Challenging the One-Stop-Shop Police Identity: A qualitative analysis on how implementing police divestitures can sustain the growth of permanent public housing infrastructure and employment of social service workers for people experiencing homelessness

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Introduction

"*What makes the job* [policing people experiencing homelessness] *worth doing is when we see someone we've been working with get housing.*" – **Enrique Rodriguez**, Santa Monica Police Department (Police Executive Research Forum 2018)

While police officers continue to maintain their position as the first-response entity to violent crime, massive police funding increases by local governments over the last forty years has made policing synonymous with social issues such as homelessness and mental health (Vermeer et al. 2020, 2–6). Today, police officers continue to feature consistently higher rates of dispatches for homelessness, minor disturbances, and dispute mediations than for violent crime – policing areas that are not apprehended appropriately in most American police training programs (Lamin & et al. 2016, 4–9). Most importantly, officers are regularly expected to understand and assist individuals experiencing mental trauma and other mental health crises, placing them in situations outside their purview of expertise and jeopardizing their relationships with people experiencing homelessness (PEH) (Reuland et at. 2012, 18–32). This paper challenges the *one-stop-shop* police identity by presenting qualitative data from Chicago-based police officers, homeless shelter employees, individuals of higher academia, and leaders of public foundations to argue that a police divestiture will benefit the city of Chicago by increasing the quality of resources available to PEH without imposing any substantial setbacks to the Chicago Police Department (CPD).

The four groups of Chicago-based interviewees – the CPD, homeless shelters, higher academia, and public foundations – each provide unique perspectives on the systemic setbacks of Chicago's strategy towards ending homelessness. Police officers discuss the limitations of the CPD's training program and support policies that aim to raise funds for developing more permanent housing units in Chicago. Further, some police officers express discontent with the

responsibilities of the one-stop-shop identity and support police divestitures that redefine the police officer's duties into a more specialized public service that concentrates on fighting violent crime. Affiliates of homeless shelters discuss the ramifications of generations of CPD officers that viewed homelessness as a crime, supporting an increase in the quantity of social service workers and a police divestiture that addresses the supply shortage of available housing units for PEH. Individuals of higher academia believe that the CPD's unsatisfactory training program and complex relationship with PEH necessitates a police divestiture that removes police officers from the civic issue and inserts better-educated and more-experienced social service workers with a higher degree of competence in communication skills and de-escalation tactics. Leaders of public foundations believe that funding increases for short-term housing units greatly benefits the concentration of Chicago natives facing insecurity, and in turn, decreases the rate of crime from PEH and the overall rate of homelessness. Thus, the qualitative data highlights the inefficacy of some of Chicago's current strategies to decrease the quantity of PEH – due to its failure of raising an adequate supply of funds to address the supply shortage of permanent housing units – to argue that a police divestiture can raise the equity of the city of Chicago.

Coming from a New York-based suburban upbringing, I spent my adolescence blindsided by the everyday realities for hundreds of thousands of Americans that fight poverty on a daily basis. During my sophomore year of high school, I decided to join the Stuyvesant football team in hopes of experiencing the internal comradery that naturally encompasses such a physically demanding and team-oriented sport. Over the next three years, my career as a football offensive lineman served as the cornerstone of my high school experience as I formed extremely meaningful relationships with the entire team, staff, and alumni network. One of my closest friends, another offensive lineman, was a charismatic, thoughtful, and kind-hearted individual from the Philippines.

While we spent hundreds of hours over three years studying for exams and playing football together, I was always left confused when he would refuse to go to lunch outside school or to explore downtown Manhattan after practice. During the second semester of my senior year, this friend – who I blindly assumed was living in a home – confessed that he was homeless and lived in the New York City MTA subway system. At first, I was shellshocked, and soon after, heartbroken. My friend, who I thought shared a transparent relationship with me on his life outside of school, not once mentioned his daily hardships to execute simple tasks like finding quiet spaces to do homework or to bathe after practice. It became increasingly apparent to me that despite the existence of city-wide resources to help people facing housing insecurity, a tremendous level of addition support – starting with academic research that concerns all aspects of PEH – needs to be properly executed to better help individuals in need find permanent housing and support their families.

In light of domestic protests aimed at condemning police departments' historic track record of abusing authority, conversations on police reform have polarized groups of individuals on not only opposing political spectrums but also supporters of the Defund Police Movement and even members of law enforcement agencies. While Defund Police Movement advocates claim that police departments are vastly overfunded and demand transfers of functionalities to social services, there does not exist ample qualitative data to measure the impact of the one-stop-shop identity on the relationships between police departments and PEH with Chronic Mental Illnesses (CMI), the ability of the CPD to adequately respond to the social and medical needs of PEH, or the psychological consequences on police officers that are professionally demoralized from not being able to concentrate on policing areas that incentivized them to enter their profession – fighting violent crime. Additionally, CPD-based qualitative data is important because it can justify the

notion that law enforcement officials would support a strongly defined transfer of functionality that would restructure the one-stop-shop identity into a slightly more specialized public service – at the expense of overall diminished police resources – while simultaneously growing alternative programs that have stronger social and infrastructural strategies to advance the needs of PEH with CMI.

Questioning the one-stop-shop identity and reforming policing into a slightly more specialized public service concentrated on violent crime can correct generational failures to implement fair and legal policies practices towards PEH. The purpose of this paper is to build on the momentum of the Defund Police Movement and garner sufficient data in support of the belief that a police divestiture is justified in nature because i. police officers do not have the proper capacity to maintain a high standard for the social and medical needs of PEH and ii. redirecting police resources towards additional public housing units and social workers can positively impact Chicago's quality of public services towards individuals facing any and all forms of housing insecurity. The ultimate hope of this paper is that Chicago's resources become better utilized, through previously untested strategies, to turn the city into a safer and more equitable environment for all residents.

Institutional Details

Throughout the course of the 20th century, homelessness was heavily criminalized by both local and state governments (Reuland et al. 2009, 4). Police officers were naturally assigned to address dispatches towards PEH and have historically refused consider many existing mental health complications that prevented individuals from finding housing security or rejecting the usage of harmful substances (Vermeer et al. 2020, 9). Additionally, there was a general social sentiment that PEH were a burden on the safety of society and thus criminalized the act of homelessness – instigating police departments to arrest PEH without major justifications (Shinn et al. 2021, 8). However, a growing level of evidence suggests that access to public housing, medical services that promote the abstinence of drug use, and pipelines for finding employment all have high turnover rates amongst PEH that need more definitive public intervention (National Initiatives 2017, 9). At the status quo, police officers being the first-response entity towards PEH dispatches means that municipal resources cannot be used to their full potential to best address how to help PEH defeat their battle against homelessness.

Over the last twenty years, U.S police departments have developed a reputation for being significantly more likely to use firearms than any other comparable first-world country. Additionally, modern research suggests that police officers are more likely to use firearms against individuals of marginalized communities than against individuals of more economically affluent backgrounds (Poppe et al. 2020, 6). As a proportion of population in 2020, U.S. police officers murdered more than 3 times as many civilians as Canadian officers, more than 7 times as many civilians as German officers, and more than 10 times as many civilians as both Japanese and English officers (Prison Policy Initiative Report 2020). Further, recent US studies suggest that

police violence is one of the most prevalent causes of death for young individuals (Edwards et al. 2019, 2–5). Evidently, acknowledging the harsh reality that police officers in the US are objectively more violent than officers of similar first-world countries is important in the context of dispatches towards PEH with CMI because this vulnerable concentration of any given city's population is exposed to unnecessary outlets of danger to their lives. Further, over the life course of an African-American, modern research estimates that 1 in every 1,000 black men can expect to be killed by a police officer; additionally, white men and women are significantly less likely to be murdered by police than Black, Latino, and Native American men and women (Statista Research Department 2021). In relation to PEH, African-Americans are at risk of additional systemic danger from police officers because they encompass 39% of the homeless population in the U.S. despite only representing 13% of the nation's overall population. Therefore, cities nationwide should consider the dire consequences of modern research claiming that African-Americans, and specifically African-American PEH, are at extra risk of harm from officers to craft policies that introduce more social service workers specialized in de-escalation training for non-violent-crime-related dispatches.

Despite the stark sociopolitical and historical differences across the U.S., law enforcement agencies deviate from nationally recognized practices to craft internal strategies of best response to address all areas of the one-stop-shop identity. At the status quo, there exists no federal mandate for a standardized police training program within the U.S despite the existence of over 18,000 different police agencies; the drawbacks of this inadequacy include grossly undertrained officers, insufficiencies in recruiting diversity candidates to advance alternate perspectives when implementing response tactics, and an inefficient equilibrium on how to best use public resources to make communities safer and more prosperous. Depending on the city, PEH are thus exposed to

both different qualities of dispatches from police departments and varying levels of risk to their lives.

Whereas US police training programs average 800 hours of total training, England features an average of 2,500 hours and Germany features an average of almost 4,500 hours (Institute for Criminal Justice Training Program 2019). With respect to the dispersion of training topics, U.S. academies disproportionally emphasize education on Firearms and Defensive Tactics. The rationale of the police is that – irrespective of the massive funding increases over the last forty years – both the municipalities that subsidize law enforcement agencies and residing communities expect police officers to be adequately trained to address any potential issue related to violent crime – whether its homicide, murder, assault, manslaughter, sexual assault, rape, kidnapping, or harassment. (National Institute of Justice 2015). Naturally, the extensive list of potential conflicts that fall under the classification of violent crime forces police officers to prioritize their understanding of protecting their communities, at the overall expense of lessening their expertise in areas of policing that are deemed by the municipalities' constitutions and law enforcement agencies as secondary on the hierarchy of urgencies. Hence, there is a clear disconnect between the inadequacy of police training programs to teach officers how to assist PEH and the overreliance of state and local governments to issue police officers as first responders – and sometimes only responders – for all civic issues related to homelessness.

The Chicago Police Department, eager to correct historic wrongs, has recently passed legislation that increased applicant qualifications and enlarged training programs for potential future officers. In order to apply, a candidate must i. have 60 semester hours of college credit, ii. three years of continuous active duty in the US Armed Forces, or iii. one year of continuous active duty in the US Armed Forces and 30 semester hours of college credit (Criminal Justice Degree

Schools 2021). Additionally, in order to pass the initial screening, applicants must be aged between 21 and 40 years of age and express proof of residency in Chicago. If accepted into the training program, police students undergo a rigorous curriculum encompassing about 1,000 hours of classes; afterwards, the program graduates spend 13 months as probation officers under the direct supervision of active police officers. On the surface, the set of required academic benchmarks and professional experiences found in the CPD greatly override the relatively relaxed requirements of Southern police counterparts and suggest that Chicago officers are both better educated and better prepared to address the responsibilities of being socially branded with the one-stop-shop identity. However, a deep investigation into the components that complete the entire training program highlight great insufficiencies in the quality of education across all segments of the one-stop-shop identity. Whereas police officers are meticulously trained on the usage of firearms and their legal rights to exert force when necessary, other components of the profession – such as dispatching to individuals that may express some form of mental illness and require high-quality communicative skills to properly de-escalate – are seen as secondary in importance and thus jeopardize the ability of Chicago officers to share a similar quality of response to all their perspective civic ordeals.

The city of Chicago has 20 homeless shelters that collectively provide over 10,000 shelter beds for individuals facing housing insecurity. Sarah's Circle and Lincoln Park Community Services are two renowned Chicago-based homeless shelters that have been operating in the city for decades and have inspired policy makers to modernize their public strategies over the course of the pandemic. Sarah's Circle's primary facility is located on North Sheridan Road in Chicago; there is another active facility "around 15 minutes away by car," and a third facility is in the process of being developed after Sarah's Circle secured the necessary donations; the shelter is primarily funded by grants and donors and has a 5-tier system on how to delegate resources to its individuals;

Tiers 1 and 2 ensure temporary housing and tiers 3 through 5 provide permanent supportive housing. On the other hand, Lincoln Park Community Services is similarly funded through grants and donors as well. Individuals that represent both entities claim that the causes of the large concentration of PEH in Chicago are attributed to the supply shortage of shelter beds and the failures of previous administrations to secure the necessary funding to increase permanent affordable housing access. With respect to law enforcement, both agencies agreed with the idea that the one-stop-shop identity is not effective enough at tackling the large volume of civic issues that currently bombard the CPD.

Individuals from Northwestern University and DePaul University that directly research and participate in the advancement of data analysis to validate policies that decrease homelessness support the viewpoints of CPD officers and homeless shelters. Dr. Molly Brown is a professor of clinical psychology at DePaul University and is the founder of the Homelessness, Advocacy, Research, and Collaboration (HARC) Lab. The HARC Lab "seeks to inform best practices for homelessness services and systems through collaborative research with community organizations in Chicago and nationwide; it provides training, program evaluation, and consultation services for organizations and engages in grassroots affordable housing advocacy." (HARC Lab 2018). Amanda Barry is a Doctoral Student studying Clinical Psychology with Dr. Brown, and specializes in homelessness, trauma, schizophrenia, dementia, and co-morbid disorders. The dedicated twosome are invested in the analysis of the issues that sustain homelessness in Chicago today and explain both the drawbacks of currently relying on police officers as the primary dispatches for unsheltered PEH and voice their support of policies that increase access to permanent affordable housing.

Chicago-based public foundations are crucial towards understanding how to better existing strategies implemented by the CPD because they essentially act as a liaison between city, CPD, advocacy groups, and homeless shelters. The Michael Reese Foundation, a 20-year-old Chicago-based public foundation with $175 million in public donations to date, is a key player in organizing the funding of private initiatives that provide short-term relief for individuals facing housing insecurity. In unison with the theories of Dr. Brown, the Michael Reese Foundation "approaches homelessness with the 'Housing First' philosophy, linking PEH to safe and affordable housing quickly and with minimal barriers so people can start their journey to healthier lives sooner," (Michael Reese Foundation 2017). Gayla Brockman, the CEO of the foundation, believes that public foundations are vital for the sustainability of resources towards all Americans because of how traditional corporations and political entities have historically abused the healthcare system. The CEO's tailors a strong and well-defined approach when looking for ways to positively impact the well-being of PEH in Chicago: she "tries to find opportunities where she can teach people how to fish, rather than giving them fish,". When Ms. Brockman first joined Michael Reese, it was operated as a private foundation – essentially a private charity – and thus was not able to leverage its relationships with policy makers or public donors to its full capacity. By transitioning Michael Reese to a public foundation, Ms. Brockman was able to raise more money using public outlets, advocate for causes with lobbyists and legislatures, and have a greater impact on systemic change; she continues to play an important role in understanding the nature of potential police divestitures because she is well-known in Chicago and the sphere of national public foundations that unite together to implement PEH-related policies.

