding against Left... the modern ‘Right’ is merely protecting the status quo of the recent past; namely, that bourgeois world which was already thoroughly pervaded by Leftist, liberal, and egalitarian ideas... Therefore, the real Right shouldn’t be created as a weaker and increasingly infected backlash against the Left, but rather develop its own, independent form of action”. Evola implies that by partaking in the liberal systems of capital, conservative principle is defeated *a priori*, whose concept only exists in harkening to the Traditional spiritual struggle against Progress, the

“system equivalent to terror”, “more cruel than Artaud's Theatre of Cruelty”³³, ie., conservatism is a form of liberalism, because what has conservatism preserved about life in the dramatic changes of the last century? Traditionalists argue that conservatives are just democrats some 30 years behind the trend. In this way, the masking of politics is stripped away; the Left is a symbol for engagement with capital entirely, and the Right is a symbol for the hoarding, the selfish lust of capital for the self; the dissimulation of culture for self-validation. In this reduction to absurdity, curiously the only theoretical model for the digital space, the Left is the positive particle; the Right, the negative. Traditionalism inherits folk-realism, especially online, where users’ ethical framework is increasingly shaped by selfish “advancements in ontology”, increasingly referencing the dramatic evolution of Western culture itself in the last century. In order to consider the decline of American capital, it is easier to consider it abroad rather than domestically, where values carry more intrinsic meaning for each academic.

Consider the political capital of Australia, a meme tightly interwoven with China’s growing rivalry with the United States³⁴, where the Nationalists and Liberals are in a coalition against “the Left”. There is no explicit “Right-wing” party, though “the Coalition” of Nationalists and Liberals is valued by “the Left” as a Right-wing marriage of convenience, and, symbolically, we gather there is some spirit linking nationalism and liberalism not immediately describable from

³³ Both are extremely abstract existentialist critiques of what amounts to, “the cruelty of liberal capital is the cruelest thing you can imagine”, for it is the most exploitative relationship to one’s capital out of any form of society in history, ie., your shortcomings as well as others are more pronounced and abstractly consumed by you through media. In fringe spaces online, this increasingly takes vernacular role (eg. Kruger 2021), each user better “deconstructing capital’s cruelty” for the things important to them. Baudrillard 1983 + Jameson 1985 respectively.

³⁴ “I would like to discuss in more detail how I think China’s rise will affect Australia in particular. There is no question that geography works to Australia’s advantage; it is located far away from China and there are large bodies of water separating the two countries... This is not going to happen, however, because China—should it continue its rapid rise—will eventually present a serious enough threat to Australia that it will have no choice but to join the American-led alliance to contain China. I would like to make three points to support this claim.” (Mearsheimer, *Gathering storm*). Also see Adam Breuer & Alistair Johnston Harvard 2019, “Memes, narratives, and the emergent US-China security dilemma”. “Memes are discrete objects constructed by users online”. Memes are also concepts of physical phenomena. B&J 2019 consider how the speed at which users’ construct and built narratives/images from memes impacts the heightening of tensions between actors. The relationship of America to Australia has long been favored as a cornerstone of IR thought.

surface-depth analysis³⁵. In Australia as much as Britain, liberal describes a market conservative, a vague ideology which largely finds dominance proportionate to the success of the economy. “Liberals”, in post-Marxist critique, are the lumpen proletarians, the inert mass of social capital. Liberals who are “married by convenience” to the Nationalists, in Australia, then are disillusioned Leftists. Australia’s history is more recent than America’s, and the need for capital to be tied to nationalistic concerns to fund and orient Australia against the threats of China or Japan is more engaging than in America, where capital has always largely been free to develop in symbiosis with the positivist ideal, the passive molding of the social fabric. In America, Leftism is more synonymous with liberalism. In this way, “Leftism” is not an ideology in the fabric of politics, but a symbol of orientation for any individual or ideology within the liberal fabric, a symbol which grows fainter the less one has hopes that capital, of the State or the public (ie. investitured capital) can be put to constructive purpose. The crueler capital is to the individual, the more disillusioned they are with mainstream dogma; whereas liberalism describes the inert function of the unmotivated voter, “the Left” and the “the Right” symbolize the social struggle over liberal capital itself, between the Globalist (positivist) and Nationalist (nihilist/negativist) interpretation of statehood.

Adam Breuer & Alistair Johnston tracked the RBO meme, the “rule based order” master-narrative as it began in the State Department as the Neoliberal catchphrase for a general strategic alliance between all political parties, and between Australia and America, against China, “In November 2010, Australian Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd employed ‘RBO’ in a meeting with US Secretary of State Clinton. After the meeting they issued the Melbourne Statement, which

³⁵ Ie., tangential analysis... Harris 1993, “John Berger articulates a notion of the novel along these lines: It is scarcely possible to tell a straight story sequentially unfolding in time, because we are too aware of what is continually traversing the story laterally ... instead being aware of a point as an infinitely small part of a straight line, we are aware of it as an infinitely small part of an infinite number of lines, as the center of a star of lines...”

