

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

NOVELTY, NETWORKS, AND THE RISE OF AFRICAN NATIONALISM:
AFRICAN INTERMEDIARY INTELLIGENTSIA AND THE MAKING OF POLITICAL
INNOVATION IN COLONIAL SOUTH AFRICA (1860-1890)

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*Hamba nto ka bawo wena noko sitshoyo!
Akuyikuba safa sewohlal' uteta –
Ingxelo zako zibaliw' ezincwadini,
Zibaliwe kwimiqolo ye “Mvo Zabantsundu.”
Ingxelo zako zibaliw' ezincwadini, -
Zibaliw' ezingqondweni zabavelayo.
Ingxelo zako zibaliw' ezincwadini, -
Zibaliwe kwintliziyo zabatshonayo.
Ingxelo zako zibaliw' ezincwadini, -
Zibaliw' ezingqondweni zohlanga lwako.
Hamb' uye kupumla x' i Nkosi ak' itshoyo –
Sosala sikutonga sikulaula.*

Son of my father, go though we say so!
You will not die, you'll keep speaking –
your reports are written in books,
written in Imvo Zabantsundu's lines.
Your reports are written in books –
written in the minds of those who've been born.
Your reports are written in books –
written in the hearts of those who die.
Your reports are written in books –
written in the minds of your nation.
Go and rest when your Lord so commands –
we who remain will interpret our dreams of you.

-Umfi u J.T. Jabavu, S.E.K. Mqhayi

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Abstract

In the late 1800s in the eastern Cape Colony in present day South Africa new forms of political understanding, identity, organization, and action were emerging which would transform the vision and practice of politics across the African continent. This dissertation studies the earliest moments of emerging African nationalism in South Africa in order to understand the social transformations and relational dynamics which made this political innovation possible. It studies the relational conditions of political novelty across four levels of analysis, focusing on the rise of a class of 'Intermediary Intelligentsia' who were able to generate new political frameworks and repertoires by bridging between colonial and African political communities. By analyzing biographical and experiential transformation at the level of the individual, Chapter 1 shows how macro-social transformations invalidated old political frameworks, and how missionary-educated Africans were able to generate innovative new political answers and identities from their emergent intermediary social position. Chapter 2 follows how these intermediary figures were able to forge new connections between colonial and isiXhosa speaking political communities which enabled new avenues for impactful political practice. In order to bridge divided communities, I study how intermediary intelligentsia must develop multivocal political forms which resonate with their different audiences. This is exemplified through an examination of how the concept of *isizwe* or African nationhood was used by intermediary intelligentsia as they engaged colonial, missionary-educated, and rural-traditionalist audiences. Chapter 3 extends the focus on linkages by studying the inter-organizational connections formed by nascent African

political organizations which emerged in the 1880s. The proto-nationalist political network is examined through network analysis techniques to show how the political structure shaped and enabled different forms of political innovation, and how cross-domain linkages enabled the consolidation of diverse local movements. Finally, Chapter 4 studies the transforming political vision of the larger discursive community through the 1880s through computational text analysis of the isiXhosa newspapers and qualitative coding of political organizations' newspaper reports. This analysis tracks how the core identities and political emphasis of nascent African nationalism emerged over time in the isiXhosa newspapers. Taken together, this dissertation contributes a sociological analysis of this important period of political transformation and theorizes the social and relational conditions which facilitate political transformation and innovation more broadly.

Introduction

At the end of the 19th Century in South Africa a profound transformation in political imagination and practice was underway. On 3 August 1877 the ninth and final war broke out between the British Cape Colony and the amaXhosa people and their allies. Wars had repeatedly raged for the last 100 years on the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony, the longest running military conflict in colonial history (Peires 1982). While leaders on both sides were reluctant, discontented factions within both camps agitated for change in the only way they knew: military conflict. In this war, the political repertoires that had guided the last 100 years of conflict repeated themselves; Xhosa chiefs led their forces to battle, and as the war turned against them, they waged a guerrilla war in the mountainous regions, as they had before. Only the death of the king of the Ngqika Xhosa, Sandile, on the battlefield in 1878 was able to end this bitter struggle against colonial occupation. The Xhosa had little hope of military victory or economic or political gains in this ninth war. Military struggle had failed before, and every conflict since 1811 had resulted in further losses of territory and political dominion for the Xhosa. Yet in this world filled with colonial land dispossession and drought there was no imaginable political alternative: economic desperation and anger drove a new generation of Xhosa to take up the same political strategies which had fueled conflict for the preceding 100 years. This imagined avenue of political change was unable to achieve the autonomy the amaXhosa sought, and with the end of the ninth war, the last of the independent Xhosa lands were ceded by the Cape Colony and the Ngqika and Gcaleka, the two kingdoms of the Xhosa people, were subjugated (Mostert 1992, 1249–54).

In the following years, the military might of the empire that was brought down on the Xhosa was turned against other independent African states. By 1879, colonial forces defeated the last independent Zulu and Pedi people groups, and they subordinated other pre-colonial states to colonial rule. With this destruction of the political and economic basis which had sustained king- and chief-led collective action, the first wave of anti-colonial resistance was forcibly shut down¹. The dead-end of this paradigm of African politics marked a crisis of political knowledge: the tumultuous transformations ushered in during colonialism demanded a response, but the institutions and knowledge authorities which had grounded political action had been decisively undermined.

Yet, into the political vacuum emerged a radically new challenge to colonial power, one not seen before in the history of colonialism. Beginning in the eastern Cape region of South Africa, a new group of missionary-educated Xhosa leaders began to forge a new political vision, new organizations, and new forms of action which would grow, flourish, and eventually spread across the country and the continent. From the late 19th century, a new paradigm of African politics was beginning to emerge: the rise of African nationalism. As this new community of mission-educated Xhosa leaders worked to develop new political understandings, identities, and strategies, they served as a bridge which drew together rural and urban movements, royals and commoners, Christians, and traditionalists into an increasingly unified proto-nationalist movement. This movement developed new articulation of ethnic nationalist and Pan-African

¹ While this discussion focuses on the amaXhosa context, the same process of conquest and institutional incapacitation of existing forms of resistance was repeated across Southern Africa at that period, at times by the British (such as with the wars waged against the Zulu and Pedi (in 1879 (Denoon and Nyeko 1982), other times by ‘trekking’ groups of proto-Afrikaaners (disrupting political organization among the Tswana and Ndebele), or by earlier destabilization caused by the spreading Zulu empire (destabilizing Tswana groups and fostering the consolidation of the Basotho and Ndebele political states (Denoon and Nyeko 1982)).

identity, created new public spheres of political debate in African language newspapers, developed political organizations to coordinate struggles over land and colonial law, and mobilized thousands of Africans in widespread geographical networks to register and coordinate their vote in colonial elections, thus decisively shaping the colonial parliament. Across the eastern Cape region intellectual debates, on the ground political resistance, new publics, transformed organizations, and growing networks among activists all worked to generate a space of innovation and transformation. In all of this, a new political paradigm was emerging which offered an account of the key problems in the colonial social context, new ways to solve these problems, and a new understanding of the political community to which one belonged. This creative appropriation, adaption, and innovation produced an ideological and institutional transformation in political thought and practice– this birthed an new form of African nationalism which would shape the next 100 years of struggle in South Africa and create a political framework that would be taken up throughout the continent.

Overview and research questions

This dissertation turns to this period of political transformation and studies the early moments of the emerging ‘proto-nationalist’ movement in South Africa in the years between 1860 and 1890. In doing so I study the social processes which enabled the transformation of African paradigms of political thought and action, following how African leaders and intellectuals were able to develop new political ideas and understandings, and how transforming social networks were able to create new organizations and inspire innovative forms of political action.

How was it possible for new forms of politics to be innovated and to cohere into the new approach to politics we now know as African nationalism? For those interested in the workings

of collective political action, the broad-scale transformation of ways of thinking about and doing politics evidenced in this emerging African nationalist political paradigm, offer important insights into how new forms of politics emerge.

Most of the time, the practice of politics and existing frameworks of political understanding use familiar ‘scripts’. People draw on shared political ideas, understand themselves and others through recognizable political identities, and take up tried-and-true forms of political action as they challenge injustice or contest for access to resources, opportunities, or political power. Scholars, following Swidler (1986), have called these contexts ‘settled times’: while political contest is as fraught as ever, in ‘settled times’ the understandings of what politics is and how to do it is ‘taken-for-granted’ by political actors. In such times political action draws on habitual patterns, and shared political frameworks repeat themselves because people take up concepts and practices which are both familiar to them and which meaningfully resonate with the communities with which they are engaged.

This can be understood as a stable ‘political paradigm’ – a socially shared framework comprised of a wide but limited set of identities, discourses, and repertoires of collective action which shape how actors conceptualize and engage in politics. This shared paradigm offers a common language and set of ideas which shape how actors think about and articulate what is right and wrong in the world, which problems counts as ‘political issues’, and what is and isn’t politically possible. Actors draw on these available ideas as they build shared group identity, mobilize their communities to act collectively, articulate demands, and choose their strategies of action. When these ideas and practices are ‘validated’; by respected members of a shared community, by experiential success, and by alignment with actors’ existing ideas (Glaeser 2011, 24–26), there is

no reason to challenge these taken-for-granted approaches. Those who abandon this common framework risk becoming unintelligible – the person who speaks and enacts a vision which does not resonate with or make sense to others cannot build the shared community necessary for collective political action. Thus, in ‘settled times’, political understanding and action repeat habitual and commonly understood frameworks.

Yet despite this norm of stability, we also know that there are key moments in history when political understanding and action are irrevocably transformed. At these moments something new breaks into the existing practice of politics, often leading to a transformation of understanding and action which can change how politics is practiced by future generations. These moments of transformation spring from ‘unsettled times’, where taken-for-granted ideas and practices are disrupted or break down. Existing approaches may fail to work, past centers of authority and leaders may be undermined, old answers no longer fit with new experiences. Once habitual political approaches can thus become uncertain as they face ‘validation failure’ (Glaeser 2011). In these contexts, old ideas of politics seem to no longer be sufficient to make sense of the world or to guide action. At these points, the very ideas of what politics is, who it is done by, and how it is done can be transformed. This is a transformation in the ‘paradigm of politics’. The question thus arises as to how such political novelty becomes possible.

The emergence of African nationalism was just such a transformation, and it provides insight into how the vision and practice of politics can change. Through the 1800s, kings and chiefs stood at the center of a ‘first wave’ of anti-colonial politics in South Africa. They mobilized their political communities and negotiated, allied, or battled with colonial settlers and states. Yet this political paradigm faced ever growing, eventually overwhelming, force – this came in the form

of the military might of an empire ready, willing, and capable of crushing resistance that had previously been effective. However, repeated failure was alone not enough to end this approach to resistance. The amaXhosa had lost decisive wars in 1835, 1846, and 1850 (with devastating consequences as shown in Ch 1). Without a viable alternative, a new generation returned to military struggle in 1877 – this they did despite the history of failure, because no other political framework seemed to offer an alternative.

However, the rise of the proto-nationalist movement developed a viable alternative political paradigm to resist total colonial expansion. Arguments for African nationalism and pan-Africanism in South Africa began in African intellectual circles from the mid-19th century, first appearing in print in the 1860s (Williams 1983) and growing as a political framework through the 1870s (Odendaal 2013, chap. 4). From the 1880s these intellectual ideas turned into collective political practice as the earliest proto-nationalist political organizations were founded in the 1880s among the Xhosa people. This innovative period of political development produced a new package of political ideas and practices that worked; from this context of flourishing political innovation and experimentation, a shared framework of proto-nationalist politics began to spread across the country in the late 1800s and early 1900s, consolidating in the ANC and influencing political organization in countries such as Malawi, Zambia, Botswana and many others that joined the increasing wave of anti-colonial nationalism.

This dissertation examines how and where these new political ideas and forms of action arose, by exploring the social processes that facilitated the innovation and transformation which made the rise of this new paradigm of politics possible. The study takes up a sociological analysis of the intellectual and political development of African nationalism by linking ‘macro’ historical social

transformation, the way these sweeping historical changes reshaped the ‘meso’ social relations and networks of African political activists, and a ‘micro’ analysis of the transformed experiences and biographical life paths and relations which shaped individuals’ understandings and forged the capacity for political innovation. In doing so, I focus on a new group of ‘intermediary intelligentsia’: missionary-educated African intellectuals and political leaders who emerged at the intersection of colonial and African social worlds. These figures bridged divides between communities, forming new connections between disjointed social networks, and innovating new ideas and organizational forms by drawing from both these divided worlds. Experientially, these figures were thrown into historically new life trajectories. From their intimate yet painful experience of living between these social worlds, they faced historically new problems, such as racial and cultural domination within the spreading colonial society, the weakening or collapse of African social, economic, and political institutions, and confrontations with growing legal oppression under colonial governance. To respond to these problems, they drew from both colonial and African knowledge systems to forge new answers and develop a new shared political imagination.

In examining what enabled these intermediary intelligentsia to generate novel political vision and practice, I study the relational conditions which enabled and shaped the innovation in political understanding and practice. Understanding how the intermediary social position of emerging proto-nationalist leaders created the capacity for political innovation and laid the foundation for political transformation contributes to both the understanding of this important period of political transformation in South Africa and shows how the dynamics seen in this context offer insights into the processes of transformation and innovation more broadly.

Studying political transformation: From mobilization to innovation

To engage these questions of political transformation and innovation I now turn to review various theoretical perspectives in political sociology and history with the aim of developing the necessary theoretical and conceptual framework to study the conditions of political change. The first section briefly reviews the major theoretical perspectives in the social movements scholarship in order to show that the dominant questions and theoretical frameworks which have guided the subfield since the 1970s have created a theoretical gap which makes it difficult to engage questions of ‘political paradigm’ transformation. I will argue that the major theoretical perspectives have led to a focus on: 1. ‘settled politics’ which emphasizes the centrality of resources and the relations among organizations as it studies how already established groups mobilize using already established (routine or habitual) political forms; 2. a faulty division between ‘structuralist’ and ‘culturalist’ approaches which has led ‘structuralist’ scholars to focus on static ‘macro’ and ‘meso’ levels of social organization and ‘culturalist’ scholars to focus on micro-level social interactions and individual understandings; and 3. a focus on moments of action and short-time windows around action, which emphasizes mobilization capacity over changing political perspectives. These three features have resulted in a lack of attention to the longer-term transformations where the ideas and ideologies that guide political practice are themselves transformed and lay down new frameworks for the future.

To respond to the theoretical gap created by this approach, the second section begins by reviewing a number of works in political sociology and history which place political transformation as their central focus. Three different theoretical perspectives on political

transformation are outlined and then synthesized to define a set of theoretical and conceptual tools which ground this dissertation's analysis and contribution.

The focus on mobilization and its blind spots

Understanding the sources of political stability and transformation has always been a central focus in the canon of political sociology. The now canonized European sociologists Marx, Weber, and Durkheim were keenly attentive to the large-scale transformations of their 19th century European milieu, and they developed 'macro-social' frameworks of analysis to understand their societies' histories of political stability and change². This focus shaped the analysis of American and European 'political sociology' in the first half of the 20th century, and led to four major theories to understand collective political action: relative deprivation (Davies 1962; Geschwender 1968; Gurr [1970] 2011); class analysis (Lipset 1950; Paige 1978), mass society (Kornhauser [1960] 2013), and modernization (Smelser 1963). While these approaches had significantly different perspectives, all attended to political transformation drawing on macro-social frameworks of explanation. These theories all sought to explain the variation in political practice through an analysis of varying social structures, focused on explaining

²Marx's analysis (e.g. *German Ideology* ([1932] 1970), *The 18th Brumaire* ([1852] 2008) 1852, *Capital* ([1867] 2018)) established a tradition which explained transformation through an attention to the structural or relational conditions of political mobilization. Marx's work established an attention to the processes of class formation (and by extension group formation more broadly), and emphasized conflict generated through the social structure which produced the capacity to transform the existing structure. Weber's analysis (e.g. *Economy and Society* (1978), *From Max Weber: essays in sociology* (2009)) established a tradition which attended to power and authority, especially to the conditions under which such power or domination might be viewed as legitimate to those who follow it. This legitimacy exists only when subordinates assign subjective meaning which recognizes the right of the superordinates to hold power (Buechler 2011, 31), and Weber's work offered political sociology a framework to explore conditions under which legitimate authority breaks down and people come to resist the power to which they are subjected. Durkheim's analysis of societal integration and disintegration (e.g. *Suicide* ([1951] 2002), *The elementary forms of the religious life* ([1915] 2008), *The rules of sociological method* ([1938] 2014)) were the primary contributions to later social movement scholarship, and his account of the social disruptions which break an individual free from their embedding in social ties (egoism) and strip them from a collective world of moral norms (anomie) ([1951] 2002) have been developed by theorists of mobilization as a potential source of collective action.

variations in political orientations (not the capacity of groups to mobilize), and made predictions about the social-structural conditions under which different forms of politics would emerge (Walder 2009, 395).

Two key shifts which began in the 1970s radically altered the existing approach to political analysis. The first was a movement away from seeing group protest as an overflow of discontentment, and a shift towards seeing movement activity as strategic action. The second was a shift away from both interactionist, short term, emergent features (as studied in the ‘collective behavior’ approach of the Chicago School (Park and Burgess 1921; Blumer [1939] 1951; Turner and Killian 1957; 1987) and long-term structural features, with a new interest in the centrality of organization and group mobilization processes. These two approaches— ushered in by figures such as Gamson (1968; 1975), Oberschall (1973), McCarthy and Zald (1977) and Tilly (1964; 1978) – shifted the core attention of the field away from questions of political orientation and political transformation. The new approach bracketed the question of how political groups experienced and understood discontentment, assuming that there was always enough dissatisfaction to fuel collective action (McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1215). Instead, scholars focused on what allowed social and political movements to mobilize supporters to collectively participate in political action. This new agenda can be summarized as follows: the question was assumed to be what influences the level of mobilization (understood as a variable with a value from low to high), and the answer took the form of features which facilitated mobilization, by and large understood as independent variables. With the ‘dependent variable’ of mobilization, studies proliferated that suggested influences of ‘independent variables’ or systematized these into models (e.g. Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982). This new approach became

known as ‘resource mobilization’ theory. The first wave of this scholarship drew on a business industry model which emphasized how successful social movement organizations strategically gathered and deployed resources (McCarthy and Zald 1977) and showed how movements built upon existing organizational capacity (Oberschall 1973) to create large and successful movements. This framework was further developed to attend to the broader inter-organizational and political structures which created different ‘political opportunities’ (McAdam 1982) which facilitated mobilization for some groups and not others (see also Tilly’s (1978) model of inter-organizational connections), and then worked to incorporate how political issues were rhetorically ‘framed’ in order to draw in wider communities and more resources for collective action (Snow et al. 1986).

This shift to focus on the capacity for mobilization as a key to social movement success yielded much fruit, but placing mobilization at the center narrowed the questions and created a set of assumptions which produced a theoretical gap (See Walder 2009).

First, this new approach was suited to explain mobilizing capacity in ‘settled’ political systems but left aside how politics itself is transformed. The attention to the centrality of resources and established organizations was conceptually tailored to modern-day social settings in affluent societies with already organized social movement organizations and an established social movement sector. In short, the scope of analysis of the more ‘economically’ minded resource mobilization framework was largely on movements in modern, affluent, and organizationally dense society (Perrow 1979, 201; Buechler 2011, 124). There remained an important trend of scholarship which focused on a larger range of historical contexts and their political structures, which eventually broke away under a new umbrella of the ‘political process’ approach

(instantiated by McAdam 1982, see the same historical attention in Tilly 1964, 1978)³. But even for these historically minded scholars, variables which predicted or explained variation in mobilization remained the central focus even while rich historical detail was used to support the larger question of mobilizing capacity. When political understanding and practice is routinized in ‘settled times’, mobilizing capacity can prove a decisive aspect for understanding social movement success. These approaches do an excellent job of theorizing the variables which affect this mobilizing capacity. Yet this approach, having chosen to bracket the meanings and understandings which drive discontentment, unwittingly bracketed the moments of transformation where the ideas, goals, values, and strategies of politics shift. Studying mobilization left the field inattentive to times of political transformation.

Second, the dominance and reaction to ‘resource mobilization’ approaches have created a faulty distinction between ‘structure’ and ‘culture’ in the analysis of social movements since the 90s. Although some scholars in resource mobilization framework focused on “an economic-organizational, input-output model” (Perrow 1979, 200) the historical attention to large scale political processes never receded from the focus of the ‘political process’ school for whom “[i]deology, grievances and political power” remained important (ibid). Yet, notwithstanding their historical interest and acknowledgement of transformation, their analysis focused on the conditions which produced high levels of mobilization. In this framework, the conceptualization of ‘structure’ was transformed. The analytical frame developed by Marx, Durkheim, and Weber, and taken as foundational by political sociologists until the 70s, analyzed ‘structure’ as the large-

³ This historical attention later grew into the ‘contentious politics’ approach (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tilly and Tarrow 2015).

scale social structures and their slow but constant historical transformation. Resource mobilization and political process theories redefined ‘structure’ as the more local environmental conditions which shaped mobilization. Attention was paid primarily to inter-organizational conditions as the basis of ‘structure’, whether the focus fell on the Social Movement Industry (SMI) (McCarthy & Zald 1977), the relations between government, members of a polity, and contenders (Tilly 1978), or the opportunities for political action based on the state of a political system (McAdams 1982). ‘Structure’ here is transformed from a societal level lens (macro) in historical dynamism (dynamic) to an organizational level set of relations (meso) taken as the system state for mobilization capacity (static).

The cultural turn which swept academic disciplines in the 90s created a challenge to this ‘structural’ approach and new ‘culturalist’ scholars worked to bring social constructionist insights into social movement analysis, reincorporating ideational elements into understanding mobilization processes (Morris and Mueller 1992; Mueller 1992; Klandermans 1992; Garrison 1992; Schwartz and Paul 1992). This ‘cultural’ challenge largely took up a ‘micro-constructionist’ approach: where “the formal social movement organization has been the primary social unit of resource mobilization, the social network of face-to-face encounters is the more typical unit of social constructionists” (Mueller 1992, 5–6). Here a new generation of scholars studied how “meanings critical to the interpretation of collective identities, grievances, and opportunities are created interpreted and transformed” in relational and interactional contexts (Mueller 1992, 10). This created an opposition where the call for attention to ‘cultural’ elements was portrayed as an alternative to the purportedly ‘structuralist’ approaches of the 70s and 80s. This opposition of structure and culture did two things: first, it reified the meso-level, static

analysis which drew on variable based metaphors of explanation as the standard of ‘structural’ analysis. Second, it pigeon-holed ‘cultural’ analysis into a largely individualistic focus on participants’ understanding. It returned attention to dynamic transformations of understanding (e.g. Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina 1982), but focused this at the level of individual recruitment and participation. These two approaches were deeply different in ontological, epistemological, and methodological orientations, yet in so far as they held together, they focused on the central question of the capacity for political mobilization. The attention to the interpretation of grievances, resources, and opportunities could be incorporated by arguing that they modify existing variables or add previously unacknowledged variables to already existing models (as in McAdams, McCarthy, & Zald (1996), additions of variables is exemplified in the relation between emotion and mobilization in Goodwin(1997)).

These imagined poles – static meso-level ‘structure’ opposed to ‘culture’ studied as dynamic small group interactionist meaning-creation – further entrenched the blindness to large scale social and ideological transformations which create broad political transformation.

Finally, scholars have highlighted how the field primarily paid attention to moments of action, and short time windows around these impactful moments. Social movements research since the 70s has almost always been bound by the *courte duree*; we have focused in detail on the organization of specific protest movements; we have studied the demands made in mobilization campaigns rather than the values or points of concern underling them; and we have given our attention to agents of social change – social movement organizations – rather than the reception they enjoy among the population (Tarrow 1992, 186). As Tarrow argues, all this leads to a focus on the practices and rhetorics of mobilization which implicitly takes for granted the underlying

ideological and cultural concepts – the mentalities and political culture that transform in the ‘longue durée’ and shape the horizons of what is considered politically possible. In summary then, a new theoretical approach to the analysis of social movements was begun in the 1970s which centered the focus of analysis on established social movement organizations and strategic movement leaders who deploy resources and rhetorical frameworks to advance their own already existing movements. Here the values, goals, and motivations of these movements appear as stable and “grievances and discontent may be defined, created, and manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and organizations” (McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1215). Thus, any changes in political orientations and imagination were bracketed away from theoretical attention. Compared with the macro-social analysis which preceded it, attention shifted decisively away from historical transformation and from the political values and orientations of movements to explore mobilizing capacity. The ‘culturalist’ challenge to this approach was focused on the ‘micro’ level of transforming meanings and understandings which arose from interactional contexts. These culturalists seeded the ground of ‘macro’ transformation to the structuralists (who in fact focused on a static snapshot of the political ‘system’), and meaning was examined at the level of the individual. Finally, social movement scholars focused primarily on short time windows around central moments of political action. Even the most historically inclined scholars turned their attention away from ‘macro-social’ transformation which had guided analysis in the past. Indeed, the ‘political process’ school grew into the new ‘contentious politics’ approach of the early 2000s (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tilly and Tarrow 2015). They added great value by expanding the scope of analysis to a wider global and historical set of cases, but they retreated even further from historical change to focus squarely on ‘contentious events’ and the

mechanisms which shaped these events— this was a clear indication of the narrow time window of analysis. The effect of this history of scholarship is that, since the 1970s, the dominant theoretical framework of social movements research has consistently resulted in a lack of attention to large scale political transformation and the conditions which make such transformation possible.

Theorizing transformation and innovation

The review above highlights that the dominance of the resource mobilization paradigm and its inheritors set aside older questions of political transformation. Yet in recent years, after much advancement in our understanding of mobilization processes, scholars have begun to return again to place questions of political transformation at the center of studies of political sociology (see esp. Walder's (2009) review and the clear articulation of the puzzle of transformation in Jansen (2017)).

This dissertation participates alongside a growing number of studies in political sociology which examine how political understandings and action transformed historically. By examining the early moments of the emergence of a new form of African political imagination and action, that of African nationalism, the research aims to answer how the innovation seen in the proto-nationalism movement was possible, what enabled this transformation, and what shaped the contours of the new set of political approaches which emerged from this movement.

This study of emerging African nationalism raises a broader set of shared theoretical questions: When do new political frameworks of understanding emerge, and when and why do existing understandings and political answers no longer seem sufficient? To understand how the

grounding vision of politics shifts, we need to attend to what I will call conditions of ‘macro-cultural’ transformation. How do the ideas and strategies for collective action which guide political practice shift in ways that transform both what is understood as the domain of politics (i.e. the problems which are solved through collective action of one group acting toward another group), and what forms of political action are imagined as possible?

To engage these questions, it is necessary to build up a conceptual and theoretical framework which is tailored to processes of transformation rather than processes of mobilization. The next section aims to do this by reviewing three different approaches to political change developed by both sociologists and historians who have taken political transformation as their guiding question. These approaches attend to change in both structural and cultural (or more precisely, ideational) elements which transform political practice. These elements are then drawn together to offer an account of how we might advance the study of political transformation, setting up the conceptual framework which guides the analysis of this dissertation.

Repertoires, political stability, and the puzzle of transformation

The definition and analysis of ‘repertoires’ in the social movements literature both powerfully articulates the puzzle of political transformation and has yielded important insights into how ‘repertoires’ are transformed. Charles Tilly instantiated this tradition by examining ‘repertoires of collective action’, noting that “given the innumerable ways in which people could, in principle, deploy resources in pursuit of common ends”, the actually available repertoire of collective actions at a given time is “surprisingly limited” (Tilly 1978, 151). The puzzle that confronts Tilly is the fact that historically a huge range of forms of collective action have been used to achieve political ends. Yet at any given time the modes that people actually use to engage

in political action are limited to a small set of options. At different times “hijacking, mutiny, machine breaking, charivaris, village fights, tax-rebellion, food riots, collective self-immolation, lynching, vendetta” have all been part of the routine and well know forms of political action, with actors who know how to engage in these modes of action and with these forms holding some sense of legitimacy (Tilly 1978, 153). Yet in spite of their past use and potential feasibility, they are not considered to be genuine alternatives for present-day American political action.

Thus, such actions are outside the contemporary American repertoire of collective action (ibid).

This notion of a limited repertoire represents an available set of strategic choices for action, but a set which is limited in time and space. Tilly highlights the stability and taken-for-granted nature of a repertoire: “It generally changes slowly, seems obvious and natural to the people involved. It resembles an elementary language: familiar as the day to its users, for all its possible quaintness or incomprehensibility to an outsider” (Tilly 1978, 156). The combination of general stability and vast historical difference noted in this repertoire account highlights the question of repertoire emergence and transformation (ibid). Given that we see this limited package of possibilities in a given time and space, how do repertoires transform? While Tilly offered a start at possible structural features which might facilitate transformation (see Tilly 1978, 155–62) the challenge of repertoire transformation has been taken up by succeeding scholars.

Clemens’ *The People’s Lobby* (1997) turns explicitly to study the question of transformation of repertoires and the emergence of new forms of political action in the emergence of interest group politics in the US. Clemens extends the idea of repertoire transformation to explore change not just of political attitudes or preferences (as Tilly’s repertoires might be conceived as), but of a shift in political rules and institutions so that new forms of political expression become normal

and appropriate. The work emphasizes an institutional analysis and looks at how agrarian, labor, and women's groups pioneered new organizational forms, and in doing so created innovative transformations of organizational repertoires which shifted the whole political system from a party-based cleavage to a new interest group approach to political mobilization. The theory of repertoire transformation offered in this work focuses on the adoption and transformation of organizational repertoires. Given that direct attacks on an existing system are easy to identify and repress (Clemens 1997, 322), Clemens follows how the challenger groups in her study adopt already existing organizational repertoires from dominant groups which appear less threatening to the established order. Yet, the adoption of these repertoires, when moved to a new context, allows their 'misappropriation' or 'misapplication' and fosters adaptation and transformation in a way that produces new scripts in newly emerging organizational contexts. These adaptations avoid the forces of repression from the hegemonic political power, working from the familiar, even while the repertoires transformed in their new context in a way that generated new alternatives. When these emerging organizational forms are able to successfully delegitimize the existing system and legitimate their new approach, the invention (i.e. novelty and creation) is able to be transformed into durable 'innovation': "the embedding of novel practices in durable social networks and resource flows" (Clemens 1997, 321).

A similar idea of organizational transformation is expressed in Padgett and Powell's concept of 'transposition and refunctionality' (Padgett and Powell 2012, chaps. 1 & 6) which marks "the movement of a relational practice from one domain to another and its reuse for a different function or purpose in the new domain" (2012, 12). In this Clemens and Padgett & Powell conception, novelty is possible when an existing repertoire is transitioned to a new context,

where it can offer “a new purpose for an old tool” (Padgett and Powell 2012, 12) and in doing so bring transformation.

Tilly, Clemens, and Padgett & Powell all outline repertoires as packages of practices or organizational forms. These packages might be thought of as ‘cultural’, in that they exist as available social ideas which enable and constrain action by making a limited repertoire available and accessible in a given social context. Yet the concept of repertoires has also been extended to focus more directly on the understandings of participants. Snow and Benford’s (1992) account of ‘master frames’ highlights the ‘conceptual repertoire’ which, within a given historical context, both makes available and limits the set of possible understandings. These ‘frames’ guide and limit interpretation in the same way that Tilly’s repertoires guide collective action; master frames perform three different functions: “diagnostic framing identifies problems and imputes blame or causality; prognostic framing encourages certain strategies and tactics; motivational framing develops compelling reasons for action.” (Mooney and Hunt 1996, 178). Such ‘master frames’ can guide the framing of a whole wave of protest (Snow and Benford 1992). Mooney & Hunt (1996) extend this idea, arguing that at a given time there is a *repertoire of interpretation* – a limited set of master frames which can be drawn on by movement participants as they seek to “(re)interpret and (re)construct systems of meaning” (179). This allows them to explore how people can draw on and transform elements of their own lifeworld, and draw from multiple master frames, as they do their framing work. It also offers an ideological equivalent to the organizational borrowing and transformation seen in Clemens and Padgett & Powell: frames can be transformed by borrowing from different domains and combining elements in new ways. Furthermore, it allows the analysis of abeyance processes (Taylor 1989) to be extended from the

analysis of how organizational forms can be maintained in unreceptive conditions, to also include attention to how ideological forms and master frames might be maintained in abeyance, then resurface at later times (Taylor 1989, 180).

Repertoires, whether conceived of as packages of practices, organizational forms, or interpretive schema, work as a useful way to consider how there are always a limited range of options available. This limited set both constrains what is possible (thus limited), yet also offers a range of tools which are culturally at hand (thus possibilities).

Changing social relations and ideational transformation

Another longstanding orientation in sociological theorizing has been to focus on how transformations of social relations in society foster changes in ideological content. In their own different ways, the ‘sociology of knowledge’ of both Marx ([1932] 1970; see Lukacs 1972; Mannheim [1929] 2013) and Durkheim ([1915] 2008) laid a foundation which emphasized how social structure forms the basis for cultural understanding, and each leaves a long tradition of examining the relation between how social relations are organized, and the impact of this organization on the ideas and understandings of that society. In what follows I take up two traditions which have taken up this ‘structure causes culture’ approach: network theorists of political transformation and cultural Marxism.

Bearman (*Relations into Rhetorics* 1993) offers an exemplar of an approach which sees changes in social structure producing changes in ideas. Bearman follows the transformation of social relations and the concordant rise of new ideological cleavages, which were the preconditions for the English civil war. In Bearman’s account, the transformation of elite social structure – the

breakdown of local kinship networks and the rise of new national level connections – fostered the rise of new ideological positions which were used for local political ends but produced new religious ideological cleavages. The shift from local integration to national level networks was the cause of a shift from kinship-based identity to a new religious identity. This emerging religiosity was not itself the driver of new action, but rather an abstract rhetoric which was used for political ends in the development and manipulation of religious patronage networks. Bearman argues that the transformation of the structure of relations produced new structurally equivalent positions, and those who shared these positions shared similar interests and motivations. These structurally equivalent actors needed a new basis to pursue their common interests, and new religious rhetorics served as identity markers to unite these newly emerging structurally equivalent ‘classes’. In Bearman’s account, one’s position in the social structure, determined by the structure of one’s relationships, is the source of common interests and the determining principle for common identity. The development of abstract religious ideologies were useful identity markers to unite those who held a structurally equivalent position because they offered a set of identity markers for individuals who already shared interests and identity due to their relationally similar context. Thus, for Bearman, structural position guides interest and identity, and rhetorics offer a basis that marks different groups and offers a legitimate cover for their interest-based unity. The religious rhetorics were used for profane political ends as the structure of social relations in England transformed from local to national networks. In this approach Bearman highlights similar dynamics to the historical work of Gould (1995; 1996) who also follows how the changing structure of social relations, created the basis for identity in political mobilization.

Ansell (1997) offers an example of the same focus on relational and ideational transformation but emphasizes the importance of the ideational content far more than Bearman. Ansell follows the emergence of the 'general strike' among the French working class and argues that this was an abstract symbol which was able to transform the existing cleavages in the working class and act as a bridge for a new common unity in their political action. Ansell highlights ideological cleavages which divided the working class. The political approaches of anarchism, corporatism, republicanism, and socialism split the political visions and goals of the working class and created polarized trade unions in political competition with each other. Yet, an emerging institution, the *bourses du travail*, created a context which fostered new social networks among different groups. This institution drew together members from different unions and created social connections between members of opposing ideological camps. It created a context which blended elements from different ideological camps as it fostered connections between an ideologically diverse range of workers. In this context of new social relations among diverse ideological positions, Ansell argues that a new symbol emerged which was able to meaningfully unite diverse groups into a common orienting direction. The symbol was the 'general strike', which transformed the already existing idea of local union-based strikes into a unifying cross-union form of collective strike action. This symbol was a 'dominant symbol' which was emotionally powerful, as well as being 'multivocal' in its ability to resonate with different ideological groups. The 'general strike' thus worked to create solidarity across unions and worked to overcome the ideological and political cleavages which divided the working class, creating a new unifying call to common action. Ansell shows that support for this new approach to collective action was significantly stronger in cities where the *bourses du travail* was present. The argument, then, is that changes in

social relations can create social contexts which transform the motivating ideas that guide action. Symbols here serve as bridges between ideological divides, and they emerge from social contexts which create new social relations and link previously existing relational cleavages. While the *bourses du travail* was a relational context which fostered the emergence of a new ideological symbol, this symbol then went on to create an ideological tool which could overcome pre-existing ideological cleavages. Thus, while Ansel sees novelty emerging from changes in the structure of social relations, unlike Bearman, these ideological creations have real power themselves. Once they emerge, they are able to create the ideological bridges which foster more widespread transformations in the relational structure, offering conceptual tools to bridge pre-existing social cleavages.

Overall, Bearman sees common network position as the source for new interests and identities. These common positions call into being identity markers which are isomorphic with network position. Ansell has shown the effect of relational proximity instead of positional equivalence. In the context of relational proximity of different ideological positions, Ansell's work suggests that new symbols can emerge to overcome ideological difference, thus allowing relational proximity to foster new tools for ideological proximity.

Thompson, in *The Making of the English Working Class* (1963) also develops a theoretical account that takes changes in social structure as the 'first mover' for changes in ideational content, yet he develops an important focus on the intermediary steps of cultural use and transformation as he studies the development of working class culture in England through the writings and cultural production of its participants. Thompson offers a useful theoretical addition

as he places *experience* as an analytical category which mediates between macro-structural transformation and cultural transformation:

Thompson sees two intersecting elements as foundational in the transformation of understanding: common experience and class consciousness. Thompson draws on the Marxist concept of class-consciousness to account for the development of a common interpretive frame of the movement. Yet this interpretive framework is not free floating and infinitely malleable (compare this with the malleability proposed in the resource mobilization literature on grievances and movement ‘Framing’ (Snow et al. 1986). Instead, it is anchored in common experiences which are then collectively interpreted:

[C]lass happens when some men, as a result of common experiences (inherited or shared), *feel* and *articulate* the identity of their interests as between themselves, and as against other men whose interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs. (1963, 9) [my emphasis]

This ‘feeling’ and ‘articulating’ mark two forms of interpretation: the development of a collective frame of interpretation to make sense of changes in the world which affect many people in a similar way. Thompson anchors this common experience in the ‘material’ world. It is the material conditions of human existence which shape *experience*. *Class consciousness* is the interpretive understanding of these experiences:

[C]hanges take place within social being, which give rise to changed *experience*: and this experience is *determining*, in the sense that it exerts pressures upon existing social consciousness, proposes new questions, and affords much of the material which the more elaborated intellectual exercises are about. (E. P. Thompson 1978, 8) [original emphasis]

The class experience is largely determined by the productive relations into which men are born – or enter involuntarily. Class consciousness is the way in which these experiences are handled in cultural terms: embodied in traditions, value-systems, ideas, and institutional forms. If the experience appears as determined, class consciousness does not. (E. P. Thompson 1963, 9–10).

Thompson's model thus accounts for both structural transformations in the 'social being' (here with the Marxist emphasis on productive relations), the way this transforms the experiential world of individuals, and the cultural resources which are both *drawn on* and *developed* anew to interpret the changing world. By tracing in immense detail the understandings and articulations of rising working class movements in their own words, Thompson offers an account which emphasizes the ways "in which individuals and groups sought to render into theory ... [their own] experiences" (1963, 711).

Like Bearman, the analysis here follows how relational/structural transformation ('the social being') leads to the rise of new identities. Yet unlike Bearman, the role of interpretation, understanding and cultural work is much more central. For Bearman, class position implies interests, and identity offers mobilization. It is enough to show changes in structural position to see that new common interests emerge; identities then name structural groups, and their content is peripheral. Thompson sees something very different in the forging of new class consciousness: in the face of a transformed experiential world, existing social consciousness may fail to make sense of experience (as in the above quote). New experiential conditions, which emerge as the ordering of the social world changes around actors, produce a need to develop new understandings – to offer new answers to new questions (1978, 8). Identities form as actors see that others share the same experiential world and that their problems and answers can overlap.

This identifying process also happens as actors feel (and articulate) themselves to inhabit a world of experience (and therefore interests) different from and opposed to others, and come to define themselves against them (1963, 9).

In this account, macro-structural transformation is the source of transformed experiences, and individuals and groups facing these new conditions “sought to render into theory ... [their own] experiences” (1963, 711). This is done through drawing on and transforming ‘cultural’ forms, using and creating traditions, value systems, ideas and institutional forms (ibid, 10). While much of the cultural analysis of movements has paid attention to how these cultural forms are used and transformed, Thompson’s unique and important contribution is to put *experience* – and the need to interpret this experience – as a central piece of his theorization. Changed experiential conditions emerge from macro-structural transformation, and they draw on, transform, and are stored in macro-cultural forms. Thus, Thompson is able to specify the way that macro-structural change produces macro-cultural change without losing an analysis of individual perspective, and the individual wrestle for interpretation. Macro-cultural transformation, in this approach, emerges from the work of individuals and groups to develop new theorizations which are tailored to their changing social reality.

Attending to experience: how social change transforms understanding

Thompson’s emphasis on experience enables a clearer linkage between scholars who study processes of macro-social transformation and scholars who study shifts in social knowledge or understanding.

The phenomenological sociology of Alfred Schütz gives us an account of the relation between individual experiences and socially shared answers. First, Schütz's notion of the 'life-world' offers a way to understand how the world appears for a social community:

In the natural attitude, I always find myself in a world which is for me taken for granted and self-evidently "real." I was born into it and I assume that it existed before me. It is the unexamined ground of everything given in my experience, as it were, the taken-for-granted frame in which all the problems which I must overcome are placed. (Schütz and Luckmann 1973, 4)

Schütz's work highlights that in an undisrupted worldview – the 'natural attitude' – allows us to make sense of the world through socially shared meanings that we take as fundamental truths. The 'natural attitude' is "the sedimented group experience that has passed the test, and which does not need to be examined by individuals as regards its validity" (ibid, 8). Thus, the "stock of experience is to a considerable extent transmitted socially. The recipes have already "proven" themselves elsewhere. The first guarantee of the recipe is social" (ibid, 15).

This social knowledge is sufficient until we come upon a problem which cannot be explained by our already existing social stock of knowledge: "I only become aware of the deficient tone of my stock of knowledge if a novel experience does not fit into what has up until now been taken as the taken-for-granted valid reference schema" (ibid, 8). These new challenging experiences can be of two types: one kind of experience can be "classified into a type formed out of previous experience ... [and is therefore] not intrinsically problematic" (ibid, 9). A second kind of experience, however, can be incongruent with previous knowledge and experiences, and cannot be classified into the existing reference schema. When we are confronted with such experiences the 'self-evident' or 'taken-for-granted' nature of the world is disrupted. Under these conditions

an individual must turn towards their own taken-for-granted knowledge and re-examine it in order to make sense of the new unfamiliar experience.

In Schütz's framework it is the encounter with "novel experience" which cannot simply be categorized into an already available type which is truly challenging to our taken-for-granted frameworks. When an individual faces similar experiences to the "sedimented group experience" of the past they have no problem making sense of them, because they can draw on the socially given answers which are already socially shared. However, when individuals face experiences which are distinctly different from their surrounding communities, they are faced with challenges to their understanding, and they do not have readymade answers at hand. New problems, then, emerge when a range of experiences confront people who do not have socially pre-given answers available to confront and engage with these problems.

The apparent validity of answers is not only challenged by new experiences outside of the social stock of knowledge. Where Schütz shows the social basis of knowledge based in a shared social stock of knowledge, Glaeser (2011) has shown how the experienced 'validity' of our understandings is also bound up in social, experiential, and interpretive contexts which either validate existing understandings, thus strengthening confidence in these interpretive frameworks, or are 'negatively validated' by social, experiential, and interpretive contexts which undermine these understandings and place them into greater uncertainty.

Glaeser argues that three processes allow actors to test their existing understandings: first, actors put their understandings to work in the world. Where these understandings produce success, achieving the goals that actors pursue, existing understandings are "corroborated". Actors also

judge their understandings in light of ‘networks of authority’, looking to those who they and their communities judge as domain specific authorities. Where these authorities validate the understandings that actors have, they are validated through “recognition”. And finally, actors judge understandings in light of other understandings they hold – and where understandings are consonant with each other, these understandings are validated through “resonance”. Thus, by turning to experiences in the world, authoritative figures, and their own larger framework of understanding, actors can either be affirmed (“validated”) in the understandings they hold, or their understandings can be challenged and made more uncertain (“negatively validated”). Glaeser’s analysis of shifting political frameworks of the GDR, which transformed within shifting institutional arrangements, shows how established understandings are weakened by negative validation and how new counter-hegemonic understandings can emerge and become guiding frameworks of action through processes of validation.

The above analysis of Schütz and Glaeser offers a set of conceptual tools to link societal change to the receptivity of people to new political frameworks. Schütz highlights how experiences beyond the existing framework of social knowledge call forth a demand to reassess taken-for-granted knowledge and to develop new ways to interpret these experiences. Not all change creates this kind of experiential rupture. As Schütz notes, many times, new experiences can be classified as a type of old experience and resolved into already existing frameworks. Yet some transformations can disrupt the experiential conditions of life to such an extent that old frameworks of knowledge seem useless, and new answers must be sought. As I will go on to show, this analysis of experiential transformation using a combination of pre-existing socially given answers offers insight into the experiential condition of the emerging community of

missionary-educated Africans. Glaeser's analysis of the validation and negative validation of existing answers also shows how societal transformation works at the level of social interaction to challenge or affirm the understandings of individuals and communities. Glaeser's work makes clear that there is no simple jump between old answers failing and new answers emerging. Social change can weaken the certainty of some understandings, creating a receptivity to new modes of understanding. But equally important is the capacity to create systems of validation which strengthen new frameworks of understanding. Thus, understandings transform in shifting institutional arrangements which can fundamentally shift how these understandings are validated. I will go on to show how Glaeser's account is particularly powerful in offering a theoretical framework which shows the 'negative validation' of the first wave of anti-colonial resistance.

Foregrounding cultural transformation: Ideational conditions shaping social structure

While the above foregrounds changing 'macro-structure' as the basis for changing cultural expressions, a different tradition of scholarship has shown how changing ideology can be the 'first mover' which transforms social structure. One useful expression of this theoretical line is visible in the theoretical shifts in the discipline of history. Together with the widespread linguistic turn reverberating through the humanities in the 80s and 90s, historians made a shift from 'social history' (of the Thompson variety) to an enhanced focus on language, ideas, and discourse in the shaping of history. Baker's *Inventing the French Revolution* (1990) offers an exemplar of this approach which also focuses on the transformation of forms of political action. Baker works to invert the assumption that it was the changing structure of social relations which created the conditions for political transformation—a staple of theoretical analysis since Marx.

Instead, Baker works to uncover the historical transformations which allowed the emergence of a fundamentally new political imagination. Baker builds on an emerging approach which sees,

the fundamental character of the French Revolution as a political phenomenon, a profound transformation of political discourse involving powerful new forms of political symbolization, experientially elaborated in radically novel modes of political action that were as unprecedented as they were unanticipated. (1990, 7)

Baker's approach is to emphasize the importance of ideational conditions of discourse over the demographic or class-based attention of the previous historical paradigm. The emphasis for him is placed on conditions of a changing discursive or interpretive paradigm. In the French case, he argues that new interconnection emerged in the 1750s and 1760 which transformed three discourses: the judicial discourse of 'justice', the political discourse of 'will', and the administrative discourse of 'reason'. Transformations ushered in by the rise of public tribunals stripped the discursive legitimacy of the old social order in the years preceding the revolution, and the intersection and competition between these discourses formed the context where a new discursive framework was developed which guided revolutionary political action.

The more general theoretical shift is to place linguistic analysis more squarely at the center of political analysis. This approach,

sees politics as about making claims; as the activity through which individuals and groups in any society articulate, negotiate, implement, and enforce the competing claims they make upon one another and upon the whole. Political culture is, in this sense, the set of discourses of symbolic practices by which these claims are made. It comprises the definitions of the relative subject-positions from which individuals and groups may (or may not) legitimately make claims one upon another, and therefore of

the identity and boundaries of the community to which they belong. It constitutes the meanings of the terms in which these claims are framed, the nature of the contexts to which they pertain, and the authority of the principles according to which they are made binding. It shapes the constitutions and powers of the agencies and procedures by which contestations are resolved, competing claims authoritatively adjudicated, and binding decisions enforced. Thus, political authority is, in this view, essentially a matter of linguistic authority: first, in the sense that political functions are defined and allocated within the framework of a given political discourse; and second, in the sense that their exercise takes the form of upholding authoritative definitions of the terms within that discourse. (Baker 1990, 4–5)

It is thus a framework of legitimate claim making which governs political action and competition within a stable political domain, and it must therefore be a transformation of the framework of legitimate claim making which facilitates significant transformation of political contest:

A community exists only to the extent that there is some common discourse by which its members can constitute themselves as different groups within the social order and make claims upon one another that are regarded as intelligible and binding. The interaction involved in the framing of such claims is constrained within that discourse, which it in turn sustains, extends, and on occasion transforms. Political authority is, in this view, a matter of linguistic authority [as explored in the quote above.] ... In these terms, a revolution can be defined as a transformation of the discursive practice of the community, a moment in which social relations are reconstituted and the discourse defining the political relations between individuals and groups is radically recast. (Baker 1990, 17–18)

Baker here offers a clear articulation of the pre-eminence of conceptual structures in the maintenance or transformation of forms societal interaction through binding legitimate claim making. Thus, it is the discursive space which structures and constrains interaction, demands,

and competition between societal groups. Transformation in this discursive domain facilitates the transformation of the legitimate relations between social groups (i.e. the social structure). This, then, is a radically different theorization of the relation between ideational structure and social structure and offers a useful addition to a sociological tradition which overwhelmingly privileges structure as the source of ideational or cultural forms.

Integrating structure and culture

The opposition defined above, structure-causes-culture vs culture-causes-structure is a theoretical abstraction of often more detailed and nuanced analysis which inevitably sees the interaction between these elements. Ansell's piece, discussed above, has already offered a more explicit account of the dual flow between relational structure and ideational content. One clear theoretical account which makes great strides in emphasizing both structural and ideational elements in a macro view while incorporating transformation is Wuthnow's *Communities of Discourse* (1989). Wuthnow focuses on ideological transformation in the making of the Protestant Reformation, the Enlightenment, and European socialism. The central contribution is to highlight that there must always be both an *articulation* and a *disarticulation* between social structure and ideology in the process of new ideological emergence. Articulation refers to the connection between cultural products and the social contexts from which they emerge. If cultural products do not articulate their social context, they will not be relevant, sensible, or useful to the contexts in which they are produced. Yet disarticulation is equally important for an ideological package to spread its influence in truly transformative ways: if a cultural product is too closely aligned with its social environment it will be seen as too parochial and context specific to be able to spread and survive by engaging a wider and more lasting audience (Wuthnow 1989, 3).

