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ELIZA STARBUCK LITTLE

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"…So ist der Mensch; wenn da ist das Gut, und es sorget mit Gaben
Selber ein Gott für ihn, kennet und sieht er es nicht.
Tragen muß er, zuvor; nun aber nennt er sein Liebstes,
Nun, nun müssen dafür Worte, wie Blumen, entstehn."

– Hölderlin, *Brot und Wein*

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Abbreviations

I use the following abbreviations to refer to frequently cited primary texts by Hegel, Kant, and Schelling:

Hegel

Hegel's texts are cited by paragraph number (where applicable) followed by a comma then the page number. Passages from Hegel's remarks [*Anmerkungen*] or additions from notes [*Zuzätze*] are noted respectively with an 'R' or 'Z' appended to the paragraph number.

Citations from the original German are from the Suhrkamp edition of Hegel's collected works, edited by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt am Main, 1969-70) unless otherwise noted.

A - *Hegel's Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, Vol. I*. Translated by T. M. Knox. Reprint edition. Oxford New York: Oxford University Press. 1998.

FK - *Faith & Knowledge*. Translated by Walter Cerf and H. S. Harris. Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1977.

EL - *The Encyclopaedia Logic, with the Zusätze: Part I of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze*. Translated and edited by Théodore F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991.

JeL - *Hegel and the Human Spirit: A Translation of the Jena Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit (1805-6) with Commentary*. Translated by Leo Rauch. Detroit: Wayne State University Press., 1983.

LPH -. *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*. Translated and edited by Barr Nisbet, Duncan Forbes, and Johannes Hoffmeister. 1. paperback ed., [Reprint]. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992.

LHP - *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*. Edited by E.S. Haldane, Frances H. Simson, and Frederick C. Beiser. *ACLS Humanities E-Book*, 1995.

PhS - *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Edited by John N. Findlay. Translated by A. V. Miller. Reprint. Oxford Paperbacks. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2013.

PN - *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature: Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. Edited by J. N. Findlay. Translated by A. V. Miller. 1 edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004.

PR - *Hegel: Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. Edited by Allen W. Wood. Translated by H. B. Nisbet. Revised ed. edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

PS - *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind: Being Part Three of the "Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences" (1830)*. Edited by William Wallace, A. V. Miller, and Ludwig Boumann. Reprinted. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003.

SL - *The Science of Logic*. Translated by George Di Giovanni. Cambridge Hegel Translations. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Kant

CJ - *Critique of Judgment*. Translated by Werner S. Pluhar. Hackett Publishing, 1987.

CPR - *Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

CPrR - *Kant: Critique of Practical Reason*. Translated by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997

LL - *Lectures on Logic*. Translated by J. Michael Young. 1. paperback ed. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004.

LM - *Lectures on Metaphysics*. Translated by Karl Ameriks and Steve Naragon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

MFNS - *Kant: Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*. Translated and edited by Michael Friedman. Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

P - *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science: With Selections from the Critique of Pure Reason*. Edited by Gary C. Hatfield. Rev. ed. Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Schelling

ST- *System of Transcendental Idealism*. Translated by Peter L. Heath. University of Virginia Press, 1993.

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Introduction

1. Overview

In the very broadest terms, the goal of this project is to say something about the relationship between the logical and the non-logical in Hegel's mature system of philosophy. In textual terms, this means the relationship between the material presented in, on the one hand, the *Science of Logic* and the *Encyclopedia Logic*, and, on the other hand, the volumes on Nature and Spirit that comprise what is often referred to as Hegel's "Realphilosophie." In theoretical terms, this means the relationship between Hegel's account of form and the respective manifestations of that form in the physical and mental domains.

In order to even begin to approach this question, it is necessary to get clear on what the dualisms in question amount to for Hegel. Though it is readily apparent that there is *some* philosophically significant difference between the logical, formal topics discussed in the logical texts and the more concrete topics discussed in the Realphilosophie, there is disagreement amongst interpreters about what this difference consists in. This can be seen, for example, in the amount of ink that has been spilled in discussions about the poorly understood "transition" from Logic to Nature in Hegel's Encyclopedia.[1] It can also be seen in the lack of scholarly consensus about whether or not Hegel is faithful to the Kantian distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, and, pursuantly, whether or not these categories adequately capture the distinction between Hegel's logical and non-logical texts.[2]

In this project, I take a new approach to understanding the systematic relationship of Hegel's Encyclopedic texts. My central interpretive wager is that Kant's Transcendental

[1] Cf. e.g. Ferrini (1999), Houlgate (2005), Martin (forthcoming).

[2] This distinction is often taken on in the literature without being explicitly thematized, especially by readers wishing to emphasize the Kantian elements of Hegel's thought. On the other side of things, Rand (2006) is the most outspoken critic of applying the a priori/a posteriori distinction to Hegel (though other explicit versions of the position exist, such as the one described in Ng [2009]). For my part, I am sympathetic to the position that, in the final analysis, this distinction cannot properly be applied to Hegel without significant redefinition of the terms in question.

Aesthetic can be understood as providing a key to the architectonic of Hegel's mature system. Following through on this insight, I argue that a neglected theory of conceptual exhibition or *Darstellung* stands at the heart of Hegel's account of what it is for something to be intelligible—and, thus, to be at all.[3]

Reading Hegel through the lens of Kant is obviously not in and of itself a new approach. In the contemporary context, Hegel's Kantian inheritance has been investigated in a number of important scholarly contributions. Foremost among these is Robert Pippin's pathbreaking 1989 book, *Hegel's Idealism*. Others working in this vein include Beatrice Longuenesse, Terry Pinkard, and Sally Sedgwick.[4] Thus far, Kantian readings of Hegel have largely been focused on Hegel's reception of Kant's accounts of the faculties of understanding and reason as these are laid out in the *Critique of Pure Reason*'s Transcendental Analytic and Dialectic.[5] The novelty of my particular Kant-inflected reading of Hegel lies in my emphasis on the importance of the theory of sensibility that Kant offers in the first *Critique's* Transcendental Aesthetic for understanding Hegel's philosophical project.

At first blush, this can seem to be a singularly unpromising angle of approach to interpreting Hegel due to Hegel's frequently evidenced lack of regard for Kant's theory of sensibility. In the *Science of Logic*, for example, Hegel famously goes out of his way to indict the Transcendental Aesthetic as being a pernicious symptom of the "psychologism" of Kant's theoretical philosophy. In Hegel's terms, this accusation amounts to a rejection of Kant's claim that the set of knowable worldly objects is only a set of knowable worldly objects *for us*—that is, for rational thinkers whose sensory faculties are configured in the way that ours are. One of Hegel's central interests in his own theoretical philosophy is to go beyond Kant by giving an

[3] Theunissen (1980) also emphasizes the importance of *Darstellung* to Hegel's *Science of Logic*, though his interest lies more in the role of this function in Hegel's Objective Logic.
[4] Longuenesse (2007), Pinkard (1994), Pippin (1989) and (2018), Sedgwick (2012).
[5] Kreines (2015) has given the most full-fledged treatment of the specific importance of the Transcendental Dialectic for Hegel's theoretical philosophy.

account of what knowable objects are like on their own, prior to any mental contribution from finite rational cognition. Critiquing Kant on this score, Hegel writes things like:

> …the Kantian philosophy has never gotten over the psychological reflex of the concept and has once more reverted to the claim that the concept is permanently conditioned by the manifold of intuition.[6]

"Manifold of intuition" refers to the cognitive contribution made by sensibility in Kant's scheme. In the *Encyclopedia Logic* and the *Philosophy of Spirit*, the psychological limitations of Kant's brand of idealism in general and of his Aesthetic in particular are expounded on in greater detail.[7]

As I read Hegel, however, the criticisms being levelled at Kant in passages like these are not intended as wholesale rejections of the Transcendental Aesthetic. Rather, I take Hegel's criticism to be more nuanced. On the view that I defend throughout the dissertation, Hegel holds that Kant has conflated three properly distinct philosophical topics in the Transcendental Aesthetic. These are: (i) space and time as formal determinations of physical objects; (ii) the set of subjective psychological cognitive acts such as sensing, perceiving, and intuiting performed by embodied rational cognizers, and (iii) the logical function of exhibition [in German: *Darstellung*; in Kant's Latin: *hypotyposis*] by means of which the actuality of concepts—that is, their instantiation in an object or set of objects that fall under them—is demonstrated (this last is obviously the most obscure from the point of view of contemporary philosophy; I return to it in detail below). On my reading, the complaint being brought against the Kantian Aesthetic in the *Science of Logic* is motivated by Hegel's rejection of the logical relevance of (i) and (ii). I argue, however, that Hegel endorses the logical relevance of (iii) and, in fact, places a theory of conceptual exhibition at the center of his discussion of "Subjectivity" in the final book of the

[6] SL 520, 12.22-3.
[7] EL 83-6, §42 and 88, §45Z.