laid out shared US–Australian interests on the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of US–Australian diplomatic relations. That statement included a reference to the RBO, and it appears to be the first use of the term by a senior US government official (Clinton 2010). The statement was mainly aspirational and called for ‘The enhancement of an international rules-based order, both within our region and for the world’ (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade [DFAT] 2010)” (Breuer & Johnston 2019). The meme quickly spread to congressman, such as John McCain, and within a decade its’ meaning evolved from a vague symbol of unity against China, to a contentious, flagrant, symbol of China’s inherent evilness. Perhaps the Australian people, in recent decades, have viewed their partnership and cultural affiliation with America in a more desperate light, as China’s soft-power encroachment unto Australia grows (H Lai + Y Lu 2012), but moreover, it is the threat of China as presented in political media (M Li 2019) which is more engaging. The Left, the Nationals, and Liberals: capital itself- is united against China in Australia, whereas in America, it is not. A general theory can be drawn around the dynamic of the RBO meme- it became a dominant, regnant, corner-stone of policy because it was necessary; the threat to Australia’s public from China is real: a new meme had to be created, by endemic, biological urge, to represent political-elite, policy makers (ie., influencers of the ‘Left’) and the public’s rational fears. Adam Breuer & Alistair Johnston conclude their piece wondering how whether the speed with which the public engages with a given meme affects how quickly the meme moves through Neoliberalism, which seems a fair bet. If a public engages with a meme, it means, even in their irrationality, they are rationally drawn to endemic biological conclusions identically with the political elite. The public, then, is drawn to memes not based at all off rationality or irrationality, but by the biological function the meme justifies, such as Great Power aggression.

The more users engage in the digital fringe, ie., engage in “unanswerable” content which reimposes the world order as a nihilistic, violent, and a totalitarian place, the more they self-validate their nationalist/natalist cognition, like the belief that Muslims need to be purged from the West (eg.)³⁶, that women are evil, that the Deep State is real, that there is a satanic conspiracy to overthrow liberalism. How can such narratives be defined if not as “schizo”? It is the user’s fears projected over culture itself. All taxonomies of capital in culture are reduced to self/other, ie., how the thing makes users feel, which they may critique and evolve at leisure, because they are only observing a discrete slice of culture, and imply their dynamic inherits all. Breuer and Johnston define such a spiral on the national level; “Both sides claim that the other... is interfering in its internal affairs, and indeed on both sides one increasingly hears the claim that the Other poses an existential threat to the Self. Despite differences in their assumptions and causal arguments, all major theoretical approaches applied to these developments share a common prediction: as conflict continues, [both] will develop images of the other that stress zero-sum interests, the efficacy of coercion in resolving disputes, and the perceived blamelessness of one side for the aggressive behaviour of the other. These three clusters of images constitute the shared central paradigm of... rivalry across explanations based on power transitions (Allison 2017), the incompatibilities of political systems (Friedberg 2011), competition for hegemony (Mearsheimer 2014), security dilemmas (Steinberg and O’Hanlon 2014), and differences in national worldviews (Wu 2000), among other things. The concrete process by which this central paradigm and its associated images emerge from narratives and stories about Self and Other, however, has been heretofore undertheorized”. This perfectly describes 4chan /pol/’s political culture as much as the aggression between China and America.

³⁶ Stuart, Allyson Haynes. "Social Media, Manipulation, and Violence." *SCJ Int'l L. & Bus.* 15 (2018): 100.

This is far more individually applicable in the digital era; Baudrillard says, “Everything is metamorphosed into its inverse in order to be perpetuated in its purged form. Every form of power, every situation speaks of itself by denial, in order to attempt to escape, by simulation of death, its real agony. Power can stage its own murder to rediscover a glimmer of existence and legitimacy.... In olden days the king (also the god) had to die - that was his strength. Today he does his miserable utmost to pretend to die, so as to preserve the blessing of power. But even this is gone”. Digital users are constantly elevating kings and killing them, idol worship, retroactively justifying their mythology under the cycle of the Liberal meme (Yao Lin 2021).

The more the Right self-iterates across myriad platforms, the more moribund “every day” objects get anthropomorphized. The Fringe is in a state of aggrandized cognitive evolution. “Applying cognitive linguistic instruments, such as component analysis and conceptual metaphor theory, it has been determined that conceptual content, structure and metaphorical representation of... crisis are subject to historical variations. Terminologically motivated name of the concept [crisis] provides historical stability of its content and structure formed by historical constants DECLINE, UNSTABLE SITUATION, TURNING POINT on the one hand, and affects its historical change: extension with new constituents – variables DISORDER, LANDMARK, ACCIDENT, on the other”³⁷. It is not the content the alt-Right consumes online at all which is relevant, but the form in which they consume it, and the veracity with which their self is induced to consume it. The Right is a rhetorical bridge away from the potentiality of the *trompe l’oeil*; which is to gaze away from Progress, a return to the hallmarks of fascist³⁸, bronze-age³⁹, or Traditionalist systems of philosophy, which are marked less by a substantive set of dogmas, and more a style of

³⁷ Oliynyk, Natalya, and Iryna Shevchenko. "Conceptualisation of ECONOMIC CRISIS in discourse: from the Great Depression to the Great Recession." (2016).

³⁸ Hartzell, Stephanie L. "Everyday (anti)-racism: Rhetorical formations of White racial consciousness in contemporary public discourse." PhD diss., University of Colorado at Boulder, 2017.

³⁹ Prewitt, Ryan. "Bronze Age Pervert, Narrative, and the Digital Fascist Project." PhD diss., Saint Louis University, 2021.

engagement with reality itself; simile in all ways to the descent of the Late Roman Republic into street thuggery and viscerally, but only now on a digital level, where “cancel culture” and “fear of missing out”, mental health issues, self-validation chambers, isolationism, the death of civil America, para-schizoid narrative qualities, merge in echo chambers- the inverse of ‘ideal’ liberalism. Only the perception of liberalism as evil can be drawn from digital rhetoric, for the irreducible texture of any digital engagement is the highlighting of the differences in ontological lifeworlds; and if these lifeworlds are fabricated for each user in the liberal meme/society, then “convergent” behavior only serves to distinguish each users’ relationship to real. The digital fabric is inverted to the liberal fabric. Nationalism is the bridge to achieve inverted liberal capital abroad in many ways- and thus is a manifestation of some amount of some capital- but nationalism is too succinct; it represents the manifestation of the symbol of the Right somewhere still in the “Leftist” portion of the conduit- because nationalists have hope that, through visceral engagement of states’ interactions, a measure of stability can be returned to the domestic frame;



the fringe has not yet been reached, a totalistic, “feudal” interpretation of reality.