The question is how cultural products can be both articulated and disarticulated from their social context. This allows Wuthnow to develop two approaches to analysis: the first explores how social conditions, including macro ‘environmental conditions’, meso and organizationally focused ‘institutional contexts’ and micro-interactional ‘action sequences’ (1989, 6–7), all play a role in shaping cultural production. In this analysis, Wuthnow echoes many of the insights of resource mobilization and political process, focusing on the requirements of economic expansion, which produces resources flows to cultural producers, and realignment among ruling elites whose cleavages facilitate the sponsorship of new ideologies (also cf. Bearman 1993). Yet Wuthnow also emphasizes the autonomous working of cultural production that develops under the impetus of its own processes. The ‘social horizon’ is the experienced world (cf. Thompson 1963) which is selected from and transformed as it is incorporated into cultural texts so that “the social world of the text and the social world in which the text is produced will resemble each other only partially” (Wuthnow 1989, 12). The ‘discursive field’ is the symbolic space or structure which an ideology develops. Its conceptual categories and oppositions “provide the fundamental categories in which thinking can take place. It establishes the limits of discussion and defines the range of problems that can be addressed” (Wuthnow 1989, 12; cf. Baker 1990). A discursive field will be both tailored to make sense of a particular social horizon, yet also be disarticulated from this local specificity if it is to resonate and be applicable in other contexts. Finally there is ‘figural action’ which are figurative and archetypal modes of thinking or characters within a discursive field:

If discursive fields define the range of problems that can be considered, figural action provides, as it were, a representative range of solutions to these problems. Figural action

defines a course of behavior that makes sense, given the problems and possibilities that have been identified. (Wuthnow 1989, 14)

Examples from Wuthnow's cases include modes of action such as faith and love in the reformation, or archetypical characters such as the "righteous magistrate, the prototypical bourgeois, the valorized proletarian" (ibid).

To recap and translate Wuthnow in light of the preceding theorists: the creation of cultural frameworks must draw on the 'social horizon', i.e. the experienced world (as in Thompson). This experienced world thus provides the raw materials for the creation of the 'discursive field', but experiences can be drawn on selectively such that the ideas expressed must draw from available experience but need not be a simple and pure replica of that world. The discursive field shapes the categories of attention and analysis (as in Baker), thus setting up the key questions and problems of a shared discursive community. The kinds of answers which seem suitable to these problems are called 'figural action' by Wuthnow – this produces an available cultural imagination of how to ideally respond to the challenges understood through a shared discourse, nonetheless drawn from an experiential world.

Wuthnow emphasizes that any ideological innovation in this 'cultural' framework of analysis and response always needs to be linked to the social context in order to be adopted and survive. Resource flows and elite sponsorship must be present for new ideological positions to develop, and these ideologies must be sensible and pragmatically useful in their social environments. Changes in the social structure thus produce the conditions for the generation and adoption of new ideological forms. Yet, the fact that these ideological packages endure, spread, and shape and guide people well beyond the social context of their emergence underlines the disarticulation

between social context and ideology. Some ideological packages endure and offer the frameworks of interpretation, questions, and answers well beyond the contexts which initially sponsor them. It is the way that these packages offer generalizations and tropic or archetypical forms which are guides for sense-making that make them truly transformative across time and space. Here ideas are not only put to work for pragmatic political ends, but instead they become the frameworks of interpretation which can guide the attention and action of communities who take up these ideas farther afield. By transforming social action in these expanded contexts, these cultural ideas can transform how social relations and structures are produced and reproduced (cf. Bearman 1993; Glaeser 2011). Wuthnow's synthesis does well to acknowledge the dynamics of both processes while still offering a clear analytical framework to explain the sources and effects of ideological transformation.

Studying transformation and innovation in the rise of African nationalism

This review highlights the key theoretical concepts and conceptual attention which guide the work of this dissertation.

Across the chapters of this dissertation I focus analytical attention on the social conditions which facilitate 'relational novelty': I pay attention to the relational conditions which enabled and shaped the innovation in political understanding and practice seen in the earliest period of emerging African nationalism in South Africa.

In Chapter 1 I trace how macro-social transformation reshaped the experiences and connections of this colonial world in a way that facilitated transformation in political understanding and action. I examine how macro-social transformation undermined the political paradigm of the first

wave of anti-colonial resistance, negatively validating existing frameworks of political response, and how new biographies arose for a new community of missionary-educated Africans which created new experiential challenges and demanded new answers. Chapter 2 extends this focus to explore the missionary educated community, showing how macro-social transformation shaped the social position of this new group and situated many as intellectuals and leaders who bridged divided colonial and African social worlds. These two studies follow macro-social transformation from the level of macro analysis down to the level of experiential and relational transformation in order to follow how these changes create the capacity for innovation. From this focus on social location and social relations, I follow how new political vision, understanding and action were created, through the emergence of an ‘intermediary intelligentsia’ who bridged different communities, and fostered innovative responses to the political challenges faced by their communities.

Thus, two driving questions need to be studied: firstly, how does macro-social transformation create the conditions which make old answers fail and make new answers necessary? Secondly, how do new answers actually emerge from this context to fill the political void created by invalidated past approaches? I now turn to outline how this dissertation engages these questions.

Macro-social transformation and the experiential breakdown of existing answers

The need for something new emerges from a changed social world, where the ideas and practices which worked to guide action and interaction in the past no longer succeed. This transformation must be understood both as a ‘macro-social’ transformation and at the same time as a transformation of experience (as Thompson (1963; 1978) shows). Macro-social shifts transform both the kinds of connections and relationship of a society (Bearman 1993; Ansell 1997), and the

kinds of experiences of those living in this changed world (E. P. Thompson 1963). These societal level transformations are most disruptive to existing modes of understanding when once taken-for-granted knowledge and understanding is invalidated in experience (Schütz and Luckmann 1973), as well as by the failure of these approaches (negative corroboration), the disruption of old networks of authority (negative recognition), and the disjuncture with other shifting understandings (negative resonance) (Glaeser 2011). First, old answers can fail under new conditions (negative corroboration), and old authority networks can be destroyed (negative recognition) (Glaeser 2011). This is the disorienting “I don’t understand” attitude that arises when the go-to answers and the go-to authorities to which people have turned, fail again and again to produce the desired results. Secondly, new experiences can raise fundamentally new problems and questions which have no taken-for-granted answers in the existing stock of knowledge (Schütz and Luckmann 1973). This is the disorienting “I don’t understand” which arises when people face fundamentally new challenges and have no conceptually available answers which fit these new challenges.

To understand the capacity for a political system to take up novelty, it is thus important to understand the conditions which challenge and break the ability of people to turn to habituated and taken-for-granted understandings and practices. To fully appreciate this existential demand for something new, it is necessary to attend to both the experiences which leave actors searching for new answers instead of turning to what they already know, while at the same time considering how macro-social transformations simultaneously bring many actors to confront this failure of existing knowledge, leaving larger communities searching for new understandings at the same time.

Chapter 1 turns to follow this process in African politics through the 1800s, linking analysis of both macro-social transformation and individual experiential transformation. Here I show how the first wave of anti-colonial politics, which emerged as the dominant pattern of anti-colonial politics through the 1800s, met failure and a dead end by the late 1800s. Tracing the rise and fall of kings, chiefs, and military resistance through the 1800s, I show how the failure of both chiefly authority and military struggle, and then spiritual authority and supernatural power failed to successfully confront colonial incursion. Not only were these existing answers challenged, but the transformation of society through colonialism undermined the very positions of authority of both political and spiritual leaders, thus undermining existing networks of authority. This failure created an existential need for new answers when old sources of strength had failed. In addition to this failure of old answers, I also show how a new group of missionary-educated African leaders faced a new set of experiences, shaped by this changed social structure, which generated new problems which had no pre-given answers in either colonial or Africa knowledge systems: they were unprecedented since they were structurally new. The analysis of the life of Tiyo Soga shows how this macro-structural transformation wrought by colonialism created the new experiential problems which then needed to be theorized by a new class of social actors who had to “to render into theory ... [their own] experiences” (E. P. Thompson 1963, 711). Thus, what is viewed from a distance as ‘structural’ transformation is, when seen through the eyes of the actors involved in the context, best understood as a transformed world of experience. The world doesn’t work in the way it once did. By turning to focus on this experiential transformation, this chapter shows how new life paths, new experiences, and ultimately new problems are the experiential flipside of the structural coin. This new experiential context breaks the ‘taken-for-granted’ set of

understandings and answers socially available to actors. These new problems thus make it clear to actors that new answers are necessary.

The relational capacity to create new answers: Innovation from intermediary intelligentsia

The question remains as to how these new answers are generated. This question is examined in each chapter at three levels of analysis: individual, relational, and organizational. Throughout the dissertation, I analyze the capacity of African ‘intermediary intelligentsia’ to generate novelty through their social position as bridging figures, and their cultural mastery of the knowledge systems of both colonial and African communities.

Chapter 1 shows how Tiyo Soga generated new visions of African identity and imagined new possible answers to his disconcerting new life path and social position by drawing on and combining the ‘discursive field’ (Wuthnow 1989; Baker 1990) of both colonial and Xhosa knowledge systems as he engaged with different audiences. The analysis of the life of Soga highlights the expanded capacity for theorizing a changed social world which emerges from ‘hybridity’. Soga held within himself the cultural frameworks of multiple worlds. By drawing on these different elements and combining them into new hybrid forms, he was able to develop new arguments and articulations of African and Xhosa identity and to make new assertions about how Africans should respond to colonial change. This analysis shows how actors positioned between multiple worlds have expanded possibilities for innovation as they seek to create new answers (now necessary through social and experiential transformation). Multiple ‘cultural’ sources and traditions meet in these hybrid figures who stood relationally between different worlds. They were able to draw on this greatly expanded set of cultural logics, symbols, and understandings to

create new answers to the challenging questions that emerged from their historically new social position which combined with the failure of old answers.

Chapter 2 takes this analysis of the intermediary intellectual position further, exploring the way that engaging multiple audiences offers constraints in addition to new opportunities. Chapter 2 offers a study of the political imagination of the generation who followed Soga, and asks why the idea of *isizwe* (the Xhosa term for nation) and ‘the nation’ emerged as a leading concept of collective identity in the proto-nationalist movement. Chapter 2 shows how mediating between divided political communities allowed intermediary intelligentsia to gain political opportunities by bringing resources from different communities together. Yet it shows how the need to resonate across these multiple communities led proto-nationalist leaders to develop ‘multivocal’ political symbols which could create a common ground across different audiences (c.f. Ansell). These multivocal political forms, exemplified in the analysis of the concept of *isizwe*, offered meaningful political symbols which could resonate with the different political framework of three audiences—colonial, Xhosa, and missionary-educated African communities. This analysis of multivocality expands our understanding of the working of hybridity by reversing the direction of influence in the analysis of mediating figures. Hybrid individuals or cultural texts are imagined as the meeting points of multiple cultural sources. In chapter 2, studying the political work of intermediary intelligentsia shows how these intermediary leaders must instead reach to and build the cultural concepts which can resonate with all different communities simultaneously. To draw metaphorically on the language of set theory: hybridity has often been analyzed as the ‘union’ of different cultural worlds, in which all elements of multiple cultures are available to be synthesized into hybrid new forms. Chapter 2 shows how intermediary

intelligentsia must also work at the ‘intersection’ of multiple worlds, drawing on ideas which resonate with multiple communities at the same time. The analysis of the multivocality of *isizwe* shows how intermediary intelligentsia must find or create concepts which can ‘intersect’ very different cultural frameworks and can resonate with all of them.

Chapter 3 turns to examine processes of political innovation by looking at the broad structure of social connections created by emerging proto-nationalist political organizations who were connected to each other through shared members. This reveals some of the structural features which shaped political innovation in different parts of the loosely connected emerging proto-nationalist political network of that period. Here, innovation in both the discourse and practice of political organizations is shown to have been shaped by the kinds of connections made in organizations. In organizations which primarily brought mission-educated Africans together in new African-only communities, we see a ‘transposition’ of repertoires (Padgett and Powell 2012; Clemens 1997). These figures took up the hegemonic political practices of the colonial regime, thus appearing as less threatening than the military action of the wars and anti-colonial uprisings of the 1800s. Yet in doing so, they transform the tools and practices of colonial politics: they took up the missionary framework of moral upliftment, ‘European’ vs ‘Native’ identity, and colonial strategies for engaging the Cape parliament, and transformed these into new organizational forms which worked for the ‘patriotic’ advancement of African communities, asserted a shared *abantsundu* (black) identity, and deployed colonial political forms in the service of African interests. From non-threatening early engagements around education and alcohol prohibition, they turned to more active forms of political, legal and electoral challenge. We see a different mode of innovation and repertoire transformation on the rural periphery where rural

leaders united with educated leaders to generate new forms of engagement and challenge to the colonial regime. These organizations created innovation through ‘repertoire syncretization’ which combine rural leaders’ capacity to mobilize large communities of Africans with educated leaders’ skills in using colonial political tools such as petitions and voter registration. These political communities strengthened an assertion of ethnic group identity and took up new strategies for mass collective action to engage the colonial state, asserting their interests and making demands for material support or legal recognition. The early mass petition politics seen among the Thembu people exemplifies how, when the skills and strategies of leaders from both rural and missionary educated communities were combined, novel forms of political action emerged.

Here the analysis highlights how it is the structure of relations which enable different forms of innovative practice. As organizations forged connections between different social groups of the emerging political community, these members brought together different political repertoires of actions, ideas, political resources. Thus, as different connections were formed within the emerging proto-nationalist movement, new possibilities emerged which shaped how political leaders created innovation and transformed political practice.

Chapter 3 also examines how local contexts of innovation were united into an enduring proto-nationalist political movement. The two structurally distinct political grouping outlined seen in this network; the more urban, missionary educated community connected in *abantu basesikolweni* (school people) organizations were distinct in their dominant ideas and political practice from the *isizwe* (ethnic) political organizations which were more peripheral in the network. The chapter highlights that, in principle, these two different groups might have united

into separate urban mission-educated and rural traditionalist political movements. Yet this did not happen, and as proto-nationalism emerged, there was an increasingly unified movement which fostered links between these different domains. I argue that this unification was possible because civic-minded *abantu basesikolweni* organizations (such as mutual aid and teachers organizations) and local *isizwe* organizations did not develop strong cross-organizational links within their own group. Instead, cross-region unity was first fostered around African voter mobilization and a legal threat to disenfranchise rural African voters. This threat challenged the new political power which African's had gained through voter registration and affected the leaders of both *abantu basesikolweni* and *isizwe* organizations, as both gained political influence through mobilizing rural voters and then connecting these voters to Cape parliamentarians. The response to this new threat sparked a truly cross-regional, cross-domain, political response where leaders from a range of organizations united in a new organizational form. Not only did this new organization, Imbumba Eliliso Lomzi Yabantsundu, forge cross-regional connections, it shifted the modus operandi of political organization. The most prominent *abantu basesikolweni* organization, the Native Educational Association, which had previously been the central space of connection between missionary-educated political leaders of various organizations at that point shifted its orientation, explicitly seeking to make connections to rural political communities in the wake of the rise of Imbumba Eliliso Lomzi Yabantsundu. These two organizations thus facilitated new connections which linked the leaders of previously disparate local movements into a community that could increasingly share a common 'proto-nationalist' political orientation which engaged the interests of both mission-educated and rural communities. In this way, political innovations which emerged in disparate organizations could now be interlinked and

shared in a more connected network, and those novel ideas and strategies which succeeded could be reproduced more widely, leading to the endurance of political innovation.

Finally, Chapter 4 looks at the shifting focus of political discourse among the wider isiXhosa speaking political community, examining the temporal shifts in political discourse as proto-nationalist politics emerged in the 1880s. This chapter explores two analyses to trace the development of this isiXhosa language political discourse. First, I examine the political claims made by proto-nationalist political organizations until 1890, charting how they appealed to different concepts of identity, focused on different key political issues, and advocated for different forms of action to respond. Here, three themes emerge as the central focus at different times. Firstly, a vision of social/moral upliftment which transforms the ‘civilizing mission’ into a patriotic vision of African advancement. Secondly, a focus on voter mobilization and electoral challenge which emphasized the need to mobilize voters, raised vision of Africans representing themselves in parliament, and contributed to building a *abantsundu* collective identity. And thirdly, a framework of legal challenge which highlighted racial injustice in the development or application of the law and sought legal expertise to challenge colonial power, all in periods where electoral challenge was in abeyance. These three political clusters all formed an important part of a larger vision of African nationalism with values and strategies which would continue to guide political practice in the decades to come.

A second analysis draws on a data set taken from the two isiXhosa newspapers of the period, examining how discourse shifted in these newspapers between 1884 and 1888. Here, the manner collective identities of nation (*Isizwe/Izizwe*) and race (*Untsundu/Abanstundu*) were amplified as the proto-nationalist community sought to resist the disenfranchisement of African voters, is

examined by tracing how the invocation of *isizwe/izizwe* (nation(s)) and *untsundu/abanstundu* (black(s)) identities both spiked in response to the Parliamentary Voters Registration Act (announced in March 1887 and passed into law in September 1887), which sought to limit the registration of African voters by changing the rules for qualification. Here I show how newspaper contributors turned increasingly to these broader collective identities, invoking them more forcefully than ever before articulating a shared African identity. Not only did these identities spike in response to the threat of disenfranchisement, but they rose again as the newspapers engaged the election at the end of 1888, showing that this new emphases helped cement new discourses of collective identification.

These two analyses show the temporal dimension of shifting proto-nationalist political discourse through the 1880s. I extend the analysis of emerging political concepts beyond central intellectuals to show how these concepts were taken up in the political discourse of the proto-nationalist community. Taken together, these analyses show the discursive shifts in ‘political claims’ and ‘political attention’ of the proto-nationalist political community as it established itself up to 1890.

Conclusion

Overall, this dissertation studies how innovative political understandings and approaches can emerge which fundamentally transform the ‘paradigm’ of political interpretation and action. In studying the earliest period of the emergence of African nationalism in South African, I have focused on the social conditions which facilitated both the need for new political answers and created and shaped the possibilities for innovative new answers to emerge. I pay close attention to how the structure of social relations shaped the dynamics of political innovation, focusing

especially on the intermediary social position of the leaders and intellectuals of the emerging proto-nationalist movement, and showing how this ‘intermediary intelligentsia’ social position created the need, the capacity, and the conditions for new political identities, understanding, and forms of action.

This analysis offers new insight into the processes which gave rise to African nationalism, as ideas forged in the late 19th century spread across Southern Africa and shaped the imagination of political leaders across the African continent. It also participates in a dialogue with those who study political transformation more broadly. By weaving together focus on macro, meso, and micro level processes, I analysis of some of the social dynamics which shape political transformation, offering a focus on how changing social relationships and mediating political leaders and intellectuals transform understandings, identities, and modes of action and create a new framework to guide politics. This theorization of the social dynamics of innovation which shape pivotal moments of political transformation offer new avenues of research and attention to those who study political change in other social and historical contexts.

1

Making New Political Vision:

Historical change, biographical experience, and the rise of Xhosa intellectuals (1800 – 1870)

Introduction

Tiyo Soga was born the son of a councilor to the king of the Southern Xhosa. He died as the first ordained Black minister in South Africa and one of the earliest voices articulating a vision of Pan-Africanism and a nascent Xhosa nationalism in print. Between his birth in 1829 and his death in 1871 he lived through a period of profound social, economic, and political transformation in Southern Africa. He lived through the height of the ‘first wave’ of African anti-colonial politics: the rise and fall of Xhosa kings, the waves of mobilization of Xhosa warriors under young princes or spiritual leaders, the guerilla tactics of Xhosa generals driven into mountainous regions, the last stands made by the sons of the king his father served and their death on the battlefield or in colonial captivity. He lived through increasing colonial land occupation and the expulsion of the Xhosa into ever smaller tracts of land. He lived through famines and prophetic revivals led by Xhosa diviners, through the failure of their prophecies, through the inability of spiritual medicines to turn colonial bullets into water, through the failure of the ancestors to drive the white man from Xhosa lands back into the sea from where they had come. In the face of the crisis caused by Xhosa political defeat and spiritual failure, Soga lived through the first stirrings of a new paradigm of African politics: he grew up in one of the many new Christian mission stations spreading through the land, and he saw the founding of the

missionary schools which would train the next generation of Xhosa political leaders. He saw the printing of the first Xhosa newspapers which would become a platform of Xhosa political organizing. His voice, echoing forth from these very newspapers, was one of the first voices of a new political vision, imagining a Pan-African and Xhosa nationalist vision which would ground African political organization for the next 100 years.

The life of Tiyo Soga thus maps period of turbulent social transformation which saw the rise and destruction of the political repertoires which supported the first wave of African reaction to colonialism, and the first articulations of new visions of African Nationalism and Pan-Africanism. In 1800, white colonists at the southern edge of Africa were no match for the settled African states they faced. Between 1800 and 1840 these African states centralized further, concentrating their military and economic power. Kings laid claim to sovereignty and were backed with military might. Diplomacy with colonial governors defined borders, or war tested the projection of state and settler power. Yet as the British Empire grew, so did the force they could bring to bear. While states such as the Basotho, the Zulu, the Ndebele, the Swazi or the Pedi could largely keep the migrant Dutch settlers at bay, the gathered force of a growing global empire was eventually beyond their scope, and the discovery of gold and diamonds gave added impetus to its force. When the British sought to decisively conquer African kingdoms at the end of the 1800s they largely succeeded, conquering the last of the Xhosa territory in 1878, and defeating the Zulu and the Pedi in 1879.

With the destruction of the political and economic basis of resistance in African state structures, the first wave of anti-colonial resistance was forcibly shut down. As pre-existing modes of understanding and models of African political action strained and often cracked under these

transformations, a void of political and social knowledge emerged. African political and intellectual authorities had failed; existing repertoires of action had failed. The crisis of colonial occupation was an existential crisis, sweeping over the taken-for-granted answers which had previously grounded social action. King-led military resistance was now a political dead end.

It was in the face of this knowledge crisis that a new group of intellectuals and political leaders rose to the fore, transforming and developing an intellectual tradition to make sense of their new social world, and gathering the sociological understanding and political tools to respond to it.

Tiyo Soga was an intellectual forerunner of a newly emerging proto-nationalist movement, led by missionary-educated Africans, which would create the political identities, understandings, and forms of action which guided politics in South Africa and across the continent for the next 100 years. In the life of Soga, we see the first stirrings of the rise of an African nationalist political vision.

Overview and theoretical framing

This chapter follows how macro-social change created the conditions for political change which radically reoriented African political understanding and action. To do so, I interlink analysis of the sweeping historical changes of the 19th century in South Africa and the biographies of those who experienced these changes and forged new political frameworks to respond, as exemplified in the biographical experience and intellectual response of Tiyo Soga.

To see the creation of political receptivity for new political imagination, this chapter will follow the rise and fall of the first wave of anti-colonial resistance—the state-centered, king-led, military resistance to colonial encroachment. I first follow the strengthening of African state

structures as they faced the spread of colonial occupation across the Southern African region and their eventual inability to stem the colonial tide. I then focus on the specific case of the Xhosa, where political centralization and authority as well as spiritual authority rose and fell in the course of colonial expansion. It is in the face of the collapse of these models of political action that an 'ideological opportunity structure' emerges for new political thought. The failure of military resistance, and the social and economic transformations which undermined the positions of Kings, Chiefs and spiritual leaders were a series of 'negative validations' (Glaeser 2011) which weakened the legitimacy of old political frameworks of understanding. Following these challenges to the first anti-colonial 'political paradigm' shows how this framework of political understanding was challenged and reveals how macro-social change created a political void which led to a receptivity to new political visions and possibilities for the isiXhosa speaking political communities of the eastern Cape region of the Cape Colony.

The chapter then turns to Tiyo Soga, one of the first figures of a new Xhosa intelligentsia who developed the political visions and organizations of nascent African nationalism and Pan-Africanism. Soga's biography reveals the experiential dimensions of the large-scale social changes which unfolded through the 1800s. His writings show how new political innovation and imagination emerged amidst this tumultuous social change. Through studying Soga's life and conceptual work, this chapter will explore the broader social position of the new social stratum of *abantu basesikolweni* ('school people') intellectuals who theorized their changing social world and led new political movements. Soga's life is emblematic of a new social position which emerged between colonial and Xhosa worlds and highlight the experiential and knowledge crisis which drove the theorizing of a new generation of Xhosa political leaders. His life reveals how

the intermediary position of *abantu basesikolweni* intellectuals allowed them to forge innovative ideas and novel political forms by drawing on the knowledge systems and social practices of both Xhosa and colonial society. I examine how this ‘intermediary intelligentsia’ social position enabled new creativity as intellectuals were able to draw on the cultural forms of both worlds they bridged, thus creating new ‘hybrid’ forms of political creativity by merging and syncretizing this wide range of concepts into new political vision.

Theoretical overview

Interlinking the macro-structural changes together with the way that these changes reshape the lives of individuals who live through them is an approach that C. Wright Mills called the ‘sociological imagination’: looking at transformation from the lens of both biography and history, self and world, individual and society (C. W. Mills 1959). This offers an important shift of analytical attention in accounting for political transformation. This chapter builds on recent attempts in the social movements literature to bridge structural and cultural explanations of political movement emergence and mobilization (Tilly and Tarrow 2015; Jasper 2014; Jasper and Goodwin 2012). Yet, as I have argued in the introduction, a key challenge in this literature is the subfield’s focus on central political events and short time windows around these events and the neglect of the *longue durée* transformations which create the grounding possibilities for social movements (Tarrow 1992). Following Thompson’s (1963; 1978) attention to how social transformation yields transformed *experience* for individuals and communities, this study aims to contribute by interweaving an analysis of structural transformation and experiential transformation, two sides of the same social process. Here, I analytically aim to engage ‘the sociological imagination’ in order to connect broad sweeping historical transformations to the

intimate lives of the people living in those worlds. This shows the way that historical change creates the *experiential conditions* which make old political paradigms fail and give root to the confronting problems as well as the range of cultural concepts which allow new innovative answers to emerge.

Macro-structuralist theories of political transformation (Skocpol 1979), meso-level theories of political opportunities (McAdam 1982) or resource mobilization (Tilly 1978; McCarthy and Zald 1977), and even the dominant theories of political meaning-making which focus on collective action frames (Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988; 1992) all fail to pay enough attention to the experiential context which make some answers and political frames fail, and allow other ideas and answers to become increasingly validated as viable alternative modes of understanding.

Glaeser (2011, chap. 3) has argued that political understandings can become more-or-less certain in changing institutional arrangements as some understandings are ‘validated’ and others are ‘negatively validated’. Glaeser outlines three processes of validation of understandings.

‘Corroboration’ marks how ideas are validated in practice – understandings which succeed in the world are affirmed, where those that fail are weakened. ‘Resonance’ marks how ideas which make sense within and affirm other understandings seem more certain – are positively validated – and how the dissonance of one understanding with other held understandings weakens the certainty of that one understanding through ‘negative resonance’. Finally, ‘recognition’ marks how ideas which are affirmed by others are validated, and the disagreement of others has the potential to challenge held understandings. The impact of this social agreement and disagreement is particularly amplified when those who an actor acknowledges as a legitimate authority in a

domain of knowledge recognizes or rebuffs particular understandings. For this reason, actors often find themselves in larger social ‘networks of authority’, where socially recognized figures affirm and thus validate existing beliefs and offer larger frameworks that allow actors to order and understand their worlds.

This framework of validation offers a way to understand how the ‘political paradigm’ of the first wave of anti-colonial resistance eventually met a dead end. In the coming analysis I will first show how African states centralized around charismatic and authoritative leaders in the tumult of colonial expansion of the 1800s. This king- or chief-led form of politics turned to broad collective mobilization and political action primarily through military resistance to colonial incursion. However, as I show in the detailed account of the amaXhosa response to colonialism, by the end of the 1800s this political framework of understanding had been profoundly ‘negatively validated’. The failure of both military and spiritual responses to colonialism ‘negatively corroborated’ this political framework; consequently, it could no longer successfully achieve the goals it promised to attain. Alongside this failure, the undermining of the economic, social, and political basis of both political and spiritual authorities undermined the ‘networks of authority’ which supported this framework of belief. The analysis of African political response in Southern Africa from 1800-1880 shows how old political frameworks were negatively validated, and furthermore reveals a context void of political answers that needed to be filled.

As I turn to the emerging stratum of missionary-educated Africans, exemplified by Soga, I also show how the transformed structure of social relations created fundamentally new experiences for this new class, which had no socially pre-given answers. Here I draw on Schütz’s analysis (Schütz and Luckmann 1973) of a socially shared stock of knowledge to illustrate how novel

experiences which cannot be categorized by existing social knowledge frameworks drive actors to generate new knowledge. As mission-educated Africans faced new biographical life paths between colonial and African communities, and with it a new experiential world, they could not turn to taken-for-granted answers from either of these communities. Instead, intellectuals like Tiyo Soga worked to forge new answers to engage the new problems which emerged from their historically new social position.

This chapter thus works to interlink the examination of the macro-social transformations of ‘history’ with the experiential transformations seen through individual ‘biography’. This enables an analysis of both the sources of the destruction of existing political frameworks, and the conditions which fostered new political claims, imaginations, and future visions for the intellectuals who would ground the emerging framework of African nationalism.

African political transformations: The rise and fall of the first wave of resistance to colonialism

African State Centralization in the 1800s

In the early 1800s there was a revolution underway in the political structure of African states in Southern Africa – a period of intensified African state formation. This entailed the centralization of political power and resources around charismatic political leaders and their institutions – pre-colonial African states – and the expansion of political units of belonging associated with these leaders, which facilitated identification with the ‘imagined community’ of these African nations (Anderson 2006). In this period new kingdoms emerged¹, existing ones centralized², and yet

¹ Such as the Zulu, Basotho, Swazi, Pedi, Ndebele, Gaza, etc.

² Such as the Xhosa, Thembu, Mpondo, Venda, Rolong, Kora, Thaping, Ngwaketse, etc.

others fled war but conquered as they travelled³ (Denoon and Nyeko 1982). This development reshaped politics across the Southern African region as far north as Malawi, Zambia, and Tanzania. This centralization and enlargement of political units was first prompted by a period of sweeping political and social unrest called the *Mfecane*. It was then reinforced as new states faced expanding colonial states, both British and Boer. This strengthened state political structure was the one that colonists met, and it formed the basis of the first dominant form of political resistance to colonial occupation. (L. M. Thompson 2014; Denoon and Nyeko 1982)

I turn first to the *Mfecane*; a period of social displacement caused by the rapid growth and expansion of the rising Zulu empire. Under a new leader, King Shaka, who revolutionized techniques of military organization and centralized state control, the Zulu empire expanded, conquered, and incorporated large areas into its state structure. Those who could not develop military resistance were incorporated or were displaced. Displaced communities fled conflict and small groups used military force to raid those not yet displaced, resulting in this social disruption replicating itself further and further across Southern Africa, rippling outwards from the locus of Zulu conquest. In this period, some groups replicated the Zulu military form, conquering territory of their own (such as the Ndebele). Other nascent African states centralized under leaders who were able to resist Zulu military incursion and traveling displaced armed bands. These groups forged strong community identities centralized around leaders and strengthened already existing polities (such as the Pedi, the Swazi, the Basotho). All took in displaced migrant bands and incorporated them into existing hierarchical structures, exchanging the protection of a centralized state and military apparatus for economic and political vassalage (L. M. Thompson

³ Such as the Kololo, Zwangendaba and Nxaba's people.

2014). This Mfecane period of disruption and the resulting social and political transformation created a pressure for State centralization of what had previously been more autonomous polities which were loosely federated through royal lineages of political leaders and inter-marriages across royal lines. Successful leaders founded new dynasties in this period, uniting displaced peoples from various ethnic lineages into new communities centered on an enlarged state.

This period of tumultuous of social transformation also saw the migration of many Dutch settlers who were discontent with the transition to British rule in the Cape Colony. Thus, bands of traveling Dutch settlers moved into the disrupted interior of Southern Africa, replicating the State formation of other African groups – they used their military capacity to lay claim to territory, taking in displaced migrants (albeit as servants and slaves), and engaging in skirmishes with other displaced groups (Denoon and Nyeko 1982; L. M. Thompson 2014).

The second social transformation was the significant change in the colonial approach of the white settlers at the Southern tip of Africa. In 1795 the British state seized control of Cape Town during the Napoleonic wars, and formally acquired the territory in 1806. Previously the Cape of Good Hope was a mercantile way station controlled by the Dutch East India company⁴, run as a stopover port to refuel merchant ships traveling between Europe and Dutch colonial territories in Asia. The British conquered the territory as a strategic military outpost during the Napoleonic wars. This change of colonial power resulted in a transformation of colonial administration.

Dutch settlers had arrived at the Southern tip of Africa in 1652, and their presence and gradual expansion had upended societies of hunter (San) and herder (Khoikhoi) peoples settled in the

⁴ *Vereenigde Nederlandsche Oost Indische Compagnie* - the VOC.

arid South-western region. However, the Dutch company had little interest in wide territorial control, and colonial expansion was largely achieved by bands of Dutch ‘*Trek Boers*’ (traveling farmers) seeking new territory and an escape from the control of company administration⁵.

Where the Dutch VOC had operated like an enterprise aiming to ensure access to fresh goods for refueling, the British administered its newly conquered territory much more like a state, seeking legal and military control over territory and subjects.

This transition to British colonial control furthered the entrenchment of nascent African states in the first half of the 19th Century. The British administrators of the colony sought to define its borders and legal jurisdiction much more formally than the Dutch VOC. This definition of territorial authority and control was attempted by negotiating with African states and their leaders. Thus, the British sought to identify the regional leaders with whom they could negotiate to formally define who had legal and military jurisdiction over territory. In this process leaders of African states were further entrenched in their role as leaders of their own polity as they served as the channels of legitimate British engagement, while challengers were cast as rebels.

In this process colonial knowledge production and bureaucratic-legal administration worked hand-in-hand, as anthropologists of the colonial empire identified ‘tribes’ and colonial administrators sought to manage loyalty and jurisdiction by negotiating with those who were supposed to be those ‘tribal leaders’ or ‘chiefs’ who had authority over their ‘tribes’. The understanding of ‘tribe’ as an enduring political form masked the political tumult of changing political authority and loyalty underway in the Mfecane period, and further positioned the new

⁵ These Trek Boers warred with and dispossessed the less densely-settled hunter and herder groups, but were unable to take territory from communities of Bantu-speaking mixed farmers, who had settled in the East and North along the geographic lines of better rainfall and agricultural land.

leaders of centralizing African states as the legitimate interlocutors for the bureaucratic-legal process of colonial administration of territory and conflict (Denoon and Nyeko 1982).

Summary

Thus, in the early 19th century, a political paradigm of king- and chief-led state centralization emerged and offered the framework which guided the ‘first wave’ of anti-colonial resistance to expanding settler and colonial influence. Many Southern African polities centralized under pressure from external threat induced by the Mfecane and white settlement, and leaders of these centralizing states came to be the primary interlocutors of the British colonial state, both in the diplomatic and military spheres. Political and military forms transformed hand-in-hand; political leadership centralized around kings or paramount chiefs, who stood at the center of the hierarchy of new states, and military technology and social organization were revolutionized in response to external threat. In the early period of British colonial expansion, the dominant African political repertoire was royal leadership with collective societal mobilization for military action deployed by the king to defend or assert political control.

Xhosa political transformations facing colonialism

I turn now to look more closely at the modes of politics developed by the Xhosa community, because it was from this context that the earliest proto-nationalist politics emerged. The ‘first wave’ of anti-colonial politics among the Xhosa followed a similar pattern to the political paradigm of the king-led military response outlined above, yet with its own nuances. Early conflict was between Dutch farmers expanding in search of land (*Trek-boers*) and autonomous Xhosa political units on the fringes of Xhosa territory. Yet the arrival of the British changed the scope of conflict, which grew increasingly to be an ‘international’ challenge between the Xhosa

state and the colonial state. I will demonstrate both the centralization of political authority around the kings of the Xhosa, as well as a growing spiritual authority of Xhosa ‘diviners’ who, with charismatic and spiritual authority, led wars and promised divine intervention, firstly through supernatural military assistance, and in the face of military failure, millenarian hope in total supernatural intervention. When both military resistance and spiritual resistance failed, the Xhosa were left with a void; they possessed no knowledge authorities to offer models of how to respond to colonialism. It is from this void that African nationalist and Pan-Africanist leaders emerged to offer new knowledge models of political understanding and action.

Colonial expansion reached the Xhosa before other African states⁶. For 100 years, from 1779 to 1879, wars raged between expanding settlers and the Xhosa, until, in the 9th war, the last independent Xhosa territories were conquered and incorporated into the Cape Colony (Thompson 2014). The Xhosa had been ruled by a single royal lineage until about 1775 (Peires 1982; Mostert 1992) when it split first into two and then three rival factions contesting power. The three major divisions were 1. the Gcaleka, the de jure royal line, who were centered East of the Kei River, 2. The Ngqika, a breakaway royal line, ruling between the Kei and the Fish River, and 3. The Ndlambe, who broke from the Ngqika, and ruled the area called the Zuurveld (L. M. Thompson 1995, 73) (See Fig 1).

The Zuurveld region (marked as Albany and Uitenhage in Fig. 1.1 below) was the first point of contact between Dutch settlers and the Xhosa, and in the three wars fought in this region – during 1779-81, 1793, and 1799 (ibid) – there was no clear superiority. The third war saw the Xhosa claiming territory from the weakened colonial state newly seized by the British, leaving

⁶ But not before the San and Khoikhoi people groups, see footnote 5.

the Ndlambe Xhosa in firm control of the Zuurveld, their forces swelled by Khoikhoi who had abandoned their Dutch overlords.

Yet the British colonial effort was led from the center and transformed what had been skirmishes over land by competitive neighbors into an ‘international’ struggle. In 1811-12, after deciding to define the territorial border of the Cape colony at the Fish River, the British mustered a large force and drove approximately 20,000 Xhosa out of the Zuurveld. The social disruption was immense, as dispossessed Xhosa now sought to remake their lives in an area of significantly limited space.




Figure 1.1: Xhosa-colonial wars and Xhosa land losses

This began a period in which the primary repertoires of political action were centered on king-leadership and military action. This would be the first of many dispossessions, and each disposition further fueled war as a political response. The Xhosa were made ready for war as the dispossessed sought to reclaim their land and settled Xhosa faced economic pressure as they incorporated displaced communities. Furthermore, the land hunger of the settler farmers drove the colonial state to dispossess further and perpetuate a conflict cycle. But it was the Xhosa kings who held enough central authority to mobilize and guide political discontent against colonist expansion into military form.

The rise and fall of Xhosa kings

Ngqika, the king of the eastern branch of the Xhosa, rose and fell as colonial occupation spread into his territory. With his uncle, Ndlambe, driven out of the Zuurveld region, Ngqika was able to solidify his power and leadership through strategic engagement with the British. Styling himself as the king of all the Xhosa, he agreed to hold the territorial line with the new colonial power. The British could rule their land, and he would be the supreme legal authority beyond the Fish River. But the dispossessed Ndlambe and the de jure Xhosa ruler, Hinsta, the king of the Gcaleka, sought to curtail Ngqika's power and authority, and they united their forces to attack him in 1818. After they defeated Ngqika, they pushed on to attempt to reclaim Ndlambe's territory, attacking the settler Grahamstown and only narrowly failing to capture it. Ngqika appealed to his colonial allies, who marched on the territory and defeated the last remnants of the largely disbanded armies of Ndlambe and Hinsta. After facing reprisals from the Xhosa leaders for his alliance with the colonists, Ngqika now also saw the costs of his bargain with the colonists. While colonial military force could shore up Ngqika's position, the British annexed a

large portion of Ngqika's territory as 'payment' for their support, driving Ngqika from his own palace, pushing his people across the Kieskama River, and seizing 23 000 heads of cattle (Mqhayi 2009; L. M. Thompson 2014).

More dispossession of land laid the ground for more and more wars. In 1834 tension built to an extreme point once again with government officials humiliating chiefs and expelling communities from 'neutral territory' (the Victoria region marked in dark blue in Figure 1.1). In December 1834, almost all Xhosa chiefs engaged in a unified invasion of the colony under the leadership of Gcaleka-Xhosa king Hintsa, acknowledged as the leader of all the Xhosa. As in future wars, the Xhosa would take an early lead, seizing colonial land and driving off farmers. Yet the British responded with superior military force and, as in future wars, they would march on the palace of the Xhosa king, holding him responsible for the war. As they pushed into Xhosa territory they burned houses, food, and fields, captured cattle, and drove women and children off as starving refugees. This destroyed the Xhosa food supply and eventually undercut the resources of the protracted Xhosa guerilla war. Hintsa nonetheless had cemented his own authority: the very act of total war had united the Xhosa under Hintsa's leadership against the British. Yet Hintsa's rise to political centrality was rapidly put to an end. The British offered parley yet used this to trick Hintsa and capture him. He was killed as he attempted to escape captivity, his ears and head cut off as colonial souvenirs (Mqhayi 2009). In September 1835, the surviving chiefs capitulated. The British seized more land.

Again in 1846 and 1850 war broke out, as the Xhosa sought to reclaim lost land and reinstate political authority in the face of a colonial government who sought to humiliate and subjugate Xhosa chiefs and kings. The war of 1850 was the last great war of the Xhosa; it began after the

colonial governor tried to depose Sandile, the king of the Ngqika. Yet the Ngqika were joined by many other Xhosa, as well as the Thembu people, and Khoikhoi rebels, to total approximately 20,000 soldiers. Again, the Xhosa led in the first phase of the war, sweeping into colonial territory, yet again the colonial armies countered, marching into Xhosa territory destroying Xhosa lands, homes, and food supply. The war waged on for three years, as Xhosa leaders fought from impenetrable strongholds in the Amatole mountain range. Yet eventually Britain's scorched earth tactics destroyed the countryside, cutting away the economic basis required to supply Xhosa guerilla war and the Xhosa leaders capitulated.

From military to spiritual hope

Military defeat challenged the authority of kings and chiefs. The realm of political authority was undermined every time the chiefs failed to prove themselves the legitimate authorities over their people through victory. However, military and spiritual power were never completely distinct, with spiritual preparation and leadership an important part of preparation for war (see below). Yet, as political hope in military force failed, spiritual hope increasingly filled the gap, with Xhosa spiritual authorities rising to offer people a new hope in the face of military failure.

The first great Xhosa prophetic figures were also leaders of war. After the mass expulsion of the Xhosa in 1812, a new spiritual leader, Makhanda also known as Nxele ("the left-handed") rose to prominence. Makhanda began as a spiritual leader drawing from, but independent of, Christian missionaries who had settled on the edge of the British territory (Levine 2010). Makhanda came to distrust missionaries and white settlers, and as time progress he preached a message about the

power of the Black god who would defeat the White god⁷. Makhanda combined elements of traditional Xhosa spirituality and Christian spirituality, and rose to prominence as the pre-eminent spiritual leader of the Ndlambe. Advising Chief Ndlambe that God would be on his side, Makhanda led the attack on Grahamstown in 1819 to drive the colonists out of Xhosa land and resettle the territory. Makhanda articulated a vision which would be repeated by other prophet military leaders over the years: by preparing for war with rituals and medicine, men would be protected from the bullets of the colonial forces which would turn to water, and the White settlers would be driven back into the sea (Wenzel 2009). The attack on Grahamstown narrowly failed. Makhanda turned himself over to the British who were searching for him in 1820 after the failed assault, and he later drowned while escaping from his prison on Robben Island, just off Cape Town.

Two wars, and two defeats later, the war of 1850 was led by Mlanjeni, another Xhosa prophet who followed in the tradition of Makhanda. Mlanjeni was an 18-year-old who strongly merged elements of Xhosa and Christian spirituality. He claimed that “he had been to Heaven and had talked to God who was displeased with the white man for having killed his Son ... God would help the black man against the white ... a stick from the plumbago plant would make them invulnerable” (Meintjies in L. M. Thompson 1995, 77). Like Makhanda before him, Mlanjeni was a prophet military leader who created an adaptive religious vision which created a pan-racial unity. In the war of 1850, internal divisions within the Xhosa polity itself and ‘ethnic’ divisions between Xhosa, Thembu, and Khoi group identities were overcome as diverse political groups united in the struggle against colonial expansion. Here the local divisions of the chief- and king-

⁷ an early Pan-African vision, uniting people on race and not clan or nation (Peires 1982, chap. 5).

based political units was overcome; this new unity was also visible in a new spiritual framework which juxtaposed white and black both in the physical and in the spiritual realm.

Yet the greatest turn to spiritual power was yet to come. After the destructive war of 1850, a European cattle disease, lung sickness, started spreading rapidly through the Xhosa territories. This disease devastated Xhosa cattle, killing as much as 80% of some chiefs' stocks (L. M. Thompson 1995), a devastation to the Xhosa for whom cattle was the primary marker of wealth and status, as well as a key food supply. Ravaged by war and cattle death, the Xhosa turned to both indigenous and Christian spiritual ideas. From the Xhosa system they drew on "concepts of witchcraft, pollution, sacrifice, and the power of the ancestors; but they also adapted concepts of sin and the resurrection from the teaching of the missionaries" (L. M. Thompson 1995, 78). The invasion of the whites, the losses in battle, and the death of cattle was said to have come from the pollution of the people. New prophets rose and declared that if the Xhosa eradicated witchcraft and made a great sacrifice to cleanse the land, then their ancestors would return, resurrected from the dead with new cattle and new grain, to drive the Whites back into the sea from where they had come. The world which had been torn apart would be put back in order by a great feat of supernatural power if the people would make a worthy sacrifice (Peires 1989). With the hope in political action and military strength destroyed, and now with the economic destruction caused by cattle sickness, people were searching for some form of knowledge and action which might enable them to act in a way that would return order to the world. With other avenues exhausted, this millenarian promise offered a new hope where hope had failed.

The prophecies eventually took root even at the highest levels of leadership: the king of the Gcaleka, and later the king of the Ngqika Xhosa endorsed this vision and instructed their people

to sacrifice their cattle in line with the prophecy. The Xhosa community was fragmented between believers and unbelievers, yet many tens of thousands of people embraced the prophecy and killed their cattle, the source and symbol of their wealth, in the belief in a new spiritual salvation. Between lung sickness and sacrifice, it is estimated that 400,000 cattle were destroyed in the lead-up to the day the prophecy would be ostensibly fulfilled. The new moon of February 18, 1857 was the prophesied day, and thousands gathered to see the rising of the ancestors. But the promised ancestors and the new cattle, seen moving in the wave of the sea, never emerged onto dry land (Peires 1989). Frenzy, revised prophecies, and a renewed effort to perfect the sacrifice followed, with new days of celebrations to mark the resurrection of the dead. Yet these prophecies failed to materialize (L. M. Thompson 1995).

The calamity was catastrophic. In the ensuing days it is estimated that 40,000 Xhosa died of starvation. Some 33,000 fled to the colony, destitute, seeking any work on farms or in towns or villages all the way to Cape Town. Xhosa territory was decimated, left with approximately 25% of its former inhabitants (Peires 1989; L. M. Thompson 1995).

In addition to the failure of political authority, and defeat after defeat in war, the authority of spiritual leaders and their knowledge then too was challenged to its core. The Xhosa had faced a calamity, the loss of land, and now cattle and grains, the death of kings and defeat in war. They also suffered the destruction of their knowledge authorities, both political and spiritual.

One final war, in 1877, would mark the end of Xhosa military resistance. While leaders of both the British and Xhosa were hesitant to return to war, angry factions of both communities agitated for change in the only way they knew: military conflict. The war started as a dispute between

Xhosa and Mfengu peoples, but the spark lit a fire that kindling Xhosa and settler resentment. The war repeated the repertoires of past conflicts; Xhosa chiefs led their forces to battle, and as the war turned against them, they waged a guerrilla war in the mountainous regions, as they had before. Only the death of the Ngqika king, Sandile, on the battlefield ended the bitter and desperate military endurance of a people left with little hope of military victory but no imaginable alternative in a world filled with colonial land dispossession and drought (Mostert 1992, 1249–54). With the end of the war, the British annexed the last independent Xhosa territories.

Discussion

The end of the paradigm of the first wave of African resistance

This history shows first the expansion and then the eventual collapse of the political repertoires of the first wave of colonial resistance, as well as the collapse of existing knowledge authorities in the face of these failures. As pressure from settlers increased over the course of colonialism, military resistance developed from local struggles of individual chiefs to increasingly unified struggles of the Xhosa people. This unification enhanced the sense of political identity and unified people under the kings of the Ngqika and the Gcaleka who served as both actual authorities and symbolic representatives of the Xhosa as a unified people. Thus, over the course of the wars the internal factional battles among Xhosa leadership were increasingly overcome by resistance to the ever-growing influence of colonial pressure. These forces strengthened the existing political paradigm of king-led military resistance as the dominant political paradigm of the first wave of anti-colonial resistance.

This same pattern held even more salience among other African states. Of the four white settler states that emerged in present day South Africa, the British Cape Colony was the strongest in economic and military might. The two Boer republics of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, and the Natal colony of the British, were both significantly weaker, and the king-led African states were able to hold white expansion at bay. Thus, through the first half of the 1800s pre-colonial African political models were adapted into increasingly centralized states which used military force to resist colonialism.

This dominant paradigm eventually failed when facing the full force of the British Empire. The Xhosa faced this force first, in direct conflict with the Cape Colony. It was the discovery of the largest deposit of diamonds in the world in 1867 which prompted the Empire to pay attention to the interior of South Africa, and the 1886 discovery of gold enhanced this interest (Denoon and Nyeko 1982; L. M. Thompson 1995). Now the Empire was willing to invest in military force to destroy the African states resulting in a series of wars in the late 1870s which subjugated the Zulu, the Pedi, and the independent Xhosa, and resulted in 'protectorate' status for the Basotho and Swazi states. Facing the force and will of the late 19th century British Empire destroyed the capacity of king-led military resistance as an effective paradigm.

Yet new political vision is not easy to come by. The availability of known strategies is a powerful determinant of mobilization even in the face of their failure. The last war of the Xhosa in 1877 returned to well-known military attacks on the colony even after eight previous defeats, and when the Basotho turned to war in 1880 they managed to successfully hold British forces out of their mountainous region. Even after the defeat and break-up of the Zulu polity, the Bambata

uprising of 1906 gathered Zulu farmers who turned to military tactics to resist colonial tax imposition, only to be brutally put down (Storey 2008; Marks 1970; L. M. Thompson 2014).

In this new era of colonial occupation, military resistance was a dead end. Colonial governors would respond with overwhelming force to any appearance of African military struggle. The repression of armed resistance now made this avenue impossible.

The destruction of knowledge authority

The close attention to the Xhosa case shows the destruction not only of this political paradigm as a viable form of mobilization and action, but also the destruction of the knowledge authorities who anchor and legitimate a paradigm of action. As kings and military force failed, spiritual hope rose. The spiritual war leaders Makhanda and Mlanjeni created a new vision of early Pan-African unity centered on a ‘god of the Black peoples’, their vision mobilized vast support, yet they were unable to win the wars they led. The extreme spiritual hope of the millenarian cattle killing came with an equally extreme failure: catastrophic death and poverty among the Xhosa. The existing political and spiritual authorities of Xhosa life had been destroyed under the expansion of colonial occupation.