Science of Logic. His goal in doing so is to offer a new theory of sensible appearances by replacing Kant's subject-involving theory of representation [*Vorstellung*] with an objective theory of exhibition [*Darstellung*]. The prefixes to the German words track the distinction: whereas in the Kantian picture, the knowing subject sets up representations of objects as they appear *before* her, Hegel's goal is to account for how objects can be understood simply as they appear *there* in the world.

On Hegel's reading of Kant, there are already resources available in Kant's own thought for effecting this shift. I focus on Hegel's transformation of two related Kantian topics: first, Hegel's rejection of Kant's categories or pure concepts of the understanding in favor of a different class of concepts that Kant calls the ideas of pure reason, and, second, Hegel's rejection of the class of pure intuitions that Kant terms "schematic" in favor of a different class of intuitions that Kant terms "symbolic." I subsequently show how, once this new framework is established in the *Science of Logic,* the physical role of space and time is treated in the *Philosophy of Nature*, and the cognitive aspect of sensing is treated in the *Philosophy of Spirit*.

2. Contextualizing the Project

The centerpiece of my argument is a novel reading of the account of apperception that Hegel describes in the *Science of Logic*. The stakes of such a reading are best understood in relation to three points of contention that have shaped recent debates in Hegel scholarship. These are:

> (i) the debate about whether Hegel is properly understood as a "metaphysics-first" or "epistemology-first" thinker and the attendant question about the efficacy of a Kantian approach to Hegel's thought;

(ii) a further question amongst interpreters who decide in favor of the Kantian approach about precisely how Hegel's inheritance of Kantian apperception is best understood;

(iii) a final point about which specific portions of the *Science of Logic* should take interpretive precedence.

In what follows, I adopt language employed by James Kreines to clarify the stakes of (i), and to describe my own project as a "meaning-first" reading of Hegel that foregrounds Hegel's Kantian inheritance. I then move on to (ii) and consider the respective interpretations of Hegelian apperception defended by Robert Pippin and Beatrice Longuenesse. I show how my own view combines elements from both of these readings. Finally, I discuss my emphasis on the exegetical importance of the "Subjectivity" section of the Logic of the Concept against a recent tendency in the literature to focus on the discussions of teleology and life.

(i) Metaphysics-first vs. Epistemology-first Readings

In spite of the generally acknowledged inadequacy of a flat-footed inquiry into whether Hegel's theoretical philosophy is best understood as being "metaphysical" or "non-metaphysical," the debate about this topic persists in the literature.[8] Framed in a simplistic, either/or way, there can be only one answer to this question: namely, that Hegel's thought is *in some way* metaphysical. Behind the crucial phrase "in some way" stands a host of genuine substantive debates about what precisely Hegel's metaphysical views are, how he argues for these views, and which elements of his thought are evidence for them. There is also a distinct but closely related question about whether Hegel's philosophical system is best understood as an inheritor of Kant's

[8] See e.g. Bowman (2013), de Laurentiis (2016), Stern (2009).

thought or of Spinoza's thought—Spinoza here being understood as a representative of the pre-Kantian rationalist metaphysical tradition and Kant as the proponent of a largely anti-metaphysical epistemological position.

As James Kreines has argued, a reframing of this debate that brings out the substantive issues lying behind the flat-footed version of the inquiry is needed.[9] In his recent book on Hegel, Kreines proposes that one such substantive issue is that of what the "organizing focus" of Hegel's philosophy is. He suggests that Hegel interpretations can be distinguished according to whether they understand Hegel's thought as having a "metaphysics-first" or an "epistemology-first" organizing focus.[10] On this view, metaphysics-first readings will foreground Hegel's interest in "philosophical inquiry into explanatory reasons, or reasons in the world, and ultimately into their completeness."[11] Epistemology-first readings, by contrast, will develop around issues of justification and knowledge, with an eye to combatting attendant skeptical worries.

Each of these sorts of readings can be aligned with a distinct view about how Hegel fits in the history of philosophy. For the metaphysics-first reader, Hegel is the inheritor of the kinds of questions about sufficient reason and grounding that concerned rationalist metaphysicians like Leibniz and Spinoza. For the epistemology-first reader, Hegel is instead heir to the anti-skeptical aspect of Kant's project.

As Kreines notes, metaphysics and epistemology are not the only organizing foci that one might ascribe to Hegelian thought. One might also argue that semantics, in the very broad sense of the study of the theory of meaning or intentionality, is the central concern of Hegel's thought. Kreines ultimately folds such meaning-first readings in with epistemology-first ones, but I think this move is overhasty.[12] It seems to me that a set of issues about meaning is, in fact, the

[9] Kreines (2006).
[10] Kreines (2015) 7-15.
[11] Kreines (2015) 9.
[12] The failure to distinguish robustly between epistemology-first and meaning-first readings is, in my opinion, one of the primary reasons that Kantian readings (such as Robert Pippin's) have been misunderstood in the literature.

central concern of Hegel's theoretical philosophy. These issues are the orienting focus of my own reading of Hegel.

What does it mean to say that Hegel's thought is centrally concerned with meaning or intentionality? To my mind, this means demonstrating that Hegel's primary interest in his theoretical philosophy is neither to offer explanatory reasons for phenomena nor to offer an account of the conditions of possibility of knowledge; rather it is to investigate the more primary issue of why there can be any such thing as either explanation or knowledge in the first place. Towards this end, Hegel's fundamental interest in the *Science of Logic* is to show that thinking and being are not dualistically separated off from one another, but, rather, that they somehow belong to one another and come along together. Thinking appears in the physical world and the physical world appears in thought, and the job of Hegelian philosophy is to explain why both of these things are necessary rather than scandalous.[13] As I read him, Hegel sets about this task by attempting to show that thinking is definitionally 'about' or 'directed at' being and being is definitionally 'about' or 'directed at' thinking.[14] In these terms, the relationship of thought and being is an intentional relationship. Furthermore, it is also a referential relationship, in the semantic sense, insofar as these terms are meaningful precisely insofar as they refer to one another. I take the exploration of the formal character of this intentional, referential relationship to be the central topic of Hegel's theoretical philosophy.

It is in this context that both the idea of conceptual exhibition [*Darstellung*] and Hegel's inheritance of the aesthetic elements of the Kantian project become relevant. In the Kantian picture, exhibition is the term that describes the demonstration of the sensible existence of a

[13] Thinking and being are not equivalent to subject and object in the Hegelian picture. Hegel takes himself to have done away with the subject/object dichotomy in the *Phenomenology*. Even so, in the *Logic,* the being/essence distinction that is central to the Objective Logic is a sort of successor problem about the relationship of 'inner' and 'outer' that is philosophically fundamental for Hegel in a way that the subject/object divide is not. Thus, thinking and being are best understood here as mapping onto essence and being, rather than onto subject and object.

[14] It may seem odd to talk about being as having the sort of intentionality that thought has, but Hegel is clear that, in his picture, being and thought are both rational. I take this to license the inference that, if intentionality is a constitutive aspect of rational thinking, it must also be a constitutive aspect of rational being. The Heideggerian idea of truth as an act of "unconcealment" [*Unverborgenheit*] performed by being offers a parallel.

thought (in Kant's terms, a concept). Kant describes exhibition as the process by means of which "conceptual reality" is "established" via the linking up of a concept with a sensible appearance—that is, the linking up of a general representation to a singular existent.[15] Kant also describes exhibition as the "making sensible" of concepts.[16] Importantly, for Kant, this process always has an epistemic element: in the Kantian picture, the demonstration of the being of a thought is always the demonstration of the being of a thought *to* a finite rational cognizer.

