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"The Land Is For Those Who Work It:
The 1969 Peruvian Agrarian Reform in the Pampa de Anta"

By

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The Land Is For Those Who Work It: The 1969 Peruvian Agrarian Reform in the Pampa de Anta

In May of 1912, descending what was once an Inca roadway, just outside the former imperial city of Cusco, Peruvian essayist José Carlos de la Riva-Agüero found himself in a rolling valley, surrounded on all sides by the towering Salkantay Cordillera. Recording his sojourn, Agüero offers a glimpse into one of Peru's lesser documented regions at the onset of the 20th Century: the Andean highlands. Traversing the valley, Agüero encountered a largely unbroken *pampa* –fertile basin floor- interrupted only by the occasional *hacienda* (land estate). It was from this seat, on the alluvial plain, that local *hacendado*s (landlords) dictated the rhythms of life for the predominantly indigenous population in a region known as the Pampa de Anta.[1] Retracing Agüero's footsteps today, one encounters a much transformed landscape. The once lightly populated *pampa* is now carpeted by clearly delineated farmlands, numerous homesteads and several large towns. On the outskirts of the largest urban center, regional capital and province's namesake, Anta, sits the old Sullupujio *hacienda* house. Albeit unremarkable by today's standards, this was once home to the zone's most notorious *hacendado*, Ezequiel Luna, and one of the few edifices permitted on the much coveted *pampa* by the ruling elite.

The Sullupujio *hacienda* serves as an illustrative example of how the Pampa de Anta's unassuming physical geography is a silent witness to a tumultuous recent past. Here, as across Peru, following a 1968 coup led by General Juan Alvarado Velasco, a left-leaning military government fundamentally transformed local life. Beginning in 1969, Velasco started dismantling the centuries-old system of *hacienda* domination; enacting what anthropologist Enrique Mayer has called "Latin America's most radical agrarian reform… a momentous shift in the history of the Andes, akin to the abolition of slavery in the Americas."[2] With the agrarian reform, *haciendas* were converted into centrally

1 De La Riva-Agüero, José Carlos. "La llanura de Anta" *Cusco Histórico* no. 1 (1920), p29. The region is also often referred to as Antapampa, although this is often applied more ambiguously to include areas of the valley that were not incorporated into the Cooperative and thus outside of this study. For sake of continuity and translation the region in question, that which was incorporated into the Cooperative, will be referred to here as the Pampa de Anta.

2 Mayer, E. *Ugly Stories of the Peruvian Agrarian Reform* (Durham; Duke University Press, 2009), p2

administered and worker-managed cooperatives.[3] Accordingly, in 1971, the Pampa de Anta's *hacienda*s were expropriated to form the Túpac Amaru II Cooperative, Peru's largest:[4] the Sullupujio *hacienda* was to be its administrative center. Unquestionably, this was a historic watershed for the local population, previously held in labor bondage as sharecroppers or forced to eke out an existence on the valley's periphery.

The Cooperative, among the first established in the highlands, was envisioned as a blueprint to address historic inequality and underdevelopment. Amid great fanfare, Velasco even attended the official inauguration in 1971, marking its esteemed place in government ambitions. Initially, for ending *hacienda* domination with promises of radical change, the Cooperative was welcomed by the local population. Yet, the successful removal of the *haciendas'* pernicious rule was stymied by underlying failures to improve life for all but a very select few. Moreover, land, rather than being distributed, was concentrated, while corruption and mismanagement were added to a litany of structural problems that brought the Cooperative increasingly into conflict with its charges. These tensions came to a head when, in 1976 -in a somewhat ironic turn of events for a Cooperative named in honor of Túpac Amaru- a series of *tomas de tierras* (land seizures) took shape.[5] Aided by a cabal of leftist party activists, local leaders brought most of the valley together in a visibly united show of force to seize lands and demand an end to oppressive forces in the countryside. After several years and numerous seizures, in 1979, the Cooperative was struck a death blow when the Sullupujio *hacienda*-turned-administrative center was taken by neighboring communities. An ignominious end came just weeks later when the government ordered the Cooperative's liquidation.

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3 Mayer (2009), p20: Velasco's government actually instituted two types of associative enterprises. The Túpac Amaru II Cooperative was organized as a Cooperativa de Producción (Production Cooperative; CAP) and functioned along the lines of traditional cooperative models; put simply worker-members were expected to work the land together, received a wage and split the benefits at the end of each year. The other, predominantly found in the central highland ranching estate, was known as Sociedad Agrícola de Interés Social (Social Interest Agrarian Society; SAIS), or what Mayer has called 'Supercooperatives', these were "variants specifically designed for the adjudication of highland sheep and cattle haciendas to indigenous communities…Land was to be adjudicated to individual peasant communities with the strong injunction not to divide up the land, but to develop a collective area with improved technology and a market orientation."

4 Peru's largest Cooperativa de Producción (CAP) not to be confused with the aforementioned SAIS.

5 Túpac Amaru II was the leader of an indigenous rebellion against Spanish forces in in the early 1780s. In the 20th Century he had been adopted as a cultural and political trope of near mythic status for a variety of purposes. Velasco's government, not one to miss a marketing trick, appropriated many indigenous cultural symbols to create a special blend of nationalism aimed at garnering popular support for its various programs.

Finally, by 1980, as the military government returned Peru to democratic rule, in the Pampa de Anta, land formerly of the Cooperative, once of the *haciendas*, was divvied up by local communities; many of whom had moved down from the valley*'s* edge to the newly acquired plots and, in the process, making their own mark on the *pampa.* Yet, just as gains were split, almost all the earlier displays of camaraderie dissipated, much to the consternation of leftist observers who were convinced that in the land seizures they had been witnessing the early stages of a revolutionary subaltern awakening.[6]

Ultimately, the Cooperative's dramatic fall from grace marked the first notable and, importantly, successful challenge to one of Velasco's agrarian reform structure by its supposed beneficiaries.[7] The Pampa de Anta, however, is significant beyond simply being a key moment in agrarian reform historiographies. It also constitutes a site, as Victor Caballero Martin has argued, where "one can study the resonances of a national history within the particular limits of a small rural ambit."[8] In this case a site to understand how local life and social relations defined a particular course of events at a moment of fundamental transition. Specifically, this paper uses as a point of departure the question many political observers were left to ponder following the Cooperative's liquidation: how were communities able to come together in such a meaningful and outspoken way, achieve no small feat in bringing down a showpiece of the reform -a direct affront to a military government- just for this unity to fall apart so soon after?

By tracing local history, one sees prior to the Cooperative, the zone had been a hotbed for revolts against the *haciendas* in a bid to ameliorate many of the bare material circumstances that governed daily life. Beneath these insurrections, however, the zone's *campesinos* were far from a united monolithic group. Rather, relatively speaking, key differences existed between communities, largely determined by ties to the *hacienda*, while internal relations were often defined by individualistic

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[6] Mayer (2009), p180-182

[7] Some important land seizures predated those in the Pampa de Anta, most notably in Andahauylas in 1974 and one earlier instance on the coast. These, however, were geared towards expediency in the expropriation of haciendas, not an end to the reform itself, the explicit demand in this case. Moreover, buoyed by this success, Leftist activists from Vangaurdia Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Vanguard; VR) also used the land seizures in the Pampa de Anta as a template for an anti-government movement praxis that helped dismantle the agrarian reform at a national level throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.

8 Caballero Martin, Victor. *Imperialismo y Campesinado en la sierra central* (Lima, Instituto de Estudios Andinos, 1981), p7

orientations to land and inter-and-intra community stratifications and conflicts. Importantly, with the Cooperative, notwithstanding the many changes that took place, key continuities persisted: namely, despite a creeping rich-poor bifurcation, nearly all the local population continued as subjects to similarly dire socioeconomic realities and political controls as before. Simply put, even 'rich' *campesino*s (peasant farmers) remained *campesino*s nonetheless, similarly excluded by the Cooperative's political economies. Thus, with realization that few, if any, tangible benefits were to be gained and prior experience of challenging *haciendas*, it was easy for many to see land seizures as a logical means to improve their lot.

Land seizures, however, did not simply spring forth as a harmonious expression of some abstract utopian unity. The impetus came from local leaders, what Antonio Gramsci has termed 'organic intellectuals', who worked to overcome persisting internecine conflicts and bind communities behind a narrative of a shared struggle for territory, sovereignty and a unifying indigeneity.[9] In closing ranks this way, communities embodied what Audra Simpsons has termed an 'indigenous refusal'.[10] In other words, a part traditional part instrumentalist 'refusal' of externally imposed orders deemed to pose an existential threat to individual and community life. Yet, although one can romanticize the land seizures as a groundswell of indigenous solidarity, as indeed many contemporary observers did, this unity was rather more defensive, tentative and volatile. That is not to say it was disingenuous, certainly during the seizures a genuine understanding of a recognizable plight existed. But, above all, holding communities together were local leaders and a shared awareness of the need to present a common front to protect lands from external threats. Importantly, beneath this, often obscured by the dramatic optics of the seizures, lay a fratricidal web of fissures and conflicts, largely driven by a desire to extend one's community and individual plots.

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9 Gramsci, Antonio, *Selection from the Prison Notebooks* (London; International Publishers Company, 1971) Trans Hoare, Quinton & Nowell-Smith, Geoffrey. These community leaders fall fairly squarely under what Antonio Gramsci has termed 'organic intellectuals', from broadly speaking the middle and upper strata of indigenous society in the Pampa de Anta they worked together with 'traditional' leftist activists that aided the land seizure movement. They were not beholden to party lines, however, and looked out for personal and community interests foremost, while articulating demands in cultural and sociopolitical specific terms of community struggles.

10 Simpson, Audra. *Mohawk Interruptus Political Life Across the Border of Settler States* (Durham; Duke University Press, 2014)

Following the Cooperative's liquidation, and with it the threat to recently seized lands, these underlying forces proved more consequential in governing daily life than more notional concepts of some innate indigenous unity. Or, in Simpson's words, all this happened despite the fact that, within and between communities, the concept of unity existed "more in consciousness than in practice."[11]

To build the narrative, this paper draws from a series of governmental and non-governmental studies of the region. Historical proximity to the Cooperative meant these documents were keenly interested in the more measurable outcomes of the model, curious to determine its viability as a remedy for highland underdevelopment. Although community experiences were considered, they often and inevitably took a back seat. Similarly, key to this paper are two studies conducted as events unfolded. The first, by Diego García-Sayán, a lawyer and political scientist working in the zone in the late 1970s, traced the causes and conditions that led to the land seizures, particularly its effects on social organization and a failure of party activists to develop a lasting political base in the zone. Although highlighting many of the complicated social relations and conflicts, as an observer, García-Sayán placed most of the blame squarely at the activists' door for failing to build a political movement on the back of the land seizures. This paper, rather than focusing on this as a failing per se, points out any such efforts would have been severely complicated by internal tensions, especially once the threat from the Cooperative abated.[12] This was more or less the view of the other key contemporary source, of anthropologist Genaro Paniagua, who argued that local communities followed the "*via campesina*" (the *campesino* way). This, he argued, was an inherent desire to break down land concentrations for individual cultivation. As a result the *via campesina* was a dynamic and relatively aggressive force, compared to conservative forms of land concentration favored by the state, and a principal source of conflicts between *campesinos* and the Cooperative and among *campesinos* themselves.[13] Paniauga, however, focused on assessing these two differing approaches to land usage, rather than the role of social relations as determinant factors on this history. In contrast,

11 Simpson (2014), p39-41
12 García-Sayán, Diego. *Tomas de Tierras en el Perú* (Lima: Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo, 1982), p16
13 Paniagua, Genaro. *Anta: Toma de tierras y la vía campesina de desarrollo* (Cusco; Universidad de San Antonio de Abad del Cusco-Tesis, Centro de Publicaciones Antropología, 1984), p50

the most recent academic study, by Enrique Mayer, focused on the land seizures movement and legacies of the reform. Mayer's account is reconstructed from participant memories, not just to tell a story but to gauge how events and legacies were popularly remembered.[14] This paper, in distinction to Mayer, however, is anchored by historical documentation, tracing the shift from the final years of *hacienda* life to the Cooperative's collapse, to uncover subtle community dynamics that underwrote local experiences, blurred by the display of the land movements and collectively held memories, using archival documentation, contemporary and subsequent testimonies, and interviews conducted by the author with community leaders and Cooperative members.[15]

On the Eve of Reform: The *Hacienda* and its Community

Peruvian society, according to political scientist and anthropologist Julio Cotler, has often been defined by 'a structural dualism' between the two dominant regions: the *costa* (coast) and the *sierra* (highland).[16] The *costa*, settled predominantly by European populations since the Spanish conquests, was by the 19th Century undergoing intense transformations with rapid growth and industrialization. Peru's capital, Lima, typified the region's ascendancy.[17] The Andean *sierra*, home to the Pampa de Anta, had a markedly different trajectory. A historic center since the Incan empire, emerging under Colonial rule and consolidating post-independence, a *hacendado* elite buttressed by bonded indigenous labor came to hold sway over vast tracts of national territory and with it the political domain. Land ownership as a means of sociopolitical control was simply a matter of fact in Peru, where less than two percent of land was arable.[18] By the late 19th Century, however, the *sierra hacendados*' influence waned and power was ceded to the coast. In line with Peru's divergent

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[14] Mayer (2009); Mayer's introduction explains in more detail his methodological approach and application of memories as a source. However, it is worth noting here that the memories used were recorded at a time when internal war ravaged much of the sierra, and speaking openly about political activity was a potentially risky endeavor.

[15] Archives consulted: the Peruvian National Library, National General Archives, Regional Directory of the Ministry of Agriculture in Cusco, the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru and the Bartolomé de las Casas Center

16 Cotler, Julio. *Política y Sociedad en el Perú: Cambios y Continuidades* (Lima; Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1994), p17

17 Watters, Raymond. F. *Poverty and Peasantry in Peru's Southern Andes 1963-1990* (Pittsburgh; University of Pittsburgh, 1994), p29; It is important to note that the coast was becoming a highly diverse region by the 20th Century and as urban centers grew so too did waves of internal migration comprised overwhelmingly of indigenous Andean émigrés driven by land shortages and dire socioeconomic circumstances. Large populations had been sustained on the coast's arid plains by 50 large rivers carrying melt waters from the Andes.

18 Watters (1994) p26; Per capita usage of 0.18 hectares in Peru is much lower than continental average of 0.50 hectares.

trajectories, by the 20th Century the "word '*hacienda*' was used to refer to two quite different types of social and economic units."[19] The coastal *hacienda*, akin to a commercial plantation, was a modern agro-industrial complex, often foreign owned and nearly always export-orientated, where those toiling the land closer are better described as rural proletarian wage laborers than bonded sharecroppers.[20] In contrast, the "almost mythical prototype of a highland *hacienda* was owned by an absentee landlord, administered by a local employee, and had a resident indigenous serf population… [because] the serfs were often not free to move elsewhere, the words feudal or semi-feudal were used to describe the despotic and exploitative conditions."[21] It is noteworthy, however, that although coastal models had reached parts of the *sierra central* (central highlands) by the early 20th Century,[22] the *sierra del sur* (southern highlands), home to the department of Cusco, clung strongest to traditional feudalistic tendencies.[23]

The feudalistic nature of the Pampa de Anta's *hacienda*, according to Jorge Villafuerte, a historian of Cusco, was "defined by its antecedents, evolutionary history [and] social relations."[24] In particular, an exacting system of local control developed as a consequence of the region's importance since at least the Incan era, serving as a breadbasket for the former imperial center just 15 miles away.[25] Anta's fortunes remained tied to Cusco following the Inca's military defeat by Francisco Pizarro, who divided the region into *encomiendas*, land grants dispersed to servants of the conquests.[26] The zone's *hacienda* thus came to be with the dispossession of indigenous lands and the superimposition of a system of bonded labor over existing kinship structures in the late colonial and early republican

19 Whyte, William F. 'Rural Peru: Peasants as Activists' in Chaplin, David *Peruvian Nationalism: A Corporatist Revolution* (New Brunswick; Transaction Books, 1976), p242-3
20 Whyte (1976), p242-3
21 Mayer (2009), p9
22 In parts of the Central *Sierra*, particularly the department of Pasco, and to a lesser extent Junín, export-orientated mining and ranching interests instituted similar modernizing economies of scale and technological models as the coast.
23 Rénique, José Luis. *State and Regional Movements in the Peruvian Highlands : The Case of Cusco, 1895-1985* (Thesis PhD. Columbia University, 1988), p201
24 Villafuerte, Jorge. 'Formación de la Hacienda en Anta, *Critica Andina*, 1:1 (1978) 13-137. p113
25Paniagua, Genaro. *Anta: Toma de tierras y la vía campesina de desarrollo* (Cusco; Universidad de San Antonio de Abad del Cusco, Centro de Publicaciones Antropología, 1984), p14; Paniagua also notes that according to chronicler Garcilaso de la Vega's *Comentarios Reales* regional connection to Cucso may date back to the Inca's very genesis, as one of the founding tribes came from the Anta valley.
26 Ibid. p15

era. Moreover, gradual population growth by the end of the Colonial era added to tensions over access to land, the lion's share by then concentrated in the *hacienda*s. These stresses were aggravated further post-independence with the penetration of market forces, resulting in the "commoditization of [indigenous community] lands and their subsequent alienation from community control."[27] The expansionist flames were again fanned in the late 19th Century by growing international prices for wool and other exports, assisted by successive governments that legalized any and all dispossessions.[28] A 1919 report on the Pampa de Anta's local economy noted the acute impact of these forces. The imminent completion of a railway line, the author concluded, was to mark a crowning moment for the crop, cattle and wool producing province, as the "agricultural district *par excellence* to supply Cusco's demands."[29]