Creation of political receptivity through failure in legitimacy of old models

These experiences created a series of ‘negative validations’ of the existing political framework of anti-colonial resistance. The experiences of repeated defeat in confrontation with the military of the British empire worked to strip away hope that this form of collective political action could yield positive results. In Glaeser’s language, this was a repeated series of ‘negative corroborations’. Huge collective social responses were seen in both the war of 1850 and in the millenarian cattle killing in the subsequent years. In these contexts, large swathes of society

collectively turned their full efforts firstly to militarily challenge colonialism and then secondly to mount a spiritual challenge to it. The need for action was great; by the mid-1800s, Xhosa society was under immense economic strain having faced both loss of vast portions of land as well as drought and cattle disease. The effects of military and spiritual action were catastrophic, brought on through defeat in war, and then the economic devastation of the cattle-killing movement, which led to widespread starvation and impoverishment. These experiences of failure in the face such a need for success were powerful negative validations of the power of these forms of political action.

The ongoing onslaught of colonial expansion on amaXhosa and other African societies also had the effect of destabilizing the networks of authority which validated these political frameworks. Kings were deposed, spiritual leaders were arrested, and the social, political, and economic practices which had organized society were greatly disrupted by loss of land, drought, and the destruction of homes and agriculture. All of this led to a weakening of the institutions which organized society, and through this, led to the weakening of the authority figures and institutions which had upheld military and spiritual visions of political resistance. This was the disruption of institutions of 'recognition'; the old knowledge leaders no longer possessed the authority that asserted that these political visions had power or validity.

In this way, the macro-social transformations of colonialism ultimately stripped away collective hope in the vision of both military or spiritual resistance as sources of power which could drive back colonial forces. Political understandings and repertoires of action which had guided anti-colonial resistance through the 1800s met a dead end.

This world of change – that was so in need of a response, but with old answers failing – must have been an experiential horror to those confronting it. Yet humans cannot bear well a void of understanding. This tragedy was not individual but social, leaving large swaths of society in need of an alternative political vision and alternative possibilities for response. In this way, the large-scale social transformations of the 1800s created a social context of political receptivity to new approaches and new answers. Into this political void, a new vision of politics was beginning to emerge among a small but growing community of missionary-educated Africans.

Making new lives: Biographies of a new stratum of African leaders

Tiyo Soga set sail from Scotland on April 13th 1857 to return to his Xhosa people as a voice heralding a new political imagination in the face of crisis. Less than two months earlier the dead Xhosa kings had failed to rise from the Gxarha River with their followers and cattle. The prophecies of the cattle-killing which had promised to return peace and prosperity to the Xhosa lands had failed. The accumulation of wars, famine, cattle disease, and cattle sacrifice had left the Xhosa devastated. Tiyo Soga, confronting this new world of colonial expansion and Xhosa fragility, was to be among the first voices to announce a new political vision, to imagine a new response, to offer a new avenue of hope.

Tiyo Soga represents the emergence of a new group of intellectual and social leaders who transformed and developed Xhosa knowledge institutions and founded a new paradigm of African Nationalist thought. Through Soga, I explore the biographical experiences of the rising figures of proto-nationalist political leadership. Positioned between the colonial and African world, these figures were the first to face a social experience which would confront more and more Africans as colonial social, political, and economic forces penetrated increasingly into

African life. Facing these historically new problems, and drawing from across Xhosa and colonial repertoires, they developed new answers to the challenge of colonialism which would resonate across the continent, and across time. These intellectuals were the forefathers of a new tradition of African politics, the creators of the ideologies and organizations which would ground a new wave of resistance to colonialism; in a way, they were the midwives of African Nationalism.

Soga: The African missionary and the kingdom of equality

As the first ordained Black minister in South Africa, Tiyo Soga would return from an extensive education in Scotland filled with a vision of the benightedness of his countrymen, swelled by missionary praise of his own moral and intellectual achievement which proved the power of the civilizing mission, and determined to see his own kin raised to new levels of civilization by the grace and power of a God who calls all nations into his fold. Yet his work as a minister deep in Xhosa territory for the next 14 years, until his death, would challenge the ideas of civilizational superiority and paternalistic racism which had surrounded him in missionary society. Through his life of ministry Soga worked to advance a Christianity that was nonetheless Xhosa. While working for the advancement of the Xhosa, he opened up an important ideological space to value Xhosa traditions and culture which were so often denounced by missionaries as part of the backward heathenism they sought to eradicate. With his life stretched out between European and Xhosa society, Soga intimately experienced dehumanizing racism which took racial inferiority as a foregone conclusion; he also faced challenges from the Xhosa as to the fitness of Christianity to offer any value to their lives. This social world confronted his beliefs and his being as both a Xhosa and a Christian. Through facing these challenges, he was one of the earliest African

intellectuals to assert Black pride, Xhosa cultural nationalism, and a fervent commitment to equality. He believed in the need for the advancement of the Xhosa, as did the missionaries, yet he sought an advancement not to bring the Xhosa in line with European civilization, but to allow Africans to worship God and build their societies on their own terms. His work would lay a new foundation for the coming generation of political leaders; the institutions he built, the community he trained, and the image he embodied of Xhosa and Black pride would ground the political activism of the generation who followed him.

Soga's communal foundations: the early Christian Xhosa elite

Tiyo Soga was born into a world at the intersection of the old Xhosa elite and early converts to Christianity. His father, Old Soga⁸, was a respected member of the Xhosa political elite: a leading councilor to both King Ngqika, and his son Sandile (Hodgson 1986). Yet through both father and mother, Tiyo also traced his Christian heritage to the first Christian Xhosa prophet Ntsikana. Many of the first converts to Christianity were people who were marginal to Xhosa society and who joined early mission stations where they received the patronage and support of missionaries as succor in a drought and war-torn context. Yet under missionary influence, these early converts had to cast off much of their Xhosa cultural practices, marked as heathenism by the missionaries, and embrace European Christian values and practices enforced by missionaries (Hodgson 1986, 186; see J. Comaroff and Comaroff 1991; J. L. Comaroff and Comaroff 1997). Ntsikana was an early Xhosa Christian leader who opened an alternate path of Xhosa Christianity which had a profound influence on future Xhosa leaders.

⁸ Tiyo and his siblings took their father's name, Soga, as their surname. For the sake of clarity, I follow the literature in referring to this figure as Old Soga.

Ntsikana, like Old Soga, was a Xhosa leader and councilor to King Ngqika, who had heard the message of Christianity but continued to fulfill his elite Xhosa social role. After a profound and personal conversion experience in 1815, where he experienced God calling him by illuminating his prize Ox (Mqhayi 2009), he began leading a small band of disciples in prayer and Christian instruction. Ntsikana's message was convincing to Old Soga, who recommended him to King Ngqika and had him instated as a counselor to the king. Ntsikana's important influence as Xhosa Christian leader who also held traditional Xhosa leadership authority cannot be overstated. He was not subservient to missionaries, and for the coming generations of Xhosa Christians, he demonstrated God's direct engagement with the amaXhosa (Mqhayi 2009). Ntsikana began a legacy of Xhosa Christianity which followed a process of assimilation of elements of Christian culture yet was grounded in Xhosa cultural values and idioms (Hodgson 1980). Among Ntsikana's followers were the parents of Tiyo Soga and William Gqoba, and the grandmother of Isaac Wauchope – these are leaders to whom I will return in following chapters.

Ntsikana gained his exposure to Christianity from the first missionaries to the Xhosa. Dr J. T. Vanderkemp was the first to minister among the Xhosa between 1799 and 1800. He was followed by Joseph Williams from 1816-1818 and John Brownlee in 1820, who established the Tyhume mission station, the first mission station in Xhosa territory (Gqoba 2015). It was this new mission station to which Ntsikana led his followers after the Xhosa had been driven from the area following the war of 1819. Yet Ntsikana died on the journey, and it was Old Soga who led Ntsikana's disciples to their final resting place. It was also Old Soga alone who did not integrate into the new mission. He remained independent, living on the edge of the mission community; he retained his standing with King Ngqika as a trusted councilor, and in time came

to lead a community as a chief even though he was a commoner. However, even once settled at the Tyhume mission, the disciples of Ntsikana maintained their identity as “the congregation of the God of Ntsikana” and maintained their loyalty and connection to King Ngqika (Hodgson 1986, 189–90).

Tiyo Soga grew up in this first mission station in Xhosa territory. His mother, Nosuthu, was the wife in the ‘Great House’ of Old Soga, the most superior of his eight wives. Nosuthu asked and was granted release from her marriage when Old Soga would not follow the missionaries’ injunction to give up polygamy. She was baptized at the Thyume station and embraced the life of the mission station, yet she remained in Old Soga’s homestead with her children, including Tiyo (Cousins 1899, 10, 27; Gqoba 2015, 5).

The Tyhume mission station was an amalgamation of European missionary influence and the lasting authority of Xhosa tradition carried by the Xhosa elite who were followers of Ntsikana. The disciples of Ntsikana played an important role in missionary production, dictating the earliest Xhosa histories and autobiographies (see Bokwe 1914; Opland and Mtuze 1994, 62–66) and assisting in producing Scottish periodicals translated into isiXhosa. Ntsikana’s son, Dukwana, was unanimously elected by the congregation as the first elder of the mission (Gqoba 2015, 5–6). Old Soga continued to hold regular prayer meetings but would allow no missionary influence, singing only the hymns of Ntsikana and rejecting those composed by missionaries and even Festiri, Tiyo’s eldest brother and Old Soga’s heir (Hodgson in Gqoba 2015, 5).

This community’s acceptance of Christianity did not come with automatic political commitment to the British colony. Old Soga continued to council Ngqika against conflict with the colonists,

but when it came to war, Soga, Dukwana, and many others of the Thyume Station, joined their chiefs in battle against the colony. Nstikana, Old Soga, and Dukwana exemplify a first generation of African Christian elites who were able to participate in spreading Christianity without disconnecting from a political commitment to their chiefs and to the first wave of anti-colonial Xhosa nationalism. Both Old Soga and Dukwana paid the ultimate price, supporting Sandile in the war of Ngcayechibi in 1877-8, where they died on the battlefield.

This account of the strength and autonomy of elite Xhosa Christians points to the capacity of the early Xhosa elite to assimilate and integrate Christian culture into a Xhosa idiom rather than simply have their consciousness defined by European Christian frameworks⁹. Yet the cultural impact of European missionaries attempting to convert Africans to European Christian values should not be understated. The spread of missionary-led schools and churches were important contexts where missionaries had authority over students and converts, and in these spaces, they decried the ‘heathenism’, ‘barbarism’, and ‘immorality’ of Xhosa customs¹⁰. For the missionaries, their own Victorian values and practices were equated with proper morality before God, and they took their task to be a ‘civilizing’ one, ‘uplifting’ the Xhosa by rooting out the social practices of Xhosa life:

[polygamy], bride-price, the levirate, marriage ceremonies, *intonjane* and circumcision [i.e. coming of age ceremonies] were condemned and attacked with a resolute dogmatism rooted in the early Victorian morality of the Evangelical Revival as well as the conviction of the superiority of Western European civilization. (Williams 1983, 89)

⁹ C.f. Peel’s (2003) account of Christianity’s flexible assimilation among the Yoruba, as opposed to the ‘colonization of consciousness’ account of Comaroff and Comaroff (1991, 1997) .

¹⁰ See for example the missionary view in Cousins 1899.

Soga's youth and journeys to Scotland

This world of missionary morality side by side with Xhosa leaders who were respected political elite was an essential part of Tiyo Soga's life from an early age. In his father, he would see a model of assertive Xhosa leadership alongside an openness to adopting and adapting colonial technologies¹¹. In his mother he would see a faithful Christian who trusted in God and in his servants, the missionaries, to uplift her and her family. His mother's path opened the educational opportunities which transformed Soga's young life. He first received schooling at the Tyhume mission station. At the age of 15, Rev. William Chalmers, the leader of the Tyhume station who had taken a shine to Soga, arranged for his enrolment in the Lovedale mission school. Rev. Chalmers belief in Soga was so strong that even after he failed an entrance exam, Chalmers persuaded the missionaries at Lovedale to accept him. He entered classes with one other student from Tyhume and was educated alongside the sons of missionaries and a small cohort of other promising Xhosa students (Chalmers 1877, 25–32). Lovedale would prove to be a pivotal institution, training many generations of African political leaders and was “arguably the pre-eminent center of missionary education on the African subcontinent”. (Attwell 2005b, 27)

Lovedale began Soga's path of elite education that would culminate in both secondary and tertiary education in Scotland, an exceedingly rare opportunity at the time. When the war of 1846 broke out, the missionaries fled the area, and it was agreed that Soga would travel with them, passing through London to arrive in Glasgow where Soga was educated first at Inchinnan, and then at the Glasgow Free Church Seminary (Cousins 1899, 43). Here, for two years, Soga was given an education with the view that he might become a missionary, and it was here that he was

¹¹ Old Soga was one of the first amaXhosa to embrace European techniques of cultivation, and eventually grew to be a wealthy man and a chief of his community (Chalmers 1877, 5-7; see also Hodgson 1986).

baptized and found a new spiritual home as a teenager. What must life have been like for the 17-year-old Soga, surrounded by difference, the eyes of his Scottish patrons and peers on him, treated perhaps as a ‘noble savage’ who nonetheless had risen to prove the virtues of the civilizing mission? This narration by a missionary might offer insight into the voices that surrounded him:

As a stranger in a strange land, [Tiyo] renounced all faith in the superstitious belief of his forefathers. He severed the links which bound him to heathenism, and received the seal of adoption into the family of Christ by being publicly baptized by Dr. Anderson, in John Street Church, on the 7th of May, 1848. (Cousins 1899, 43)

Soga returned from this education to South Africa in 1849, where he taught at the Uniondale and Igqibigha mission stations (Williams 1983, 2). However, war broke out again in 1850 and he returned to Scotland with his missionary hosts in 1851, to be reunited with his Scottish church and his missionary patron William Chalmers. Here Soga entered tertiary education at Glasgow University and then entered the Theological Hall of the United Presbyterian Church at Edinburgh, where he studied theology, Greek and Latin, and in his spare time poured over the literature of the day, reading “Washington Irving, Prescott, Macaulay, Foster, Vinet, and Mosheim”, and undertaking “a very earnest and thorough study of English history” (Cousins 1899, 55). After four years of study, from 1852 until 1856, he completed his theological training, received his preaching license from the United Presbyterian Presbytery of Glasgow, and was ordained to the office of the ministry by his Scottish home church of John Street, where the sermon was preached by Rev. H. Calderwood, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh. Before he returned to South Africa early the following year, he married his Scottish sweetheart, Janet Burnside, and toured around to various churches preaching to

congregations who were eager to hear the sermons of a newly ordained Xhosa preacher and seeking aide for the South African mission (Cousins 1899, 53-55).

Building the mission among the Xhosa

Soga thus left Scotland much feted by his peers and superiors¹², filled with a certainty that he had been ordained by God to bring the good news to his countrymen. Yet his arrival back in South Africa proved to be a stark confrontation with the crisis that had set upon Xhosa society. Soga returned to a world laid waste by two wars and to the height of the starvation and depopulation in the post-cattle killing event. The Tyhume mission station of his youth had been destroyed in the war; its missionaries had fled and its community had scattered. Soga's work for the next 14 years, until his early death from Tuberculosis, would be as a missionary and minister in the heart of Xhosa rural communities. Soga began by gathering the scattered community of his old Tyhume station, as well as the Uniondale and Igqibirha congregations, at the time leading 172 members to start a new station at Mgwali¹³. With him came Xhosa leaders who had guided him in his youth such as Dukwana, son of Ntsikana, and Soga's brother Festiri. Both were among the first four appointed elders of the new community¹⁴. This core community settled in an area depopulated after the cattle killings and slowly set to work building a church community¹⁵.

Leading the Mgwali community, Soga exemplifies the experiences and challenges which would become common for the coming generations of proto-nationalist leaders. Soga was a confident,

¹² He received a letter of well-wishing and praise signed by 186 of his theological peers on his graduation, as well as praise and encouragement from his mentors and leaders both at his university and at his John Street church (Chalmers 1877, 82-6).

¹³ Letters in the Missionary Record of the United Presbyterian Church (*MRUPC*), 1 February 1858, Vol 13 No.CXLVI, 23-24 (in Soga 1983, 71-73).

¹⁴ Soga's Letter Book, 9 Feb 1859 in Soga 1983, 47. Soga's brother Zaze, Nkohla Falati were also among the members of this first community (Gqoba 2015, 7).

¹⁵ *MRUPC*, 1 February 1858, Vol 13 No.CXLVI, 23-24 (in Soga 1983, 71-73).

capable, and authoritative leader, yet his leadership bound him between two worlds –the Xhosa of his congregation to whom he ministered, and the missionaries and governors who offered necessary support to the mission. Soga’s day to day life in the Mgwali mission station was shaped by his role as a missionary – building the station, preaching, managing schooling, serving his community members and assisting the Xhosa who came for aid from the wider community, as well as traveling to preach in the courts of Xhosa chiefs or at missionary outstations and schools. His life led him to constant interactions with both elite and commoner non-Christian Xhosa, and yet he also remained in constant connection with missionaries in South Africa and in Scotland both in letter correspondence and in reciprocal visits, in addition to his visits to various towns of the Cape colony.

A new political vision at the intersection of colonial and African worlds

Each of these spheres of life created new challenges for Soga, challenges which he was among the first to face. Yet, as will become evident, Soga’s experience at the intersection of colonial and African worlds would become a common experience for more and more Africans. The answers he developed to the questions of the time would offer an ideological foundation to the new generation of Xhosa leaders who followed him.

As will become clear in the following biographies, Soga’s experience – positioned between social worlds – would become an increasingly common social position. This new structural position which emerged through colonialism created new experiences and problems for a growing stratum of Africans who had to navigate between two opposing worlds. The experience was intensely felt by the class of missionary and colonially educated Africans, and it is from this stratum that intellectual novelty and a new political vision emerged. In this following section I

will look at three forms of experience that Soga faced in this new social position and show how he developed new answers to respond to issues of his time, articulating for the first time in print a vision of Pan-Africanism, Xhosa nationalism, and Black equality.

Black Pride: The demand for equality

Soga's life kept him tied to the colonial world. While he was based in his rural Xhosa community, his life as a missionary kept him in close contact with missionaries in both South Africa and Scotland, while his prestige as a black missionary kept him engaged with colonial government authorities and his travels through the colony exposed him to the everyday racism of the settler community.

In facing the colonial world, Soga embodied the Christian British gentleman, and to this community he presented his missionary effort as advancing the Lord's work, ministering to heathens and seeing souls saved by putting their trust in Christ. His oratory dazzled white congregations¹⁶; he maintained close connections with churches in both South Africa and Scotland who continued to contribute significant funds to the mission¹⁷, and he was invited by the then Cape Governor, Sir Gregory Grey, to accompany Prince Alfred, Duke of Edinburgh, and the Xhosa king Sandile to Cape Town to act as a political mediator (Chalmers 1877, 206-207).

Yet it was also in these colonial communities where Soga had to face a constant barrage of racism, at times when his missionary fellows would despair over what they saw as the

¹⁶ Consider his tour of White Eastern Cape churches when he returned to South Africa as reported in the local Port Elizabeth newspaper: "For one hour he commanded the uninterrupted attention of a densely packed, highly intellectual congregation. In this person may be seen the transcendent operation and effects of Christianity, civilization, and science, trampling under foot every opposing prejudice and difficulty, however formidable or seemingly insurmountable." *Telegraph* 9th July 1857 (Chalmers 1877, 133).

¹⁷ For example, Soga personally raised £600 from church communities (equivalent to almost \$100,000 today) for the building of the Mgwali church (Cousins 1899, 93).

irredeemable barbarism of the Xhosa, and at other times when he himself was the subject of racist attacks.

This experience of colonial racism would become a common confrontational experience for Africans who lived and moved in colonial spheres. It was through facing this racism that Soga developed the ability to assert black equality as well as to embrace his Xhosa identity with pride. Two missionary accounts speak powerfully of these traits in him:

Tiyo Soga had an honest pride in his manhood as a pure Kafir¹⁸ [Xhosa]. He was disposed to glory in his Kafirhood. He would not bow down before anyone because of his own black face. ... Hence, he was not disposed to demean himself when treated slightly or shabbily by a fearful or slavish submission. He seemed at such times to grow taller before you, as if he would say, 'I also am a man! A gentleman! A Christian!' (Rev. Robert Johnston in Cousins 1899, 147-8)

In daily intercourse, it was difficult to remember that he was a Kafir; one had to be completely on his guard lest he should wound his sensitive nature. He was not offended at a trifle, but if anything seemed to depreciate his countrymen, or to bring discredit on his work, or if he imagined himself insulted as a Kafir, he became completely unnerved. He suppressed his anger and indulged his grief, but at other times he resented the wrong with unusual dignity and declared his patriotism with unbounded enthusiasm. (Cousins 1899, 148)

Throughout Soga's diary and letters it is evident that he struggled against the pervasive racism of the colonial community, and wrestled to assert himself as worthy of respect and dignity. An exemplary illustration of Soga's response to this racism is his letter written to the King Williams

¹⁸ Note that this term is today an extremely offensive racial slur. Yet at the time it was used without any necessary derogatory connotations as an English equivalent term for Xhosa or the larger Nguni speaking group, (including by Soga himself). I only employ this term in quoting original sources and label it with [Xhosa] as a translation.

Town Council which he also sent for publication in the *King Williams Town Gazette and Kaffrarian Banner* newspaper, published on 23 October 1865. Soga recounts how he was accosted by two white river-ferry toll keepers because he refused to perform his subservience to the young drunk ferry assistant. Soga saw this as a racist attack aimed at demeaning him because he is black¹⁹, and he took a stand to challenge those who would disrespect black people:

Now sirs, if Mr. Hall and his assistant [the ferry men] possess a monopoly for insulting quiet individuals without reason, but because as black men, they think they must take them down for aiming at being fine gentlemen, the sooner they are informed of the danger of this self-assumed right, the better. They might do this upon some black men with impunity, but not upon all. (Soga 1983, 182)

The missionaries called this Soga's "sensitive nature". Soga, who confronted constant racism with little to no recourse, responded to attacks on the dignity of black people by embodying the moral standards of a gentleman and from this position demanding that he be treated with dignity and respect, refusing to be taken as anything less than worthy of respect because he was black.

This demand for equality while embracing a black pride is most powerfully demonstrated in Soga's advice he left for his children at the end of his life in a note-book entitled *The Inheritance of my Children*. Here he left 62 short maxims to guide his children after his death. Soga starts with the question of black pride for his children who are of mixed race:

¹⁹ Franz Fanon has examined the psychological effects of this encounter with racism. He powerfully narrates a similar encounter: "I was responsible at the same time for my body, for my race, for my ancestors. I subjected myself to an objective examination, I discovered my blackness, my ethnic characteristics; and I was battered down by tom-toms, cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, fetichism, racial defects, slave-ships, and above all else, above all: "Sho' good eatin'." On that day, completely dislocated, unable to be abroad with the other, the white man, who unmercifully imprisoned me, I took myself far off from my own presence, far indeed, and made myself an object. What else could it be for me but an amputation, an excision, a hemorrhage that spattered my whole body with black blood? But I did not want this revision, this thematization. All I wanted was to be a man among other men. I wanted to come lithe and young into a world that was ours and to help to build it together." (Fanon [1952] 2008, 85).

Among some white men there is a prejudice against black men; the prejudice is simply and solely on account of colour. For your own sake, never appear ashamed that your father was a Kafir²⁰ [Xhosa], and that you inherit some African blood. It is every whit as good and as pure as that which flows through the veins of my fairer brethren. ... I want you, for your own future comfort, to be very careful on this point. You will ever cherish the memory of your mother as that of an upright, conscientious, thrifty, Christian Scotchwoman. You will ever be thankful for your connection by this tie to the white race. But, if you wish to gain credit for yourselves, if you do not wish to feel the taunt of men, which you sometimes may be made to feel, *take your place* in the world as *coloured*, not as *white*, men – as *Kafirs* [Xhosas], not as Englishmen. You will be more thought of for this by all good and wise people than for the other. It will show them that you care not for the slight put by the prejudices of men upon one class of men, who happen to differ from them in complexion. (Chalmers 1877, 430)

Facing colonial racism, Soga demonstrates both the demand for black equality when challenged and asserts a Xhosa patriotism in the face of the denigration of the Xhosa in his presence. His development of a prideful identity as a black person stems from a new racial matrix in which he found himself. His assertion of a prideful black identity that was deserving of every equality was a position that would grow as Africans faced a white racist world.

Pan-African progress: Africa blessed by God

As a Xhosa minister to the Xhosa, Soga faced a different set of challenges as a Xhosa man who was at the time deeply steeped in the lifestyle and knowledge of the missionaries. At its best, Soga felt himself to stand as an exemplar to his countrymen, yet just as often he had to face the challenging perception of not being a true Xhosa, and the skepticism and rejection of his countrymen based on his adopted colonial culture.

²⁰ See footnote 18.

One avenue of this alienation was the sense that Soga now inhabited a different position to his fellow Xhosa. In the worldview of the missionaries, he was elevated above the ‘heathen savagery’ of his own countrymen. His experience of being torn between these Xhosa and missionary worlds of belonging shaped Soga’s own self-identity and forged his political imagination of the future of Africa.

Soga was confronted by this challenging intermediary position immediately on returning to South Africa. He recounts his first encounter with the Xhosa in a letter to missionaries in Scotland:

When we arrived [in Port Elisabeth, back from Scotland] ... I gathered that they [Xhosa] did not even believe I was one of themselves. When, at length, I did speak, their amazement became complete. My poor countrymen! With what interest did I regard them, even when they, perhaps ignorantly, supposed me an indifferent stranger. I cannot describe the emotions with which I contemplated them when I preached in the native church at Algoa Bay [Port Elisabeth]. They looked upon poor me as an extraordinary personage, who had bridged over the apparently impassable gulph, fixed between their degraded condition and that of their pre-eminently distinguished white neighbours. But I could not but adore, on their behalf and mine, the grace of the Gospel which has come not only to proclaim liberty to the captives, and the opening of the prison to them that are (spiritually) bound; but also, to elevate and enlighten, and to remove all the barriers that have interposed between man and man, by uniting all the bonds of a common brotherhood. Can it be that, as a people, we are doomed to remain forever in that degraded state in which we are so deeply and so generally sunk? God is no respecter of nations and peoples! Surely then the time of favour to poor, benighted, and despised Africa is yet to be.²¹

²¹ *MRUPC*, 1 March 1858, Vol 13, No CXLVII, 43 (in Soga 1983, 73-74).

Here, facing both a gulf of difference and at the same time an inescapable unity with his ‘countrymen’, Soga reaches to a set of ideals to interpret himself, the Xhosa, and the future. His alienation comes from a sense that he is now on the other side of the gulf between the Xhosa and the white colonists. He is ‘extraordinary’ and ‘distinguished’ and stands above their ‘degraded’ position. He has imbibed the deep sense of civilizational superiority held by the colonists and missionaries, and yet he feels estranged from his own people even while he feels bound to them. However, in the face of this, his vision is one of a future progression to racial equality; God will elevate and enlighten, the Gospel will remove all barriers that separate different peoples and all will be equal in the common brotherhood of Christ. Quoting Acts 10:34: “God is no respecter of peoples”, Soga reminds his missionary readers that as God showed no favor to the Jews, but gave his blessing to the gentiles: “in every nation he that feareth him, and worketh righteousness, is accepted with him” (Acts 10:34 [KJV]). So too, God will not favor the whites alone, but will show His favor to Soga’s nation. Filled with the same spirit which filled Peter, Soga does not only invoke the equality of all people, nor does he only see a future for the Xhosa. He prophetically envisions the favor of God for all of Africa.

What must Soga have felt seeing his own countrymen and feeling them to be in a ‘degraded condition’? Perhaps in Scotland he felt the same eyes of the Scottish on him, a ‘poor, benighted, and despised Africa[n]’. Yet Soga sees in himself the ‘elevation’ and ‘enlightenment’ of Africans. In this piece, he envisions that, through the grace of God and the power of the Gospel, his story would be the story of all of Africa. The civilizing mission of the missionaries had been transformed into a patriotic task for Soga – ‘Are *we* doomed to remain forever in that degraded state in which *we* are so deeply and so generally sunk?’ [my italics] – the promises of God would

not allow it, and Tiyo Soga would pour his life into being the hands and feet of this promise in his missionary work.

This vision – of God’s blessing for Africa – was to be sparked immediately on his return to his country. It was this same vision that he would expand and enrich in his famous article *What is the destiny of the Kaffir race?* published in the *King Williams Town Gazette and Kaffrarian Banner* newspaper on 11 May 1865, in which Soga responded to an article written by his fellow mission worker, and the son of his missionary mentor, John Chalmers. Chalmers’ article argued that the vices of the Xhosa which included being ‘indolent, drunken and averse to change’ would lead them to be ‘doomed to extinction’ if they did not change their ways (Soga 1983, 180). This discussion had emerged in missionary discourse in light of the decline of other indigenous groups throughout the territories claimed by British colonialists.

Soga’s response to this article was remarkable in the way in which it turned knowledge gathered from both the Xhosa and British world against the colonialist rhetoric of superior and inferior civilizations. Soga moved to refute the claimed future extinction of the ‘Kaffir’²² [Xhosa] by linking the vast histories of Africans, both in Southern Africa and beyond, extending the group of ‘Kaffir’ beyond the Xhosa to include all the Nguni language speaking people groups of Southern Africa and beyond:

I find the family of the Kaffir tribe extending nearly to the equator; along this line I find them taking the north-eastern coast of Africa, the dominant and governing race; they are all one in language and are one people – for language is that which decides the difference between one race and another. Now I venture to say that if this doom

²² See footnote 18.

includes all these tribes, the process of its extinction will be very long indeed. (Soga 1983, 180)

Here Soga highlights the enormity of a ‘people’ united by a shared language, some of whom are ‘dominant and governing’. He resists the attacks against the Xhosa people by turning to the European notion of a language group as a nation, and thus ties the Xhosa to a much larger, and therefore much more powerful, group, in order to declare the importance and strength of ‘the Kaffir’ people.

Soga then takes this conception of shared identity one step further to Pan-Africanism: he ties together all the people of Africa, from the great empires of history to the slaves of his present day in North and South America and the West Indies, and demonstrates the perseverance of the African people:

Here is another view. Africa was of God given to the race of Ham. I find the Negro from the days of the old Assyrians downwards, keeping his ‘individuality’ and ‘distinctiveness’, amid the wreck of empires, and the revolution of ages. I find him keeping his place among the nations and keeping his home and country. I find him enslaved – exposed to the vices and brandy of the white man. I find him in this condition for many a day – in the West Indian Islands, in Northern and Southern America, and in the South American colonies of Spain and Portugal. ... I find him now ... returning unmanacled to the land of his forefathers, taking back with him the civilization and the Christianity of those nations. (see the Negro republic of Liberia). I find the negro in the present struggle in America looking forward – though still with chains on his hands and with chains on his feet – yet looking forward to the dawn of a better day for himself and all his sable brethren in Africa. Until the Negro is doomed against all history and experience – until his God-given inheritance of Africa be taken finally from him, I shall never believe in the total extinction of his brethren along the southern limits of the land of Ham. (Soga 1983, 180)

These two extracts demonstrate something that was remarkably new in South African political thought at the time. This is some of the earliest, to the best of my knowledge, *the earliest* articulation of Pan-Africanism in South Africa²³, and it is contemporaneous with the very earliest advocates of Pan-Africanism elsewhere²⁴.

Soga faced a distinctly new experiential problem, and combined new conceptual tools available in his brokerage position to develop a new political response. The new problem was the exposure of Africans to the ideas of western cultural and racial superiority, in the face of their own supposed inferiority. His answer to this challenge was a Pan-African pride. Soga drew on a number of tools to develop this answer: his wide knowledge of the African communities of Southern Africa allowed him to call forth a unified ‘Kaffir’ people.

In this extract, his historical knowledge, likely gained in his studies overseas, shined to call forth a political unity spanning across time – from the Assyrian empire onwards – and across space – he connects the people of Africa, to the struggles of black slaves in the Americas, and to the new nations of freed slaves of Liberia. Finally, he couches all of this in a logic of Christianity and God’s providence. He reappropriates the ‘Curse of Ham’²⁵, used by Europeans to justify slavery and domination of Africans (Braude 1997; Evans 1980), and instead argues that Africa is the God-given inheritance of ‘Negros’. The destruction of the African people would be nothing short of violating the will of God, an impossibility in Soga’s world view.

²³ This sentiment is echoed by Williams (1983, 178), the editor of Soga’s collected works.

²⁴ Such as Edward Blyden in Liberia. See also Atwell’s (2005b) similar claim.

²⁵ In the biblical book of Genesis, one of the sons of Noah, Ham, is cursed for seeing his father naked. In the 17th and 18th century, the idea that Africans were the descendants of Ham became a justification for slavery, the ‘curse’ being their black skin (see Braude 1997).

Thus, he synthesizes a rich variety of conceptual tools to argue for the place of Africans in the future of the world. Soga's view sees the hope of the future rise of Africans and envisions them as shared participants in human progress (Attwell 2005b).

Xhosa nationalism: Preserving the culture of the nation

In addition to the challenge of being a worthy role model of black excellence to his growing community of Christian Xhosa aspirants, Soga also had to answer a challenge to the legitimacy of his Xhosa identity among the Xhosa. As his Mgwali church grew and became established, Soga began to travel to the surrounding villages, ministering and preaching at the courts of Chiefs. Through this, he was deeply connected with both the community of Xhosa converts and the wider world and life of the Xhosa of his area. In this context Soga maintained his identity as a legitimate *umXhosa* [Xhosa person] challenged by both commoners and chiefs around him who anchored their Xhosa identity in maintaining Xhosa social traditions and practices.

Soga reacted to this challenge to his legitimate identity by pursuing a deeper knowledge of Xhosa oral tradition and social practices. He worked to collect and preserve these traditions and in doing so affirmed his own Xhosa identity by celebrating and embracing the knowledge markers of Xhosa culture. In doing so, he developed an early vision of cultural nationalism, asserting a positive Xhosa identity through validating traditions of knowledge and practice. His diary entries and letters recount practices he observed among the Xhosa, but the clearest articulation of this protection of Xhosa culture is seen in his writings to the new isiXhosa newspaper *Indaba*: the first sustained isiXhosa newspaper, which ran from 1862-1865. Soga contributed a number of articles to this publication, including numerous stories and fables from Xhosa oral traditions which he used to reflect on the Xhosa moral tradition.

Soga wrote a piece in the *isiXhosa* language, in the inaugural edition of this newspaper, in August 1862, praising the creation of a new “national” newspaper which he envisioned as way to preserve the history and identity of the Xhosa people:

I envisage in this newspaper a beautiful vessel for preserving the stories, fables, legends, customs, anecdotes and history of the tribes. ... All is well known today. Our veterans of the Xhosa and Embo people must disgorge all they know. Everything must be imparted to the nation as a whole. Fables must be retold; what was history or legend should be recounted. (Translated from *isiXhosa* in Soga 1983, 152-3)

Soga’s work in this piece places emphasis on Xhosa customs and practices, evoking those Xhosa customs as evidence for why the Xhosa people should preserve their history and stories in the new newspaper. He argues for histories, poetry and fables of the past to be collected as a way to keep connected to the Xhosa past:

Let us bring to life our ancestors; Ngconde, Togu, Tshiwo, Phalo, Rharhabe, Mlawu, Ngqika and Ndlambe. Let us resurrect our ancestral forebearers who bequeathed to us a rich heritage. All anecdotes connected with the life of the nation should be brought to this big corn-pit, our national newspaper *Indaba* (The News). (ibid)

Soga’s strategy in this piece presents a fascinating combination of Xhosa and Western ideas. The problem which Soga faced was both the challenge to his own legitimacy as a Xhosa as well as the larger question of self-identity for Xhosa people (himself included) in the face of the destruction of Xhosa social life under colonialism. In response to this, in this piece, he combines elements of European nationalism with Xhosa cultural practices and oral traditions. The use of nationalism is seen in his continuous appeals to the “Xhosa Nation” and the “Xhosa people”. He argues that the Xhosa have an “essential nature” (Soga 1983, 151), and can be seen as a single shared race – “We Xhosa are a race which enjoys conversation” (ibid). This appeal to nationhood

is one way to create an identity in the face of decline under colonialism – the political unit is no longer taken for granted, but now needs to be invented (Ranger 2002; Spear 2003) and imagined (Anderson 2006), and Soga turns to European ideas of nationhood in calling the Xhosa nation into being. However, this imagination of the Xhosa nation leads Soga away from Western practices to praise the practices he views as authentically Xhosa. Moreover, he advocates for this tradition to be kept alive by delving into history and remembering the practices and stories of the past in order to find orientation in the present. Soga here articulates a cultural nationalism which is vital to the next generation of politically engaged Africans who turn to African history and seek to use the past to offer an alternative to western ideas.

Discussion: Soga’s political imagination and the social conditions of political novelty

Soga’s letters, diary, and newspaper articles demonstrate some of the first printed articulations of new political orientations in South Africa. They highlight how these new political ideologies emerge as missionary-educated Africans faced new experiential problems and drew on the cultural and political symbols and frameworks of both colonial and African worlds to answer these problems. As more and more Africans received missionary education, a growing social stratum faced the same kinds of tensions which emerged for Soga. Soga’s writings that reflect his experience give insight into some of the challenges which emerged more generally for the Africans inhabiting this new conflicted social stratum. More broadly, a close analysis of political innovation in the case of Tiyo Soga demonstrates how novel forms of political understandings were generated through the emergence of nationalist and pan-African thought in South Africa; this may reveal new insights into how novel forms of political imagination emerge more generally.

Broad historical transformations create new kinds of social actors, who are structurally positioned in new ways as society transforms. Social movement literature has paid attention to these structural transformations but has not explored the implications for individual experience and understanding. These new structural positions produce new political understandings and answers because they create historically new biographical trajectories. These new life trajectories entail a new set of experiences for those who inhabit the new social position. These experiences can create the need for new frameworks of understanding when they cannot be understood through the socially available frameworks of ‘take-for-granted’ previously established answers (Schütz and Luckmann 1973). Historical change makes this possible because these socially accepted answers are inherited from experiences and understandings of the past. Insofar as historical change creates a different experiential world for individuals, these new experiences may not be easily mapped onto this ‘sedimented stock of social knowledge’ (ibid).

Thus, historically new experiences create new problems which cannot be answered with existing social ideas. I have argued that this was especially true for an emerging stratum of missionary-educated intermediaries who did not live entirely in either colonial or African social worlds. The lives lived between these contexts created a set of experiences which could not be easily interpreted in the knowledge system of either world.

In such contexts people must develop new understandings and answers to engage these problems. In this chapter I have argued that the intermediary position of missionary-educated intellectuals also made innovative new answers possible, because these figures could draw on the conceptual and symbolic resources of the worlds they bridged and combine these elements into new frameworks of understanding. The analysis of the life of Tiyo Soga offers a particularly

clear insight into this capacity for innovative creativity, precisely because he was one of the earliest missionary-educated intellectuals who left behind a significant body of writing. Soga had a much smaller group of missionary-educated intellectual peers than the generation who followed him (which I turn to in Chapter 2). For this reason, he had to do much of his creative work alone, in dialogue with intellectuals from missionary and Xhosa communities.

Consequently, his writings show more clearly the challenge of grappling with experientially new problems, and the way that intermediary intelligentsia generate new answers.

The analysis of his writings and political arguments show how he drew and synthesized elements of Xhosa and colonial knowledge to articulate a new political identity and vision. Here Soga shows the capacity for ‘hybrid’ creativity as he draws from cultural and political imaginaries, symbols, and knowledge systems of both bridged communities (see the analysis of this creativity in Bhabha [1994] 2012; Nandy 1989; Said 1979; [1993] 2012; Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 2003). Soga’s political innovation shows how intermediary intelligentsia have an expanded capacity to create and innovate because they can draw on and blend elements from the dual, opposing knowledge systems. These intermediary knowledge workers develop a mastery of the cultural frameworks of both worlds they bridge (see Chapter 2), and they can draw on the cultural resources (the metaphors, archetypical stories, practices, symbols and symbolic interconnections, etc.) of both communities. As Soga shows, by drawing on this range of elements, these intermediary knowledge workers have the capacity to blend once separated cultural elements into new forms of argument and articulation. This ‘hybridity’ emphasizes the expanded space of creativity and possibility which is available to those who stand with a foot in two opposing worlds. The biographical trajectory of Tiyo Soga thus offers us insight into the

social processes that generate both new experiential problems and facilitate the creation of innovative political thought.

These new political visions have the capacity to become the seeds of a new political framework. Soga was upheld as an archetype of success by both missionaries and by the subsequent generation of missionary-educated intellectuals. The ideas he espoused as well as the people who grew up under his leadership grew to take on a life of their own as early ideas of racial, pan-African, and Xhosa cultural nationalist identities discussed here grew and flourished in the decades after Soga's death, building a new interpretive framework to respond to colonialism.

Conclusion

This chapter has followed both the historical and biographical transformations which reshaped South Africa through the 1800s and created the conditions for the emergence of a new political vision. In the first half of the 19th century, African state structures offered a set of political tools and frameworks which were used as the first wave of resistance to colonial expansion. Yet the chapter traces the eventual failure of this framework. Repeated military failure cut away political authority from Xhosa kings. In the face of these defeats, people turned to spiritual authority for a new vision, and the Xhosa cattle-killing represented the height of the turn to a spiritual domain of power. The willingness to sacrifice cattle, the very symbol of wealth, showed the commitment to a new answer in the face of desperation. When the millenarian prophecies failed, mass starvation and emigration marked the destruction of the social, political, and economic structure of Xhosa society. It also marked a catastrophic collapse of legitimate knowledge authority; it proved that both political and spiritual leaders had failed to deliver their people from conquest. This crisis thus saw both experiential failure and the disruption of old networks of authority,

ultimately yielding a powerful ‘negative validation’ of the existing Xhosa frameworks of knowledge. In this void of legitimate answers to the existential crisis of colonialism, the Xhosa community needed new knowledge leaders to ground social action. Macro-social transformation thus created conditions which stripped away the legitimacy of accepted knowledge and created a receptive political audience who were open to new answers when existing answers had failed.

The transformation of the colonial world also created the conditions for new answers to rise. The biography of Tiyo Soga highlights the kinds of political imagination made possible through the creation of a new social position – in his case, the class of intermediary missionary-educated intellectuals who were deeply socially connected to both colonial and African communities. It is from this new social stratum that new political identities, answers, and a new vision emerged, which grounded a growing set of proto-nationalist organizations. What made this innovation possible? The life of Tiyo Soga shows a set of experiences which would be echoed in the study of future generations: these *abantu basesikolweni* (‘school people’) leaders faced historically new experiential problems: racism, notions of cultural superiority and inferiority, and the need to demonstrate their legitimacy as both Xhosa and as ‘civilized’ to different, opposing audiences. In facing these challenges, they produced new answers; their intermediary position allowed them to create ‘hybrid’ innovation by taking up useful ideas from both colonial and African knowledge systems in order to interpret and respond to their new context. They drew on elements from both Xhosa and European knowledge systems, and in doing so synthesized and innovated to develop new identities, new conceptual tools, and new political vision. They developed both a new political imagination which envisioned a new ideal world, and a new sociological imagination which analyzed ways to act to bring this new world about.

This offers insight into the larger social stratum of missionary-educated Africans who led the new wave of African nationalism and reveals the conditions for political innovation which emerge from a relational position that is connected to two different knowledge communities. This chapter has demonstrated how attention to the experiential transformations ushered in by historical change, and attention to the social structure which shapes these new experiences, offer key insights into the generation responsible for creating new African political imagination, and new understandings of the conditions necessary to birth a new political imagination more broadly.

2

Intermediary Intelligentsia and Political Transformation:

Innovation and multivocality in the early African nationalist movement (1860-1890)

Introduction

In this chapter I turn to the social and political context of proto-nationalist intellectuals and leaders in the generation that followed Tiyo Soga, by studying the spread and transformation of emerging proto-nationalist political visions as this political movement expanded. In the preceding chapter, we saw how the sweeping societal changes ushered in by colonialism created the historically new experiences which led figures such as Tiyo Soga, and others like him, to develop new political articulations of African identity. This chapter now turns to the next generation of political leaders and intellectuals to examine how they forged a nascent, yet growing collective movement which developed new forms of politics to engage the colonial state.

Here I focus on the missionary-educated Xhosa leaders and intellectuals between 1870 and 1890. The overarching question is: what enabled these early proto-nationalist leaders to develop this novel political movement? This chapter examines this capacity for novelty by focusing on how these leading figures made connections between multiple different political communities, following how these connections enabled new political possibilities and at the same time constrained and shaped the political forms which became central to the emerging African

nationalist framework. I develop the concept of *Intermediary Intelligentsia* to highlight how this new stratum of political leaders mediated between otherwise disconnected African and colonial political communities and I analyze the effects of this mediating role. By focusing on how the relational position of these leading figures both inspired new ways of thinking, and at the same time made demands of their emerging political articulations, I argue that we can better account for the dynamics which enabled and shaped the political innovation of the nascent African nationalist movement in South Africa and can theorize the dynamics which shape the vision and practice of ‘intermediary’ political figures more broadly.

In the first part of the chapter, I outline the existing contradictions in the literature on African nationalist leaders: I highlight how scholars who study the same the same stratum of leading figures disagree about the sources of political inspiration for African nationalism – some emphasize the influence of colonial political frameworks in shaping political practice while others see African political frameworks as central. I argue that we can resolve these contradictions by theoretically shifting our conception of intellectual attachments. To do so, I theorize a new category of intellectuals who are simultaneously connected to multiple groups – the *intermediary intelligentsia*. The term intermediary marks that these intellectuals mediate between multiple communities. The term intelligentsia is used to signify politically engaged intellectuals. I go on to outline how this mediating position shapes the kinds of political work that such intermediaries can undertake as they bridge different communities.

In the second part of the chapter, I turn to a close empirical study of the rise of Xhosa proto-nationalist leaders and show how their position as members of the *intermediary intelligentsia* created both opportunities and constraints which shaped the innovation of the early African

nationalist movement. Developing the idea of ‘*multivocality*’ – where one idea is spoken in many ‘different voices’ thus appealing to different audiences – I focus on the concept of *Isizwe*, the Xhosa term for African nationhood, as one key multivocal political concept. I use methods of close textual analysis to study how this idea was used in the writings of two leading intellectuals, I.W. Wauchope, and W.W. Gqoba. Through this analysis, I demonstrate that the concept of *Isizwe* or African ‘nationhood’ offered a multivocal platform which could resonate with multiple audiences and draw them into supporting a common political project. Only intermediary intelligentsia could bring these disconnected communities into a common movement. Ultimately this bridging work enabled the innovations which laid the foundation for African Nationalism.

Setting the scene

In the preceding chapter, we saw Tiyo Soga in the last years of his short life, articulating new visions of African identity as he wrestled with his colonial, missionary, and Xhosa interlocutors. Through his work in the 1860s, Soga was largely a ‘voice in the desert’, declaring a new political vision in his writings, letters, and newspaper articles. Yet less than 10 years after his death in 1871, Soga’s ‘proto-nationalist’ vision would be transformed from ideas into action. Through the decade of the 1880s and beyond, increasingly connected and coordinated African political mobilization in the eastern Cape region offered a growing engagement with and challenge to the Cape colonial political system.

Through the 1870s missionary-educated Africans forged a wider and more interconnected ‘community of discourse’, developing a framework of political and social analysis which would ground the proto-nationalist movement using the isiXhosa language newspaper *Isigidimi sama-Xosa* and connecting through mission-school and church organizations (Odendaal 2013). In the

1880s the earliest ‘proto-nationalist’ political organizations were founded, and quickly found a footing that offered new avenues of political power in the Cape parliament. Through the 1880s the leaders of an increasingly interconnected political movement debated the issues most plaguing the African political community, mobilized both missionary educated and rural African communities to act collectively, engaged with political leaders of the Cape parliament through delegations to governors, magistrates, and the prime minister, brought petitions to the Cape parliament, and formed alliances with members of parliament for representation.

In this chapter I turn to the social formation of the leaders of this emerging political movement and examine how this shaped possibilities for political action and identity in the emerging proto-nationalist movement. First, I study the social conditions and processes at play where political novelty emerged. I show how African intermediaries emerged at the intersection of colonial and African communities who came to lead the nascent proto-nationalist movement. These figures were able to connect colonial and African political communities to create new forms of political action. Second, I consider what shaped the characteristics of this novelty. I show how the challenges of bridging between apparently incompatible political logics of two communities facilitated the development of ‘multivocal’ political concepts. I closely study the writings of two leading intellectuals in order to examine the nature of these multivocal political concepts, focusing analysis on the concept of ‘nationhood’: *Isizwe* and *Uhlanga* (isiXhosa). I follow how this concept of the political community is deployed as intellectuals engage colonial, Xhosa, and missionary-educated African audiences. In each context the idea of *Isizwe* or nation resonates with audiences, but it does so in different ways. This ‘multivocal’ resonance enabled the creation of a political vision that many different groups could buy into, facilitated by the capacious

political meanings which could be attributed to this communal identity. Where other identities always alienated at least one of these three critical audiences, Isizwe identity was able to draw different interlocutors into supporting a shared political project, albeit for different reasons. This form of bridging work, and the multivocal political forms which fostered this bridging, was only possible because intermediary knowledge workers had the mastery of multiple cultural worlds that was necessary to forge this common ground. I thus show how an analysis of *intermediary intelligentsia* gives insight into emerging African nationalist identification and into the novel forms of politics that were enabled as multiple audiences were drawn into supporting a common movement.

Theoretical framework

It is necessary to construct a new theoretical perspective on these *intermediary intelligentsia*.

This theoretical framework is developed from the empirical analysis of this generation of proto-nationalist leaders, and in the second section I put this framework to work, examining in detail how this mediating stratum emerged and how their bridging work shaped the political framework of African nationalism.

The emerging African nationalist movement in South Africa offers an ideal case to study how intellectual transformation come to redirect political organization and action. There is broad agreement that a group of missionary-educated African intellectuals were the key leaders of this new movement, shaping both a new political imagination and creating new political organizations (Odendaal 2013; Thompson 2014). The preeminence of intellectuals in this case thus foregrounds the influence of ideological work in the forging of new political practice. As outlined in the introduction, scholars have theorized how new forms of political action can

emerge (Tilly 1978; Jansen 2017), and have examined the innovation and transformation in organizational repertoires which guide whole political systems (Clemens 1997; Padgett and Powel 2012). Yet there remains a limited analysis of how new ideological frameworks emerge which guide the dominant political issues and direct different forms of action in a given period. To better understand the ideological and conceptual shifts which transform political action, we need to examine the formation of new conceptual frameworks which eventually consolidate into new ‘paradigms’ of politics with large scale and lasting impact.