The specific stakes of establishing conceptual reality are modal: an undemonstrated concept is a merely thinkable representation (what Kant calls an "idea" [*Idee*]) that is only *possible*, whereas a demonstrated concept is a knowable representation that is *actual*. In Kant's epistemic picture, modality is a function of cognition. In the first *Critique,* Kant describes a set of modal categories—possibility, actuality, and necessity—that index the relationship between the knowing subject and the objects of her knowledge. In this scheme, conceptual exhibition marks the specific cognitive difference between the categories of possibility and actuality.

Different sorts of concepts require different sorts of exhibitions. In the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant illustrates the process of exhibition for empirical concepts using the striking example of an anatomist who, having described a human eye, goes on to exhibit the eye by means of performing a dissection: "if an anatomist has set forth the concept of the human eye discursively and goes on to dissect the eye to make the concept intuitable, we say that he demonstrates this organ."[17] In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the Schematism chapter describes the demonstration of the pure concepts of the understanding by means of the forms of intuition. In sum, Kantian conceptual exhibition has two main components: (i) exhibition establishes conceptual reality and (ii) it does so by forging a link between conceptual thought and the sensible existents that are available for perception by finite rational cognizers.

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[15] CJ §59 225.
[16] ibid. 226.
[17] ibid. §57 216.

In the *Science of Logic*, Hegel remains concerned with both of these issues. He is interested to establish the reality of what he calls "the Concept" and, with a critical reservation, he is also interested in the way sensible appearance is required for establishing the Concept's reality.[18] The critical reservation in question is the one I have already touched on above: unlike Kant, Hegel is not only interested in how conceptuality appears *to* finite rational cognizers. Rather, Hegel is interested in how conceptuality becomes sensible *in general*, apart from any psychological contributions made by the sensoria of finite perceivers. Put slightly otherwise: while Hegel takes himself to have shown in the *Phenomenology* that there is no need for a "transcendental deduction" that proves the commensurability of the supersensible and the sensible, this does not mean that he has nothing to say about how the formal relationship between these two elements plays out.

For Hegel, conceptual exhibition is no longer a narrowly epistemic process. Even so, on my reading, exhibition continues to be an apt description of the relationship between thinking and being as Hegel construes it. This is so specifically insofar as Hegelian thought and being can only be understood by the fact of their reference to one another. One of the central goals of my project is to reconstruct Hegel's account of this reciprocal reference between thought and being.

It may seem paradoxical to discuss the topic of perception while excluding the involvement of any actual perceivers. It is helpful in this connection to remember that, prior to Kant, Western philosophy had a robust notion of divine mindedness that, often, served as the paradigm case of rational mindedness. It was this notion that allowed Isaac Newton to describe space as the sensorium of God, a remark that Hegel cites with approval in his *Philosophy of Nature*.[19] Unlike for finite perception, the sensible dimension of infinite perception is definitionally objective—that is, it describes a set of sensible appearances that are binding for all

[18] These are two of the central issues at stake in the *Science of Logic*'s middle book, The Doctrine of Essence. As is well known, Hegel has a different, more demanding definition of what a concept is than Kant does. Even so, there is continuity between Hegel and Kant insofar as they both use "concept" as a term for to describing a rule for unification. The point of contention is downstream, regarding what sorts of things properly count as rules of this kind.

[19] PN §261Z.

perceivers insofar as they perceive, in the same way that the laws of logic are binding for all thinkers insofar as they think.

I take this notion of the objectively sensible as the physical compliment to a conception of infinite rational mindedness to be what Hegel has in mind in his theoretical works. Hegel finds no philosophical interest in the theological implications of the notion of a divine subject, but he *is* interested in the logical-formal model of the relationship between thought and reality that emerges out of this notion. His particular interest has to do with the way in which infinite rational thought stands in a different relationship to its object than finite rational thought does: infinite rational mindedness *gives itself* an object, whereas finite rational mindedness is *given* an object. On my reading, it is precisely this activity of giving oneself an object that Hegel is after—that is, the idea that thought gives itself being, makes itself objective, or, synonymously, displays itself in a sensible form as an object.[20] At the same time, on Hegel's view, the perceptually available world is made into a display of the form of thought, and, as such, offers a sensible point of contact with this ostensibly supersensible form. And all this in the absence of any specific minded being (human or divine) "doing" the thinking.

Thus, on Hegel's view as I reconstruct it, conceptual thought is self-intentional, or, as he puts it in the *Science of Logic*, conceptuality gives itself reality.[21] He glosses this self-given reality as a conceptual "content" that is "posited by the form [of conceptuality] itself."[22] Hegel further argues that a self-directed account of conceptual form along these lines is already contained in Kant's own thought. Specifically, Hegel finds such an account in Kant's description of the transcendental unity of apperception, which Hegel pursuantly places at the center of his own theory of conceptuality.

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[20] As with the eye, the thing displayed is transformed by this process: rather than simply being a sensible individual, it is made into a sensible universal or a "model" of the universal. I'm grateful to David Wellbery for pointing this out.
[21] SL 12.21, 518.
[22] SL 12.25, 523.

(ii) Hegelian Apperception and Judgment

Allowing that apperception plays a central philosophical role for Hegel's understanding of logical form, the crucial question that must be asked is: *what* role? That is, what exactly does Hegel want from Kant's theory apperception?

The most famous and thoroughly explored answer to this question in the contemporary literature on Hegel is Robert Pippin's claim that what Hegel takes on from Kant's account of apperceptive synthesis is a certain notion of self-consciousness. In his most recent major work on Hegel, Pippin puts the point thus: "[Hegel's] Concept just is thought's self-consciousness of itself in thinking."[23] For Pippin, the paradigm case of such thinking is judging. It should be spelled out that Pippin's focus on thinking as judgment is concomitant with his view that Hegelian thought is fundamentally "discursive." He states, "Hegel decisively sides with Kant's view that thinking is discursive"[24] and he glosses discursivity to mean "to think what is the case is to assert that it is (the basic unit of intelligibility in Hegel's account is the judgment; assertion its linguistic manifestation)."[25] Thus, self-consciousness is the sort of self-consciousness that belongs to the discursively judging subject. In Pippin's words:

> The claim common to Kant and Hegel is that judging is apperceptive, and that this is a logical matter, a matter of the very concept of judging, and this because no act of judging, asserting to be the case, say, could be such an act if the subjective judging were not self-consciously judging.[26]

[23] Pippin (2018) 106.
[24] Ibid., 20.
[25] Ibid., 14.
[26] Ibid., 113.

The kind of self-consciousness under discussion here is to be understood in a very specific, technical sense. It is emphatically not merely an introspective, psychological awareness of one's own "states of mind." Rather, it is a formal characteristic of the sort of first-personal thinking engaged in by a rational being. Pippin writes:

> …to judge is to be aware not only *of what* one is judging, but that one is judging, asserting, claiming something. But one is not, cannot be, simultaneously judging that one is judging…Rather, judgment *is* the consciousness of judging. These are not two acts, but one.[27]

Thus, for Pippin, Hegel's commitment to apperception is a commitment to this formal notion of self-conscious discursive thinking.

I take it to be undeniable that, at many places in his oeuvre, Hegel hews to a theory of rational self-consciousness along these lines.[28] Even so, it is debatable whether or not this is the appropriate lens through which to understand Hegel's specific inheritance of Kantian apperception. In particular, Pippin's claim that "the Concept just is thought's self-consciousness of itself in thinking" has been contested by other Kant-inclined readers of Hegel's *Science of Logic*.

In the course of her *Hegel's Critique of Metaphysics*, for example, Beatrice Longuenesse defends an exemplary version of a very different position.[29] She argues that Hegelian apperception is fundamentally different in kind from Kantian apperception, and, further, that this difference has specifically to do with the kind of mindedness that each thinker is respectively interested in placing at the center of his account. She writes:

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[27] ibid. 105. Pippin goes on to draw on work by Sebastian Rödl to help make this point.
[28] Throughout the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, for example, as well as in the *Philosophy of Spirit* and the related lectures on Right, Aesthetics, and Religion.
[29] Horstmann (2006) defends a similar position to Longuenesse.