As a result of these forces, *hacienda* expansions had been vigorous across Pampa de Anta in the late 19th Century and the trend saw an uptick during the 1930s when Ezequiel Luna was elected to a national senatorial position.[30] Using political ties to enlarge his various estates, Luna and fellow accomplices forcibly seized land belonging to adjoining indigenous communities. Met with outcry and remembered with a brooding discontent, these expansions constituted what would later form a collective font of injustices for communities across the zone. Conducting fieldwork in the region in 1963, Australian geographer and anthropologist Raymond Watters noted how one such community, Chilca, still remembered the *personero*'s (community leader) struggle with leaders from other communities against Luna's representatives.[31] Elsewhere a 1978 study of the ranching community of Compone revealed local claims that Luna had pushed them from *pampa* lands into higher Andean

27 Guillet, David. *Agrarian Reform and Peasant Economies in southern Peru* (Columbia; University of Missouri Press, 1979), p52-53; This process was begun in earnest by Simón Bolívar, Spanish America's liberator, who broke up communally titled land, previously granted to indigenous communities as de jure corporatist bodies. Liberal pretension of bringing indigenous communities into national economies aside, what Bolívar actually did was to kick off a second process of dispossession at the hands of the hacienda.
28 Caballero (1981), p27-33
29 Informe que sobre la provincia de Anta presenta by Miguel Enrique Mendoza, 1919, XPM 16766, Manuscritos y Libros Raros, Biblioteca Nacional del Perú, Avenida de la Poesía 160 San Borja, Lima, Perú, p5
30 Guillet (1979) , p53
31 Watters (1994), p107

recesses, much less hospitable for animal husbandry.[32] These land grabs were not the work of Luna alone, however. Cusco's Center for Rural Development confirmed the history of *hacienda* expansions was as alive as it was contentious, recording in the late 1960s and early 1970s, complaints in numerous communities of how vast tracts of land had been bought by neighboring estates.[33] Elsewhere in Cheqqereq and Mahuaypampa, accusations were more explicit; through 'invasion' and 'trickery' local *hacendado*s acquired their ill-gotten gains.[34]

For Esteban Puma from the community of Piñanncay, who had been both a Cooperative employee and a chief architect of its demise, these were all familiar tales. In an interview with the author, Puma reminisced of learning as a child how sometime around the 1930s two *hacendado*s, Mariano Díaz and Isabel Ochoa, had arrived from nearby Paruro: "They bought a small piece of land, one or two *topos* (Andean measurement for surface land for agricultural roughly equivalent to one-third hectare) no more and from there they began to take more and more land… They ended up with at least 40 hectares, 50 hectares. No it was more! Two hundred, three hundred hectares!"[35] The fact remains, regardless of the exact nature and number of dispossessions, often muddied by the ambiguities of communally held memories and perceptions of loss, by one way or another many of the local *hacendados* had significantly expanded their holdings. Consequently, for local communities on the eve of the reform, and beyond, grievances of forceful or underhanded dispossessions held firm, a particularly jarring wounds in a zone where an acute concentration of arable land was outside of community hands.

Land concentration was undeniably stark by the time agrarian reform officials began drafting notices of expropriation for the zone in 1969 as local *hacienda*s had consolidated into 68 extensive

32 Análisis de la producción en la comunidad campesina de Campone by Miguel Sánchez Tristán, Universidad Nacional San Antonio Abad del Cusco, 1978, DOC/07.05.01/04060, Centro Bartolomé de Las Casas, Pasaje Pampa de la Alianza Numero 164, Cusco, Perú. p1
33 Investigación de ocho comunidades de los sectores de Anta y Urubamba by Centro Básico de Capacitación Rural Cusco, 1973, DOC(BR)/07.02.01/01303, Centro Bartolomé de Las Casas, Pasaje Pampa de la Alianza Numero 164, Cusco, Perú, p21
34 Investigación de ocho comunidades (1974), p7
35 Esteban Puma Author Interview July 2017; One topo is equivalent to one-third hectare.

estates encompassing 67 percent of the valley.[36] This left the vastly more populous 37 indigenous communities just a 26 percent share, while 160 middle-sized landholders and 750 smallholders split the difference. Compounding the consolidation of land was the fact that quantity went hand in hand with quality: while the *hacienda*s sat atop the productive *pampa*, the indigenous peasantry was relegated to poorer land on the valley's periphery or slopes.[37]

Albeit concentrated in a few hands, the extensive estates still required a workforce and access to much desired lands was afforded to some, with between 40 to 75 percent of any given *hacienda* populated by tenant farmers.[38] David Guillet, an anthropologist working in the Pampa de Anta during the late 1960s, noted how communities had grown within the *hacienda*'s confines.[39] Referred to as *feudatarios*, these resident peons were given the right to cultivate small plots usually on the *hacienda*'s periphery with some access to animal pastures, all in exchange for their labor.[40] One gets a sense of this obligation's encumbrance in the Pampa de Anta by looking at conditions in the adjoining Urubamba valley, where, in 1961, a study found *feudatarios* were forced to contribute anywhere between 150 to 200 days of labor each year.[41] Moreover, *feudatario* families, typically the women and children, were also obliged to labor in the *hacienda* house. For Esteban Puma, son of a *hacienda* farmhand, this went beyond drudgery, it was subjugation plain and simple: "The most taxing, ugly and inhumane work was the *mita* (uses Quechan word for forced labor in the colonial system)… An example would be if my wife, my daughters, my sons and I, the six of us, would have to go to the *hacienda* and work for one week, two weeks, a month perhaps, leaving the house and

36 Paniagua (1984), p17-18 The main *hacendado*s of the region expropriated by the agrarian reform: Diaz, Vega Centeno, Romanville, Pacehco, Ponce de Leon, Quevedo, Araujo, Urioste, Lira, Acu, Gamerra, Infrio, Moreno, Silva, Oilvera, Trujillo, Rosas, Ramirez, Valdivia, Gamerra, Infantes, Bellido, Lorena, Vargas, Guzman, Hinjosa, Santander, Duenas, Cajigos, Alvarez.
37 Paniagua (1984), p17
38 Howard Handelman, *Struggle in the Andes: Peasant Political Mobilization in Peru* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1974), p27
39 Guillet (1979), p54
40 Paniagua (1984), p20
41 Pementel, Gustavo Palacio. "Relaciones de trabajo entre el patrón y los colonos en los fundos de la provincial de Paucartambo" Revista Universitaria del Cuzco 46, no.112 (1961): 174-222.

lands abandoned."[42] Making matters worse, the *feudatarios'* fate was at the *hacendado*s' whims, subject to a whole host of cruelties, according to an anthropology student, Genaro Paniagua, conducting research in the Pampa de Anta during the 1970s.[43] Likewise, a Dutch-funded NGO, CENCIRA-Holanda, documented how local *hacendado*s' tight grip extended to controlling access to markets for *feudatario* products.[44]

The prominence of the Pampa de Anta's landed elite's position and egregiousness of their abuses was confirmed by agrarian reform officials in Cusco who noted that "the process of land recuperation [started with] the most important and despotic *hacienda*s in the region… these *hacienda*s were located in the province of Anta."[45] Puma's sentiment on the highly dictatorial nature of this relationship so many years later certainly would have held its own weight at the time as a truism of life for those directly subjected to the strictures of the *hacienda*, with numerous studies in the zone documenting similar grievances.[46] Nor was this surprising as *hacendados*, often with a violent grip and almost always with impunity, controlled what the communities desired most: land. Such shared experiences and memories would form the yardstick against which the Cooperative would be measured. Moreover, drawing on this era would prove fertile terrain for a politically salient and historically credible metanarrative of dispossession that Puma and others would use to organize communities against the Cooperative.

Beyond the *Hacienda*: *Comunero* Communities

42 Esteban Puma Author Interview July 2017; Puma also pointed out that the burdens, and thus strains on communities such as his, often depended on the numbers tied to the hacienda and the *hacendado in question.* On any given hacienda a *feudatario* "may have to work one month, if there were more people on the hacienda it may be only one week."

43 Paniagua (1984), p 20

44 Plan de desarrollo de Antapampa by CENCIRA, 1979?, 33.985613/A59P, Guillermo Lohmann Villena-Libros Peruanos, Biblioteca Nacional del Perú, Avenida de la Poesía 160 San Borja, Lima, Perú. p27; Despite cutting imposing figures, by the late 1960s most the Pampa de Anta's hacendados were absentee landlords. Residency in urban centers like Cusco or Lima, however, only slightly hampered their influence. In their steads mayordomos supervised local estates, while in the few administrative centers, notably Anta, the political economy was controlled by a mestizo middle class. Local government officials, church, police, urban professionals, major merchants, and small or medium landholders upheld the local order, intimately tied to hacendado interests (Guillet, 1979, 38)

45 Estudio de los centros poblados de la Pampa de Anta by Chicata, Horacio. Ministerio de Agricultura Perú, 1970, DOC/07.02.01/01141, Centro Bartolomé de Las Casas, Pasaje Pampa de la Alianza Numero 164, Cusco, Perú. p3

46 Among the many documents that register compaints about the *hacendado*s at the time see;: Investigación de ocho comunidades (1974); Un Estudio de la comunidad de Eqqeccochacán (1964?); Estudio socio-económico de la Comunidad de Zurite-Cuzco (1960); Estudio de los centros poblados de la Pampa de Anta (1970); Análisis de la producción en la comunidad campesina de Campone (1978) ; Paniagua (1984) Watters (1994); Guillet (1979)

A 1960 Ministry of Education study picked up on the deep societal fault lines in the Pampa de Anta, a place where "social classes [were] clearly marked in three stratums: upper class, the *hacendado*s and authorities; the middle class, merchants, smallholders… and lastly indigenous or serf populations."[47] Such divisions were as stark quantitatively as they were qualitatively, as despite forming the majority of the region's residents, over 80 percent, virtually all indigenous *campesinos,* "constituted the base of the *sierra's* social pyramid."[48] Moreover, not only did the zone have a majority indigenous *campesino* population, the better part was not even housed on *hacienda* lands, but in independent *comunero* communities.[49] The roots of these communities date to the pre-Columbian era, when the Inca's basic social unit was the *ayllu*: "a clan of extended families living together in a restricted area with a common sharing of land, animals and crops."[50] Albeit much changed in composition by the midcentury, indigenous communities were nonetheless the most common grouping of the zone's most populous sociopolitical unit. Moreover, *comunero* communities had since the 1920s been granted some legal protections starting with gaining official recognition, further distinguishing them from *feudatario* counterparts. In the 1960s, Howard Handelman, a political scientist working in the *sierra,* gauged the fallout of these protections: "the position of the village *comunero* (independent *campesino*) in the 1960s was quite different from that of the [*feudatario*]. The villager controlled his own plot of land and generally marketed his crops as he saw fit… Thus, the *comunero* had long been more independent and self-reliant than the [*feudatario*]… he generally enjoyed higher standards of living and was more integrated into the national economic and social system."[51]

A Ministry of Agriculture study, conducted in 1970, to understand the demographic components at play in the future Cooperative, noted that *comunero* communities, mostly officially recognized, were

47 Estudio socio-económico de la Comunidad de Zurite-Cuzco by Ministerio de Educación Pública, Servicio Cooperativo Peruano Norteamericano de Educación, 1960, XJMA/ 985.613P4, Manuscritos y Libros Raros, Biblioteca Nacional del Perú, Avenida de la Poesía 160 San Borja, Lima, Perú. p5
48 Guillet (1979), p8
49 Handelman,(1974), p29-30; Across the *sierra* independent indigenous communities housed roughly 70-75 percent of the entire population.
50 Handelman (1974), p29
51 Ibid p29

clustered in 16 population centers deemed to have some slight levels of urbanization. In reality, the report admitted, this amounted to little more than closely grouped houses, organized in streets with some kind of local political administration system. A further 24 centers of loosely clustered homesteads with little-to-no administrative cohesion also dotted the zone.[52] Yet these centers were still core elements of the zone's human and political geography and *comunero* communities were at their core.[53] A fact upheld by an overwhelming weight of numbers, the zone's population centers were 89 percent *comunero* communities, while just eight percent were *feudatarios*. Thus, as the authors concluded, "the *campesino* communities represent a creative and strengthening element of the population centers."[54]

Within these centers, life had since at least the late 19th Century gravitated around the three most populous polities of Anta, Zurite and Huarocondo, over which the Cooperative would later be superimposed.[55] By virtue of population, these centers were also central actors in the political economy and historical trajectories of the zone. It was from here that the first *comunero* communities gained recognition. Throughout the early-to-middle decades of the 20th Century, nine more communities were recognized,[56] with more still appearing until 26 communities were officially recognized by 1953. This number grew again by 1960 to 37 leading to, by the time of the agrarian reform, recognition for over 76 percent of all the communities, as one by one they grew more independent from *hacendado* authority.[57] As CENCIRA-Holanda pointed out, several years into the agrarian reform, the consequence of this history was that "the process of gaining official recognition signified that the Pampa de Anta's communities went through a process of social consciousness development, which put them in direct conflict with the *hacendado*s. This fight grew concretely over

52 Estudio de los centros poblados de la pampa de Anta, (1970), p10
53 Ibid, p24
54 Unknown, 1
55 Informe que sobre la provincia de Anta, (1919), p37
56 Madueño, Ana Maria. *Las Comunidades de Anta; El Dilema Parcelar o No Parcelar* (Lima; Formciencas, 1983), p3; Others included Conchacalla, Ccahura and Huyallacocha.
57 Plan de desarrollo de Antapampa (1979), p27

the control and access to land, and since then it is difficult to find even one community that has not filed a complaint against the *hacienda*."[58]

A prime example of this was Puma's community of Eqqecco-Chacán and its annexes Chacaurque, Quehar and Piñanncay. In 1948, Chacán's *comuneros* collectively took the first steps towards recovering community lands, soliciting Colonial titles dating back to 1730 in pursuit of official recognition. Unsurprisingly, dispute with the local *hacienda*s Huaypo Chico and Huaypo Grande, of the Luna brothers, followed.[59] It would take fifteen years of struggle, at least one land invasion and a Presidential decree in 1961 for the community to be officially recognized holders of the lands in question.[60] This particular history is intimately tied to that of the zone in the coming years; for one, Chacán's ability to successfully challenge the most prominent *hacendado*s helped position it as a leader in the land seizures. Elsewhere across the zone, according to the Ministry of Agriculture, 14, of a possible 38, equally enterprising communities had launched their own challenges over land: "This situation has been a source of legal rulings over boundaries, the most, eight, with *hacienda*s."[61] These tended to be more exceptions than rules, however. Most independent communities had experiences more akin to that of Conchacalla, which prior to the reform was documented to have clearly delineated borders, with no recorded challenge to the surrounding *hacienda*s.[62] Meanwhile many more independent communities were left unrecognized, faced with a long and hard road of expensive legal challenges for recognition, even before contemplating repatriation of land.[63]

58 Ibid. p28
59 Un Estudio de la comunidad de Eqqeccochacán by Auhtor Unknown, 1964?, DOC/07.02.01/01545, Centro Bartolomé de Las Casas, Pasaje Pampa de la Alianza Numero 164, Cusco, Perú), p1
60 Watters (1994), p107; For land invasions see Investigación de ocho comunidades (1974)
61 Estudio de los centros poblados de la pampa de Anta (1970), p27-28
62 Síntesis de las comunidades indígenas oficialmente reconocidas en el departamento del Cusco by Dirección General de Asuntos Indígenas, Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Indígenas, Departamento de Estadística, 1952, XPM 16749, Manuscritos y Libros Raros, Biblioteca Nacional del Perú, Avenida de la Poesía 160 San Borja, Lima, Perú (1952), 11
63 Handelman (1974), p33-34

A seeming ascendancy of *comunero* communities and relative position vis-à-vis *feudatario* communities can belie the realities of life, however. Even the most 'developed' centers Anta, Zurite, and Huarocondo, were considered at the time to be "the lowest rung of the Peruvian urban hierarchy," according to Ministry of Agriculture officials.[64] Yet, in the Pampa de Anta, a further 16 population centers were characterized below the 'lowest rung', deemed to form a middle stratum in terms of development and services, while 19 more were documented with the most rudimentary subsistence.[65] Taking stock of local infrastructure, the officials noted, "34 percent of the population centers had no form of medical service and of the 66 percent that did it was often therapeutic or traditional medicine."[66] The picture got bleaker, as the study surmised that 92 percent of the population centers had no type of governmental support at all, while only two centers had electricity and just one with running water. Based on the bare material existence, another study grimly summarized that "the state of health in the province of Anta and the defense of human capital, as is the case in most of the *sierra*, has been abandoned by the state."[67]

A clearly growing differentiation, then, existed by midcentury between the *feudatario* and the *comunero* community, particularly if recognized. Recognized communities had at the very least some autonomy, freedom from forced labor and could attend to plots as deemed fit; at the very most, they could challenge *hacienda* structures, gain recognition and reclaim land. Yet, these distinctions came with significant qualifiers; for the most part recognition as a community did not, in and of itself, beget repatriation of dispossessed lands. Similarly, neither were differing levels of development ever more than hollow distinctions for a zone where even the key centers were viewed askance at the time as rudimentary in a country where penury was commonplace. In other words, a *campesino* from the most independent of *comunero* communities, living in one of the Pampa de Anta's three main

64 Estudio de los centros poblados de la pampa de Anta (1970), p51
65 Ibid, p25 & p40-42
66 Ibid, p31- 32
67 Unknown 2, p23

centers, could judge their lot to be better than that of a Luna *feudatario*. Yet, albeit locally significant, taken in the bigger picture this accounted for little, for the vast majority life was defined by bare material circumstances and was very much a struggle.