While the central role of these African intellectuals is agreed upon, the African studies literature offers two contradictory accounts of the ideological formation of these intellectuals and thus of the origins and drivers of African nationalist politics. One literature argues that proto-nationalist leaders had deeply imbibed a European political imagination, and that their turn to nationalism was a mimicry of European ideas, now adapted to an African context (Chatterjee 1986; Ranger 2002; J. Comaroff and Comaroff 1991; J. L. Comaroff and Comaroff 1997; Marks and Trapido 1987). Another group of scholars has emphasized the connections these intellectuals had to African knowledge systems and argue that the development of African nationalist identities was rooted in an embrace of African political traditions and practice and a rejection of European hegemony (Mbeki 2007; Masilela 2014; 2013a; Ndletyana 2008; Mangcu 2014, chap. 2; Odendaal 2013).

In what follows I will argue that this contradictory view of African intellectual leaders reveals a broader challenge in our existing conceptualization of intellectuals. By shifting our theoretical account of how intellectuals attach to society, we can both resolve this contradiction and offer

new insight into how proto-nationalist intellectuals created an innovative political platform which made the concept of African nationhood one of its central identities.

Unitary attachment in theories of the intellectual class

As Kurzman & Owens (2002) outline, the three dominant traditions that explain the workings of an intellectual class have seen intellectuals as: 1. A class-in-themselves, 2. Class-bound, and 3. Class-less. One of the core distinctions which drives these three traditions to a different analysis of intellectuals is their disagreement on intellectuals' allegiance: how are intellectuals attached to social classes? The class-in-themselves approach develops from the Dreyfusards and the work of Julien Benda (1900; [1927] 2011) and argues that intellectuals share a common social position and thus develop their own interests and shared identity as a unified class. The class-bound approach develops from Gramsci's ([1929–1935] 1971, 5–23) analysis of organic intellectuals and argues that intellectuals grow out of and represent the ideas and interests of their class of origin. Finally, the class-less intellectuals approach develops from Mannheim's ([1929] 2013, 136–64; 1993) account of intellectuals as 'free floating': a group who, through education, is able to transcend the worldview of any individual group, thus becoming decoupled from the particular and distorting perspective of their class. This allows intellectuals to attach themselves to different classes, becoming the rationalizers and intellectualizes of a class other than their own (c.f. Mannheim [1929] 2013, 158).

While these schools have fiercely disagreed on the dynamics which shape intellectual work, they all see intellectuals engaged in a *single* dominant attachment either to their own class, their class of origin, or a freely chosen class. The debate remains centered on a identifying the *unitary form of attachment* which 'correctly' characterizes the relation between intellectuals and their society.

Unitary attachment in the debate on African nationalist leaders

The historical literature on African nationalist leaders reproduced this same conceptual debate centered on the connections which most define the intellectual thought of these leaders, these being either to European or African knowledge systems. I consider these two perspectives in turn.

The *Ideological Import* thesis

The first approach has highlighted African nationalist leaders' attachment to European models of thinking and acting. Partha Chatterjee (1986) has argued that anti- and post-colonial nationalisms replicate a form of nationalism which is a European invention, its core concepts drawn directly from 19th Century European Romantic and Enlightenment values. For Chatterjee, anti-colonial nationalism is thus a 'derivative discourse' which draws on the same ideas of national culture, history, and faith in modernization which grounded European nationalism (1986, 9).

Many scholars of African nationalism in both South Africa and across the continent see similar dynamics. Influential works on African political ideology such as Terence Ranger's account of the 'invention of tradition' (2002) portray proto-nationalist leaders in South Africa as an educated class who had deeply imbibed Britishness, with the political claims to rights and freedoms seen as a claim to share in the "British liberal universe" (2002, 238). Comaroff and Comaroff have examined the 'colonization of consciousness' as missionaries instilled both the ideology and embodied practice of western modernity in South African Tswana converts (1991; 1997) (see also 2019; J. L. Comaroff 1997; see de Wet 2008 for the Xhosa case) and Marks and Trapido (1987) have argued that Xhosa political leaders were "a clearly defined group of Africans who identified themselves with British liberal values and hoped for incorporation into

the colonial order. ... Cape liberalism continued to provide a powerful counter-ideology for the black intelligentsia, through at least the first half of the twentieth century..." (Marks and Trapido 1987, 6). While emphasizing African agency, much scholarship in this tradition has studied how Africans adopted British or French technologies, ideologies, and styles in order to pursue their own individual or collective ends (Attwell 2005a; Osborn 2003; Prein 1994).

I call this line of analysis the 'ideological import' thesis: that proto-nationalist leaders were immersed in the political imagination of the colonizers, that through their colonial education in European knowledge and their social position as petite bourgeoisie they absorbed the values and tools of their colonizers, and that they then transformed these values and tools into a weapon used against those very colonizers, building a political platform of anti-colonial nationalism to attack the contradictions of the colonizers' own system of value, and drawing on the colonizers' own techniques of politics.

The *Indigenous Intellectual* thesis

A second orientation to these early proto-nationalist leaders has been to assert their position as nationalist icons. This approach has emphasized the way these early leaders were *African* intellectuals who embraced African ideas and practices, transforming indigenous knowledge systems to forge a framework of resistance to colonial domination.

The impulse to identify and celebrate African intellectuals has been particularly strong and important as a counter to the negation of African knowledge and African humanity which was experienced through the colonial period and whose logic of civilizational and racial hierarchy

echoes on into the present. Thabo Mbeki, South Africa's second president, clearly articulates the stakes of turning to black intellectual traditions in South Africa:

[T]o guarantee its domination, colonialism and apartheid had sought to wipe out the history, the customs, the self-worth, the identity and dignity of the African oppressed. Tiyo Soga, and John Dube, Pixley Seme, Albert Luthuli, and Steve Biko after them, knew that for the Africans to liberate themselves, they had to regain possession of their history, their value system, their customs, their heroes and heroines, their (oral) literature. (Mbeki 2007)

The figures Mbeki celebrates as Africanist icons – Tiyo Soga, John Dube, and Pixley Seme – are the same figures who appear to the ‘ideological import’ scholarship above as the models of the modernizer ‘petite bourgeoisie’ embracing European knowledge. Yet, sharing Mbeki’s orientation, a number of scholars who engage in biographical studies and intellectual history¹ have emphasized the continuities and connections which mark the development of African political thought from the pre-colonial through the colonial and into the anti-apartheid period (see esp. Mangcu 2014, chap. 2). These studies show how the intimate connections that proto-nationalist intellectuals had with existing traditions of African knowledge allowed them to generate an intellectual approach to African modernity which was not simply defined by colonial forms; rather, it was also able to define itself against colonial knowledge by anchoring itself in already available African intellectual traditions. Exemplifying this approach, Ntongela Masilela (2013a; 2014) argues that:

¹ including Tiyo Soga (Williams 1978; Attwell 2005b), Isaac Wauchope (Nyamende 2000; Mkhize 2008; Wauchope 2008), Magema Fuze (Mokoena 2011), and S.E.K. Mqhayi (Schoots 2014; Saule 1996, 23–80; Midgley 2010; Neethling and Mpolweni 2006), as well as group biographies of African intellectuals (Ndletyana 2008; Odendaal 2013; Hodgson 1986; Hodgson and Edlmann 2018).

Although profoundly appreciative of the education imparted by the missionaries, the New African intellectuals who had been educated under its auspices, came to resent and eventually resisted their process of acculturation into Europeanism and Eurocentricism. This resistance entailed a complex process of rejecting Europeanism, which was in effect white domination and hegemony, while embracing European modernity with the intent of transforming it into African modernity. This African modernity would transcend African tradition while [being] in a state of continual dialogue with it. (Masilela 2013b, 1)

I call this approach the ‘indigenous intellectuals’ thesis: That proto-nationalist leaders turned to and drew upon African knowledge as well as cultural and social forms to develop ideas which countered colonial knowledge claims (such as the inferiority of Africans) and resonated with African audiences who were distant from the European social and cultural norms dominant in colonial centers. This is a vision of proto-nationalist intellectuals who intentionally turn to already existing African knowledge, cultural forms, and modes of political practice, developing an African centric knowledge, cherishing and pridefully defending an African identity, and working to drive out the colonizers who harm and disempower African communities.

Beyond unitary attachment: the intermediary intelligentsia

Thus, much like the literature on intellectuals, opposing explanations of early African nationalists emerge from two approaches which either emphasize attachment to a European or African political community, seeing one or the other as the key driver of African nationalist intellectual formation. Both sides present rich empirical evidence to support their claim; the challenge comes not from the data but from a conceptual apparatus where intellectuals attach to one or another social group. This contradictory explanation can be overcome if we shift our conceptualization of intellectuals away from the idea of a unitary form of attachment. Instead, I

argue that by conceptualizing a category of intellectuals who connect simultaneously to multiple groups, we can better understand the dynamics which shaped the ideas and innovations of early African nationalism. I call these politically engaged intellectuals who mediate between multiple communities *intermediary intelligentsia*.

Theorizing intermediary intelligentsia

The concept of intermediary intelligentsia works to focus analytical attention on how the dynamics of mediating knowledge work shapes the knowledge produced. I consider two kinds of work done by intermediary intelligentsia and argue that this work generates particular problems which require solutions unique to the intermediary intelligentsia position. First, I consider how intermediary intellectuals can transmit knowledge between separated communities. In this work they act as *translators* of knowledge between otherwise disconnected communities, but to do so they must transform knowledge from community A into a form that is intelligible in community B. This mediating and translating work requires that they develop a *dual mastery* of the social and cultural logics of both source and target community.

Second, I consider intelligentsia—defined here as politically-engaged intellectuals. Intermediary intelligentsia are able to serve as *political bridges* which allow them to gather political support from different communities to build a new common political platform. To do so, these intelligentsia must develop *multivocal* political forms: ideas and organizations which allow them to simultaneously speak to and resonate with disparate audiences who hold different cultural logics.

The approach is to focus on the effects which emerge from figures who bridge disparate social communities. The scholarship on ‘hybridity’ has begun this work in the colonial context (Bhabha [1994] 2012; Nandy 1989; Said 1979; [1993] 2012; Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 2003). Yet the focus of these studies has been on the hybrid figures themselves and their creative works, seeing new entities that are made up from multiple elements. This chapter seeks to go further by focusing on the relational role of mediating and its consequences. By studying the possibilities and constraints which emerge from the work of connecting two or more disparate audiences, I show the conditions which enabled and constrained the innovation seen in the early African nationalist political framework.

Intermediaries as knowledge translators: the capacities for dual mastery

Intermediaries are defined by their role in bridging between two disconnected communities. Both African studies and sociological literatures have expanded on the importance of this social position. The sociological literature has called these figures ‘brokers’ and has shown that “in a remarkably wide range of settings, people situated between distinct social worlds collect and channel scarce information in ways that make things happen” (Stovel and Shaw 2012, 140). The network analysis tradition has examined how brokers bridge gaps in social structures, facilitating the flow of goods or information and potentially benefitting in the process (Granovetter 1973; Gould and Fernandez 1989; Burt 2000; 2004; [1992] 2009; Small 2009; See Stovel and Shaw 2012). The African studies scholarship has seen similar dynamics in the role that ‘African intermediaries’ played in colonialism (Lawrance, Osborn, and Roberts 2006; Osborn 2003). These intermediaries do the work of mediated, translated, and transmitted colonial demands to

African communities, and have been shown to enrich themselves in the process due to the power which arises from their brokerage position.

As an analytical concept, an intermediary can be formally defined by the structure of the social relations held by a figure located between multiple groups. Intermediaries use their social connections between two otherwise two incongruent or disconnected groups to bridge these groups. Groups can be disconnected by a range of differences including language or cultural differences. An interpreter who translates denotative and connotative meanings across languages is as much an intermediary as a team leader who mediates between an IT staff and corporate managers.

What is required for such bridging work to be possible? The archetype of translator exemplifies the kind of knowledge work required by such intermediaries. In order to effectively translate meaning from one language to another, the translator must have an in-depth understanding of both the source and target language. More than this, translating across cultural communities means the translator must deeply apprehend the cultural idiom of the source material and must transition these meanings into a suitable equivalent in the target community. The work thus requires deep enough cultural proficiency to understand and transmit meaning in the cultural logic of both groups they address. From this twofold mastery the translator can bring knowledge from one community to another, bridging between what would otherwise remain separated. Intermediary knowledge work thus stands in contrast to the unidirectional approach of the intellectuals literature, which emphasizes intellectuals' mastery of one community (Gramsci [1929–1935] 1971; Mannheim [1929] 2013; 1993).

In the case of South Africa, the intermediary Xhosa intellectuals had to develop this dual mastery, which allowed them to serve as translators of knowledge between Xhosa and colonial communities. When they worked as teachers, pastors, missionaries, or acted as advisors to chiefs, they translated European knowledge, and their understanding of European people, into a form that resonated with the African communities they served. When they worked as interpreters in colonial courts, or shared their knowledge of history, African society, and African forms of education with missionaries and colonial academics, they translated African knowledge, and their understanding of African peoples, into something sensible to European audiences.

Intermediary Intelligentsia as political bridges: multivocality and a public political platform

Intermediary *intelligentsia* do their mediating knowledge work in the political domain. I define intelligentsia as intellectuals who are politically engaged actors, standing in some leadership or advisory relationship in relation to organized political action. As the Xhosa proto-nationalist intelligentsia created a new political movement, they transcended their original role as translators of knowledge. Instead, their capacity to operate effectively in two communities enabled them to become political bridges between colonial and Xhosa worlds. While they themselves represented a small community that had insignificant political or economic resources, they were able to bring the political resources from both colonial and African contexts together to enable new avenues for political action.

Yet their intermediary position created a challenge: how could they build connections and mobilize groups with different, often opposed, political logics? This challenge of bridging disparate political logics is one that exists by definition for all intermediary intelligentsia. It

emerges precisely because of the incommensurate cultural logics that create the need for intermediaries in the first place. The meanings, values, and common sense of two communities are distinct. This means that what is politically meaningful and mobilizing for one community is at best unintelligible and at worst threatening or alienating to the other community.

I argue that this case shows how using *multivocal political forms* – forms of presentation which are meaningful to different audiences in different ways – allowed members of the intermediary intelligentsia to mobilize two divided communities to support a common project.

Multivocal political forms: Technologies of dual inclusion

When intermediaries can keep their audiences separated they can engage in switching (White 2008), moving between the cultural logics of different audiences as they move contexts, appealing to each audience in their own framework. There is evidence of this in the rhetoric deployed by early proto-nationalist leaders. Yet this separation of audience is not possible as a movement grows and must develop a public face that is visible to multiple audiences simultaneously. In the South African case, the spread of public media such as newspapers, and the growth of early institutionalized political organizations made it difficult to keep audiences separate and nullified the possibility of appealing to each audience only in their own cultural logic.

Under these conditions, intermediary intelligentsia must find a way to appeal to and resonate with different audiences at the same time. I will call this capacity to appeal simultaneously to divided audiences *multivocality*²—a term sociologists have used to describe actions or ideas

² This capacity for multiple resonance has also gone by other names, including ‘multivalence’ or ‘polysemy’.

which “can be interpreted coherently from multiple perspectives simultaneously ... can be moves in many games at once” (Padgett and Ansell 1993, 1263). Multivocality is thus the capacity to produce *unified* forms of presentation which can achieve different, yet desirable, interpretations by diverse audiences. These multivocal forms of presentation resonate with the different logics, understandings, and interests of these audiences in different ways and thus appeal to each audience in their own framework.

The proto-nationalist intelligentsia in South Africa developed a number of multivocal political forms. In what follows I focus on one exemplar which defined this movement: the concept of the African nation. The idea of the political unit demarcated by ‘the nation’, and the vision of where this ‘national’ project would lead was understood very differently by colonial interlocutors, rural Xhosa communities, and missionary educated Africans. Yet the concept of nationhood resonated with all audiences in a way that was motivating, allowing each group to buy into the ‘nationalist’ project. This multivocality allowed these diverse audiences to all support the proto-nationalist political movement in its nascent moment. This was just one of many multivocal political forms which were developed by the proto-nationalist movement, and I point to other political institutions and forms of communication which were multivocal as well. This need for multivocal political forms was a constraint which shaped the conceptual and political forms taken by the nascent African nationalism, but it also generated novel ideas and institutional practices which facilitated the political innovation seen in African nationalism.

Xhosa intermediary intellectuals in the rise of nationalist politics

I now turn to a detailed analysis of the Xhosa intermediary intelligentsia who founded the nascent African nationalism movement in South Africa. I begin by following the social

transformations which led to the emergence of Xhosa intermediary intellectuals who bridged between colonial and Xhosa societies. I then follow how this intellectual class was able to build a new political movement by combining political resources from both communities, exemplified in the wave of African voter registration seen in the 1880s. Finally, I examine how multivocal political forms enabled this bridging political work through an examination of how two leading members of the African intelligentsia used the concept of the African nation when addressing three different political audiences.

The rise of Xhosa intermediaries and the creation of a dual cultural mastery

Xhosa intermediaries emerged as a stratum from the sweeping changes ushered in by colonial conquest. Dutch occupation (1652-1803) began in Cape Town, upending and destroying the region's large San and Khoi political communities as it expanded in the 16th Century. By the 1770s settlers confronted the Xhosa people, a settled mixed farming people group of approximately 100,000 people (L. M. Thompson 2014). This began a long history of both conflict and interconnection between the Xhosa and colonists at least 40 years before other African states experienced equivalent colonial incursion. The Xhosa fought colonial expansion, waging nine wars between 1779 and 1879 against Dutch settlers, and then the British Empire (1803-1879), the longest running military action in African colonial history (Peires 1977; 1979). Over these 100 years, the colonial state progressively annexed lands, dethroned chiefs and kings and set up their own governance through magistrates and military outposts. Yet alongside repeated wars, there emerged new lines of social, economic, and political interactions. From these interstitial spaces of interconnection arose a new political movement which created the

earliest frameworks and political organizations of the African nationalist movement in South Africa.

Xhosa intermediaries and missionary education

Of the many new lines of interconnection between Xhosa and colonial society, missionary work was one of the earliest and most sustained vehicles of cultural and social interconnection.

Beginning in 1799, missionaries traveled beyond the boundaries of colonial control into Xhosa communities seeking to impart a European Christian worldview. Yet to convert the Xhosa they needed to reach them across a cultural gulf. This created the tension which shaped the first generation of Xhosa intermediaries.

With the aim of converting Africans to Christianity, missionaries invested in the interlocking areas of religion and education. In their churches and schools, African converts were taught new ways of thinking and new forms of practice which inculcated them into the values and social norms of European Christianity (J. Comaroff and Comaroff 1991; J. L. Comaroff and Comaroff 1997). These mission stations grew, very slowly at first while the Xhosa social and political structure remained intact, and more quickly as war, displacement, and famine dislocated Xhosa from existing social structures (Vernal 2012, 16–21). The African communities which developed around these stations were trained in Christian beliefs, European social practices, and literacy in both English and Xhosa so as to have access to the word of God in their own language. Xhosa Christians were called *Abantu Basesikolweni* ('school people'), or called *Amaqoboka* (those who have a hole or those who have opened a hole in the society) by their detractors. Those who rejected Christianity were called the *Abantu Ababomvu* ('red people') named for the Xhosa traditional practice of covering the body with red ochre clay, a practice which became

metonymic for all Xhosa traditionalism (Vernal 2012, 66). Missionary work thus succeeded in transforming practices and beliefs to such an extent that Christians and non-Christians formed distinct communities and social categories.

Yet as much as missionaries were conduits of the values, mindset, and social practices of a European worldview to their converts, they also needed to translate Christianity into Xhosa to make it appealing and accessible to potential converts. This is where the knowledge work of the earliest Xhosa intermediaries became a vital necessity to the missionaries. In the task of representing African society to missionaries, early converts recorded oral histories and helped missionaries navigate Xhosa political institutions to which the missionaries were subject, out beyond colonial authority (Levine 2010; Gqoba 2015; Wauchope 2008). Equally these intermediaries allowed missionary and colonial knowledge to flow to the Xhosa. Early converts helped with developing the written Xhosa language, with translating the Bible, and with the printing of the first written materials in *isiXhosa* (Hodgson 1986). As more converts were trained up in missionary institutions, they became teachers, preachers, and missionaries themselves. They allowed Christianity to ‘speak Xhosa’, developing a framework and idiom of this European knowledge which was sensible to the Xhosa people.

The class of Xhosa intermediary intelligentsia emerged from this social context, navigating between colonial and Xhosa knowledge. The most promising students of missionary primary education were ushered into missionary run elite higher education institutions. These prestigious centers of missionary education gave the early generations of Xhosa students a classical

humanistic education fit for European elites³. Here Xhosa students learned Latin, Greek, mathematics and geography, as well as English, Xhosa and Theology (Khabela in Davis 2012) following the same model of the theological curriculum given to aspiring preachers in England (Stewart 1884, 17–18). Schools such as Lovedale founded by the Presbyterians in 1824, Healdtown founded by the Methodists in 1853, and Zonnebloem founded by the Anglicans in 1857 (Hodgson and Edlmann 2018), trained up the first generations of intellectuals who took up professions as preachers, teachers, missionaries, journalists, printers, law agents, and magistrates' clerks (Nyamende 2000, 58).

This new generation of students stood in a historically new social position between Xhosa and colonial society. They had been handpicked and groomed by missionaries, intensively educated and selectively promoted at each step, raised to believe in the supreme virtue of Victorian English society, and taught that they were socially and morally elite by the standards of that society. Yet, in this colonial world, they confronted constant racism which frustrated their advancement. They had to constantly strive to be seen as more than their skin color, as they sought recognition from their colonial interlocutors as Victorian gentlemen. On the other hand, their professional life drew them deeply back into the Xhosa communities from which they came. Most acutely for the teachers and pastors who made up the bulk of the early proto-nationalist leaders, their intellectual roles entailed serving as leading figures in Xhosa communities where they had to meet the social standards of their fellow Xhosa. Here they had to

³ From the 1880s the model shifted from training a small elite to the highest intellectual standards to training a larger number of students to take up handiwork professions (Stewart 1884).

defend their legitimacy as true Xhosa and find a language of self-presentation which resonated with these Xhosa audiences even as they taught European ideas.

In each world their position as intellectuals required the ability to masterfully perform the cultural understandings and social mores of their audience, yet it also demanded the ability to have knowledge of their audiences' 'other', and to translate that otherness into something sensible and accessible. In this way, these Xhosa intermediaries, by virtue of their education, their social experiences, their professions, and social roles, needed and developed a dual mastery of colonial and Xhosa culture⁴ (see Fig 2.1).




Figure 2.1: Xhosa Intelligentsia and their political audiences

⁴ This analysis draws on biographies of leaders, both present day (Ofosu-Appiah 1977), and written by contemporaries (Mqhayi 2009) as well as archival research and primary texts (Gqoba 2015; Wauchope 2008; Mqhayi 2009; Soga 1983). This is supplemented with evidence from secondary sources (Williams 1978; 1983; Attwell 2005a; Wenzel 2009; Levine 2010; Mangcu 2014, chap. 2; Odendaal 2013; Masilela 2013a; 2014).

From intellectuals to intelligentsia: Bridging multiple communities in the emerging proto-nationalist movement

From the Xhosa intermediary stratum emerged not just intellectuals, but a politically engaged intelligentsia, rethinking and redefining political understanding and action, and laying the foundation of the growing African nationalist movement. The first arguments for African nationalism and Pan-Africanism are seen in print from the 1860s (Williams 1983) and these political frameworks were developed through the 1870s, spreading through discursive communities forming around missionary centers and connected through the first African language newspapers (Odendaal 2013, chaps. 3–4). From the 1880s, new forms of political organization began to emerge, mobilizing around various interests including those of African teachers, groups resisting rural land disposition, and groups uniting rural communities into self-help organizations (Odendaal 2013, chaps. 6–14).

The emergences of this political movement contradicts our common sociological understandings of social movement success which has been shown to depend on access to resources (McCarthy and Zald 1977), weakened or fragmented political elites which create new political opportunity (McAdam 1982), and preexisting organizational development (Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982). The Christian Xhosa community was few in numbers, low in resources, and peripheral to the two centers of political power – the colonial government and the Xhosa political structure centering on the chiefs.

Instead, the capacity for political success in the rise of African nationalism grew out of the ability of intermediary intelligentsia to forge political connections to both Xhosa and colonial communities simultaneously. Successful movements bridging these worlds sprang up across

diverse political domains spearheaded by African intelligentsia. Land struggles, teachers unions, African newspapers, and other prominent domains of new political activity all show a common feature: mobilizing Xhosa Christians was not enough, leaders needed to draw together colonial and traditionalist Xhosa communities with very different political logics and interests to create successful new possibilities.

One of the clearest examples of this linkage is seen in the movement for African voter registration which has been studied in depth by André Odendaal (2013, chap. 10). In the late 1800s, Xhosa proto-nationalist leaders were able to leverage their connections to both the Cape political system and to rural Xhosa communities to disrupt colonial politics and push for African interests to be represented in parliament. In the 1880s, the Cape Colony followed the British model of class limitations: there was no racial limitation on voter registration, but voters had to qualify by holding land or earning above a yearly income threshold. The small Xhosa Christian community contained very limited land holders or high-income earners. Yet opportunity lay in mobilizing Xhosa who lived in rural areas, many of whom were eligible because of their communal land tenure. While Cape elections were completely foreign to these rural Xhosa, intermediary intelligentsia were able to reach out to them and mobilize them to vote in large numbers. As is demonstrated in the voter registers, the Xhosa Christian communities around mission stations and in urban areas made up only a small portion of African voters, and the vast majority were rural farmers who qualified based on their individual or communal land holding⁵. By 1886, African voters made up close to 50% of the registered voters in a number of Eastern

⁵ Western Cape Archives and Records Service, CCP Records. See professions captured in the 1887 registers. The professions and qualifications seen in the voter registration records of 1887 bear testament to this rural basis.

Cape districts (see Odendaal 2013, 96) and had the power to determine the elected parliamentarian. While mobilizing rural Africans was key, equally critical for the success of this form of politics was the ability to connect with colonial political elite. Xhosa leaders negotiated with the Cape Parliament candidates, demanding support for African interests in parliament in exchange for block voting which would ensure a candidate electoral victory.

Mobilizing divided communities: Multivocality in the proto-nationalist movement

Voter mobilization shows how new political possibilities emerged more broadly: Xhosa political leaders could successfully bridge different political communities, thus combining the resources of each into new forms of political power. But to develop a movement which maintained support from such disparate communities, they needed to draw these diverse audiences into a common political project.

This need to simultaneously appeal to multiple audiences is clearly demonstrated in the first recorded announcement of the first Xhosa political organization, Imbumba Yamanyama⁶. This article, published in the newspaper *Isigidimi* in 1882, summarizes the founding meeting (reproduced with translation in Wauchope 2008, item 3.2, 170-175). The article is exemplary because it simultaneously speaks to the interests of multiple political communities. The core framing is one of a pan-racial appeal to form an “Association for the Unity of the Black People of South Africa” (*Yintlanganiso yomanyano lwaba ntsundu base South Africa*) (Wauchope 2008, 171/174). Yet the meetings’ leaders also frame their organization to ensure that it appealed to traditionalist Xhosa, missionaries, and colonial authorities: The piece is filled with Xhosa

⁶ See also analysis of this organization in Chapter 3. For details on this organization see Odendaal 2013, Ch 7.

knowledge and idiom which would resonate with a traditionalist Xhosa audience, it promotes education anchored in a Christian metaphor for the missionaries, and it rejects the militant resistance of the past, promising loyalty to the colonial regime. In short, this founding articulation of Xhosa political organization has something for everyone who matters to this new political paradigm.

This simultaneous appeal demonstrates that multiple political audiences are central to the imagined success of this nascent proto-nationalist movement. Mobilizing these diverse audiences simultaneously is the unique strength of this movement, allowing it political success where so many others failed. But this bridging political work also creates a unique challenge: how is it possible to convincingly mobilize support from communities who held not only different political interests, but fundamentally different *political logics* of understanding that were largely alien to each other?

I argue that these intermediary intelligentsia were able to overcome this challenge by creating multivocal political forms: political ideas and institutions which could ‘speak’ to different logics and interests of their different audiences at the same time, thus allowing each group to find a meaningful resonance with this emerging political movement within their own political logic.

Isizwe/African nationhood as a multivocal political concept

To demonstrate the way this multivocal resonance worked I turn to the concept of African nationhood as one pre-eminent exemplar. As outlined above, the ‘ideological import’ scholarship sees nationalism as growing out of a European political imagination and the ‘indigenous intellectuals’ scholarship sees nationalism growing out of a strengthening attachment to African

identity and knowledge. Seeing African nationalism as a multivocal concept both synthesizes these literatures and identifies a different mechanism that explains why the nation became central to this movement. I argue that the concept of the African nation became a powerful ideological foundation which won out as the defining identity of this movement because it could resonate and mobilize support from both colonial and African communities, whereas other contending identities always alienated one audience and could not generate the same broad support.

To show how nationhood had a multivocal resonance, I now turn to a close textual analysis of *'isizwe'* and *'uhlanga'* in isiXhosa and of 'nation' in English. One part of the challenge of tracing the 'multivocal' power of a concept in this context is the movement across two languages. Two primary terms were used as equivalents of the English term 'nation': Isizwe and Uhlanga. These terms are today translated as nation, but these figures themselves established the equivalence when they use the isiXhosa and themselves translate it to the English 'nation' (c.f. Gqoba 2009 item 8). These two terms draw on different isiXhosa connotations of a political unit. The isiXhosa term, Uhlanga (plural Izintlanga) holds the connotation of a community of people as well as a lineage, as can be seen in the closely related word *ukuhlangana* – to gather together. Missionaries of the time translated *uhlanga* as “nation, tribe, people, generation” (Kropf 1915). The term Isizwe (plural Izizwe) has the connotation of territory and space, as in the related *Ilizwe* meaning country or region. The missionaries of the time translated *isizwe* as “a tribe, clan, nation, people” (Kropf 1915). In addition, I pay close attention to terms such as *abakowethu*, which missionaries translated “people belonging to our family or tribe”(Kropf 1915) and which signaled collective belonging to a larger African community, as well as the collective appeal to racial unity, *abantsundu* (brown people) and *abamnyama* (black people).

To demonstrate how this concept has a different resonance with different communities, I follow the use of these terms in the collected writings of two of the most preeminent Xhosa intellectuals of the early proto-nationalist movement; Isaac William Wauchope, and William Wellington Gqoba. Wauchope, called “the first politically conscious African man of letters [in South Africa]” by Masilela (2013b, 6) was an important political leader and activist in the first Xhosa political organizations: he was a founding member of Imbumba yama Nyama, the first proto-nationalist political organization, a leader of political mobilizing and organizing in the city Port Elisabeth (Odendaal 1993), a long-time ally of the influential John Tengu Jabavu, and one of the candidates put forward when proto-nationalist leaders considered sending an African representative to parliament in the 1880s (Odendaal 2013, 97). Gqoba, called by Masilela “the first important modern African poet [in South Africa] ... [among] the first to grapple with modern literary culture and linguistic matters” (Masilela 2013b, 6) was a leading intellectual of the proto-nationalist community: the editor of *Isigidimi sama-Xosa* from 1884-1888, one of only two Xhosa newspapers which anchored the emerging proto-nationalist community, and an author of many influential texts, histories, and poems. He has historically been lauded more for his pivotal role in establishing Xhosa literature (Jordan 1973; Masilela 2013b, 5) but these writings, published in the *Isigidimi* newspaper, make their central purview questions of African politics, identity, culture, and history. He is thus a pre-eminent intellectual whose oeuvre offers key insight into the debates and logics of the proto-nationalist community.

My analytical strategy is to separate out three audiences, showing how the same concept of ‘Isizwe’ or ‘the nation’ creates different resonance for 1. Colonial communities, 2. Missionary-educated Africans, and 3. Traditionalist Xhosa audiences. This approach best reveals the

multivocal resonance of the appeal to nation – this demonstrates how two leading intelligentsia could use the same anchoring concept to appeal to very different audiences. In doing so, this chapter focuses on the links ‘outward’ – showing how one multivocal idea formed conceptual bridges to multiple communities – and brackets, for now, the links ‘inward’– these being the diachronic and dialectic intersecting of different logics of nationhood which meet to shape a ‘hybrid’ individual or text (contrast with analysis of hybrid work in (Bhabha [1994] 2012; Nandy 1989; Said 1979; [1993] 2012; Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 2003).

Progressive nationhood and the colonial audience

When appealing to a colonial audience, intermediary intelligentsia invoke the idea of the nation as a vision of ‘progress’. The idea of the future of the ‘Xhosa nation’ offers a transformation of both the logic of the civilizing mission, and the ‘Xhosa tribe’, a narrative that speaks to missionary goals while at the same time imagining political authority for ‘modernizing’ Xhosa leaders, who will be the legitimate guides of this new modern nation.

In the elite missionary schools, African students were trained to replicate the ‘civilizing’ goal of their missionary teachers. These students were surrounded by a European-supremacist logic which saw African civilization as without merit and saw missionaries mercifully bringing ‘civilization’ to ‘savages’. In this context, the promise to young African Christians trained at the elite schools was that their work as teachers, preachers, and missionaries might bring salvation and civilization to their own people. A speech by John Buchanan to the Lovedale Literary Society reveals how ‘the white man’s burden’ was placed on the shoulders of these African students:

Every observing mind sees that the very existence of our Native races is at stake. The eyes of the civilized are on these colonies, and the question is being discussed on every side: ‘Are these South African races destined like most, if not all, other aboriginal races, to melt away and disappear before the white man?’ Now the answer will depend almost entirely upon the many natives now receiving a Christian education ... [The African students he addresses should thus say to themselves:] I may, through God’s blessing, yet do something considerable towards saving my nation from extinction, and towards turning the tide of their history into a channel of true and permanent prosperity: *I* may do it, and *all* my fellows *here* may do it: or we may by our slothfulness and selfishness hasten on the day of our country’s ruin (1877, 22, 27 in Nyamende 2000, 56–57)

This missionary vision here is one of existential threat and at the same time of heroic agency. Missionaries dismissed African societies and imagined them passing away, and themselves worked to usher in a ‘modern’ future. But they also offered their African students an empowering historical calling to agency: these students might be the saviors of their ‘nation’, and through their work might bring Africa into its new modernity.

When Xhosa proto-nationalist leaders addressed their colonial and missionary audiences, they employed this same ‘civilizing’ logic, but they transformed it by emphasizing the promise of the nation to come. As they appealed to missionaries and colonists, proto-nationalist intellectuals envisioned a transformation from a backward Xhosa past into an independent nation-in-development, using the idea of the Xhosa nation as a conceptual tool to turn the civilizing logic into a patriotic vision. As they appealed to the need to develop or advance the Xhosa nation, they used the missionary logic which imagined progress through education and Christianity. Yet both ideologies asserted the authority of Xhosa Christian leaders and imagined at least a conceptual political authority for the Xhosa nation in the process. The active agents of transformation then

became these figures, the Christian Xhosa working for their ‘own’ people, aided by missionaries. Further, as they claimed nationhood, they transitioned the political status of the Xhosa from ‘tribes’ under colonial authority to ‘nations in development’ who would assumably be entitled to the political rights of European nations. Xhosa intelligentsia could assert themselves as the legitimate builders and leaders of this new nation, and in this role they were able to call forth the idea of a future Xhosa nation which would claim the same political independence and authority enjoyed by European nations.

I illustrate this line of argument with two examples; Gqoba’s paper “The Native Tribes, their laws, customs and beliefs” presented in 1885 to the Lovedale Literary Society (Gqoba 2015, 210–31) and Wauchope’s article “The Christianization of Natives” published in the missionary newspaper *The Christian Express* also in 1885 (Wauchope 2008, 14–22). By the time of their writing, both authors had already taken up far more ‘anti-colonial’ political positions than colonial narratives in the isiXhosa newspapers; this was in line with an emerging assertive proto-nationalist rhetoric. Yet here, both pieces are directed to a missionary and ‘sympathetic’ colonial audience in English, and appeal to a logic of backward traditions which must be transformed and brought into modernity. These articles thus reveal how the notion of ‘nation’ can be used to strategically appeal to colonial political thought.

Gqoba’s piece engages three central topics: the genealogy of the kings and chiefs of different African groups; the system of laws among ‘native tribes’; and the customs and beliefs of Africans. Gqoba pridefully educates his audience about the lineage of kings, chiefs and political groups and asserts the justice of precolonial law in governing both subjects and rulers. Yet he offers a skeptical and even disdainful picture of the customs and beliefs he recounts, using ‘they’

and ‘them’ to distinguish himself from ‘those Natives’. However, this othering pronoun ‘they’ of the past shifts to an inclusive ‘our’ as he imagines the future towards the end of the piece. He praises the missionaries for their labors, as those who endure hardship for “our sake, and our physical and spiritual welfare”(Gqoba 2015, 228). Even greater praise is given to Africans working for the gospel, and it is here that the logic of nation supersedes the previous rhetoric of tribe. These Africans are “true patriots” and “*Tand’ uhlanga*” (lovers of the nation) (ibid) because of their patriotic work on behalf of “our benighted countrymen” (2015, 229). Thus, Gqoba transforms the alienating tension created by negatively viewed past practices into a call to Africans to work for the progress of their nation and calls for Africans to commit themselves to their countrymen. The distancing power of missionary condemnation is resolved through a vision of progress of the nation from heathenism to enlightened Christianity.

Wauchope’s piece follows a similar argument. He recounts the ‘progress of Christianity among the natives’ (Wauchope 2008, 14–22). Wauchope is even more negative than Gqoba in his assessment of Xhosa life when the missionaries arrived: the “already corrupt morals of the Kaffirs [Xhosa] ⁷” were being made even worse by “degrading practices and heathenish rites” introduced by King Ngqika (Wauchope 2008, 16), and Xhosa were “a people deeply sunk in barbarism and superstition” (ibid, 18). These are seen as “national indecencies”, and Wauchope

⁷ This term ‘Kaffir’ is today a racial slur of the highest order. From here on out I mark this term with the term [Xhosa] instead. Yet, it is important to note that the weighty racist connotations the term carries today were not present at the time. The term was used widely by colonial audiences (see also Tiyo Soga’s use in Chapter 1), and it was not intended with the derogatory implications any use today would hold. Instead, the term was the English name for a people group whose boundaries were either the isiXhosa speaking communities of the eastern Cape region, or more broadly, the Nguni language people group who extended up the East Coast of Southern Africa. Nonetheless, this was a colonial term which isiXhosa speaking people never used when writing in isiXhosa. The use by colonial audiences and by isiXhosa speakers engaging these audiences thus held the disrespect of not using isiXhosa speaking peoples’ own emic terms for their communities, but the term did not hold the vitriolic racist connotations which exist today as a legacy of its increasingly racist deployment through colonialism and apartheid.

asserts a '[Xhosa]' nation, albeit one that is morally corrupt. Christianity enters into this corrupt nation, brought by missionaries but ordained by God. The coming of the Gospel was "welcomed by the [Xhosa] as a nation" (ibid, 16), and Wauchope sees Christianity bringing a great social transformation. Wauchope also uses 'they' in accounting for Xhosa people who partake in heathen practices, or those who are "half-heathen and half-Christian, half-civilized and half-barbarous". However, his ultimate vision is for the advancement of the nation. Christianity, he argues, is "the backbone of England's prosperity" and advanced England beyond the practices of great ancient societies such as Babylon, Rome, and Athens (ibid, 20-1). The implication is that, through embracing Christianity, the Xhosa nation will also rise to its own greatness.

Thus, both authors echo the missionary logic of Xhosa backwardness, or even moral corruption, to their missionary and colonial audiences. The nation, however, serves as a tool to bridge the distance between these negatively regarded practices and the desire to positively associate with Xhosa people. Both authors position themselves and other mission-educated Xhosa as builders of a Xhosa nation in order to place themselves in this vision of progress, working for the betterment of 'our nation'. In doing so they speak to their colonial audience in its own logic, building on the vision of the civilizing mission as they highlight the need for African development. Yet the vision of *national* progress allows them to pridefully work towards the advancement of 'their' nation and to recruit missionary and colonial support for this nation-building project. Taking up the identity of 'modernizing leaders' of the Xhosa nation positions them as allies to the missionary task of civilizing 'benighted' African societies, yet it also allows them to claim material support for this project from the missionaries and the colonial state, in addition to positioning them as legitimate and capable leaders of the new nation. Furthermore, the imagined

future nation also allows African intellectuals to subtly invoke political rights of the European conception of nationhood, envisioning a future where African nation states have their own authority and independence. This becomes explicit in Wauchope's piece, where he subtly twists Christianity into a call for independence: if it is true that it is Christianity, and not force, which is responsible for England's greatness, then once a 'native' [African] nation embraces Christianity they will be able to be freed from subservience and become independent, yet under the authority of England (ibid, 22). Wauchope closes his article with praise for all that missionaries have done for him, but his final words cap this praise with an undertone of this vision of independence: "Remember that we need your sympathy and support, for, *as yet*, we cannot get on without you." [My emphasis] (ibid, 22)

Chatterjee writes that colonial nationalism is deeply contradictory, it imitates the colonial model while also seeking to reject it. There is the "rejection of the alien intruder who is nevertheless to be imitated and surpassed by his own standards, and the rejection of ancestral ways which are seen as obstacles to progress and yet also cherished as marks of identity" (1986, 2). This characterization of the narrative is apt in accounting for the way the logic of the nation was used when addressing colonial audiences. Yet the appeal to a European vision of the 'nation' was one that held sway only when addressing a European audience. The language of the nation had a logic and a resonance for European audiences which give Xhosa intellectuals some room to maneuver. They could not break colonial audiences out of their visions of pre-colonial backwardness, but by calling for a future developed Xhosa nation they could transition the project of civilizing into a patriotic national development which they legitimately led, while at the same time invoking a future independence for this Xhosa nation.

Unifying nationhood and the mission educated community

A second key audience for intermediary intelligentsia was the community of mission-educated and literate Africans, which had steadily grown in size with the expansion of mission work. By the 1870s and 1880s, this community had begun to assert its own political interests. Debates in the isiXhosa newspapers of the time⁸ show this community focused its growing political lens on issues of inequality, the administration of Africans, and the moral and social value of western versus traditional practices.

While there was growing political attention given to shared legal and social discrimination based on race, an important political challenge was the internal ‘ethnic’⁹ divisions of the missionary-educated community. While the majority of this community were isiXhosa speaking, identity divisions still threatened to fragment the community– these fissures had been created by both pre-colonial political structures such as kingdoms and clans, and from political oppositions created during colonial expansion. One dominant source of tension was the divide was between the Mfengu and the Xhosa people. The Mfengu were a group of people displaced during the Mfecane, a period of societal dislocation created by the expansion of the Zulu empire. They had at first been integrated into Xhosa society, but had joined with colonial forces early during the colonial process; they fought in wars against the Xhosa until 1879, and received land and support from the colonial regime as a collective community. This history left enduring tensions between

⁸ *Isigidimi sama-Xosa* (The Xhosa messenger) (published 1870-1888) and *Imvo zabantsundu* (Native/Black opinion) (published 1884 -).

⁹ In this context ‘ethnic’ identity is less based on a notion of biological relations and more based on political units centering on pre-colonial political divides anchored by ‘royal lineage’. These political units were organized under kings or paramount chiefs who traced their ruling lineage back to a founding leader. The political community assumed the membership in this royal lineage. Thus Xhosa people were those belonging to communities led by ‘Xhosa’ Chiefs who all traced their lineage to Tshawe (the royal clan) and to the possibly fictional founder named Xhosa (Peires 1982).

the Xhosa and Mfengu and threatened to divide the missionary-educated community. In addition, a smaller number of Africans from ethnic groups across Southern Africa had come to train at elite missionary schools and made up an important minority. Thus, for this community made up of Xhosa, Mfengu, Thembu, Sotho, Zulu, Tswana and many other kingdom- and clan-based identities, emphasizing a purely Xhosa nationhood was divisive.

In response to these challenges, race offered a unifying identity. Here, when oriented towards missionary-educated groups, identification with African nationhood (*Isizwe* and *Uhlanga*) draws on skin color markers: black (*-mnyama*) or brown (*-ntsundu*) people marked in opposition to white (*-mhlophe*) people, and limits the use of ‘ethnic’ nationalism based on precolonial political divides or colonial notions of ‘tribe’. Leaders identify themselves and their audience as members of the ‘black nations’ (*zintlanga zabamnyama*), who’s plural incorporates different ‘ethnic nations’ unified on race, or even assumes the singular ‘black nation’ (*uhlanga olumnyama/oluntsundu*)¹⁰.

Gqoba’s great debate on education, written in 1885, expresses the spirit of the debates of the larger missionary-educated community and offers a clear example the use of nation concept when engaging the interests of the mission-educated community. The piece is a serialized article and is stylized as a parable in poetic form.¹¹ The style uses a ‘debate’ format, with different archetypal characters¹² taking opposing positions on the key issues of the time.

¹⁰ For examples See Gqoba 2015, p.96/97, 102/103, 128/129, 132/133, 188/189 (isiXhosa/English).

¹¹ It thus combines Western allegorical form found in canonical pieces such as *The Pilgrim’s Progress* (Bunyan 1856) (Translated to isiXhosa by Tiyo Soga (Soga 1866)), and Xhosa praise poem form.

¹² As in *The Pilgrim’s Progress* (Bunyan 1856) (Translated to isiXhosa by Tiyo Soga (Soga 1866)).

Using this debate format, Gqoba is able to voice opposing political positions in the same piece by having different fictive characters argue for contrasting claims. This allows Gqoba to give voice to political positions which might otherwise have been censored by the missionary newspaper, and thus enables him to present an analysis of social and political change under colonialism from the perspective of both African supporters and detractors.

On one side of the debate, Gqoba's characters praise the advantages of education, Christianity and the missionaries for the advancement of Africans and denounce as ungrateful those who oppose missionaries:

We were dead in our ignorance/ Until the missionaries came/ I've called to mind that time/ Of darkness at its deepest/ When [the missionaries came]/ They came in prevailing darkness/ Everything enveloped in gloom. ...” [The missionaries were motivated by love to leave their homes and bring advancement to the chiefs of the past. Now today Africans are ungrateful:] “Those chaps in present days/ travel in horse-drawn carts/ that are flashy and flamboyant,/ they keep their cash in the bank,/ a source of pride to them;/ despite the fact that they're black/ they're now the owners of farms:/ they till the land with ploughs,/ no longer made from sneezewood;/ and women have legal status/ with the advent of the light./ On the seats of the well-to-do/ sit these elevated toffs,/ prattling away in their chatter,/ devoid of any gratitude ... their goal is independence,/ they're ever ready with pretexts. (Gqoba 2015, 104–17) [Italicized to mark that original text is in isiXhosa]

These characters echo the 'national advancement' narrative seen above. This orientation praises the cultural, technological, and economic 'advancements' which missionaries and education has brought, contrasting the 'light' brought by the missionaries with the 'darkness' of a backward

African past. This position, put into the mouth of fictive characters, cherishes ‘advancement’ of African peoples, yet rejects the clamoring for independence which is that of the ‘ungrateful’.

Yet in opposing fictive voices, Gqoba expresses a position which is profoundly critical of colonial conquest, emphasizing how it destroyed the existing social and economic basis of African lives, and how the present regime continues to hurt black people through discriminatory laws:

The truth is this, they snatched this land/ when by rights it belongs to us;/ we have been turned into strangers,/ requiring a pass to travel:/ it's a dazzling magic trick,/ a meticulous white campaign./ With the education that we've had/ we see them go about their business:/ discrimination's sleeping,/ the long-lasting hostility/ between the black man and the white... The whites from overseas/ talk of this black nation/ in terms such as these:/ "Languages like Latin, Hebrew,/ as well as Greek,/ are unsuited to black people"/ Prejudice propels them. ... What's the point of education?/ Why should we feel any gratitude?/ When were we ever offered any help?/ What exactly are you doing?/ Why do you point your fingers/ at this nation of black people? (Gqoba 2015, 126–33)
[Italicized to mark that original text is in isiXhosa]

Here Gqoba's character shows how the intimate experience that missionary educated Africans had with the missionary and colonial community shape their shared racial political identity:

Through their education they have seen and experienced discrimination and prejudice based on their blackness. This shared experience of racial discrimination defines their commonality rather than another identity category.

The opposing characters in Gqoba's poem thus embodies the debates of the day. The poem gives full assertive voice to strongly contrasting views in the missionary-educated community as they

debated a wide range of issues of colonial society¹³, even to the extent that they berate each other. In spite of divided positions on how to address the challenges of rapidly transformed society under colonialism, the framework of this contestation is built on a reiterated common unity: a shared community searching for the best practices to support their own interests and wellbeing. Throughout the piece the idea of *Isizwe* and *Uhlanga* ('the nation') is repeatedly used as the basis for this common community which has emerged from a history of conquest, discrimination, prejudice, and 'enlightenment'. Instead of an 'ethnic' nationhood (such as *Isizwe samaXhosa*, *Isizwe samaMfengu* or *Isizwe sabaThembu*) which would divide the community, it is the racial nation which unites all participants: the unity the 'black nations' or the 'black nation'. The sense of relief from estrangement, of a 'feeling at home', and of a positive affirmation of their own identity is affirmed as a sense of belonging anchored to a shared 'black nation'; it is now a positive identity instead of being a negation of whiteness, a notion furthered by white missionaries who they confront.

In this framework it is not the European logic of nation state, nor in the framework of a pre-colonial royal lineage which defines a shared 'national' commonality. Instead, the appeal to black nations both marks the common experience of being identified and treated as 'black' in colonial spaces and serves as a way to unite an ethnically diverse community of mission-educated Africans. Through their missionary education they have faced a 'trans-ethnic' experience – they are at once educated in the 'light of the gospel' while also being separated from the 'white' community by repeated experiences of discrimination. This identification with the

¹³ Debates include the nature of pre-colonial government; transformations through war, education, and changing economies; relations between missionaries, the colonial government, the Afrikaaner states, and African chiefs in the process of colonial expansion; black wages; pass laws; black voter rights and discrimination; strategies of political alliance, and more.

black nation(s) allows the community to smooth over potential internal divisions and focus political attention on the nature and practices of missionaries and the colonial regime of governance—challenging the colonial state’s ever-expanding racist laws and administration.

Historical nationhood and the traditional audience

Finally, the language of national identity was also used increasingly as a platform to connect to African chiefs and kings as well as to draw in rural and non-Christian communities. The engagement between intermediary intelligentsia and more traditionalist African communities was largely carried on outside the newspaper sphere. Yet there is a clear trace left in the newspapers as the proto-nationalist movement grew increasingly connected to rural sources of political power. While there was a clear distinction between the missionary-educated *Abantu Basesikolweni* (‘school people’) and the traditionalist *Abantu Ababomvu* (‘red people’), as discussed above, two sources drove the increasing interconnection between intermediary intelligentsia and more rural ‘red’ communities. First, in their missionary work, visits to royal chiefs’ courts, preaching, travel to rural communities, and teaching, intermediary intelligentsia had for a long time shared a world with traditionalist Xhosa. The frequency of this interaction grew as more missionary-educated Africans completed their training and took up professions as knowledge mediators in the roles of teachers, ministers, missionaries, and interpreters. Secondly, interconnections in the domain of politics grew as many new proto-nationalist political organizations emerged and grew through the 1880s. As Odendaal (2013) has shown, while early political organizations were made up largely of missionary school graduates throughout the 1880s new organizations emerged which linked these ‘school’ leaders to local political movements made up largely of rural communities mobilizing around voter registration, land

rights, and mutual aid organizations. Thus, through both expanding professions of intermediary knowledge work, and through growing political mobilization, intermediary intelligentsia developed significant connections to non-missionary educated and non-Christian communities.