The Michael Reece Foundation places its raised capital into a community trust and gives away 5% of its portfolio a year towards public donations that address homelessness. By being

public, the agency is able to raise more money, and also give away more money. At the moment, Ms. Brockman is at the head of a unified initiative called the Chicago Funders Together to End Homelessness (CFTEH) – a national network that includes 30 Chicago-based funders and invests roughly $25 million into permanent housing units. The allocated capital comes from over 200 donors and includes the support of the Mayor, Illinois Governor, Cook County, the state of Illinois, and both the public and private funders that sustain the agency. Evidently, public foundations such as The Michael Reese Foundation are acting on modern research that suggests increasing public housing units decreases the rates of crime from PEH and the long-term rate of homelessness in the city. To best address the supply shortage of housing units, public foundations continue to advocate for police divestitures that remove officers from the civic issue – big data from higher academia, the efforts of homeless shelters, and recent initiatives from public foundations all serve as testaments to the notion that the city of Chicago can raise the equity of its citizenry by hiring more social service workers and increasing the quantity of public housing units.

Literature Review

A collection of case studies conducted over the last ten years has prompted the claim that municipal allocation of capital towards PEH decreases if the capital that is used for officers to respond to PEH-related dispatches is redirected towards building more public housing units with necessary social and medical personnel (Shinn et al. 2021, 4). Advocates claim that police departments are not adequately trained to address the nationwide issue of homelessness as the average quantity of hours spent on De-escalation and Communication tactics significantly lingers behind the length of curriculums in comparable first-world countries (Institute for Criminal Justice Training Program 2019). In addition, reports from police officers nationwide suggest that many police officers joined local police units to make communities safer by specializing in violent crime – not to be at the forefront of social issues such as homelessness (Reuland et at. 2012, 18–32). An overwhelming level of research conducted on the costs of relocating people experiencing chronic homelessness towards permanent housing solutions suggests that police divestitures can make policing a more specialized endeavor while making public responses to PEH more strategic and cost-effective.

In 2016, U.S. police training programs spent only 16% of total hours trained on i. Communication Skills, ii. De-escalation, and iii. Crisis Intervention (Police Executive Research Forum 2016, 11). In response to public pressures to improve the quality of PEH-related dispatches, countless police departments have secured additional municipal funding to kickstart Crisis Intervention Teams (CITs): partnerships between officers and mental health experts (Police Executive Research Forum 2018, 6). First implemented in 1980, there are currently hundreds of active CITs across the country (Rogers et al. 2019, 3–5). Police officers, seen by many coalitions

focused on homelessness as too aggressive towards unsheltered PEH, leverage the expertise of mental health experts in both crisis de-escalation techniques and communicative strategies to prioritize effective mental treatment over simply incarcerating the perpetrators (Rogers et al. 2019, 5–7). However, critics of CITs claim that they are an inefficient use of municipal resources, irrespective of the location of the police department, because public dispatches to unsheltered PEH i. take significantly more time than responses to other social issues, ii. are highly dependent on privately contracted (not fully employed) mental health experts with unreliable availability, iii. is bottlenecked by the lack of police officer expertise, and iv. incriminates the safety of the mental health experts if the public dispatch is a volatile situation (Reuland et al. 2009, 1–23). Hence, research organizations have analyzed the costs and benefits of using police resources to subsidize additional housing units to examine any potential positive externalities that can be realized for unsheltered PEH.

In 2010, a concerned group of community activists started the "Vision 2025" initiative in the Clark and Floyd counties of Indiana with the goal of providing a permanent housing solution to the 300 PEH of the two counties by 2025 (Fry et al. 2015, 7). Vision 2025 aspired to turn their community service systems into more effective responses by "improving the health and stability" of PEH and "increasing access to stable and affordable housing" (Fry et al. 2015, 12). The program realized that the costs of homelessness to the Indiana counties was significantly higher than the costs of providing affordable housing after calculating i. the cost of shelter use, ii. the cost of county, state and federal incarceration, iii. the cost of probation and parole, iv. the cost of emergency transports, v. the cost of medical and psychiatric services, vi. the cost of substance abuse treatment, vii. the financial burdens on the Veterans' administration, and ix. the cost of lost business enterprise through decreased tourism and spending from local communities (Fry et al.

2015, 15). Vision 2025 noted that while many of the costs associated with unsheltered PEH are still fixed into the cost of PEH in permanent housing, they are significantly lower in both the short and long run – resulting in a large decrease in the average total cost per PEH from the perspective of the counties' municipalities. Additionally, the case study reported that PEH in permanent housing had significantly higher success rates of securing employment than unsheltered PEH (Fry et al. 2015, 22).

Nation-wide case studies over the last ten years have validated Vision 2025's claim that PEH with chronic mental illnesses (CMI) who transitioned from chronic homelessness to supportive permanent housing resulted in a decrease in the average public spending per PEH per year. "Rethink Homelessness", a coalition based in central Florida, quantified the public costs of 107 chronically homeless individuals over 10 years based on the costs of incarceration, emergency rooms, and hospitalizations (Shinn et al. 2021, 4). Rethink Homelessness is a national initiative represented by various public sector officials, non-profit leaders, and business executives who unanimously believe that the conventional approach of dispatching police units towards PEH with CMI is ineffective at decreasing homelessness rates because they do not address the core of the issue: providing resources towards public housing, rehabilitation for substance abuse, and pipelines for seeking employment. In Rethink Homelessness' case study, the average public cost was $31,065 per person per year, $3,323,955 for the entire group per year, and a total cost of $33,239,553 for the entire duration of the study (Shinn et al. 2021, 7). Afterwards, Rethink Homelessness considered the costs of placing new permanent housing units for unsheltered PEH in central Florida through the publicly subsidized "Housing First" initiative for a similar group of individuals; the average public cost was $10,051 per person per year, $1,075,457 for the entire group per year, and a total cost of $10,754,570 (Shinn et al. 2021, 8). Consequently, the additional

infrastructure resulted in annual cost saves of $21,014 per person per year, or an overall cost reduction of 68% per person per year. Furthermore, case studies in other American cities have derived conclusions that verified Rethink Homelessness' findings: municipal allocation to build new public housing infrastructure for unsheltered PEH decreases public costs per PEH per year.

Location	Public Cost Savings Per Person	Survey Quantity	Cost Savings Per Person	Annual Cost Savings Percentage
Los Angeles	$23,836	376	$8,962,336	79%
Jacksonville	$54,086	12	$649,032	72%
Louisville	$26,280	34	$911,897	55%
Seattle	$30,000	95	$2,850,000	53%

In 2016, an L.A-based pilot project named "Whole Person Care" allocated a grant of $20 million for "Housing for Health" – a program dedicated towards investing internal resources into social services and public housing units; Whole Person Care reported that for every dollar that LA invested into Housing for Health, the corresponding municipality saved $1.20 in reduced health care and social service costs because the rate of repeat substance abusers decreased and the rate of PEH employment increased (Hunter et al. 2017, 14). In between 2009 and 2019, a collaborative program between "Community Foundation for Northeast Florida" and the *Jessie BallduPont Fund* in Jacksonville, Florida subsidized affordable housing and achieved a decrease in the rate of local homelessness by 32% – vastly outperforming the national average of only 14%; the program noted that access to housing and medical resources awarded PEH opportunities to increase their health equity and financial security that were previously unavailable do to a lack of policy initiative from local governments (Poppe et al. 4–19, 2020) . In 2018, the "Third Door Coalition" was started by concerned researchers and Pacific-Northwestern business leaders to find more cost-effective

strategies for decreasing the rate of chronic homelessness in Seattle after seeing little success from initiatives started by the state criminal justice system and local law enforcement agencies. The coalition quantified the cost of conventional approaches and calculated that the costs of issuing police officers as first responders, subsidizing sanitation services, negatively impacting local businesses, and providing emergency rooms in private hospitals totaled the state government between $30,000–$50,000 per PEH more than the cost of permanent supportive housing – including medical services – using the Florida-based Housing First model (Third Door Coalition 2020). The research reported that the costs to house unsheltered PEH under the Housing First model in Seattle was only between $16,000-$22,000 and resulted in both a 98% utilization rate and 99% success rate in preventing individuals from returning to homelessness (Third Door Coalition 2020). The unanimous revelation of different coalitions and privately funded programs is that investing into permanent public housing reduces chronic homelessness at a smaller average cost per PEH. Considering the recent research, California recently passed a $4.8 billion to build permanent housing for PEH – legitimizing the research and dedicated work of independent programs and coalitions (Platchta 2021). Evidently, the case studies conducted over the last ten years reaffirm the position held by countless advocates for police reform that resource allocation for new housing infrastructure results in significant annual cost savings; the range of annual cost savings is 53%-79% for research conducted in Seattle (53%), Louisville (55%), Florida (68%), Jacksonville (72%), and Los Angeles (79%) (Shinn et al. 2021, 13).

To better understand why public costs decrease after the implementation of new housing infrastructure, a public policy research institute quantified the housing, criminal, medical, and health costs for the PEH population in Maricopa County, Arizona based on their housing status (permanent supportive housing, housing with unknown support services, or chronic

homelessness). Out of the 1,956 PEH diagnosed with CMI, 39% were chronically homeless and 49% had unknown support services – less than 10% of the entire sample size with CMI lived in permanent supportive housing (Bausch et al. 2019, 4). Evidently, the resources and qualified personnel that complemented permanent supportive housing had a positive effect on the mental wellbeing of their respective PEH communities. The case study reported that the recruited medical personnel had a significantly higher success rate at improving the mental health conditions of their designated PEH with CMI than police officers (Bausch et al. 2019, 12). Additionally, the study found that the total cost of chronic homelessness – including health costs, housing costs, and criminal justice costs – was $72,969 for PEH experiencing chronic homelessness and $51,976 for PEH in permanent supporting housing (Bausch et al. 2019, 14). The cost disparity of $20,993 was most clearly explained by the decrease in health costs over the long run; whereas people experiencing chronic homelessness had relatively equal medical costs absorbed by their state government, PEH in permanent housing units with medical personnel continued to marginally decrease their individual total medical costs absorbed by the program as their health equity improved. Over the course of the study, health costs totaled $54,978 per PEH experiencing chronic homelessness but only $37,402 for PEH in permanent supportive housing (Bausch et al. 2019, 15).

There are a series of social phenomena that explain the cost disparity in health costs for people experiencing chronic homelessness as opposed to PEH in permanent supportive housing. One core reason is that people experiencing chronic homelessness are significantly more likely than PEH in protected shelters to interact with both their local criminal legal systems and with emergency services; according to a California-based study, unsheltered people were more than 10 times as likely to encounter police and 7 times more likely to be incarcerated (n=64,000) (Batko et al. 2021, 7). One cited reason by the study for the significantly greater concentration of police

interactions was the general feeling of danger amongst unsheltered PEH who feared their belongings would be stolen or they would be sexually abused; in fact, a significant quantity of unsheltered PEH in California claimed that they welcomed police dispatches because temporary incarceration in local penitentiaries guaranteed safer housing not available on the streets of the city (Batko et al. 2021, 11). Considering the public sentiment that questioning the one-stop-shop police identity can lead to more effective public dispatches to PEH, this research paper will use qualitative data sourced from both CPD officers and members of coalitions focused on homelessness to understand how policing can become a more strategic component of the complete public response to homelessness at a lower total public cost. The goal of the policy recommendations from qualitative analysis is to propose solutions that align policing into a slightly more specialized endeavor, connect unsheltered PEH with better trained mental health experts, and ensure that municipal funds are more effectively dispersed.

Methodology

My primary objective in writing this research paper is to understand how police resources can make the most profoundly positive impact on PEH. To achieve this goal, I gather and utilize qualitative data that questions the inherent nature of policing. One prevalent theme across the qualitative data is the opinion of police officers that police departments are bombarded with responsibilities that exceed their ability to concentrate on fighting violent crime; the negative externalities of having police officers as the primary response unit to PEH dispatches – whether it's for health issues, drug overdoses, potential suicides, or domestic abuse – include the deterioration in quality of response from the police, the relationships between the police and PEH, and the behavior of the police who struggle to maintain a high standard when serving the needs of their communities. Through qualitative research, I observe that police officers do not support the one-stop-shop identity and have a different attitude and level of specialization when dealing with issues – not merely PEH dispatches – outside the realm of violent crime. Therefore, my qualitative data provides meaningful insight for why police divestitures can be in the interests of both police departments and PEH if executed appropriately.

Further, I collect qualitative data from individuals in higher academia, homeless shelters, and public foundations that supports the findings of the case studies discussed in the Literature Review. Individuals in higher academia present evidence that suggests PEH are significantly more likely to cooperate with social service workers than police officers, and that de-escalation training can prevent almost all risks of danger to the PEH from the police officer. Homeless shelters believe that police divestitures can be one of the most organic and probable ways of raising more money for advancing the quantity of public housing units. The public foundation cited in this paper calls

on the successes of its initiatives to increase public housing units as evidence that securing more funding translates to a string of positive externalities for the threesome of PEH, the CPD, and the city of Chicago. Hence, I observe that a police divestiture is a coherent solution for advancing the needs of Chicago natives facing housing insecurity at a minimum cost to the current state of public services.