United and Divided: Individualist Outlooks, Land Concentrations and Communal Practices

On the eve of the reform, the largest source of concern and underlying tension dictating life for the zone's *campesino*s –*feudatario* or *comunero*- was not so much lack of development as access to sufficient land. For one, Handelman pointed out that "nearly 75 percent of the [*sierra's*] rural population… owned only 10 to 15 percent of the land and as such most [communities] lacked sufficient land to support their populations."[68] Inflaming tensions and buffeting the *hacendado*s' position was not just a shortage of land but an abundance of labor: tenant sharecroppers, landless peasants and surrounding independent communities all vied for increasingly scarce plots. Members of independent communities, such as in Chilca, could often solicit employment on the neighboring *hacienda*s.[69] Likewise, in Zurite, in 1960, about half of all men were economically active, a third of the overall population, and this meant working on the *hacienda*, abusive conditions and all.[70] Readily available work for others, including *comunero* communities, however, was scarce. A regional study found the zone's ample labor force was significantly underemployed and poorly distributed. In a buyer's market, the "shortage of adequate agro-ranching activity planning" resulted in "a disastrous property regime."[71]

In turn, this led to the dominant practice of minfundium, a system of agriculture dependent on a number of tiny fragmented plots worked primarily for subsistence; a direct consequence of land accumulation in the hands of the zone's *hacendado*s.[72] Tensions over access to sufficient plots were

68 Handelman, (1974) , p35
69 Guillet (1979), p21
70 Estudio socio-económico de Zurite (1960), p59
71 Estudio de los centros poblados de la pampa de Anta, (1970) p50
72 Investigación de ocho comunidades (1974?), p 2

further strained by the system of land inheritance that had developed within communities.[73] Juridical changes in the 1920s granting some communities corporate recognition simultaneously offered others an aperture to individual legal ownership of land through sale, possession and inheritance. Privately owned land was often divided among sons and, as population sizes grew, plots fragmented and shrank. Thus, land which previously had been returned upon death to the community, to maintain a balanced distribution, was increasingly retained within families. Guillet documented how this led to considerable accumulation in the hands of some households in the community of Rumipata where individuals often owned up to 40 plots, a considerable estate by local standards.[74] According to Ana Maria Madueño, working in the region just after the Cooperative's collapse, "this fact is of utmost importance as it legitimized a situation of differentiation between *campesino*."[75] Moreover, arriviste *campesino*s by wealth, resourcefulness, or simply good fortune were also able to purchase more land from obliging *hacendado*s. A study carried out in the community of Compone noted the *hacienda*s of Sullupujio and Marquesbamba started selling off a hectare of land to some as the moment when "the differentiation between *campesino*s emerged, stratifying *campesino*s into rich, middle and poor classes."[76] Likewise, the Center for Rural Development found that these prevailing practices led to further disarticulations as ever more people wanted their parcels to pass on through hereditary lines or sales, rather than returning to the community.[77]

The consequence of varying levels of landownership came to the fore in Zurite, where, by 1960, roughly half the population had their own plots, forming "a considerable sector of the population with disposable lands to rent."[78] The accumulation by certain peasants was so acute across the zone,

73 Watters (1994), p88; See Mayer (14-20) for a description of miscalculations of scale, and solutions to, land pressure was at the core of Velasco's agrarian reform.
74 Guillet (1979) 55-56
75 Madueño (1983), p3
76 Análisis de Campone, (1978), p3
77 Investigación de ocho comunidades, (1974?)
78Estudio socio-económico de Zurite (1960), p59

according to Guillet, that larger landholders rented plots to other, often landless, *campesino*s.[79] Further aggravating internal hierarchies, not unlike the *hacendado*s of the zone, large swathes of rented lands were held as *tierra en compañía* (sharecropping): that is, by *campesino*s no longer resident within a particular community. As land was retained through purchase or inheritance and *campesino*s accumulated surpluses, those living outside the community, or even the region, would rent plots for cash or more likely a split share of the outputs to tenants. This was widespread across the Pampa de Anta, where land-poor *campesino*s were left with little choice but to work for the relatively land rich, supplying their own materials, in a highly exploitative system: "The problem exists and is grave," the Center for Rural Development concluded.[80] Thus it was that "in this way the accumulation of land in the hands of living *comuneros* who have gained up to 15 to 20 hectares while others have no land whatsoever… generat[es] inequality and entrench[es] the practice of minifundium, the principal characteristic of this zone."[81] This stratification had consequences for *campesino* relations too. Within Chilca in 1964, "while 90 percent saw themselves as *campesino*s a few larger landholders saw themselves agriculturist and above this a few called themselves Peruvians."[82] With an acute stress on land, this at times boiled over into open conflicts, and at least two recorded instances existed by the time of the agrarian reform of legal rulings over inter-community disputes. In all likelihood there were others, for to reach a legal ruling was a long and arduous road, whereas in the *sierra* disputes are typically dealt with in-house at the community level, mediated by impartial parties.[83] These studies lend credence to a trend Watters had noticed, that "overwhelmingly, the heads of households saw

79 Guillet (1979), p55-56
80 Investigación de ocho comunidades (1974?), p1-2; Huarocondo residents held most lands in Huayllaqocha, Chaqqepay and Mahuaypampa.
81 Ibid. p2
82 Watters (1994), p83
83 Estudio de los centros poblados de la pampa de Anta, (1970) p27-28

their main tasks as subsisting and providing a livelihood for their families. Life is often seen as a constant struggle against nature, and against other people."[84]

Shifts to individualistic orientations to land, however, had not erased pre-existing forms of collective work in the zone. Paniagua noted among the most common was the reciprocal practice called *ayni*, or *minca* a labor exchange for food and alcohol. *Faena*, a communitywide agricultural work on communally harvested lands, was the other dominant form- heavy fines and social castigations would be levied against those who did not participate.[85] A Ministry of Agriculture study noted that, "regarding collective work it is interesting the figure arises that in 58 percent of the population centers the majority participated in collective work, and that 32 percent of the population centers say all their members carry out collective work. If we group these with the 8 percent of communities that say they only conduct some communal work, we arrive at the conclusion that only 2 percent of population centers carry out no communal activity."[86] Although this study arguably misread this as evidence of a communitarian spirit they hoped would underscore the Cooperative, it rightly points out this constituted "important referential data to support the hypothesis that the population centers… had not lost the social practice of organizing themselves collectively to carry out works of communal interest"[87]

The nature of such communal practices could be distinctly misleading. Watters, for one, saw communal labor as a consequence of necessity, practiced when the resources of family labor were inadequate for the task at hand.[88] Moreover, tensions were stoked by the fact that within communities, although "land was held as common property, each family had access to very little of

84 Watters (1994), p98
85 Paniagua,(1984), p20-21
86 Estudio de los centros poblados de la pampa de Anta (1970) p37
87 Ibid, 37
88 Watters (1994) p102

it."[89] Community sociopolitical structures also lived a somewhat fraught existence. The Center for Rural Development observed "in all communities the single form of associations [was] the general assembly."[90] Yet they found that assemblies, convening for joint decision-making on use of land, community issues and internal conflict resolution, met infrequently. Not only that but "in said assemblies the fundamental problems are not addressed, such as 'use of land' and improving organization. Rather, topics are limited to problems with harvests and administration. Everyone is unhappy with the organization."[91] In the late 1960s, Peace Corps volunteers working in the zone had been similarly frustrated with what they saw as a "lack of unity and by the attitudes of a number whose self-interest and lack of concern for communal well-being caused considerable handicaps to the various projects."[92]

Taken together the various studies present a picture of the Pampa de Anta before the agrarian reform as home to a heterogeneous peasantry, at the broadest level distinguishable by community relationships to the *hacienda.* As Handelman had noted, "the grievances of the *comuneros* were not as severe as those of the *hacienda* peons and the *comuneros* were in a better position to react against perceived injustices."[93] Delving further into these distinction, it is evident community life was defined by other, predominantly internal, cleavages. For instance, insomuch as official recognition had been a stabilizing force for *comunero* communities, this was countermanded by concentrations of land, internal stratifications and penchants for individualization. Furthermore, although the tradition of community-based activity was still alive, this was, importantly born out of pragmatic necessity rather than a necessarily communitarian spirit. But, in the end, most of these distinctions paled before the bleak facts of life for those that called the region home. To take one example: "thus,

89 Mayer (2009) p9-10
90 Investigación de ocho comunidades (1974?), p6
91 Ibid. p6-8
92 Watters, (1994), p126
93 Handelman (1974), p35

although Chilca, like other communities, was proud of being 'free' and 'independent'… the economic strategies followed by the peasantry revealed the hollowness of their claim. Their poverty and the ever present processes of pauperization… forced dependence through a relationship of servitude to more powerful local property holders."[94]

Rumbles in the Andes: Land Movements in the *Sierra* and the *Pampa*

By the middle of the 20th Century, new winds of change blew across the southern *sierra*. In particular, *hacendado* influence had waned as their physical grip on power through possession of vast estates loosened. This was best illustrated in the Pampa de Anta by the fact that "except for Luna's interlude, it appears that the *hacienda* began to decline in importance during [the 20th] Century and to fractionalize through inheritance patterns."[95] The breakup of the Tukiwasi *hacienda* was a prime example. Upon the death of the *hacendado,* a complex family web of death, sales and inheritance left the estate, which until 1910 was one *hacienda*, at the time of the agrarian reform as three separate estates, each with a different owner.[96] As Mayer put it, "though a landowner could socially strut around as an *hacendado*, the actual amount of land he controlled was far less than his legal title would suggest… and by the late 1960s the *hacienda* as an economic system was in severe decline."[97] In much the same way, local power dynamics were "changing because of improved infrastructure, the spread of education and new ideas, and the opening-up of new market opportunities."[98] Yet, diffusion of these new ideas gained additional traction, as Rénique argues, as for many change had been underwhelming as "capitalistic penetration into the Peruvian highlands did not bring about a

94 Watters (1994), p98
95 Guillet (1979) p53
96 Ibid, 53-54; Guillet wrote the following: "Three sons sold their shares to an individual who was related in no way to the original family. He died in 1946, leaving the property to his sister. She died the same year and left the property to a relative, his widow now owns it. One of the original sons inheriting the property in 1910 bought the share of one of his brothers. He died in 1934, leaving the property to his wife and son. They in turn sold the property in 1941 to the present owner. The remaining share from the six of the original transfer was split up in eight parts in the will of the brother who died in 1951. The heirs decided to cede their minuscule plots to the present owner in 1953".
97 Mayer (2009), p16
98 Watters (1994), p106

fundamental political transformation."[99] A final paradigmatic shift, and a consequence of these composite changes, was the peasantry's increasing ability to establish "viable alliances for beating the *hacendado*s in the battle for land."[100] Nevertheless, despite *hacienda* control significantly straining, they were yet to break. As Handelman observed, "it was [still] tremendously difficult for [*feudatario*s] to organize politically or to challenge the *hacienda* system in any way. Consequently, in the twentieth century, [*hacienda*-tied] peons participated in few revolts or organized peasant movements."[101] The first real test to shake the foundations of this system would not come from within but from independent *comunero* communities. Here, weakening *hacienda* influence and brewing discontent over access to land had resulted in an increasingly bellicose atmosphere. Such backlashes against the prevailing order were nothing new on the national scene, according to Pedro Prada; these revolts, however, were highly localized and failed to challenge the traditional order.[102] Yet, emerging in the 1950s were significant *campesino* movements of a different scale and kind, "characterized by intense and widespread rural mobilizations that not only question and disrupt the agrarian structure, but also profoundly shake Peruvian society."[103]

The first of these movements came from the central highlands. In 1959 two small villages in the Department of Pasco invaded *hacienda* lands tied to the Cerro de Pasco mining company; at first glance indistinguishable from a longstanding historical dance of revolt and repression. One village, Rancas, however, would eventually become "the first *sierra* [community] in recent Peruvian history to forcibly recover territory from a major *hacienda.*"[104] Three years later a similar wave of land seizures swept the nation; the most fervent unrest spread to the southern *sierra* and, above all, to

99 Rénique (1988), p173-4
100 Rénique (1988), p182
101 Handelman (1974) p24
102 Gibaja Vargas Prada, Pedro. *Movimiento Campesino Peruano: Algunos elementos de análisis preliminares y una aproximación bibliografía 1945-64* (Lima: Centro de Estudios Sociales, 1983) p11-14
103 Ibid, p7
104 Handelman, (1974), p63

Cusco.[105] The most significant mobilizations erupted some forty-or-so miles north of the Pampa de Anta, in the valleys of La Convención y Lares.[106] An especially significant outcome was the emergence of Cusco's first important peasant federation, the *Federación Departamental de Campesinos Cusco* (Departmental Federation of Cusco *Campesino*s; FDCC) which launched a series of valley-wide strike, famously joined by political dissident, Hugo Blanco.[107] By 1962, practically all the zone's *campesino*s had struck and for all intents and purposes controlled the valley's land which the *hacendado*s would never regain.[108]

Faced with this mounting pressure from below, as early as 1959, whispers of agrarian reform echoed in the halls of government.[109] The real impetus, however, came from a young progressive politician named Fernando Belaúnde Terry, who challenged the political order's twin pillars, the landed oligarchy and the political elite, particularly the *Alianza Popular Revolucianaria Americana* (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance; APRA) party, with his newly founded *Acción Popular* (Popular Action; AP). In 1962, following a "whole year visiting villages and towns drumming up expectations for an agrarian reform", Belaúnde's first challenge to the established order ended in an inconclusive three-way split election.[110] The military, fearing an APRA government towards whom they had historically held a deep animus, intervened as it had many times before, seizing power until new elections could be held a year later. Albeit brief, the military's tenure was significant, declaring Peru's first agrarian reform in the troublesome La Convención valley. Highly localized and minimally enforced -only one *hacienda* was ever expropriated- the reform unsurprisingly fell well short of addressing any underlying problems. Yet, as Handelman observed, for the time being, "the promise

105 Ibid p5-6
106 Handelman, (1974), p72
107 Ibid p129; As Handelman noted this was "one of the few peasant federations in Latin America organized from below."
108 Ibid p73-7
109 Rénique (1988) p145
110 Mayer (2009) p17

of reform, coupled with the military's earlier police repression, effectively stopped any additional invasions."[111]

The end result of this interlude was that by 1963 "agrarian reform was clearly 'an idea whose time had come.'"[112] For his part, Belaúnde redoubled his electoral campaign, reaffirmed promises for agrarian reform and won the presidency. Almost instantaneously, anticipation spread like wildfire and the *sierra* was awash with land invasions.[113] Murmurs of agrarian reform sprung from several fonts in the Pampa de Anta.[114] Arguably the most tangible of these, Guillet noted, came as the dead season in the Pampa de Anta matched perfectly with peak harvest in the La Convención valley and seasonal migrants brought back tales of challenges to the *hacienda.*[115] Moreover, popularly known as Red Cusco at the time, thanks to a burgeoning presence of communist and socialist parties, the city was politically active with demands for land redistribution spearheaded by a vibrant and combative syndicalist movement.[116] Thus, as a consequence of ties to the La Convención Valley to the north and Cusco to the south, a series of *hacienda* and community federations sprung up in the Pampa de Anta.[117]

The initial steps to forming communitywide federations were taken around 1959 but fortified in 1963, according to Madueño, "under the control and influence of [Cusco's] syndical movements… the *hacienda campesino*s organized themselves behind the demands for better salaries and working conditions… [while] within the independent communities decided to recuperate communal lands

111 Handelman (1974) p83
112 Ibid p82-83
113 Ibid, p111 Also in 1965 two separate guerrilla campaigns began inspired by foco Guevara in highlands and jungle
114 The Center for Rural Development noted how the community of Chacan had been visited by Peace Corp and Alliance for Progress representatives offering their own particular brand of agrarian reform. Esteban Puma's future wife and others even went to the US for training.
115 Guillet (1979) p35-7
116 Handelman (1974) p101-103
117 Del Mastro, Marco. *El Movimiento Campesino Cusqueño: 1968-1978* (Lima; Tesis - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú 1979), p14; Key leaders at this time were: Ruben Acurio, Emiliano Huamantica, Justino Huallpa, Victor Angles, Fausto Cornejo, Vladimiro Valer. In particular, Paniagua noted that the leftist activists of the FDCC and the FTCC were the ones behind many of the federations.