“Friends of unrighteous Mammon”, RH Hiers 1970, the most rational explanation of irrationality from the perspective of the Left. Memes which better “troll”, ie., disrupt, Mainstream are better adopted by the Right, even if the Left understands the meme better. The alt-Right “enters unto” Mammon, who is their Ego / surface-depth. Irrationality inherits rationality in digital spaces.

Only the interaction of the fringe with mainstream is relevant to digital-era politics. The action of extremist ideologues, terrorists, and anti-establishment thinkers congregates in users' headspace (Stuart 2018), each trying to maximize their own selfish justification of liberalism's degeneracy, though their form is pronounced; its' texture is more irreducible⁴⁰: they hate post-modern culture & the liberal meme. For the fringe, the very ontological space has expanded too much—far from crude, their Dadaist interpretation⁴¹ of capital is a stunning *trompe l'oeil*, a fake whose façade is constantly reconstructed in real time: a myriad byzantine fresco. Their hatred for liberalism is their all-inducing drug. A stance against liberalism is their *modus vivendi*. How, in mere decades, has the Fringe public degenerated to such spiteful cause, to hate the fabric of culture itself?

One must consider the ontology of the individual's relationship to State, often regarded in IR thought through Leviathan, the concept that each individual, if rational, will enter the social contract of State, orient to the Left, toward mainstream; toward convergent Progress; that anyone who is “enlightened” will admit that entering unto dynamic's Obligation is the optimal path of capital's gain; and that capital's sum is rational. Traditionalists as much as Chicago Realists hold the privileged stance of this belief, “capital's sum is rational”, was only afforded by the dramatic

⁴⁰ It is the dynamic of Matthew's Law, fluid statistics, which apply themselves fully to anonymous spaces. 20% of users engage whereas 80% observe; 2% influence the 20%, and .2% influence the 2%. Harris 1993, “Texture here stands for what is irreducible to system, to grammar, perhaps even to language; a moment or site where the code becomes self-referential, opaque, an overly dense composite of possible trajectories; where discontinuous digital algorithm slides into continuous, qualitative analog... The matrix is synthetic in two senses: it gestures toward totality, a synthesis, yet remains only a (synthetically) manufactured texture, subject to reworkings. The matrix metaphor thus collides not only two modes of procedure, but two notions of system: on the one hand, the system of philosophy, defined by propositions, rules, and the synthesis of perception in the idea; on the other, a dynamic system governed by the properties of chaos, that evolves as a thickly braided bundle of possible trajectories. I do not seek to replace the former with the latter, but to cross over from one to the other”.

⁴¹ The Ideal Reader Jacques Riviere 1950 pg. 238, “But, especially with symbolism, the determination to free themselves from all models and to make of art nothing more than a kind of substitute for personality asserted itself among a large number of writers. Although he is instructive, let us leave Mallarme to one side... “I came down along the vineyard, having rested my feet on a gargoyle, in a carriage whose period is... indicated by the convex []panes, the rounded panels, and the shape...” He sought one thing only: to go away... The cubists speak of construction so frequently because they think only of outer construction”, a critique equally as applicable to Realist empiricists. The drug 4chan /pol/ users consume is more refined over time; this is the meaning of their redpill meme. As each engagement is really a measurement of how much stake the user is willing to put into a narrative

dominance of the West after the second world war. This advantage has fast gone. Although the Chicago School as much as Libertarians or anarchic sects critique Leviathan, opining Obligation has grown so dominant in post-modern culture no “enlightened egoist” can truly exist, this is a deontological question, and is actually indicative of the degradation of Leviathan’s theory itself. From being a metaphor for the incontrovertible truth (ie., any “Enlightened” individual engages with the State as the public), realists now derive the inverse meaning from Leviathan (ie., the public, who is inherently irrational, is the sum of State, which is rational). This difference may only be explained by liberalism itself. In Hobbes time, on the cusp of the liberal meme’s transformation to global phenomenon, only patricians, the wealthy, and other influencers were motivated to truly consider the ontological implications of deference towards State, whereas, by the Chicago School’s calculation, no choice is possible in post-modernism, where State is so dominant in all cultural and economic aspects the question cannot be seriously approached. Driving without a license plate gets one pulled over rather quickly; zoning laws and ecological mandates limit individuals’ ability to freely develop a parcel of land (e.g., as “enlightened egoist” anarcho-capitalist landowners are wont to dump uranium to save a quick buck). Essentially, Leviathan is reduced to a metaphor for how this “cruelty” of State’s systemic control within Liberalism makes one feel⁴².