The growing need to appeal to and mobilize the traditionalist Xhosa community left its traces in the newspaper forum, as concerns relevant to the traditional sphere were discussed in the newspapers, and this public narrative shaped the use of *Isizwe* and *Uhlanga* (nation) at the time. A range of articles appealed to the traditional audience, drawing on Xhosa narrative style and oral tradition; writers borrowed from oral forms and used concepts familiar to the traditional sphere. There was also a more explicit engagement with producing traditional knowledge and African history. In this context, *Isizwe* (the nation) was addressed to the traditional sphere in opposition to the orientation towards the colonial sphere: practices of the past and Xhosa literary style were celebrated and central to the invocation of this vision of the nation. Invocations of nationhood reached explicitly to precolonial political units, *Izizwe* (pl.), as the units of belonging, and authors praised the institution and practices of these political units.

I outline two examples which illustrate how the concept of *Isizwe* was used and developed in dialogue with this traditional sphere: The emphasis on chiefs and royal lineages as the representation of *Isizwe* (the nation), and the work of educating the missionary-educated community in the ways of Xhosa ‘tradition’.

Chiefs as the symbol of the nation

The metonymic use of the chief as a figure who stands for the nation, which harkened especially to the kings or leading chiefs of previous generations, is one clear articulation of this

conscription of a communal traditional national identity. Here appeals were made to a shared nationhood rooted in the past political identity, styled as kinship. For example, in a debate about the negative effects of Liquor (Gqoba 2015, 50-53), Gqoba undertakes an analysis of the effects of African beer versus colonial hard liquor by invoking a historical vision of pre-colonial *Izizwe* (nations) represented by chiefs and royal lineages. Colonial liquor, he argues, has been destroying whole nations (*kutshabalala izizwe*) (ibid, 52). These nations are defined by their historical royal lines: the Thembu community are marked as “Tato’s territory” (*kwelakwa Tato*), a reference to a historical Thembu king. Similarly, the Xhosa are those of the land of Phalo (*kwa Palo*), who was a founding king of the Xhosa. The Thembu, Xhosa, Mfengu, Khoi, and Mphondo groups are all seen as different *Izizwe* (nations) in the article and are often metonymically marked as a community by royal lineage traced back to pre-colonial kingship.

The importance of chiefs is not only an indication of the centrality of a shared past. Wauchope collects Xhosa praise poems (*izibongo*), an Nguni oral form that both honors and/or critiques the life of a subject, especially royal figures, and is used to recount lineages. He not only gathers together the already existing praise poems of different chiefs, but he offers new praise poems for chiefs of his present day, thus taking up the traditional role of the *imbongi*, an honored role the function of which is social praise and critique in Xhosa society (Wauchope 2008, 112-119).

Elsewhere he mobilizes for imprisoned Xhosa chiefs to be released by encouraging the Xhosa people as a nation to fight for their chiefs. He exhorts his audience: “Oh, we are a nation, my country men!” (*Siluhlanga nto zakowetu, au!*) (Wauchope 2008, 165/168), and, invoking their fathers and grandfathers of the past he calls on the “men of the nation” (*madoda ohlanga*) (ibid, 164/167) to “fight with the pen” (*Yilwani ngo siba*) (ibid, 165/168), replicating African military

resistance of the past, no longer armed with guns but with signed petitions for the release of chiefs. Here the Xhosa national identity and pre-colonial military resistance is the model for political action to defend the wellbeing of the then present-day chiefs.

Educating the educated in the ways of tradition

Both Gqoba and Wauchope also turned increasingly to recording and commenting on Xhosa history and proverbs in newspaper articles from the late 1880s onwards. Gqoba published extended works on Xhosa history, and then on the history of other groups of the region in 1887 (Gqoba 2015, item 16 & 17, 264-346), and in the same year collected and explained Xhosa proverbs (ibid, item 18). Wauchope published 14 articles on Xhosa proverbs between 1899 and 1891. He argued that these proverbs show “the ethical aspects of native life”, and that they would serve well as moral education for Xhosa students, offering familiar “national mottos”, which would also show them that the Xhosa tradition has a set of moral standards comparable to that of “civilized” colonial society (Wauchope 2008, item 4.5, 291). The bout of publications of histories, royal lineages and Xhosa proverbs may, in part, have been a response to the growing need for educated Africans to engage with traditionalists (‘red people’) and to demonstrate their ‘true Xhosa-ness’ in the context of widening social and political connections. These works both highlight the growing sense that Xhosa and African knowledge and history should be remembered and preserved for future generations, and may also show that the missionary-educated African community were increasingly seeking the knowledge that would allow them to appear as ‘true Xhosa’ (or African) knowledge experts, as they engaged increasingly with chiefs, kings and rural constituents in shared political projects.

In summary, the concept of the nation oriented towards the traditional sphere is one that turned to focus on precolonial political *Izizwe* communities, promoting especially a Xhosa nationalism which defined the unit of identity as all Xhosa people, and which celebrated chiefs and the knowledge and practices of the past as markers of national identity.

Contrasting the nation with divisive collective identities

The centrality of the appeal to the *Isizwe/Uhlanga*/African nationhood did not simply emerge without contenders. Various other identities were used in appeals made by the Xhosa intelligentsia studied here. The challenge is that all of these other identities created an opposition between Xhosa and colonial interlocutors. One set of identities united the missionary-educated African community with the colonial order but did so by distinguishing them from traditionalist Xhosa. Xhosa intermediaries appealed to a Christian identity opposed to heathens, the educated as opposed to the uneducated, those who were civilized opposed to those who were backward. All these identities sought to identify the missionary-educated community with the colonial order and advocated for their equal treatment with other colonists. Yet these identities excluded the traditionalist Xhosa audience. Alternatively, the intelligentsia appealed to several identities which aligned missionary-educated Africans with the traditionalist Xhosa community. Here they emphasized Xhosa or African culture and history as opposed to European culture and history, they appealed to those who were local or native opposed to those who were foreign, they highlighted the oppression of those who were subjugated to colonial law opposed to the rulers and governors, and they distinguished black from white. These identities could unite missionary-educated Africans with traditionalist Xhosa, and indeed with other Africans from different ethnic groups, in a common identity against the colonists. These various pro-colonist or pro-Africanist

identity claims appear in the writings of Wauchope (2008), and Gqoba (2015) as well as others (cf. Soga 1983; Mqhayi 2009). Yet these identities did not become the dominant identity in the proto-nationalist movement. Each of these oppositions rather allowed the intermediary community to define a common political group with one of their interlocutors by distinguishing themselves from an enemy or other group. Yet none of these identities could simultaneously appeal to both the Xhosa and colonial community.

Nationhood, multivocality, and the foundation of a political platform

Instead, it is the multivocal capacity of the concept *Isizwe* or nation which allowed it to take pre-eminence over other available identity concepts. This analysis has shown that proto-nationalist leaders addressed diverse audiences and appealed to each audience in their own conceptual framework. Yet across these diverse appeals, the idea of *Isizwe*/nationhood is a conceptual framework which appears applicable to all. In the missionary and colonial sphere, it is a progressive vision of ‘national’ advancement through Christianity and selective appropriation of western ideas and practices. In the missionary-educated African sphere it is a term which was able to unite a diverse group of Africans from different ‘ethnic’ or political groups into one body by emphasizing a shared experience of racial identification and discrimination. In the traditional sphere, it is the inverse of its usage in the colonial sphere; it was a concept which validated the need to conserve tradition and uphold the authority of precolonial institutions and leadership roles.

The process of building a ‘multivocal’ common ground thus begins as ‘polyvocality’—speaking in different voices to different audiences. In this polyvocal mode, proto-nationalist intellectuals asserted their legitimacy as leaders to each different group. Yet across these different appeals, the

concept of *isizwe*/nation offered a common core and a pivot to unite different audiences. The multivocal resonance of the idea of the African nation was thus a useful political tool as intermediary intelligentsia navigated their different audiences. It allowed them to promote the political project of the African nation from a public platform without alienating their audiences, simultaneously calling forth different associations and implications among their different constituents.

The various different ‘shades’ of *Isizwe*, *Uhlanga*, and nation seen in the analysis above show that the logic of nationhood in the nascent proto-nationalist movement is neither purely a European import, nor is it just a development of African intellectual traditions. Those who have focused on writings directed to Europeans have seen the European logics emphasized and those who have focused on writings to Africans have seen the African logics emphasized. Yet the success of this unifying identity was that it appealed to different audiences each in their own logics.

It is from this multivocal foundation that hybrid innovation is possible: in the coming generations of African nationalism, the concept of the nationhood was to become enriched and transformed as it drew together elements from these different conceptual frameworks. As leaders moved across these logics they increasingly could experimentally and pragmatically draw on and blend ideas together into a new understanding of the claim to African nationhood. From the basis of resonance shown in this analysis, national identity still grows to cover new ground, and different audiences learn to relate to it and identify themselves with it in new ways. The original multivocal resonance prepares the way for the enriching and expanding of the nation concept in a way that not only resonates with existing logics, but creates the capacity for new fictive kinship.

This growth and expansion of ‘national’ identification is beyond the scope of this dissertation, yet it is an innovative transformation of identity which is grounded in the multivocal resonance which *Isizwe*, *Uhlanga*, and nation still has across multiple audiences.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that to understand the processes which shaped the formation of the early African nationalist political framework in South Africa, we must understand the relational position of proto-nationalist leaders and intellectuals. These figures were able to develop a new political movement because they successfully connected to both colonial and African political communities, mobilizing their political resources and tools to create new opportunities to engage the colonial state. The capacity to forge this new movement emerged from their position as ‘intermediary intelligentsia’. As intermediaries, they stood in a bridging role, connecting colonial and African societies. As intelligentsia, they forged new political knowledge which grounded a new framework of political identity and claim making.

I argue that to successfully bridge these separated worlds and forge a common political platform intermediary intelligentsia needed to develop *multivocal* political platforms which could simultaneously appeal to their different audiences and hold them together in a common political project. I have taken the appeal to nationhood (*Isizwe* and *Uhlanga* in isiXhosa, and ‘nation’ in English) as one key example of this multivocality. The idea of the political community as a ‘nation’, ‘*isizwe*’, or ‘*uhlanga*’ had very different meanings and associations when intermediary intelligentsia appealed to three different communities, colonial, missionary educated African, and traditionalist African audiences. Yet because this concept of nationhood had a multivocal resonance which allowed it to appeal to these key audiences in different ways, the notion of the

nation became a central concept used to unite different communities where other identities had divided them. This laid the intellectual groundwork for future African nationalist intellectuals to develop and transform the logic of nationhood, drawing on various elements of these different logics.

Nationhood was just one among many political forms which developed this multivocal' appeal, yet it shows the larger trend: intermediary intelligentsia need to do a particular kind of knowledge work as they build political movements which bridge different communities. They need to develop a set of common concepts and ideas which can bridge between otherwise disparate systems of understanding. These bridging ideas then serve as a common platform from which new arguments and understandings can be developed.

More broadly, this chapter shows how intermediary intelligentsia can enable new forms of politics because they have the cultural mastery to be able to bridge previously divided communities. This bridging work enables new political possibilities, as exemplified in this chapter by the political power generated by mobilizing African voters and connecting them with colonial elites seeking parliamentary election. In abstract, intermediary intelligentsia have the capacity to bring together the political resources of divided communities, and by combining them, can make new forms of politics possible. They can do this because they have the cultural capacity to engage with communities who would otherwise remain alien to each other.

Yet this mediating work requires the creation of multivocal political forms which can create a common political platform, even while different communities may engage with this common platform in different ways. This need for multivocal resonance places limitations on what is

possible. It is because intermediary intelligentsia have both the cultural mastery of and social connections to these different communities that they are able to find and create new spaces of ‘intersection’ between these worlds. Intermediary intelligentsia are involved in a dialectic interplay between their communities, seeking out and developing the ideas and practices which successfully resonate with their audiences. This search for multivocal resonance is thus constitutive of new articulations of political understanding and identity. As seen in emerging African nationalism, the period of nascent identification with the community as racial or ethnic *isizwe*/nation which drew communities in through a concept which held familiarity and resonance within their own political logics, was developed and established into a new political vision which could later call participants to transform their own self-understanding to see themselves as a member of a shared national struggle for ‘African’ interests, rights, and wellbeing.

Thus, attending to *intermediary intelligentsia* as a category of mediating knowledge and political workers offers insights into the social dynamics which can facilitate and shape the emergence of novel forms of political action and identity. Taking up this conceptual framework in the study of nascent African nationalism shows how African intellectuals and leaders unleashed new possibilities for politics as they bridged colonial and African worlds.

Organizational Innovation and Consolidation:

Political networks and transforming identity and strategy in the first decade of proto-nationalist organization (1880-1890)

Introduction

Beginning in the 1880s there was an explosion of new African political organizations across the Eastern Cape region. These emerging organizations ushered in a period of rapid innovation and transformation in the practice of African politics: the co-transformation of institutions, ideas, and action, creating a new political field which laid the foundation for a new approach to political action.

This chapter focusses on the network of political leaders and organizations in the earliest moments of this emergence, emphasizing the rapid innovation between 1880 and 1890. In the preceding chapters I have followed the conditions which enabled and shaped the creation of new political understandings and identity in the nascent proto-nationalist movement. Thus far, I have examined how macro-social transformation made new political vision necessary, how intermediary intelligentsia were empowered to create innovative new answers as they drew on their mastery of both colonial and Xhosa political knowledge, and how these mediating intellectuals developed ‘multivocal’ symbols and political forms which allowed them to draw together the political capabilities of diverse Xhosa and colonial communities. This chapter now

examines the processes of political innovation seen from the perspective of emerging African political organizations.

To understand how the ‘proto-nationalist’ movement emerged, we must understand both how innovative forms of politics emerged, and how diverse contexts of innovation came to consolidate into a more unified movement. This chapter examines the dynamics which shaped both innovation and consolidation in the first ten years of the nascent proto-nationalist movement in the Eastern Cape.

First, I argue that two broad types of innovation appear in emerging African political organizations, which I call ‘repertoire transposition’ and ‘repertoire syncretization’. This chapter explains the dynamics of these two forms of innovation by looking at the political structure of the emerging proto-nationalist movement and combining this with an analysis of the ideas and actions of these early organizations. To understand the political structure of the proto-nationalist movement, I map how organizations and individuals were connected in a wide political ‘network’. I study how organizations were connected to each other through shared members and using the methodological tools of network analysis to map how these connections linked diverse local movements across the eastern Cape into an increasingly interconnected ‘proto-nationalist’ movement.

This distant view of the ‘political structure’ reveals two distinct structural positions which shaped how African leaders and organizations created political innovation. A densely connected core of ‘Abantu Basesikolweni’ (school people) organizations emerged which united more urban and missionary-educated African communities. These Abantu Basesikolweni organizations

developed innovation through ‘repertoire transposition’: they took up colonial political models and reshaped them into new, unexpected forms in African-only political contexts. A second type of innovation arose in ‘Isizwe’ (‘ethnic’ or ‘national’) organizations which were more peripheral in the political structure. These Isizwe organizations created innovation through ‘repertoire syncretization’: they drew together rural and missionary-educated African leaders, and merged and syncretized colonial and rural political forms to create new ideas and strategies of action.

To see these two forms of innovation in practice, I focus on key organizations, drawing on the work of historians, most importantly the detailed work of André Odendaal (2013), to give them a rich context. I then work to draw out the innovative political vision of these organizations in their own words, drawing on close textual analysis of their political arguments. This analysis shows how broad structural connections shaped the innovative political imagination of these emerging organizations.

Once I have outlined the dynamics of political innovation in this first decade of African political organization, I turn to consider how these innovations were consolidated into an increasingly unified ‘proto-nationalist’ movement. I ask—why did Abantu Basesikolweni (School people) organizations and Isizwe (ethnic/national) organizations come together to form a united movement? Missionary-educated, often more urban, communities united in Abantu Basesikolweni organizations and emphasized shared *Abantsundu* (Black) identity and fought for legal rights, while rural communities united in Isizwe organizations and emphasized land and ethnic identity. We might imagine that these two political orientations would lead to a schism in African politics, but instead we see the emergence of an increasingly connected political

movement which united African political leaders and communities and advocated in the interest of both groups.

The second part of the chapter follows how the threat of African voter disenfranchisement sparked new unities and examines how new cross-regional connections created a new political modus operandi, which made a focus on creating broad network connections the new norm. This shift in political practice enabled a consolidation of structurally and ideologically different local movements into a more unified proto-nationalist movement by the end of the 1880s.

Together, this analysis explores both political innovation and consolidation in the first decade of African political organization to reveal the dynamics which laid the foundation for the emerging form of African nationalism of the late 19th and early 20th century. In doing so, this chapter contributes a view of both the zoomed out ‘political structure’ and the zoomed in voices of African political actors to the history of nascent African nationalism in South Africa. It also reveals the social dynamics which shape political innovation generally, bringing this case into current social science dialogues on political innovation and transformation across the world.

Research design, data, and methods

Research design

The theoretical and methodological approach taken in this chapter is a ‘network analysis’ approach. The goal is to understand how emerging political ideas, vision, organization, and strategy were shaped not only by the dynamics of any single organization or individual leader, but they emerged from the linkages and connections made in a broader community. In doing so, this analysis draws inspiration from both the broad sociological literature on historical network analysis (Bearman 1993; Padgett and Ansell 1993; Gould 1995; 1996; Ansell 1997; Hillmann

2008; Padgett and Powell 2012), as well as from André Odendaal's (2013; 1983; 1984; 1993) detailed historical work on the political organizations of the Eastern Cape from the late 1870s to 1912, which, since his PhD research until today, has been replete with a 'network metaphor'. Where other historians were focusing in on the role of class (Bundy 1979; Beinart and Bundy 1987), or studying biographies of key leaders (Williams 1978; Marks 1986), Odendaal focused on the organizational precursors of the African National Congress highlighting important leaders and members of these organizations and noting the connections and linkages made by these figures across the emerging political field, including linkages to organizations as well as the generational inheritance of politically engaged families.

Odendaal's study of these first political organizations inspired the research design of this chapter, which focuses in on both organizations and individuals who were members of these organizations. In a number of works, culminating in his magnum opus, a historical analysis of these organizations entitled *The Founders: The origins of the ANC and the struggle for Democracy in South Africa* (2013; See also 1983; 1984), Odendaal lists the key leaders and members of these first organizations and considers the linkages which emerged across organizations and regions.

This chapter builds on this attention to networks, connections, and organizational membership. Here I aim to give the much-used metaphor of social networks a more formal focus by drawing on social network analysis techniques to examine the broad political network of this emerging political community. Following Odendaal, I focus on membership in these organization, and examine how organizations were linked together by individuals who were members or affiliates of multiple different organizations.

Applying network analysis techniques to study this political network which emerges from co-membership offers a formalization which renders abstract much of the rich qualitative detail of these organizations. Yet this formalization also offers new perspectives which reveal new facets of this social and political world, using mathematical tools from graph theory to offer insights that otherwise remain unobserved. To bring in the historical richness which gives context to these networks, I draw on the historical analysis of Odendaal and others (including W. G. Mills (1980) and Beinart and Bundy (1987)), and I undertake a qualitative text analysis of primary source isiXhosa newspapers (*Isigidimi sama-Xosa* and *Imvo Zabantsundu*) and African petitions to the Cape Parliament, to reveal the political visions, understandings, and practices which were shaped by the social structure revealed in the network analysis.

Data collection and coding

In data collection and coding I have worked closely with two Research Assistants, Bathobele Mcilongo and Siphenkosi Hlangu who have been constant co-workers, companions, and interlocutors in developing the organizational membership database which underpins this chapter's analysis.

Newspaper article database

Organizational membership in these first African political organization of the Eastern Cape is drawn from newspaper reports, primarily from isiXhosa newspapers (*Isigidimi sama-Xosa* and *Imvo Zabantsundu*), but also supplemented by reports from other colonial newspapers.

Newspaper articles were collected as follows: a list of African political organizations in the Eastern Cape was created drawing on Odendaal's analysis of political organizations until 1890 (see Odendaal 2013, Ch 3-14). These organization names, together with aliases, synonyms, and

related key words were used to undertake a digital key word search of Newsbank’s digital archive of South African newspapers, drawing on the “African Newspapers” and “African Newspapers, Series 2” digital collections, focusing the search on newspaper articles between 1870 and 1890. The Table 3.1 reports the full details of the 12 newspapers which were searched.

Article collection was done in two rounds, a primary round done by myself and a secondary round done together with the support of Bathobele and Siphenkosi to search for any additional articles. This second round also included a search for specific articles referenced by Odendaal (2013) which were not collected in the first round. This yielded a collection of 293 newspaper articles (226 in the first round of collection, 67 in the second round)

Table 3.1: List of newspapers searched

Newspaper Name	Publication location	Dates in collection	Language
Afrikaanse Patriot	Paarl	1883-05-24 - 1900-12-27	Dutch
Cape Times	Cape Town	1876-11-02 - 1913-12-31	English
Cape Town Mercantile Advertiser	Cape Town	1852-11-13 - 1889-12-31	English
Eastern Province Herald	Port Elizabeth	1845-12-31 - 1922-12-30	English
Friend of the Free State and Bloemfontein Gazette	Bloemfontein	1850-06-10 - 1890-12-30	Afrikaans, English
Imvo Zabantsundu	King William's Town	1884-11-03 - 1922-12-26	English, Xhosa
Indaba	Cape Town	1862-08-01 - 1865-02-01	English, Xhosa
Isigidimi Sama-Xosa	Lovedale	1870-10-01 - 1884-12-01	Xhosa
Journal	Grahamstown	1831-12-30 - 1913-12-31	English
Natal Witness	Pietermaritzburg	1846-02-27 - 1885-03-14	English
Port Elizabeth Telegraph and Eastern Province Standard	Port Elizabeth	1881-01-04 - 1897-08-31	English
South African Outlook	Lovedale	1870-10-01 - 1922-12-01	English, Xhosa

Organizational membership dataset:

These newspapers were then coded by the three-member research team. Alongside other coding, we created a database of organizational membership, noting all official leadership positions, committee members, delegation members, and general members who were mentioned in the above newspaper articles.

Cleaning and Standardization

Cleaning and standardizing this dataset involved handling variations in naming of both individuals and organizations. Individuals' names are at times given in full, or with the first and/or second name abbreviated to the first letter (e.g. 'I. W. Wauchope'), and at times only the last name is given. In addition, occasionally slight variations in naming appear, due to both variations in conventions of writing Xhosa phonemes (e.g. Umhalla and Mhalla) and printing errors, as well as coding errors. To resolve these variations to ensure that individuals are correctly identified, all records were rigorously checked by hand. The following approach was taken: differences were compared against other information which would suggest identity, including the same organization, same first and second name, same location, and same organizational role (e.g. secretary), same honorific (e.g. Rev), and similar timeframes. Where these various corroborating sources agreed, a normalized ID was assigned to matching records. A few cases proved more complicated as there was limited corroborating data. In these cases, the original newspaper records were double-checked by hand for any coding error and where disagreement remained the distinct name from the newspaper source was maintained¹. Thus,

¹ Consider for example the following more challenging cases: Thos. Mandyu, a committee member of Umanyano and Thomas Mandyu a committee member for ETNAS were considered the same person (abbreviated first name similar, 'o' vs 'u' in the surname is a common phoneme switch, Umanyano and ETNAS share the same location and

matches were made when corroborating information offered a large degree of confidence. In cases where there was uncertainty, the cautious approach of maintaining different IDs rather than excessive matching was chosen. Since these edge cases were limited, this approach may very slightly underrepresent the links between organizations where potential matches were possible, but it avoids spurious links between organizations which did not exist. Variations in organization names were managed through a list of equivalent names in both English and isiXhosa for each organization which was used as the search criteria for identifying newspaper articles². This list of equivalent names was expanded where alternative names were used in collected articles. Where variations existed, location and leading organization members were used to identify organizations which had different names but were deemed to be the same³.

Assessing the sources for co-membership in proto-nationalist organizations

It is important to highlight the way the sources constrained how membership is visible. First, all membership ties were drawn from newspaper reports which mention organization members. The nature of this newspaper reporting meant that members who held important roles were more likely to be recorded, and less influential members were more likely to remain invisible.

Members were named in newspaper reports primarily because they: 1. had a formal leadership

many members making a match feasible). However, J.Q. Sondlo. and J.W. Sondlo were kept distinct. These names share a common organization (Eliliso Lomzi), but the original sources clearly mark J.Q. and J.W. Since the second name abbreviation included abbreviated in the original text, this may intentionally mark two different people, or it may be a printing error. Without further corroborating information, I have chosen to keep the original naming of the newspaper sources. However, such tricky cases were rare.

² For example, consider NEA: search criteria included the English name and its variants: "Native Educational Association", "N E A", "NEA", "N. E. A."; as well as the Xhosa name and its variants: "*manyano nge mfundo" or "*manyano ngemfundo".

³ Consider for example, the 'Transkei Teachers Association', or 'Manyano lwe Teachers zase Transkei' in isiXhosa, and the 'Native Teachers Association' which operated in Transkei and overlapped in membership. These organizations were deemed to be identical and united.

role (e.g. president, secretary, treasurer, etc), 2. they had been chosen to participate in a delegation to another organization or to government officials, 3. they had spoken during a meeting, chaired a meeting, or explicitly participated in some other way which bears reporting in the newspapers, or 4. they are recognized as socially important enough to be mentioned (for example, leading ministers or chiefs). This means that membership as recorded through newspaper reports largely captures only the most important people who participate in an organization. This limitation is a strength for this analysis: by linking organizations through members, the analysis assumes that these members carry some level of influence between these organizations and that their co-presence across these organizations has an impact. The fact that only the most important and influential members of an organization were named in the newspapers, strengthens the assumption that these members had some significant influence which links these organizations. Uninfluential members were very rarely named in the newspaper reports. Secondly, these newspaper reports did not give even coverage to all organizations. Those organizations with more coverage would have had more opportunities for members to be named, and those with less coverage would have had fewer opportunities. It was thus important to consider what shaped newspaper coverage to be mindful of how this might introduce bias into the analysis. The two central newspaper sources are the isiXhosa newspapers *Isigidimi sama-Xosa*, published from 1870 to 1888 at Lovedale, and *Imvo Zabantsundu*, published from 1884 onwards in King Williams Town and helmed by J.T. Jabavu, who alongside his editorship also wielded significant political influence. Both of these papers were anchored in what I refer to as the *Abantu Basesikolweni* (school people) community and, in addition, through the 1880s a number of these newspaper editors and main contributors also participated in these

organizations. Thus, the isiXhosa language papers gave greater voice to organizations of this Abantu Basesikolweni community and to organizations which were geographically and socially proximate to the editors and main contributors to these papers. This is reflected in the greater volume of articles which addressed central *Abantu Basesikolweni* organizations (such as the NEA and Imbumba which I introduce below) and organizations in which editors had a stake (organizations that emerged from Lovedale got greater attention in the pages of Isigidimi; organizations in which J.T. Jabavu was invested claimed more attention in Imvo).

While this bias in reporting, and thus membership visibility, must be kept in mind, there were also a number of factors which instilled confidence that the more peripheral organizations were not unduly obscured from view. The first is that both Isigidimi and Imvo, in their self-understanding as a mouthpiece for broader African political projects, reported on political developments throughout the broader region, and welcomed letters written in from readers from a wide swathe of the eastern Cape. Thus, while fewer in number, the newspapers captured reports from a number of emerging political organizations, who often wrote in to announce the formation of their new organizations and inform the wider community of their political projects. Secondly, the analysis of this chapter focuses in on how links between organizations were formed through shared membership, especially the shared membership of influential members who would hold enough sway to carry ideas, issues, and potential alliances across organizations. While there were a lesser number of articles covering the more peripheral organizations, while their less influential members might never be named in newspaper articles, the existing articles still announced the names of the organization's influential figures as well as leaders that were known to the wider community. For this reason, it was more likely that the influential leaders

who made connections between organizations were named, and those who remained unnamed were more likely to not have been members of other organizations. As discussed below, the majority of organization members captured through the coding process were members of only one organization. As the analysis focuses on those who were members of multiple organizations, the key figures of an organization who also participated in other organizations of the region would have been generally named in newspaper articles due to their wider recognition, despite an inherent bias in the amount of reporting.

There were no other written sources which capture the membership of this ‘proto-nationalist’ movement as well as the isiXhosa language newspapers. While there are challenges with the completeness of this data, it is the best and most complete data available. In spite of some challenges which these newspaper sources presented, the above discussion suggests that, for the purposes of this analysis, which focuses on linkages formed between organizations through co-membership, these sources offer a realistic representation of co-membership at the time.

Combining newspaper sources with secondary sources:

The coding of newspaper membership resulted in a dataset of 865 links between individuals and organizations, including some duplication when an individual was listed in separate newspaper articles. This membership database was supplemented with the organization members listed in Odendaal (2013, chaps. 3–14) who also drew primarily on isiXhosa newspaper sources, but in addition drew on letters, government documents and reports, and mission school archives.

Odendaal listed the most important leaders of organizations which yielded a list of 262 links between organizations and members. The majority of Odendaal’s membership information was

also captured in the coded newspaper articles, however Odendaal's work served as the primary source of membership in the two mission schools—Lovedale and Healdtown—and for participation in the newspaper *Isigidimi*. This resulted in a combined dataset of 1127 total membership links provided by individuals between organizations.

Network nodes and ties

This membership dataset was used as the basis of the 'nodes' and 'ties' forming the network analysis employed in this chapter. These analytic methods focused on a set of elements called *nodes*, and the linkages formed between these elements called *ties*. In this analysis each unique person and organization was represented as a node. These nodes are then linked together through ties. In this analysis, membership in an organization formed the tie which linked members to organizations. Two forms of representation were used in the network which both drew from this same linkage through membership. The first representation showed both people and organizations, and links were made through membership, thus links exist in this representation only between people and organizations (i.e. never people to people or organizations to organizations). This form of representation is called a 'two-mode' network. These ties were weighted by the number of times a person was mentioned as a member of an organization in distinct newspaper articles, where each mention is summed to create a weight (visualized as the width of the line connecting two nodes). The second form of representation presented these same connections but additionally dropped the visualization of the people, showing only connections between organizations to simplify and clarify the same data. Here organizations were connected to each other through sharing common members. This is a 'one-mode' network, showing only the connections between organizations. This presents the same connections shown in the two-

mode network, but instead of people standing as mediating nodes, the tie between two organizations is made by the number of people who are members in both organizations (see appendix A pp.249-253 for a comparison of weighted and unweighted ties between organizations).

With duplication removed, this formed a dataset of 604 unique nodes (19 organizations and 585 people) and 784 unique membership ties. Of these membership ties the majority, 463 individuals, were members in only one organization. The analysis below focused only on individuals who held membership in two or more organizations, thus honing in on how these organizations were linked through co-membership. The analysis of these linking figures, presented below, focused on 140 nodes, comprising 18⁴ organizations and 122 individuals who are members of more than one organization. This network is made up of 321 ties.

Methods and qualitative data:

The chapter draws on a number of different network analysis tools which are introduced below as they were used. These network analysis methods are used to examine the broad social structure which was created through links between organizations made by sharing members. The effects of this relational structure are examined qualitatively through a series of focal case studies of key organizations in order to highlight the innovative forms of political action and understanding which emerged in these organizations. In these case studies I flesh out the organizations' contexts by turning to the analysis of historians, notably the research of Odendaal (2013), Mills (1980) and Beinart and Bundy (1987). I then turn to close analysis of the political

⁴ One organization, the Intlangansio ye Teachers, was also omitted, because it had only one listed member. Other organizations which listed no members were also excluded.

articulations of these organizations drawing on analysis of primary sources including newspaper articles discussed above and African petitions to the Cape Parliament collected from the Western Cape Archives and Records Service archive in Cape Town. The digitized list and summaries of all petitions to the Cape Parliament between 1875 and 1895 created and graciously shared with me by Kara Dimitruk supported the collection and analysis of petition data, in particular the identification and collection of key African petitions between 1880-1890.

Theoretical framework: Two models of political innovation

Where the preceding chapters have examined the conditions which enable and shape innovation at the individual and relational level, this chapter turns to examine the organizational context of innovation in the first ten years of the nascent proto-nationalist movement in the eastern Cape. In doing so, it builds on the analysis of scholars who have studied political transformation (see Introduction chapter) and draws on and extends the literature on transforming repertoires of understanding and action (Tilly 1978; Mooney and Hunt 1996; Clemens 1997; Padgett and Powell 2012) to show how political innovation was shaped by different organizations' networks of political connections.

This first section examines the social structure of the emerging proto-nationalist political field. This view from a network analysis perspective reveals two broad modes of innovation which were enabled by the structure of social connections made by organizations. I then argue that examining the structure of these connections also offers insights into why various local political movements were able to hold together and form a unified movement in the early period of proto-nationalist emergence.

I now outline two conceptual models which typologize these modes of innovation. These models were developed inductively from the case, yet theoretically developed through the political sociology literature.

1. Repertoire Transposition

The first model of innovation, which I term Repertoire Transposition, denotes the adoption and transformation of an already existing repertoire in a new context. The change in context produces changes in the application of the existing repertoire, so much so that it yields new and innovative approaches which may transform the political domain from which they were drawn. Sociologists have identified and studied this model of transformation: two exemplars shown in Clemens' *The People's Lobby* (1997) and Padgett and Powell's study of 'Transposition and Refunctionality' (2012, chaps. 1 & 6)

Clemens (1997) shows how interest group politics emerged historically in the US. The work emphasizes an institutional analysis and looks at how agrarian, labor, and women's' groups pioneered new organizational forms, and in doing so created innovative transformations of organizational repertoires which shifted the whole political system from a party-based cleavage to a new interest group approach to political mobilization. The theory of repertoire transformation offered in this work focuses on the adoption and transformation of organizational repertoires. Given that direct attacks on an existing system are easy to identify and repress (ibid, 322), Clemens follows how the challenger groups in her study adopted already existing organizational repertoires from dominant groups which appeared less threatening to the established order. Yet, the adoption of these repertoires, when moved to a new context, fosters adaption and transformation in a way that produces new scripts in newly emerging

organizational contexts. These adaptations avoid the repressive forces of hegemonic power because they appear familiar and non-threatening to the dominant political powers (in Clemens' case studies, local organizational lobbying looked like corporate lobbying). Yet, these repertoires transformed in their new context in a way that generated new alternatives. When these emerging organizational forms are able to successfully delegitimize the existing system and legitimate their new approach, the invention (i.e. novelty and creation) is able to be transformed into durable 'innovation': "the embedding of novel practices in durable social networks and resource flows" (Clemens 1997, 321).

A similar idea of organizational transformation is expressed in Padgett and Powell's concept of 'transposition and refunctionality' (2012, chaps. 1 & 6) which marks "the movement of a relational practice from one domain to another and its reuse for a different function or purpose in the new domain." (2012, 12) Padgett examines this process in the birth of the Partnership System in Renaissance Florence (2012, chap. 6) and argues that:

Recombinant innovation in organizations is produced ... when one or more social relations are transposed from one domain to another, mixing in use with relations already there. This transposition-induced hybridity is the raw material for invention, but that is only the first step. Refunctionality is when transposition leads not just to improvement in existing uses but, more radically, to new uses—that is, to new potential objects with which to interact and transform. Catalysis is when these new interactions feed back to alter the way existing relations reproduce (Padgett and Powell 2012, 170).

The key here is that the contextual shift in models of social relation, practice, and understanding from one context to another can create radical changes in form, which ultimately yield new forms of practice or understanding as they are put to work in this new context. It is if and when

this change ‘feeds back’ into the larger system that we see the capacity for this form of innovation to have widespread effects. In Clemens’ study, a new form of popular participation in politics emerged as organizations took up and transformed the practice of corporate lobbying creating a form of organization which mobilized around specific interests or policy demands instead of the party, class, language, or religion based political communities of the past (Clemens 1997, 2-3). This ultimately challenged the national party-based cleavages of the past and transformed the rules and institutions which guided politics, as politicians then had to contend with appealing to interest-based groups with assertive legislative agendas. In Padgett’s study, local Florentine Cambino bankers were transposed into international trading systems, and transformed their master-apprentice logics in interaction with the dominant patrilineal family logics of their context to create the new organizational form of the partnership system. Not only did this new form of current accounts, credit, and double-entry bookkeeping revolutionize international finance, it also fed back into elite Florentine social structure to refigure marriage as a form of elite inter-family partnership formation (Padgett and Powel 2012, 172-3).

This pattern of borrowing and transforming repertoires is particularly salient in South Africa’s colonial context, as both religious and political movements drew on strategies they saw implemented by colonial powers, yet turned these to their own ends, “remak[ing] and rearrang[ing] organizational forms, thereby changing the rules about who may use them and to what ends.” (Clemens 1997, 6) Another good example is the modernist Muslim nationalist movement in Indonesia, where modernist Muslim organizations borrowed tactics from Christian missionaries such as orphanages, schools, hospitals, and social welfare programs, yet turned these forms to their own ends as they built a movement for Indonesian Islamic Nationalism

(Noer 1973; Celarent 2013). As this chapter demonstrates, missionary-educated African political leaders took up forms of missionary and colonial political and social organizations. Yet as they put these forms to work for their own ends, they transformed the vision and practice from the dominant paternalistic ideology rooted in the ‘civilization’ of the ‘native’, into an assertive, agentic, and patriotic struggle for ‘African’ (*Abantsundu*) political interests and advancement. From this context both a Abanstundu (Black) identity, and the practice of direct political engagement with the Cape parliament ‘fed back’ from this context to transform political practice more broadly as African nationalism developed.

Thus, in both Clemens and Padgett & Powell conception, novelty is possible when an existing repertoire is transitioned to a new context, where it can offer “a new purpose for an old tool” (Padgett & Powell 2012, 12) and in doing so bring transformation.

2. Repertoire syncretization

The second model for innovation, repertoire syncretization, marks contexts of innovation which are produced by the intersecting of two or more existing repertoires. Swidler (1986) argues that in ‘unsettled times’ people turn to their available cultural toolkits in order to generate political action and ideological positions. Repertoire syncretization becomes possible when *multiple* different repertoires of understanding and action are brought together in social spaces which intermix people with different repertoires. The result is that new combinations of action, organization, and ideas are possible by combining elements from different political cultures and practices, producing new possible combinations, and ultimately yielding syncretic forms of political action that produce novelty.

Other studies show how transformed social relations can yield new political identities (Bearman 1993) and new political symbols (Ansell 1997), which transform political cleavages and political action. Repertoire syncretization mirrors these studies in that social recombination yields transformation, yet it goes a step further; it is the interactions of elements of previously separate repertoires which produce innovative possibilities in this model. This chapter demonstrates this form of innovation in the context of colonial South Africa, as it follows how the uniting of missionary-educated leaders and rural leaders created the capacity for the merging of different strategies, demands, and identities into new forms of mass political mobilization which was directed toward the colonial state. In sum, this analysis shows how innovative transformation is possible when previously separated elements are united to create new syncretic possibilities for action, organization, and/or thought.

The organizational patterns of emerging proto-nationalist politics

This first section examines the African organizations of the eastern Cape Colony region from the mid-1870s to 1890 and focusses on how the connections between these organizations created a political network which linked various local political movements into an increasingly connected ‘proto-nationalist’ political movement.

Drawing on organizational membership, I focus on how organizations were interconnected through co-membership – connections formed as political activists were members in multiple organizations. In the language of network analysis, both people and organizations are represented as ‘nodes’. Individuals are tied to organizations through membership, and organizations are linked to each other through these shared members—the ‘ties’ which link the ‘nodes’ in the

network. Using these ties, I visualize the larger ‘political structure’ of connections between these organizations and individuals.

Making connections: What a tie means

What does a tie mean in this context? People who are involved in one organization share in (and contribute to) the political understandings, focal issues, and strategies of that organization. To be a member of an organization is thus to be a part of a collective community which is guided by both a shared set of organizational goals (which arise from a shared analysis of what problems need to be engaged) and the collective practices which addresses those goals, which forms the political strategies of an organization.

When a person is a member in multiple organizations, they can carry these frameworks of understanding and strategies of action between organizations, allowing both knowledge and a larger framework of political interpretation to travel across organizations. This does not imply an unmediated ‘pipeline’ of knowledge; people often move between different social communities and can inhabit different identities and roles in these domains (White 2008; Simmel [1903] 2002). Nonetheless, a person who links different organizations by participating in both can carry with them the frameworks of analysis and the knowledge of effective and ineffective practices of these different organizational contexts and are able to share this understanding across different organizations. The capacity to influence an organization is also not straightforward; leading members will have a greater impact on a shared conversation than more peripheral members, and one person alone will have less of an influence than if many members share similar connections, and thus share common framework of understanding and can affirm each other’s knowledge and perspectives.

What does this mean in this study of proto-nationalist political organizations? First, the individuals documented in the newspaper reports were more likely to have been influential members of these organizations (see discussion in Data and Methods section). As organizational leaders, delegates, or speakers, these members were likely to have had organizational influence. Their knowledge and understanding, shaped through their experiences in many political and organizational contexts, was thus likely to have had an impact in shaping the collective discussion, analysis, and action of the organizations to which they belonged. Secondly, the organizations studied here engaged at times in very different political domains: they worked with teachers organizations, mutual aid organizations, political interest organizations, etc. The linkages between these organizations is not a straight mapping of organizational form from one place to another. Yet more linkages between these organizations enabled an easier sharing of knowledge, analysis, and strategies of action. Thus, as many network analysis scholars have shown, these kinds of ‘ties’ can enable ideas, understandings, and forms of action to travel between connected domains in ways that are not possible if they remain disconnected (Granovetter 1973; Gould and Fernandez 1989; Burt [1992] 2009; 2000; 2004; Small 2009; see Stovel and Shaw 2012).

This is best illustrated with a real example. In figure 3.1, I show the connections that Daniel Mzamo made between different organizations. Mzamo an ordained minister who was educated at Lovedale Mission school, was the founder of the Ethiopian Benefit Society (EBS), a mutual aid organization formed in Port Elizabeth, participated in the Temperance Organization called the Independent Order of True Templars (IOTT), joined with other teachers in the Native Educational Association (NEA) and was a founding member of Imbumba yama Nyama

(Imbumba), one of the earliest explicitly political African organizations. Mzamo was thus influential figure who participated in a number of new African organizations. Each of these organizations had their own goals and strategies (which I will show in detail in the coming analysis), a mutual aid organization, an anti-drinking movement, a teachers' association, and an African political interest organization. Yet, as Mzamo participated in these different movements, he could bring his knowledge of both the organizational practices and the broader frameworks of political understanding with him, sharing his knowledge of these diverse contexts in the different organizations in which he participated. These kinds of connections between organizations facilitated the sharing of different 'repertoires' of political understanding and action in a wider community of activists and organizations, creating networks of shared knowledge which emerging organizations put to work as they built their political platforms. The case of Mzamo shows that, while each organization developed its own goals and strategies within its collective community of members, links between organizations offered avenues for shared knowledge, analysis, and strategies to spread beyond individual organizations, and ultimately shaped the kinds of political innovation in which different connected clusters of organizations engaged.




Figure 3.1: Connections made by Daniel Mzamo

Visualizing political networks and patterns of connections

The visualizations of this political network, used throughout this paper, combine the links made by many different activists as they participated in different organizations. These different connections together show how connected different organizations were.

In visualizing these connections and the broader structure they create, I draw on network analysis tools which work to visualize ‘social distance’ as ‘spatial distance’. The visualizations used throughout this piece use a ‘force-directed’ algorithm where ties draw their nodes together, resulting in a visualization which depicts how closely connected different nodes are to each

other⁵. When organizations share many members, they are ‘pulled’ together by the connecting ties as though these ties are springs. When a person is mentioned in many articles as connected to an organization, this is represented a stronger tie⁶, which exerts a greater ‘pull’ representing the greater influence this member has. This ‘weight’ is also illustrated by a thicker connecting line.

In this way, people or organizations who shared many social connections are shown as spatially close together, and those who were socially distant are positioned far apart. This approach also reveals the social structure of a broader community: those people and organizations (nodes) that are positioned at the periphery are less connected to the wider community; they are more socially distant from other nodes and thus are spatially further away. Those nodes closer to the center are ‘socially closer’ to more members of the community; they are more widely connected, or they are connected to others who are widely connected. This layout of the social closeness and distance approach was validated by comparing it to Multidimensional Scaling methods which visualize comparative ‘distances’ between nodes. This analysis, reported in the appendix A (section ‘Comparison of Force-directed layout to Multidimensional scaling’, pp.246-248) closely aligns with the force-directed representation shown in figures 3.2a and 3.2b and corroborates the validity of this representation.

Figure 3.2a shows the network of people and organizations in a ‘two-mode network’. In this network, connections are made between individuals and organizations when an individual was a

⁵ Applied using the ForceAtlas 2 Algorithm (Jacomy et al. 2014). This application draws on the same ‘Spring embedding’ or ‘force directed’ approach developed by Kamada and Kawai (1989) and Fruchterman and Rheingold (1991) with its own modifications. In this family of visualization approaches, nodes repulse each other with a force modeled on charged particle repulsion ($F_r = k/d^2$) and edges attract their nodes, modeled on the attraction formula of springs ($F_s = -k \cdot d$). These forces converge on a balanced state. The actual formula of attraction and repulsion is modified for visual clarity (see Jacomy et al 2014 for full details).

⁶ The weight is the count of each unique mention in an article and/or in Odendaal (2013).

member of an organization (as outlined in the Research design, Data, and Methods section). This means that individuals are never connected directly to other individuals, and organizations are never connected directly to other organizations. Instead, organizations are linked through shared members, and individuals are linked through membership in common organizations.

Here organizations are drawn larger than people to distinguish them, and the color of the node represents the primary area of operation of the organization (see the key). Individuals who are ordained ministers (blue) and chiefs and headsmen (red) are color coded, because they are figures with important political and cultural authority, which will be further discussed. This image shows only those members who linked organizations, in other word, who were members of at least two organizations. The names of individuals who linked at least four organizations (thus the most important political mediators) are labelled in addition to the organization labels which abbreviate organizations' full names.




Figure 3.2a: Whole network overview – organizations and people




Figure 3.2b: Whole network overview – organizations only

Figure 3.2b removes the visualization of the people, showing only the organizations, and the ties are the connections made through shared membership. This is done to simplify and clarify the same information seen in Figure 3.2a. In this ‘one mode’ network (organizations only), the ties are now the number of shared members between each organization⁷. The same Force-embedding

⁷ In this one-mode visualization, the strength of the tie is the number of shared members and does not include the weight of the members’ tie. This approach was taken in order to prevent over-emphasis on the ties of organizations which are often reported on and to under emphasize the organizations which have fewer articles about them. Nonetheless, the results are very similar when the tie is weighted by the strength of the members ties. See appendix A section ‘Comparison of weighted and unweighted one-mode network representations’ (pp.251-253), for a comparison and discussion.

approach was used on both networks (yet run independently). The pattern seen in both is very similar, which corroborates the visualization of the layout⁸.

For full details of all organizations, including names, members, and number of members who link between organizations see Table 3.2 in appendix B at the end of this chapter.

Organizational overview

The organizations shown here are briefly introduced, through highlighting where and when they emerged, and more detailed case studies of key organizations follows. This summary draws on the research of Odendaal (2013) and Mills (1980) (see the Data and Methods section).

In the center left and right in light blue, we see the two main missionary schools of the Eastern Cape, Lovedale (founded 1824) and Healdtown (founded 1850). These two schools were the elite pinnacle of African missionary education (see Chapter 2) where many upcoming political leaders received their education. At the center bottom in yellow is the important early isiXhosa newspaper *Isigidimi sama Xhosa*, founded in 1870 at Lovedale. This was the first enduring African language newspaper, and it created a pivotal new public sphere for African politics, fostering debate through the 1870s and offering an important platform for political organizations in the 1880s (Odendaal 2013, chap. 6). On the bottom left in purple lie two of the first influential organizations engaging in African politics. The Independent Order of True Templars (IOTT) was a temperance organization promoting abstinence from drinking. This organization was founded

⁸ Note the only key difference is the position of PNA (the Peddie Native Association). This organization had only two members named in newspapers, and only one had ties to other organizations. Thus, in fig 3.2a it is pulled to the location of the one linking member (Samuel Mvambo). In fig 3.2b it is pushed far away from the center because the weight of its ties is extremely low compared to other organizations (1 for its one member who was linked to other organizations). The PNA is included here for completeness, but it has been omitted from the analysis later on, as it is an outlier (due to lack of newspaper reporting on its members), which is linked through only one member.

by missionaries and copied an organizational form originally developed in the US. The IOTT broke away from the white only 'Independent Order of Good Templars' in 1879 to start a multi-racial movement (although the first Africa branches were formed from 1875 onward) (Odendaal 2013, 71), and many of the important leaders of the emerging African organizations in the 1880s cut their teeth in leadership roles in this organization (see Mills 1980). I shall return to this organization in more detail due to its important role in offering an early venue for African leadership. The Ethiopian Benefit society (EBS) was an early self-help organization founded by Africans in Port Elizabeth in 1877, and it collected money for mutual aid and funeral costs (Odendaal 1993, 9). As is visible from the numerous connections, the members of EBS were also involved in IOTT as well as Imbumba discussed below. Here we see an early mutual aid organization, a form which would be taken up more widely through the 1880s. In the center in light blue lies the Native Educational Association (NEA), founded in 1880 as an organization for African teachers. In its early days the organization focused on teachers' issues, engaging increasingly in politics to support the interests of African teachers. Yet as the organization developed, it widened its political scope and became a pivotal central hub which engaged around a wide range of political issues and united members from across diverse political organizations (Odendaal 2013, chap. 6). The centrality of this organization in the network is telling and its important role will be explored.