To source qualitative data, this research paper obtains interview transcripts from police departments, homeless shelters, higher academia, and public foundations via Zoom or phone call; each interviewer is recruited through online sources or through spreadsheets provided from professors at the University of Chicago. Naturally, not all individuals recorded wanted their personal information displayed for the purposes of this paper's research. Three out of the five police officers preferred to stay anonymous given the current political tension between police departments and various activist groups. A manager at Lincoln Park Community Serves asked to asked to be named Mark for the purposes of this paper – because he claimed that his views might not be shared with other employees in the facility and did not want to risk his internal reputation. Nonetheless, all 10 interviewees gave me permission to use all of the qualitative data collected on our calls.

First Name	Last Name	Relationship to PEH	Email Address
Julius	Givens	Chicago Police Department; Active Officer	julius.givens21@gmail.com
Pete	Kalenik	Chicago Police Department; Active Officer	Clark2@uchicago.edu
Police Offcer #1 (anonymous)		Chicago Police Department; Active Officer	N/A
Police Officer #2 (anonymous)		Chicago Police Department; Active Officer	N/A
Police Officer #3 (anonymous)		Chicago Police Department; Active Officer	N/A
Molly	Brown	HARC Lab Director, Professor Clinical-Community Psychology	molly.brown@depaul.edu
Amanda	Barry	DePaul University; Doctoral Student in Clinical Psychology	ABARRY11@depaul.edu
JoJo	Palmer	Sarah's Cirlce; Communicative Manager	jpalmer@sarahs-circle.org
Mark (anonymous)		Lincoln Park Community Services; Manager	N/A
Gayla	Brockman	Michael Reese Foundation; CEO	gbrockman@wearemichaelreese.org

In order to build a level of trust and understanding with each recruited speaker, every interview started with a 5-to-10-minute introduction on our backgrounds and similar interests. It was extremely helpful for me to learn about some of the primary incentives for wanting to join police departments, volunteer in homeless shelters, conduct research in higher academia, or to be employed by a public foundation. These introductions gave me an outlet to generate credibility on my understanding of the civic issue by sharing my perspectives and how they are in sync with the everyday realities of their professions. I came prepared to every interview with a list of 30 meticulously created questions, but I was careful to prioritize the smooth nature of the interactions to make the interviewees feel as comfortable as possible. Each of the conversations with the police officers lasted in between 45 minutes and 90 minutes. The conversations with Dr. Brown and Ms. Barry were 60 minutes long. I spoke with Ms. Palmer on 2 occasions, each of which lasted 45 minutes. The conversation with the manager of Lincoln Park Community Services was 45 minutes and the conversation with Ms. Brockman was 60 minutes. Altogether, the qualitative data used in the paper amounts to about 11 hours of documented transcripts.

A key advantage of qualitative data is that it is sourced from individuals that have direct exposure towards the difficulties in providing PEH with the resources necessary to defeat their fight against homelessness. One of the greatest drawbacks on the overreliance on quantitative data is that it is ineffective at personalizing the general sentiment of all respective parties – PEH with CMI, police officers, and experts on the subject – that can provide extremely valuable perspectives on better understanding the social issue through anecdotes and other personal experiences. This valuable exposure grants me the ability to grasp a stronger and more consequential understanding of the insufficiencies at hand – making qualitative data the more appropriate and definitive method for answering the research question. In light of the strengths of qualitative data, quantitative data

is used to support the Findings Sections by support claims that validate i. the inherent distrust of PEH towards policing to address their needs, ii. the inability of police to succeed in all aspects of their jobs, and iii. the need to divest resources to support public housing and additional social services. Thus, this paper predominantly relies on qualitative data to amplify the voices of real-world professions who are dedicated to the cause of homelessness and are eager to support policy changes that can turn Chicago into a more equitable city.

Findings

Section 1: *The Police Officer's Perspective*

Each of the five interviewed CPD officers believe that there are significant drawbacks to existing police training programs; some of the most notable issues include viewing some aspects of the one-stop-shop identity as more important than others and a general lack of information on how to balance defensive tactic training with de-escalation skills when dispatching to individuals experiencing a mental health crisis. Julius Givens, a current member of the CPD Tactical Team – responsible for reducing violent crime by removing illegal firearms from city streets – recalls his confrontations with PEH in downtown Chicago and Southside Chicago while a Patrol Officer as "troubling" due to a lack of clarity from his training program on how to calmy intervene and de-escalate high-intensity confrontations. In fact, Julius believes that the lack of a nationally standardized and thoroughly regulated training program is one reason police officers struggle to cope with the realities of their daily responsibilities. Police officers, generally attracted to the profession to play a micro role in combatting violent crime that plagues marginalized communities all over the country, specialize in the usage of defensive tactics, but do not get a holistic experience that includes the mental and social components necessary to prevent the usage of firearms unless absolutely necessary when responding to public dispatches. This directly effects the quality of response from officers on a wide range of potential civic issues such as homelessness, traffic collisions, and low-level property crimes. In fact, Julius thinks that the significantly shorter police training programs in the U.S. force civic constituents to question the legitimacy of their ability to address the everyday responsibilities of the *one-stop-shop* identity:

> *If you look at training in the US versus every major city in Europe, there is a significant difference in both quality and quantity of education. In the US, coppers are trained in between 400 and 1000 hours. In Europe, police officers train anywhere from 3 to 5 years. There is a significant decrease in the level of education to do the job (policing) in the US; In some states, you don't need a college degree to join a local police academy.*

Given the lack of a federal mandate to regulate individual police training programs across states, the large range in total training programs exposes systemic issues with policing in America today and suggests that are fundamental resource constraints that prevent officers from attaining the necessary education to become more capable "coppers". The shortened domestic training programs forces law enforcement agencies to concentrate on "the most important aspects of the job," at the cost of "not properly covering everything else,". According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics' Census of Law Enforcement Training Academies, which interviewed over 600 random training facilities, the national average of US police training program was roughly 840 hours or 21 weeks (Armstrong 2020). Whereas North Carolina has one of the longest training programs at 903 hours, Alabama (520 hours), Tennessee (501 hours), South Carolina (480 hours), Georgia (408 hours), and Mississippi (400 hours) significantly lag their northern counterpart. These large discrepancies from the national mean highlight a systemic flaw in domestic police departments because various regions of the U.S. have significantly different standards for what constitutes a police academy graduate. With respect to PEH, each individual facing housing security deserves a civic guarantee of high-quality dispatches from police officers in their time of need – irrespective of their residing location. This discrepancy creates trouble for people that transition from facing housing insecurity to identifying as a PEH because they are prone to an unfortunate conflict of interest – choosing regions of the country with better-trained officers and healthier policies or staying close to their current regions at the cost of overall diminished resources. Irrespective of the cause, every person facing housing insecurity deserves an equally-strong response from their local

civic constituents; the lack of a standardized police training program is one core reason that police officers all over the country struggle to uphold the responsibilities of the one-stop-shop identity, negatively impacting their relationships with PEH and their overall perceptions on society.

In spite of the failures of current police training programs, police officers are adequately compensated for their labor – justifying the Defund Police Movement's stance that both accountability enforcement and performance measures must rise to reflect the financial costs that law enforcement agencies impose on municipalities. In 2020, the median salary for a police officer in the US was $67,290 – almost 37% larger than the national median of $48,769 for all other professions. Further, the median police officer salary does include overtime pay, which almost always results in a substantial total increase near or over the six-figure salary range and does not factor in the costs of subsidizing health insurance, sick leave, or paid vacations. Additionally, many police departments now offer full and partial scholarships for college graduates that partake in legal, policy, or other applicable coursework related to the job. Clearly, there are significant financial incentives for individuals that are interested in joining this line of work. Since municipalities all over the U.S. have properly funded police departments, then society is within its right to demand a higher quality of police-related services across all areas that represent the one-stop-shop identity. If police officers are unable to consistently express a high-quality response to an aspect of their job, then this large allocation of tax payer's capital is not being utilized to its full potential. Hence, the proposition to implement police divestitures that result in the increase in quality of all public services gains merit as it is in the interests of all constituents involved – the police departments that benefit from a regression of existing responsibilities, the municipalities that spend tax dollars more effectively, and the members of society who would now have better-quality public services.

One component of the CPD training program that is improperly apprehended is the inevitability of police encounters with unsheltered PEH. An anonymous police officer from the CPD Special Investigations Unit (SIU) discusses his safe and secluded upbringing in Schaumburg, Illinois as the catalyst in his decision to move to Chicago and be at the forefront of all civic issues that come as a result of massive socioeconomic inequality. He explains that CPD training fell short of expectations, and he recounts moments where he feared he was not properly prepared to address the responsibilities of the one-stop-shop identity. With respect to training on PEH-related dispatches, this police officer claims:

> *I can't remember anything specific from the academy from my training days that addressed homelessness other than brief discussions about the types of resources that officers can direct people to like shelters and warming centers. There are materials that we have access to, but other than that, there really isn't that much training on this subject. The majority of our training program was focused outside of homelessness, it was on fighting violent crime in Chicago.*

Evidently, the CPD officer suggests that his training program brushed on the topic of homelessness, given that it is a legitimate component of the one-stop-shop identity, but was not covered with anywhere near enough detail to truly help the officers work with unsheltered PEH experiencing CMI. CPD officers, and other officers all across the country, are often times expected to "learn the trade on their job because there is no substitute for the real deal,". During the 13-month phase where training program graduates shadow active officers, a large portion of the gaps and inadequacies of the training program are "hoped to be covered so that we are prepared when we start full-time,". However, this is an ineffective way of correcting the flaws of training programs because there is no guarantee that the active police officer will properly mentor or educate – let alone understand himself – how to address the various responsibilities of the one-stop-shop identity. Further, there is no guarantee that training program graduates will get exposure to all areas of policing that do not arise on a regular basis, but are nonetheless extremely important

when they become an issue. Thus, the systemic flaws apparent in the CPD training program, and countless other programs across the country, signal the need to incentivize cities such as Chicago to rethink their approach on training respective professionals that address homelessness to turn their cities into more equitable places of habitat.

The lack of emphasis on Communication Skills, De-escalation tactics, and Crisis Intervention in U.S. police training programs is troubling because, according to modern research, the average sample size of PEH has a concentration of at least 30% that is simultaneously battling at least one form of mental illness (Homeless Hub 2018). According to Julius, one negative consequence on the over-emphasis of Firearm and Defense Tactic trainings is that future officers are not properly prepared to be the first responder to civic issues with PEH:

> *On the topic of homelessness, you typically (as a student of a police training program) get a PowerPoint or two on dealing with the homeless population. There is no significant amount of training; there is a certain amount of preparation done, but it's nowhere near worthwhile considering how much time officers dedicate to the issue.*

Additionally, Pete Kalenik, an active CPD officer, claims that, "Out of the 6-month long training program, 4 hours (half a day of police training) is spent on dealing with homeless people,". Evidently, the lack of i. simulations that resonate potential interactions with PEH, ii. coursework on psychology, and iii. communication with individuals that express some form of mental illness all serve in unison to jeopardize the ability of officers to properly respond to public dispatches related to PEH. According to a 2015 study conducted by the U.S Department of Housing and Urban Development – encompassing roughly 565,000 PEH on a given night in the United States – roughly 140,000 individuals were diagnosed as "seriously mental ill" and a total of 250,000 were diagnosed as having "some mental illness" (Treatment Advocacy Center 2016). The results of this research translate to extremely concerning statistics: about 25% of the large sample size (n = 564,708) experienced seriously consequential mental illnesses and almost 50% of the entire sample

size suffered from some form of mental illness. In the context of police dispatches towards PEH, the strategy at the status quo implies that the public response towards addressing to the needs of PEH – one of every two that is fighting from some form of mental illness – by relying on police officers, who are grossly undertrained in communication skills and de-escalation tactics, presents an interesting opportunity to redirect existing resources that can better address any and all pending PEH-based emergencies.

Despite the commonly held belief that expertise in De-escalation tactics can save countless lives from incarceration, or even murder, De-escalation training is not mandated in over twenty states (Stockton 2021). While historically seen as inconsequential in the grand scheme of all police activities, the social upheaval that followed the grotesque 2014 murder of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri incentivized former President Barack Obama to create the 2015 Task Force – a legislative bill that would implement De-escalation training across all 50 US states. Prior to the murder of Brown, only eight states offered De-escalation training as a component of the overall program; this was only eight years ago (Gilbert 2021). However, modern research suggests that officers that partake in De-escalation training are 26% less likely to receive a citizen complaint, 28% less likely to use their firearm, and 36% less likely to injure a citizen (IACP Center for Police Research and Policy 2020). Clearly, the research proves that De-escalation training results in positive impacts that work in unison to strengthen the relationships between law enforcement agencies and marginalized communities. Today, a total of only 29 states has De-escalation training – meaning that 42% of states train officers without the ability to properly apprehend any dispatches related to individuals experiencing mental to a degree of expertise (Stock 2021). Therefore, a significant concentration of the 18,000 police departments in the US do not have the proper coursework to adequately train potential future officers. In other terms, police departments are

failing to properly prepare recruits for the harsh reality of addressing the realities of the one-stop-shop identity on a regular basis. In light of the slow progression to nationally implement De-escalation training, the fact that one of every two police dispatches to PEH involves an individual that has a history of mental illness forces the question: Can cities do better? If police departments fail to properly train officers, then there needs to be a fundamental change in how society approaches conflicts with mental health issues. President Obama initiated the Task Force seven years ago, at a time when a significantly smaller amount of research existed on not only the importance of De-escalation training but also the possibility of using social service workers. Legislative bills that aim to increase the amount of De-escalation training can thus be replaced by bills that use resources to employ social service workers that already have De-escalation training with multiple years of experience. As the U.S. demands more from officers, it is becoming increasing apparent that police departments are struggling to meet societal expectations. Hence, the failure to implement De-escalation training across all fifty states is further evidence that a police divestiture is an appropriate solution of increasing the total amount of officials qualified in De-escalation training through the increased employment of social service workers.