⁴² Mintz 1962 “the Hunting of Leviathan” is a curious piece exactly illustrating Leviathan’s decay, because the scholar makes an academic error defined in IR context by Mearsheimer & Walt 2013, “simplistic testing hypothesis”, which is essentially synonymous with “failure to induce”. Mintz declares, “the hindsight view of Hobbes’s system has... been undergoing... transformation. From being regarded as the prototype of a Utilitarian, Hobbes has been converted into the prototype of a Kantian deontologist. It used to be axiomatic that Hobbes’s political theory represented a deduction from egoist psychology: obligation explained as the enlightened calculation of self-interest [i.e., a dynamic intrinsic to each individual]. It is now suggested [by others] that the grounds of obligations [i.e., enlightened dynamic] may need to be detached from the psychological observation [i.e., obligation, which used to be induced through enlightened egoism for each individual, is now induced by a *null-pointer*]: an attempt is being made to anchor the politics of Leviathan firmly to the traditions of Natural Law”. Leviathan’s theory makes little cohesive sense framed here, for how may a theory justify itself through its’ dynamic? Mintz goes on to reshuffle the epistemology of scholarly opinions surrounding Leviathan’s transformation; missing the inductive jump: “it is whether the grounds of Obligation may be detached from psychological observation which is at stake in Hobbes’ system”, or, more simply, “it is whether Leviathan may be a deontological, rather than ontological, beast, which is at stake”.

Essentially, the Fringe argument is the same as Whent's critique of empiricism⁴³, which only ever justifies mainstream narratives- "the idealized and most valued form these arguments can take is a textual one... Printed word is the most [prescient means] to navigate by. Texts and their producers are invoked in conversation as arbiters and evidence of expertise and experience. If you had read x, you would sagely nod your head in approval at this point. These texts are 'branded' in a number of ways: publishing venues matter, for instance – very much so in relation to texts produced locally. Some venues are more desirable, exclusive, and prestigious than others, often directly commensurate to their relative inaccessibility (to writers, and to readers, especially those readers who do not have access to a subscribing university library). This is not a trifling matter: it is the fabric out of which career success and failure is made". Both /pol/ users and academics induce; academics induce better. Yet /pol/ users are still as convinced of their lifeworlds' veracity. Mearsheimer & Waltz' concept of "simplistic testing hypothesis" is fundamentally synonymous with the existential notion that "space invades the subject". Online, it is the distance between two users' lifeworlds which subsumes the bound of engagement; digital conversations more so highlight differences in cognition (ie. one's mythological understanding of post-modern, liberal politics) than similarities, it is safe to induce that little convergent interaction among users is actually taking place. Each individual derives a derivative meaning from their brief interpretation of other. On the anonymous social media 4chan /pol/, "chat threads" are deleted after 24 hours⁴⁴, further reducing the need for subjects to form interpersonal bonds, instead reducing all rhetoric to the hyper-sensational goal of "winning", or "being based",

⁴³ Whelan, Andrew M. "Academic critique of neoliberal academia." (2015).

⁴⁴ 4chan /pol/ is an Endemism of particularly transitive rhetoric (ir., Tutters et. all 2018; Hagan 2020) i.e. "the sheer volume of auto-deleted activity means one has to stay up-to-date with a rapid waterfall of subcultural ephemerality".

or simply complaining about the vaguest thing, to attribute the most responses, and the most capital.

The existential relationship between ethics and reality is a complex one, as offered by Jameson. Whichever way the Fringe user looks, they cannot escape the alt-Right's 'forbidden' knowledge, the red pill, *the existential horror- culture is degenerate in every way!* "it would take too long to run through the whole range of operational negativity... moribund principle by simulated scandal, phantasm, murder-a sort of hormonal treatment by negativity and crisis. It is always a question of proving the real by the imaginary, proving truth by scandal, proving the law by transgression, proving work by the strike, proving the system by crisis and capital by revolution, as for that matter proving ethnology by the dispossession of its object (the Tasaday) - without counting: - proving theatre by anti-theatre - proving art by anti-art - proving pedagogy by anti-pedagogy - proving psychiatry by anti-psychiatry, etc., etc" (JB 1983). To existentialists as much as the Fringe, the quality of liberalism is toxic.

The Fringe despises "the axiom of Leftist thought from Enlightenment theory to Communism...", the progress of Western society itself, for this society now serves as testament to the decay of capital, the decay of users' own potentiality, and users project this subliminally into their narratives, like Qannon, which held that there was a conspiracy within the Federal Government to drain the swamp of any non-Trump loyalist, and may have directly led to the 6th Insurrection; what begins as a narrative of justification for a handful of users, by its' unique rareness and intricacy it developed among a small number of arbitrary users, mythologizes rampantly. Myths like Qanon spread because of, not in spite of, their vagueness. Rather than this seeming a minute proportion, 675 terrorists on the 6th from a narrative reaching many millions- it is its' dynamic academics fear will subsume American politics more in coming decades. Whereas the absolute

number of users reached by any narrative will decline, as the space between lifeworlds expands, it is the proportion of users motivated to visceral action which will rise, because it is not the symbol of Right or Left, but the liberal fabric itself, which must “decay”. As liberalism’s decline increasingly places economic, social, and political hardship on the public conduit, already irrational, the proportion of users affected to violence grows; their ontologically distinct lifeworlds now more refined, more abstract, more different from mainstream real, and the difference between their *trompe l’oeil* and real itself decays, until the “uncanny slippage”⁴⁵ from the difference- the user subject matrix- is ignited to violence. Liberalism’s dissimulation online is purely theoretical until these moments of uncanny slippage, when Fringeness percolates from the Fringe to the mainstream, like the 2016 election, Covid-19, or the 2020 election, which discretely and drastically alter America’s Overton Window (the range of acceptable discourse).