From the 1880s a number of political organizations flourished in various areas of the Eastern Cape. Imbumba Yama Nyama (Imbumba), in the center right, was founded in 1882 and united a number of important missionary-educated leaders into one of the first explicitly political organizations (Odendaal 2013, chap. 7). In the Glen Grey area of Thembuland (top right), the

South African Native Association (SANA), comprised primarily of missionary-educated Africans, was created in 1882, and then worked closely with the Thembu Association (founded in the same year), which united School leaders and Thembu rural farmers and headsmen in a struggle against land expropriation (Odendaal 2013, chap. 8). On the top left, organizations in Emigrant Thembuland are seen, including the Emigrant Thembuland Native Association (ETNAS) founded in 1876, which united relatively elite African ‘modernizer’ farmers, and later had leaders join *Umanyano lwase Batenjini* (the Union of Thembus, labeled Umanyano), which served as the political wing of ETNAS from its formation in 1886 (Odendaal 2013, chap. 8). Located on the right side are organizations in the Transkei, first the Transkei Teachers Association (TTA), which was founded in 1882 and mirrored the NEA in bringing local teachers together, and then the Transkei (or Butterworth) Mutual Improvement Association (TMIA) which coordinated local self-help efforts from its formation in 1884 (Odendaal 2013, chap. 9). Just below on the right are two political organizations also in the Transkei region which unite important chiefs and headsmen of the Ngqika and Mfengu with school leaders to advocate for their political group based on *Isizwe* (ethnic/national) identities. *Intlanganiso Ye Nqubelo Pambili Yama Ngqika* (Association for the Advancement of the Ngqika – Labeled IntlanNgqika) founded in 1885 and *Manyano nge Mvo Zabantsundu* (Union for Native opinion [also called the Fingo Union]– Labeled ManZabant) founded in 1887, represented Ngqika and Mfengu interests respectively (Odendaal 2013, chap. 9). Finally, at the top center is the important *Imbumba Eliliso Lomzi Yabantsundu* (Eliliso Lomzi) or the Union of Native Vigilance Associations. This organization emerged in 1887 as a cross-regional platform to unite the proto-nationalist

community in its struggle against voter disenfranchisement. The central position of this organization highlights its importance and I will return to discuss its role in greater detail.

Typologizing the social position of organizations

In what follows I draw on a variety of network analysis tools to explore the patterns of organizations and membership in the nascent moment of political emergence. Here I identify two different patterns of organization seen in these early political bodies, and argue that these different organizational forms facilitated two very different forms of political innovation and transformation through the 1880s. I then consider the linking work of the central organizations, considering how these diverse political organizations were held together to form a unified proto-nationalist movement.

Core periphery structure and cultural and political authority

The visualization approach used in in figure 3.2a and 3.2b serve to visualize ‘social distance’ as ‘spatial distance’. As outlined above, this approach shows those who are strongly connected as spatially close together, while those who are disconnected are placed far apart. When this approach is applied to a whole network, it shows the social structure of this broader community. The people and organizations which are at the center of the network were ‘socially closer’ to others whereas those at the periphery were less connected to the wider community.

This spatial visualization approach highlights an important core-periphery pattern of political organization. There is a closely connected central core of organizations and people seen in the center right of figure 3.2 including the Native Educational Association (NEA), Imbumba, the newspaper Isigidimi, which is also closely connected to the Lovedale School. There are then a number of peripheral clusters. On the bottom left the Independent Order of True Templars

(IOTT) and Ethiopian Benefit Society (EBS) are connected to the main core through linkages to Imbumba and NEA. This connection marks an important moment of political emergence and development which will be explored in more detail. The remaining peripheral clusters mark organizations which were defined both by their regional position and their ethnic/isizwe (national) identity grouping; as noted, these were the Thembu, Mfengu, and Ngqika identities and the regions including Transkei, Thembuland, and Emigrant Thembuland.

This core-periphery structure also reveals important differences in the cultural and political authority of these organizations' members. In Figure 3.2a ordained ministers are marked in dark blue, and chiefs and headsmen are marked in red. Figure 3.3 amplifies what is seen in Figure 3.2a by including all individuals who link organizations (as in Fig. 3.2a) and adding in individuals who are ministers, headsmen, and chiefs.⁹ This reveals the very different role of political and cultural authority in the network: Ministers are largely clustered in the core and the bottom left cluster, and many are important linkers of organizations (c.f. Fig. 3.2a). Chiefs and headsmen are almost entirely found at the periphery of this network, with many participating in only one organization.

This points to an important difference in the social structure and membership of these organizations which I will argue impacted the processes of political action and innovation. We see a closely connected core, and one wing filled with ministers, and a number of more

⁹Ordained ministers, marked in dark blue, are easy to identify as they are always given the honorific 'Rev'. in newspaper articles as a sign of their status. Figures colored in red are known chiefs or headsmen, the former who represented the political authority of precolonial political rule, and in the case of headsmen, local political leaders who had been incorporated into the colonial political structure and retained political leadership in more rural areas. These figures are not as explicitly marked as the ministers with their honorific, and so this data likely underrepresents some headsmen. Information on Chiefs and headsmen is drawn from Odendaal's analysis (2013), newspaper mentions of status, and biographical databases (Ofosu-Appiah 1977).

peripheral clusters where chiefs and headsmen are dominant, but where ministers and other educated leaders provide links to the more central organizations.




Figure 3.3: Including all ministers, chiefs, and headsmen

Political sub-groups in the proto-nationalist field

Before I examine the impact of this structural difference, I will deepen this analysis by examining different sub-communities in this political field. Here I draw on a ‘community detection’ approach, which aims to “[decompose] the network into sub-units or communities, which are sets of highly interconnected nodes” (Blondel et al. 2008). I draw on the algorithm developed by Blondel et al. (2008), which works to identify communities which were densely connected within the identified community and more sparsely connected across different communities¹⁰. This approach works to identify groups who were most closely connected and thus make visible larger underlying groupings in the network. To corroborate this community identification, I perform hierarchical cluster analysis to identify clusters of organizations. These results are reported in appendix A (section ‘A comparison of hierarchical cluster analysis with community detection’, pp.254-256) and identify near identical clusters to the ones found through the community detection approach, corroborating these results.

Figure 3.4a presents the results of this community detection approach¹¹ run on the two-mode network. Figure 3.4b visualizes these identified communities in the organization-only network¹². These figures make clear the influence of mission schooling, geographic region, and *isizwe*/ethnic groupings in shaping different clusters in this network. The orange and blue

¹⁰ This set of criteria is called modularity (the difference between the density of within community connections and between community connections). Blondel et al. (2008) develop an approach which aims to maximize modularity by iteratively considering if modularity would be increased if each node was reassigned to the community of each of its neighboring nodes. Nodes are iterated potentially multiple times, until local maxima are reached (see Blondel et al. 2008 for details).

¹¹ Implemented as the ‘Modularity’ tool in the in Gephi software package (see Blondel et al. 2008; Lambiotte et al. 2008 for details).

¹² Note that the community clusters were identified with the two-mode network. Yet this one-mode presentation can be contrast with the results of the hierarchical cluster analysis (reported on pp.254-256 in appendix A), showing very close agreement between the two approaches.

clusters show the Lovedale (Orange) and Healdtown (Blue) schools, and the political organizations which emerged from the leaders educated there. In the orange cluster, lie the isiXhosa newspaper *Isigidimi sama Xhosa*, published at Lovedale, the Native Educational Association uniting African teachers, and other missionary offshoots including the *Inlangaiso yaba Fundisi* (Ministers Association). This cluster also includes the first explicit African political organization *Imbumba yama Nyama*. This cluster also has many figures tied to the purple cluster made up of the earliest African temperance and self-help organizations (IOTT and EBS). In blue, we see the Healdtown graduates leading education (TTA) and mutual improvement organizations (TMIA) which mirror the education and self-help organizations seen as connected to Lovedale. The remaining light green, dark green, and red clusters represent geographical clusters among different ‘ethnic’ groups and colonial districts (as discussed above).

Broad patterns of political communities

A number of important conclusions can be drawn from these two analyses of the structure of the political network. First, geographic space and precolonial *isizwe* (tribal/national) political identities were an important influence on political emergence and connections at this early stage, with clusters representing either school affiliations or colonial and *isizwe*/ethnic geographies. Second, these different clusters emphasize a political field made up of different movements which are nonetheless loosely connected. I shall return to examine the nature of these connections, discussing the important linking role of the NEA in the early period and *Imbumba Eliliso Lomzi Yabantsundu* in the later period.

Third, and most importantly, this analysis helps to identify two broad structural patterns emerging in these organizations: one set of organizations being made up of teachers, religious,

and self-help organizations which link with the two dominant mission schools, and incorporate many mission school graduates and ordained African ministers. The second set of clusters explicitly marks their *isizwe*/ethnic identification in their names and are found in areas further away from colonial influence: the Thembu association in red, a Ngqika and Mfengu organization seen in dark green, and Emigrant Thembuland organizations in light green. This second set of organizations also have a number of mission-educated leaders who now are partnered with Chiefs and Headsmen who have political authority in these more rural regions.

The different structural position of these two groups of organizations had an important impact on the kinds of politics in which these organizations engaged and the political imagination they developed. In the following analysis I refer to the first set of organizations as *Abantu Basesikolweni* ('School people') organizations. These organizations were first modelled on missionary and colonial organizations and at first reproduced many of their values. Ministers and teachers were key political and cultural authorities and these organizations first emerged reproducing the missionary vision that education, Christianity, and 'progress' would uplift and develop African communities. Yet in these African-led organizations, which set their sights on African interests, the original missionary and colonial starting point was transformed to generate new political possibilities. I shall return to this process as I discuss exemplars of 'Repertoire transposition' in the coming section.

I refer to the second set of organizations as *isizwe* ('ethnic' or 'national') organizations. These organizations linked missionary-educated leaders with chiefs and headsmen and drew they membership from more rural communities. These organizations got started around a range of specific on the ground issues (including land disposition, farming unions, and ethnic-based

mutual aid) which faced these local communities. They combine the authority of Chiefs and Headsmen, the interests of rural and often non-Christian peasantry with the fluency in colonial politics brought by mission educated leaders. I will explore the dynamics of political action and innovation in this community as I consider repertoire syncretization in the following section.




Figure 3.4a: Community detection




Figure 3.4b: Community detection visualized in organizations only network

Dynamics of political innovation in early African political organizations

The two different organizational forms discussed above – Abantu Basesikolweni organizations and Isizwe organizations – created very different contexts of political innovation and transformation which shaped emerging African politics. I now return to the two models of

political innovation outlined above to explore how this different social structure shaped political innovation and transformation differently in these two groups.

Transforming colonial political forms – Repertoire Transposition

Repertoire transposition best describes the form of innovation that was present in the Abantu Basesikolweni organizations emerging from missionary school networks (Orange, Blue, Purple communities Fig. 3.3). To illustrate the dynamics of this form of political organization I turn now to two case studies, fleshing out the political dynamics of these organizations by drawing on secondary source historical analysis supported by primary newspaper reports.

Independent Order of True Templars

First, I turn to the Independent Order of True Templars (labelled IOTT), which has been studied by Mills (1980). This organization, with branches first founded in Port Elizabeth in 1875 (Odendaal 2013, 71) and Lovedale in 1876 (Mills 1980, 206), grew out of the Independent Order of Good Templars, a global movement of temperance organizations founded by prohibitionists in the United States in 1851, which spread to Britain in 1868 and then across the British empire and across the globe (Mills 1980, 204-205). While in principle the Good Templars proclaimed racial equality, in both South Africa and in the southern United States, white members resisted any inclusion of black people (ibid, 205). This led two missionaries, Henry Kayers of the London Missionary Society, and John Geard of Lovedale, to found a separate interracial society in 1879: the Independent Order of True Templars. This society replicated the same organizational form as the Good Templars had, which was “a highly elaborated example of American fraternal societies semi-masonic type” (Mills 1980, 206), with local ‘temples’ (branches) linked together into regional ‘Grand Temples’ all under the umbrella of a ‘Right Worthy True Temple’ (ibid). The

pageantry of this semi-masonic form shaped the everyday practice of the organization, with grand titles for leading members (such as the ‘Right Worthy True Templar’, ‘Right Worthy Guard’, ‘Right Worthy Sentinel’, and so on.)¹³ and secret passwords (circulated in Xhosa, English and Dutch) (Mills 1980, 206).

This interracial society grew rapidly in the Eastern Cape, and by 1883 the annual meeting reported a membership of over 3500 members, constituting 42 Temples in the Midlands and frontier districts, and 15 Temples in the diamond fields and Free State. This fifth annual meeting had 34 delegates from across the Eastern Cape region including Richmond, Graaff-Reinet, Tarkastad, Bedford, Stockenstrom, Chumie [Tyumie], Lovedale, King William's Town, Pirie, Uitenhage, Bethelsdorp, Kruisfontein, Strandfontein, Nanaga, Port Elizabeth and Grahamstown¹⁴. The urban towns of the southern Eastern Cape Region were the center of this organization’s membership, and the first six annual meetings were held at major Eastern Cape colonial towns: Port Elizabeth (1879), Graaff Reinett (1780), Uitenhage (1881), Port Elizabeth (1882), Grahamstown (1883), and Graaff Reinett (1884)¹⁵. The organization’s popularity endured, and by 1898 an article in *Imvo Zabantsundu* reported that the ‘Eastern Grand Temple’ was made up of over 40 temples and more than 5000 members (Mills 1980, 206).

What impact did African participation have in this organizational form imported from the US and Britain? First, this broad-based organization offered one of the earliest venues where a number of prominent African leaders cut their teeth on the organizational dynamics of a multi-

¹³ c.f. “Independent Order of True Templars” *Port Elizabeth Telegraph and Eastern Province Standard* 1883-03-31, p.3.

¹⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁵ *Isigidimi sama-Xosa* 1884-05-16, p.6.

branched and territory-wide organization. While many white missionaries took the leading positions in the early days of the organization, African leaders, particularly the African clergy (including figures such as Daniel Mzamo, John Knox Bokwe, Pambani Jeremiah Mzimba, and Isaac Williams Wauchope, among others) held major leadership positions from the organizations early days¹⁶ and by the 1890s Mills highlights how the African clergy had de facto control over the leadership and running of the organization even while Henry Kayser remained the official head (Mills 1980, 208). Figure 3.5 shows the members of the I.O.T.T who were also linked to other African political organizations. As is clear, especially from the figures colored in orange, a number of IOTT leaders were also leaders in the emergence of the first African-only political organization including NEA and Imbumba to which I will return in greater detail.

¹⁶ See reports in: *Isigidimi sama-Xosa* 1880-02-01, p.5; *Port Elizabeth Telegraph and Eastern Province Standard* 1883-03-31, p.3; *Isigidimi sama-Xosa* 1883-05-01, p3; *Port Elizabeth Telegraph and Eastern Province Standard* 1887-06-28, p.3.




Figure 3.5: IOTT members who also link to other organizations

Second, participation in this temperance movement developed a social and political commitment to racial and ethnic identities. On the one hand, the explicit racial exclusion from the Independent Order of Good Templars, and the specific need to form the True Templars organization emphasized a ‘racial’ identity as *Abantsundu* (black people, or ‘native’ in the colonial usage). It is clear in newspaper reports that this organization offered an early articulation of shared *Abantsundu* (black) identity over diverse ethnic identities, strengthened by the organization’s racial conceptual framework distinguishing white, coloured, and black communities (which mirrored the English, Dutch, and Xhosa language usage highlighted above). Furthermore, the challenge of drinking was seen as both an individual moral problem (as

destroying individual lives) and as a social evil affecting whole communities. In this context, alcohol was seen as destroying the nation, and the struggle against alcohol was seen by these leaders as a fight for the social and communal wellbeing of the Xhosa and Mfengu people. Mills evocatively argues that this anti-drinking movement was one manifestation of ‘postmillennial Christianity’ including:

a belief in the possibility (and the imminence) of the perfecting of men and society to achieve the millennium (progress). The achievement of the millennial society required not only the perfecting of individuals by conversion and personal pietism but also the perfecting of society by the elimination of evils (political action). (Mills 1980, 211-2)

In the writings of True Templars leaders like Pambani Mzimba¹⁷ and Isaac Wauchope¹⁸, it is clear that the struggle against alcohol was seen as a struggle against the destruction of Xhosa and Mfengu communities. This commitment to African communities and the work to win gains for these communities was an important ideological focus seen across emerging proto-nationalist political organizations.

Finally, the temperance organization also served as an early model of collective political action with the goal of engaging the colonial legislature and transforming laws pertaining to Africans. As seen in the Mills quote above, the IOTT went beyond having only an individual focus on personal pietism. This organization sought to use political and legal action to transform the social conditions of African communities with the vision of eliminating the social evil of drinking (and the social evils that drinking created) and thereby uplifting African communities. Mills notes that in both the United States and Britain, the Good Templars organizations were deeply political,

¹⁷ “Ingxelo Yabatunywa Base Lovedale” *Isigidimi sama-Xosa* 1883-05-01, p.3.

¹⁸ “Intlanganiso Enkulu Yabazili Benene e-Rini”, *Isigidimi sama-Xosa* 1883-05-01, p.3.

lobbying government for prohibition laws (Mills 1980, 211, footnote 66). The IOTT followed this same model including “petitions to parliament (almost annually), representations before parliamentary commissions, and legal actions opposing the issuing or renewal of canteen licenses.” (Mills 1980, 211) The important role of anti-liquor petitioning as a precursor to later petition politics is discussed alongside the Thembu association.

Imbumba yama Nyama

The second exemplar is the organization *Imbumba yama Nyama*, which has been studied in depth by Odendaal (2013, chap. 7). This organization took the transformations seen in the IOTT a step further. Emerging from a tradition of debates held in African language newspapers, and then from the path-breaking yet largely apolitical NEA, Imbumba was one of the first, if not the first, African political organization to explicitly articulate political interests based on an African identity. In the newspaper article reporting about the first meeting of this new organization¹⁹, this explicitly African political identity is made clear, with this new organization reported as aiming to be an “[I]ntlanganiso yomanyano lwaba ntsundu base South Africa”²⁰ (an Association for the Unity of the Black People of South Africa). The vision of pan-racial unity in this inaugural meeting was clear:

*Zonke izinto zelungelo laba ntsundu ziya kuxoxwa ezintlanganisweni zolu manyano, eziya kumiswa kwindawo ngendawo kulo lonke eli laba ntsundu ukuba kunokwenzeka.*²¹

[All affairs of black people will be discussed at the meetings of this union, which will be held at various places in all the black areas if possible.²²]

¹⁹ “Imbumba Yomfo ka Gaba” *Isigidimi sama-Xosa* 1882-11-01, pp.4-5. This article was previously discussed in Ch. 2.

²⁰ *ibid*, 5.

²¹ *ibid*.

This African-centric political vision emerged from a growing public sphere made up for the first time almost exclusively of missionary-educated Africans no longer under missionary authority. The members of this public sphere had been trained and exposed to the political repertoires of the colonial and missionary world, and in this African-only social context they drew from these repertoires, in doing so transforming them to suit their own contexts and needs and producing new ideological positions in the process. In the isiXhosa newspaper *Isigidimi*, published from 1870, Africans began to discuss and debate their political context. The NEA, founded in 1879, offered the first organizational form to extend this space to a physical Africans-only organization, but it remained focused on education issues in its early days. *Imbumba yama Nyama* thus represents the first full-blown African only political organization to emerge from the mission-educated community.

Figure 3.5 shows the members of *Imbumba* who also participated in other organizations. It is clear from this picture that many of the members of the I.O.T.T and the Ethiopian Benefit Society were important leaders in *Imbumba*; Odendaal has highlighted the strong links between these organizations, showing how the urban core of the IOTT “also constituted the basic geographical framework ... which the pioneering *Imbumba* functioned in the early 1880s” (Odendaal 2013, 71). *Imbumba* can thus be seen as a further ‘transposition’ of the colonial political vision seen in the IOTT. Here was the first truly independent political organization bringing missionary-educated leaders together. As is visible in figure 3.6, *Imbumba* also drew in many other prominent African political leaders, many of whom had links to Lovedale and to the NEA. This organization was thus an early hub of missionary-educated Africans which explicitly

²² Trans from Wauchope 2008, item 3.2, 174.

68-69). This organization, shifting from the military resistance of the past, aimed to “fight battles in writing rather than [with] guns”, and aimed to “tackle the white man at his own political game” (ibid). The inaugural meeting revealed a wide range of ideas and symbols on which the Imbumba drew. The organization’s instigator and first president, Simon Peter Sihlali (“the first and at that stage only African to pass the Cape of Good Hope University matriculation examination” (Odendaal 2013, 67-68) intended that this organization would cure the illness of disunity and unite “[u]sapo lwase Africa” (the family of Africa)²³; Isaac Wauchope envisioned that “*Lembumba mayihlanganise imihlambi eyalanayo—Kubunjwe um Xosa ne Mfengu nom Tshaka nom Sutu...*” [This Imbumba should unite diverse flocks. A Xhosa should be bound to a Mfengu and a Zulu and a Sotho...]

In addition, to expressing this pan-racial unity, this inaugural meeting also drew on ideas and symbolism common to both colonial and Xhosa communities. Speaking to the interests of the colonial state, Daniel Mzamo argued that “*lombumba mayayame ngase ntetweni, ‘ingakabeli ezikalini,’—Mayipume kwa Hoho, nakwa Manyube, ingene pantsi kwepiko lom HLEKAZI*”²⁴ [“Imbumba should receive support from the law ‘and should not upset the scales’. Let it emerge from the Hoho and Manyube forests and remain under the wing of HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS.”]²⁵ The Hoho and Manyube forests were strongholds from which Xhosa leaders of the past had lead guerrilla wars, and this was thus an appeal to submit to the laws and authority of the colonial state. Speaking to the missionary and African teacher audience Samuel Mvambo notes “*Lembumba mayi qengqelekele ngase MFUNDWENI, ekwazini, ebulumkwani*. Because her

²³ “Imbumba Yomfo ka Gaba” *Isigidimi sama-Xosa* 1882-11-01, p.4.

²⁴ ibid.

²⁵ Translation from Wauchope 2008, 173.

ways are of pleasantness and all her paths are peace—Prov 3:17.”²⁶ [“This Imbumba must roll down the hill towards EDUCATION, knowledge and wisdom.”²⁷] The missionary goal of education was thus placed as a central goal of the organization, and the appeal to missionaries was explicit in the quoting of a Biblical verse in English.

Finally, the piece also rings with appeals to traditional Xhosa practice and culture. The Sihlali’s initiation of the meeting took the form of the initiation of a traditional Xhosa court proceeding (“I accuse”), and the political problem was phrased in the framework of Xhosa traditional knowledge – the ‘sickness of disunity is called *isidlanga*, “the object a [Xhosa] traditional healer withdraws from the body of a patient, which causes ailment” (Wauchope 2008, 173, footnote 19). Regular appeals were made to Xhosa practice – unity is metaphorically seen as mixing lime paste with wool, or mixing mud and cow dung to make plaster for walls or flooring. The vice president William Philip Momoti notes that “*Lembumba mayicokiswe ekaya, ibekise pambili.*”²⁸ [“This Imbumba must be refined at home before it proceeds.”²⁹] and it was urged to focus on the Xhosa language, to provide Xhosa books and to establish its own printing press, all to ensure that the Xhosa language did not die. The organization’s name itself is a reference to the words of the Xhosa Christian prophet Ntsikana, who said that Africans should ‘unite into a tight ball like the sinews of meat’: “Imbumba yama Nyama”.

This rich and ‘multivocal’ political symbolism grounded this political organization, which engaged in political action to defend African interests in a number of more urban areas. The

²⁶ “Imbumba Yomfo ka Gaba” *Isigidimi sama-Xosa* 1882-11-01, p.4.

²⁷ Translation from Wauchope 2008, 173.

²⁸ “Imbumba Yomfo ka Gaba” *Isigidimi sama-Xosa* 1882-11-01, p.4.

²⁹ Translation from Wauchope 2008, 174.

organization was headquartered in Port Elizabeth and founded branches in Graaff-Reinet and Colesberg, growing from its original 40 members to over 300 by May 1883 (Odendaal 2013, 70). The Port Elizabeth branch had close to 100 members by this stage and met regularly, as often as once a month (ibid). Odendaal shows how Imbumba engaged in both local urban politics as well as engaging the Cape parliament on broader issues. The Port Elizabeth Imbumba:

brought African dissatisfaction with municipal laws to the attention of the town council; it attended licensing board sittings to oppose applications to open canteens near African areas; it asked for the establishment of a Native Management Board; it saw to the registration of African voters; and it opposed moves by the council to have a bill passed to remove the largest African location, the Native Strangers location, to a site away from the town [thus opposing segregation]. (Odendaal 2013, 72).

At the first annual congress, delegates from the three branches formed various committees to engage a range of issues including “the registration of voters, location grievances and education, and passed several resolutions for submission to parliament ... [including a request] that the franchise qualifications should not be raised in order to deny the vote to blacks.” (Odendaal 2013, 73)

In Imbumba we see how the repertoires and practices of colonial style political organizations transformed to generate new political identities as they were ‘transposed’ into African-only contexts. These African leaders, educated in mission schools and engaged in political projects like the temperance movement, held to many of the political values and visions of their colonial counterparts. They reproduced many missionary values including supporting African education and the isiXhosa press and opposing alcohol sales. Their political projects were deeply connected to local urban struggles within the colonial legal framework (such as engaging local municipality

council politics) and it also set its sights on the Cape colony's legal framework as it engaged colonial laws, met with government officials³⁰, and aimed to challenge and influence the Cape Parliament's laws³¹. In these aspects, Imbumba reproduced colonial style political repertoires common to its context. Yet the fundamental underlying shift seen in this organization was the rise and assertion of a shared black identity to unite Africans and defend their interests. The organization with its element of urban and missionary-educated elite, envisioned a pan-racial form of politics which would overcome the "denominational and ethnic divisions among Africans" (Odendaal 2013, 69). Much like the urban and Christian roots of the later Black Consciousness movement of the 1960s, this organization saw beyond the identity divisions which otherwise remained powerful and salient for more rural political communities, and was an early political voice defending an 'Abantsundu' identity which would grow in power and prominence throughout the 1880s, reaching a crescendo in the struggle for African franchise seen in 1887, which will be further explored.

What facilitated the earliest vision of 'African' or 'black' political organizations? It was organizations like Imbumba yama Nyama who, instead of fighting the colonial system with military resistance which would now be crushed by imperial might (c.f. the Bambatha uprising), rather took up the political repertoires of the colonial system. Yet in adopting these colonial political techniques, they were not conformed to the colonial political vision. Instead, organizations like Imbumba were able to transform the vision and goals of these political systems, putting the old tools to work in new ways. As they did so, they increasingly understood

³⁰ *Isigidimi sama-Xosa* 1883-05-01, p.1.

³¹ *Isigidimi sama-Xosa* 1883-10-01, p.4.

their own political project as an '*Abantsundu*' (African or black) project: their work was to unite Africans together and to fight for their interests. In Imbumba yama Nyama, the Independent Order of True Templars, and other organizations emerging from mission school networks, we see a repertoire transposition which transformed colonial and missionary organizational forms. The individuals in this part of the network were deeply embedded in the missionary founded organizations: education, newspapers and teachers. They were socially close to the majority of African reverends and ministers. Yet, it is through the uniting of these members to confront increasingly racist government policies that these organizations forged a new vision and basis for political action: the earliest organizational foundations for *African* interest politics.

New possibilities by combining political resources: Repertoire syncretization

In the Isizwe organizations seen on the periphery of the network we see a different pattern of political innovation and transformation – that of repertoire syncretization. These organizations – seen in the dark green, red, and light green clusters in figure 3.4 – united members from the missionary-educated elite together with headsmen and chiefs who held traditional authority, and rural African communities comprised primarily of subsistence farmers. These spaces produced new political imagination, which merged elements of various members' repertoires social contexts and yielded new forms of politics; these new political forms would not have been shaped without the diverse repertoires and resources which were combined in these organizations.

The clusters marked by these groups came from different regions of the 'Transkei' area (literal translation: 'beyond the Kei River' which served as a dividing line and colonial boarder). This region had a markedly different colonial history than the lands to the south and west of the Kei

River. Long-running military conflict and white settler farmers with small but growing urban centers marked the colonization of the 'Ciskei' (before the Kei River) region, which has shaped our discussion so far. By contrast, the Transkei region remained unannexed (although influenced by colonial power) until 1872. Instead, the colonial government treated different parts of this area as separate geographic units, with their own local power-structures with which the colonial government engaged, negotiated and interfered with in order to promote African leaders who would be 'loyal' to the Cape government. What began with colonial conquests and the capture of land for colonial allies, culminated between 1872 and 1895 in the annexation of each of the territories known as Fingoland, Gcalekaland, Thembuland, Emigrant Thembuland, East Griqualand, Pondoland and districts peopled by the Mpondomise, Bhaca, Hlubi and Sotho groups (Saunders 1972; Beinart and Bundy 1987, 5). Under Cape rule, this region was named the Transkeian Territories (Beinart and Bundy 1987, 7; see also de Wet 2008)

Even when the area was annexed, prominent political leaders and political lineages, and local political identities which governed the political practice before colonial control continued to shape politics. Colonial authorities cultivated patron-client relationships with 'loyal' leaders, giving them land taken from communities who rebelled, and often providing an income. Yet these leaders and their communities still most often understood the legitimacy of their leadership as based on their royal, ethnic, or even sub-ethnic political legitimacy. This shaped the development of political identity and action in the region, as Beinart and Bundy argue:

Although the imposition of taxes, colonial laws, and colonial institutions defined the political issues that confronted rural Africans, they do not alone explain patterns of alliance and conflict. Political thinking and behavior grew out of what were still real

and self-conscious local communities, with their own internal dynamics. (Beinart and Bundy 1987, 7)

Beinart and Bundy, just quoted, study political transformation in this broad Transkei area, but their analysis covers a period beyond the timeframe of this chapter (1890-1930) and includes regions geographically beyond the organizations explored here; they focus deep in the Transkei region, where the organizations seen in this network were located on either side and on the Transkei border. Nonetheless, their sensitive analysis of the social and political dynamics of the Transkei are insightful for understanding the political form seen in organizations emerging on the periphery of this network. Their analysis of the social, political, and economic composition of the Transkei in the first years of the 20th century offers a keen insight into the ‘cast of characters’ that make up the areas bordering the Kei in our period. They argue for four broad social, economic, and political classes: first is the “educated elite” who have been discussed at length in this dissertation. Beinart and Bundy highlight that these families could support agricultural production with income from salaried and secure jobs and their influence in church leadership, which allowed them to best weather the economic storms of the period. Second is a grouping comprised of the “old loyal communities, often Christian, peasants, transport riders and workers in the small towns” (Beinart and Bundy 1987, 11) who were attracted to incorporationist ideologies but were slowly losing their economic footing as openings for all labor except unskilled migrant labor began to close. Third were the “traditional leaders, hereditary chiefs and headsmen” (ibid). These figures both retained their authority to “conduct traditional court cases, collect tributary fees and dues, and to exercise considerable authority over the distribution of land” (ibid) and they were also increasingly enmeshed in the colonial admirative system, as local

authorities under the umbrella of a colonial magistrate, who both represented the interests of their community to the state (via the magistrate) and were expected to bring the state's edicts to their people and exercise control over them (Beinart and Bundy 1987, 7). Finally, there were the "traditionalist followers" (Beinart and Bundy 1987, 12), who were the largest group in most districts, and who "displayed a cautious and selective traditionalism" engaging some forms of migrant and wage labor but balanced this against an emphasis on access to land and livestock, and who "reject[ed] Christianity and the assimilationist ideas that accompanied it." (ibid). This group would join in "alliances with Christian or radical Africanist groups when there were appropriate targets to fight," but were mobilized primarily around "ethnic or localized associations or behind their chosen branch of the royal family." (Beinart and Bundy 1987, 12)

This brief outline of the history and social dynamics of Transkei districts shows an important different social context for political organizing than the context we have seen so far, which was centered on mission schools, mission communities and urban areas. As I will show, this different social composition and social structure had an important impact on the kinds of political innovation and transformation seen in these regions of the political network of proto-nationalist organizations.

The Thembu Association offers an exemplar of 'repertoire syncretism', a form of innovation seen more broadly in the rural contexts that were more peripheral to colonial rule. In what follows I draw on the detailed analysis of Odendaal (2013, chap. 8), newspaper reports, and petitions to the Cape Parliament to explore the political form this organization developed.

Odendaal has studied both the Thembu association and the *South African Native Association* (SANA), which both were formed in the Glen Grey district of Thembuland in 1882. SANA was

an organization made up of important missionary educated teachers and leaders emerging from Healdtown (David Malasi, Richard Kawa, and James Pelem among others) (Odendaal 2013, 76), and repeated much of the same pattern seen in the political organizations of missionary-educated leaders discussed above, and indeed SANA was explicitly linked to both the NEA and Imbumba, seeking closer association (Odendaal 2013, 76-77). But in Thembuland, this missionary-educated organizational form did not have the same political base that it had elsewhere and by 1884, SANA had merged into the Thembu Association. The Thembu Association, also founded in 1882, emerged from a political movement engaged in land struggles between the approximately 20,000 strong Thembu community, who lived in the district and the colonial settlers who were pressuring the colonial government to give more land to them (Odendaal 2013, 77). In the process of mobilizing to resist land disposition, the Thembu Association united the leadership, political resources and acumen of educated leaders and important headsmen of the area (the ‘traditional leaders’ of Beinart and Bundy’s characterization), and mobilized mass support from both ‘loyalist’ and ‘traditionalist’ followers to create a new form of mass mobilization to engage the Cape government. Odendaal highlights the mass meetings and engagement which marked the “populist” nature of this engagement with the government: after raising over £100 and sending a delegation to the government which included prominent headsmen (Petrus Mahonga, Thomas Zwedala and Samuel Sigenu), alongside a mission-educated leader (James Pelem) and a missionary (Rev E.J. Warner), and receiving “reassurance from the government that the people’s land rights would be respected and that they would be consulted on key issues” (Odendaal 2013, 78), the organization held two meetings “attended by 600 and 1000 people respectively, [where] the Thembu expressed appreciation of the reassurances they had been given, but requested the

government to reconsider its refusal to relocate the dispossessed Thembu” (ibid). This land struggle and mass mobilization continued and in 1885 the Secretary for Native Affairs aimed to intervene and was met by headsmen Samuel Sigenu and Thomas Zwedala, and the educated leader James Pelem, at the head of a group of 600 people, ready to push their demands (Odendaal 2013, 79). Using this evidence of their capacity to mobilize such large groups to resist settler political pressure, and to make demands on the government, Odendaal highlights how this co-operation between traditional leaders, headsmen, and mission educated activists “succeeded in establishing a popular base for political action.” (Odendaal 2013, 79). Figure 3.7 visualizes the linking members of both the Thembu Association and the South Africa Native Association.




Figure 3.7: Thembu Association and South African Native Association linkers ego networks

What kinds of political innovation and transformation did this alliance of educated leaders and traditional leaders facilitate? A petition to the government sent by the leaders of the Thembu

Association in 1886³² offers a powerful exemplar of the kinds of politics which emerged, and the way this new political action drew together the different political logics and resources of both educated and traditional leaders to forge new forms of political claims and action. This petition, presented to the Cape Parliament on April 16th 1886, is remarkable for two reasons: first, it had a huge number of signatories. Where petitions received by the Cape parliament had tens or at most hundreds of signatories, this petition had 2138 signatures – this marked a clear break from the existing petitioning norm and an early appearance of mass petitioning politics. Second, the language of the petition itself shows a remarkable synthesis of the logic of political claim making, combining the logics of educated leaders and traditional leaders into a syncretic composite which leveraged the claiming power of both.

The petition form itself was a colonial mode of engagement with the government with which educated leaders and some chiefs had begun experimenting in the late 1870s and 1880s. One early engagement that educated leaders had with petitions came from the prohibition movement seen above; the white Independent Order of Good Templars and the primarily African Independent Order of True Templars (IOTT). Prominent educated African leaders had headed petitions for the prohibition of the sale of liquor to Africans including influential African Minister James Dwane³³ together with Africans of the Mount Coke Wesleyan Methodist Church in 1884³⁴, Isaac William Wauchope together with members of the Independent Order of True

³² Western Cape Provincial Archives and Records, Petitions to the House of Assembly (CA, HA) 799, no. 11.

³³ Dwane was an important figure in the African independent church movement, participating in the Ethiopian Church movement of Mangena Mokone, serving as a Bishop and General Superintendent of the African Methodist Episcopal Church in South Africa, and later forming and becoming the ‘provincial superior’ of the ‘Order of Ethiopia’ in the Anglican church (Lahouel 1986; Millard 1999, 20–23).

³⁴ CA, HA 793, no. 183.

Templars in 1885³⁵, Walter B. Rubusana leading Peelton inhabitants in 1886³⁶, Pambani J. Mzimba with Africans living in Victoria East in 1887³⁷. These petitions were just four of a huge number of petitions (at least 79 between 1883 and 1887) to limit the sale of liquor to Africans submitted by missionaries, African communities, and colonist communities which began in 1883 and continued through the rest of the century³⁸. From this base in prohibition petitioning, educated African leaders expanded the petition form to engage other political issues, especially African voter disenfranchisement to which I will return³⁹. These same petition records show that some African chiefs had also begun to use petitions to engage directly with the Cape government to express their interests instead of working through the magistrates of their area. Some of the earliest petitions came from the Basotho Paramount Chief Letsie in 1877, 1878 and two in 1880⁴⁰, and demonstrate that this direct petitioning by African chiefs was not unheard of. However, between 1877 and 1886 (the date of this petition), only 11 petitions mention chiefs or headsmen and came from five different chiefs⁴¹. The use of petition politics by rural African leaders was still relatively rare.

The petition from the Thembu Association thus shows a form of political innovation – mass petitioning – which was seldom used before this date, yet which increasingly came to be one

³⁵ CA, HA 798, no. 240.

³⁶ CA, HA 800, no. 70.

³⁷ CA, HA 804, no. 76.

³⁸ CA, HA “Abstract of Petitions received by the House of Assembly” from 1883-1895.

³⁹ For example, P.J. Mzimba (CA, HA 804, no 73) and J.T. Jabavu (CA, HA 804, no. 114) led inhabitants from Victoria East and King William’s Town respectively in petitions against the Parliamentary Registration Bill in 1887.

⁴⁰ CA, HA 774, no. 27; 11; CA, HA 778, no. 15; CA, HA 778, no. 16 respectively.

⁴¹ Chief Letsie (seen above footnote); Darala, Mantanzima, Gecelo, and Stockwe, Emigrant Tembu Chiefs in 1880 (CA, HA 779, no. 109); Chief Seyesi Siwani in 1882 (CA, HA 784, no. 2; CA, HA 784, no. 6), Johannes Tshatshu (a.k.a Jan or Dyani Tzatzoe) Chief of the Amantinde in 1883 (CA, HA 789, no. 267); Jonathan Molapo, son of Molapo Chief of the Leribe in 1882 and 1883 (CA, HA 784, no. 7; HA 791, no. 28) ; and Kosana, Chief of the Amavundhlu in 1883 (CA, HA 790, no. 350).

political form that African communities used to make demands on the colonial government. In this case, the creation and presentation of a petition with such a relatively huge number of signatories was made possible by combining the political skills and resources of both rural and educated leaders. Headsmen could mobilize mass support from their rural communities, and missionary-educated leaders could protest and appeal in the language of colonial politics, presenting the petitions before the Cape colonial court.

This synthesis of political repertoires and logics is visible in the language of the petition itself. Repertoires from the educated community include fluency in the elaborate and specific language and style of the petition format, fluency in government legal frameworks shown in the careful legal and historical argument developed in the petition, and arguments made from the government's own documents to support the petition's claim. From the repertoire of traditional leaders, we see a strong *isizwe*'ethnic' political identity of the 'Tembu tribe', which lay the basis for a clear argument, and also furthered the notion that the 'tribe' was the legitimate political unit which could enter into agreements; this was an appeal to the longstanding logic of loyalty of rural leaders and their communities to the government, and evidence of the mass mobilization of the community through the rural political hierarchy of headsmen.

The petition synthesized these elements to build a legal argument that the Thembu people had been given the territory of the Glen Grey District in 1852 by the Governor of Cape of Good Hope and his appointed agent, and that no agreement to exchange this territory for another land had been entered into by the Thembu people. The petition recounts attempts in 1864 and 1865 to offer an exchange of the Glen Grey territory for territory beyond the colonial boarder, which were rejected. The petition goes into detail to defend the claim that no arrangement between the

Thembu and the government was agreed on for relocation. The first two proposals (1864 and 1865) fell through and:

after this our Thembu chiefs, three of them minor chiefs, applied for leave to move into the vacant country, and permission was granted ... but this was a special arrangement entered into with a fragment of the tribe and aceded to by the government with the full knowledge that this proposal had not been accepted by the Tembu tribe. (p. 1)

Furthermore, they argue, the terms of this proposal could not have been honored, regardless of their rejection, because “more than one half of the country originally offered by Sir Philip Wodehouse to the Tembu in exchange for the locations was by Sir Philip’s directions filled up with Fingoes [amaMfengu] shewing conclusively that the then government admitted the failure of their proposed exchange.” (pp.1-2). The legal basis of this argument is made clear as the petition asserts “[t]hat your petitioners will be prepared to prove all these statements by evidence at the bar of your Honorable House.” (pg. 2)

Establishing that the Thembu retained the original rights to the Glen Grey district, the petition then argues that this territory, allotted in 1852 by the government, “has been very considerably reduced in extent” with the seizure of the lands belonging to the Chief Gangubelle, the land given to the Indwe and Imvani Railway project⁴², as well as 300 families relocated to Qumbu, as well as “nearly the same number [who] have been forced to leave their homes to be located elsewhere” (pg. 2).

⁴² Noted in the petition as 12 farms, Odendaal notes that this was “25,000 morgen of land, about a tenth of the district” (Odendaal 2013, 77).

The petition lays the blame for these removals squarely on the shoulders of the most powerful colonial officials of the region, and the authors do not shy away from making explicit accusations:

That the proceedings of Mr. Frost [The Member of Parliament] and Mr. Jenner the Resident Magistrate in connection with these removals complied with the assertions of Mr. De Wet [the Government Secretary of Native Affairs] at his interview with the Queens Town Council and Chamber of Commerce have caused great uneasiness to your petitioners and have created a feeling that your petitioners may be driven from their homes and rendered incapable of acquiring and holding lands. (pp. 2-3)

Furthermore, the petition quotes the government's own documents to assert their proposed solution – that the legal title to the Glen Grey territory held by the Thembu should be vested in a Thembu board of Trustees. They argue that:

In or about the year 1881 the then Governor of the Colony, by and with the advice of his responsible advisers, appointed a commission ...[who] reported in section 112 of their report:

‘... the commission recommends that these locations should continue to be reserved for native occupation; and that this reservation should be reserved by means of Folk or Forest Deeds issued for that purpose in favor of Boards of Trustees who shall hold and administer these lands for and on behalf of the natives in occupation of the same.’ (pg. 2)

This argument in place, the petition concludes with three requests: First, that key figures be summoned to the House of Assembly for an inquiry into the history of the proposed and actual removals of Thembu from the area, supported by documents which the House should request from the Civil Commissioner of Queenstown and the Resident Magistrate of Glen Grey. Second,

that the territory of the Thembu location currently occupied by Thembu should be vested in Trustees, as recommended by the government's own report. And third, that the government might provide other relief that the House of Assembly deemed fit. (pp. 3-4)

This document shows a syncretic form of political action and demand making which emerged as the political repertoires of both rural and educated leaders merged to create new possibilities.

The influence of educated leaders is clearly visible in a number of areas. First, in the use of the petition form, which was carefully crafted to adhere to the form and language of government petitions. Second, in the deployment of a clear legal framework which sets forth the history of governmental decrees and agreements, to be supported by documentary evidence and legal argument before the House if required. And finally, in the fluent use of the government's own documents as the basis for the argument for the creation of a single Trust to unify and formalize Thembu land rights. This fluency in both the language and tools of the colonial regime was the power that educated leaders brought to the table, allowing both traditional leaders and emerging leaders to turn the political and legal tools of the colonial regime to serve both their goals.

This capacity to use the tools of the colonial regime in the service of African interests is something already seen in the 'repertoire transposition' mode of political engagement discussed above. But in the Tembu Association these tools combined with the political power which rural leaders brought to the table. Thus, the political logic of traditional leaders is apparent throughout the piece. First, the appeal that the Thembus were "well-disposed natives" (pg. 1) who the government wanted to situate in land taken from Gcaleka Xhosa, builds on the logic of mutual political interdependence of rural leaders 'loyal' to the government who received government support, and a politically weak colonial state which depended on rural leaders to have any

governance in these areas further away from colonial power. By highlighting that the Cape government had sought out the “well-disposed” Thembu, the petition reminds the government of its need for African allies, and invokes the specter of the alternative – the political uprisings in Thembuland in 1880-81, forged out of political discontent, led by rural leaders who did not see reason to be “well-disposed” to the Cape government.

Second, where the organizations led by educated African political activists discussed above built a political identity increasingly around ‘Abantsundu’ (black) identity, it is evident that the political community had been conceptualized clearly along ‘ethnic’/*isizwe* lines; this political unit is clearly articulated as the Thembu people. This Thembu identity both overcame any internal political divisions of the area, and at the same time limited the rights claimed to a community unified by both Thembu pre-colonial identity, and by the colonial imagination of a “Tambookie” ‘tribe’. Thus, the petition was not made on behalf of the followers of any particular headman or chief, and indeed internal political divisions (such as the “three minor chiefs” who took up the offer for relocation) are dismissed as illegitimate political units. Instead, the petition appeals to the whole “Tembu tribe”, asserting that agreements were made and could only be renegotiated with this whole community. This Thembu identity thus offers a basis on which the thousands of signatories could be unified, and demonstrates the importance of the ‘ethnic’/*isizwe* political identities in shaping the political imagination and demands in these more rural contexts. Unlike the missionary-educated leaders who faced the ‘white vs black’ political cleavage created out of the raw racism of colonial institutions, the interests of the Thembu here were still seen as different from the Xhosa whose land had been taken, and the Mfengu who had been given half of that territory.

Finally, the political power of rural leaders was brought to the fore with the mass mobilization of thousands of Glen Grey inhabitants. This is visible in the huge number of signatures to the petition and is further emphasized by those who signed their names and also added the name of the headsman of the area from which they came. The relative political power of different headsmen is thus emphasized by the document which shows just how many people each different headsmen was capable of mobilizing. The petition thus implicitly invokes the claim of all mass movements, a threat that was ever present in the mind of both settler and governor: ‘We outnumber you, don’t forget to play nice.’

Each of these different political repertoires and logics had a power of their own and at different times in colonial expansion had won gains for their respective mission-educated and rural communities. Yet, separately, each political form was losing ground in the Glen Grey region. However, in the Thembu Association evidenced a merger of these different political repertoires generated new political imagination and political action. Here the mode of legal challenge and skilled engagement with colonial political institutions was linked to the same capacity for rural mobilization that once enabled anti-colonial uprisings. This yielded new forms of action, such as the mass petition politics seen in this example above, and it also yielded new political imagination – this included asserting the legal and political rights of an ethnic/*isizwe* community, pushing the government to use its institutional power to pursue legal justice for the Thembu community, and envisioning formalized legal land rights, not for the individual property holder, but for the community as a whole, held in trust not only by the chief or headsmen who remained in the good grace of government leaders, but held in trust as a formal and legal affirmation of the land rights of a community.

This close study of the Thembu Association shows a pattern which is seen more widely. In different ways, other organizations including Umanyano Batenjini (Union of the Thembus), Umanyano Zabantsundu (the Mfengu focused ‘Union of Black people/Natives’), and Intlanganiso Ye Nqubelo Pambili Yama Ngqika (Association for the Advancement of the Ngqika) all linked the skills and strategies of both educated and rural leaders, and mobilized rural communities around ethnic/*isizwe* identities to develop new forms of political engagement with the Cape government to defend the interests and wellbeing of their own ethnic/*isizwe* group (including movements focused on farming, housing development, infrastructure development, and mutual aid (see Odendaal 2013, chaps. 8 & 9 for more)). These different organizations all generated new and different forms of political engagement by drawing together the political resources and repertoires of existing rural and educated political forms and syncretically merging them to create new political opportunities and make gains for their local communities. In doing so, they developed new political subjectivities for their local communities, reiterating political identities based on pre-colonial and colonial ‘ethnic’ political groups, yet at the same time directing this unity to make demands on the government for rights and support by selectively incorporating colonial political forms.

Political consolidation through movement wide connections

Political innovation is one part of political transformation, but it alone is not enough. To transform a political field, these various forms of politics need to be held together, consolidated into a coherent political movement with the capacity to enable these innovations to endure and manifest in long-term transformation. Thus far I have argued that this emerging political field was made up of a number of different clusters representing different local movements.

Furthermore, I have argued that we see a distinct structural pattern which marks a fundamental difference in political practice and imagination between the Abantu Basesikolweni (school people) clusters and the *isizwe* (ethnic) clusters. These two groups mark two structurally similar ‘classes’ of political organization: first, the more ‘modernizer’ school people, which drew primary membership from those educated in mission schools, and operated closer to urban and mission contexts. Second, the more ‘traditionalist’ chief or headsman-led organizations who operated in more rural contexts, and actively deployed ethnic identities to mobilize large rural communities, merging long-standing logics of rural mobilization with new engagements with the government, and drawing in select educated leaders. This division between supposed ‘modernizers’ and ‘traditionalists’ has long been a conceptual distinction in the literature (Marks and Trapido 1987; Ranger 2002), signaled in the distinction between Abantu Basesikolweni (‘school’) and Abantu Babomvu (‘red’) communities (de Wet 2008), or between ‘traditionalists’ and ‘progressives’, each group made up of both elites and working class (Beinart and Bundy 1987).

This characterization of a social division in political communities of the time is also reflected in the structural analysis of the linkages in this political network. Yet this raises a puzzle for the emergence of the proto-nationalist movement: The understandings, political practices, and repertoires of these two groups would have more in common within their group than across groups. Why do we not see two movements emerging which reflect the ideas, issues, and worldview of each of these communities? Why did these different groups, with their different political orientations hold together to form a single political movement?

One important part of the answer is revealed by looking at how organizations were connected to each other. Organizations who shared members would have the basis for a closer connection and the potential for alignment with each other. These shared members would be able to keep linked organizations abreast of each other's political vision and action, facilitating easier coordination and alliance should it be desirable. The connections made in this network show one reason why the *isizwe* and 'civic minded' Abantu Basesikolweni organizations did not splinter off along existing social and ideological cleavages which might have divided them; different *isizwe* and Abantu Basesikolweni groups were socially disconnected from each other.

To study how socially connected, how socially 'close' or 'distant' organizations were from each other, I draw on network analysis methods which calculate the 'path length' between different nodes. In the figures shown below, I use the one-mode network which shows how organizations are linked by shared members. Here the strength of the links between organizations (the 'weight' of the tie) is the number of members they shared. This network allows us to ask: how closely connected were different organizations to each other? The conceptual framework which underpins this question is the following: organizations who shared many members were connected in a way that could facilitate coordination or alliance if the organizations chose this path. Such connections also allowed organizations to be aware of each other's political ideology and practice. For the social and ideological cleavages which existed between *Isizwe* and Abantu Basesikolweni groups to turn into political cleavages, these organizations would need to be connected enough to both build a mutual recognition of their similarity, and to coordinate or even ally with one another in their political goals and practices. The starting point for such connections could be fostered through shared members, but organizations would have also

become aware of each other if a number of their members interacted together in a third organization.