> Kant and Hegel disagree in their answer to the question: what is the unity of apperception? For Kant, it is the unity of a finite consciousness: a consciousness which is not the source of its own empirical objects, but merely generates the forms according to which these objects are perceived and conceptualized…For Hegel, the unity of apperception is much more than this. It is the same "reason," or intuitive understanding, which Hegel found in Kant's [*Critique of Judgment*].[30]

For Longuenesse, Hegel's interest in the account of apperception in the *Science of Logic* is to give an account of the kind of thinking enacted by an "intuitive understanding" rather than by a self-conscious discursive judger. On her reading, the "intuitive understanding" is a kind of mind—like a divine mind—that can spontaneously generate its own objects.[31]

On this reading, Hegel's interest in apperception has little to do with the Kantian notion of self-consciousnesss. Rather, Hegel's interest in apperception is primarily in the formal notion of synthetic unification that it delivers. In Longuenesse's words:

> Hegel's concept, like Kant's concepts, has a unifying function…the unifying function is itself subject; it does not have to be placed in a subject, be it even a "transcendental" subject. It is subject, i.e. it is what is active in the constitution of cognitions, and more generally in all thought process… What remains essential, then, is the fact that both Hegel and Kant characterize the concept as having a unifying function.[32]

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[30] Longuenesse (2007) 187.
[31] ibid. 170. Cf. 187: "to interpret the transcendental unity of apperception in these terms [as Hegel does E.L.] is to say that it is the source not only of the form but also of the matter of appearances. It is to say that it is that unity of an understanding for which there is no distinction between form and matter, between possible and actual, between concept and intuition, the very understanding which in the third *Critique* Kant characterized as intuitive understanding."
[32] ibid. 20

Thus, on Longuenesse's view, Hegel uses Kant's notion of apperception as a way of explaining the kind of activity that is the definitive activity of a divine subject. Here, "apperceptive" simply means the unifying function of the concept, i.e. of the intuitive understanding.

I think there is much to praise in Longuenesse's reading. In particular, I concur with her defense of the continuity between Hegel's arguments in *Faith and Knowledge* and his later arguments in the *Science of Logic.*[33] I also think she is right, *pace* Pippin, that Hegel's primary interest in Kantian apperception in the *Logic* is in the notion of formal unity that this logical structure provides rather than in a full-fledged notion of discursive self-consciousness thought.

At the same time, I reject Longuenesse's claim that Hegelian conceptual activity is the activity of an intuitive understanding. I side, nominally, with Pippin in holding that Hegelian conceptual activity is discursive. On this score, I follow Pippin as far as the claim that the discursivity of Hegelian thought is fundamentally bound up with the activity of judgment. On my reading, however, judgment is not a mental activity performed by a self-conscious thinker. I follow Hegel's lead in passages like this one: "The judgment is usually taken in a subjective sense, as an operation and a form, which occurs only in thinking that is conscious of itself. But this distinction is not yet present in the logical [realm]."[34] He continues on to say "every thing is a judgment [*alle Dinge sind ein Urteil*]."[35] I interpret this to mean that judgment is, first and foremost, a formal structure that characterizes any Hegelian individual (mental or physical).[36]

Further, judgment is primarily defined by its status as an act of division or diairesis, rather than as an act of combination or synthesis. I take it that this means that judgment is not, as Pippin would have it, "the primary unity of intelligibility" but, rather, only one of two

[33] Pippin (1989) 66-73 also draws attention to the importance of this text as an early formulation of Hegel's view, though he does not defend the strong continuity that Longuenesse does.
[34] EL §167, 245.
[35] ibid.
[36] Pippin (2018) acknowledges this. It is not clear to me, however, how the ascription of judgmental form to physical objects can ultimately be squared with his understanding of judgment as a paradigmatically self-conscious activity in the sense I have just described.

ingredients required for intelligibility.[37] The other of these ingredients is conceptuality itself, i.e. the moment of synthesis that compliments the dividing moment of judgment.[38]

(iii) Subjectivity

The final issue of textual interpretation that I will say something about here has to do with the specific sections of Hegel's text around which I center my reading. Anyone aiming to distill a set of clear theses from Hegel's sprawling philosophical edifice finds herself in the position of picking and choosing which elements of Hegel's project to emphasize and which to leave behind for others. My reading foregrounds the set of post-Kantian aesthetic themes that I see at work throughout Hegel's Encyclopedia. In light of this, I focus primarily on reconstructing Hegel's obscure account of synthetic unity as it is first described in his early essay, *Faith and Knowledge,* and, later, in the "Subjectivity" section of the Concept Logic. My goal in doing so is to track Hegel's transformation of Kant's theory of intuition and the attendant issue of conceptual content. I then go on to link this discussion up with the related treatments of space and time in the *Philosophy of Nature* and of finite perception in the *Philosophy of Spirit*.

I take this approach in part because I think these segments of Hegel's work, and especially the "Subjectivity" section of the Logic, have received less attention than they merit. One reason why this is so is simply because it is particularly difficult to understand what Hegel is up to here. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that the topics under discussion, i.e. the forms of judgment and inference, can seem at first blush to be much *less* exotic than some of the other topics treated in the *Science of Logic*. It is the very familiarity of the subject matter that makes Hegel's repurposing of it so challenging to pin down.[39]

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[37] Pippin (2018) 99.
[38] SL 12.55, 552.
[39] Consequently, readings of this section of the *Logic* tend to be thin exegetical reconstructions. Exceptions can be found in Schick (2002) and Redding (2007).

In light of this, it is perhaps not surprising that recent literature on Hegel's theoretical philosophy has tended to focus heavily on the "Objectivity" and "Idea" sections of the Concept Logic. This is owing to a trending emphasis on the "vitalist" strand of thinking in Hegelian logic. Interpreters working in this vein have stressed the particular importance of the topics of teleology and life to Hegel's thought.[40] An adjacent trend is the attribution to Hegel of some species of neo-Aristotelian naturalism.[41]

It is undeniable that these vitalist topics are of interest to Hegel and that Hegel's views about them should, in turn, be of interest to contemporary philosophy (wherein such topics are only beginning to get a fair hearing). At the same time, overemphasizing the importance of these topics runs the risk of covering over aspects of Hegel's thought that are less easily motivated, but equally central. This is borne out in the way in which readings along these lines frequently gloss over or misconstrue the details of Hegel's account of apperception in "Subjectivity."[42]

This section, which begins with Hegel's account of "the Concept" and ends with his appeal to the demonstration of the identity of thought and being offered by the ontological proof, is the denouement of the *Science of Logic*. It is the place where the motivating drama of the Objective Logic, the distinction between Being and Essence, is resolved. Apperception is the device that effects this resolution. It does so specifically insofar as it provides the logical resources for describing the structure of self-reference by means of which the Concept provides itself with content.[43]

One of the primary goals of the reading that I advance is to make sense of the way in which the Concept employs self-referentiality in order to provide itself with content. Towards this end, I contend that the forms of judgment and inference are aesthetic forms for Hegel in the same way that space and time are aesthetic forms for Kant. Unlike for Kant, however, Hegel's

[40] I have in mind especially the reading offered in Ng (2020), but see also Kreines (2008), Pinkard (2012), Pippin (2018) and Thompson (2012) and the collection of essays in Khurana (2013).
[41] Cf. Ferrarin (2007), McDowell (1996) and Pinkard (2012).
[42] I expand on this point in a pair of forthcoming reviews of Ng (2020) in the *SGIR Review* and *Hegel Bulletin*.
[43] Here I follow, again, Horstmann (2006) and Longuenesse (2005).

aesthetic forms are logically prior to the sensory capacities of finite rational perceivers. These forms are, instead, absolute forms of intelligibility that characterize anything that can rightfully described as "being."