Although officers are not properly trained on the psychological component of PEH-related dispatches, modern police reform has added significant legal courses to protect police officers from violating the rights of civilians. One anonymous CPD officer, born and raised in West Side, Chicago, promised himself he would work in policing after his uncle was shot and killed – the murder is unresolved to this day. He says that growing up in West Side was dangerous and taught him to "never get too comfortable", but the negative sentiment of his friends towards the police actually inspired him to pursue a career in law enforcement. He claims that "the best way to fix a

system that affects you is to become a part of it," and he is currently a proud member of the CPD's Civil Rights Unit. With respect to PEH, this anonymous CPD officer explains that:

> *The vast majority of the CPD's training program, that can somehow be related towards addressing your question, is in law and policy. We receive some training on landlord-tenant disputes. Landlord tenant law in Chicago is very complicated because it is a civic manner. When you are dispatched to a household facing eviction, it is oftentimes one of the most difficult encounters that you can have on the job; hope is misplaced and they* [the individuals facing eviction] *forget what position you are in. To be clear, cops cannot stop evictions; the sheriffs are responsible for all evictions in Chicago. It is usually difficult to explain to angry landlords that its legally challenging to get somebody out of a unit that's not supposed to be there anymore; cops, themselves, cannot do anything about it. From an officer's point of view, the most that we can do is look for alternatives. We try to address the issue as best as we can and avoid incarceration as much as possible. We usually offer to give the people rides to shelters.*

One of the larger issues associated with the sustained phenomenon of placing police officers in situations where they cannot help but feel "helpless to address the needs of the individual" is that it significantly demoralizes their ability to effectively do their job. Additionally, it is clear that police training programs have paid close attention to the importance of ensuring that police officers understand the extent of the law that can used to implement order. The opportunity cost of this decision is that officers still do not get enough training in De-escalation or Communication skills. Society, over the last few years, has been made it an upmost priority for the police to ensure that their officers understand what they can and cannot do to civilians – punishable by officer suspensions and costly lawsuits. The drawbacks of this additional barrier are evident in the account of the anonymous police officer – who believes that police departments are forced into focusing on adapting to new societal expectations and thus are struggling to incorporate more topics into their existing curriculums. The revelation poses the threat to individuals who experience mental health crises and will not receive the same quality of dispatch from an officer as from a social service worker – creating more evidence in favor of a police divestiture.

As with all professions, there exists a natural element of comfort for police officers from building confidence to successfully execute tasks on a regular basis over a sustained time period. When officers are regularly asked to respond to public dispatches where outcomes will inevitably lead to verbal arguments and physical tension, a large window for unnecessary incarceration opens that stems from pending housing insecurity and the series of physical dangers that accompany not having a secure location to call a home. An anonymous CPD officer from Schiller Park, Illinois explains that an area of policing that doesn't get enough attention from researchers or the media is the mental stress imposed on officers from being dispatched to individuals, especially in marginalized communities, that express aggression from crises such as housing insecurity. Further, this CPD officer claims that ordinary individuals, including potential officer recruits, do not understand the general sentiment of individuals from marginalized communities – which adds an additional layer of complexity to housing-insecurity related dispatches:

> *I have worked in marginalized communities my entire life. The majority of violent confrontations with people that were at risk of living on the streets [due to existing housing insecurity] was largely driven by existing mental illness and catalyzed by drug use. I know I speak for many of the other coppers when I say it's extremely frustrating to spend certain nights dealing with people facing housing insecurity when other officers need help addressing violent crime. That 25-minute car ride from the street corner takes away resources that could have been used to keep the streets safer; someone might've needed that car for a [different] reason. Sometimes, concerned residents call us to help the homeless. I have driven to bus stops and asked people if they wanted me to take them to shelters for free – we have this authority and try to take advantage of it when possible.*

As expressed in the words of the officer, the one-stop-shop identity actively creates a multitude of unpleasant scenarios for the threesome of officers, people facing housing insecurity, and the local municipality's resource-constraint budgets. This officer claims that "mental illness" and "drug use" are the most prominent instigators of "violent confrontations", there appears to be a conflict of interest for police officers because they cannot help but feel frustrated that they "spend certain nights dealing with people facing housing insecurity when other officers need help addressing

violent crime,”. Clearly, officers sometimes express discontent with their responsibilities because they are not focusing on areas of policing that they believe are more important. This is problematic and unfair to anyone facing housing insecurity because they deserve a better public servant than an individual that essentially would prefer to be someplace else – especially if there are dedicated and well-trained social service workers who are eager to play a larger role in conflicts of this nature. Irrespective of the causes for violent confrontations, the city has an active responsibility to ensure that its resources are utilized to the best of its ability – not to subsidize the labor of individuals that do not express passion and commitment to their duties. Additionally, as police officers struggle to maintain their professional self-esteem through the constant backlash of dispatching to individuals that are best suited to alternate services, the constant rate of crime that plagues other areas of the city are left with an understaffed cohort of officers; as vehicles intended to transport officers from one location of potential crime to another transform into modes of short-term comfort and safety for unsheltered PEH, the city must consider how its existing resources can be best used to properly address the underlying issue at hand: the lack of access to permanent affordable housing.

The entirety of police officers interviewed by this study unanimously reaffirmed the stance that there have been “significant decreases in the level of education required to do the job [policing] in the US and on the overall level of interest in considering the profession,” due to a series of both direct and indirect factors. One anonymous CDP officer from Skokie, Illinois claimed that:

> *We [the CPD], like probably every other police agency in America, are struggling to recruit and we are struggling to perform very basic functions like respond to crime and investigate violent crime on a regular basis.*

As evidence, the last 30 years has seen the average age of California law enforcement officers rise from 35.9 years to its present level of 40.8 years; an increase of 17% (Smith 2021). This trend is

shared in Chicago, New York, and Florida. Similarly, the eligibility for retirement has decreased from the age of 60 to at least the age of 55 – in many states, the age has decreased to as little as 50 years old. However, there has been an inverse relationship between police funding and police ages in Chicago over the last twenty years. Adjusted for its present value, Chicago allocated $750 million to the Chicago Police Department in 1964 – resulting in a cost of $215 per Chicago capita (population of 3.5 million) (Chicago Reporter 2020, 1). In 2021, Chicago allocated $1.6 billion to the CPD, not including the cost of settling police misconduct lawsuits and large police pensions – resulting in a cost of at least $600 per Chicago Capita. While the funding seems large relative to the past, the city understands that healthy law enforcement that maintains law and order is an upmost priority for every community – and thus distributes municipal capital appropriately. One of the main reasons that police departments struggle to recruit is the "increased social tensions between officers and city people,". Many potential recruits now contemplate on whether or not to join academies because they "do not want to be labeled as pigs for the rest of their lives,". For this reason, police departments such as the CPD must continue to implement strategies that improve their public relationship with marginalized communities – a potential option is to begin removing officers from dispatches that do not relate to violent crime in order to increase the average individual's trust in the competency of the public response and therefore their respect for the value of the city's services.

As previously mentioned, law enforcement agencies across the country, eager to maintain healthy recruitment pipelines, have strategically built networks to contact, mentor, and encourage U.S. military veterans to join the profession following the end of their careers as soldiers. However, critics of this policy believe that modern law enforcement agencies should dedicate more resources towards recruiting candidates that were raised in marginalized communities in order to increase

the variety of perspectives that are necessary towards implementing the most effective policies for combatting violent crime in rough neighborhoods. The anonymous CPD officer from Skokie, Illinois claimed that "we [the CPD] have pretty strict requirements on background checks. You also have to pass a credit check; if your debt-to-income ratio is too high, you won't be eligible to work as a copper. At the moment, there are massive barriers to becoming an officer because of all the lawsuits against poor policing in the past. To be straight, you have to be really vanilla to get the job now,". For this reason, individuals of marginalized communities who have the potential to make a great police officer are automatically barred from even approaching the idea of enrolling in the academy if they have any prior misdemeanors – or anything short of a perfectly clean record. This is a clear systemic flaw because it prevents the recruitment of individuals that would not only add important perspectives to conversations on how to implement new policy but also improve existing relationships with marginalized communities that feel police departments do not understand their inherent struggles. Thus, police officers interviewed in this study believe that it is crucial for future recruitment policies to focus on diversity pipelines if they are to improve their relationships with marginalized communities. According the CPD officer from West Side, "it's extremely important to have conversations with individuals that have historically not been sitting at the table,". Further, the contrast in response for sexual assault dispatches and PEH-related dispatches amplifies the issue at hand. Given that officers are the first responders for 911 calls that alert a case of sexual assault, male officers often work closely with female officers, who have historically been underrepresented in not only the CPD but almost all law enforcement agencies, because "a lot of [female] officers have lived experiences with sexual assault or mental illness – they bring these conversations to the table when we choose the best practices,". However, as another anonymous CPD officer points out, "we cannot get cop perspectives from personal

experiences on homelessness, which is part of the reason as to why our responses are viewed by various advocacy groups as not effective enough,". In light of this logic, if officers encourage the recruitment of females to advance their understanding of dispatches to sexual assault cases, then what kind of impact would recruiting individuals that previously faced homelessness have on their understanding of the issue? The fact that individuals who faced housing insecurity don't play a role in shaping the perceptions of police officers that eventually respond to PEH-related dispatches fundamentally corrupts their ability to understand the gravity of the situation for any respective individual. This poses an unnecessary and avoidable setback to the single-dimensional understanding of the police officer, who can only think of homelessness from his/her/they personal perspective – presenting more evidence to justifiably employ more social service workers.

In light of the drawbacks to existing recruitment requirements, when questioned on whether the CPD should consider decreasing the list of requirements to join a police academy, the resounding answer was: "No!". In the words of the Schiller Park CPD officer, "There are absolutely no circumstances under which the CPD should lower its hiring standards. The job continues to become more complex with each new year and it is absolutely crucial that we hold our standards as high as possible. Otherwise, we will lose a ton of cases through either police negligence or misconduct, and certainly won't be able to sustain the same quality of response that has been crucial from keeping criminals away from the streets,". Therefore, in spite of the modern hurdles that place strains on the existing recruitment pipelines, police departments should not decrease their existing requirements when considering applications in order to keep talented and competent officers at the forefront of all respective dispatches. However, this does not mean that police officers should not keep an open mind with respect to how they view potential recruits or what characteristics should be sought after. A minor misdemeanor before the age of 21 is generally

not reflective of an individual's long-term morals – sustaining old-school stereotypes on what constituents a "good cop" actively prevents police departments from penetrating great sources of talent and plagues their ability to create more diverse classes that are capable of addressing all areas of the one-stop-shop identity.

One area of policing that is often overlooked by policy makers and city legislatures when tasking police departments with responsibilities outside of violent crime is the list of primary incentives that have historically motivated officers to join police academies. A common theme held in the CPD is that active CPD officers are often descendants of a lineage of officers that stretch multiple generations. When asked about his background, Pete Kalenik, an active CPD officer, says:

> *My family's policing history dates back to 1942. There have been active officers from my family 80 years in a row – starting with my great grandfather. My father was a cop, my cousin is currently in the organized crime unit, one guy* (anonymous) *is deep undercover, and my aunt is active as well. The CPD has 22 police districts and 333 police peats; I have been the patrolman for Roosevelt Road. It's been the most violent of the 333 police beats for the last 6 years. I started my career as a trooper in North Carolina, then was in the Army reserve, and then was a volunteer teacher on 45th and Princeton in Englewood.*

According to another interviewed CPD officer, "active officers with a lineage of retired coppers in the family is relatively common; officers that previously served in the military are much more common,". Evidently, this presents an issue with addressing dispatches outside of violent crime from the get-go. If a large concentration of active officers has engaged in an active relationship and deep knowledge of firearms prior to the start of their careers as officers, then it naturally comes with the innate struggle to appreciate the upside of transitioning away from past practices to become experts in social services. To be clear, individuals that come from a lineage of officers or are U.S. military veterans certainly have the skillsets to respond to violent crime, but their lack of interest – or failure to acknowledge every aspect of the one-stop-shop identity – is problematic on

several fronts because it jeopardizes the quality of response to individuals in mental distress; this also results in an equilibrium of labor with significant deadweight loss because the professionals best suited and most interested in responding to dispatches with a mental-health component are being neglected in favor of professionals that are significantly less likely to care or have as high a skill-set on the matter. Additionally, a string of critics nationwide has reaffirmed the notion that there should be a fundamental separation of firearm usage for violent crime and psychology for mental health crises in public services. When asked on the catalyst for wanting to dedicate a substantial portion of his career to policing, Pete remarked, “When I was volunteering as a teacher, the community of Englewood was extremely appreciative of my work. I think the community as a whole was really thankful for the officers that were in the community on a daily basis. When I was a teacher, I also worked as a basketball coach afterschool. It was a great way to keep students active when they might’ve not had supervisors at home. For the students without caretakers to pick them up, I would often offer rides home. Every single student that I drove home would run quicker across the street to get into their houses than at any point during practice,”. While Pete’s background and motives for choosing to work in Englewood as a CPD officer might be unique, his experiences can certainly serve as a metaphor for the majority of officers that choose to risk their own lives to serve and fight violent crime: to make communities prone to violence safer, more equitable, and fairer for all its inhabitants. The city of Chicago, like all American cities, has an active responsibility, in the interests of its people, to systemically assign public workers that are reflective of their skillsets. Thus, the hiring of social service workers provides a great option for the CPD that wishes to spend more time dealing with violent crime and less time on other components of the one-stop-shop identity.