If Leviathan is truly dead, if obligation and enlightened egoism mean too many things to too many different people, how may academics regard this “schizo” ontology, a dissimulating space where theories, narratives, and even individual words and cognates come to be iconoclast idols for some fringe users⁴⁶? Only the function of transformation is necessary. All fringe users stake themselves as “eschatological proletarians”⁴⁷; they are cruelly oppressed by liberalism in

⁴⁵ Paul Harris 1993, “Textual memory would be the virtual text that is projected from this momentary slippage, this uncanny friction caused at a site that traverses many levels of the human mind, many textual scales, and grafts this moment to a particular cultural moment. While the phenomenon of textual memory is produced by a human subject, it simultaneously creates a thrust or trajectory from the subject through language onto a landscape. The concluding portions of *The Names* exemplify the thrust of this route in several complicated ways. Axton’s search for self-realization ends in an empty, jarring fact: he has been duped in his occupation as risk analyst; the company he works for has close ties to the CIA. It is as if, in his search for a subjective agency that led him to take such an influential job, Axton’s agency is illusory, playing into the hands of the Central Intelligence Agency. So the knowledge of himself Axton gains is negative: he feels that his cynical distance on things in fact implicates ...him in matters he considers distasteful, unethical. The “subject” in this text does not achieve a self-realization, he does not complete himself; rather he experiences him- self as a discontinuity, a fissure between his projected self and his acting self”.

⁴⁶ Harris writes, “To come to terms with this situation, rather than recalling the metaphors of the schizo or the switching network, we may recall Roger Cailliois’s discussion of mimicry” (Paul Harris 1993). Whereas “mimicry” is the theoretical form of engagement online (Blackmore 2000), “the schizo/switching network” is more ontologically evident in fringe communities, where the raw speed of the dynamic “stretches the microscopic and cosmological limits of space” (i.e., deontological and ontological). In essence, whatever a fringe user wants to believe, they will find evidence that may be woven into a narrative of justification”, yet this function is still perfectly theoretical, for the user’s interaction with unreal (i.e., physical engagement in society) will always reinforce the untruth of some portion of their lifeworld. Although the user overcomes this incongruity by, themselves, bracketing the discrete portion of the lifeworld from deontological thought, it increasingly makes its’ inheritance degenerate the more times the function is engaged, meaning that, indeed, digital culture is not at all mimicry through online engagement (ir Blackmore 2000), but a quasi-schizoid environment the more one puts stake into justifying their grievances.

⁴⁷ RH Hiers 1970 “friends of unrighteous Mammon”

general, and the more time the user spends online, the more they may justify this symbolic view. They self-validate; they self-iterate memes which are similar to their Egos and lifeworlds; and they immediately reject narratives whose stance of rhetoric or form seem agreeable to many people, to mainstream in general. The more rational, detailed, and realistic narratives are, the more the user regards it as a symbol for inertness; the more vague and potentially shocking the narrative is, the more the “shock of entry” is for each user, and the better the meme justifies their own cognition. “Magic realism”. Nothing objective has changed within reality, but for each user, their perception has fundamentally transformed- a “metamorphosis” (Yao Lin 2021). “Enter unto unrighteous Mammon” (RH Hiers 1970). The moon landing is faked. Covid-19 as a Hoax. Biden as a ‘fake’ President. These narratives, blithe and and vacant, are so frustrating to liberalism because they are impossible to parse (ir Tuters & Hagan). Academia must not taxonomize the unrighteousness of the public. Digital mythologies are the affordance of liberalism’s eating itself. Liberalism is the affordance of schizoid thoughts in a digital anonymous space; a digital bully pulpit, the most abstract art becomes cultural law, and percolates through the mainstream interpretation of the art. “There has to be a spatial dimension to the analysis of [the public]”, an aloofness, or, in contradiction of Wittgenstein and the milieu-dyad empiricists, or even Kertzer’s understanding of public rationality, distance between “enlightened” thought and public thought. The public cannot be “gotten at”, there is nothing to understand about the public; “the existence of the individual is sufficient reason for everything that he expresses” (Riviere 1950) a notion which demands we leave the empiricists’ parsing of fringe narratives, and return to Breuer & Johnston’s understanding of self/other dynamic, for the whole of the ontological lifeworld is more than projection of self in anonymous spaces, but a dynamic of capital totally contextualized to the lifeworld itself.



(‘time spent online’ is fundamentally synonymous with ‘stake put into rhetoric’).

Section II: Folk-Traditional model

If theory symbolically represents the confusion of the post-modern schizoid public, what symbol represents semblant meaning? Such a question is deeply relevant to the State Department, referencing the Sino-US Great Power relations insecurity spiral; being a nationalist matter, it inherits the far more prescient dynamic of domestic Left/Right, indeed, the whole of the *existential* political rivalries subsuming any engendered poles in post-modernity. Yet in both cases, no permutation of theory, theorist, or game-theory simulates escaping the discursive spiral of relations itself. It is not helpful to end the tract opining that in Existentialist theory, all theorizing is vain. The task of theorists is simpler, because if the symbol of theory itself no longer leads to a refinement of thought, the only symbol which may be referenced truthfully is self/other, the symbol of ontological dynamic altogether against null space. In the same manner that Leviathan is reduced to a creature of ethical (i.e., personal, not metaphysical) dynamic,

theory becomes a problem of self-knowing more than knowing other⁴⁸. It is easy to understand, in the digital era, how everything is linked to self/other dynamic, as all subjects, observing rivalry online, may share opinions and memes which are all discrete bits of narratives of rivalry (Breuer & Johnston 2019) which go on to influence the micro foundations of policy, and later, culture (Kertzer 2012).