Defending a position along these lines requires Hegel to propose a different account of apperceptive synthesis from the Kantian account. I suggest that Hegel draws on resources that he finds in Kant's *Critique of Judgment* in order to do so. The lynchpin of my argument surrounding the *Science of Logic* is that Hegel's conception of apperceptive synthesis is fundamentally symbolic.[44]

3. Symbolic Form

One of the central goals of my reading is to demonstrate the way in which Kantian and post-Kantian notions of "symbolic form" figure in Hegel's logical project. Very generally, "symbolic form" describes a set of structural devices employed in both fine art and philosophy for making sense of the way in which one item can stand in for or refer to another item. On my reading, Hegel draws on this set of structural devices in order to offer a non-Kantian account of the synthetic unity of apperception.

The primary initial evidence in favor of this view is provided by Hegel in his 1802 "Faith and Knowledge" essay. I follow Beatrice Longuenesse and Sally Sedgwick in underscoring the continuity between this early essay and Hegel's mature view.[45] My novel contribution to this line of interpretation is the claim that Hegel's poorly understood praise of Kant's *Critique of Judgment* in this text has specifically to with Kant's remarks about symbolic intuition in the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment.

[44] There is a resonance here between my work on Hegel and recent work by Samantha Matherne on Kant defending the importance of symbolic intuition for Kant's metaphysical thought. Cf. Matherne (2014), (2016) and a forthcoming contribution to the *Cambridge Critical Guide to the Prolegomena.*
[45] Cf. Longuenesse (2005) and Sedgwick (2012).

I argue that Hegel's positive assessment of Kant's discussion of Aesthetic Judgment centers on a set of claims Kant makes about conceptual exhibition in *Critique of Judgment* §59 and the surrounding paragraphs. Up to this point in his critical philosophy, Kant has maintained that the reality of rational ideas is strictly indemonstrable. In these paragraphs, however, Kant indicates that a privative exhibition of these ideas can be provided by means of a procedure of judgment that he calls "symbolic intuition."

Kant's argument account of symbolic intuition is highly complex, but the key thought is that the relationship between two empirical concepts can illustrate the relationship between a rational idea and an empirical idea. Take, for example, the rational idea of "the soul." The soul is definitionally immaterial and, thus, we can never pick out any sensible objects that fall under this concept. But, according to Kant, the concept of the soul can be symbolically demonstrated by drawing an analogy between the way the soul acts on the body and an empirical relationship between terms—say, for example, a charioteer steering a team of horses. Kant claims that the relationship of charioteer to horses symbolizes the relationship of the soul to the body and, thus, allows for the indirect cognition of the soul.[46] The deficiencies of this procedure are readily apparent: there is no inherent connection between the symbol and the thing symbolized, and the aptness of the symbol is debatable. Even so, Kant argues that this sort of symbolic exhibition provides us some limited cognitive access to rational ideas.

In *Faith and Knowledge*, Hegel takes up this thought and runs with it. He is centrally interested in the possibility that the activity of one particular rational idea, the idea of freedom, can be symbolically exhibited by one particular aesthetic idea, the idea of the beautiful. Later, in the *Science of Logic*, Hegel will state that the rational concept is synonymous with freedom. More specifically, it is the free synthetic activity of reason, the Hegelian successor to Kantian

[46] Kant is by no means the inventor of this sort of analogy. Though Kant does not explicitly note his sources, he could not have been unaware of the rich scholastic discussions of metaphysical and theological employments of analogy that can be traced back to Aristotle and commenters like Avicenna and Aquinas. Cf. Ashworth (1991) and (2014).

spontaneity. And, already in *Faith and Knowledge*, Hegel is interested in giving an account of how this sort of free conceptual activity appears in the sensible world. Put otherwise, he is interested in giving an account of the way that freedom appears.

The resources that Hegel finds in *Critique of Judgment*'s account of symbolic intuitions allow him to begin to give such an account. But, as we have seen, in the Kantian picture, symbolic exhibitions of concepts are always privative. As in the case of the soul and the charioteer, the activity of freedom may be *likened to* the activity of beauty, but, on Kant's view, it is not one and the same activity.[47]

I argue that, in his quest to provide an account of how symbolic intuitions can be adequate to rational concepts, Hegel turns to Schelling's philosophy. My specific claim is that Hegel's specific version of symbolic form is best understood as an instance of something called "tautegorical symbolization." I borrow "tautegory" from Daniel Whistler's recent work on Schelling, but the coinage originates with English Romantic poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834) who was active at the same time as Hegel. As Whistler shows, tautegorical symbolization was brought into philosophical usage by Schelling who was both a correspondent to Coleridge, and, more famously, a close friend and philosophical rival to Hegel.[48]

The description of a constellation of innovative theories of symbolic representation was one of the hallmarks of the European Romantic movement that arose at the turn of the nineteenth century.[49] In this context. Coleridge coined the neologism "tautegory" to describe one specific sort of symbolic representation. The term is formed from the Attic Greek roots "*tautos*" (meaning "identical") and "*agoreuein*" (meaning "to speak in the assembly").[50] Coleridge defined it to mean a symbol that "express[es] the *same* subject [as its referent] but with a *difference*."[51] The

[47] Difficulties arise for Kant in relation to this particular claim because the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment seems to show, against the wishes of the author, that freedom and beauty are, in fact, one and the same activity. It is precisely this difficult that piques Hegel's interest.
[48] Whistler (2013).
[49] Cf. Halmi (2007) and Wellbery (1984).
[50] Halmi (2012) 354.
[51] Coleridge (1913) 136.

intended contrast is with "allegory," from "*allos"* (other) and "*agoreuein.*" Regarding this distinction, Coleridge writes that, whereas an allegory is "but a translation of abstract notions into a picture-language which is itself nothing but an abstraction," a tautegory, by contrast, is a symbol which "always partakes of the reality which it renders intelligible; and while it enunciates the whole, abides itself a living part in that Unity, of which it is the representative."[52] Nicholas Halmi helpfully glosses this point thus: "whereas allegories merely substitute fictional images for abstract ideas, [tautegories] convey something beyond or greater than themselves precisely because of what they are in themselves."[53] Another way of putting this point is to say that, whereas an allegory falls short of the thing it depicts, a tautegory is sufficient to the thing it depicts.

Schelling employs the notion of tautegory explicitly in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Mythology*, where he uses it to describe the unique mimetic nature of myth:

> Everything in [myth] is…to be understood as mythology expresses it, not as if something else were thought, something else said. **Mythology is not allegorical; it is tautegorical.** To mythology the gods are actually existing essences, gods that are not something else, do not mean something else, but rather mean only what they are.[54]

The idea is that mythological symbols (such as the Greek gods) are not simply devices that stand in for something else (e.g. forces of nature or psychology). Schelling's claim is, rather, that there is no different or better way to express what mythology expresses than through a set of stories about anthropomorphic deities. This stands in contrast to views that understand mythology as a set of "just so" stories that provide inadequate explanations for things that are best understood

[52] Quoted in Halmi (2012) 354.
[53] ibid.
[54] Schelling (2007) 136. Also quoted at Whistler (2015) 12. My emphasis.

in other ways. On this view, it is the rain god, not meteorological explanation, that best expresses the nature of a storm.

The question that naturally arises in light of these claims is the question as to what exactly it is that mythology expresses. Schelling's answer to this question is that mythology expresses divine unity or "the One."[55] On this point, it is helpful to note that Schelling's interest in these lectures is to show that there is continuity between mythology and revealed religion. In the Christian context, the notion of the trinity of father, son, and holy spirit is not a mere metaphor for the triplicity of the godhead. Rather, the trinity is taken to be a necessary illustration of the threefold nature of divine unity. Schelling wants to claim this adequate status for mythology as well: on the view he defends in the lectures, a theogonic story like the castration of Cronus is a necessary illustration of divine nature in the same way as the Christian trinity. Mythology and revelation are both adequate symbolic exhibitions of divine unity. [56] In the wors of Schelling scholar Markus Gabriel: "Myths are not faulty efforts at expressing a logical truth, they rather enact the very unity of sense and being, of content and form."[57]

In his book, Whistler convincingly argues that this notion of the tautegorical symbol can be generalized to other parts of Schelling's system. Most importantly for my purposes here, he claims that Schelling views certain finite objects, like works of art and organic life forms, as tautegorical symbols of infinite rational form.