One strategy for improving public responses to PEH exerting CMI is to consider whether new state-subsidized infrastructure for PEH with both in-house professional and medical resources will result in a more cost-effective strategy than financially-constraint police training programs. Julius claims to be one of many constitutes in the CPD that do not believe their city and state municipalities have provided an adequate level of resources to properly respond to PEH:

> *We [CPD officers] do not have the resources to deal with the problem of homelessness itself; police officers are seen by politicians as an easy solution to limit the risks and negative outcomes associated with the problem.*

Evidently, many police officers currently express the shared sentiment that not enough resources exist to properly apprehend violent crime – let alone the rest of the responsibilities that come with the *one-stop-shop* identity. For this reason, civic constituents should not only hold police officers to a higher standard, but demand more from their local city officials. As Julius explains, officers are seen as "an easy solution to limit the risks and negative outcomes" of homelessness – advocating for city officials that seek to distance themselves from the old-school mentality that police officers are capable for addressing all of the city's issues should go hand-in-hand with a potential police divestiture. Evidently, it is not fair nor in the interests of individuals facing housing insecurity to live in a city that refuses to stop thinking single-dimensionally – police officers will not be able to properly apprehend all aspects of the one-stop-shop identity without a transfer of functionality. Julius continues to explain:

> *Its* [policing] *not always a pretty profession. Sometimes you need to be the guy that runs down bad motherfuckers who refuse to go back to jail. It's too bad we can't spend more time on this* [violent crime].

Irrespective of the many reasons that prevent officers from solving more violent crime cases, such as the general belief that marginalized communities often times choose against cooperating with detectives due to their consistent track record of abusing authority, asking police officers to address

dispatches outside the realm of violence or crime seriously jeopardizes the public's ability to believe in the ability of local precincts to solve its reported cases. Confirmed by this study's officers, every officer eventually responds to a dispatch with a PEH. Julius explains:

> *The guys [PEH] are usually sleeping outside of restaurants and common areas – dispatches are much more common downtown than in the South and West sides of Chicago. I moved from the South to Chicago to live with my then-girlfriend, now-wife. I started as a copper downtown – being downtown is a dream come true for anyone. You get 'thanks for coming' from random people all the time. When you get relocated to the South side, your colleagues tell you: "It sucks to suck!" That couldn't be further from the truth. When I'm at a traffic light in Southside, 45-year-olds come up to me and say thank you for being here. When I'm in a deli, random adults come in all the time and buy you lunch. We get so twisted because the media narrative is so persistent that if we hear it over and over again, we are going to eventually believe it. I am grateful to work in the south side and they [the people of the marginalized communities] respect and want me here. You're not getting the gratitude that you would've gotten 30-40 years ago, but trust me it's still there.*

As Julius says, police officers are greeted from a surplus of positive sentiment from the marginalized communities that they serve and protect on a daily basis. Despite being hesitant to transfer from Downtown to the Southside, Julius was pleasantly surprised to be bombarded with an excess of gratitude. Julius is clear in his account that there is a concentration of individuals that do not believe in the role of the police at the status quo, but nonetheless, the majority of the individuals are very happy to have officers address the various issues of violent crime on a daily basis. The fact that individuals offer to buy Julius lunch should serve as a testament to how important officers are to marginalized communities in suppressing the negative externalities of not addressing violent crime. Julius is careful to emphasize that the communities see the primary role of officers as the first responders to violent crime; they believe officers have primary responsibility of keeping streets safe. However, Julius does not discuss some of the reasons for why PEH prefer to live near "restaurants and common areas of downtown Chicago rather than the South and West Side," – these are areas that have statistically much less crime and naturally create significantly more favorable conditions for PEH. Anyone facing housing insecurity is physically vulnerable,

and at risk of violence, especially at night – staying downtown in areas of little to no crime lessens this risk. The fact that most dispatches to PEH are in downtown Chicago further implies that they are non-violent; this claim would be invalidated by either Julius' account or by CPD data. Thus, CPD officers are consistently asked to be dispatched towards PEH that do not pose a risk to themselves or to society, eliminating their association to "violent crime" and forcing the question: Do police officers *really* need to be here? If the city's overwhelming majority of PEH, not in homeless shelters, is in the streets of downtown Chicago, then there is ample evidence to suggest that social service workers will have a stronger and more profoundly positive impact on the quality of available responses.

When asked on the topic of the recent social upheaval and the Defund Police Movement, Julius remarked: "BLM hasn't changed anything. The movement reinforced the need for good and quality police officers, but nothing else. We must continue to ensure public trust, accountability and effectiveness. It's an uphill battle. I think that things are changing for the better." From the perspective of law enforcement, BLM served an important role in highlighting the importance of "public trust, accountability, and effectiveness" – three pillars that should be associated with any competent and well-respected police department. When asked on the idea of abolishing police officers in favor of community policing, Julius remarked: "The reality, and this is hard for some people to swallow, is that police officers go to everything. There are certain times when you just need a cop there, it's that simple. There are skillsets that only cops have; cops shouldn't be taking kids to school, and we shouldn't be expected to properly understand mental health crises either." In this account, Julius opens a unique and very valuable opportunity to consider what kind of change law enforcement agencies would support. Further, it is evident that Julius associates the social upheaval demanding more accountability and effectiveness with violent crime – not

homelessness or other aspects of the one-stop-shop identity. Evidently, police officers have heard society's pleas for change, and are focusing their resources on modernizing their strategies to combat violent crime. This is problematic from the perspective of PEH because they are being neglected and not being addressed with the degree of seriousness that's necessary to improve the quality of existing response

Cops like Julius understand that they cannot do all that is asked of them; they are happy to admit that alternate professionals are sometimes best suited to address various public dispatches. This opens a gateway to consider how a divestiture that simultaneously takes a small percentage of resources away from police departments, with the subsequent alternation of the existing one-stop-shop identity, to make both policing a more efficient public offering but also to relocate resources to different outlets that can best address the needs of individuals experiencing mental trauma. Julius goes so far as to say:

> *Most coppers would appreciate mental health professional or someone that specializes in the crisis versus simply having the police respond. A lot of these jobs have a mental health component that isn't described at the time of dispatch. Almost everyone that is shooting in Chicago has a mental health disorder. A mental health expert should not be a first responder to a shooting in Southside; they can accompany cops if they want but they shouldn't be the first responders. The person going through the trash can doesn't need an officer, he/she needs a healthcare worker.*

Julius asserts that "everyone that is shooting in Chicago has a mental health disorder," to rationalize his stance that "a lots of these jobs have a mental health component that isn't described at the time of dispatch,". However, it is brutally unfair to PEH that police officers overgeneralize the mental health crises of "shooters" to PEH as the same entity – most PEH that express a mental health component do not pose a threat to society and thus should not be labeled by police officers as equal to individuals that engage in violent crime. Social service workers, better versed in the large volume of different types of mental health disorders, would be able to coherently identity

which individuals with mental health disorders pose a threat to society and which don't. Further, police officers such as Julius believe that there are certain instances of mental illness where officers must be present. Individuals that are part of gangs often express mental illness to some capacity, but given that they are a grave threat to all individuals around them, their needs to be a trained professional in the usage of defensive tactics and firearm usage to adequately suppress any and all risk of violence. However, other cases of mental illness, such as a "homeless person digging through the trash", does not need highly valuable police officers who already struggle to fully address all violent crime to neglect their primary responsibilities and instead work with the individual at hand before transporting them to a local shelter or hospital. For this reason, the option to divest some police resources to fund alternate programs that are inherently different in nature to traditional policing must take place if we are to increase the breadth and quality of pubic dispatches that are available to all constituents of society.

Pete Kalenik provided a descriptive explanation on how the CPD currently partners with the city of Chicago to address homelessness, as well as some the conflict of interest between CPS and the city on how to best approach the issue of distribution the available resources for the cause. Pete says, "The City of Chicago does not provide direct homeless services; they are all nonprofit organizations (that are either publicly or privately funded) and other philanthropic organizations. The city provides resources to nonprofits that have shown a consistent track-record of positively contributing to the cause,". Pete was careful to explain the issues with quantifying the total amount of PEH in Chicago:

> (To figure out how many people are homeless and unsheltered in Chicago), *there is a single night count conducted. It's a count that only takes place in the winter during one night. The count is conducted by volunteers. Each count is only counted by a volunteer if they are visibly seen. It's pretty clear that the number that the city reports is extremely smaller than the true figure.*

The city of Chicago is notorious for grossly underreporting the total number of unsheltered PEH. The sample is intentionally under resourced to result in a total figure that significantly underwhelms the truth of the situation. On the chosen night of the survey, if an individual is not seen by a volunteer, then they will not be counted. Or, if an unsheltered PEH happened to find a place to sleep that very night but is still facing serious housing insecurity, they will also not be counted. Additionally, Pete explains a massive conflict of interest that prevents policy makers from better addressing the issue. Pete says, "the CPS (Chicago Public Schools) wants to grossly overcount the total of people that are homeless; by their definition, a subject is considered homeless if they face some form of housing insecurity. However, the city wants to undercount the total PEH in a given year. This is because the public schools in Chicago are funded with federal dollars – meaning that more reported homeless students will result in better funded schools. On the other hand, the city wants to report less PEH because a rise in PEH 'makes the mayor look weak'". In this context, we see a conflict of interest because "there is a battle between policy considerations and political considerations,"; the battle for this complex legal challenge lies in the fact that navigating through multiple layers of government can be extremely time consuming and likely ineffective. Additionally, unsheltered PEH are often neglected by marginalized communities and do not get the care that they need because marginalized communities understand that police department have resource constraints and thus save 911 calls for more "urgent matters,". As Pete describes, "Chicago communities oftentimes don't call enough [to report unsheltered PEH on the streets] because there is more pressing stuff at hand for all parties involved,". For this reason, it is critical to consider how a redistribution of resources could take place such that marginalized communities won't have to pick and choose between calling for help for unsheltered PEH out of

moral responsibility versus have the confidence in being able to turn to their local law enforcement agencies when violent crime is jeopardizing the safety of their streets.

Pete continues to provide a strong example on the difficulties of mitigating issues that may arise with people facing housing evictions, and by extension, housing insecurity:

> *For a given apartment, the girlfriend is on the lease due to public incentives. If she is being physically abused, she tells her boyfriend to leave, but he has nowhere to go. The police officers, historically, would have to force him to leave. In the 1990s, there were a lot of illegal evictions. Landlords were really poor in behavior and got a really bad reputation in the city. As a result, the city adopted a set of rights for tenants that extended beyond just the leaseholder. As of right now, you can have a right to live in a place by the legal definition of a tenant if you have physical objects, like a backpack, in the unit. The CPD does not touch evictions anymore for this reason. When they [evictions] do take place, they cannot be executed unless it is over 40 degrees outside – because the assumption is the individual facing eviction has no place to go and will probably go to the streets. This is one of the biggest issues facing the dynamic of housing insecurity.*

One of the unfortunate realities of facing housing insecurity is that it naturally comes with an element of domestic abuse for young women – which is an extremely difficult area of policing to properly apprehend because justifying probable cause is "complicated,". As Pete says, "Without evidence in the form of probable cause, attempting to evict is illegal. If you make them [the person known to commit domestic violence] leave, it's an illegal eviction and they can sue both the city and the landlord. But on a moral note, if you don't evict the guy, you are doing a disservice to the woman and to yourself,". Pete continues to explain, "The most negative energy that I am exposed to on a regular basis is from women that don't get what they want because of housing insecurity – obviously these issues are avoided through more housing security,". As another anonymous CPD officer puts it, "The most dangerous weapon on Chicago streets is pride! People use law enforcement at their own discretion to settle their arguments,". Evidently, organizing more innovative ways of addressing the need to increase public housing can solve many of these issues; individuals would be less likely to resort to violence if they had the security of being guaranteed

housing. For this reason, a police divestiture that results in more public housing units makes sense because it will lessen the tension between police officers and women suffering from both housing insecurity and domestic abuse, and also decrease the overall rates at which women are vulnerable towards abusive partners because they now have more options to leave for self-protection.

Pete also explains that homeless shelters have been negatively impacted by COVID-19. He remarks that, "COVID-19 has forced the city's homeless shelters to decrease capacity by up to 50% by removing every other bed. This has had a negative impact on local crime and displaced more people on the streets,". The CPD officer from Skokie, IL explains that, "In order to properly address the issue of housing insecurity, we need to start tapping into more vacant properties to make more beds. We need the same number of beds, at the very least, to be spread out over a greater number of properties. The beds are not the issue – we already have them. There are dozens of quality abandoned warehouses." Clearly, police officers are well versed on not only the microsegments that encompass the housing security crisis in Chicago, but also the strategies that must take in order to decrease the rate of homelessness in the city. Further, Pete highlights the fact that, "they [shelters] make you leave in between 9am-4pm, they force you to leave during the day to be productive,". However, he adds, "these are people with mental issues and substance issues, so being productive without the proper guidance is incredible challenging and often results in unintended effects for the city,". The CPD officer from West Side says that:

> *Gangs have historically targeted homeless shelters because they know that these people are easy targets. The shelters end up being hubs of activity because gangs target these people. They start using Fentanyl because this increases the profitability of Heroin sales. We have seen more heroin laced with Fentanyl since the start of the pandemic. Giving thousands of dollars to people that are experiencing homelessness and are actual drug addicts was not a good idea. We also think the increase in Opioid abuse is at least partially due to the stimulus checks. If you give a drug addict $1,500, what are they going to do with it? They are going to go and buy 1.5k worth of drugs. While the intent might've been good, the outcome was not.*

Thus, the fact that many homeless shelters require their inhabitants to leave during the day creates additional problems for police officers that naturally respond to all issues related to hard drug usage. Permanent public housing units – with no reason to force people to leave at random points during the day – eliminates this issue. Thus, a police divestiture has an indirectly positive impact on the police officer, who would now respond to less dispatches in between 9:00am and 4:00pm towards people that broke the law due a lack of medical resources. Increased funds for permanent housing units would naturally decrease the overreliance on officers to worry about PEH during the mornings and afternoons, and in turn, help them focus on fighting violent crime.