The insecurity dilemma of the public among themselves online infects Great Power relations; the International fabric is the endemism in which the RBO meme spread, implying America is losing the global initiative against China and has little domestic symbolic unity. It is not the duty of the public to quail their critique of political-elite in order to appear unified (this is the tactic of Communist society, and is not historically the West's), but, as Kissinger operated, as the conduit of public distrust in the government grows, government becomes more clandestine, exactly the same problem of academia within China and America; an 'ivory tower' mentality inherently mandates a totalitarian relationship between the State and the Public. Yet this mentality should not be denied; the abstraction of Great Power Rivalries, in the public headspace, grows horrifically evoking; the rivalry becomes a metaphor for the public's confusion of itself, the last "Great Other". Every member of the public hates China, theoretically, but hates any other justification against China besides their own more than they hate China itself. Who in a Liberal society is not checked by enough balances to actually take the mantle of this heavy, contradictory, crown? Which political-elite does not "pass the buck", using China as a cheap rhetorical trick, and is confident the threat can be contained through clever strategy? Which leader invigorates the public? It is an endemic demise, not a narrative one. In all ways, the circuit

⁴⁸ Sun Tzu- "If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle"

of America's political nihilism strips public individuals, which all elite in America are by nature of its' fabric, of confidence, reflecting not only their self shortcomings, but the shortcomings of other, through the rhetorical spiral of game theorizing about capital online, where the fringe immediately sets the ontological bounds of any conversation to its' absurd binaries. In a nation where strategy is not explicitly disseminated via propaganda (e.g. 50 cent army), few voices support interventionist foreign policy, which is taboo for the American Left, and viewed as pointless by the fringe. Strategy against China must project a fundamental truth: liberalism's mood is apathetic and inert. Few justifications against China will command the support of any majority, or even dominant plurality, of the American public, and by justifying its' support through a given narrative, distinguish itself from the public's total sum of lifeworld's. The public as a whole is individualistically motivated against China⁴⁹. Political-elite should cease justification against China entirely, and understand the rivalry *is*.

Secondarily, because of the reluctance to admit outright war and keep the dynamic in the grey zone⁵⁰, and to shunt its' *trompe l'oeil* into some discrete corner, the American public's ability to commit violence inherent to conflict is lacking. Whereas, at the very least, a citizen of China has the propaganda of the party to justify violence (ie., it is the American scoundrel 'other' who is to blame for the proletarian's plight!), every edifice of America's media / capital society dissimulates individuals' self-worth until they have no justification for any theory. It is a hallmark of post-modern liberalism that each individual should reduce bias's effects, be more "rational", enter unto mainstream logic, but Great Power conflict is always biased, irrational, because your 'side' is ultimately arbitrary and dependent on where you were born. The necessary

⁴⁹ ELC Lai - Economic and Political Studies, 2019 - Taylor & Francis "the US-China trade war"

⁵⁰ Of spirit as much as fact. If America were truly motivated against China, with the purpose of war in all but name, China would actually predominate more heavily in the media than it already does. Although content on China is vast, domestic ideologue content is far vaster still.

conclusion to be drawn from psychoanalytic thought is that political-elite's bizarre lack of substantive actions is the result of distinct lifeworld's contradictory capital in clash against another. No individual in post-modern America is sure of themselves, so the political-elite inherit this schizoid hallmark. Each political-elite is reduced to the conflict of positivist tendencies they derive from their constituents, which are all irrational, which itself confuses the liberal meme, as there is no stance against China, for post-modern liberalism always keeps the question in the game theory of "what should be an aggressive stance", forgetting, ultimately, that through this deliberation, kinetic capital, or initiative, is totally lost. Whereas the first point deals in the symbology of the struggle, which is inverted, this second concept deals in the capital of its' morphology, which is likewise inverted.

Tertiarily, the importance of digital ideologue's interaction cannot be overstated. Beijing's as much as Washington's understanding of the American public's mood from 2010 onwards was overshadowed by the aftermath of the Great Recession, when both political parties used China as a rhetorical, rather than literal, threat⁵¹, and likewise was the time period in which alt-Right ideologues and endemisms spawned⁵². The most conducive meeting between political-elite in the rivalry would be complete deference, ie., Joe Biden sits down at the table across from Xi Jinping and refuses to speak. It would be the least inflammatory, and therefore the most inflammatory, bit for our visceral media society, and may go a far way in putting the "buck" back in America's corner. The American public endemism as much as the politburo purely wouldn't know how to evolve. No binary theory could be reached. A primary weakness of the politburo is to hyper analyze public moods and how they relate to the discrete actions political-

⁵¹ C Layne - International studies quarterly, 2012 - academic.oup.com

⁵² Luke, Timothy. "Overtures for the Triumph of the Tweet" (2017)

elite take; the politburo always derives rational logic from the public's irrationality. By understanding the schizoid nature of public interaction online, political-elite must formulate an 'edge-test' of their own, and understand the quality of the public's inflammation⁵³. By taking the deliberately least inflammatory discrete actions, and thereby inducing the fringe to the greatest turmoil, the political-elite obfuscates strategy. Such "negative" actions (ie., the absence of an action) are powerful because of their vagueness; the public may interpret it any way they want to, and would elucidate to the political-elite how the public twists the absence of action into arbitrary and totally 'schizo' theories. Deprive the media society of bits, and maybe the government won't feel so induced to change strategy day-to-day to be attuned to the latest fringe rhetoric. No rhetoric, only action, can inherit government.