This conceptual intuition of the closeness of the connection between two organizations is analyzed below through a calculation of the ‘path distance’ between organizations. The analysis below uses a modified approach to Dijkstra’s (1959) shortest path calculation developed by Opsahl Agneessens and Skvoretz (2010)⁴³. Here the more members (the stronger the tie) between two organizations, the easier it is for them to connect, i.e. the ‘shorter the path’ between them. The distance between an organization and those it connects to directly is 1/tie weight. The distance to an organization not directly connected, or very weakly connected⁴⁴, would be through the shortest path between intermediary nodes, since in this instance the path length is the sum of each of the paths⁴⁵.

This approach allows the relative distance between one organization and all others to be calculated. This analysis of the closeness or distance between organizations is reported below in fig 3.8 and 3.9. These two figures exemplify the pattern: different ‘traditionalist’ organizations (fig 3.8) as well as different ‘school’ organizations (fig 3.9) are distant from each other.

⁴³ I drew on the tnet package for R, where Opsahl Agneessens and Skvoretz implement this approach.

⁴⁴ While this approach allows for shorter paths between two organizations which are weakly connected through a strongly connected third organization (or in principle more intermediary steps) in practice, for this network, the shortest path is almost always made through direct connections.

⁴⁵ This is given by the weighted modification for Dijkstra’s calculation shortest path as proposed by both Newman (2001) and Brandes (2001): **Distance (node i, node j) = Min($\frac{1}{\text{Weight}_{\text{node i}}} + \dots + \frac{1}{\text{Weight}_{\text{node j}}}$)** (see Opsahl, Agneessens, and Skvoretz 2010, 248).




Figure 3.8: Social closeness of Umanyano Batenjini (left) and Umanyano Zabantsundu (right)




Figure 3.9: Social closeness of the Ethiopian Benefit Society (left) and the Transkei Mutual Improvement Association (right)

Contrasting with this distance, figure 3.10 shows the ‘closeness centrality’ of all the nodes in the network, where each node’s closeness to all other nodes is calculated as the sum of the path

distance from one node to every other node (Opsahl, Agneessens, and Skvoretz 2010, 248)⁴⁶.

Nodes with the shortest total path distance are closely connected to all other nodes in the network, and those with the longest sum path distance are distant from many other nodes.




Figure 3.10: Closeness centrality of the whole network

Taken together these analyses show one reason why political development holds together. Isizwe and ‘civic’ Abantu Basesikolweni organizations are not strongly connected among themselves.

⁴⁶ Calculated using the tnet package for R.

Instead, these movements make connections to each other through common central organizations such as the NEA, Imbumba Eliziso Lomzi Yabantsundu and through ‘old boy’ networks formed through school connections. The NEA and Imbumba Eliliso Lomzi Yabantsundu are the ‘closest’ in social space to all other nodes. Both the *isizwe* clusters, as well as the mission-educated ‘civic’ organizations such as the Transkei Mutual improvement Association (TMIA), the Ethiopian Benefit Society (EBS), and the South African Native Association (SANA) are the most ‘distant’ from other movements (shown by their color as well as by their position on the edges of the network).

This gives insight into the different roles played by organizations in the emerging political field. While a range of different political forms flourished across the region, they did so largely directed towards their own local challenges, mobilizing people in local regions, with separations between the educated and the traditionalists, and between different *isizwe*/‘ethnic’ political groups. Yet, these diverse movements were connected by important unifying organizations, the Imbumba Eliliso Lomzi Yabantsundu (henceforth referred to by the shorthand Eliliso Lomzi) and the NEA after 1887. Focusing on the members of these two organizations drives this point home (fig 3.11 and 3.12). It is clear from the diagram that the NEA drew membership from all of the different community clusters (from the community detection above). Eliliso Lomzi also drew wide membership from these clusters, including all clusters except the purple cluster of the temperance movement and the urban Port Elizabeth organizations. Yet Eliliso Lomzi drew many more leading rural chiefs and headsmen into direct participation.




Figure 3.12: Eliliso Lomzi linking members

Indeed, if these two linking organizations, and the two schools with their old boy networks are removed, this network comes very close to being split into four distinct clusters, with only one or two people who link between these clusters. Figure 3.13 shows those people who link organizations once these two organizations and two schools are removed. This figure labels the

five individuals who link these four clusters and demonstrates how disconnected the network becomes without these connections.




Figure 3.13: Network of linkers with NEA, Eliliso Lomzi, and the two schools (Lovedale and Healdtown) removed

Political transformations and linkages in the late 1880s

To understand how these linkages formed across the political spectrum I now turn to an analysis of Eliliso Lomzi and the NEA to examine the conditions which facilitated new connections which united these different clusters. I again draw primarily on the historical work of Odendaal (2013) to recount this history, supplemented by primary newspaper reports and petition records.

A key moment of political transformation began in 1887 in response to the newly proposed Voters Registration Act which threatened to remove a large number of rural African voters from the Cape voter roll. The organized reaction to this new threat, which I will discuss in detail below, prompted new connections and unities between rural and educated political organizations, most clearly seen in the creation of a new umbrella body Eliliso Lomzi which was a Union of ‘native vigilance’ associations, made up of many branches in local communities which were linked through the umbrella organization.

This transformation is made visible if we look at the ties that had been made in the network by 1886, shown in Figure 3.14. This figure shows membership ties which were reported in newspaper articles published until the end of 1886⁴⁷, and these figures are color coded according to their closeness centrality as discussed above (in Fig. 3.8-3.10). What Figure 3.14 reveals is that by early 1887 the separate regional and ethnic clusters remained distinctly disconnected. The

⁴⁷ Note that these links draw on the date of the newspaper articles reporting membership, not the date of the organizations themselves. This may under-represent the true membership which may have existed but only appeared in newspaper reports later. However, this approach holds to the newspaper sources instead of imputing possible membership without sufficient information. The only organization this significantly affects is Intlanganiso Ye Nqubelo Pambili Yama Ngqika, which was founded in 1885, but whose first article reporting membership comes from 1888. Note that this figure also includes membership listed in Odendaal (2013) which lacks date information. This only affects the school membership (Lovedale and Healdtown) and participation in the newspaper Isigidimi sama-Xosa drawn from Odendaal as other organizational membership is linked to dated newspaper reports. The inclusion of these ties does not misrepresent the links made by 1886, as individuals would have already graduated from these schools and participated in the newspaper.

NEA remained the organization most ‘socially close’ to all others, but it remained at the core of the group of Abantu Basesikolweni (school people) organizations. In fact, the figure illustrates how the NEA only made connections to rural clusters through the two labeled individuals, James Pelem and Duncan Makohliso. In this figure we see that the ‘old boy’ school networks are still a primary link between the Abantu Basesikolweni and *isizwe* organizations. Lovedale, with graduates connected to organizations in emigrant Thembuland (ETNAS, Umanyano), and Healdtown with graduates connected to Thembuland organizations (Thembu_A, SANA) and to teacher and self-help organizations in the Transkei (TTA, TMIA) remain the nodes which created the bridges between rural and mission educated political movements. Thus, beyond these ‘old boy’ ties of the past, there were very few active co-membership links between organizations from the mission school heartland (the central cluster) and both rural and educated movements at the colonial periphery.




Figure 3.14: Membership of linking figures until 1886, colored with closeness centrality

This state of affairs, poised on the cusp of a transformation, is made clear in an analysis of the political development of the NEA. As Odendaal’s work shows (2013, chap. 6), the NEA was a cautious adopter of the more radical political trends developed in other organizations. The organization (called Umanyano nge Mfundo in isiXhosa (lit. the Union of Education) was founded in 1880 as an association for African teachers (Odendaal 2013, 60). Initially, the organization was centered around the mission school axis of Lovedale, Healdtown, and St. Mathews (ibid). Yet from this basis, as an organization focusing on issues of African education

and being shy of political engagement in 1882, the organization grew increasingly politically engaged. By 1884, it was engaging in political issues including registering African voters, challenging pass laws, arguing that Africans should serve on juries to ensure justice, and even proposing that the time had come for Africans to sit in parliament (Odendaal 2013, 62). Here we see the NEA engaging many of the core political issues and focal points shared by explicitly political organizations representing the mission-educated African community. Odendaal attributes this increased political dynamism to the arrival of John Tengo Jabavu as vice-president (Odendaal 2013, 60). Jabavu gave extensive coverage to the organization in his role as editor of the *Isigidimi* newspaper and participated in the creation of a new constitution which broadened the mandate of the organization's political involvement. While officially operating as a teachers' organization, the organization's leadership and membership included most of the most influential educated black leaders of the time. As shown by its central position in the network, this organization offered an opportunity for important leaders from across various Abantu Basesikolweni political (and religious) organizations to rub shoulders and debate their visions for the advancement of African communities. The organization's constitution set out the guiding goals: "to take a special interest in all educational matters, in schools, in teachers and all others engaged in similar work, the aim of which is the improvement and elevation of the native races; to promote social morality and the general welfare of the natives" (NEA Constitution quoted in Odendaal 2013, 62). Yet, as Odendaal shows (2013, 62-63) the organization also brought together an established and more conservative older generation of mission educated leaders⁴⁸ with a younger generation who were seeking more radical and explicit political challenge. This

⁴⁸ Members who held to the mission-educated line of 'developing' what was still considered an 'inferior race' of Africans (see Odendaal's analysis of Elijah Makiwane's speech as president in 1885 (2013, 62).

difference of political vision and strategy both drew the NEA into political engagements, but tempered these engagements, maintaining a level of political caution even as it became more explicitly political from 1884 (Odendaal 2013, 62-63).

By 1887, in the face of a new threat to African participation in the colonial state, this tension came to a head. In early 1887, Jabavu was aiming to push the organization in a more explicitly political direction, seeking to reform the constitution and develop a branch structure to build membership in different local communities (Odendaal 2013, 63 & 113-114). When this proposal was rejected, Jabavu cut ties with the organization, and became a leading figure in the Eliliso Lomzi movement to which I will now turn. What this analysis highlights is that by 1887, the NEA remained a central, powerful, and enduring organization which fostered and coordinated mission-educated African political action, and was pivotal in forging connections among important leaders, yet it remained disconnected from political movements emerging in rural areas, and was held in a tension between cautious and radical political action.

Imbumba Eliliso Lomzi Yabantsundu

In 1887, a new threat sparked a political transformation which created new alliances between educated and rural leaders. As Odendaal notes, “What finally provided the trigger for a regional organization, encompassing under its wing all existing groups, was the Parliamentary Voters Registration Act passed by parliament in September 1887” (2013, 114). On the one hand, this Act sought to extend voting rights to the Transkei territories (annexed to the Cape colony from 1877 onward as discussed), but at the same time it aimed to strip rural African voters from the voter registry by disqualifying tribal or communal land tenure as a qualification to register to vote (Odendaal 2013, 114). As discussed in Chapter 2, the huge growth in African voters by

1886 enabled Africans to provide the decisive swing vote in electing members from a number of eastern districts to parliament. A large number of rural voters were able to register to vote, because they could use communal or tribal land tenure as the prerequisite land ownership requirement necessary to register, and educated leaders served as key intermediaries who were able to engage and negotiate with colonial candidates seeking election and engage rural leaders who could mobilize and coordinate collective voting in their communities. This dynamic provided a potentially powerful political swing.

As discussed above, the Transkei area had a much larger African peasant farmer community, a much smaller white population, and retained strong local organization directed through rural leaders. The expansion of the franchise to this area thus offered an opportunity to further expand African electoral politics and influence in the Cape government. However, not only would this gain be invalidated if communal land tenure was removed as a basis for property qualification, but a large number of Africans already registered to vote in the eastern districts would be stripped of their voter rights. Thus, while the Act was sold as an expansion of franchise, it was in fact a direct attack on the power of Africans to use democratic means to secure their interests. As noted by Odendaal, quoting the *Imvo* newspaper run by Jabavu: “having taken away their weapons under the Disarmament Act, Sprigg [the Cape Governor] now sought to remove even their constitutional weapons.” (Odendaal 2013, 115).

The response by African political leaders was an emphatic sounding of the alarm in African language newspapers, and a flurry of activity seeking to oppose the Act. One early response which highlights the mass engagement with this new threat were the large petitions sent by a number of communities. As with petitioning discussed above, African leaders turned the political

strategies developed in the prohibition struggle to this new threat⁴⁹. Zulu Zunema headed 600 residents of Oxkraal and Kamastone opposing the bill presented on June 7th 1887⁵⁰, P.J. Mzimba headed Africans from Victoria East on 27 June 1887⁵¹, and J.T. Jabavu himself headed a petition from the African residents of King William's Town on July 1st 1887⁵². Odendaal notes that this last petition was signed by just under 1000 people, four-fifths of whom were illiterate; this demonstrated that political mobilization had expanded well beyond the mission-educated community (Odendaal 2013, 115-6).

This resistance by petitioning was just one form of political response. Odendaal emphasizes the central role that J.T. Jabavu played in coordinating this political action, both through his editorship of the *Imvo* newspaper, and through mobilizing local communities. Mobilization by Jabavu began in the urban areas of Port Elizabeth and King William's Town and soon expanded more widely. Participants prepared to send a delegation directly to the Queen of England and sought alliances with the Aborigines Protection Society in Brittan to aid their cause in bringing the battle to England, which Odendaal tracks in detail (2013, 116-117). Ultimately the most powerful result of this mobilization was the "convening [of] the first-ever regional conference of political organizations in the eastern Cape ... and reflected a hitherto unequalled sense of unity among them." (Odendaal 2013, 117) While meeting on 6 October 1887 in King Williams Town, this conference drew delegates from across the political spectrum, uniting the important leaders

⁴⁹ Indeed, this link is made clear as P.J. Mzimba of the IOTT headed two petitions from African residents in Victoria East, one opposing the Parliamentary Registration Bill (CA, HA 804, no.73), and the other defending the prohibition of liquor sales to Africans (CA, HA 804, no.76), both presented to parliament on the same day: 27 June 1887.

⁵⁰ CA, HA 803, no. 12, see also Odendaal 2013, 115.

⁵¹ CA, HA 804, no.73.

⁵² CA, HA 804, no.114.

of all but two of the educated and rural political organizations discussed above (Odendaal 2013, 118). Only official delegations were missing from Manyano nge Mvo Zabantsundu (labeled ManZabant above) and Intlanganiso Ye Nqubelo Pambili Yama Ngqika, the neighbouring Ngqika-Xhosa, and Mfengu organizations under founder Andrew Gontshi. These organizations were absent since Gontshi took the minority position of supporting the Bill (for more see Odendaal 2013, 118). Even still, two members, one from each of these organizations, opposed Gontshi and attended the meeting in an unofficial capacity⁵³ (Odendaal 2013, 118-9).

Ultimately, this conference of eastern Cape African political organizations resulted in the formation of a new umbrella body, Imbumba Eliliso Lomzi Yabantundu (the Union of Native Vigilance Associations) which would be made up of local branches in every district called *Iliso Lomzi* (Native Vigilance Association, lit. the eye of the homestead) (Odendaal 2013, 119).

Odendaal closely follows how this new organization coordinated its struggle against the Parliamentary Registration Bill, and when in spite of this resistance, the Bill was passed, how the organization coordinated local challenges on behalf of African voters who had been stripped of their voting rights, and succeeded in reinstating hundreds of African voters, eventually turning to legal challenges before registration officers and in courts, supported by retaining esteemed Cape lawyers (2013, 12-14).

For this study, the key transformation was the new political unity created between educated and rural political organizations, fostered by a form of political power which emerged at the intersection of the political strengths of each of these organizations. Both educated and rural

⁵³ Furthermore, the newly established organization continued to build bridges with these two organizations by nominating both Gontshi and the Ngqika queen Nowawe Sandile (a member of the Ngqika association) as potential delegates to send to England (see Odendaal 2013, 119).

leaders could gain political strength through mobilizing African voters. As discussed in chapter 2, the power of this form of politics was only possible when Cape political elites were linked with rural African voters. The expansion of franchise to the Transkei area alongside the threat to disenfranchise rural voters offered a key intersection between the political capabilities of educated leaders – who were skilled in the political forms of the Cape Government⁵⁴ and used newspapers to coordinate and explore political possibilities – and rural leaders who could mobilize mass support from their local communities, the numerical foundation for African electoral power. This new foundation for political connections across educated/rural and multi-ethnic political divides created a new institutional base which facilitated the continued development of a united proto-nationalist movement and steered this emerging political form away from potential political class and ethnic schisms, both of which are structurally visible in the political network.

A new modus operandi for political organizations

The above analysis makes clear how Eliliso Lomzi forged new connections and established its central position in the proto-nationalist network. But what about the NEA? Although Odendaal notes that as other more explicit political organizations emerged, “the NEA gradually reverted to its role of a teachers’ association and in 1906 it finally became the South African Native Teachers Association (SANTA)” (2013, 63), the network above shows that by the end of 1890 the NEA had not lost, but had in fact expanded its centrality as the most important connector in this network. Instead, it seems that the break with Jabavu and the rise of Eliliso Lomzi resulted in a transformation within the NEA itself. While the NEA was not directly engaged with Eliliso

⁵⁴ And even in the potential access to the British government, although the deputation to England never materialized (Odendaal 2013, 121-122).

Lomzi, they too participated in challenging the Voter Bill, sending a deputation to the premier to oppose the Bill⁵⁵, although they took an approach which was not directly confrontational when they sent a delegation to meet with the Cape Governor Gordon Sprigg⁵⁶. Nonetheless, in the aftermath of the rise of Eliliso Lomzi, there was a distinct change in both the membership and in the rhetoric of the NEA from 1888 to 1890.

Figure 3.15 shows the linkages made by the NEA until 1886 alongside the linkages made between 1887 and 1890, including the community detection colors from the analysis above. What this figure makes clear is that the NEA forged many new connections to members who participated in rural organizations in the 1887-1890 period. The vast majority of these come from the 1889-1890 period which reveals that this new expansion of connections was not in concert with the political mobilization of 1887, but instead was a shift in political orientation which emerged in light of the new cross-regional networks formed through the Eliliso Lomzi political struggle.

⁵⁵ *Imvo Zabantsundu* 1887-01-26, p.11.

⁵⁶ *Imvo Zabantsundu* 1887-05-11, p.2.




Figure 3.15: NEA ties to 1886 (left) and ties between 1887-1890 (right)

One part of these new connections might be explained by Andrew Gontshi's opposition to the Eliliso Lomzi movement. We see many new connections to dark green colored nodes, representing members of the two organizations founded by Gontshi, who had never formally aligned themselves with Eliliso Lomzi. Yet the other connections formed in this period suggest that these new connections cannot be explained by a cleavage between those who supported the formation of Eliliso Lomzi and those who did not. We also see many new linkages to the Transkei Mutual Improvement Association and Transkei Teachers association (in blue), as well as to important figures who were connected to Eliliso Lomzi (in red) as well as a headsman from the emigrant Thembuland cluster. Thus, these new connections do not represent a cleavage between the NEA and Eliliso Lomzi, but instead indicate that the NEA worked to open itself to

engagement with Transkei organizations as well as to important figures who participated in Eliliso Lomzi.

This new orientation to expanding its connections to more rural political movements is visible in the reports about the NEA in the newspapers. In 1888, newspaper articles reported that the NEA was actively seeking to expand its connections. In a report from April 6th of 1888 the organization decried that the spirit of welcoming guests was dying in the organization, and it resolved to assist visitors who came to organization meetings⁵⁷. After some reports of tension with a visiting delegation from Transkei⁵⁸, an article in June reaffirms that the NEA was seeking to build new connections and new unity among its members, seeking to spread to new areas in order to better help both its members and the wider community⁵⁹. In January of 1889 the organization proposed new laws and regulations, including the aim of having smaller regional meetings in a wider range of areas with the goal of revitalizing the dignity and spirit of the organization⁶⁰ and a report from February recounted that the NEA held a meeting where among other issues they considered the need to grow and expand the organization, both in membership numbers and socio-political reach, so much so that the organization would be capacious enough to cover all issues pertaining to black people and not just teacher-student issues⁶¹, and debates around expansion continued to be a recurring theme throughout 1889 and 1890⁶². In this same period, the organization also explicitly engaged a wide range of issues in addition to education

⁵⁷ *Imvo Zabantsundu* 1888-04-06, p.3.

⁵⁸ See articles in *Imvo Zabantsundu* 1888-05-23, p.2 & p.3.

⁵⁹ *Imvo Zabantsundu* 1888-06-14, p.3.

⁶⁰ *Imvo Zabantsundu* 1889-01-17, p.2.

⁶¹ *Imvo Zabantsundu* 1889-02-07, p.3.

⁶² See reports in *Imvo Zabantsundu* 1889-02-22, p.3; *Imvo Zabantsundu* 1890-08-07, p.2.

issues, including how to engage the government's arrest of chiefs⁶³, debates over who should be African's choice electoral candidate⁶⁴, taxes⁶⁵, and traditional Xhosa initiation rituals⁶⁶. Thus, from 1888 onward newspaper reports show both a clear organizational focus on expanding membership and forging new connections with areas beyond the old missionary heartland from where the NEA had drawn its primary membership, and an engagement with issues that were pertinent to members from these expanded areas.

This transformation in the NEA highlights that the rise of Eliliso Lomzi was not only a new organization which fostered new connections between rural and educated political organization. More than this, it ushered in a transformed vision of how African politics should be orchestrated. As the NEA demonstrated, the new modus operandi was to build wider connections. Pursuing African interests was now envisioned as a task which would require wider connections across regions and would involve rural leaders as well as the missionary educated elite.

The rise of Eliliso Lomzi, with its clear vision of linking local branches into a cross regional struggle, and the resulting response by the NEA to work to transform itself into an organization which also developed cross-regional connections, are evidence of a defining shift in emerging proto-nationalist politics. While the opposition between educated 'progressive' communities and leadership, and rural 'traditionalist' communities who rejected colonial values and norms would not go away, the new interconnections between educated, more urban-centered politics, and rural

⁶³ *Imvo Zabantsundu* 1889-02-07, p.3.

⁶⁴ *Imvo Zabantsundu* 1889-02-22, p.3.

⁶⁵ *Imvo Zabantsundu* 1889-04-11, p.3.

⁶⁶ *Imvo Zabantsundu* 1888-09-20, p.2; *Imvo Zabantsundu* 1889-04-11, p.3.

political movements headed by chiefs and headsmen, created a more unified proto-nationalist movement which could draw innovative political strategies and ideas from both contexts.

Conclusion

The decade of the 1880s marked the rise of the first African political organizations of a nascent but rapidly growing movement which laid the political foundations for African nationalism in South Africa. These earliest organizations of this emerging proto-nationalist movement collectively participated in a context of rapid political innovation which transformed the horizon of political possibilities. Emerging from this context were new frameworks of shared identity, new analyses of the key problems of day, new articulations of African's rights and abilities to engage these problems, and new strategies of action to engage both local and state political powers to seek a shared political change.

In this chapter I have studied this capacity for political innovation by combining a broad view of the political structure which emerged from networks of cross-organizational membership and linked this with a close analysis of the ideas and arguments seen in these organizations' political articulations. Drawing on this combination of methodological tools reveals two broad patterns of innovation seen in nascent proto-nationalist organizations emerging through the decade of the 1880s. I call these forms of innovation 'repertoire transposition' and 'repertoire syncretization'.

Repertoire transposition arises when frameworks of political organization, interpretation, and strategies of action are moved to new social contexts. As they are applied in a new domain, these political frameworks are transformed to fit the needs of the new context, and as they are applied in new ways, they are ultimately transformed into something new. This form of innovation is

most clearly seen in the cluster of ‘Abantu Basesikolweni’ (school people) organizations which united more urban and missionary-educated African communities. Missionary-educated Africans, who had experience and familiarity with missionary and colonial style political organizations, began to form their own African-only organizations drawing on these organizational models. Yet as they turned these colonial organizational forms to achieve their goals, they transformed these colonial approaches in ways that fostered a new ‘patriotic’ African and black identity, and they worked for the benefit and advancement these newly imagined communities.

To illustrate this, I have turned to closely look at how colonial political models were taken up and transformed in two early political organizations, the Independent Order of True Templars and Imbumba yama Nyama. I have shown how prominent proto-nationalist political leaders got early political exposure in organizations such as the Independent Order of True Templars, a multi-racial temperance organization which developed branches across the eastern Cape region. This organization was strongly modeled on semi-masonic organizational practices inherited from the temperance movement in the United States, and held strongly to Christian missionary visions of individual and social moral degradation, and the need to transform society through both individual morality and broad social upliftment. Yet from this context and born from a global temperance movement and missionary morality, new African-centric visions of identity and utopian social upliftment emerged. African leaders developed a framework of analysis that identified racial and ethnic inequalities, worked to uplift the ‘black nations’ who were being destroyed by alcohol, and gained political experience both with organizing and leading widespread engagement with the Cape parliament in order to push for state intervention to bring

about their goals of social upliftment of black communities. A similar transformation of colonial political forms to achieve African ends is visible in the earliest proto-nationalist organization Imbumba yama Nyama. This organization emerged as an African political interest group, in part reacting to the Afrikanerbond – an organization mobilizing for the interest of Dutch farmers explicitly opposed to African rights. Imbumba offered an organization now explicitly dedicated to the political situation and political problems of people now understood as ‘African’. Working in urban contexts, this organization engaged deeply in colonial political practice – it both engaged the white city and governmental leaders in their local contexts, and engaged the Cape parliament itself, leveraging some of the earliest efforts to register African voters, setting a movement which would become increasingly powerful through the 1880s.

The second form of innovation I follow is repertoire syncretization, which emerges as the political understandings, practices, and skillsets of different political traditions are brought together to create innovative new forms. This form of innovation is most visible in a set of *isizwe* organizations which brought rural political leaders and communities who were united around ethnic political identities together with missionary-educated leaders who had experience and expertise with the political forms present in the Cape colony. Here I show that as rural and missionary educated leaders combined their political frameworks and skillsets, they forged new movements which mobilized rural communities around ethnic identities, yet they were able to turn this mass mobilization to new forms of political action in order to make demands on the colonial state.

I illustrate this approach through a close analysis of the Thembu Association, which combined knowledge of the legal framework of the colonial state and petitioning, with mass mobilization

and the reassertion of a shared Thembu identity to make demands for land rights and protections for Thembu peoples. Similar patterns are also seen in other ethnic organizations, where leading rural leaders and missionary-educated leaders united to create ethnically-oriented self-help organizations which offered a platform to increasingly engage the colonial state and make demands for support. In these contexts, we see the development and reassertion of local *isizwe* or ethnic political identities as the key unifying category. Yet these new *isizwe* organizations were able to fight for their local community's interests, rights, and access to state resources by incorporating new avenues for collective strategic action, and framing their demands to the state in new ways.

The second key process I follow in this chapter is the consolidation of forms of innovation seen in various local movements in the eastern Cape into a more unified and interconnected proto-nationalist movement. The structure of the political network highlights how political organizations first emerged in local regions, by responding to local challenges. In this network, two structurally distinct political groupings are visible. One set of organizations were centered around mission-stations and more urban areas, which united the *Abantu Basesikolweni* (school people) communities. A second set of organizations emerged in more rural contexts, led by rural headsmen and chiefs alongside some mission-educated leaders, and drawing membership from these rural communities. The dominant ideas and political practices of these two groups, and the social, economic, and political contexts of their members had more in common within these two groupings than across them. These social cleavages might have led to a schism among emerging political organizations, creating two separate urban mission-educated and rural traditionalist political movements. Yet instead of this social cleavage resulting in a political cleavage, an

increasingly unified ‘proto-nationalist’ movement which fostered links between these different domains, was formed. I argue that the structure of the political network offers insight into why this schism did not come to pass in the nascent period of emerging African political organizations. The structure of inter-organizational connections reveals that civic-minded Abantu Basesikolweni organizations (such as mutual aid and teachers’ organizations) across the region and local *isizwe* organizations did not develop strong cross organizational links within their own group. Instead, cross region unity was first fostered around African voter mobilization and a legal threat to disenfranchise rural African voters. This threat to rural voters resonated with both urban and rural political leaders. Urban leaders were highly conscious of electoral politics and saw voter disenfranchisement as an attack on African (rather than rural) political representation. Rural leaders and their communities were directly affected, threatened with increasing exclusion, just as newly emerging ethnic organizations were directing their demands to the colonial state. The response to this threat fostered a truly cross-regional, cross-domain, political response. Leaders from across the region met together, formed an umbrella organization called Imbumba Eliliso Lomzi Yabantsundu with local branches, and coordinated their challenge of this new legislation. Not only did this new organization form new connections across previously separated organizations, it also shifted the modus operandi of political organization more widely. As shown in the analysis of the Native Educational Association – the most enduring and centrally connected Abantu Basesikolweni organization – the image of political connections changed in the face of this collectively catalyzing event. Before 1887, the NEA had drawn leading African teachers and ministers together in an organization which represented Abantu Basesikolweni interests, issues, and political vision. After the rise of Imbumba Eliliso Lomzi Yabantsundu there

was a clear shift in the political rhetoric and practice of the organization, which both repeatedly raised the need to reach to more rural organizations, and whose membership reflected that they did indeed transform the nature of their connections, linking far more widely from 1888 until the end of the decade. This shift suggests a larger change in political imagination ushered in by the widespread response to African voter disenfranchisement. At that point, cross-regional connections and common political interests and issues were powerfully foregrounded in the attention of African political leaders, and leading organizations were intentionally working to overcome social cleavages as they continued to develop the proto-nationalist movement in response to a sudden and pressing shared threat.

Both innovation and consolidation were critical to the emergence and endurance of the nascent political forms which grew into African nationalism. By attending to both the relational structure of organizational emergence, and to the political vision visible in these organizations' own political articulations, this chapter has worked to take into account the dynamics which facilitated political transformation in the first decade of African proto-nationalist organization.

These structure patterns which created the possibility for innovation are applicable more broadly. Drawing this case into dialogue with other political sociology literature has enabled the typification of two patterns of innovation in organizational contexts which is widely applicable. Thinking with the concepts of repertoire transposition and repertoire syncretization may offer scholars conceptual tools to delineate different dynamics of political transformation which emerge in structurally different contexts: repertoire transposition where contender groups who have mastery of elite or hegemonic political forms take up those forms yet transform them as they put them to work in their own contexts, and repertoire syncretization where political actors

with very different political imaginations and strategies are united in new ways and are able to merge their different strategies and political imaginations into new forms which open up new avenues for political contention.

Yet as other scholars of transformation have noted, innovation alone is not enough for transformation. For innovative new forms to truly transform a political system, these novel political practices need to become established and enduring and be fed back into the wider political system to transform the practices and understandings of others. This chapter has only begun to gesture towards this aspect of transformative feedback. I have shown how new cross-regional and cross-domain political unities were formed, which enabled enhanced collective action and allowed innovation to be shared among a wider network. Future work will study how the packages of ideas and practices developed in this nascent proto-nationalist movement fed back into wider geographic circles in the following two decades, truly transforming the practice of African political organization as political communities across present-day South Africa have taken up the innovative forms developed here and were linked together into wider networks which consolidated in the formation of the African National Congress.

Appendix A

Full organization membership details

Table 3.2 documents the full details of the organizations included in the network analysis including membership counts, the number of members who link at least two organizations, and the number of members who link four or more organizations.

Table 3.2: Organizations and membership

Full Name	English translation	Label	Founded	Memb count	Link 2+ Orgs	Link 4+ Orgs
Native Educational Association		NEA	1880	137	56	16
Independent Order of True Templars		IOTT	1875/6	103	27	5
Imbumba Yama Nyama		Imbumba	1882	89	33	9
Umanyano lwase Batenjini	Union of Thembus	Umanyano	1886	58	21	2
Intlanganiso yaba Fundisi	Ministers' association	Int_Fundisi		38	5	2
Lovedale		Lovedale	1824	37	25	7
Transkei Mutual Improvement Association		TMIA	1884	37	13	2
Imbumba Eliliso Lomzi Yabantsundu	Union of Native Vigilance Associations	Eliliso_Lomzi	1887	107	35	12
Emigrant Thembuland Native Agricultural Society		ETNAS	1876	30	16	1
Manyano nge Mvo Zabantsundu	Union for Native Opinion	ManZabant	1887	26	7	3
Healdtown		Healdtown	1855	24	19	4
Thembu Association		Thembu_A	1882	24	11	3
Ethiopian Benefit Society		EBS	1877	18	16	3

Table 3.2: Organizations and membership – continued

Isigidimi Sama Xhosa		Isigidimi	1870	18	11	7
Intlanganiso Ye Nqubelo Pambili Yama Ngqika	Association for the Advancement of the Ngqika	IntlanNgqika	1885	14	9	4
Transkeian Teachers Association		TTA	1882	18	14	5
South African Native Association		SANA	1882	6	6	2

Comparison of force-directed layout to multi-dimensional scaling

To check the validity of the force-directed layout I apply multi-dimensional scaling methods to the weighted adjacency matrix of Organizations by Members.

Multi-dimensional scaling approaches work to try to preserve the ‘distances’ between all nodes and represent these distances in two-dimensional space as accurately as possible. This measure of ‘distance’ must be defined. In the following I first identify the ‘similarity’ of organizations by calculating the Pearson correlation coefficient of organizations through membership (using the adjacency matrix of Organizations by Members). I then use the Euclidean distance approach to identify the ‘distance’ between organizations whose similarity is defined by this correlation. This is applied using the scikit-learn package `sklearn.manifold.MDS` in Python. The results are presented below, and nodes are colored using the communities identified in the hierarchical cluster analysis, presented below (This serves as a cross check on both the MDS and the cluster analysis). Figures 3.16 a and b are presented in order to contrast the MDS output with the force-directed approach used in the chapter (and the community detection – see appendix A section on hierarchical clustering, pp.254-256).




Figure 3.16a: Organization MDS layout




Figure 3.16b: Organization force-directed layout

Discussion

This MDS output maps applies very well to the output of the force-directed layout. One key change is the more central position of PNA in the MDS approach. As noted, this organization has only two mentioned members, and only one member who makes ties. Thus, PNA has no ties for almost every individual in the network and is thus ‘similar’ to other organizations who also have non-members. This lack of ties means that PNA is pushed to the periphery in the force-directed layout. Besides this one difference, the MDS layout using correlation to calculate similarity and a Euclidean distance metric, yields results that closely mirror the force-directed layout and thus corroborate the layout visualization used throughout the chapter.

Comparison of weighted and unweighted one-mode network representations

Transforming two-mode to one-mode

Two approaches were used to transform the two-mode network into a one-mode network. The first ‘unweighted’ transformation dropped all membership tie weights, marking only the presence (1) or absence (0) of membership. The transformation to a one-mode network then entailed multiplying this unweighted adjacency matrix of Organizations by Members with its transpose ($M \cdot M^T$) which yields the Organization by Organization matrix, where each cell holds the number of members shared by each organization (see Breiger 1974).

The second ‘weighted’ transformation kept the weights of membership ties and performed the one-mode transformation, multiplying the weighted adjacency matrix of Organizations by Members with its transpose ($M \cdot M^T$). This yields weights which are multiplicative rather than additive. For example, if a person has one tie to two organizations, each organization’s tie weight is increased by 1(1x1). Yet, if a person has a weight of nine in one organization and of four in another, the tie between those organizations is increased by 36 (9x4).

Strengths and weaknesses of weighted and unweighted representations

These approaches have strengths and weaknesses for this analysis. Remember that the weight is obtained from the number of unique articles about an organization which mention a member.

The strength of the weighted approach is that it preserves the way that important leading figures may be more influential than marginal figures. A person who is influential in two organizations here gains a multiplicative weight, marking their increased capacity to influence both organizations and therefore transmit understandings and strategies between these organizations.

The important weakness of this weighted approach arises from the uneven level of reporting in the newspapers. Organizations closely connected to the newspapers or newspaper editors and writers receive significantly more coverage than more rural organizations. This can disproportionately skew the sense of connections in favor of organizations who have drawn a lot of reporting (which may be influenced by bias).

The unweighted approach loses the way that influential (operationalized as more frequently mentioned) members might have a disproportionate impact on connecting organizations. Yet this approach solves some of the problems which emerge from skewed reporting. Even while rural organizations are less likely to be reported on, their key members are still reported on (especially members who are known to the mission-educated community, which form the newspapers' consumer bases). This means that, while the lack of reporting may still obscure some members who link to other organizations, many of the members who are also linkers are likely to be reported on. This means that using the unweighted approach can mitigate some of the challenges which emerge through the varying frequency of reporting.

Choice of unweighted representations

In the paper I have focused on the unweighted transformation to the one-mode network. This is because the primary use of the one-mode analysis is in the examination of path distance between organizations. In this analysis of path distance (drawing on the inverse edge weight), the disproportionate influence of uneven reporting plays a big role and obscures the relative position of more rural organizations. Using the raw membership count thus makes sense to consider how easy it would be for one organization to connect with another.

Comparison of weighted and unweighted graphs

Nonetheless, there is a significant degree of agreement between the weighted and unweighted representations. The figures below present the unweighted approach (left) used in the paper with the weighted approach (right), visualized using a force-directed layout as outlined in the chapter (see pg 173, footnote 5). First, I present the image with the overview color scheme, and next I present the difference in closeness centrality (as outlined in the chapter, pp.233-235)




Figure 3.17: Unweighted overview (left); weighted overview (right)




Figure 3.18: Unweighted closeness centrality (left); weighted closeness centrality (right)

The following key differences are visible between these two representations. First, IOTT is brought into the core (along with EBS to a lesser extent), and ETNAS and Umanyano are pushed to the periphery. This shift is explained by the fact that IOTT, Imbumba, and NEA have significantly greater reporting in the newspapers (as key newspaper reporters were leaders in all three) and key individuals were members of all three organizations. The frequency of these reports and the multiplicative effect of the transpose approach leads to stronger ties of IOTT to the core. This change should be noted but considered with a pinch of salt, as this is clearly an effect of reporting bias. The same situation is visible with ETNAS and Umanyano pushed to the periphery. These organizations had limited new coverage and are disproportionately displaced because of this.

Second, the changes in centrality are notable: in the weighted graph, IOTT is far more central (due to the greater weight created by the frequency of reporting), and Isigidimi increases in its

centrality. All of the more peripheral organizations decrease in their centrality, most notably Healdtown and the Thembu Association. Overall, the weighting which arises from the frequency of reports on IOTT, NEA, and Imbumba, combine with the transpose which uses a multiplicative approach, serves to overemphasize the connections made between highly reported organizations and underemphasizes the more infrequently reported organizations.

Despite these differences, the above graphs show that there is no major change between the unweighted and weighted representation. While I have argued for the value of using the unweighted representation (being cognizant of the trade-offs), the above graphs also affirm that there is no major change which would affect the analysis should the weighted representation be used.


Summary

The unweighted and weighted representations offer a trade-off between including the greater influence of more frequently mentioned members and managing the bias in the frequency of newspaper reporting which affects these weights. I have argued for using an unweighted approach compared to a weighted multiplicative approach when transforming the two-mode to a one-mode representation. Future work might aim to find a middle ground by developing an alternative to this multiplicative approach (arising from $M \cdot M^T$) which scales the influence of weights by the number of reports, or by another function.

Nonetheless, while these two representations change some elements (especially the position and centrality of IOTT), there are no huge changes between the two approaches which would invalidate the analysis if the alternative representation were used.

A comparison of hierarchical cluster analysis with community detection

Hierarchical cluster analysis was performed as a check on the communities identified with community detection. Hierarchical clustering was performed using the weighted adjacency matrix of Organizations by Members. Analysis used the Scipy package's implementation of hierarchical clustering `scipy.cluster.hierarchy` for Python. Euclidean distance was used as the distance measure. The following dendrograms (Fig 3.19) report the clusters identified with different linkage criteria including 1. Unweighted average linkage clustering, 2. Weighted average linkage clustering, 3. Minimum or single-linkage clustering.






Figure 3.19: Clusters identified with different linkage criteria (cont. from p.254)




Figure 3.20: Community detection visualized in organizations only network

Discussion

These clusters almost entirely agree with the clusters identified through the community detection method reported in the chapter (see Fig 3.4b reproduced above). The three differences are 1. in all clusters Healdtown is grouped with Eliliso_Lomzi, Thembu_A, and SANA. In the Community detection approach, Healdtown is grouped with TMIA and TTA. 2. In only the single linkage method, IOTT and EBS are linked with the Lovedale cluster. In the community detection approach, these two organizations formed a separate community, and this clustering is also identified in the unweighted and weighted linkage approach. 3. In all clusters PNA is identified as a separate cluster. As noted in the main text, p.177 footnote 8, this is because it is very peripheral, linked by only one person to other organizations. This contributes to the justification of removing the node from the later analysis of path distance between organizations.

Summary

Overall, the hierarchical cluster analysis aligns almost identically with the community detection analysis (with the only meaningful difference being the grouping of Healdtown). This corroboration builds confidence in the communities identified and used for analysis in the chapter.

Proto-nationalist political imagination:

Transforming political discourse in organizations and the isiXhosa newspaper community

Introduction

This chapter turns to look at shifting political discourse in the wider isiXhosa speaking political community in the late 19th century, with a focus on the 1880s. The analyses presented here work to extend the analysis of the ideas of leading intellectuals (Chapter 1 and 2) to the wider community of organizations and newspaper contributors and deepens the focus on organizations and social networks (Chapter 3) to incorporate the political discourse of these organizations. In doing so, I examine the discursive shifts in ‘political claims’ and ‘political attention’ of the proto-nationalist political community as it established itself up to 1890.

Datasets and Methods

This chapter draws on two novel datasets: a systematic qualitative coding of the political claims made by emerging African political organizations between 1870 and 1890, and the complete corpus of the isiXhosa newspapers from 1884-1888. These datasets are explored in two analyses which focus on the temporal shifts of discursive attention in the 1880s.

Political Claims dataset

The first dataset collects the political claims made by the African proto-nationalist political organizations of the eastern Cape between 1870 and 1890. This analysis focuses on the same

organizations discussed in detail in Chapter 3. The dataset draws on the same 293 newspaper articles used in Chapter 3. For details of collection see Chapter 3 ‘Data Collection and Coding’. In Chapter 3, these articles were used to collect organizational membership. For this analysis, these articles were qualitatively coded to capture the ‘political claims’ of these organizations. This coding focused on three areas of political claim making: political identities, issues, and forms of actions. A set of codes was initially developed based on historical knowledge, secondary source analysis (primarily Odendaal (2013; 1993; 1984) supplemented by others (Mangu 2014, chap. 2; Nyamende 2000; Trapido 1968) [add others]), and qualitative analysis of the writings of central isiXhosa intellectuals: Soga (1983), Gqoba (2015), and Wauchope (2008) who have been discussed in this dissertation, as well as the writings of S.E.K. Mqhayi (2009) This set of codes was used on a sample of articles and updated in the first weeks of coding as coders considered incorporating new codes which were identified. Coding for English sources was done by myself, and Bathobele Mcilongo and Siphenkosi Hlangu (two researchers who are home language isiXhosa speakers) coded the isiXhosa sources. Analysis and discussion of coding was done weekly to incorporate feedback and align coding practices. The list of coding categories is reported in Table 4.2 in the appendix to this chapter.

This yielded a dataset of 252 coded articles with 505 occurrences of identity codes, 282 issue codes, and 170 action codes. In this analysis, I aggregate these articles into grouped periods of years and track the proportion of articles within each group which mention a particular political claim.

IsiXhosa Newspaper Dataset

The second dataset is a digitized collection of the two isiXhosa newspapers of the period – Isigidimi sama-Xosa and Imvo Zabantsundu – digitized by a team of researchers in South Africa which I co-lead. These two newspapers were centrally important in the emerging proto-nationalist movement: they were the only two isiXhosa newspapers published at the time, and as such offered a new public sphere for literate Africans to engage each other, develop a public dialogue which analyzed and debated the social world, and to shape new visions of how the community should individually and collectively respond.

Isigidimi sama-Xosa (The Xhosa Messenger) was one of the earliest African-language newspapers in South Africa. It was founded by James Steward of the Glasgow Missionary Society, and was published at Lovedale, present day Alice, Eastern Cape. From October 1870 to December 1875 it was published as the isiXhosa language section of the Kaffir Express newspaper, and included translations from the English language section as well as isiXhosa language letters and articles. During this period, it was under the editorship of Elijah Makiwane and John Knox Bokwe. From 1876 it was published as the first independent African-language only paper and edited by Elijah Makiwane, John Tengo Jabavu, and William Wellington Gqoba. The articles and news reports were authored by African local correspondents who represented at least 27 towns in the Eastern Cape, and two towns in Natal. The paper also included letters to the editor, which were sent from a broad range of the newspaper's readership. This newspaper focused on publishing general interest news, but also became a mouthpiece for the earliest African political organizations, fostered political and social debate and commentary in articles and letters to the editor, and featured some of the earliest African protest poetry. Reluctance on

the part of missionaries to publish pieces with explicit political themes ultimately led the editor J.T. Jabavu to break away and found the more openly political Imvo Zabantsundu newspaper. Isigidimi eventually lost readership to Imvo Zabantsundu and closed in 1888 after its editor W.W. Gqoba passed away. (Switzer and Switzer 1979, 45–46)

Imvo Zabantsundu (African Opinion) was the first African owned and run newspaper in South Africa. It was founded by John Tengo Jabavu in King Williams Town, in the Eastern Cape, with its first edition published in November 1884. Imvo Zabantsundu offered the first platform for African journalism, political and social commentary, and opinions which were free from any missionary control or censorship. The paper played an important role in developing African politics of its time, offering a mouthpiece to various emerging African political organizations, and promoting African voter registration and coordination during the elections for the Cape parliament. The paper was written primarily in isiXhosa and also contained an English editorial section titled ‘Native Opinion’. (Switzer and Switzer 1979, 40–41; Moropa 2010)

Overview of the newspaper collection

The newspaper dataset contains the full digital text for all editions of these newspapers¹. The analysis presented in this chapter focuses on only the isiXhosa text of Isigidimi and Imvo newspapers for the period from 1884 to 1888.

Table 4.1: Details of newspapers analyzed

Newspaper	Issues	Pages
Isigidimi sama-Xosa (A4)	170	1360
Imvo Zabantsundu (A3)	212	848
Total	382	2208

¹ Where these editions are available in South African archives. Some editions have been lost.

Shifting focus of political claims in emerging proto-nationalist organizations

Drawing on the political claims of proto-nationalist organizations reported in newspaper articles, this section follows the shifting focal attention of these organizations between 1871-1890. Most of these organizations were formed in the decade of the 1880s, thus the analysis focuses on this decade, which also includes the vast majority of the coded articles.

Here the frequency of different political claims is studied, by tracking the proportion of all articles which contain different political claims and grouping these articles into five different periods.

The shows different clusters of political claims to follow how three themes of political attention emerged and dominated political focus over time. I consider a vision of moral and social upliftment that predominated in the early period, showing how a cluster of issues emerged as proto-nationalist organizations engaged African voter mobilization, and illustrating how strategies of legal challenge emerged in the years between election cycles.

1. Moral/social upliftment: Replicating and transforming missionary values

Figure 4.1 and 4.2 show the political claims which peaked in period 1 (1871-1881) and period 2 (1882-1883). Figure 4.1 collects words from this set which share a thematic focus which I have called ‘moral upliftment’; ‘religion’ used as an identity is included with this group for comparison as it shares the broader theme.




Figure 4.1: Frequency of 'moral upliftment' cluster of words

Figure 4.1 shows the early influence of missionary and Christian political vision in the early period of proto-nationalist political organizations. The identities which orient political discussion focus on teachers, education, pastors, and Christians in the first period (1871-1881). In period 2 (1882-1883), appeals to teacher and education-based identities decline, but identification as pastors and Christians grows. The central political issues discussed here are drinking and education, which both increase into the second period. The focus on the need for Africans to attain education is less frequent but follows the same pattern of growth. Yet by the third period, most of these focal points decline in political discussion. The focus on the problem of alcohol which dominated the first two periods drops off alongside a decline in the appeal to Christian and pastor identities and the emphasis on Africans getting education also recedes from central attention. The focus on the issue of education, and identities related to being educated do not face

this same sharp drop off: they extend into the third period before they decline to a similar frequency as the other claims, only used in around 10% or less of the articles of that period. In the final period, all of these political claims are again on the rise, for reasons to which I will return; this suggests that these claims are interlinked, and that, while this focus receded, the political vision of this early period did not disappear but rather went into abeyance as other political foci oriented public discussions in period 3 and 4 (cf. Taylor 1989).

Discussion

This cluster of political claims highlights the influence that missionary political vision had on the early proto-nationalist organizations and leaders. The emphasis on Christian and pastor identities highlights how mission-educated leaders and organizations began their political movements reproducing the framework of understandings which they had been exposed to in their mission education. Here organizations focused on the need to spread education among the African community, and the need to curtail the individual and social impacts that drinking alcohol had had on their brethren. Mission-educated Africans thus began organizing, focusing on the same issues that their missionary benefactors had emphasized. They too sought to spread Christianity to their non-Christian community, they emphasized the need for education, and they condemned drinking as a social ill which destroyed both the individual and the community.

The huge focus on drinking offers an insightful case of this logic. The turn to alcohol in African communities, particularly to colonial liquor, was in many ways a response to the devastation of colonial conquest. Stories prevailed about how leading chiefs turned to liquor in the face of colonial defeat. Renowned figures like Ngqika, king of the Southern Xhosa in the early 1800s, and his second son Maqoma, the general who had led the Xhosa in many of the wars against the

British, turned to excessive drinking after their power and authority had been stripped by colonial conquest and land seizure (Peires 1982). The Xhosa chief Oba who presided in the area near Lovedale also succumbed to drunkenness with the loss of land and authority which accompanied colonial conquest². For these once great leaders, as for other amaXhosa, drinking was an individualistic escape to the social, political, and economic destruction which accompanied colonial conquest and effectively destroyed old established meanings and ways of living.

For the temperance movement and the growing African branches of this movement in the Independent Order of the True Templars (see analysis in Ch 3), drinking was seen not just as an individualistic retreat from social destruction, but also an individual moral choice which had disastrous social consequences. The debate over the status of colonial liquor compared with Xhosa beer emphasizes this point. For the missionaries, drunkenness was uniformly a sin, and Xhosa beer drinking was a fundamentally social form of drinking which loosened the restrictions and distinctions between ‘Christian’ and ‘heathen’ and brought the community together (see Mills 1980). But for Christian Xhosa intellectuals, the debate was more fraught. While some followed the teetotaler line, seeking to forbid all drinking, many drew a clear distinction between colonial liquor which was destroying African nations³ and homebrewed beer, which held no danger as it had long been a part of Xhosa culture. The underpinning analysis for mission-educated intellectuals was that alcohol had a socially destructive function. Insofar as Xhosa beer affirmed and established sociability, it was not the problem. Yet the alcohol-heavy colonial

² See Western Cape Archives and Records Service, CCP 1/2/2/1/29 A50-‘82 “Report of the Select Committee on the Claim of Chief Oba”, 1882.

³ For example in an article written in 1875 W.W. Gqoba argues ‘*kutshabalala izizwe... yotywala bomlungu*’ (2015, 52) (the white man’s liquor is destroying whole nations).

spirits were destructive as they were isolating and offered a retreat from the social world to those overwhelmed by colonial destruction.