Julius is one of several CPD officers who advocates for policies that increase state-wide funding for public housing for unsheltered PEH:

> *There is significant data that proves from the enforcement's perspective, it is significantly cheaper for a society to build houses/residences of some capacity to treat the individuals than to delegate officers; this would significantly reduce crime from homeless people as well.*

The fact that police officers are aware of case studies that try to limit the negative externalities of keeping PEH on streets strengths the argument that police officers are aware of various systemic failures – but also their respective solutions. In sync with Julius, modern research suggests that new housing for unsheltered PEH results in a series of positive externalities on the threesome of law enforcement, PEH, and society. According to a survey of 64,000 PEH in Western America, unsheltered PEH are 3 times as likely to have CMI, 4 times as likely to have physical health issues, and 9 times as likely to have substance abuse issues than sheltered PEH (California Policy Lab 2019, 7). Additionally, modern research claims that unsheltered PEH interact with law enforcement at a significantly higher frequency than sheltered PEH and have a larger probability of having a negative interaction with a member of law enforcement that results in arrest, convention, or incarceration (Linton et al. 2014, 9). Self-reported data from California found that

unsheltered PEH had 10 times the average number of interactions with police officers and were 9 times as likely to spend a night in jail as sheltered PEH (Urban Institute 2019, 6). Evidently, housing infrastructure for unsheltered PEH can decrease civic reliance on law enforcement to addresses issues related to PEH while providing PEH with the resources necessary to live in safer and healthier environments.

Nation-wide case studies over the last three years have unanimously reaffirmed that PEH with CMI who transitioned from chronic homelessness to supportive permanent housing resulted in decreases in the average public spending per PEH per year (Bausch et al. 2019, 2). In Arizona, one study used a comparative analysis of average costs per person across three house settings – permanent supportive housing, housing with unknown-in-home support, and homelessness – and average costs of housing, health care, and criminal justice; the results definitively concluded that the public costs of individuals with CMI in permanent housing were about 29% lower than individuals with CMI experiencing homelessness (Bausch et al. 2019, 4–14). Another case study quantified the costs of probation, jail, general assistance, food stamps, HMIS, paramedics, DADS, mental health, private hospitals, and VMC in Silicon Valley – a region that spends an average of $520 million a year on PEH – before and after the introduction of the "Housing 1000" program; the study found an estimated average post-housing cost of $19,767 per PEH – a reduction of almost $43,000 (~68%) from the pre-housing public cost (Flaming et al. 2016, 6–13). Lastly, a case study in Florida considered the financial costs of 37 unsheltered PEH who were collectively arrested over 1,250 in ten years. When the study quantified the average booking cost per arrest ($104/arrest/person) and days of incarceration ($80/day of incarceration/person), their total came out to over $31,000 per PEH per year (Shinn et al. 2021, 16). The introduction of supportive housing for PEH, with in-house professional and medical outreach services, resulted in an average

cost of $10,051 per PEH per year – a cost reduction of over 68% (Shinn et al. 2021, 17). Clearly, there is reason to suspect that using resources from local municipalities to develop new housing infrastructure for PEH with CMI will result in decreased overall public costs per PEH per year. This would catalyze a host of positive externalities; cities will have more capital to allocate to alternative needs, police officers will share a slightly smaller public responsibility, and PEH will be provided with better resources to assist them in their rehabilitation from physical, mental, and substance abuse issues. Based on analysis of both qualitative and quantitative data, the two main analytical conclusions are 1. U.S. police training programs are not prepared to meet the needs of unsheltered PEH with CMI, and 2. There exists more cost-effective strategies at addressing the needs of unsheltered PEH with CMI that benefit the threesome of police officers, PEH, and society as a whole.

Section 2: *The Homeless Shelter's Perspective*

According to a Manager of Sarah's Circle, JoJo Palmer, the homeless shelter was founded in 1979 to specifically address the issue that "no facility existed for women only,". The mission was started to create a safe space for women, who were exposed to an additional set of social barriers that prevented them from realizing their mental wellbeing. Sarah's Circle wanted to address one of the core issues of conventional homeless shelters – kicking PEH out of their facilities in between 9:00am and 5:00pm – and provide them with a "safe place to stay during the day,". According to JoJo, "when homeless shelter kick people out in the mornings, they are exposed to a lot of societal dangers, and women specifically are predisposed to a lot of sexual abuse that negatively impacts their self-esteem and ability to pursue employment opportunities,".

This is an extremely important consideration in the context of a police divestiture – using current police resources to build more permanent public housing units results in a string of positive externalities such as decreases rates of sexual abuse towards women. At Sarah's Circle, female PEH can "relax, eat, and shower," as well as "use Sarah's Circle address as their own address to get food stamps, IDs, and addresses for employment,". As JoJo explains, one of the primary roadblocks that prevent PEH from securing employment opportunities is their inability to provide a permanent residence on their application; most employers discriminate against individuals with this inability and are hesitant to take a leap of faith on individuals who are plagued with stereotypes about their personalities and work-ethic. Thus, permanent housing units – similar to homeless shelters – help some employers bypass existing stereotypes, such as the unprofessionalism of PEH, and in turn increase their likelihood of granting employment to PEH. Additionally, Sarah's Circle "serves breakfast, lunch, and dinner," and "every member gets their personal locker and a claim to their own bed,". JoJo explains that giving PEH ownership of beds is extremely important for their self-esteem, and usually results in a more friendly atmosphere across most new inductees after a couple of weeks. In sync with modern research, access to housing stability not only decreases the rates of depression by over 200% but also increases confidence and self-worth – two mental components that are critical towards beating homelessness (Lee et al. 2019, 2). Thus, increasing access to public housing units can not only decrease the overall rate of homelessness in Chicago, but also result in a second positive externality to decreased rates of sexual abuse: an increase in the mental well-being of the PEH community.

JoJo explains that "the lack of affordable housing for people is the biggest issue preventing the decrease in unsheltered PEH," and that the city "is capable of providing better support services,". At the moment, JoJo believes that "there are 2,000 women a night on the streets of

Chicago," and "the city is lacking 100,000 units to permanently eliminate the issue of homelessness,". No individual, irrespective of their gender, should spend their nights "outside with no roof,". Given that JoJo presents the lack of permanent housing as a humanitarian issue, the argument for a police divestiture is strengthened through the moral claim that a modern society has the responsibility to ensure that no individual sleeps outside. This supply issue can be addressed by divesting city budgets – such as the CPD that currently maintains a very consequential impact on the well-being of PEH – to fund the housing shortage while not necessarily decreasing the impact of smaller alternate budgets on the well-being of the public.

When asked on whether police divestitures would make sense, given that case studies over the last ten years have unanimously reached the same verdict – increasing permanent housing options decreases the average public cost per PEH – JoJo agreed both in concept and in practice. JoJo says:

> *According to our research, the city spends $60,000 in emergency services per year for unsheltered PEH. It costs so much more for emergency services like police officers that respond to PEH and go into hospitals. If you just put the people into houses, it would certainly eliminate a lot of the emergency services that are currently extremely expensive for the city to subsidize. $60,000 is definitely more than a person needs to live in a house. But, the government makes it so hard to create new housing. They are wasting so much more money on emergency services.*

Evidently, homeless shelters such as Sarah's Circle are not only aware by the extreme costs that current systems of governance impose on themselves, but also how much more effective it would be to spend less money on emergency services and more money on housing. As Jojo claims, "$60,000 is definitely more than a person needs to live in a house,"; Chicago's inability to implement new policies that spend money more effectively prevents it from making more positive impacts on civic issues and disturbs the PEH's quest to end housing insecurity. A redistribution of the $60,000 in emergency services to increase public housing would decrease the overall rate of

homelessness and prevent a series of negative mental, physical, and social outcomes that financially burden the existing municipality. A Program Director named Mark at Lincoln Park Community Services, confirms JoJo's thesis that increasing additional permanent housing options would decrease the rates of homelessness and crime from PEH. He explains that, "the lack of affordable housing is the main issue that people face homelessness – it's a supply issue. We need to continue to try and support the creation of apartment buildings that serve individuals in a more affordable manner." Evidently, the general sentiment that not enough affordable housing has a string of negative externalities is shared by multiple homeless shelters in Chicago. The homeless shelter component of the PEH crisis has ample evidence that cities such as Chicago can spend their money wiser, and to a greater effect, if they start listening to the perspectives of individuals who have traditionally been excluded from conversations on forming PEH-related policies, but nonetheless, have extremely insightful opinions that are in the interests of all municipalities.

With respect to the negative outcomes of the one-stop-shop identity, JoJo remarks, "Ultimately, that [police responding to unsheltered PEH dispatches] should not be a police job. There is so much money being funded into them. With PEH, these people don't need a cop yelling at them to move – it shouldn't be their job. There needs to a complete system change if we are going to change this situation for the better. It's obvious that what is currently going on isn't working and that its time for a change,". Evidently, Jojo shares the opinion of the interviewed CPD officers: "unsheltered PEH dispatches should not be a police job". Jojo points that "so much money is being funded into them [the police]" but "it's obvious that what is currently going on isn't working" to proclaim that modern policy proposals such as police divestitures should be tried as they are in the interests of all involved constituents. Systems are built in the interests of its represented people, and every government has the responsibility to change and adapt its existing

strategies if the combination of modern research and relevant perspectives justifies systemic change – the qualitative data sourced from both police officers and homeless shelters workers continues to support the argument that a police divestiture is justified in nature and is in the interests of all afflicted parties.

When asked on how facing housing insecurity places additional trauma on female individuals, JoJo provided a unique perspective on why many women are forced to turn to the streets when they don't have a tight-knit community to help them in their time of need. JoJo explains, "Half of our clients became homeless because of domestic violence. This is a big issue for women – when they are living on the streets, that is when they are most vulnerable because literally anything can happen to them. There is a lot of sexual abuse that takes place and goes unreported because the women feel as if they won't get justice or peace of mind from reaching out to authorities,". Hence, JoJo starts to provide one of various important reasons for why some homeless shelters should be female-only and provide mentally traumatized individuals with environments that are free of violence and sexual abuse. Additionally, Jojo unknowingly remarks on some the problems with relying on police officers to be the first response entity for dispatching towards female PEH – police officers can neither prevent sexual abuse towards females nor properly apprehend the male criminals in most cases. Through more public housing, the issue of sexual violence would naturally decrease. JoJo also remarks, "There is a lot of sexual violence towards women on the street – you would be surprised what kind of men have occasionally been caught committing these crimes". JoJo continues:

> *We don't have enough resources to assist women that are victims. It's so hard for them because in many cases, a woman's option is to leave and become homeless or just stick it out for their children, to have a roof over their head. It's an extremely difficult situation to be in. The police are required to report any domestic violence when dispatched, even if the woman is asking them not to. A lot of women are afraid of calling in for cops because they don't want to aggravate their abusive men more than what they are already enduring. The*

> *cops don't have a choice. For women, these problems are completely draining and really difficult. If they have children, it's a whole different factor. 50% of the women I have worked with had domestic violence play a large role in their journeys to homelessness. Our close associate, Deborah's Space, conducted research that said out of the 2,000 women that sleep on the streets of Chicago a night, about 1,000 have suffered multiple cases of intense domestic violence.*

Given that "out of the 2,000 women that sleep on the streets of Chicago, about 1,000 have suffered multiple cases of intense domestic violence,", increasing more permanent housing would naturally decrease the rate of domestic violence as well. Every city has the active responsibility to implement measures that decrease the likelihood of sexual abuse and domestic violence towards women; for this reason, financially insecure women would certainly find security and mental well-being in permanent housing – adding an additional layer in support of the case for a police divestiture. For women, "sleeping on the street is not an option because of all the risks involved – you have to stay awake throughout the nights to protect yourself,". Hence, Sarah's Circle provides a crucial environment for individuals that are in particular need of extra protection from society's unfortunate realities. JoJo adds, "Having a safe space for women is particularly important. Men are a trigger for traumatized women. For their wellbeing, sometimes the best approach it to provide them with environments where there are little to men. Everyone deserves a safe space. For the few men that do work in the facility, they are required to wear encouraging t-shirts at all times," If cities would conduct internal investigations on some of the most prevalent causes – such as the fear of men – then they would have a more concrete and well-justified understanding on how to fund the necessary resources to help traumatized individuals cope with mental distress and find eventual employment.

In addition to the sexual abuse and domestic violence that many female PEH endure, all PEH have difficult relationships with police officers, which makes it harder to feel safe enough to reach out for support in their time of need. Mark explains:

> *Front line police officers are not always the best for responding to PEH. Police departments do not undergo a lot of training. The majority of the change that I have seen recently has come from the crisis intervention teams, which is basically when social service experts partner with police officers to dispatch to PEH. For many people, the sight of an officer uniform can be very triggering and very traumatizing. Whether or not the person that responds is an officer, its better when that person doesn't have a gun and a badge. The issue with cops is that you get the whole range of officers when they are called for – starting with the very bad and ending with the great. You really get the whole spectrum, but it is this inconsistency which makes it tough for PEH to truly trust cops as a safe haven for their problems. Also, cops must be on the lookout for pending criminal activity, which it makes it harder for them to sympathize with certain issues. They must be on alert of criminal activity, illegal substances, or petty crimes. It's not good to stereotype officers one way or another though – I have personally witnessed some officers being very abusive, and others being very nice. Though, I do think it's time for a systemic change.*

Mark's long career in homeless shelters provides a unique perspective on the how the tense relationships between PEH and police officers jeopardizes the quality of present-day dispatches. Over the course of several decades, police officers used excessive force and abused their authority to deal with PEH, when a better prepared social service worker would have been more capable of de-escalating the scenario, and lost the faith of this vulnerable community in the present-day society. Hence, in addition to the sexual abuse and domestic violence components, the fear of police officers adds a third layer of support to justify police divestitures. Many police officers, irrespective of the quality of their training, are at a natural disadvantage when dispatching towards PEH because of their social perception. As Mark says, "the police uniform can be very triggering and very traumatizing" for PEH because some officers "were very abusive". Unfortunately, even new officers, eager to change conventional stereotypes, cannot truly change the perceptions of many PEH on a macro level. Thus, it's more strategic to place police officers out of public dispatches, and in turn, insert more social service workers that are significantly more likely to be

met with more hospitality. Mark brings up the good point that officers do not have the luxury of always giving PEH the benefit of the doubt – their primary responsibility of looking for "criminal activity, illegal substances, and petty crimes" forces a fundamental framework for approaching the subjects that does not serve in either party's best interests; police officers are naturally more likely to be concerned with whether the PEH is breaking the law than with their mental condition. Mark also mentions the recent successes of the implementation of crisis intervention teams – joint partnerships between police officers and social service workers – that has been met with overwhelming positivity from individuals with direct exposure to homelessness. In these dispatches, officers take a hands-off approach and let the social service utilize his/her/they skillsets, merely providing oversight from any risk of violence that may jeopardize the safety of the social service workers and themselves. It is clear, however, that social service workers possess the innate ability to communicate and de-escalate tensions with PEH such that the overall level of incarceration decreases. Building on the foundation of success in recent changes, the dialogues from these two Chicago-based shelters provide evidence that a systemic change on the way that the city addresses the issue of homelessness is in the inherent interest of all municipalities, police departments, and PEH.