Fundamentally, China's spirit can be motivated against itself. By understanding that the politburo is largely motivated to take actions that may be sold to the public through propaganda, America must take any action, rational or irrational, to limit this aim. On one hand, this means Fabian tactics⁵⁴. How may the public be deliberately aggravated against China, and this mood be put to positivist purpose in cultural society? This also means direct confrontation. If Beijing meets with the Kremlin for some bilateral conference, and America was not invited, the American consulate must loudly and publicly decry the meeting as "inherently against the rule-based order" across myriad platforms, engage in a "light / ironic" version of Beijing's propaganda, sell ourselves into our memes' bias, so as to reimpose America's goal through media. If China hopes to build an island in the South China Sea, if America cannot deter this

⁵³ Ie., Evola's concept of *dukkha*, a Pali word derived from Sanskrit for "inflammation" or "turmoil", ie., the public is in turmoil about how to objectively handle the threat, implying all political-elite are, too, whereas it should be the political-elite giving aesthetic orientation to the public in the conflict.

⁵⁴ Or Meme Dogma Ie., engaging with the enemy in flexible encounters

action through guerilla tactics, then America must build a larger island next to it, in order to remove the ability of the politburo to justify their policies through satellite pictures (e.g.). Let's gladly remodel our school systems after Europe's (eg.) to increase test scores against China, and also, afford the alt-Right their separation from society. There is much land in Alaska or Idaho; let them go there. Crucially, China is a young nation compared to America; and it may be said they have more "stake" put into their rivalry against the United States. Whereas we have our mythologized history against the British, the Confederates, or Fascism to promote the liberal meme's pre-eminence, the Chinese struggle against the West, for them, is more *real*.

These examples all illustrate how any hierarchy of rivalry in the post-modern era, especially Great Power relations, is characterized by a nihilistic spiral of confusion of self in reference to the public, such as with the works of Traditionalist influencers, who influence the fringe, as Aleksandr Dugin, endemic of the Traditionalism meme's influence over culture, whose influence over liberalism is directly linked to the Sino-US relations, a rivalry which is, to Dawkins, sapio-sexual: Silurian zero-sum logic. Dugin championed "non-linear warfare" against the West, Georgia, and Ukraine as early as 1992, and was a primary media icon in Russia during their 2007 invasion of Georgia. Russian media widely disseminated his "Tanks to Tibilisi!" slogan, and this orientation was fully in-line with Putin's desire to turn warfare in the post-Soviet bloc into a rallying cry of the Nationalists, upon whom he based his government. In this way, Russian society is still composed of the same liberal-meme as the American fabric, but the population as a whole is much more induced away from the Left, and nearly 40% of the Russian public are nationalists, implying the symbolic Right is much more influential as a whole. Through the collapse of the Soviet Union, with the death of the positivist ideal, as the public lost economic, social, and moral capital, they were induced to the fringes of liberalism's conduit. Nationalism is

a tantalizing form of liberalism for any society whose capital has declined, because Nationalism inherently carries the implication of “zero-sum” capital, either outright invading neighbors, or at the very least, blunting the ability of other nation’s citizens to accumulate capital, which can in some way be seen as a projection of strength to hide the public’s feeling of weakness. In times of societal decay, the public abandons any Enlightened basis of liberalism, and views capital in a much more nihilistic, apathetic way. Dugin’s influence over the Russian public shows how influential fringe ideologues can be during times of civil decay or outright war. Dugin’s pre-eminent rise and dismissal by Putin should not be seen as Putin experimenting with different forms of Nationalism until he settled on a less-Traditionalist influenced version, rather, it implies ultimately how fervently all subsets of the Russian public wanted war, a ‘return to the land’, akin to Rasputin, a peasant leader against Russia’s foes after her collapse- how poorly regarded the Progressive symbol of the Left was. The ultimate implication to be drawn from Dugin is that the presence of fringe voices in government is a hallmark of civil decay.

The American Leftist ideal’s capital may not be gone, then, for Traditionalist influencer Steve Bannon had mere months of influence in Donald Trump’s administration⁵⁵ as NSC, and very few of his ideals were implemented in policy⁵⁶ and his furthest-fringe voice was replaced by Bolton and other nationalists. If a heavily-nationalist-influenced administration was not ready for the Traditionalist meme, it implies that not even the substantive majority of the conservative fringe was ripe for it. On January 6th, then, the capital riot was precisely what it seems to be: Trump, through careless regard for how powerful of a “beacon” he had become among his in-group,

⁵⁵ Quartz Feb 3rd 2017- “Bannon’s political philosophy boils down to three things that a Western country, and America in particular, needs to be successful: Capitalism, nationalism, and “Judeo-Christian values.” These are all deeply related, and essential. America, says Bannon, is suffering a “crisis of capitalism.” (He uses the word “crisis” a lot—more on that later [ie. see Olyshenko]) Capitalism used to be all about moderation, an entrepreneurial American spirit, and respect for one’s fellow Christian man. In fact, in remarks delivered to the Vatican in 2014, Bannon says that this “enlightened capitalism” was the “underlying principle” that allowed the US to escape the “barbarism” of the 20th century”. This contrasts directly with Baudrillard’s impression that “enlightened” thought *is*.

⁵⁶ Ie. war with Iran

languished his electoral defeat through fierce rhetoric on Twitter, which was taken seriously by a proportion of the alt-Right and fringe, but also the fringe Leftists themselves, who immediately decried the action as Fascism, creating myriad content in tangent with the substantive portion of the fringe, and liberal capital was induced this way, too, further incensing the fringe and far-Right. Further Right than nationalism is indeed Fascism, and at this moment of discrete uncanny slippage, capital chose to move back toward the Left, toward a resolute transition of power, which implies the Leftist ideal has not been defeated by the Right. Trump became a symbol of Fascism through his binary use as a rhetorical symbol (Yao Lin 2021), and the public largely abandoned the Fascist symbol at the uncanny slippage, as on 4chan /pol/, too, far before the 6th of January, 2021. After Trump sacked Steve Bannon, Trump's "opinion rating" among the fringe on 4chan /pol/ plummeted. From being regarded as "based" (ie., he trolled the liberals and Leftists! He's so based, or awesome!), he became regarded as "cucked" (ie., a weakling). Trump could not be based, because he sacked Steve Bannon, and Bannon was more Right than Trump was. If Traditionalism is broached too quickly to a population, or the civil decay of liberalism rhetoric is not ripe, the public will collapse back toward the positivist, Leftist, ideal.