[usurped by the *haciendas*]."[118] The insinuation that land invasions came from purely external forces are misplaced, however. Although working with the federations, *campesinos* were not beholden to their whims; land invasions were very much community-led affairs. For instance, days before one of the zone's first land invasions, "community leaders travelled to Cusco, to the FDCC to air out grievances between the *hacienda* owner Julio Silva and the community members, in which the *campesino*s demanded Julio Silva return to them sector B of the Callanquinray estate, which was rejected. Instead, Silva offered to give up the sector of Cha'pupata but this offer, supported by the Federation, was declined by the community who accused the Federation of being too appeasing to the *hacendado*."[119]

Once the groundwork had been set with local federations, land invasions began.[120] Among the earliest were carried out by the community of Kataniray between 1960 and 1961, who invaded the La Joya *hacienda* to recuperate land only to be pushed back by the *hacendado*.[121] In the following years, communities even grew confident enough to challenge the most powerful *hacendado*s of the zone. In a sign of open defiance "in 1962 and 1963 the community of Tambo Real invaded the lands of T'pccpqueray that belonged to the *hacienda* Sullupujio."[122] Most of the *comunero* communities' invasions had in the crosshairs reclamation of land usurped by the *hacendado*s, such as the 1963 "*campesino* uprising against both Markju Grande and Markju Chico *haciendas* over recognition of boundaries."[123] In 1963 these invasions were widespread across the entire Pampa de Anta, reflecting a united movement. At one point around 2,000 peasants surrounded the capital Anta and demanded

118 Madueño, (1983), p3-4 Also see; CAP Tupac Amaru II de Antapampa Ltda.: informe by CODERSO Cusco, 1977, DOC/07.03.02/03053, Centro Bartolomé de Las Casas, Pasaje Pampa de la Alianza Numero 164, Cusco, Perú. p11
119 Paniagua (1984) p23- 24
120 CAP Tupac Amaru II de Antapampa Ltda.: informe (1977), p11
121 Paniagua (1984), p24
122 Comunidad de Tambo Real Ayllo Mayo by Author Unknown, 1968, DOC/07.02.01/00774, Centro Bartolomé de Las Casas, Pasaje Pampa de la Alianza Numero 164, Cusco, Perú. p7-12
123 Paniagua (1984), p24

that the *hacienda* lands in dispute in Huarocondo be turned over.[124] By late 1963, the local situation was so volatile that the Cusco Chamber of Commerce sought the declaration of a state of emergency for the zone.[125] Tensions reached fever pitch soon after when *campesino*s reportedly from Anta and Huarocondo blocked the main highway to Cusco and blew up a stretch of railway to La Convención.[126] All in all, over "these years in total 65 *hacienda*s were invaded, principally those with the most land, including properties belonging to Luna, Pacheco, Diaz, Urioste, Silva."[127]

This movement would prove consequential for the zone's response to the Cooperative. In an augury to later events, communities were brought together by leaders and, importantly, held together by a united desire to challenge the *haciendas.* Amandina Quispe, another instrumental leader in the coming land seizures, remembered accompanying her father as a young child in these years: ""we would listen to the radio for news of events in La Convención, to hear about the federations… my father would go to meetings at night… and they spoke about how to fight back against the *hacendado* (*el patrón*)."[128] Elsewhere, the community of Cheqqereq entered the Churacalla *hacienda* claiming: "We met and all decided to retake the lands, we also collected fees to cover any costs."[129] Beyond the actual experience of working in unison, this era was also consequential for how it was remembered posthumously. The Center for Rural Development extensively documented the reach and support the syndicalist movement enjoyed, as "almost all the communities belonged to a union in the 1960s" which was roundly remembered as "a good period."[130] In a similar vein, this era was also evidently a key formative experience for the future leaders of the later land seizures. Isidiro Franco, in 1980, less than a year after the Cooperative's final lands were taken, spoke about his experience of these years

124 Guillet (1979) p41; Elsewhere Guilett noted the following communities rose up; Andenes, Campana, Oroco, Kenko invaded Santa Barbara and La Perla in Zurite. Pitucalla, Kallanquiray and Larraconca invaded lands. Huarocondo and Huayllaccocha invaded Huaypo Chico, Huayllas and Sartuhuaylla also invaded *haciendas*. The Center for Rural Development recorded invasions by Ccaccahuara on hacienda Ichubamba, Tambo Real on Tamboraccay, Kataniray on La Joya, Conchaccalla on San Ezequiel. Eqqueco Chacan on Huypo Chico.
125 Rénique (1988) p197 see; ECC, 11-13-1963, p3
126 Ibid. 200
127 Paniagua (1984) p24-25
128 Amandina Quispe Author interview July 2017
129 Investigación de ocho comunidades (1974), p21
130 Ibid. p7

at a CENCICAP meeting, a local NGO. Like Puma, Franco was from the community of Eqqeqo Chacán and was also a future leader of the land seizures. In the 1960s, he joined a local federation along with other community members.[131] Franco recalled: "we began to work with the help of the community and the community was now aware of the issues and we held an assembly [to decide on the land invasion]… we saw how they lived on the *haciendas* [and] we said, we do not have land and what are we going to do."[132] Puma, speaking at the same meeting, also witnessed the movements. Although younger than Franco, he similarly acknowledged these events as key to zone's combative history. Listing the invasions one by one, he said: "Martin Salas [a local leader] found trouble in the Pampa de Anta, he generated a movement from 1963 to 1964 in Huarocondo against the *hacendado* Silva. After, we had a movement against the *hacendado* Diaz and from the communities of Kataniray, Yanama, Compone against Mariano Luna."[133]

Elsewhere across the *sierra* the situation was threatening to boil over into open rebellion, leaving Belaúnde, little over a y,ear into his term, in a deep bind. For his part, he made good on the campaign's signature promise, passing an agrarian reform on 24 May, 1964. The reform prohibited serfdom and personal service, *campesinos* were granted ownership over usufruct parcels and communities were bestowed ownership rights and high priority in adjudications.[134] The reform, however, was a shadow of what had been promised. Belaúnde's government, hampered by its minority in Congress, was blocked by a coalition between the landed oligarchy and APRA.[135] Exceptions, loopholes and a tedious bureaucratic legal framework resulted in an overpromised and undercooked reform that was instituted piecemeal.[136] Ultimately, as Watters surmised, "unfortunately

131 Testimonio campesino sobre las areas asociativas en las comunidades campesinas de la micro región de Anta by CENCICAP, 1980, DOC/07.02.01/02101, Centro Bartolomé de Las Casas, Pasaje Pampa de la Alianza Numero 164, Cusco, Perú; p2. Franco, and others, had also gone to the La Convención valley as itinerant workers, making contact with Hugo Blanco on their travels.
132 Ibid. p4-5
133 Ibid. p2
134 Mayer (2009), p18
135 Mayer (2009), p3
136 Ibid p18-19

Belaúndeism was always much stronger on style than on substance."[137] As the invasions spread to Cusco, Belaúnde gave in to the oligarchy's demand for a return to law and order.[138] The government response differed across the *sierra,* but in the Pampa de Anta it was swift and fierce, beginning in earnest in 1963 with broad arrests of suspected leaders.[139] In early 1964 the sub prefect of the province of Anta "expressed the new government policy when he warned villagers to cease invading or face severe police repression."[140] In the end, informants of the Center for Rural Development noted how, with most leaders jailed or returned to Cusco, just before Velasco declared his own reform, traces of a local movement had vanished from all but collective memory.[141] Esteban Puma, in the CENCICAP meeting, in 1980, pointed to a sense of unfinished business left following this movement's collapse: "In this era the law had not favored anyone in [the Pampa de] Anta; only the community of Compone had recuperated some 10 hectares of land… But in Quehar, Piñanncay and Chacán, in these places, none of this had been able to happen."[142]

The Pampa de Anta was not alone in the early 1960s as the uprising had reached almost every corner of the *sierra*. This was, after all, Rénique argued, "a time when the country was going through a modernization process, Indian rebellions showed not only that the Andean tradition was alive, but also that four million Indians were the vital source of Peruvian nationality."[143] Handelman agreed, stating that although at the time, "the peasantry [was] not a significant independent voting block and because its members lack association that can articulate their demands to the government, often its only political power capability may be its potential for violence"[144] Or to paraphrase Tamar Herzog,

137 Watters, (1994), p75
138 Handelman (1974), p122
139 Paniagua, (1984), p23- 24
140 Handelman (1974), p120
141 Investigación de ocho comunidades (1974); This study recorded in every single community a yearning of a return to this kind of a movement.
142 Testimonio campesino (1980), p3
143 Rénique (1988), p74
144 Handelman, H (1974), p6

*campesino*s learnt 'they could vote with their feet';[145] an important lesson that would be carried forward by the likes of Franco, Puma and Quispe. Yet, even within this milieu, events in the Pampa de Anta resonated beyond the valley's confines. The Ministry of Agriculture, for one, noted the local reputation for having one of the *sierra's* traditionally most mobilized and combative peasantry.[146] So much so, in fact, that "when the [agrarian reform] was passed, the problematic socioeconomic and political situation in the Pampa de Anta was still in full swing, which is why in 1970 it was considered a top priority for the expropriation and adjudication program, despite the fact that the zone still had not been declared an [official] Agrarian Reform Zone."[147]

The communities in open dissent, however, learnt the hard way the overarching political economies and power of the *hacendado*s still defined much of local life. Yet, Madueño argues, "despite the severe repression taking stock at the end of the land invasions one can surmise that the communities were able to achieve an end to forced free labor, a shorter workday and, above all, the *campesinos* gained experience of methods and organization that would help them, in the future, to work together and know their strength."[148] Beyond the material gains, this history is also suggestive of the fact communities were able to overcome local divisions, individualistic outlooks and seemingly disappearing interest in community structures to challenge the most powerful *hacendado*s of the zone. The opposition was to such a degree that looking to mollify an agitated valley the *hacendado*s were forced to make what had once been unthinkable concessions. Nor was this unity purely held together by the input of outside federation structures; communities acted on their own steam and in large numbers to boot. Perhaps the best evidence for the existence of a willingness to unite and challenge broad strictures can be seen in the near ubiquitous reach of community

145 Herzog, Tamar: *Frontiers of Possesion: Spain and Portugal in Europe and the Americas* (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 2015) 59
146 Plan de desarrollo de Antapampa (1979), p3
147 Apuntes sobre la problemática agraria en Anta by INP Peru, 1978, DOC/07.01.01/00603, Centro Bartolomé de Las Casas, Pasaje Pampa de la Alianza Numero 164, Cusco, Perú, p 4-5
148 Madueño (1983), p3-4

federations. Most importantly, for the coming years, the movement would serve as an illustrative example for local leaders, backed up by generally fond popular memories and yearning of a return to such forms of organization precisely at a time the Cooperative-community relations were straining. Ultimately, despite internal divisions, the zone had demonstrated a collective 'refusal' of the *hacienda* control over community lands.

'Plan Anta': The Rise and Fall of the Cooperative Túpac Amaru II

By the late 1960s, despite restoration of an uneasy calm, a mixture of the land invasions' sheer scale and Belaúnde's increasingly lame duck presidency led to an air of low public confidence and even lower expectations that a solution to the *sierra's* troubles would be reached. The seeming deadlock, however, was broken in the early hours of October 3, 1968, as the sound of tanks rolling across Lima's Rímac River pierced the early morning calm. The Peruvian military, as it had before, decided to intervene, ushering the half-asleep Belaúnde from the presidential residence, onto a plane and out of the country. Awakening to a military junta, many Peruvians met the news with little surprise. But when just six days later the military's leader, General Juan Velasco Alvarado, decreed the nationalization of the one company oil industry monopoly, long held contentiously under US control, eyebrows were raised; perhaps this was different to previous interventions interested in maintaining the status quo.[149] Velasco, for his part, did not disappoint, enacting what Dirk Kruijt labeled a 'revolution by decree', as a flurry of laws were passed targeting all corners of Peruvian society.[150] The jewel in the reformist crown was without a doubt the Agrarian Reform Law, prepared in secret and released without warning on June 24, 1969.[151]

149 Aguirre, Carlos & Drinot, Paulo. *The Peculiar Revolution: Rethinking the Peruvian Experiment Under Military Rule* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2017), p1
150 Krujit, Dirk. *Revolution by Decree: Peru 1968-1975* (Amsterdam, Thela Publishers 1994)
151 Aguirre, C. & Drinot, P (2017), p2-3

The initial phase of the agrarian reform targeted the lucrative agro-industrial complexes on the coast. Once complete, Velasco turned his attentions to the *sierra*, the traditional seat of landed oligarchy long viewed by coastal residents as a leading cause of the nation's fraught economic development and social unrest.[152] Since the early 20th Century, intellectuals and politicians from divergent viewpoints had looked for solutions to what was commonly known as the 'Indian problem'. In one of his seven famous essays José Carlos Mariátegui, founder of Peru's Communist Party, forwarded what would become a canonical argument that 'the problem of the Indian' was not just racial, but socio-economic, namely the lack of access to land.[153] Mariátegui and other likeminded thinkers' arguments for land redistribution underscored proposals from social scientists and policy makers thereafter.[154] In Velasco they suddenly found a friendly ear, the "first government ever to execute significant income redistribution in a society of great inequalities."[155]

The Pampa de Anta felt the agrarian reform's full effects early, earmarked as the "first important attempt at making the reform visible in the southern *sierra* of Peru."[156] The zone was planned to be a showcase for the reform's ability to transform indigenous regions with considerable effort and resources allocated for the task.[157] An outlier in more than just government ambitions, the future Cooperative was also to be enormous in scale compared to its counterparts, the majority of which comprised a couple of *hacienda*s. The Cooperative Túpac Amaru II, however, was to incorporate over 105. "The colossal expanse of this gigantic Cooperative" was, according to Héctor Martinez,

152 A long standing fear of coastal residents had been of a millenarian highland uprising against the extremely unequal agrarian system descending from the Andes in open revolt. This fear had been heightened by large waves of rural-to-urban migration since the early 20th Century.
153 Mariátegui, José Carlos. *Siete Ensayos de Interpretación de la Realidad Peruana* (1928)
154 Mayer (2009), p9
155 Ibid. p3; In grossly simple terms, Velasco's agrarian reform was predicated on the idea that redistributing land would solve land pressure. As Mayer noted, however, others pointed out after the agrarian reform was enacted, a simple redistribution of land would never have sufficiently altered the highland's chronic problems. Simply put there was not enough land to go around.
156 Mayer (2009), p151; This was not by chance but a response to the region's combative reputation following the land invasions of the 1960s. In fact, groundwork was being laid by Belaúnde's government to bring his reform to the zone, just two months before his ouster a group of engineers and topographers from Lima travelled to the Pampa de Anta to collect information according to Watters (1994, 219).
157 Guillet (1979), p102

"hard to comprehend."[158] Grand designs were marked by equally grand promises and expectations. According to a University of Cusco study, since 1969 the Pampa de Anta's status as a 'pilot' project generated "great expectations among the local peasantry."[159] Building anticipation, official news of the Cooperative's arrival spread in an almost messianic fashion. Beginning in mid-1970, the government ran a promotional blitz to attract members: newspaper advertisements ran in *El Comercio* and *El Sol*, posters couched in Velasco's sloganeer rhetoric, with phrases like 'the land is for those who work it' and 'the boss will no longer feast on your poverty' plastered local walls, government promoters walked from community to community and a van equipped with a speaker system was seen, and heard, crisscrossing the zone.[160] As this was taking place, in October, an eight-day training course was held on the recently ex-Sullupujio and Ancachuro *hacienda*s, where two elected representatives from each community were 'educated' to report back about how the Cooperative was going to transform the region.[161] García-Sayán spoke to Franco who claimed to have heard of the Cooperative's arrival from Esteban Puma, then a willing promoter of the agrarian reform: "He told us the Cooperative would be ours... We joined the Cooperative because we thought there would be help for us… help for the poor *campesinos*."[162]

Reformist hubris aside, according to an NGO study of the Cooperative's early years, behind the scenes this was "an era of conflicts" between the Ministry of Agriculture and ONDECOOP (the government agency in charge of all Cooperatives), over which Cooperative model to follow. *Campesino* leaders from Anta and Zurite along with ONDECOOP suggested the formation of three separate cooperatives. Leaders from Huarocondo and the Ministry of Agriculture however won out with demands for just one, which was officially confirmed in June 1970 with the forming of the

158 Martínez, Héctor. *Reforma agraria peruana: las empresas asociativas alto andinas* (Lima, Centro de Estudio de Desarrollo; 1990), p109
159 Comunidades y Empresas Comunales by Jorge Díaz Gómez; Carlos Arturo Dávila Rojas. Instituto de Investigación UNSAAC-NUFFIC, 1982, BIB/03.03.05/12091, Centro Bartolomé de Las Casas, Pasaje Pampa de la Alianza Numero 164, Cusco, Perú. p21
160 Guillet (1979), p105-6
161 Acta de delimitación de tierras (1978), p14; Also see Guillet (1979), p105-6
162 García-Sayán (1982) p129

Cooperative's constitution.[163] Shortly after, in December, the first stage of land adjudications began when 17 *hacienda*s covering 5,541 hectares were seized. Until the Cooperative was fully functional, it was agreed expropriated lands were to be entrusted to the Provisional Adjudication Commission of Plan Anta to be administered, including the 1970-71 agricultural season.[164] The commission's representatives were named by the Ministry of Agriculture and all came from a local pro-government peasant union, the United *Campesino* Front of Anta (*Frente Unico Campesino de Anta,* FUCA*)* founded the same year by, among others, Esteban Puma. According to an Agricultural Sector Planning Office (*Oficina Sectoral de Planifiacmineto Agricola,* OSPA) study, these were middling *campesino*s, "from a socioeconomic perspective, the control of the organization appeared to be in non-marginalized hands… In terms of property and interests there was a significant gap between these actors and the peasantry." This, the study concluded, sowed early doubts among *campesino*s over who the reform's real beneficiaries would be.[165]

In spite of internal politicking, expropriations started again in January 1971 and continued apace over the next two years.[166] As lands were seized support remained generally positive. Certainly the import of the moment was not lost on many. According to Watters, an observer of the process, the removal of the former system in the early years translated into "interest in the agrarian reform remain[ing] high and generally positive. The peasants of the Pampa appreciated that a real revolution had occurred."[167] At the FDCC II Congress in 1970, the region's largest *campesino* organization, where the Pampa de Anta was well-represented among the 400 delegates, motions of support for the agrarian reform were approved. But, in an omen to future problems, demands were made that

163 Detalles de Cooperativa Agraria de Producción Túpac Amaru II de Antapampa Ltda. No. 105 by Becerra Piscoya, Juan José Lima Centro de Estudios de Participación Popular, 1974, HD1491.P42C4312, CEDOC, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Av. Universitaria N°1801, San Miguel, Lima. p1-2)
164 Paniagua, G. (1984), p32; It would seem the 'Provisional Adjudication Comission de Plan Anta' took on various names, Esteban Puma referred to it as the Comite Especial while other sources have it under a different names.
165 La Implementación de la reforma agraria en las cooperativas agrarias de producción Tupac Amaru No. 106 de Antapampa y Lauramarca No. 56 by Instituto Nacional de Planificación, 1973?, DOC/07.03.02/05353, Centro Bartolomé de Las Casas, Pasaje Pampa de la Alianza Numero 1, Cusco, Perú, p2-3; For founding date see Sayan p127
166 Apuntes sobre la problemática agraria en Anta, (1978), p5
167 Watters (1994), p222

communally held lands usurped by the *hacienda*s be returned to the communities.[168] Popular support reached a zenith with a massive public outpouring in September 1971 when Velasco, accompanied by a small army of dignitaries and officials, visited the ex-*hacienda* Sullupujio for the Cooperative's official opening.[169] Although attitudes towards the reform remained favorable, according to Puma much of the *campesino* body was a little more quizzical: "they did not really understand what a Cooperative was."[170] Some of these underlying cracks surfaced when, in September 1973, a local newspaper reported that 5000 *campesino*s along with 50 organizations and 14 speakers came to demand more haste from the agrarian reform in expropriations of other *hacienda*s.[171] By that time, expropriations had slowed to a trickle; from there onwards periodic seizures were conducted until the last one in 1976.