JoJo holds a high level of understanding on the steps that cities can take to decriminalize homelessness. She explains:

> *The biggest issue with PEH is that society thinks that they are below others and that they did it to themselves. People face homeless for so many different reasons – domestic violence, mental health, one long and costly accident, difficulties in trying to feed families, and large medical expenses. People either discredit or do not view these issues seriously, so if one bad thing happens in your life, you're fucked.*

Evidently, JoJo highlights a list of reasons that can cause individuals to face housing insecurity in an attempt to humanize the PEH and their inherent right to respect from society. Unfortunate

circumstances, such as "domestic violence, mental health, costly accidents, inabilities to feed families, and large medical expenses," can be usually addressed through help from close family and friends who are gracious enough to provide a temporary support system. However, the reality of the situation is that a significant concentration of individuals across the country do not have families nor friends that they can rely on when they need financial or emotional help. Individuals that enter housing insecurity due to unforeseen circumstances, such as costly accidents or large medical expenses, are still entitled to respect and compassion from civic constituents; implementing police divestitures goes hand-in-hand with correcting generational wrongs of criticizing people who could not maintain housing security due to incredible circumstances; further, a police divestiture would be aligned with a change of perspective from the city on how it deems society should view its most vulnerable concentration of inhabitants. For this reason, it is even more important to find the resources necessary to increase the quantity of permanent affordable housing units. As JoJo continues, "In order to change this systemic problem, people need to see PEH as real people and not as society's problems. They are also human people – everyone deserves the right to feel safe and have a place to call home. Being homelessness is not a choice, no one wants to live on the street. There are folks everywhere that say it [being homeless] is a choice – it drives me insane! It is not a good belief at all." As eloquently put by JoJo, one of the largest roadblocks in advancing the cause is the societal belief that being homeless is a choice and something that is in complete control of the individual. This stereotype discourages city officials from prioritizing the issue and securing additional funds to help their cause, as local constituents would find these actions as a misalignment of priorities, and in turn, weaken their internal credibility. In order to properly address the issue, there needs to be a change of mentality across major cities; then, a fundamental change might take place.

In addition to providing housing and support systems, Sarah's Circle provides exciting employment pipelines for its visitors through strategic partnerships. JoJo explains:

> *We have employers that will come in several times throughout a season to talk about their businesses and employment opportunities. Each of our case managers (individuals that are assigned to a group of PEH to assist with more specialized needs on a case-by-case basis) worked directly with their teams to build out resumes. The case managers mainly give support, and find appropriate clothing for their interviews. They make sure that they [the PEH] look good and feel good, and they also coach the PEH for the interviews. Sarah's Circle is actually pretty successful in this sense; I do think a lot of our clients find employment because of all the tools that we employ. The main barrier for employment – providing a home address – is not an issue for our guests.*

These pipelines come to the great benefit of Sarah's Circle attendees at a low cost to the facility. Individuals that are in a condition to become financially secure can take advantage of the employers who are eager to provide opportunities. As Jojo explains, permanent housing units would naturally result in more economic opportunities for its inhabitants at little to no cost to the city; sheltered individuals would be able to use physical addresses when applying to jobs and employment recruiters would approach residents of permanent housing with a greater degree of confidence given its ability to increase the self-esteem and mental well-being of its inhabitants. The outcome is beneficial to all parties involved: the PEH have access to employment opportunities to gain financial freedom, homeless shelters succeed in their mission of bettering the lives of people in distress, and employers find dedicated workers who are ready to look past previous trauma for a better future. Altogether, the fact that increasing permanent housing options can result in i. decreases in the rate of sexual abuse, ii. decreases in the rate of domestic violence, iii. increase in the rate of self-esteem, iv. increase in the rate of confidence, and v. increase in employment opportunities all work in unison to justify the police divestiture argument from the homeless shelter's perspective.

***Section 3**: Higher Academia's Perspective*

Amanda Barry's experiences working in several non-profits and incarcerations provide a unique perspective on the issue of homelessness in Chicago because she has spent the last few years working pro bono at two homeless shelters – hosting behavioral activation sessions and implementing courses that are structured around job searches and interview training. She claims that the "COVID-19 environment was terrible and made things worse," because the overall capacity of existing shelters significantly decreased to protect existing individuals from the spread of the virus; this claim is supported through statement of both the CPD and various homeless shelters. Amanda says that when it comes to policing, "there is a great difference between the needs that PEH express versus what the police think that they need." She sees validity in the Defund Police Movement because in the context of PEH, "Police have historically and continue to be seen as major sources of harassment. It would be a unique opportunity to take things of the plate of police officers who are already overrun with violent crime". Amanda gives an insightful anecdote on when she volunteered to work in an Illinois prison. She recounts that "some of the guys that she met were rough around the edges, and there were a handful of confrontations and threats, but she never felt as if she was in serious danger." In reality, "I [Amanda] ended up having a great working relationship with all of the individuals by the end because I [Amanda] was able to talk them down in moments of distress,". Amanda credits her success in dealing with these hostile situations due to her extensive training in social services. In contrast to police officers not specialized in De-escalation training, Amanda was able to overcome the various "confrontations and threats" due to her expertise in communication skills. Whereas police officers would interpret

"confrontations and threats" as probable cause for resorting to firearm usage or other hostile tactics, further escalating the intervention, Amanda was able to leverage her education to present herself as an icon of safety and comfort towards individuals that felt threatened by her presence. For this reason, she harshly disagrees with police officers who think that there are no alternatives to dispatching public services towards unsheltered PEH. Amanda believes that "only a small percentage of all unsheltered PEH actually pose a legitimate threat to themselves and others, and that it's extremely unfair to stereotype the entire group – who each have their own reasons for being homeless – as a danger to the wellbeing of communities,". For this reason, it is irrational to issue police officers as the primary response unit for all cases involving PEH, since the vast majority are not at risk of committing violent crime and would greatly benefit from an intervention with a social service worker. Amanda admits that while "she is not a confident person", she "always felt super comfortable doing it [social services]," because the job essentially "requires you to put on a mask and showcase the skillsets you learned in school in the real world,". Hence, there appears to be legitimate reason to suspect that professionals with great expertise in De-escalation tactics are qualified enough to replace officers at the forefront of lots of dispatches related to PEH given that they express the "calmness and confidence" to handle individuals that may seem dangerous on the surface, but in reality, just need a bit of guidance to regain their mental wellbeing and neutralize the risk of incarceration. This revelation is important in the context of arguing for a police divestiture because it inserts the social service's perspective as wanting to play a larger role in the civic issue due to their inherent belief that they can do a significantly better job than most police officers. If the community of social service workers advocates for change, the perspectives of concerned police officers and homeless shelters would also gain more validity in the eyes of cities – the unification of different players that each play a critical role in combatting housing

insecurity could be used as leverage to implement fresh policies that dismantle the traditional one-stop-shop identity.

Amanda also discusses the difficulties in placing PEH into employment pipelines due to the set of existing barriers and discriminatory practices of employers. She says that, “in the shelters I [she] worked in, there was only a small computer lab that was donated from a local university that didn’t want the computers anymore,”. Unfortunately, “there was no WIFI in the shelter, and a lot of the people didn’t have computer skills.” The PEH wanted to have face-to-face interactions with people, instead of using technology to make connections, so Amanda “put them through computer training programs, where they would sit and type for hours, to help them apply to jobs.” In Amanda’s experience, the two major hurdles for seeking employment were access to computers and money. Amanda explained that employers would always ask “whether you have a car,” and inquired details on your “housing history, history of evictions, relationships with landlords, and your credit score,”. Further, many employers required application fees, which the PEH could not afford. Naturally, problems that might arise from providing “housing history, history of evictions, and relationships would landlords,” would naturally decrease through the growth of permanent housing units – an additional layer of justification in support of a police divestiture. As a result, Amanda says that, “A lot of guys really want to work but it’s difficult to find a place that’s understanding, specifically when it comes to guys that were previously incarcerated,”. Also, “it’s really hard to schedule and attend interviews because ‘if you’re not back by a certain time, they [the shelter] will give away your bed – so you basically need to make the decision on whether you want to take a shot at a job or be guaranteed a bed for the night.’” In modern cities of first-world countries, no individual should be forced to choose between seeking employment to better themselves or being guaranteed a bed for a given night. It is thus the responsibility of all major

cities to secure the necessary funding to prevent all inhabitants from being forced to choose between the two human rights. At the status quo, a lot of PEH don't feel comfortable taking the chance on having to spend a night outside, so they oftentimes have to cancel on interviews in order to protect themselves from the streets. All in all, Amanda claims that "If you get folks that want to be off the street and out of housing – it will have a lot of great consequences." Hence, a police divestiture can raise funds that simultaneously provides housing opportunities for PEH, decreases the rate of moral dilemmas, and turns cities into more equitable environments for all inhabitants.

When approaching the "systemic process of research", Dr. Brown claims that "the approach to data collection on the issue of homelessness is highly unreliable,". As mentioned by CPD officer Pete Kalenik, Dr. Brown says that "no data suggests that we are ending homelessness in Chicago," because the nature of the surveys conducted are neither thorough nor definitive given the lack of resources and time allocated to the survey. Further, Dr. Brown says that "It [Chicago] has not seen a rapid increase [in homelessness] like the West Coast, so the city must be doing, at least something right,". However, the professor is careful to point out that California has a list of compelling incentives for PEH to seek comfort given the better climate and more appealing state-wide financial and social incentives. The fact that the conducted surveys are not descriptive enough questions the integrity of Chicago – failing to provide housing options for PEH is, in a way, a failure of the city to uphold its responsibility of providing adequate resources towards all civilians in need. The promotion of better executed surveys should be encouraged to both understand the true scope of the problem and to incentivize policy makers to address the urgent needs of the most vulnerable population of the city.

Dr. Brown continues to discuss the positive impact that partnerships between CPD officers and social service workers have had on PEH-related dispatches. She says, "the city is making a

serious effort to train cops with acute mental health crises; we are moving in the right direction" and "one of the biggest issues with homelessness is that it is associated with lots of trauma, often times which is the result of interactions with the police for being criminalized for reasons such as losing their tent encampment." If the CPD is admitting that mental health crisis training is necessary, wouldn't it be more cost-effective to hire social service workers instead of training existing officers? Social service workers have their credentials backed by years of education and on-field experience – no police training program is likely to reach the same level of quality as existing social service programs. Similar to the responses of JoJo Palmer and Mark, Dr. Brown also mentions that "the police uniform can be super traumatizing, especially because a disproportionate amount of the [homeless] population is black, which this city has historically neglected,". Following the footsteps of anonymous CPD officers, Dr. Brown adds that "the militarization of police forces is not the right approach for PEH,". With respect to police training programs, Dr. Brown agrees wholeheartedly that they do not properly tackle the range of specializations that are necessary to fully understand and appreciate the gravity of PEH-related dispatches. She says that "some of the challenges that are linked to unsheltered PEH, even social service agencies aren't fully sufficient in understanding,". She applauds recent efforts of the CPD to reach out for help through partnerships with both federal and non-profit entities. This can be interpreted as an additional layer of support to justify a police divestiture because the CPD's actions prove that their existing training programs are insufficient at addressing the needs of PEH. Dr. Brown claims that "the CPD tries its best to partner with the Department of Social Services to deal with homeless encampments when doing sweeps, but also to start working on how to find alternate solutions for the status quo,". On a similar note, "partnerships with Grassroots Collaborative (a union of ten membership-based organizations that create policy change on local

and statewide levels in Illinois) make the process of implementing new policies more efficient because they have people who were homelessness in the past and it's really important to get that voice in the conversation,". Further, the professor believes that "the city can do a better job of listening to Grassroots organizers and meaningfully responding to them,". Hence, Dr. Brown applauds the work of social service workers as they unify their goals with local law enforcement agencies, and believes that non-profits play a crucial role in not only expanding the range of perspectives that come into crafting new responses but also making the process more efficient and cost-effective for all parties involved. Thus, non-profits should form strategic partnerships with representatives of homeless shelters and interested police officers to present the city of Chicago with a well-crafted argument on the importance of implementing a police divestiture.

Dr. Brown believes the idea of divesting police resources towards permanent public housing units "makes good political sense from the concept of cost-effectiveness,". However, from a moral standpoint, she thinks that the priorities are misaligned. Dr Brown explains:

> *Access to housing is a human right. Do we need to show that it's cheaper in order to get it done? The data on cost-effectiveness and police interaction is a little bit varied. The research suggests that there is a segment of folks that have lots of emergency service uses, which are stemmed in mental health and drug abuse, so it's probably cheaper for that segment of the population. But what about for the people that don't have these issues? A lot of PEH have a lot of functionality to them and work. There are lots of people that have full-time jobs and are still homeless. What do we do about those people?*

Dr. Brown continues to justify her stance by providing quantitative data. She says that, "Chicago spends more than $3 million a year on dispatches to unsheltered PEH. That comes out to more than $5,000 a week, so it's definitely costing the city a lot of money." Hence, Dr. Brown brings up the strong point that police divestitures must take into account the full range of individuals that are exposed to PEH. Whereas some PEH exert large medical bills due to drug abuse, a significant concentration of PEH have neither mental issues nor drug abuses, and instead have fulltime jobs.