My argument in the dissertation is that, in the Hegelian picture, tautegorical symbolization also applies to the logical realm. Specifically, it describes the relationship between the infinite rational form that Hegel calls "the Concept" and the set of finite forms of judgment and inference that describe the determined structure of individual objects and thoughts; that is, forms like the simple predicative judgment "S is P". In the Hegelian picture as I reconstruct it, the synthetic activity of conceptuality in general is symbolically expressed in individual rational

[55] ibid. 137.
[56] ibid. 123-39.
[57] Gabriel (2009) 62. Also quoted at Whistler (2015) 13.

acts. These individual rational acts are adequate symbols of the Concept. In this way, the determined individual (mental or physical) is identical to the rational universal in the way that the tautegorical symbol is identical with its referent: it is the same thing, put differently.[58]

I have been emphasizing the Schellingian heritage of this idea but characterizing Hegelian logic as "tautegorical" also brings Hegel into contact with the foundations of contemporary analytic philosophy of logic. In that tradition, Wittgenstein is famous for having claimed that the laws of logic are tautological.[59] He explains this claim by appeal to a distinction between logical propositions, which can be seen to be true simply from the way they are written, and non-logical propositions, which require additional information in order for their truth or falsity to be ascertained:

> It is the characteristic mark of logical propositions that one can perceive in the symbol [i.e. in the notation, E.L.] alone that they are true; and this fact contains in itself the whole philosophy of logic. And so also it is one of the most important facts that the truth or falsehood of non-logical propositions cannot be recognized from the propositions alone.[60]

On this view, logical propositions are explicitly analytic statements that require no heterogeneous material in order for their truth to be demonstrated.

As is well known, one of Kant's explicit goals in the first *Critique* is to show that there is a certain kind of object-involving a priori logic that is comprised of synthetic a priori judgments. Kant accomplishes this by means of his doctrine of sensibility. By arguing that there are a set of

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[58] My claim that Hegel's thought contains a robust theory of symbolic form that serves as a successor concept to the Kantian schematism is similar to Ernst Cassirer's account of a symbolic successor to the Kantian schematism in his *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* (1923-9). My reading of Hegel departs from Cassirer, however, by proposing that forms of judgment and inference are symbolic in this way.
[59] Wittgenstein (2010) 6.1, 77. On this claim cf. Durben and Floyd (1991).
[60] ibid. 6.113, 77.

a priori forms of sensibility that serve to provide a priori intuitive content for certain concepts, he defends the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments.

In his own logic, Hegel wants to do Kant one better. As we have seen, Hegel wants to preserve the synthetic, object-involving character of Kant's transcendental logic while rejecting the Kantian claim that there is a distinct set of a priori sensible forms. Further, on my reading, Hegel *also* anticipates the Wittgensteinian claim that the propositions of logic are self-identical and, as such, require no additional heterogeneous material in order for their truth to be demonstrated. In order to hold these two apparently contradictory positions simultaneously, Hegel argues that logic exhibits its correspondence with itself by being comprised of two apparently distinct but ultimately identical aspects—conceptual unity, on the one hand, and the discursive forms of judgment, on the other—that refer to one another symbolically.

The self-referring symbolic character of Hegelian logic is what I describe by means of the term tautegory. Hegelian logic is tautegorical rather than tautological and this is the way in which Hegelian logic is synthetically self-identical.

4. Outline

The dissertation is comprised of five chapters. In Chapter 1, I take up Hegel's critique of Kant's theory of intuition as it is presented in an important early essay entitled "Faith and Knowledge" (1802). I follow Longuenesse and Sedgwick in emphasizing the importance of the critique of Kant provided in this essay to understanding Hegel's mature critique of Kant, and especially his critique of Kantian intuition. I go on to outline a novel interpretation of the positive alternative to Kant that Hegel proposes in this essay. Specifically, I demonstrate that Hegel finds resources in Kant's discussion of symbolic intuition in the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment for offering a different understanding of the relationship between thought and reality to Kant without reverting to a pre-Kantian rationalist metaphysics. I argue that the lynchpin of Hegel's view is his

rejection of the idea of intuitions as representations [*Vorstellungen*] in favor of the idea of intuitions as exhibitions [*Darstellungen*].

In Chapter 2, I expand on this account by looking at Hegel's rejection of Friedrich Schelling's theory of intellectual intuition. This chapter fills a pressing gap in the literature. I argue that Hegel and Schelling share a commitment to offering an account of sensibility that is centered on the way in which individual sensible objects exhibit the existence of supersensible universals. This is where the notion of tautegorical symbolization becomes relevant: following Whistler, I show how Schelling employs this symbolic structure to account for the way in which individual sensible objects exhibit the existence of supersensible universals. For Schelling, works of fine art are paradigmatic sense objects of this kind. I claim that, contra Schelling, Hegel believes that logic itself should also perform this function.

In Chapters 3 and 4, I turn to Hegel's positive account of the way in which the forms belonging to logic exhibit the way in which universals appear to the senses in individual objects. Against recent interpretations that have sought to understand Hegel's logic as offering only a "theory of explanation" I show that Hegel's logic also offers a "theory of exhibition": that is, a theory of the way in which sensible individuals exhibit the existence of universals. In order to show how this works, I focus on the relationship between the Hegelian Concept and the forms of judgment that is laid out in the "Subjectivity" section of the *Science of Logic*. I argue that, here, Hegel shows that the synthetic activity of individual logical forms (i.e. specific forms of judgment and inference) are symbolic exhibitions of the universal logical form (i.e. the Concept).

Finally, Chapter 5 takes this reading from the abstract context of the *Logic* into the concrete realms of nature and spirit, the topics of the other two volumes of Hegel's tripartite Encyclopedia project. I discuss the fate of Kant's forms of intuition, space and time, as the opening moments of Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature*. I then offer a reading of the account of empirical cognition in the *Philosophy of Spirit* that focuses on reconciling Hegel's apparent

coherentism about conceptual knowledge with his claim that sensory representations still have a role to play in his epistemology.

Chapter 1: Hegel's Critique of Kantian Intuition and the Early Theory of Exhibition

1. Introduction

In the essay that follows, I offer a new interpretation of one of the more challenging aspects of Hegel's idealist philosophical system: namely, his poorly understood view about how it is that logical forms like concepts, judgments, and patterns of inference come to be contentful.

Hegel's philosophical system is notoriously difficult, but perhaps no single idea is as foreign to the contemporary interpreter as his claim that "logical forms"—among which Hegel includes propositional logical forms, the general forms that can be abstracted from the sentences and arguments of ordinary language—come somehow ready-equipped with the content about which they hold true.

Here is a characteristic Hegelian formulation of this claim from his masterwork, *The Science of Logic*:

> [logical] form has in it a content or reality of its own…[this] content [is] posited by the form itself and therefore adequate to it. – This form is for this reason of quite another nature than logical form is ordinarily taken to be. It is truth already on its own account.[1]

As Hegel himself notes, the idea that a logical form gives itself its own content, and, in particular, that forms of this sort do not require an additional sensible contribution in order to be applied to reality, was not the view most people held about logical forms in his own time, any more than it is the view people hold today. When we employ formulas like "S is P" we do not typically understand them as being true in the absence of some sort of referent, S, about which we can ask and of which we can determine whether it is or is not, in fact, P. Hegel, however, thinks that

[1] SL 12.25, 523.

forms like "S is P" already have a content in advance of being referred to any worldly objects and apart from any sensible contribution. The aim of this dissertation is to show how Hegel defends this unique view and to say something about his philosophical motivations for doing so.

My central line of argument will be that getting Hegel's claims about logical content into view requires understanding Hegel's radical reconstrual of Immanuel Kant's theory of sensibility. As is well known, Kant's three *Critiques* outline an innovative theory of knowledge. One of the main features of this theory is Kant's novel proposal that spatiotemporality belongs to the mind of the perceiving subject. Kant calls this his "transcendental aesthetic."

For reasons that will be treated in detail below, Hegel is often understood as having rejected Kant's aesthetic altogether. On my reading, however, Hegel's own system of philosophy best understood as being structured in direct response to Kant's aesthetic proposal. As I have already noted in the Introduction, in Hegel's eyes, the problem with the transcendental aesthetic is that it runs together three topics that ought to be treated distinctly. These are: (i) a modal question about the actuality of concepts, (ii) space and time as the forms of the sensible world, and (iii) the sense-affective capacities belonging to individual human perceivers.