By the mid-1970s the agrarian reform had seized 31,638 hectares for the Cooperative; a further 17,940 hectares passed into community hands and 2,000 to private agriculturalists.[172] Along with land, by 1973 the Cooperative had formerly incorporated 2,125 heads of families as '*socios*' (associates) and counted 4,190 more families under its purview.[173] Of these 6,225 families, 1,200 (21 percent) had been *feudatarios*, 4,677 (75 percent) *comuneros* and the remainder comprised small and middle holders.[174] The government agency charged with rolling out the Cooperative, CONMACRA, presented in a document the official rationale behind the mammoth project, to find an optimum size socioeconomic unit. The plan was to tread a fine line between earning economic dividends from economies of scale while removing *hacienda*-style concentrations of power and creating mechanisms

168 Del Mastro (1974), p79-81
169 Mayer (2009), p151;Velasco's entourage included Comander Augusto Villaconta, Minister of Government and the Police; General Juan Mendoza Rodrigues, Minister for Public Education; General Zenono Noriega Agüero, Minister of War and President of the Ministerial Cabinet; Noriega Calmet, Minister of Development and lastly Minister of Justice and Culture, Dr. Augusto Tordhik
170 Author interview with Esteban Puma on 7/10/2017
171 Del Mastro (1974), 101-102; Newspaper article 'Mitin *Campesino* en Anta (Chaski, Ano 2, No 37, Cusco, 8 Set 1973 Gigantesco Mitin en Anta)
172 Madueño (1983), p7
173 Acta de delimitación de tierras (1978),p15
174 Plan de desarrollo de Antapampa (1979), p3

for peasant participation.[175] It was also feared that adjudicating *haciendas* one by one would have favored *feudatario* communities, sidelining the valley's more numerous independent communities.[176] Thus, the best course of action was judged to be merging the zone's different units together under a single Cooperative umbrella.[177]

For Madueño, who worked with communities in the aftermath of the Cooperative's collapse, the story behind the model's failure was a relatively straightforward one: "they had no success in achieving these objectives."[178] Enormous in scale, over-engineered and nearly impossible to administer, the Cooperative also "had not taken into account differing levels of productive capability and technology between the economic units (the different communities). This meant the Cooperative with its centralized position was not able to effectively utilize the productive lands, nor was it able to exert full control over all the adjudicated areas."[179] These shortcomings were clear for all and the Cooperative locally earned the moniker *machu asnu*, Quechan for old donkey. According to García-Sayán, this was "a very important element in explaining the turn of events in this zone."[180] Looking back in 1979, after land seizures, CENCIRA wrote that "from the beginning it was clear that a Cooperative of this size… would not be viable in the long-term… The associate communities realized quickly that the situation was creating minimal benefits: they had not recovered their lands and the Cooperative was unable to offer them any social compensation."[181] Even at the Cooperative's inauguration, Mayer notes how when the administrator's grandiose promise to General Velasco "that he would turn the Pampa de Anta into a flourishing garden" many of those in attendance "doubted even then that it could be done."[182] Yet, despite the fact this may have seemed

175 Paniagua, (1984), p27 & Guillet (1977), p103
176 Madueño (1983), p5
177 Ibid. p10
178 Ibid. p10
179 Madueño (1983), p10
180 García-Sayán (1982), p128
181 Plan de desarrollo de Antapampa (1979), p3
182 Mayer (2009), p153

like a self-fulfilling prophecy, at least with the benefit of hindsight, if not to many at the time, it is not necessarily why the Cooperative failed but how that was impactful for local life. For instance, added to these structural problems was a litany of other issues such as the emergence of power groups within the Cooperative and tangible benefits felt by only a select few. More importantly, from a community perspective, new and existing stratifications compounded already significant internal fissures. All in all, an atmosphere of mistrust and distance from the Cooperative, and to a lesser but still significant degree between one another, permeated local life over these years.

The Old Donkey: The Cooperative before the Land Seizures

Once up and running, officially the Cooperative's operation was turned over to the member body. A General Assembly of 120 delegates, elected from communities across the zone, met twice yearly to decide major priorities and policies that were formulated into a 'work plan'. Execution of the plan was then bequeathed to an 11-member Administration Council charged with hiring and budgetary oversights. A parallel body, the Vigilance Council, was also formed to ensure general accountability.[183] Day-to-day operations including the work plan were in turn delegated by the Administration Council to an outside hired administrator, ultimately responsible for the Cooperative's fate.[184] The problems engendered by this highly-stratified order were immediately clear. SINAMOS, a Velasco government agency charged with drumming up popular support for the revolution, noted that the General Assembly met much less frequently than required. Although the two councils maintained regular schedules, their smaller number essentially led "to just a few members running the Cooperative."[185] Concentration of administrative power passed down the organizational structure to 43 smaller committees tasked with addressing specific issues, the majority

183 Watters (1994), p220
184 Guillet (1979), p107
185 Cooperativa agraria de producción Anta by SINAMOS, 1973, DOC/07.03.02/00776, Centro Bartolomé de Las Casas, Pasaje Pampa de la Alianza Numero 164, Cusco, Perú, p3-4; SINAMOS complained about how since September 1972 the General Assembly had only met five times

of which did not carry out local assemblies.[186] If power grabs did not immediately stir local ire, inept management soon did. Starting at the very top, between November 1971 and February 1972, an Executive Committee replaced the first Administrator following widespread dissatisfaction with his performance.[187] By February 1972, the Executive Committee too was replaced for similar shortcomings.[188] Likewise, SINAMOS stated candidly that from the outset the councils neglected their roles, did not adhere to the Cooperative's official Organization and Functions Manual and failed to record accounts for any of the initial campaigns.[189] "Technically speaking [the councils] do not run the Cooperative with any logic, we found many oversights in the harvest, underemployment … unaccounted salary payments, deficient commercialization [and a] lack of clear direction and control."[190]

Mismanagement was accompanied almost immediately by petty venality and internal politicking. The Administration Council overruled the Vigilance Council, while the latest Administrator disregarded everyone, helping himself to salary increases, acting "according to his own interests."[191] Willing accomplices, the Administration Council reaped patronage benefits such as internal promotions without approval of the delegate body.[192] Conflicts ran down the rungs of the Cooperative ladder. According to SINAMOS two factions emerged among the *campesino* body, one from Anta initially led by Esteban Puma and the other from Huarocondo and Zurite, jockeying for influence in the Cooperative through elections to the various posts.[193] Emerging victorious, the Anta faction "had been able to capture control over the directive posts in the Cooperative and use said

186 SINAMOS (1973), p3-4
187 Guillet (1979), p108; Not to mention his exorbitant 30,000 soles a year salary compared to the measly 24 soles a day for working socios.
188 Paniagua (1984), p33; This was the first of several reorganizations conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture.
189 Cooperativa agraria de producción Anta by SINAMOS, 1973, DOC/07.03.02/00776, entro Bartolomé de Las Casas, Pasaje Pampa de la Alianza Numero 164, Cusco, Perú p7
190 SINAMOS (1973), p7; Waters also has several examples of the Cooperative's poor management (p224-5)
191 Detalles de Cooperativa Agraria de Producción Túpac Amaru II de Antapampa Ltda. No. 105 by Becerra Piscoya, Juan José Lima Centro de Estudios de Participación Popular, 1974, HD1491.P42C4312, CEDOC, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Av. Universitaria N°1801, San Miguel, Lima, Perú, p15-16
192 Becerra (1974), p51
193 SINAMOS (1973), p3

positions for personal benefit without any interest in elevating [the base's] level of political consciousness (a favored government trope for participation)."[194] All this led SINAMOS to caution, years before the first land seizure, that the misuse of the "local committees constitutes a serious problem that needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency."[195]

Mayer argues "another source of unpopularity was the [Cooperative's] inability to get production going."[196] Certainly at the time SINAMOS believed low production and poor commercialization had led to "negative attitude" among the region's *campesino*s.[197] In just the second year under full Cooperative oversight, between 1972 and 1973, the potato harvest was blighted with heavy losses. To make matters worse, according to some *socios*, the Cooperative failed to offer necessary assistance leading to even poorer yields.[198] Mayer documented numerous similar issues, such as storehouses full of rotting crops next to communities struggling to support themselves.[199] Moreover, even when yields were sufficient, according to Juan Becerra, the author of a Ministry of Agriculture study on the Cooperative, there was no adequate commercial system to sell the products.[200] Watters saw this was coupled with the arrival of "new patrons (bosses), a class of 'modernizing' doctrinaire bureaucrats."[201] Centralizing many important decisions, administrative plans were routinely and adversely impacted by resolutions from Lima and Cusco. Likewise, a small army of agronomists and technical experts, who were paid exorbitant salaries compared to the local population, with little knowledge of the local ecology, would institute haphazard plans often exacerbating problems.[202]

Had shambolic management and a pervasive jobbery been the sole problems, the Cooperative may have lived a more charmed existence. It became increasingly clear, however, the Cooperative's

194 Becerra (1974), p47
195 SINAMOS (1973) p11; Becerra (1974, 47) saw the consequence of "the small groups of power" that limit popular participation.
196 Mayer (2009), p152
197 SINAMOS (1973), p4
198 Becerra (1974), p20
199 Mayer (2009) p153-162
200 Becerra (1974), p39
201 Watters (1994), p128
202 Guillet (1979), p104

model was fundamentally at odds with key tenets of local life. Guillet made precisely this point, well before later unrest, that there was an "incongruity between the organization of production in the Cooperative and… in the peasant economy. This incongruity is most pronounced in economy of the independent community. The incompatibility lies at two levels: at the loci of short-term and long-term production decisions. Peasants operate household economic units and make decision allocating factors of production at their disposal. In the Cooperative, on the other hand, short-term production decisions are a responsibility of an individual or set of individuals' delegated authority."[203] Importantly, individual members had no direct say in the short-term production decisions. Their only voice came via elections for those charged with said responsibilities, but plain to see years before the first land seizures, as Becerra did, "the delegates and/or council members do not really represent the base… due to the existence of groups of power within the Cooperative."[204] Moreover, he continued, often elected delegates or officially incorporated *socios* "were not even free to make suggestions and if they do, they are often pushed aside. This is not just on social matters, but on fundamental ones of productive activity."[205] At bottom, "the decisions are the domain of the administrators [later council] and his advisers,"[206] leaving, the relationship with production plans, for the overwhelming majority, limited to periodic memorandums.[207]

When considering that by the National Planning Institute (*Instituto Nacional de Planificación*, INP) estimates, the Cooperative in some form encompassed over 77 percent of the zone's *campesino*s, one starts to get a sense of the top-down control's impact on local life.[208] Put simply, the zone came under "a structure that combined earlier forms of land tenancy with that of the Cooperative."[209] This was achieved by superimposing the Cooperative over existing communities and lands which took on

203 Guillet (1979), p171-2
204 Becerra (1974), p44
205 Ibid. p47
206 Guillet (1979), p112
207 Becerra (1974),p45
208 La Implementación de la reforma agraria (1973?), p1
209 Apuntes sobre la problemática agraria en Anta (1978), p5

the new term 'production units'.[210] In that sense, technically speaking, the Cooperative only directly oversaw 5 per cent of the productions units, while *comunero* and *feudatario* communities accounted for 87 percent, eight newly formed *campesino* groups another 5 percent, the last 3 percent to small and middle holders.[211] Yet, the actual productive uses of the production units were mandated by the Cooperative's hierarchies. The consequence was that often longstanding decisions regarding communal production were being overruled by the Cooperative. In the community of Rumipata, for instance, the cultivation of potatoes was ordered on what had previously been pasture lands, leaving many with hopes of gaining access to *pampa* pastures for their livestock disappointed. Making matters worse, their communal land was also put aside for other communities, leading to "considerable dismay."[212]

This was made worse by the fact a considerable portion of these lands was not just from expropriated *hacienda*s, but from communities themselves, persuaded, quite literally, to throw their lots in with the Cooperative. Moreover, persuasion and coercion were often one and the same, as many communities felt they had little choice but to cede communal holdings. The Ministry of Agriculture study found no communities in their sample had received lands from the agrarian reform, yet they had all lost lands to the Cooperative, "above all in [Eqqeqo] Chacán, Huayllacocha and Chaqqupay."[213] This left the INP to surmise "the real significance of the agrarian reform for the majority of the Pampa de Anta's *campesino*, especially the independent communities, rather than benefiting, was that the Cooperative gained control over lands for which they held titles."[214] Although communities, as Guilett cautioned, were not some egalitarian enterprise in which resources are commonly exploited, they were nevertheless accustomed to more autonomy in

210La Implementación de la reforma agraria (1973?), p1
211 Plan de desarrollo de Antapampa (1979), p42
212 Guillet (1979), p130-1
213 Investigación de ocho comunidades (1973), p7
214 Apuntes sobre la problemática agraria en Anta (1978), p7

decision-making, nowhere more so than in jointly operated communal lands.[215] Taken together, this led INP to conclude the Cooperative's "associative structures have very little to do with the reality of life for the majority of the *campesino*s."[216]

In a similar vein, the Cooperative's official line of only overseeing a small portion of the valley's lands fell flat when one considers the University of Cucso study's findings of the extreme inequality in average land distribution. The study revealed the average holding, once quality of the land was taken into account, that is irrigated land, the 4,677 *comunero* families and the 1,300 *feudatario* families had access to just 1.40 and 1.38 hectares respectively, with the 136 smallholders reaching 2.43 hectares. All of which were significantly below what would be the zone's average of 2.75 hectares of irrigated land. These figures pale in comparison with the 21,763.29 hectares directly under Cooperative control that was "used for agriculture and ranching by 64 permanent workers and 263 seasonal hands." More galling still, "not only did the Cooperative concentrate the majority and the best lands, but it was only able to use a small percentage of all its available resources."[217] Things only got worse over time, dropping from 70 percent of all lands in use in the opening harvest to less than half just five years later. This was not lost on local population which were utilizing upwards of 92 percent of available lands. Indeed it would be an all too familiar sight for communities toiling on limited and overcrowded lands to watch broad sections of the valley's fertile *pampa* lie fallow.[218] Mayer argued this left many to wonder "what the slogan, 'the land is for those who work it," really meant."[219]

Ultimately, the Cooperative's control over land, production and political economies, reaching into the heart of local life, was at polar extremes with tiny fraction of real beneficiaries. The Andean

215 Guillet (1979), p130-1
216 Apuntes sobre la problemática agraria en Anta (1978), p7-8
217 Comunidades y Empresas Comunales (1982), p16
218 Madueño (1983), p10
219 Mayer (2009), p152

Center for Education found that despite the Cooperative, comprised 89 percent local communities and nearly 10 percent individual agriculturists, the beneficiaries of the agrarian reform were in reality just the 64 full-time workers, or less than 1 percent of the body.[220] The INP, a government agency, in a damning indictment, agreed: "We consider the actual beneficiaries are the permanent workers."[221] Even when who was considered to have benefited was expanded to offer a more holistic view, the numbers remained low. The INP study argued, for instance, if including those who gained occasional temporary work the figure grows to 5.2 percent; or those who received lands adjudicated into the Cooperative are considered, the number rises to 21.9 percent. Particularly telling is the fact that even government officials at the time never dared to inflate the number past 38 percent.[222]

The lack of tangible benefits on offer was a fact evidently not lost on the *campesino* body which responded to the Cooperative first with a distinct apathy. Only half those that could join the Cooperative in the opening years actually chose to do so, often more out of necessity to maintain access to lands than anything else, particularly in the former *feudatario* communities.[223] Many other communities within the Cooperative's ambit did not join at all.[224] According to INP, among the reasons was a fear of losing control over communal lands.[225] Even of those that did join, INP found from the outset "*campesino*s participation is very low."[226] At what would come to mark a zenith for the Cooperative, between 1974 and 1975, studies found only half of those that joined as *socios* were active. Moreover, according to Becerra, "identification and commitment of the members and the base with the Cooperative is almost non-existent. The *campesino*s see the Cooperative as something

220 La Ganadería en las comunidades campesinas de la provincia de Anta by Centro Andino de Educación y Promoción José María Arguedas, Ernesto Ugarte; Edilberto Portugal Speedie, 1979, DOC/07.09.02/02295, Centro Bartolomé de Las Casas, Pasaje Pampa de la Alianza Numero 164, Cusco, Perú p9
221 Apuntes sobre la problemática agraria en Anta (1978), p7
222 Ibid.p6-7
223 Guillet (1979), p9
224 Becerra (1974), p47
225 La Implementación de la reforma agraria (1973?), p5
226 Ibid. (1973?), p8

external and imposed by the functionaries, [meanwhile] the *socios* have no interest in assuming responsibilities and those that do act more out of personal interests."[227] Hardly a surprising outcome when, as members of communities and as individual *campesinos,* the vast majority was subject to the Cooperative's routinely negligent control over political economies, gaining few if any benefits in return.