Here we see how, even in this early period of organization, the missionary meanings and values which were taken up by African intellectuals were transformed. While the missionaries decried all forms of alcohol, for Xhosa intellectuals, colonial liquor stood in a separate category to Xhosa beer because its social effects were so different. For African leaders of the temperance movement, liquor was understood as destroying the ‘Xhosa’ or the ‘Mfengu’⁴, or destroying *izizwe*, the African nations (Gqoba 2015, 52). Even as these African Christians took up the prohibitionist political vision of their missionary teachers, they transformed these inherited visions in light of seeking the wellbeing and advancement of their ethnically or racially defined ‘imagined communities’.

The politization of African education followed the same trends of transformation seen in the African temperance drive; both were issues which were central to the missionaries, and they went hand in hand with Christian and pastor identities. These offered some of the earliest issues on which new African organizations focused. Mills has argued (as discussed in Ch 3) that the temperance movement was one instantiation of a larger ‘postmillennial Christianity’ which envisioned utopian social transformation. Mills defines this ‘postmillennial Christianity’ as:

a belief in the possibility (and the imminence) of the perfecting of men and society to achieve the millennium (progress). The achievement of the millennial society required not only the perfecting of individuals by conversion and personal pietism but also the

⁴ See Pambani Mzimba in ‘*Ingxelo Yabatunywa Base Lovedale*’, *Isigidimi sama-Xosa*, 1 May 1883, p.3; Isaac Wauchope in ‘*Intlanganiso Enkulu Yabazili Benene e-Rini*’, *Isigidimi sama-Xosa* 1 May 1883, p.3.

perfecting of society by the elimination of evils (political action). (W. G. Mills 1980, 211–12)

This analysis highlights how Christian morality was not taken up as an individualistic morality. Both the spread of education and the prevention of drinking were seen by early proto-nationalist organizations as forms of social transformation which would result in the advancement of their own community, understood along both ethnic and racial lines (Gqoba 2015, 84–209). As Mills highlights, and as is evidenced from the history of these early organizations, this drive became ‘political’ as it sought both the perfecting of Xhosa, Mfengu, Thembu, etc. society through educational advancement, and as it sought the prevention of social evils through limiting drinking. This perfecting of society was not an issue of individual morality alone (although individuals were called to ‘upright’ action). Instead, these issues were seen as a task for both communities and governance, and both early temperance organizations (IOTT) and early teaching organizations (NEA) turned to the government to support their projects of social upliftment.

Overall, the strong emphasis on religious identities and on social issues of drinking and education in these first two periods show that early proto-nationalist organizations began as offshoots who were very much inspired by missionary political and social visions of societal upliftment or development. For the missionaries, this was the civilizing mission: turning the ‘backward and barbaric’ African communities into civilized equivalents of Europeans (see Chapter 2). Yet for the missionary-educated African leaders, ‘civilizing’ quickly lost its paternalistic air, and projects for the advancement of Xhosa and other communities took up a ‘patriotic’ focus which sought the advancement of ‘our’ people. While this advancement was

driven by missionary political and social visions in the early period, this ‘patriotic’ approach soon expanded beyond moral reform. The vision of moral and social upliftment was thus an important part of the growing proto-nationalist political vision, and it remained important. As is visible from the graph above, visions of education and religion return in the 1889-1890 period in the face of voter disenfranchisement (to which I will return). Yet this beginning, in a vision of moral upliftment, offered a platform which developed patriotic identities as members of ethnic communities (Xhosa, Mfengu, Thembu, etc.) and as *abantsundu* (black people). The commitment to the wellbeing of African peoples turned to focus on other issues and other identities as proto-nationalist political organizations expanded and developed their political expertise.




Figure 4.2: Frequency of other words peaking in Period 1 and 2

Fig 4.2 reports other political claims which were peaking in period 1 and 2. This reveals another transformation which was growing alongside the focus on ‘moral upliftment’ discussed above. These political claims show a significantly growing emphasis on political organization. The focus on land emerges as organizations discuss the issues in Thembuland where white colonists were agitating for and illegally taking land in 1882, and the broader issues of African communities losing land to white settlers. The three other political claims all show how political attention turned to focus on growing organizational capacity in the 1882-1883 period. Discussions of both organization meetings and organizations hosting meetings in the wider community grew from almost non-existence in the first period to appearing in 15% of all articles in the second period. The discussion of sending delegations appeared in almost one quarter of all articles. This includes discussion of delegations sent to engage Cape leaders, as well as delegations sent to visit other organizations, or who received other organizations. Together, the growth of these political claims in the second period shows the growing organizational capacity of emerging proto-nationalist organizations. This discussion dovetails with the next analysis, which shows how this new organizational capacity was also put to work in African voter mobilization.

2. Election cycles and voter mobilization

A second key cluster of political claims in the proto-nationalist political organizations was a focus on African voter mobilization. As shown in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, voter mobilization offered a new avenue for political engagement as missionary-educated leaders worked to mobilize large numbers of African voters – with the largest numbers coming from rural contexts

– and negotiated to support colonial members of parliament who promised to support African interests.




Figure 4.3: Voter related political claims

Fig 4.3 shows how this focus on voter mobilization strongly aligned with the election cycle of the Cape parliament. The first spike in period 2 (1882-1883) centered around mobilization for the election in 1883 for the 1884-1888 parliamentary term. The spike in period 4 arose from both the new legislation which sought to exclude rural African voters from the right to vote (‘The

Parliamentary Registration Act’, see Chapter 3) and the mobilization of African voters in 1888 for the 1889-1893 parliamentary term.




Figure 4.4: Voting issues and actions

Fig 4.4 reduces the number of words in the graph for clarity, showing only the political claims about issues and forms of action directly relating to voting.

A number of key insights are revealed by this graph. First, while African voter registration grew continuously through the 1880s and the number of registered voters remained limited in 1883, the proto-nationalist political organizations were attentive to the need to register voters from early on. While the actual number of African voters peaked in the voter role of 1886 before tens

of thousands of Africans were stripped of rights in 1888 after the voter registration bill was passed, there is not a large change in the discussion about the need to register voters between these periods. The issue of voter registration (indicated by the orange line) grows slightly, from 9% of all articles to just under 11% of all articles, and the call to action to register voters (shown by the light green line) actually diminishes slightly, from 6% of all articles to just over 5% of all articles in period 4.

Along these same lines, although the Parliamentary Registration Act of 1887 offered the greatest threat to African voter registration, organizations had been attentive to political attempts to disenfranchise Africans already in period 2. This highlights that colonial contender groups (especially the Afrikaner Bond) saw African voter mobilization as a threat in the lead up to the 1884 election, and that African political leaders were well aware that these groups were attempting to limit their voting rights.

The emphasis on getting African representatives in parliament is also an important focus of discussion, albeit one that was never actualized. This discussion of working to get African representatives in parliament (as seen by the blue line, with added glow as it overlaps the orange line) aligns very closely with the discussion of voter registration issues. While newspaper reports show that African leaders were considering running for representative roles in a number of areas, leaders eventually decided that they would have stronger influence by supporting selected white candidates who in exchange would work to support African interests. In this way, African voters were able to offer the decisive swing vote to elect their chosen candidate in a number of eastern Cape districts (See Odendaal 2013, chap. 10).

While the issue of African voter registration was discussed by reporting on proto-nationalist organizations from the 1883 election cycle, reporting on these organizations shows a consistently growing focus on the issue of voting (yellow line) and on the call to vote (green line) over time.

A final notable feature illustrated in Fig 4.4 is the sharp drop in calls to action in the 1889-1890 period. While the issue of voting (yellow) and registering voters (orange) do not drop off entirely, the call to action to vote and to register voters drops off entirely, as does the call for African representatives in parliament. This drop is in part due to the election cycle, and a drop was seen in the non-election years of period 3. Yet the drop in calls to action is more extreme – this may point to a frustration and disillusionment in the face of the success of the Parliamentary Registration Act, which disenfranchised rural Africans who had qualified to vote based on rural land tenure. This needs to be explored in more detail with qualitative analysis. These graphs show that in the face of this voter challenge, organizations returned to emphasize the moral/social upliftment approach (see Fig 4.1 period 5). Yet research into the levels of African voter registration has shown that despite the disenfranchisement of 1887, African voter mobilization continued, and by the next election cycle of 1894, the number of African voters had grown to nearly equal pre-disenfranchisement levels, despite more disenfranchisement laws of 1892 (Nyika and Fourie 2020). This may highlight that new organizations, not followed in this dataset, took the reins of the voter mobilization drive in the early 1890s.




Figure 4.5: Voter impacts on political organization identity claims

Fig 4.5 shows the words which were part of Fig 4.3 but excluded from fig 4.4. This figure highlights a number of political claims which strongly correlate with voter discussion.

First, planning organizational meetings strongly correlates with the election cycle, with newspaper articles reporting more planned organizational meetings in election years. Voter mobilization was only one part of organization meetings, but this correlation suggests that engaging colonial elections was one important driver of organization meetings. We also see a rise in discussions of negotiating with the government or government officials in election years.

This again is clearly not entirely driven by voter mobilization, but it is also clear that elections were seen to have offered an increased opportunity for engagement with government leaders.

Two identities also emerge in close relation with voter registration. The first is identifying as ‘natives’ (blue) and the second is an appeal to the identity as a subject of the queen (grey, bottom). The identity of native appears only in English language articles⁵, but this identity highlights how colonial elections, which drew the political lines in terms of ‘Europeans’ and ‘Natives’ contributed to African understandings of political communities. I return to discuss this shortly. Secondly, in period 4 we see an appeal to being a subject of Queen Victoria. This appeal was a direct rejection of being a subject of the colonial state, and it emerged in response to colonial efforts at African voter disenfranchisement. Here, Africans appealed to a sense of belonging, not to the power of the Cape parliament, but rather articulated themselves as a subject of the queen and thus the British Empire. This was part of a wider political subcurrent which saw the crown colonies (of the Basotho and the Swazi people) who were directly under British empire rule (and in principle relatively autonomous) as an alternative for people, rather than living under the political authority of the Cape Colony. It was also a part of a vision which saw the British queen as a power which stood superior to Cape colonial power. This political vision was part of a tradition which hoped that direct appeal to the British crown would reign in the racial injustice of the Cape Colony, and was part of the same vision which resulted in the (failed) delegation to England in 1913 to oppose racial exclusions of the newly unified South Africa (Plaut 2017).

⁵ As the term ‘native’, used to code this identity, is English.

Finally, an articulation of cultural supremacist discrimination (as a distinct coding category from legal, social, and economic discrimination) also correlates strongly with the election cycle, and peaks strongly with the disenfranchisement attempts of period 4. Here discussion focuses on how Africans are excluded as Africans, and how voting limitations work to specifically target rural African communities. The logic of the new disenfranchisement laws, which in practice increased the requirements for registration, repeated the same elitist logics which made land and income the requirement for political influence in Britain: only those of the higher strata of society had the necessary wisdom to elect the correct candidates. This logic heightened the sense of the denigration of ‘Africanness’ for African political communities, foregrounding a racism which only strengthened the growing racial unity of the proto-nationalist movement.




Figure 4.6: Voting and identity

The link between elections and a growing *abanstundu* (black) identity is made visible in Fig 4.6. What this figure shows is the frequency of the use of Xhosa, *abanstundu*, and ‘native’ identity, alongside discussions about African voter registration and voting.

What is made clear here is that *abanstundu* identity is strengthened in election mobilization periods, and Xhosa identity is suppressed in these same years. Xhosa identity (indicated by the orange line) drops slightly in period 2 and drops significantly in period 4. Yet in both following periods it jumps back to around the same frequency as before. *Abanstundu* (black) identity grows over the period, but it grows significantly in election cycle years and shrinks slightly in non-election years.

This highlights first how Xhosa identity is both a dominant identity among proto-nationalist organizations, but it is a divisive identity which gives way to the more encompassing *abanstundu* identity as elections focus discussion on the identities of European/white vs native/*abanstundu*/black. Particularly in period 4 where the proto-nationalist community is facing voter disenfranchisement, and where new connections are being made across diverse missionary-educated and rural ethnic organizations (see Chapter 3), Xhosa identity takes a significant backseat and *abantsundu* identity rises to unparalleled levels. In fact, this is evidently the most frequent of all political claims, reaching a level of frequency that no other political claim did in any time period.

This shows the way that increasingly racialized colonial laws created a unified basis of exclusion of Africans as African or black. This shared threat only served to further unify the proto-nationalist movement, fostering new unity against this common problem.

3. Legal challenge

The third and final cluster of political claims examined here are a cluster of claims which focus on legal challenge. Figure 4.7 shows a number of claims which closely correlate with each other and peak in the third period.




Figure 4.7: Legal challenge political claims

Two key themes connect in these figures. The first is the focus on legal means to engage political problems, and the second is the emphasis on race. The legal focus is shown in Fig 4.8. Here a key issue is that of legal discrimination or legal inequality. This issue aligned very closely with the ‘profession’ identity (in brown, with glow to show overlap), which almost entirely was used to code the discussion of lawyers as a legal profession. The green line shows the frequency of the decision to seek legal counsel, as organizations engaged political challenges.

This focus on legal discrimination and recourse to legal response is connected with two issues. The first is a discussion of the issue of race, and a broad appeal to racial identity (coded separately from appeals to *abantsundu* identity; this category captures race discussed more abstractly). The second is the connection with Thembu identity. Fig 4.9 shows the frequency of these words.




Figure 4.8: Political claims of the legal theme




Figure 4.9: Identities and issues connected with legal focus

Discussion

Two time-specific issues drove this focus on legal challenge to the political issues of the proto-nationalist community. The first was the rise of pass laws which limited and controlled African access to urban areas, requiring Africans in urban colonial spaces to have a ‘pass’, a legal document which served as a permit to be there. This is the core political challenge which strongly linked race to legal challenge. The second was the struggle of those in Thembuland over land rights. The issue of land was discussed in Fig 4.2. The connection of the Thembu identity to legal challenge emerged as the Thembu community began to develop a legal framework of challenge to the threat of colonial land disposition (this legal focus is visible in the analysis of Thembu petitioning seen in Chapter 3).

What is of key interest in light of the larger patterns of political focus shown above is that the discussion of proto-nationalist organizations turned to focus on legal issues and to develop

strategies of legal challenge to these issues in the non-election years. In period 2 and period 4, discussion was more closely focused on engaging the Cape Colony through the electoral system. In these years, mobilizing voters offered a central vision within the strategy to affect change. However, this avenue for political challenge was only viable in the lead up to elections. Outside of this election cycle, proto-nationalist organizations turned to another form of engagement with the colonial state – that of legal challenge. Thus, the problem of pass laws, and the legal framework applied to the threat of Thembu land expropriation offered the time-based events which drove a turn to legal strategies, but this legal focus was able to become a central focus of attention because the avenue of electoral challenge through voter mobilization was not possible in the years between elections. Here we see the proto-nationalist community turning to and developing a wider repertoire of political challenge as different possibilities for engaging the colonial state opened and closed over time.

Conclusion

This analysis has considered three clusters of political claim-making which all became central orientations of emerging African nationalist politics. I have shown a focus on the upliftment of African communities, the emphasis on voter mobilization and strategies of electoral participation to fight for African rights and interests, and the use of legal challenge to racial and ethnic exclusion in the years where electoral challenge was not an option. These three clusters were all important parts of a growing framework of political analysis and became parts of the repertoire that African nationalist politics turned to as this movement developed. Future work will aim to expand and substantiate the key themes and preliminary analysis outlined here by looking

qualitatively at the arguments and logics used as the proto-nationalist community discussed and engaged these issues.

In addition, future work will aim to look at how these ideas were connected, not only in time-based clusters, but in actual usage. This analysis will aim to look at the co-use of key political claims at the level of articles, examining how this co-occurrence of political claims created linkages over time, and interlinked different discursive clusters together at different points. This analysis will aim to look at both the discursive clusters which emerged and examine how different clusters became linked through shared bridging identities, issues or calls to action.

Discursive shifts in the isiXhosa newspaper community

Here, the discussion turns from a focus on the articles of political organizations to the isiXhosa newspapers as a whole. In the following analysis I examine collective political identity formation among the broader community, focusing on the language of race and nation to examine how these collective identities were used in all newspaper writings between 1884 and 1888.

Voter disenfranchisement and the activation of broader collective identities

As discussed in Chapter 3, the threat of rural African voter disenfranchisement sparked new unities across previously disconnected organizations in the proto-nationalist political network. This section shows that not only did organizations develop new linkages and interconnections, but latent collective identities which could unite African communities under a common banner were powerfully emphasized in response to this voter disenfranchisement threat, as evidenced by newspaper discussions at the time.

The new law which threatened African rural voters was called the Parliamentary Voters Registration Act. As discussed in detail in Chapter 3, this act incorporated the Transkei territories into the Cape franchise, but it invalidated tribal land holdings as a basis to meet the property qualification to register to vote (see Odendaal 2013, 114). This threatened to disqualify a huge portion of African voters, both those already registered and those who might join with the inclusion of the Transkei region, because a large portion of this constituency held land on this communal land tenure basis.

To see how this legislation prompted a response in the African newspapers, it is important to lay out the timeframe. The government signaled this new bill in March 1887, and the bill was passed in September 1887. It is exactly within this timeframe that we see a shift in the appeal to collective identities in the isiXhosa newspapers. A second timeframe is also important: toward the end of 1888 African newspapers were gearing up for the 1889 election. These collective identities return in newspaper articles (with an emphasis on the single individual rather than the plural usage) as the election drew near. This highlights how these identities that were drawn to the center of political attention in response to disenfranchisement, again became focal identities in discussions of electoral political practice.

The analysis below shows that each newspaper turned to emphasize a different vision of this collective identity. *Isigidimi sama-Xosa* emphasized a collective *isizwe/izizwe* (nation, precolonial political community) identity, and *Imvo Zabantsundu* emphasized a *unstundu/abantsundu* (black, African) collective identity. Each one is discussed in turn.

Isizwe/Izizwe – the community as nation




Figure 4.10: Frequency of -sizw- and -zizw- roots (nations) combined in newspapers




Figure 4.11: Frequency of -sizw- root (nation singular) in newspapers

Frequency of '*zizw*' [Nations (pl.)] in Newspapers




Figure 4.12: Frequency of *-zizw-* root (nations plural) in newspapers

Figures 4.10-4.12 show the frequency of the use of *isizwe* and *izizwe*, capturing all words with the *-sizw-* and *-zizw-* root. While this discussion of *isizwe/izizwe* remains low in Imvo throughout the period, there is a sharp spike in its use in Isigidimi beginning in April (1887-04) directly after the announcement of the new Act.

While both the singular (*isizwe*) and the plural (*izizwe*) rise in use in Isigidimi, it is the plural which skyrockets from a frequency of less than 0.05% of all words on average to around seven times the frequency at 0.35% in May (1887-05). This spikes again in September (1887-09) when the Act was passed, and it remains an important focus of conversation (around 0.1% frequency) in-between. Here the focus on the plural *isizwe* foregrounds both the political units and identities defined by the pre-colonial groupings (e.g. the ethnic groupings such as *Isizwe samaXhosa*, *Isizwe sabaThembu*), but also foregrounds the unity in plurality of the various *izizwe* ‘African

nations’. This unity in plurality of *isizwe* both calls forth individual ethnic-national identities and at the same time calls forth a common community of ‘African nations’.

The singular *isizwe* also spikes in this same period, yet not as intensely as the plural. From around 0.04% just before this period, it jumps to 0.1% (more than double) by May (1887-05) and remains around 0.07% over the coming months. Yet a key difference between the singular and the plural is that, while the plural *izizwe* drops back down in use, *isizwe* remains frequent and even grows into 1888, shaping discussion of collective identity into the lead up to the Cape parliamentary election at the end of 1888.

Abanstundu – The community as race

The central collective identity which Imvo Zabantsundu turned to was not *isizwe/izizwe* (nation), but the community defined by ‘race’. The following analysis shows the frequency of the use of the singular and the plural of *-ntsudnu*. This literally translates to ‘brown’ and indicates the category of black identity. This identity was not only racial, although skin color was the basis of distinction: the English colonial term ‘natives’, which was widely used in colonial circles as a collective ‘other’ was also translated as *abanstundu* in isiXhosa. The identity thus includes the ‘European’ vs ‘native’ distinction (thus wider than the apartheid definition of ‘black’, but well in line with the black consciousness definition of Steve Biko) as well as the skin color differentiation indicated by *-nstundu* (brown) or *-mnyama* (black) vs *-mhlophe* (white).

Frequency of '*[ou]ntsundu*' [Brown Person (sg.)/Native] in Newspapers




Figure 4.13: Frequency of *-untsundu-* or *-onstudnu-* in newspapers

Frequency of '*(<?<Imvo za)bantsundu*' [Brown People (pl.)/Natives]] in Newspapers




Figure 4.14: Frequency of *-banstundu-* (removing references to the newspaper *-mvo zabantsundu*)

Figures 4.13 and 4.14 show the changes in the frequency of the use of *-ntsundu* in both the singular and plural as both a noun and as an adjective attached to a person (e.g. *umntu ontsundu*, a black person/person who is black).

Firstly, it is important to note that in general the use of *abantsundu* is more frequent than *isizwe/izizwe* in both newspapers (averaging around 0.2 to 0.3 % compared with *isizwe/izizwe* at around 0.05% to 0.1%), and that Imvo Zabantsundu has consistently drawn on this appeal to black identity more than Isigidimi sama-Xosa (as is visible in the trend lines in each figure). Yet it is also clear that there is a significant spike in the use of this word during the voter disenfranchisement threat. This is clearest in the plural identifier, *abantsundu* (black people). In March (1887-03) it rises from just over 0.2% to over 0.35%, by July (1887-07) the frequency doubles to 0.7% of all words. A similar rise is mirrored in the singular to a lesser degree at the same time (fig 4.13).

This spike coincides with the central focus on the new law and on African strategies to respond. The same spike is visible in discussions of *umthetho* ‘the law’ (*umteto* in the old orthography) seen in fig. 4.15 following *-mteto-*, as well as a discussion of strategies to respond, including the sending of a delegation to England, seen in the discussion of the Queen of England in the Isigidimi paper in fig 4.16 (following *-kumanikazi-* ‘Queen’). This shows that in Imvo Zabantsundu the attention to this law and strategies to respond to it, clearly emphasized and centered the shared racial identity of *abantsundu* as the collective vision of the community.

Frequency of '*mteto*' in Newspapers




Figure 4.15: Frequency of -mteto- ('law') in the newspapers

Frequency of '*kumkanikazi*' in Newspapers




Figure 4.16: Frequency of -kumkanikazi- ('Queen') in newspapers

Much like the new emphasis on *isizwe/izizwe* in Isigidimi, this central focus on *-ntsundu* identity in Imvo had an impact on future political imagination. There is a significant spike in both singular and plural *-ntsundu* identity toward the end of 1888 in the lead up to the elections. Furthermore, we see *abantsundu* identity emerging as the primary articulation of racial identity, taking over from the equivalent racial term *abamnyama* (from the root *-mnyama*: ‘black’). Figure 4.17 shows that *-bamnyama* spiked in this same period to around 0.13%, but it became less and less frequently used compared with previous periods. It is also clear that in the lead up to the election at the end of 1888 the term was now no longer a go-to collective identity, with *-ntsundu* becoming the primary racial identifier. The spike of focus on racial identity in Imvo Zabantsundu in response to the voter disenfranchisement Act also cemented this racial identification as the key racial collective identity over other words such as *abamnyama*.

Frequency of '*bamnyama*' [Black People (pl.)] in Newspapers




Figure 4.17: Frequency of -bamnyama (black people) in newspapers

Discussion

The above analysis shows the rise in emphasis on emerging collective identities which imagine a shared African community in both the model of a pre-colonial *izizwe* – nations united together in a shared unit – and in the model of *abantsundu*, which offered a shared racial identity distinct from the colonial or European community. As has been discussed throughout this dissertation, these identities offered new bases to call forth a shared political project which united African people, and these identities went hand-in-hand with the creation of new analyses of the colonial social world and new strategies of political response.

The difference in emphasis between Isigidimi sama-Xosa and Imvo Zabantsundu is suggestive of a wider difference in political emphasis and analysis of the emerging proto-nationalist

community. *Isigidimi sama-Xosa* was published at the Lovedale mission station, which had many Xhosa students and a mission history of close engagement with the amaXhosa state structures of early to mid-1800s. Its very name emphasizes its orientation to ethnic identity – *Isigidimi sama-Xosa*, or ‘The Xhosa Messenger’. In the same way, *Imvo Zabantsundu* embodies its different focus; *Imvo Zabantsundu*, or ‘Black/Native’ Opinion’, and was an independent African publication based in King Williams Town, among an emerging urban class of educated Africans, notably helmed by J.T. Jabavu, an uMfengu rather than an umXhosa. The different focus of these newspapers endured in lasting debates about cultural nationalism and identity as well as in tensions between Mfengu and Xhosa political communities, as the African nationalism movement grew through the 1890s and onward.

Despite this difference in the emphasis of what constituted the political community, the threat to disenfranchise African voters clearly sparked new debate and a wider imagination of a shared African political community. Both of these newspapers show a sharp turn to discussing wide-reaching collective identities which unify their readership on the basis of a shared identity which extends beyond ethnicity, and the new attention to these collective identities had enduring consequences, returning in force as the election at the end of 1888 drew near.

This offers a view of how new intellectual articulations of nationhood and blackness began to be taken up more widely as a shared discursive framework for the broader literate community.

Alongside the new political linkages shown in Chapter 3 that emerged in response to African voter disenfranchisement, this analysis shows how the discursive sphere shifted in response.

These two newspapers offered a central vehicle for a wide community who were not necessarily in personal contact to get a sense of the key issues and conceptual frameworks of others in their

‘imagined community’. The shift in the discourse of the newspapers thus played a key role in shaping the broader imagination of the wider community. This analysis highlights how voter mobilization and the threat of disenfranchisement was one political orientation which drew a wider community towards developing shared and more inclusive collective identities which grounded a shared proto-nationalist struggle.

The analysis here offers an exciting opportunity to see how the discourse of a wider literate community shifted over time, and to identify key events and moments which sparked these shifts. This offers a powerfully different perspective which shows not just the thinking of political organizations or of intellectuals and leaders, but also gives an avenue into the diffusion of emerging political ideas and claims in a wider community.

An example of this is clear in the different trajectories of the *abantsundu* identity revealed in the analysis of reports on political organizations when contrast with the analysis possible through looking at all newspaper writings. The analysis of political organizations’ claims shows how *abantsundu* identity rises in the periods of the election cycle, rising alongside other discussions of African voter registration and electoral participation (as shown in fig 4.6). The analysis of the whole newspaper corpus affirms this view, but also highlights how a key moment – the political response to voter disenfranchisement – amplified attention to a shared *abantsundu* identity. Here this appeal was brought into the public sphere of newspaper debate more clearly than ever before (in the 1884-1888 period). More broadly, looking at the shifting discursive focus in the newspapers as a whole, offers a way to follow how and when ideas that are foregrounded by organizations or intellectuals are taken up by a wider community and become part of a shared political discourse.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined temporal shifts in political discourse through the 1880s among the wider emerging proto-nationalist community. Attention to the temporal shifts of political articulation offer an insight into how political vision and attention changed and developed in the first decade of proto-nationalist political organization, and show different clusters of ideas, identities, and strategies of action which rose and fell together.

The first part of this analysis examined the political claims of the first African proto-nationalist organizations, identifying the shifting focus of discussions of identity, political issues, and strategies of action as the proto-nationalist political field developed. I have argued that three themes are visible: firstly, a vision of social/moral upliftment which transforms the ‘civilizing mission’ into a patriotic vision of African advancement. This political vision is developed from the 1870s and peaks in the 1882-1883 period. I have argued that these trends show how mission-educated founders of the first African organizations took up Christian values for social transformation, but in both the domain of temperance and of education they transformed these values into an early patriotic vision for African progress and societal wellbeing.

Secondly, I have shown a focus on voter mobilization and electoral challenge which emphasized the need to mobilize voters, raised a vision of Africans representing themselves in parliament, and contributed to building a shared *abantsundu* collective identity. These connected ideas rose to the fore in election years when (as early as 1882-1883) African leaders set their sights on engaging with Cape politics through elections and worked to mobilize African communities. This cycle of elections also reveals how this election mobilization coincided with a downplaying of ethnic identities (such as Xhosa) and led to a growing focus on *abanstundu* (black) identity,

which spiked each election period, and ended as the most frequently used political identity by the second half of the 1880s. These election politics were heightened by the new legislation of 1887 which sought to disenfranchise rural African voters, to which I return in the second analysis. Overall, the engagement of proto-nationalist organizations with Cape elections focused organizations on registering African voters, led organizations to discuss the possibility of sending African representatives to parliament, and amplified an *abantsundu* identity as leaders saw settlers seeking to disenfranchise African voters.

The final theme is the framework of legal challenge which highlighted racial injustice in the development or application of the law, and invoked legal expertise to challenge colonial power. This focus on legal challenge came to dominate discussions in the years between the 1884 and 1888 elections. The focus on legal challenge arose as political organizations were struggling against new pass-laws which limited African movement, and alongside a struggle to protect Thembu land rights. In addition to these issues of the period, I highlight the importance of the post-election period, where change is not possible through electoral politics. In the 1884-1885 period, proto-nationalist organizations turned to develop a language centered on legal challenge, resisting racial discrimination by seeking out legal counsel in order to defend African interests. This nascent focus on the law as a vehicle of change shows the early turn to a set of legal political repertoires which would continue to play an important role in the development of African nationalism (Ngcukaitobi 2018).

Overall, these three clusters of political focus all played a central ideological role in the future development of African nationalist politics. This analysis has shown three different visions of fighting for ‘the nation’. While electoral challenge and the development of a shared *abantsundu*

identity is perhaps the most recognizable for of emerging African nationalism, this analysis has shown that an emphasis on societal upliftment for the African community, and legal challenges to racial injustice are two additional political discourses which emerged in the 1880s. All three visions of political engagement continued to intertwine as African nationalism developed through the 1900s.

The second analysis examines the changing frequencies of key political words as they are used in the isiXhosa language newspapers. Here I focus of the shifting appeal to race and nation and highlight how attention to these collective political identities were amplified in response to the threat of voter disenfranchisement through the Parliamentary Voters Registration Act, announced in March 1887 and passed into law in September 1887. I follow how the invocation of *isizwe/izizwe* (nation(s)) and *untsundu/abanstundu* (black(s)) identities both spiked as newspaper contributors turned increasingly to broad collective identities. While these identities had long been developed by intellectuals and were latent in communities' political imagination, I show how they emerged to the center of political attention as the proto-nationalist political community reported on and discussed the threat of the disenfranchisement of rural African voters. Not only did these identities spike in response to the threat of disenfranchisement, they rose again as the newspapers engaged the election at the end of 1888, suggesting that this new attentiveness played a role in cementing new discourses of collective identification.

In conclusion, this chapter offers insights into the temporal shifts in the development of the political discourse of the proto-nationalist political community. This augments the previous analyses of the rhetoric of leading intellectuals and offers depth to the examination of the inter-organizational political networks which have been previously examined. Future work will extend

this temporal analysis of community discourse, deepening the examination of Xhosa political concept formation in the newspapers and linking political organizations' discourse to their social networks in order to advance our understanding of these contexts that give rise to ideological innovation.

Appendix B

Table 4.2: List of coding categories

Id Code	Identities Category	Is Code	Political Issues Category
1	Iziwe/(Ethnic) nation	1	Race
1.1	Xhosa	1.1	Legal discrimination/inequality (unjust law etc)
1.1.1	Rharhabe	1.2	Social discrimination
1.1.2	Ndlambe	1.3	economic discrimination
1.1.3	Gqunukhwebe	1.4	cultural supremacist discrimination
1.1.4	Gcaleka		
1.1.5	Ngqika	2	Unjust law or application of law
1.2	Mfengu	2.1	Injustice to Chiefs
1.3	Thembu	2.2	Unjust government laws
1.4	Mphondo	2.3	Injustice - other (For race see 1.1)
1.5	Mbo (AbaMbo)		
1.6	Zulu	3	Internal organization issues
1.7	Sotho	3.1	Need for funding
1.8	Tswana	3.2	need to manage members
		3.3	need to grow or spread organization
2	Language grouping	3.4	Internal Corruption or leadership issues
2.1	Unity of isiXhosa speaking		
2.2	Unity of Nguni Speaking	4	Voting
		4.1	Register African voters
3	Royal lineage	4.2	Government is removing African voters
3.1	Xhosa	4.3	Laws limit registration of African voters
3.1.1	Rharhabe	4.4	Voting - other
3.1.2	Gcaleka		
3.2	Thembu	5	Land
		6	Liquor/drinking
4	Clan	7	Government funding
4.1	Imidange	8	Education
4.2	Hleke	9	Religion
4.3	Ntinde	10	Jobs
4.4	Amatshawe	11	Loss of tradition
5	Race or colour	12	Women's rights
5.1	Black	12.1	women's access to politics

Table 4.2: List of coding categories – continued

5.2	White	12.2	women's treatment by government
5.3	Coloured	12.3	women's social position
5.4	Abantsundu		
5.5	Abamnyama	13	Taxation
5.6	Native		
6	Religion	14	Read newspapers
6.1	Christian	14.1	Read colonial newspaper
6.2	Heathen	14.2	Read African Newspapers
7	Education	15	Pass Laws
7.1	School - abantu basesikolweni	16	Farming
7.2	Red - abantu ababomvu	17	House building
7.3	Englishmen/English woman		
7.4	Gentleman/lady		
8	Government/rule		
8.1	Government subject		
8.2	Queen [Victoria] subject Subject of African		
8.3	King/Chief/Royal Crown/Empire (British		
8.4	empire) Subject		
9	Location/Land		
9.1	Foreign		
9.2	Local		
9.3	Royal lineage land		
9.4	Ciskei		
9.5	Transkei		
10	Profession		
10.1	Teacher		
10.2	Pastor		
10.3	Evangelist/missionary		
11	Age		
11.1	Young		
11.2	Elders (wisdom etc)		
11.3	Older people (need help)		

Table 4.2: List of coding categories – continued

Ac Code	Political Action Category
1	Petition Government
2	Register voters
3	Vote
4	Send delegation
5	Negotiate with government or leader
6	Fight with weapons
7	Get Education
8	Create Constitution
9	Seek parliamentary representation
9.1	White representative of African interests
9.2	African representative in parliament
10	Africans in leadership positions
11	Legal challenge
11.1	Seek legal council
11.2	Challenge in court
11.3	Challenge - other - using legal rules
12	Plan meeting
12.1	Plan organization meeting
12.2	Plan community meeting
12.3	Plan other meeting
13	Appoint/create organization committee
14	Print or circulate materials: Pamphlets/Tracts/posters
15	Public March/Procession

Conclusion

Intermediary intelligentsia and the relational conditions of political innovation

This dissertation has focused on the relational conditions which enabled and shaped the innovation in political understanding and practice seen in the earliest period of emerging African nationalism in South Africa. To account for this transformation, I have studied the ways that the ‘political paradigm’ of the first wave of anti-colonial resistance met a dead-end, creating a void of political answers to the continual crisis of colonial social transformation. I have then explored how new political identities, understandings, and strategies of action were developed, led by an emerging community of missionary-educated African political leaders and intellectuals. The central focus has been to examine how the relational position of these figures created both the capacity for innovative political imagination, and at the same time how these relationships shaped the kinds of political visions which were possible.

To account for this space of political possibilities shaped by relational connections, I develop the concept of ‘intermediary intelligentsia’. This concept grounds an analysis of the ways in which African intellectuals and leaders bridged and interconnected African and colonial political frameworks and communities and focuses analytical attention on how this bridging social position shaped the capacity for political innovation. I examine this bridging social position at three levels of analysis: the level of the individual, the relational community, and political organizations and the interconnections between them.

Macro-social change, transformed experience, and new capacities for novel political imagination

In the first chapter I have focused analysis on the level of the individual, studying the life and writings of Tiyo Soga to reveal the experiential dynamics which shaped the emerging class of missionary-educated intellectuals. This analysis of Tiyo Soga aimed to show how macro-social transformation is always received as transformed experience for those who live through it. In this chapter I have argued that missionary education created new biographical trajectories for those Africans who participated in it, which I exemplify through a close study of Tiyo Soga's biographical path. The emerging community of missionary-educated Africans inhabited a historically new social position, situated between colonial and African social worlds, and faced new experiences, new challenges, and new questions which had no socially pre-given answers which could satisfactorily make sense of their lives. This new social position on the one hand created the need for new answers, and on the other hand offered those facing these questions a historically new combination of conceptual and symbolic tools to work to generate these new answers. To understand how this relational context generated the capacity for new articulations of African identity and nascent visions of African nationalism and pan-Africanism, I have turned to Soga's writings. I have shown how Soga forged new political arguments, new assertions of identity, and new imaginations of how to face the challenges of colonialism as he engaged both colonial and African audiences. In these contexts of political argumentation and articulation, Soga drew together elements of both Xhosa and colonial knowledge systems in order to offer new forms of response to what he saw as being wrong in the world. I have shown the interlinking of these various concepts as Soga argued for black equality, pan-African unity, and Xhosa cultural nationalism.

This focus on individual creativity highlights the way that intermediary intelligentsia have an expanded capacity to generate novelty because of their social position. Their positionality at the liminal intersection of two communities generates both the need for new questions and the capacity for new answers. New questions arise because their experiences do not directly transfer onto the experiences of either of the communities they bridge. Because of this, it is more likely that they face experiences which cannot be easily interpreted by the social ‘stock of knowledge’ of either community with which they are linked, thus leaving the taken-for-granted answers of both of these communities insufficient. This social context means that they are pushed to seek new answers to these unique problems which emerge from the experiences of a life lived in ‘two worlds’.

Tiyo Soga offers a unique insight into this context of challenging new questions precisely because he was an early intermediary figure who was thrown deeply into both European and Xhosa social contexts at different times. Soga and others of the early generations of intermediary intelligentsia lacked the broader social community made up of many mission-educated intellectuals which grew more rapidly through the 1870s and 1880s. For this very reason he exemplified more clearly the challenge of grappling with experientially new problems, and the way that intermediary intelligentsia generate new answers.

These new answers can be understood as ‘hybrid’ creations which draw from cultural and political imaginaries, symbols, and knowledge systems of both the bridged communities. As seen in Soga, intermediary intelligentsia have an expanded capacity to create and innovate because they can draw on and blend elements from both knowledge systems which they bridge. Being exposed to two different ‘worlds’ leaves them with cultural resources (the metaphors,

archetypical stories, practices, symbols and symbolic interconnections, etc.) of both communities, and with this expanded palette they are able to paint the world anew: borrowing, linking, and blending once separated cultural elements into new forms of argument and articulation. This ‘hybridity’ emphasizes the expanded space of creativity and possibility which is available to those who stand with a foot in both worlds. In Soga, we have seen a capacity to articulate new and expansive visions which assert a new political space for blackness, for Africanness, and for *ubuXhosa* (Xhosa cultural identity).

Multivocality and mediating between multiple audiences

Where chapter one showed the dynamics which call forth novel answers, chapter two has shown how the position of intermediary intelligentsia can place demands and limits on new political assertions. I have done this by turning analysis to examine how intermediary intelligentsia engaged with their wider relational communities – in other words, their audiences in the different communities which they bridged. In chapter two, I have followed how the generation after Tiyo Soga was able to forge new connections between colonial and isiXhosa speaking political communities, which enabled new avenues for impactful political practice. I have argued that, by drawing together and merging the political resources of colonial political communities (including missionaries and Cape colony politicians), missionary-educated African communities, and rural political communities, proto-nationalist leaders were able to forge new forms of political action to engage the colonial state, exemplified through the analysis of the rapid rise of African voter mobilization. This study has focused analytical attention on the bridging work that intermediary intellectuals must do as they act as mediating political knowledge workers. Where the hybridity examined in chapter one focused on multiple sources which converge in the hybrid individual,

thus expanding their resources for cultural creativity, chapter two has focused on the demands which emerge when intermediaries work to build a common political platform which can resonate with multiple communities with diverse knowledge systems and cultural frameworks. Here I have argued that ‘multivocality’ is the key conceptual counterpart to the ‘hybridity’ of chapter one. In order to create a political platform which resonates with different audiences who have very different frameworks of political understanding, I have argued that intermediary intelligentsia must develop multivocal political forms which ‘speak in different voices’ to the multiple communities they seek to connect. I have exemplified this creation of multivocal political forms as I examined how the concept of *isizwe* or African nationhood is used as intermediary intelligentsia speak to the three audiences they seek to connection: colonial, missionary educated, and rural-traditionalist audiences. While many identities were in principle available and used at different times in the emerging intellectual circles of the missionary-educated isiXhosa speaking community, it was only the concept of *isizwe*/nation which offered an identity that resonated with all audiences.

This need for multivocal resonance across diverse communities suggests a different impetus to the emergence of ‘African nationalism’ as a central framework. Scholars have debated the sources of African nationalism, with some seeing it as an imported political framework from Europe, while others have argued that it was the articulation and affirmation of Africanness in rejection of colonial forms. This analysis offers an alternative framework which argues that the intellectuals of nascent African nationalism were not simply an intellectual class attached to European or African knowledge systems. Instead, it was their intermediary knowledge position, attached to both communities, which shaped their intellectual work.

More broadly, an analysis of multivocality pairs well with the analysis of ‘hybridity’ or brokerage. Using the metaphor of set theory, hybridity (also called brokerage in the sociological literature) focuses on how intermediary figures have access to the ‘union’ of two cultural worlds, and multivocality emphasizes how an intermediary must find or create the ‘intersection’ between these worlds. An analysis of creative hybridity shows how intermediaries can draw widely on concepts from both worlds and reconnect them in innovative ways, thus enhancing their capacity for creativity. Yet when intermediary figures need to meaningfully resonate with multiple audiences at the same time – that is, when they need to create a common platform which multiple groups can be invested – they must turn to ‘multivocal’ concepts which resonate with and motivate their different audiences (albeit in different ways and for different reasons). This speaks to two different transformative capacities which intermediaries have. They have the capacity for both innovative creativity, and for innovative alliance building. Both of these capacities can usher in opportunities for political transformation. Yet these two capacities can also stand at odds with each other: creativity expands what can be imagined precisely because it strays from the common sense ‘taken-for-granted’ answers which are available. In doing so, it can expand the horizon of political possibilities in ways which can transform understanding and action. Alliance building and mobilization places the emphasis instead on the audience of political claims, and here the challenge of resonance is only enhanced as intermediaries bridge different cultural worlds. Such alliance-building places limits on the concepts to which intermediaries can turn, while bringing together different political communities and combining their resources also offers new possibilities for transformative forms of politics. As in the case of African nationalism, the notion of *isizwe*/nation might begin as a multivocal concept which creates a common platform

that is motivating for both colonial and African communities, but from this anchoring point it can grow into a motivational conceptual framework of its own. Later articulations of African nationalism turned from an identity which needed to seek resonance to one that could transform participants self-understanding, teaching a new interpretation of the world rather than needing to appeal to the political meanings which already existed.

Possibilities for innovation in political networks

Chapter three has extended the focus on linkages and connections by turning to study the nascent proto-nationalist political organizations which emerged in the 1880s, examining the connections between them and showing how the structure of these connections shaped and enabled different forms of political innovation and transformation. Here I have combined tools of network analysis which reveal the ‘political structure’ of the emerging proto-nationalist political community with historical and close textual analysis of key organizations, which reveal the innovative forms of practice and understanding which arose in these organizations.

This combination of methodological tools has revealed two broad patterns of innovation seen in nascent proto-nationalist organizations emerging through the decade of the 1880s. I call these forms of innovation ‘repertoire transposition’ and ‘repertoire syncretization’. Repertoire transposition arises when frameworks of political understanding and action move to a new context. In this new domain, these existing political models are transformed to fit the needs of the new context, and as they are applied in new ways, they are ultimately transformed into something new. This process of transformation is like an old tool being put to a new purpose, and then slowly being adapted from its original form to best fit that purpose. This form of innovation is seen in a cluster of ‘Abantu Basesikolweni’ (School people) organizations which

united more urban and missionary-educated African communities. Here, African leaders who had deep familiarity with missionary and colonial political forms began to build their own African-only organizations, initially modeled on these colonial forms. Organizations such as mutual aid societies, teachers' associations, temperance organizations, and the earliest African political interest organizations first emerged by taking up colonial organizational forms, now developing them in African-only organizations. In this context, the organizational practices, political vision, and forms of collective action were transformed to suit the needs and interests of the Abantu Basesikolweni political community.

The early organizations of the Abantu Basesikolweni community often developed this form of politics. In political and civic organizations which also included teaching organizations and mutual aid organizations, these communities began with organizational models which mirrored missionary or colonial political forms. Yet in these contexts, they increasingly developed a social and political commitment to racial and ethnic identities, identifying how the colonial social system disadvantaged and discriminated against their communities based on these categories. For the missionaries, the 'natives' were to be socially and morally uplifted and advanced. For the colonial state, the 'natives' were to be managed at the margins of colonial society. With a deep familiarity with these colonial approaches, the early Abantu Basesikolweni political organizations worked to reject the exclusion which was being developed on a legal level by the colonial state, and they worked to transform the missionary organizational forms which offered paternalistic upliftment, into a form of patriotism. These organizations began to assert a shared *abantsundu* (black) identity which directly responded to the colonial vision of the 'natives' as a conceptual other. Taking up the organizational forms and strategies from missionary and colonial

political organizations, this community now deployed the tools of social upliftment and the strategies to engage the colonial state (both for support and to resist legal discrimination) which they borrowed from their colonial interlocutors. As they applied these colonial political repertoires, they transformed the politics which were possible by developing a shared ‘African’ (*abantsundu*) identity and working for African interests and social wellbeing through both local political engagement and direct engagement with the colonial state.

The second form of innovation I have followed is repertoire syncretization. Repertoire syncretization is made possible when people with very different political experiences – with different knowledge of strategies for organization and collective action, and with different frameworks of political analysis and interpretation – are brought together in new organizations. In these contexts, new forms of political practice emerge which draw elements of these different political approaches and forge them into new syncretic political forms. I have argued that this form of innovation is most visible in the ‘*isizwe*’ (‘ethnic’ or ‘national’) organizations which were more peripheral to the political structure. These organizations connected missionary-educated leaders, who had knowledge of colonial political models, with rural leaders who retained rural political authority, and led rural political communities who were united by shared ethnic political identities. Here, new political forms were developed by bringing elements of rural and ‘traditionalist’ political organization together with the skills and strategies of colonial political approaches of which missionary educated leaders had mastery. New syncretic forms of political articulation and action emerged as rural political leaders were able to mobilize mass support from their communities and build a shared movement around local ethnic identities, and missionary-educated leaders were able to direct this mass action to engage the colonial state in a

language and political form with which Cape political leaders were familiar and to which they were receptive.

Consolidating proto-nationalism from local political movements

In the final part of Chapter three I considered how the innovations seen in various organizations of the proto-nationalist network were consolidated as new cross-regional, cross-domain connections were forged as Abantu Basesikolweni and *isizwe* organizations were connected in a struggle against the disenfranchisement of rural African voters. This new threat challenged the political power of both missionary-educated and rural political leaders. Rural leaders and their communities were directly threatened with exclusion from electoral participation, and missionary-educated leaders who had long pushed for increasing African voter participation, saw voter disenfranchisement as an attack on African (rather than rural) political representation. The response to this threat created new truly cross-regional, cross-domain political connections, bringing leaders from almost all the political organizations in the region together to build a collective response. This interconnection resulted in a new umbrella body, Imbumba Eliliso Lomzi Yabantsundu, along with local branches in different regions, thus fostering a new organizational capacity for interconnection. Yet, more than just a new organization, this new space of interconnection transformed the modus operandi of political connections. As I have shown in the transformed political practice of the Native Educational Association – the most enduring and centrally connected Abantu Basesikolweni organization – the logic of political connections now shifted to emphasize forging cross-regional connections. The NEA actively worked to build wider connections, developing a rhetoric of welcoming in others in order to revive itself, and in practice made new connections to rural organizations between 1888 and

1890. This shift suggests a larger change in political imagination ushered in by the widespread response to African voter disenfranchisement. Now cross-regional connections and common political interests and issues were powerfully foregrounded in the attention of African political leaders, and leading organizations were intentionally working to overcome social cleavages as they continued to develop the proto-nationalist movement. These new connections across past geographical, social, and ideological divides allowed previously local organizations to participate in an increasingly shared proto-nationalist political movement.

Taken together, this chapter has followed both how different structural locations in the proto-nationalist network facilitated different forms of innovative political transformation, and has offered a window into how these forms of innovation came to survive as they were embedded in wider and more interconnected political networks.

This analysis highlights structural patterns of both innovation and consolidation which are applicable more broadly. Thinking with the concepts of repertoire transposition and repertoire syncretization may offer scholars conceptual tools to delineate different dynamics of political transformation which emerge in structurally different contexts – repertoire transposition where contender groups who have mastery of elite or hegemonic political forms take up those forms yet transform them as they put them to work in their own contexts, and repertoire syncretization where political actors with very different political imaginations and strategies are united in new ways and are able to merge their different strategies and political imaginations into new forms which open up new avenues for political contention. Studying the increased connections which facilitated consolidation in the emerging proto-nationalist movement speaks to the emphasis scholars have placed on the need for innovations to become established and to feed back into a

wider political system to be truly transformative. The consolidation examined in this chapter has only begun to examine the processes by which innovation fed back into larger networks to create enduring transformation. Tracing the spread of a shared ‘paradigm’ of ideas developed across the country will be the task of future work.

The beginnings of a new paradigm of politics

In the period after 1890, the end point of this study, the ideas, identities, and strategies developed in the eastern Cape spread beyond this context to offer a template for African politics across southern Africa. African language newspaper communities and then African political organizations began to spring up in Zulu, Basotho, and Tswana communities, and then multi-language newspapers and new political organizations emerged in urban centers. This spreading set of political organizations drew from the political vision and approach developed in the eastern Cape. The commonalities in political vision and practice which this spreading template facilitated created a political common ground that allowed African political groups from across South Africa to connect and ultimately to form the African National Congress in 1912 as the four colonies of present-day South Africa were united into one country.

This spread and growth emerged not just from local innovation, but from the capacity of the political vision developed in the local context of the eastern Cape to ‘disarticulate’ from its local specificities and to offer a motivating new political framework to newly forming African political communities across southern Africa. This spread was the beginning of a new political paradigm which became truly established and truly transformational as it fed back to reorient wider and wider circles of African political communities, inspiring and motivating new visions of African nationalist politics. This dissertation has thus studied the early contexts which

facilitated innovation and allowed a new repertoire of political understandings, organizations, and strategies of action to establish themselves. Future work will study how the packages of ideas and practices developed in this nascent proto-nationalist movement fed back into wider geographic circles in the following two decades, spreading an emerging African political paradigm which fostered a shared political vision that facilitated the new political unity seen in the multi-ethnic African National Congress.

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