My aims in this first chapter are twofold: first, I offer an outline the Kantian view of intuition that Hegel positions himself against, and, second, I show how Hegel finds resources in Kant's own work, specifically in the third *Critique's* treatment of aesthetic judgment, to begin to describe an alternative to Kant's transcendental aesthetic.

On my reading, Hegel's critique of the Kantian conception of intuition centers on two points. The first of these is a relatively simple claim about what Hegel understands to be the untenably subjective character of the Kantian forms of intuition, space and time. I will refer to this as the "subjectivity objection." The second point of contention is more complex. It has to do with the device of analogy that Kant employs throughout the critical philosophy to describe the regulative relationship between the principles of pure reason and the spatiotemporal appearances given in intuition. I will refer to this as the "adequation objection." The first

objection has to do with the relationship between intuition and the faculty of the understanding [*Verstand*], while the second has to do with the relationship between intuition and the faculty of reason [*Vernunft*]. Both points are bound up with Hegel's identification and rejection of two insuperable dualisms at the heart of Kant's critical philosophy, the first between the transcendental subject and unconditioned things in themselves, and the second between the subject's own faculties of thinking and perceiving.

2. Intuitions and concepts of the understanding

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant famously puts forth the view that there are "two stems of human cognition, which may perhaps arise from a common but to us unknown root, namely sensibility and understanding, through the first of which objects are given to us, but through the second of which they are thought."[2] These two stems each furnish the mind with a distinctive kind of cognitive representation: sensibility provides intuitions, whereas the understanding provides concepts. Although the two stems are logically distinguishable, they are operationally interdependent. Thus, Kant tells us, "thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It is thus just as necessary to make the mind's concepts sensible (i.e., to add an object to them in intuition) as it is to make its intuitions understandable (i.e., to bring them under concepts)."[3] To sum up, intuition comes on the scene in Kant's philosophy as a kind of cognitive representation given to the mind by the faculty of sensibility that provides content to conceptual thought.[4]

In a passage adjacent to the one just cited, Kant goes on to align the faculty of sensibility with mental receptivity, in contrast to mental spontaneity, which he ascribes to the understanding: "If we call the receptivity of our mind to receive representations insofar as it is

[2] CPR A15/B29, 151. I draw on Engstrom (2006) throughout my discussion of this point.
[3] Ibid. A51/B75, 193-4
[4] There are extensive ongoing debates in contemporary Kant scholarship about the precise nature of the relationship between sensibility and the understanding, particularly as regards the conceptuality of sensible content. See especially Allais (2015) and Heideman (2014)..

affected in some way sensibility, then on the contrary the faculty for bringing forth representations itself, or the spontaneity of cognition, is the understanding."[5] One of the key innovations of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* is his elaboration of the *a priori* conditions that make such sensible reception of representations possible in the section of the text called the "Transcendental Aesthetic." On Kant's view "the pure form of sensible intuitions in general is to be encountered in the mind *a priori*."[6] There are two such forms of intuition: space and time. Kant is emphatic that these forms are exclusively mental:

> if we remove our own subject or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, then all the constitution, all relations of objects in space and time, indeed space and time themselves would disappear…What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us.[7]

In short, the spatiotemporality of cognition comes from the perceiving subject and not from the perceived world.

Hegel's first critique of Kant consists in his rejection of this last claim. This does not mean that Hegel attributes spatiotemporality to the perceptible world *instead of* to the perceiving subject. Rather, on Hegel's view, space and time belong to *both* minded perceivers and to the physical perceptibles. Thus, Hegel: "Sensations are therefore made spatial and temporal by intuition…this statement must not be understood to mean that space and time are only subjective forms. This is what Kant wanted to make them. But things are in truth themselves spatial and temporal."[8] Here, Hegel strikingly agrees with Kant that intuition plays a role in the spatiotemporality of perception. But he further asserts that things are *also* spatiotemporal on

[5] CPR A51/B75, 193.
[6] Ibid. A20/B34, 156.
[7] Ibid. A42/B59-60, 168.
[8] PM 448z, 198

their own. This is so, Hegel says, because spatiotemporality "has been originally imparted to them [i.e. to the things] by the intrinsically infinite mind, by the creative eternal idea."[9] Understanding precisely what this means is one of the central tasks of this dissertation. In the context of this preliminary overview of Hegel's critique of Kant, it is sufficient to see here that Hegel rejects the idea that the spatiotemporal character of intuition is merely subjective.

But Hegel goes further. He additionally rejects the very idea that spatiotemporality is a topic of central importance to cognition in the first place. Farther on in the passage just cited, he writes, "the answer to those who…attach quite extraordinary importance to the *reality* of space and time, is that space and time are extremely meager and superficial determinations…things obtain very little from these forms, and the loss of them, were this in some way possible, would therefore amount to very little."[10] This provocation is indicative not, as one might initially think, of Hegel's rejection of the importance of intuition for cognition. Rather it points towards Hegel's rejection of the importance of the Kantian capacity of the understanding for cognition. As described above, the *Critique of Pure Reason* defines cognitions as consisting in the synthesis of sensibility's intuitions and the understanding's concepts. Kant's aim in the first portion of the first *Critique* is to demonstrate that synthetic a priori synthesis of pure intuitions (i.e. of the forms of intuition, space and time) and pure concepts of the understanding (i.e. the categories) is possible; his description of space and time as the forms of intuition anchors this project. For, it is specifically insofar as these pure aesthetic forms are provided by the perceiving subject in advance of empirical experience that Kant takes himself to be able to demonstrate that the categories of the understanding are necessarily applicable to all spatiotemporal objects given in perception (what Kant calls "appearances" [*Erscheinungen*]). Thus, in the Kantian cognitive scheme, the subjective spatiotemporal character of intuition is of specific importance because it

[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.

is a condition of possibility for the adequation of intuitions and the pure concepts of the understanding.

But Hegel does not think that the synthesis of intuitions and the concepts of the understanding is what cognition consists in. Instead, taking his cue from Kant's *Critique of Judgment,* Hegel defines cognition as the synthesis of intuitions with the concepts of reason.[11] And, as we will see in the next section, spatiotemporality is not central to this kind of conceptual adequation on either the Kantian or the Hegelian view. This will be Hegel's point of departure for reevaluating the philosophically significant aspect of intuition altogether.

3. Intuitions and ideas of reason

Hegel's second point of disagreement with Kant provides an initial indication of what the substance of his positive reevaluation of intuition will be and, as such, will require a somewhat more intricate exposition. I term this second objection "the adequation objection." This objection has to do with the question of whether or not there can be any intuitions (sensible or pure) that are adequate to the ideas of reason. Kant argues throughout the critical philosophy that there are not. Hegel, contrariwise, argues that there are. Hegel's rejection of the Kantian view has two loci: first, Hegel rejects the idea that sensible intuitions cannot be adequate to pure concepts. Second, Hegel additionally rejects the idea that the reflective procedure whereby the faculty of judgment provides what Kant terms the "merely analogous" adequation of sensible intuitions and rational ideas provides a cognitively inferior kind of certainty. In what follows, I treat these points in tandem.

The primary aim of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is, as the title indicates, "a critique of our power of reason [*Vernunft*] as such, in regard to all cognitions after which reason may strive

[11] Programmatic statements to this effect are evident very early on in Hegel's writing, in particular in the 1802 *Faith and Knowledge*, which juxtaposes Kant's position on these topics with those of Jacobi and Fichte. Pippin (1989) & (1997) draws particular attention to the importance of that text for understanding Hegel's theory of cognition.

independently of all experience."[12] The Kantian faculty of theoretical reason strives toward "what is unconditioned absolutely,"[13] that is, toward traditional metaphysical topics like God, being, and the unity of nature. On Kant's view, however, these totalizing concepts of reason are mere ideas that lack reality. Per Kant, "establishing that our concepts have reality always requires intuitions."[14] And he is clear that there are no intuitions that can be adequately synthesized with these ideas of reason:

> If the concepts are empirical, the intuitions are called examples. If they are pure concepts of the understanding, the intuitions are called schemata. But if anyone goes as far as to demand that we establish the objective reality of the rational concepts (i.e. the ideas) for the sake of their theoretical cognition, then he asks for something impossible, because absolutely no intuition can be given that would be adequate to them.[15]

Despite the apparent finality of the last sentence of the quotation, however, this is not the last word on the subject.