'Less Poor than the Rest': Community Conflicts under the Cooperative

With the Cooperative offering little in the way of substantive change, as early as 1973, INP argued, "the majority of the *comuneros* continue in the same situation that existed before the agrarian reform"[228] According to the University of Cusco report this meant that "the interest of the *campesino* falls on growing their personal agricultural lands."[229] Even those incorporated in the Cooperative preferred to "to prioritize time on their parcels, of the 2,125 official *socios* normally only some 300 people work for the Cooperative."[230] These individualist outlooks also persisted within community structures, much as prior to the reform. SINAMOS witnessed that "the communities in their administrative structure have a similar problem [to the Cooperative]… a lack of general recognition of their obligations to the community." Moreover, "no consciousness of participation exists among the *comunero*s in the consolidation of communal property [and] the use of natural resources takes on an individual form."[231] For CENCIRA, this was explained by the Cooperative quite literally benefiting, by some estimates, one percent of the valley, leaving community life, much as before, dominated by demands for auto consumption.[232]

Repeating at the community level, a combination of the precariousness of life and Cooperative control of productive resources resulted in emerging tensions among the *campesino* body. At one

227 Becerra (1974), p46
228 La Implementación de la reforma agraria (1973?), p4
229 Acta de delimitación de tierras (1978), p57
230 La Implementación de la reforma agraria (1973?), p 6
231Acciones de la OLAMS Anta by SINAMOS, 1976, DOC / 07.02.01 / 00748, Centro Bartolomé de Las Casas, Pasaje Pampa de la Alianza Numero 164, Cusco, Perú, 1976, p7
232 Plan de desarrollo de Antapampa (1979), p48

level, acrimony existed towards those perceived to have gained dividends from the Cooperative. CENCIRA recorded how, during the land seizures, when in theory goodwill was at an apex, many complained that a social and economic distance had increased in these years between *socios* and *non-socios* that they believed had not existed earlier.[233] These perceptions often boiled down to an unequal nature in which land was distributed.[234] For CENCIRA, it was hardly surprising that most favored communities were *socios*.[235] Other commensurate benefits included differences in wages on offer by the Cooperative, when work was available, were growing astronomically; already high in 1971 *socios* earned twice that of non-*socios*; by 1977 the difference reached twelvefold.[236] All in all, SINAMOS found, a situation existed where gains trickled almost exclusively to *socios*, to the dismay of others.[237]

Tensions, however, were not constrained to *socio* non-*socio* binaries. Both the INP study and Guillet found that much to the chagrin of *comunero* communities, former *feudatario*s and individual agriculturists had taken more land than they had held prior to the reform.[238] In some instances individuals were able to extend personal lands to twelve or more hectares while others had gained none at all.[239] This was added to an already extant general air of distrust between communities. Guillet witnessed, for example, the community of Antapampa's refusal to work among strangers on other community lands when ordered by the Cooperative.[240] Likewise, Watters recorded how in the community of Chilca, residents were highly suspicious of other communities now using their pasture lands. These suspicions came to a head and conflicts broke out following accusations of cattle rustling against the incoming community.[241] Another conflict involved Esteban Puma who had been charged with running a production unit while the Cooperative was still under construction.

233 Plan de desarrollo de Antapampa (1979), p33-37
234 Ibid. p44
235 Ibid. p45
236 Guilett (1977), p193
237 SINAMOS (1973), p2
238 La Implementación de la reforma agraria (1973?), p4-5 & Guillet (1979), p192
239 Ibid. p 4
240 Guillet (1979), p132
241 Watters (1994), p225

According to Amandina, her community was at loggerheads with Puma over his management and use of land.[242] Community divisions had not begun with the Cooperative, of course, and those benefiting in a meaningful way were few in number. Yet these instances are suggestive of the fact that internal conflicts were relatively common affairs in the zone and, while added to existing fissures, new sources of contention sprouted from the Cooperative's presence.

In much the same way, and much as before the reform, stratifications cut to the heart of community life. The Cooperative, again, helped widen these fissures. In particular, a mixture of return migrants with external wealth sources, hoping to benefit from the reform, and small and middle holders acquiring sizeable quantities of land from the Cooperative had coalesced into a new authoritative stratum in community life. In the recently vacated space by *hacendado*s and the Cooperative's lack of reach, Watters noted, these arriviste figures began to exert ever more influence over local communities.[243] These distinctions had spiked both qualitatively and quantitatively since 1964, when Watters recorded three distinct *socio*-economic groups within communities. At the height of the land seizures, in 1979, this grew to six distinct groups, more pronounced than before. The richest, for instance, were four times better off than the next wealthiest, while at the other extreme the poorest had less than half of more moderate *campesino*s.[244]

The lasting consequence of this was a consolidation of internal hierarchies. Surfacing in CENCIRA's study was the fact that poor *campesino*s predominantly worked as salaried labor for their richer neighbors, while although the middle strata similar had to sell their labor, it was mainly to other communities or the Cooperative.[245] Unsurprisingly this begot tensions as indicated by the study's respondents, the sample size of which covered 30 percent of the zone, offering a reflective view of life. By the time of the seizures, when in theory communities were at their most united, 42

242 Amandina Quispe and Esteban Puma, Author Interview July 2017
243 Watters (1994), p228-9
244 Ibid. 135-143; For more detail see this section in Watters's study for a host of examples of a new emerging groups.
245 Plan de desarrollo de Antapampa (1979), p54

percent of the poorer respondents still saw their richer counterparts as "exploiters, they do not work with us, they are *gamonales* (insult for *hacendados*), they work for themselves… are spendthrifts." A further 30 percent were more diplomatic in their terms, seeing wealth distinctions "as a matter of inheritance" rather than anything else. Just a quarter viewed the rich in a favorable ways: "they share their lands… give work to the poor… [and] are efficient workers."[246] The richer *campesino*s also bought into these distinctions, 41 percent saw the poor as "degenerates, drunks, inefficient and lazy (*picosas*)." A little over a quarter were more Genarous: "the poor should work among themselves [and] the state of the community should help them." Just a quarter saw them as unfortunate, as people who "do not have sufficient land and seen badly because they have no money or luck… they are hard workers and are exploited."[247]

Based on these results, CENCIRA came to conclusion that "there is effectively little solidarity between 'rich' and 'poor' in the *campesino* community."[248] Moreover, they argued, "it is evident that the poor are, in general, highly aware of the inequalities within the community and that this translates into certain combativeness towards the rich… In conclusion one can say that within the poor of communities in [the Pampa de] Anta a clear consciousness exists of the intra-communal inequalities and that the majority of the poor members do not accept this inequality as something 'natural.'"[249] This extended both ways; the rich also held 'prejudice' and 'aggressiveness' towards those classed as poorer. Thus, communal solidarity, the study concluded, "is a very relative notion and is reaching its limits in the divergence of interests."[250] The study closed, however, with points of fundamental import, namely that "it is difficult to classify communities as more or less poor

246 Ibid. p291-2
247 Ibid. p292-3.
248 Ibid. p292-3
249 Plan de desarrollo de Antapampa (1979), p291-2
250 Ibid. p294

according to their resources" as this distinction is an imprecise measure of wealth.[251] Moreover, even the word *rico* (rich) locally was seen as something of an anathema by most *campesino*s, very few would readily accept such a mantle. In reality, the study qualified, being rich "really just implies being less poor than the rest."[252] Community life, then, much as it had before, involved fissures and conflicts. The Cooperative for its part was an antagonistic force, solidifying internal hierarchies and inflaming conflicts. Yet these relative distinctions, albeit clearly consequential in day-to-day life, seem more trivial when placed in plain view of the Cooperative's impact on the zone.

All in all, as Becerra argued, in the Pampa de Anta, "it is clear that the agrarian reform has profoundly altered the previous system."[253] Land was taken from the *hacienda*s and dispersed to the different production units, local communities by another name. Thus the Cooperative could reasonably argue, as Guillet did, that the reform had removed the previous agrarian elite. Yet as Guillet, and many others, also acknowledged, instead of distributing land and expanding participation, the Cooperative concentrated land, centralized power and decision-making.[254] Thus, as Becerra argued, "despite having given land to the *campesino*s, they do not have any real power in the new organizations that have appeared." Specifically the Cooperative "maintains the same organization structure that existed under the *hacienda*, superimposing associative models (councils, committees) that do not match with reality and the participatory tradition of the zone's *campesino*s."[255] Even SINAMOS, a government propaganda agency, reached the same conclusions, arguing this was, "a crucial point of departure for a series of policy mistakes."[256] On the surface this may seem like a contradictory conclusion to draw, profound change hand in hand with the perpetuation of earlier systems. Yet what this illustrates is that the Cooperative had engendered significant, if not

251 Ibid. p72
252 Ibid. p292
253 Becerra (1974), p17-18
254 Guillet (1979)
255 Becerra (1974), p17-18;
256 SINAMOS (1973),p8-9;

fundamental, change. In other words, Guillet was right in the sense that the pernicious control of the *hacendado* was gone but this was replaced with a conflicting mix of rigid state controls and abandonment.

Communities, for their part, had met the news of the Cooperative with expectations of regaining lands, built on grand promises and genuine hope for significant change. In the end, however, daily life continued in much the same way as before, with a focus on individual land production, a precarious existence defined by auto-consumption and a hope to extend one's usually meager acreage. The Cooperative's control over the zone was to such an extent that an oft-raised opinion by local *campesinos*, still held by Bruno Cabrera to this day, was that "many *hacendado*s turned into just one *hacendado*."[257] Equating the Cooperative with the *hacendados* was a favored and salient leitmotif during the coming land seizure as, according to Paniagua, most communities shared this outlook that life had not changed substantively.[258] Once this conclusion had been reached, Becerra argued, the zone's *campesinos* faced two options: "double down with the Cooperative or recuperate lands."[259] Thus, by tracing the Cooperative's impact on life, it is abundantly clear why communities came together. Put simply, by benefiting so few and controlling so much, almost the entire valley was united by their exclusion and left little choice but to challenge its system.

'The Way of Chacán': The First Land Seizure

By the mid-1970s, as relations reached breaking point in the Pampa de Anta, nationally there had been a significant turn of events. On August 29, 1975, Velasco was ousted in a palace coup. Replaced by the more conservative General Morales Bermudez, the revolution was left in tatters. Thus, despite signaling his ascension as the 'Second Phase' of the revolution, initially parroting much of Velasco's rhetoric and promising continuity, Bermudez rolled back many earlier policies, especially the expansive agrarian reform. As far as the Pampa de Anta was concerned, another key

257 Bruno Cabrera Author Interview July 2017
258 Paniagua,(1984), p46; Also see INP study, which recorded over a third of the respondents feeling life under the hacienda was better.
259 Becerra (1974), p42

development was the growing presence of the Confederación Campesina del Perú (Peasant Federation of Peru, CCP) on the national stage. An umbrella organization, the CCP united a host of regional peasant federations, including the FDCC from Cusco. In effect, the CCP served as the rural arm of the leftwing political party Vanguardia Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Vanguard, VR), who had made a name for themselves as among the very few outspoken critics of Velasco on the Left. Above all, they lambasted the agrarian reform for not being truly revolutionary as it had not redistributed land. Although founded in 1947, it was not until the 1970s that the CCP grew in import, hosting several congresses across the country in a bid to extend their base beyond Lima and galvanize Peru's peasantry.

The CCP settled on tomas de tierras as a political modus operandi, tapping into a historic tradition of indigenous Andean land movements. According to Mayer, "tomas de tierras were dramatic performances with uncertain outcomes. Unity and resolve by the invading groups were countered by attempts to divide them and by the threat of repression." These seizures were different to the invasions of the 1950s and 1960s, however; the former was largely a tool to negotiate better working conditions, while the latter sought to reclaim land outright. Documents from the IV CCP Congress, in 1974, offer insights into the party's tactic. The plan was to send political organizers to rural regions, agitate and unite local campesinos by highlighting 'contradictions' in the agrarian reform and, in so doing, politicize the countryside. The end goal was to encourage communities into collectively seizing lands, leaving the government little choice but to relinquish ownership or risk tarnishing their popular image. In 1974, immediately after their IV Congress, the CCP supported a dramatic series of land seizures in Andahuaylas, a neighboring province to Cusco, where no hacienda expropriations had taken place. The government response, however, was heavy-handed and the seizure movement quickly fell apart; a chastening experience from which the CCP was eager to rebound.

It was under this cloud then, in July 1975, that Isidiro Franco and Saturino Acostupa, from the community of Chacán, travelled to the CCP's Second Extraordinary Congress in Querecotillo. It

was here that Franco learned about land seizures and was given the chance to discuss events in the Pampa de Anta. This caught the attention of Andres Luna Vargas, the CCP leader and, in Franco's own words, "they began to discuss among themselves that we would have to seize the lands. This idea was approved. They said 'we are going to help you.'" With interests peaked, later that year the CCP's National Executive Committee held a meeting in Chacán. This was, for García-Sayán, "of singular importance in revitalizing the zone's campesinos and the particular role the campesino community of Chacán acquired [as leaders in the land seizures]." This meeting also marked a defining moment for the agrarian reform. Previously land seizures had been used to force expropriations. Thus in targeting the Cooperative, much like the revolution, land seizures entered a second phase, this time directed against the reform itself.

It is important to point out, however, that the presence of the CCP can mislead one over key internal dynamics. Above all, the land seizures were autonomous affairs, directed by local campesinos. Juan Mendoza, a VR member in the 1970s who was sent to nearby Puno, emphasized the fact community wishes lay at the center of all plans. Everything was to be agreed in assemblies, while CCP members would serve ancillary functions and act as go-betweens for communities. Moreover, the line between party cadre and local leader was a blurred one. Much like Gramsci's organic intellectuals, although local leaders, mostly middling and rich campesinos, worked with, and as part of, the CCP, their allegiances was foremost to reclaim land for community and personal gain. Lastly, land seizures must be placed in light of the fact working for common cause was nothing new in a zone with a strong, and recent, tradition of joint struggles. Certainly, based on a study conducted in 1974, the Pampa de Anta offered fertile ground from which a movement could flourish. One respondent lamented; "we do not have any [Federations], we had them and they were good; we were all more united." Another said: "federations are remembered well, as an era of unity between campesinos."

On balance, it would appear these outlooks were broadly shared, even before the CCP entered the picture. In 1973, a tentative step towards a united front was taken with the creation of the

Asociación de comunidades para comercialización de la papa Mateo Pumacahua (Community Association for Potato Commercialization Mateo Pumacahua). This was a key development as "via this organism the campesinos… again began making contact among themselves." Franco, who lead this organization, along with other future leaders in the seizures, remembered "calling an assembly and people from all over [the Pampa de Anta] came… there was almost 50 plus communities to hold an assembly to appeal against the prices [for selling potatoes]." Soon after the assembly, however, Franco was jailed for two years, leaving the Association moribund without clear leadership; what remained was directed from his cell.

Set against this backdrop, the first concrete steps towards land seizures were taken in 1975, as local campesinos, aided by the CCP, started working in the zone, using Chacán as their base. As among the earliest officially recognized communities, and an enclave for prior challenges haciendas, Mayer felt this left Chacán "in a good position to challenge Machu Asnu". Added to this, Chacán as a community had evicted Peace Corp volunteers working in the zone prior to the reform, as many in the community had felt "the gringos [were] imposing customs that clash with ours." The significance of this remained clear a decade later when García-Sayán noted "in the community's memory the action of expelling the Peace Corp members is important as they had already developed antithetical attitudes towards the presence of foreign elements."

In fact, it was to be a repeat of a prior conflict for land that led to the first salvo being fired against Machu Asnu. The Cooperative had ignored rulings in Chacán's favor over lands once held by the Huaypo Chico hacienda, opting instead to incorporate the plots and stonewall the community with promises of a return that never materialized. The community had unsuccessfully pursued several avenues to regain the land before calling an assembly where, with the CCP onboard, it was agreed the plots must be seized. Following this decision, a year of underground preparations followed, clandestine squads and a campesino guard were brought together and plans were made to financially support anyone widowed or orphaned should events go astray. Then, at last, on December 5, 1976, to the sound of Andean huayno music played from loudspeakers, "over two

thousand people, organized into orderly battalions with women and children in front and men in back, all carrying tools, seed, Peruvian flags, and banners, marched onto Huaypo Chico."