The last few Traditionalist influencers to be noted are Brazilian shaman Olavo de Carvalho, Norwegian esoteric Viking Varg Vikernes, and American social media personality Benjamin Owen, all of whose personal philosophies differ greatly (esoteric-communistic, egoistic-aryan, natalist, respectively), an affordance of the many permutations of possible trajectories online, but have come to the same "conclusion" against modernity- "return to the land". Both de Carvalho's compound in Brazil, and Owen's in Idaho, are styles of archaic communal living which will draw in the fringe over time, who are opposed to liberal lifestyles; what motivates the inert public toward Traditionalism is the image of regality, obligation, and privilege it offers each

subject: a return to the patro-centric, patriarchal tendencies of the centuries before the post-modern. Many /pol/ users muse about how they'll never have a "trad q.t. waifu" to make a homestead with or have many kids in the American frontier. In this sense, their plight is the plight of that patriarchal energy which took the liberal meme to the fringes of the Western world through the 1600s onwards into the 1900s, but which does not largely exist in contemporary culture. Only philosophers may muse why the Public has lost the will to live. One may reasonably induce that post-modernism heightens, rather than reduces, the game theory dynamic of Socratic dialogue through engagement with visual and audial stimuli across myriad platforms (Harris 1993), and often the only result of rhetoric in the post-modern era is for both sides of any pole to be more incensed, confused, and self-deprecatory after engagement, convinced the fabric of the world is oriented against them. This is the way in which digital technologies are akin to a "schizoid" space: no matter the symbolism presented to you by self/other, it is the mood induced through your interaction with digital media dictating the next symbolic transformation.

The fundamental lesson to be drawn from the Traditional influencers may be the "Great Right Hypothesis", the consideration that the alt-Right / fringe fundamentally see themselves as the tail-end of nearly 400 years of resistance against the Enlightenment / liberal meme, which is the Dark Enlightenment memes, and as the "pressure" of the Right grows more condensed, substantive, long-term political division between Right and Left, genetic and memetic divergences, will become dominant. Population density will come to be more of a demarcate between Left and Right than it already is. Florida, which was arbitrarily Right in 2021 (it switched fairly often between Right and Left before) will continue to stay Right, because the uncanny slippage of Covid-19 was so impactful that having an arbitrary Right-winged governor

in office in 2021 necessarily mandates the state, thereafter, will evolve in a Right-winged direction.

The difference between Right and Left will become endemic and stationary, bonded to the capital of the individual, family, or commune; the freedom to navigate capital in American social fabric will also decline, followed by folk-traditionalism and radical Christian revivalism, “a return to the land”, the wholesale rejection of most amendments after the Bill of Rights, which was considered relatively regnant principles among many traditional conservatives in America for a substantive portion of her history (ie. anti-Federalists to Confederates to American Nazis, ie., the fringe evolves its’ face, and only now grows dominant). The rhetoric of the Left at any level will become toxic to the Right, and vice versa. Taking American history not as the cumulation of events towards some “grand” liberal ideal goal (eg. Fukuyama’s ‘the end of history and the last man’), it is rational to hypothesize that Traditionalism is the only ideology which may adequately justify the severe decline of the liberalism meme in its’ final days among the public, especially among the users so incensed to violence, nationalists, and some conservatives, and as liberalism substantively declines, many nationalists or disaffection liberals will be induced by the Dark Enlightenment meme, the meme justifying the “degeneracy” of liberalism online- and their violence is the only last credo to enter unrighteous mammon.

Julius Evola teaches, “it will be as well to discuss the elements of "right conduct"... some refer exclusively to an absolute form of "departure" [from the world]... of a material as well as a purely interior or spiritual detachment from the world; that is to say, to the asceticism of the monk or anchorite... Of greater importance are the precepts of... morality... The following may be taken as a general maxim... "Though I be hurled head down into the infernal regions, I will do nothing that is ignoble”” (Evola 1943). In the coming decades of ideologues and chaos,

Aestheticism is a symbol which both the Left and Right may approach, regardless of beliefs in God, science, State, being, knowing, truth, logic, or culture, because it is the symbol of affable inaction in regards to the dynamic of these things; the symbol of choosing calmness, detachment, and acceptance of the world in its' dynamics, a concept which must be seen as wholly necessary to undoing some of the more deleterious affects of post-modernism on culture, which is the affordance of the Dark Enlightenment. Aestheticism as a concept could be applied to the State Department (e.g., formulating new "capabilities" more than new "morality"), and returns the individual from an ethical to ontological station. If Leviathan is dead; let the metaphor of Leviathan be the new metaphor of Leviathan. Enter unrighteous Mammon (RH Hiers 1970). In the digital era, it is easy to get lost in the headspace of the images and lifeworlds one consumes online, so the symbol of detachment from this function, *Aestheticism itself*, is a reasonable alternative for liberalism rather than ideologue decay. To connect to Hiers' post-Marxist critique, to be "aesthetic" is to be a humble eschatological proletarian who fully admits the arbitrary cruelty of all things- including the cruelty of self- accepting this inevitable dynamic as a world of forms. "Enter unrighteous Mammon", in this sense, means, "return to self/other", and avoid the intrinsic inflammation of the world.

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