She is also correct in believing that the precedent for allocating more resources to the cause should not be based on an economic standpoint; all humans are entitled to housing and thus the catalyst for accessing additional resources should be based on moral grounds, not economic misalignments. However, if existing politicians are hesitant to react to arguments based on morality, then proposals to divest police resources based on simple economics should be used as it would result in the most likely scenario of materializing into the intended outcome.

Additionally, Dr. Brown expresses frustration on the current state of research related to homelessness. She "feels frustrated that research is still taking place when we already know what the solution is: access to affordable housing,". The professor cites the Housing First model as a highly effective long-term strategy and believes that a lot of homelessness can decrease through its implementation. She adds that, "there should be more of a focus on individual choice on their housing and what it looks like if we actually want this policy to truly work," and "the fed wants a one-size-fits-all bill but that logic doesn't really apply here because not everyone that needs housing will qualify as PEH under the federal framework." Additionally, she cites the failures of recent short-term policies to grow evidence in favor of her stance. Dr. Brown claims that "the rapid housing projects that the city provides is shown to not be effective at addressing the issue in the long-run because it sets folks up for homelessness again after the temporary subsidies run out,". As a result, a fair assessment of the information provided is that the best course of action would circulate around a more cohesive and long-term proposition that tailors to the needs of various groups of the entire PEH population – with the chief goal of ensuring that the quantity of permanent housing access increases in the long-run. If concerned affiliates of the cause want to implement a long-lasting policy that genuinely makes a difference, there needs to be an exhaustive effort to

propose a legislative bill that tailors to the various needs of PEH such that different groups of individuals facing housing insecurity are not barred from qualification under any city framework.

Lastly, Dr. Brown discusses some of the intergenerational inequities that have disproportionately plagued the Black population, and how its reflected in the current demographic trends of the homeless population. Dr. Brown believes that "reparations for black people that are faced with generational poverty must take place in order to reduce inequities." Additionally, she thinks that, "on the topic of defunding the police, more money should be put into community developing because police don't stop crime – they respond to it." On the topic of taxes, and whether groups of different socioeconomic backgrounds pay their fair share, Dr. Brown believes that, "we have policies in place that prevent individuals from paying their fair share of taxes; we have immense wealth that is just becoming more and more divided." Therefore, "we need policies that can spread that wealth out; vulnerable people that worked through the pandemic deserve to be compensated for more than just their labor,". One proposal that Dr. Brown believes in circulates around the idea of a real estate transfer tax:

> *We should have a real estate transfer tax that would increase funding for affordable housing. The less homelessness we have, the less police we will need. This is a win-win for both parties. For many PEH, if they had access to mental healthcare, then many tragedies would have been avoided. It's the systems that are allowing these crimes to take place*

This adds an additional layer of justification for a police divestiture – increasing public housing units would serve as a step towards correcting the true cost of plaguing generations of African-Americans with poverty. Ideally, advocacy groups, policy makers, and legislatures unite and form a cohesive framework that encompasses the wide range of perspectives that are necessary to fully mobilize the budgets of respective municipalities to increase the quantity of permanent housing options – in hopes of making their cities more equitable and fairer for all citizens.

***Section 4**: The Public Foundation's Perspective*

CFTEH is predicated by an initiative called EHI, which stands for Expedited Housing Initiative, that was started by the Michael Reese Foundation during COVID-19 – a period of time when a surplus of individuals was facing housing insecurity due to the financial destruction of the national economy. Gayla Brockman started the initiative after it became painfully clear that, "people were not being able to find a bed and individuals were trying to social distance too – making the situation harder for everyone involved,". She also mentions that "more people than before the pandemic were wandering the streets helplessly, and it was our responsibility to get them into sustainable housing,". At its peak, EHI "put individuals into hotels, apartments that were empty after working with landlords, and other residencies that were interested in offering short-term stay." Ms. Brockman mentions that once private and public funders united, 1,500 families were off the streets incredibly quickly. While it may seem self-explanatory, this movement was extremely important because private entities, unsatisfied with Chicago's response, took matters into their own hands and positively impacted PEH. If Chicago allocated more resources towards permanent housing units before the pandemic, public foundations such as the Michael Reese Foundation would not need to take as strong an initiative to handle matters that are the city's responsibility. Without Ms. Brockman's efforts to mobilize different interest groups, an additional 1,500 families in Chicago would have been forced to weather through the pandemic while facing housing insecurity. Ms. Brockman also explains that, "it takes federal funding to connect families with rent subsidies – federal money moves people into housing quicker and public partnerships work more effectively than private partnerships,". Therefore, advocates for police divestitures

should target state officials, in addition to city officials, because they oftentimes have a say in the development of policies that eventually impact the city level. The CEO also mentions that she believes "there is lot of money out there – more than enough to advance our fight to end the problem," and the real struggle lies in "mobilizing it to get to the right places – that's what it is really all about,". Ms. Brockman is right – city police departments such as the CPD have budgets in excess of $1.5 billion, and even small divestitures can result in extremely positive impacts for people in need at a minimum overall effect on the police's ability to address violent crime. Looking into the future, the agency is excited and believes that real change will take place; Ms. Brockman says, "people are taking about it [increasing public housing units] already; there are pilot projects going on right now and I think we are going to see a lot more funding in the future. Hopefully, the future holds a new age of politics that understands the value of increasing permanent housing units for individuals facing housing insecurity. Police divestitures should play a key role in these discussions because, ultimately, it is the responsibility of the city to address the issue of homelessness – not public foundations nor other private entities that consist of generous donors. As declared by Ms. Brockman and supported by the accounts of homeless shelters and higher academia, cities have enough money to increase the quantity of public housing units – if they conduct internal investigations on how their money is currently being spent in existing police departments, it would add an additional layer of justification for the argument because the analysis would show that the costs of deploying police officers and subsidizing emergency services greatly outweigh the costs of increasing permanent housing access. Given that police departments are the largest municipal expenditure of almost all states, a deep-dive analysis on how budgets are currently being utilized would certainly derive interesting results. At its core, housing access is a human right and governments have the responsibility to provide it for any person in need.

Therefore, this paper proposes a small police divestiture that simultaneously realigns the one-stop-shop identity into a slightly more specialized public service – that becomes more focused on fighting violent crime – and increases funding for permanent housing access for unsheltered PEH with CMI. The intended outcome of this proposition is to fulfill a key promise of every government to its constituents – to create conditions such that every individual, irrespective of ethnicity or socioeconomic background, can freely engage in the pursuit of happiness. Given that the proposal will likely decrease the average public cost per PEH, the rewards will be shared across PEH, police departments, cities, and municipalities; the end goal is to create a more equitable environment that extends access to fundamental human rights.

Policy Recommendations

In light of the qualitative data sourced from police officers, homeless shelters, higher academia, and public foundations, there are a recurring set of themes that justify how a calculated police divestiture could benefit all parties involved while decreasing the overall rate of homelessness at a smaller average public cost per PEH. The data collected from this paper proclaims that i. police officers are not complacent with the one-stop-shop identity and would prefer to spend more time working in violent crime, ii. homeless shelters are experiencing a massive supply issue after having their internal capacities slashed due to the global pandemic, iii. higher academia verifies the thesis of the Housing First Initiative and believes that a police divestiture is in the interests of both police officers and PEH, and iv. Public foundations have consistently provided evidence on how raising public and private capital to create short-term living accommodations for people facing housing insecurity decreases the rate of homelessness, costs associated with PEH, and the overall rate of crime from PEH. Hence, the following policy recommendations intend to improve the quality of police dispatches while simultaneously advancing pipelines to increase funding for both social service workers and for permanent housing units.

1. *Initiate a thorough two-year research program in the Chicago Police Department to assess what percentage of all dispatches conducted by active officers relate to individuals facing housing insecurity and express some form of mental illness in a non-violent-crime context.*

This data collection is important because it helps to better understand how much city-subsidized time the CPD spends allocating its forces towards areas of policing that both quantitative and qualitative data has proven to be best addressed by alternate services.

2. *Release two annual surveys asking active CPD officers what their positions are on the one-stop-shop identity and the level of interest they express in being dispatches to areas outside of violent crime – such as for homelessness, minor disturbances, and dispute mediations.*

This data collection will play a crucial role in carrying the voice of the department in boardroom negotiations for crafting future policy that seeks to elevate the equity of the citizenry by improving the quality of all public dispatches in the long-run.

3. *Hire a private entity, such as a consulting firm trained in redistributing resources for specific strategies, to propose a police divestiture such that officers are able to maintain the same quality of output for non-PEH related dispatches while freeing up capital for new ventures. This strategic partnership would help Chicago understand the extent of budget cuts that could take place in order to accurately reflect the quantity of hours that the total*

police force engages in dispatches with PEH and other categories centered around mental and behavioral health.

Despite the initial difficulties in understanding how a potential divestiture could work, it is important to stay mindful of the fact that the CPD maintained a budget of over $1.9 billion for 2022. Hence, a divestiture in 2025 after the two-year research program, for as little as a 1% decrease, would free up $19 million in capital. At the status quo, the average social worker makes $70,000 in Chicago, IL (Indeed 2021). Hence, a 1% divestiture of the budget would be able to fully employ over 270 new social service workers. Further, according to modern research, depending on the location and construction choices of permanent housing units, the typical total cost per affordable housing unit is in between $80,000 and $150,000; Hence, under the 1% suggested divestiture, that would result in the development of in between 126 and 237 new affordable housing units (National Housing Conference 2021). Hence, under this proposed model, the city of Chicago would have the option of hiring 270 new social service workers or constructing up to 237 new affordable housing units. Realistically, the divestiture should result in a combination of employing new social service workers as well as constructing more permanent housing. Under this divestiture, a rational allocation of the new capital could result in the hiring of 75 new social service workers, totaling $5.25 million (27.6% of the divestiture), and in between 91 and 171 new affordable housing units (the remaining 72.4% of the divestiture).

At a 5% divestiture, there would be $95 million in new capital to deploy towards social services and permanent housing units. This could result in the employment of 1,357 new social service workers, or in between 633 and 1,187 new units. Realistically, the city does not need to hire over 1,000 new social service workers for public dispatches related to PEH. Hence, a more appropriate

use of capital would hire around 200 social service workers, totaling $14,000,000 (14.7% of the divestiture), and in between 540 and 1,102 new affordable housing units (the remaining 85.3% of the divestiture).

Evidently, any alleged divestiture has the potential to make a large and highly meaningful impact on the status-quo because it would address the need to increase permanent housing units for people experiencing housing insecurity while also hiring more specialized workers to address dispatches where individuals might be expressing some form of mental illness. Additionally, this would decrease the list of responsibilities expected of police officers – and in turn make them a more specialized public service that becomes more concentrated on responding to, fighting, and solving violent crime to turn marginalized communities into safer, more equitable, and more prosperous communities.

4. *Research the impact that new public housing units and the employment of more social service workers has on i. the rate of homelessness in the city, ii. the rate of crime from PEH in the city, iii. the rate of all violent crime in the city, and iv. the average cost per unsheltered PEH in the city post-implementation of the divestiture*.

At its core, the point of this police recommendation is to improve the situations of all parties involved. The intended outcome of this proposal is to significantly decrease the rate of homelessness in the city, significantly decrease the rate of crime from PEH in the city, maintain a level of overall violent crime that does not increase but hopefully decreases in the city, and significantly decrease the average cost per unsheltered PEH in the city post-implementation of the divestiture. The logic of this policy assumes that homelessness rates and rates of crime from PEH

will decrease as they will now be presented with new options to gain housing security. The rates of overall violent crime are contingent on a series of factors that are not addressed for the purposes of this proposal, but the assumption is that although there will be a smaller total quantity of police officers due to the divestiture, they will all be more specialized in their list of new duties and thus the actual manpower that is able to be dispatched to an issuance of violent crime remains constant. Lastly, the goal, and one of the primary incentives in this policy proposal, is to decrease the average public cost per PEH post-implementation of the divestiture in order to make the municipal distribution of capital in Chicago more efficient and effective while making police departments, individuals facing housing insecurity, and the threesome of homeless shelters, concerned members of higher academia, and public foundations better-off.

Conclusion

Under the notion that access to housing is a human, the qualitative data sourced from the CPD, homeless shelters, higher academia, and public foundations work in unison to uphold the belief that police divestitures can result in a string of positive externalities that are shared amongst all parties. The one-stop-shop identity that overwhelms police officers across the country, starting with insufficient training programs and ending with a lost string of expectations from the public, can become better-defined and result in a phenomenon that relieves the officer from dispatches outside of violent crime and in turn places them into a more focused and better-prepared light: fighting violent crime and turning marginalized communities into safer areas of habit. Higher academia validates the modern research that supports the validity of the Housing First initiative and sides with the arguments made by this paper that police officers should not be the first responders for unsheltered PEH with CMI. Homeless shelters signify the big issue at hand – the supply shortage of beds in available shelters – to emphasize the importance of finding new funding immediately to address the cause and prevent PEH from being incarcerated or injured by police officers. Public foundations provide direct evidence in support of the Housing First framework after their recent successes in implementing EHI, and their current progress in accelerating the development of CFTEH. Evidently, the city of Chicago must find innovative methods of correcting these unacceptable societal failures; the policy recommendations of this paper provide a potential opportunity to improve the state of housing insecurity in the city today.

The policy recommendations to divest the existing CPD budget for 2025 by 1-5% intends to result in a string of positive impacts on the inflicted parties. Police officers are expected to gainer higher morale as they would now be a more specialized public service and can focus on spending

more active-duty hours fighting violent crime. The rate of crime from PEH in the city is expected to decrease as there will be more permanent housing units. Naturally, the quantity of people facing housing insecurity is intended to decrease as well. Additionally, the average cost per unsheltered PEH in the city post-implementation of the divestiture – in sync with the findings of the case studies cited in the literature review and the Housing First initiative – should decrease as well. The outcome of the proposed divestiture has the potential to make the city of Chicago a more equitable environment where more people are granted their human right to housing at a minimal cost to the status quo of how the current municipality distributes its existing capital to address society's needs.

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