Following an expectant year of preparations, the community solidified to protect their collective gains. Franco divulged that prior to the seizure the community had decided as a point of order to work all newly acquired lands in common for at least one year, also agreeing to plant barley, a fast growing crop to sure up their claims to land. For García-Sayán the "force and vigor of the campesinos was expressed… over three days of intense work where they were able to sow almost all of the 240 hectares." He interpreted all this, as defensive posturing to present a common front as deterrence to Cooperative ambitions of retaking the land. Further tactics deployed by the community conform to this as, outwardly at least, no time was wasted in building an image of a united front. For starters, flyers were prepared defending the seizure and a placard which read 'land seized by the community of Chacán' was placed at the plot's entrance. After the seizure, events continued more or less to script. The police came following several tranquil days to whom the community pleaded their case, protesting that they were ready to die to defend the land if needs be. Likewise, demands to identify leaders were countered with claims that it had been organized by all. In response, the Cooperative accepted the lands were lost. A few days later, when an inspection from the Ministry of Agriculture came, Franco said, "in Quechua we told them, he who works the land is all of us." This act of open defiance was clearly an impactful moment for Franco, who spoke of the same event to García-Sayán, recounting the community's response when one official said they needed technical help to work the land: "why would we want this engineer who would oversee and order us… just so that the government can benefit from this."

All in all, however, a general air of calm reigned until the last days of December, when a government prefect arrived with court summons for 14 members of the community. The matter was put to an assembly and it was agreed that those cited would not be left to face their fate alone. So, in early January, three trucks were hired and majority of the community piled in to answer the summons. At the site of this, according to local accounts, the prefect demanded that only the 14 in

question remain and "the General [Montoya] (in charge of Cusco) shouted at us that the seizures would not be allowed to stand, that blood would run if we did not leave… not even a millimeter of land would be ceded. We answered with 'let the blood run then, but you won't get us out. We also won't cede even a millimeter.'" Closing ranks and staking a shared indigenous unity, they said "the General Montoya wanted us to speak in Castilian because he did not understand Quechua… [To which they replied] Look for a translator, this is our language. This is how we express ourselves." In spite of such heated exchanges, however, the whole affair fizzled out soon after. Summonses were once again served a few days later and, responding in kind, the community ignored them.

Drawing on a similarly defiant vein, a 'Pronouncement' was released defending the community's seizure with easily recognizable complaints against the Cooperative, coded in a distinctly CCP lexicon: "We are oppressed and exploited by the same enemy, the military government that represents imperialists, the bourgeoisie and the large landholders." The document complained about losing pastures and cattle, a lack of stable work or paid salaries and the Cooperative's small number of beneficiaries. Moreover, applying the dictum strength in numbers, a call to arms was issued to other communities: "That is why, you are called to fight…in all the communities for the recuperation of our lands… [only then] will it be possible that 'the boss will not feed on your poverty' and that 'the land will belong to those who work it'." García-Sayán felt the CCP, for their part, were important actors in bringing together the community over this period, serving "not only to unite the community but to amplify the level of participation of its members." Such communiqués point to CCP affiliates pulling some strings, yet their role was more likely organizational than ideological. Luna Vargas, for instance, arrived a month prior to help plan the seizure, but also with intentions to politicize the community. These efforts, however, as Franco recalls, largely fell on deaf ears: "there had just recently been talk of politics in the Pampa de Anta… but we did not know much about this. Our brother Luna Vargas was annoyed by this."

To outside observers, however, witnessing this brazen defiance of the Cooperative, this appears to have been far from clear. Several political allies of the CCP, for instance, were seemingly eager to

translate this united front into a narrative of a revolutionary campesino groundswell. On December 6, 1976, the day after the seizure, a leftwing publication Volante, from Cusco, penned an article titled "a Manifesto from the campesino community of Equecco-Chacán to all the poor of the countryside." It portrayed an image that Chacán's leaders and the CCP would have viewed favorably: "By agreement of all the comuneros, they have taken possession of 200 hectares from Huaypo Chico, which belonged to them since 1590. These lands were usurped by the gamonales. The military government, however, recognized it as property of the landholders despite the fact that the community had won rulings." Likewise, Carlos Hanco, a witness to events, wrote: "The 'way of Chacán'… has gone down in the history of class struggle… The struggle of [the Pampa de] Anta has correctly tied the struggle for land with the struggle for liberation, not stopping simply with the land seizure but they have redoubled their forces to fight the oppressors of the countryside." Certainly, a case can be made that these interpretations were hasty, if not embellished, but these conclusions would have been much harder to draw had community resolve and affront to the Cooperative been less than it was.

With that in mind, however, despite outward appearances to the contrary, cracks soon emerged within the community. For one, relations strained after the seizure, when middling campesinos with more resources found themselves in "a situation qualitatively distinct to poorer campesinos" to work and benefit from jointly held lands. After the first year, once acquisitions were felt secured, cracks widened further over how to divide the plots. Prior consensus had only been that land would be divided: not how. When equal parcelization was proposed, poorer campesinos argued they were in more desperate need of land, while others pushed for distribution based on participation levels in the seizure. The final settlement was what García-Sayán saw as the 'middling campesinos' criteria of an equitable division which "reaffirmed the differentiations that already exist in the heart of the community." Poor campesinos felt "this outcome was influenced by the fact that the principal leaders of the seizures, like Acostupa and Franco, were middling campesinos." Paniagua likewise recorded another grumbling that "there had not been much gained, quite to the contrary there

existed friction between comuneros. Everyone worked for themselves." Puma forwarded his own perspective five years on from the seizure: "From 1975 to 1977 working together, instead of giving us productivity, it gave us, more than anything, a headache. There were squabbles (lios) between leaders, the comuneros mistrusted the leaders; a series of social problems just like those."

Ultimately, rather than an embodiment of some intrinsic communitarian spirit, or a political awakening, Garcia-Sayan concluded, "it appears the principle motivating element [for the seizure]… was the need to obtain guarantees for the possession of the land that had been taken." All things considered, however, despite these tensions, this was also a period of otherwise genuine unity. Internal conflicts took a back seat to shared interests, evidenced by nearly two years of working towards securing the land, all the while facing pressure from local authorities. Decisions, albeit influenced by leaders, were commonly agreed and a politically salient portrayal of an indigenous front was collectively embraced. Certainly, the manner in which the lands were seized was enough to rouse certain observers into viewing events from a popular insurrectionary lens. At its core, however, the current underpinning this solidarity was a far cry from revolutionary, yet equally far from disingenuous; it was defensive and beyond that more than a little capricious.

"Expelling the Cooperative from Our Lands": Land Seizures and the Cooperative's Restructuring

The fallout of the land seizures had a twofold impact on the residents of Chacán. On the one hand, as the lone community to so brazenly defy the Cooperative their situation was precarious. Yet, on the other hand, the whole experience had been an invigorating one and many saw an opening for further gains. In the end, both outcomes led to the same conclusion: if more lands were to be seized, the valley would have to come together. Acting on this, just four months after they marched onto Huaypo Chico, leaders from Chacán with support of the FDCC brought together local campesinos, including from the neighboring Urubamba valley, to create the Federacion zonal de campesinos de Anta y Urubamba (Zonal Peasant Federation of Anta and Urubamba, FEZOCAU). Tapping into the same spirit that underscored the Mateo Pumachuca Association, according to Hanco, this "had an important impact in reinvigorating the masses will for struggle." In fact, FEZOCAU was

explicitly created with a land seizure mandate and on 16 April, 1977, a joint program was agreed. Not hiding their intent, one statement read "Chacán opened a new revolutionary struggle led by the countryside's poor expelling the Cooperative from our lands." The plan was "to continue recuperating lands… [and] to organize the production over the recuperated lands, parcelization for each [campesino] and land to be used collectively according to each communities necessities."

Recalling these events, Franco said: "I was the General Secretary [and with others like Puma] we prepared further land seizures. So what did we do? For this we went to all the communities, speaking of land seizures, we spoke in assemblies and we got everyone onboard." Quispe, living in Chacán at the time, recalled the considerable efforts poured into the venture. Mobilizing a small army, campesino leaders from Chacán were joined by key CCP figures like Javier Diez Canseco and Ricardo Letts as well as a cabal of priests, students and teachers. As an ardent CCP cadre, Quispe, along with others, travelled to communities, moving clandestinely to lobby their cause. The final plan, she said, was to get everyone to seize land in unison, to galvanize the zone and stop the Cooperative reacting to individual seizures. This was not always plain sailing, however, with many initially unreceptive to the idea. Franco noted how when he went to Compone and Huarocondo to state their case "everyone disappeared." Franco recalled another false start: "I went to Ancahuasi and there they told me… you're a different man, you cannot be leader (personero), you might betray us, we are not going to go. So what could we do, they voted against us and it was nighttime, there was no assembly… So what happened? There would be no land seizure and we all returned to the community of Chacán."

Despite some hesitancy, the fruits of this labor eventually paid dividends, just nine months after Chacán's reclamation of communal land, as a large wave of seizures engulfed the zone. Beginning in early September, 1977, with support of leaders from Chacán, who had themselves just a day before seized 124 hectares from a plot named Bandoja, reportedly 12,000 campesinos, from 12 communities mobilized, recovering roughly 6,000 hectares. El Comercio recorded some of the seizures including that of the community of Condebamba gaining 78 hectares of irrigated plots,

Mantocclla 565 hectares of pastures and Tambo Real a 'good extension' of cultivable land. Moreover, "hundreds of campesinos from Masoccacca took lands from Chimpahuaylla, where the most important cattle center of [the Pampa de] Anta is located." Faced with this wave emerging all at once, El Comercio concluded, the Cooperative was left little choice but to count its losses.

The Cooperative, however, would not give up quite as meekly as El Comerico had suggested. In light of this opposition, uncertain yet heady days followed, with plentiful evidence of solidarity on display as campesinos and communities rallied to one another's defense. On September 10, for instance, the community of Kewar seized lands in the early morning. According to Hanco, other communities came, including Chacán, in support of the seizure. When later that day news arrived of the arrest of six female campesinos from Chacán for distributing flyers about the land seizures, joint discussion were held over what to do. A decision was reached to march on the guard post and free the captives. Reporting from a source claiming first-hand knowledge, Voz Campesina, the CCP's print organ, noted how "two thousand [campesinos] carrying all their tools surrounded the Guardia Civil (Civil Guard) post." Faced with such numbers, the Cooperative returned the detainees in question who had been en route to Cusco. The account continued, once they had been 'liberated' news spread "growing belief in the neighboring communities who were getting ready for a meeting on September 11. This day, from early morning, in three columns carrying Peruvian flags and pennants and wearing the red of the world proletariat, more than five thousand [campesinos] came down from their villages." Another Voz Campesina edition noted how the crowd shouted "for land, national liberation and popular democracy!" The next day, September 12, the contiguous communities of Conchacalla and Compone united to pressure the Cooperative to return lands. In the face of the sheer weight of numbers mustered by both communities, the Cooperative acquiesced, ceding over 2,000 hectares.

The scope and scale of popular unity -although some numbers must be taken with caution, likely inflated for dramatic effect- points to undeniable collective spirit presiding over this period; so much so that political observers seemed to genuinely believe they were witnessing an emerging political

movement and proposed grandiose visions for the future. Voz Campesina, for instance, published the following one month on from events in the Pampa de Anta: "They recognize themselves not just as productive forces, but more importantly, as forces able to foment a revolution with the direction of the proletariat and united with all the people." Likewise, Hanco felt "conditions exist for a grand fight that is now beginning to give great hope to the national peasantry." These interpretations, however, amounted to little more than wishful readings or calculated politicking as many with closer ties to events at hand held less triumphalist outlooks. An internal document from the first FEZOCAU Congress, for instance, drew on what were by then common tropes for the zone's struggle with the Cooperative, stating "the need to organized the campesino masses and to project their struggles for lands as revolutionary acts… the campesinos in our long years of fighting have learned… that our force comes from our unity and in our mobilizations." Yet in a revealing auto-criticism, suggesting this professed unity was not quite as plain to see, FEZOCAU acknowledged that there had been a failure "to revolutionarily orient the seizures", which they felt "had not created a united front."

Yet the political spectators' portrayal of events cannot easily be reduced to mere calculus; certainly evidence bears out the fact a genuine concord existed between and within communities. Arguably, however, this is better understood by the fact all across the zone communities were directing similar complaints at the Cooperative, especially, but not exclusively, the control concentration and usurpation of lands. This had already been jumped upon by those planning the seizures. Eduardo Vagas Moscos, from Compone, for instance, recalled how his community was receptive to the messages emanating from Chacán and elsewhere, deciding to join the seizures because "we had 270 heads of families [and] the pressure for land, similar to that of other communities, which obliged us to start the fight to recuperate lands." Likewise, El Comercio noted how together "thousands of campesinos have begun to invade… demanding radical change in the redistribution of lands and protesting against administration." Marcelina from Circa Kajjla confirmed this first-hand, as her "husband found that in every community he visited there was

inequality among the people… there was not enough land for the communities and [listing other shared complaints] because of that people rose up in rebellion against the Cooperative." Placed in a context of a shared desire for land and an end to the Cooperative, unity, rather than emerging as a revolutionary awakening, seems to have been driven by a recognizable plight.

Ultimately, however, as FEZOCAU acknowledged, the undeniable solidarity belied an atmosphere of hesitance and unease. At the very top, even among the leaders, according to Puma, deep underlying tensions over political ideologies existed, between the majority connected to the CCP and a smaller group, himself included, over the role of the campesinos. Puma saw the VR line that the campesinos could form a new proletariat as misguided and naïve. More striking, at the base, following the Ministry of Agriculture mobilizing a small army of officers to visit many of the valley's communities, a mixture of threats and promises in hand, of the 16 communities that had agreed to seize land, only 10 did. Franco recalled how "on the day of the invasion at 4am the communities that decided to [seize lands] were Chacán, Piñanncay, Huayllococha, Pancarhuyla. But what happened to Compone? What happened to the other communities of the Pampa de Anta?... Just these four communities took lands… We were surprised and we held a meeting… a delegation went to Compone but nothing had happened and we were scared."

Even after most seizures materialized the next day, Quispe remembers how a cloud of apprehension loomed over her home community of Ancahuasi. In the immediate aftermath of the seizure, a passing observer would have seen a coordinated effort to sow lands, around which Peruvian flags flapped in the breeze, women buffered the men at work in protective columns, and a youth guard stood lookout for any Cooperative forces. Yet, Amandina recalls, beneath this lay a somewhat uneasy alliance of different ayllus each trying to recuperate lands and united by, above all, "a fear of repression." The defensive nature of alliances similarly surfaced on the Bandoja plots seized by Chacán; when leaders were asked why they had not divided up lands as before they replied: "because it is legally uncertain; if we parcel lands who is going to defend the legal challenge? Will everyone defend it by themselves? Once we gain a favorable ruling and there are no problems, then

we will parcel." Moreover, as lands were seized and secured, tensions grew. Puma recalls how certain groups from Piñanncay and Pancarhuallya "wanted to fight, with stones, sticks, pickaxes, slings" over who had right to community lands from the former hacienda Marti Florencia. Likewise, another skirmish broke out over newly demarcated boundaries with the community of Huyallacocha. These tensions appear to have been lost in the general excitement and acts of solidarity that accompanied seizing lands. Importantly, however, this indicates, even with concord at something of an apogee, as lands were seized in a vast coordinated effort and in need of defending, unity was still a precarious concept.

In the immediate aftermath of events, what "was until recently the most powerful Cooperative in the South-East of Peru," went under a process of restructuring ordered by the Ministry of Agriculture. As a result of the land seizures, the Cooperative was reduced to just nine communities, retaining only dairy operations at valley's center, with all other lands returned to community control. The lion's share of plots went to the more truculent communities such as Tambo Real, Conchacalla, Ancahuasi and Compone, among others. Those less combative or opportunistic were left with much reduced gains. Watters, for instance, recorded the chagrin of Chilca's campesinos who had gained on average two hectares per family, feeling "they had won no great victory, for some other communities had gained much more land per family (up to 7-8 hectares)." Moreover, with lands being dispersed, conflicts reemerged over ownership. Just one of numerous such instance included Luis Tiesfor Quispe Gomez who had 12 hectares of land, a considerable sum, given to him in the restructuring of the Cooperative. He had been challenged by third parties to this land but court documents show his claim was upheld. Thus, the Cooperative's restructuring concluded with a general air of disappointment among large swathes of the valley. This was exacerbated by the fact much of the land offered to communities was poor un-irrigated plots on the valley's margins. Discontent was so palpable that even the Ministry of Agriculture admitted "the risk of further invasions… is imminent."

Now it was the Cooperative's turn to find itself in a precarious position, clinging to a final few holdings; not least as many of the communities that had not taken part in the September seizures felt it had been an opportunity missed. Chief among these was the community of Circa Kajlla which, in December 1977, decided to take 135 hectares from the former Ichubamba hacienda. This seizure was aided by the communities of Chacán and Compone who rallied in aid despite the fact both were between 15 and 25 kilometers from Circa Kajlla and would thus come away with no lands for their troubles. Without direct gains to be had, these acts of support were still grounded in wider aims; for Chacán this was an opportunity to further weaken the Cooperative, while leaders from Compone saw a vested interest in learning how to organize a land seizure in anticipation of mounting one of their own. Following the seizure, the Cooperative, feeling increasingly under pressure, responded by sending a truck full of employees to confront the community; scuffles broke out and members were arrested. Repeating earlier forms of solidarity, a large contingent from the community marched on the local judge's office and did not leave until a release of the detainees was secured.

At the end of all this, by 1978, communities that had gained lands by seizure, restructuring or both were planting their acquisitions, while many that missed out bemoaned their inaction. With this lull in activity, the CCP and Chacán's leaders looked to press the advantage. Building on narratives of shared indigenous struggles, albeit in a more curated environment, the CCP held their V Congress in Chacán on August 26-29, 1978. Peruvian Social Scientist Carlos Iván Degregori had been at the Congress and gave his account to Mayer: "It was huge, more than one thousand delegates from all over the country converged on this tiny village… It was symbolically very inclusive... It was all very moving and emotional, the CCP's high point." Playing on the spirit of solidarity, during the Congress a list of joint denunciations and stated objectives were agreed to support the framework of the earlier seizures. It was agreed "to continue recuperating lands by direct action of the organized campesinos [and to] organize the production of the recuperated lands combining parcelization for each comunero and collective work on the lands according to communities' needs and by democratic accord."

The impact of the CCP Congress is hard to underestimate; it was often quoted as a formative event by communities who took part in subsequent land seizures. Certainly, it appeared to have achieved its desired effect, when campesinos from Lucrepata, mostly ex-feudatarios, buoyed by what they saw in Chacán, elected to seize lands from their former hacienda Chamancalla, in Zurite. Lucrepata invited the neighboring community of San Rafeal to join the venture; both had failed to gain lands in the restructuring, while Lucrepata was particularly irked to have missed out on seizing land the year prior after an eleventh hour change of heart by the community president. Coming together, in the early morning of November 18, 1978, the communities seized 50 hectares, roughly one-third of the former hacienda. Despite the fact these lands had been left fallow by the Cooperative, they were located on the coveted central pampa and, consequently, the very following day Lucrepata's President was arrested. The community led by the campesino guard raced to his rescue, freeing him from the police while still on the road to Zurite. This resolves was put to the test again on November 21, as the Cooperative returned with two trucks and some 400 interlopers who proceeded to clash violently with the community. Based on the accounts of one witness, word was sent to neighbors of this incursion and "friends (compañeros) began to arrive from Ancahuasi and [Circa] Kajlla. This was a spectacular sight and it made those attacking us run in different directions."

Not all efforts to unite the valley ran as smoothly after the Congress, however. On February 28, 1979, a meeting was led by Puma, convened to address local government elections. Caught up in the spirit of working in common, following this meeting dozens of communities created the Frente de defensa de los intereses del pueblo de Anta (The Defense Front for the People of Anta's Interests, FEDIPA), also to be led by Puma. Panigaua, however, notes this organization was, like its many predecessors, moribund soon thereafter. Succumbing to similar mercurial tendencies, in April, FEZOCAU held an assembly in the community of Yungaqui, to approve a 'plan of untied struggle'. The assembly was well represented by 37 different groups "which had demonstrated the desire of

the campesino masses to unite and coordinate their fight." However, after just one day's work, the assembly was unable to approve a joint plan and fell apart.

Putting these fleeting exercises to one side, events following the Cooperative's restructuring would come to mark a high point for the zone's efforts as a joint venture. Since the seizures in September of 1977, these years were a testament to genuine cooperation, resolve and solidarity to face down the Cooperative. Communities rallied to one another's side and voiced common refusal of what they interpreted as external forces meddling in local life, often outwardly predicating their solidarity on a shared indigeneity; certainly it was ostensibly convincing enough that observers started planning for a coming campesino political revolution. Yet, outward appearances to the contrary, the unity on display remained as before; defensive, hesitant and, often, fickle.

"The Land is for Those Who Work It": Liquidation and Parcelization

Despite a handful of small actions, most of 1978 and early 1979 constituted an otherwise peaceful interlude as earlier gains were worked and secured. Communities, however, sensed the upper hand and a final wave of seizures in mid-1979 sealed the Cooperative's fate. Distinct from previous efforts, these were less an exercise in regaining communal lands as acquiring the Cooperative's final holdings and installations on the central pampa. Attesting to the earlier tentative nature of alliances, with the Cooperative's threat waning much of the displays of solidarity dissipated, as communities in a whirl of frantic activity, opportunistically and sporadically, looked to procure as much as possible. The Ministry of Agriculture had tried to avert precisely this outcome following restructuring, moving from community to community, as before, offering a mixture of the carrot and the stick in efforts to stymie further rebelliousness. As such some communities were slow starters or missed out altogether in picking the Cooperative's bones, while the more combative like Chacán, Huayllacocha and Curamba had their fill.

The final push came in late August 1979, when the community of Tambo Real recovered 100 hectares of pastures from what had been the Sullupujio hacienda. This was soon followed, on October 5, by a spate of seizures when two communities from Zurite, Marques Alto y Marques

Cosco, took over the former Ancachuro hacienda, its stable and some 700 cattle. A few days later, on October 12, the communities of Lucrepata, Ayllumayo and San Rafeal took what remained of the Chamancalla lands, including its dairy producing installations and 232 cattle. Elsewhere, the community of Compone seized stables belonging to the San Ezequiel production unit with 420 cattle, while Cataniray seized lands once of the La Joya hacienda. Finally, the community of Curamba seized what remained of the Sullupujio lands, left untouched by Tambo Real. This more haphazard approach was typified by campesinos from Lucrepata who revealed the land seizure had been planned just two days before. Speaking to García-Sayán one leader said; "if we did not organize ourselves and seize the lands, it would have just been done by those from Ayllumayo. Afterwards, [the community of] San Rafeal joined in." The disorderly manner in which lands were taken is more than suggestive that much of the earlier concord was coming apart at the seam.

In the end, this final wave "took the little land that still remained in the [Cooperative's] hands and practically all its installations." With this, on October 11, 1979, 4000 campesinos from 18 communities met in Mamnchaca and approved a plan to liquidate the Cooperative. At this meeting, it was also agreed to peacefully resolve among themselves any boundary disputes that might arise from the distribution of lands and equipment. Hearing its death toll knell, the Cooperative's hierarchies responded to the land seizures with a final outburst, forcing communities to close ranks one last time. First the Cooperative threatened Tambo Real, but failed to "dislodge them because support came from all the surrounding communities." Then, on October 24, in Zurite, on what had been the main cattle operation at Ancachuro until its seizure, management and police arrived in trucks to retake cattle and equipment. Local accounts at the time noted how some 150 people, from the newly formed campesino community San Nicolas de Bari, united to stop this incursion. The result was what El Sol recorded as "a grave clash between campesinos and Guardia Civil (Civil Guard), many injured." According to Mayer, "the whole town of Zurite and its neighboring communities were mobilized to go out to the field to battle the Cooperative… A town meeting in Zuite lasted until past midnight to calm the populace."

At last, on November 29, 1979, the Cooperative Túpac Amaru II was officially liquidated by the Office of the IX Agrarian Reform Region. In light of these events, the Cooperative's General Assembly came together to issue a final statement. Restructuring, they said, did not solve problems and diplomatically concluded "the Cooperative in its effort to better its role diversified its activities; however, this was not sufficient… [as] generally in the communities each person has very limited usufruct areas of land." In a like response, the newly created community of San Martin de Pores (Ayllumayo, Lucrepata, and San Rafael de Zurite) jointly penned a letter to the Minister of Agriculture for Cusco: "We have [seized lands] in view of the fact the [Cooperative] has not been of benefit for the campesinos… land, pastures, cattle and installation have been built on the fruits of our labor since the 'hacienda'." Listing what were by then ubiquitous complaints, they defended their actions with a particularly poignant question: "Is it not said that 'the land belongs to he who works it?"

Nor would this be a question that disappeared with the Cooperative. Upon finally ridding external control over land, contentious issues regarding ownership emerged between communities, with earlier acts of professed unity conspicuous only by their absence. Problems arose almost immediately when a Liquidation Commission was called to distribute the seized machinery, stables and cattle. According to Paniagua, these were dispersed in a highly unequal manner: "the small and poorly organized communities have benefited very little… This poor distribution is not due to the Liquidation Commission having preferences" but from outmaneuvering by other, more cutthroat, communities. At the same time, instances existed of cattle rustling by individuals and communities, while, elsewhere, campesinos from Conchacalla and Circa Kallja, irked they had received no cattle, pilfered a Volvo truck that had to be retrieved by police. These tensions soon boiled over into direct conflicts. At the center of this was the fact that much of the final lands to be seized had belonged to the haciendas, leaving few communities with clear historic or juridical claims, and thus fights over demarcation of boundaries ensued. Notably, an entanglement emerged between prior allies of Tambo Real and Compone over what had been Sullupujio hacienda lands, the former

adjudged the latter to have encroached on a historic claim. Likewise, El Sol highlighted similar clashes over Ancachuro lands. Similar inter-community conflicts proliferated to such an extent that other communities often had to serve as peacemakers, sending delegations "to mediate, sometimes marching in columns between opposed lines while carrying a white flag and urging the leaders to parley and negotiate."

In much the same way, issues regarding what to do with lands echoed within communities. Upon news of the Cooperative's liquidation, many communities, if they had not already done so, parceled their lands straight away, while others with prompting from the Ministry of Agriculture were put into Empresas Comunales (Communal Enterprises). Reflective of why many communities opted for parcelization, members of newly formed campesino group of San Nicolas de Bari disclosed to Garcia-Sayan that they thought "the Ministry [of Agriculture] insists on communal enterprises so that it can place its bureaucracy over them under the pretense of improving their wages." For them, the choice to parcel was a straightforward one. Yet, even arriving to this point had been a fraught affair, as many from Lucrepata, the largest member, felt San Rafael and Ayllumayo should not be incorporated due to their smaller populations, seen as less able to pull their weight on the new plots. Neither did problems end once formed, as ever since lands had been seized, there was resistance to working together; many often arrived late to work the seized lands if at all. Likewise, when parcelization was proposed, the community president at the time of the seizure suggested that plots be sold to raise money for a joint community fund. This notion, however, was rejected, in favor of straight division.

Despite strong desires to parcel lands, many communities between late 1979 and early 1980 actually took the steps to form Communal Enterprises, as Jorge Sarmiento has shown. For the overwhelming majority, however, this was a fleeting exercise. According to Mayer, the Empresas were riddled with "bad administration, no accounting, and much suspicion…. These problems caused endless internal conflicts within communities. Again, two tendencies emerged: one was to keep maintaining the associative enterprises; the other was to divide up the reserved land into

parcels and to dispense with any development projects. The poorer and landless peasants were for division, while the leadership and the wealthier peasants were for keeping communal enterprises." Paniagua, a witness to this process, said the "running of [communal enterprises] is in the hands of the rich campesinos, which creates social problems within the community. In Chacán, with growing lots, "some landholders incentivized other [campesinos] to work on their land… [while others] sell their lands to people from outside the community." Franco, a middling campesino, but one for protesting his relative penury, claimed "there are four or five [smallholders] in the community and if some cattle enter their lands, they charge us a 500 soles fine." He concluded that "some have lands and the rest of us do not have land and are poor, this is not just in one community but in all the communities." Corroborating Franco's claims, Amandina remarked how her community of Ancahuasi formed a communal enterprise "but all we got, each time we reduced the size of the enterprise, was another smaller boss (patrón)."

Even when division was elected, rarely did its manner please all parties, with internal stratifications once again playing its part in tensions. In the community of Conchacalla, for instance, land was divided by neighborhoods, leaving the poor neighborhoods, in most desperate need of land, to split the same share as their more land-rich neighbors. Elsewhere, in Lucrepata, land was split among the 80 most active members in the seizures. Puma, for his part, remembers how some leaders got more land from the seizures, insisting most leaders only gained a topo or two more, while in rare instances such as one person from Compone gained 25 topos or another rumor had it gained 50. Generally speaking, Puma had an altogether negative view of other campesino leaders: "I have said many times, leaders would sell their mothers for a drink… The middle and rich campesinos are those that assume the leadership of campesino communities." To generalize, across the zone, land again tended to be split equally, despite sounding like the most egalitarian option this left the poorest campesinos frustrated. Eduardo Sumire, a former FDCC representative, offered some insights into his similar experiences and why he felt the communal enterprises failed: "Often on cultivatable lands there exists unequal parcel and from this conflicts emerged." Historically this

had caused serious tensions and problems for communities, all were too well aware of this, and "that is why the lands, as a result of years upon years of fights, were parceled." Finally, despite divergent paths, the story of the empresas ends just as that of the Cooperative, with communities dividing concentrated lands in favor of personal plots.

Conclusion:

Thus, with the last of the empresas parceled, communities took up sole oversight of the pampa's lands, previously the dominion of the Cooperative and the hacienda before that. In this, Mayer saw, that "the ultimate mini-agrarian reform took place inside the communities with the distribution of the last few hectares of communal agricultural land into tiny parcels, while no one was looking, and no one objected." Beyond local confines, events in the Pampa de Anta had a profound effect on Peru in the coming years. For one, Chacán marked the beginning of an earnest shift in the use of land seizures, from targeting haciendas scheduled for expropriation to cooperatives and other associative enterprises. In the following years, across the country communities dismantled these structures and with them relegated the agrarian reform to the pages of history. Locally, however, events took a more anticlimactic turn. According to Mayer, "after inciting them to take lands, and seeing that running the associative areas was generating problems that they could not solve, the politicos left the campesinos to their own fate." A fate where, at last, the land was for those who worked it and those who worked it opted to do precisely that. Following this, by and large, the valley-wide concord of previous years evaporated, as campesinos turned to their individual plots, quite literally reaping what they sowed. The grand reward for over a decade of struggle was that, on average, holdings grew from 2.6 hectares per person in 1969 to 6.6 hectares in 1980. With this, as García-Sayán so eloquently put it, "the expectations aroused in certain sectors of the Left, who saw in land occupations the beginning of a powerful hurricane that could drag in its wake the foundations of the bourgeois state, were proved to be profoundly idealist and in error." This error, however, cannot so easily be chalked up to an overzealousness to view events as a revolutionary subaltern awakening. Undeniably, on display throughout the land seizures were striking acts of

fellowship and resolve, as indigenous campesino communities took on the might of a military government, standing together when outcomes were far from certain. All this considered, then, it is little wonder that many onlookers were left vexed by how this crumbled so soon after.

To address the question at hand, this paper traced the zone's historical trajectory, with a focus on social relations, which reveals the particular conclusion to events should be seen as far from surprising. For starters, in the decades prior to the reform, communities had been subjected to a spate of dispossession of communally held lands and pervasive hacienda-dominated political economies. Yet, under this system, community life was far from one of a uniform subjugation, but rather defined by distinctions which included relative freedoms from the hacienda, growing internal stratifications, individualistic outlooks and internecine conflicts. Significantly, these tensions, albeit highly consequential for daily life, when viewed in the bigger picture were relative to the more absolute controls of the hacienda and an existence dominated by subsistence struggles. Despite individualist outlooks, with the valley's campesinos more or less ubiquitously held under hacienda auspices, communities still served as important sociopolitical units to jockey for common interests; so much so that political activists were able to grow an anti-hacienda movement on the back of community-based federations in the early 1960s. Moreover, the ensuing land invasions, although ultimately collapsing under the weight of government repression, had an important twofold impact on the later seizures: firstly, it showed communities could look past internal divisions to challenge more pressing concerns to local life and, secondly, serve as a key formative experience, remembered favorably as a precedent within living memory of joint struggle.

With the advent of the Cooperative, promises of change were met with the reality that day-to-day life continued much as it had before. Moreover, in controlling so much of the valley the Cooperative inadvertently united communities by virtue of excluding the overwhelming majority, in the process earning well warranted comparisons to the hacienda. As such, common cause was easy to reach, as communities had traded lands and the small autonomy they had under the hacienda for little, if anything, in return. With this, soon apathy towards the Cooperative gave way to antipathy, a

consequence of life still dominated by subsistence struggles. Thus, the first half of the question, how the valley was able to unite en masse against the Machu Asnu, is the easier to answer. At bottom, the Cooperative fell afoul of Marx's famous maxim; it repeated history, playing the role of farce to the tragedy of the hacienda. Yet, for communities, unity in exclusion did not mean unity in everything, as historic tensions and stratifications continued to define much of the internal social relations over these years, often exacerbated by the Cooperative's very presence.

To overcome these tensions, local leaders and political actors, such as the CCP, played a key role in uniting communities during the land seizures. Faced with the existential threat of the Cooperative, these were genuine alliances, but they were defensive and, as a byproduct, tentative, both within and between communities. Simmering below the surface, obscured by the spectacle of the seizures, tensions persisted and conflicts were never far away. Hints at these underlying frictions played out in the multiple frustrated efforts to bring the valley together in fragile organizations, such as FUCA, the Mateo Pumacahua Association, and FEDIPA. With the Cooperative's end nigh, unity began to crumble and post-liquidation, exposing further tensions, the more arriviste and combative campesinos and communities looked to seize lands for personal gain. That is not to say these acts of cooperation and visions of solidarity were disingenuous; they were, as Simpson noted, clear acts of an 'indigenous refusal' to accept imposed orders viewed as external and detrimental. Importantly, however, those that presented the seizures simply as a portrait of a revolutionary unity in face of oppressive forces missed, or willfully eschewed, that life was also defined by of a complex web of tensions, divisions and conflicts. Taken together, this helps to explain why following an historic struggle local campesinos turned to their individual plots, as once the Cooperative's threat abated, these underlying social currents meant that any concept of a shared indigenous unity returned to existing more in consciousness than in practice.

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