In *Critique of Judgment* §59, Kant divides intuitions that provide content for *a priori* concepts into two sub-categories, the schematic and the symbolic:

> All **hypotyposis** (exhibition, *subjecto sub adspectum*), as making [a concept] sensible, is of one of two kinds: either **schematic**, where to a concept grasped by the understanding the corresponding intuition is given *a priori*; or **symbolic**, where to a concept which only reason can think, and to which no sensible intuition can be adequate, an intuition is attributed with which the power of judgment proceeds in *a way merely analogous* to that

[12] CPR Axii
[13] CPR 370, A326/B382
[14] CJ §59 225, K351.
[15] Ibid. 225-6.

> which it observes in schematization, i.e.*, it is merely the rule of this procedure, not of the intuition itself, and thus merely the form of the reflection, not the content, which corresponds to the concept*…[16]

Hypotyposis is translated into German as "*Darstellung,*" a Kantian term of art that has just been specified in CJ §57 as the exhibition of a concept in intuition. There, Kant uses the empirical example of an anatomist who "has set forth the concept of the human eye discursively and goes on to dissect the eye to make the concept intuitable [*anschaulich*]" as an illustration of the procedure of exhibition.[17] In performing the dissection, Kant says, the anatomist "demonstrates the human eye [*demonstriere das menschliche Auge*]."[18] In the passage about hypotyposis just quoted, Kant is contrastingly concerned with the sensible exhibition of the pure concepts of the understanding and of reason. We learn there that, although there are no intuitions that are adequate to the pure concepts of reason, these concepts can still be exhibited in a privative way by means of inadequate sensible intuitions. Intuitions that serve this purpose are called "symbolic."

In Kant's words: "Symbolic exhibition uses an analogy (for which we use empirical intuitions as well) in which judgment performs a double function: it applies the concept to the object of a sensible intuition; and then it applies the mere rule by which it reflects on that intuition to an entirely different object, of which the former object is only the symbol."[19] There are two important features of this passage that we must attend to: first, the fact that this procedure of judgment is reflective, and, second, the fact that the reflective character of this

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[16] CJ §59, my emphases. Translation adapted.
[17] CJ §57, Comment I, 216, K343.
[18] Ibid, KU 202. Translation modified. Kant's choice of example is of interest on multiple levels. First, there is something philosophically (if not natural scientifically) bizarre about the idea that the proper exhibition of the human eye consists in the display of a dead, cut apart eye by an anatomist to an audience of visual perceivers, rather than in any actual act of vision. In the language of the contemporary debate, this illustrates the 'sideways on' view *par excellence*. It also raises some Aristotelian hackles: a dead eye, we might object along the lines of the *Physics*, isn't properly an eye at all. Furthermore, insofar as the text goes on to discuss symbolic intuition only a few pages later, it is not entirely farfetched to suspect that this image provides a methodological comment on what Kant takes himself to be up to in the third *Critique*: displaying the dissected aesthetic apparatus of the mind for an audience of minded readers. At the very least, this resembles how Hegel viewed Kant's elaboration of the categories of the understanding, which he frequently criticizes as "static" and "dead."
[19] Ibid. 227 (K352)

particular judgment consists in its employment of analogy to bring together the supersensible ideas of reason with sensible intuitions.

Understanding the import of these claims will require a brief detour into Kant's account of theoretical judgment.[20] The topic is highly complex and what follows makes no claim to being exhaustive; I aim only to sketch a theoretical framework for the discussion at hand. According to Kant, the power of judgment [*Vermögen zu urteilen*] is the power of bringing intuitions under concepts or, synonymously, of bringing together representations of particular objects presented to the senses with the general rules of thought. In Kant's words, a judgment is "the mediate cognition of an object, hence the representation of a representation of it. In every judgment there is a concept that holds of many [representations], and that among this many also comprehends a given representation, which is then immediately referred to the object."[21] Judgment is thus the faculty that combines the two kinds representations that are given by the two stems of cognition discussed above. A judgment is a "mediate cognition of an object" because, by uniting a concept of the understanding with a sensible intuition, it refers the manifold that is immediately given in intuition to the universal laws of thought; that is, it displays a particular intuition as falling under the logical categories that structure and unify the experience of finite rational perceivers on Kant's view. The possibility of such combination is one of the central things Kant takes himself to demonstrate in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

According to Kant, at the highest level of generality there are two kinds of theoretical judgments: determining [*bestimmend*] judgments and reflective [*reflektierend*] judgments. Determining judgments are the paradigm case of Kantian theoretical judgment. They synthesize adequate intuitions and concepts, thus providing knowledge.[22] Insofar as we are interested in the

[20] I bracket practical judgment for the moment, although it will be touched on later in the section.
[21] CPR A68/B93, 205.
[22] I use "adequate" here in the traditional logical sense referring to a making equal of thought and being that yields truth about the external world. The first *Critique* goes into great detail about why certain concepts and intuitions are adequate to one another. Kant's view seems to be that standing in the same relation to empirical experience (i.e. being either both *a priori* or both *a posteriori*) is a necessary (but emphatically not sufficient) condition on the schematic synthesis of any two cognitive representations.

exhibition of pure rational concepts by means of sensible intuitions, determining judgment does not primarily concern us here. Our topic instead will be reflecting judgment. Reflective judgments do not provide the kind of necessary certainty that determining judgments do. This is because the intuitions and concepts involved in such judgments are not adequate to one another. Thus, instead of the act of simple combination that characterizes determining judgments, a different activity of synthesis is required.

In the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant distinguishes determining and reflective judgments from one another based on whether or not the concept or universal rule for synthesis of universal and particular is given in advance:

> If the universal (the rule, principle, law) is given, then judgment, which subsumes the particular under it, is determinative…But if only the particular is given and judgment has to find the universal for it, then this power is merely reflective.[23]

In the Jäsche *Logic*, the rule sought by the reflective judgment is further described as having "only subjective validity, for the general to which it proceeds is empirical generality only—a mere analogon of the logical."[24] Another way of putting this point is to say that reflective judgments are always in some wise *a posteriori*; they involve a reflection on something given in experience. Unlike determining empirical judgments, however, which combine empirical concepts with empirical intuitions under rules specified in advance by transcendental logic, reflective judgments make a claim to universal necessity that has not been specified in advance. Determining empirical judgments are "cat on the mat" judgments; they describe facts about what is the case. A reflective judgment, in contrast, makes a claim along the lines of "all of the cats I've ever seen have been on mats, so the rest of them must be too." These judgments proceed from empirical

[23] CJ 18-19, K179.
[24] JL 136. The text in question is a technical manual that was compiled by Kant's student, Gottlob Benjamin Jäsche, and published posthumously under Kant's name in 1800.

particulars to either empirical universals (in the case of induction) or further empirical particulars (in the case of analogy).

Our particular interest here is in the latter way reflective judgments bring together concepts and intuitions that are not adequate to each other in order to provide this "analogon of the logical." "Analogon" is the substantive term for the result of an act of analogy, which is a technical philosophical term for Kant. In the Jäsche *Logic*, analogy is described as a procedure by means of which "the power of judgment concludes…from many determinations and properties in which things of the same kind agree, to the others so far as they belong to the same principle."[25] The text further specifies, "Analogy concludes from *partial* similarity of two things to *total* similarity according to the principle of *specification*: things of one genus which we know to agree in much, also agree in the remainder as we know it in some of the genus but do not perceive it in others."[26] The analogy can be expressed in apparently syllogistic form, although it is not, on Kant's view, a proper syllogism.[27] Here is an empirical example:

P1 The osprey is a raptor.

P2 The eagle is a raptor.

C1 The eagle, like the osprey, is a diurnal, fish-eating bird.

For Kant, this procedure is not properly syllogistic because the suppressed premise, that ospreys and eagles are identical in all of their properties insofar as they are raptors, is merely a subjective assumption (in this case, the conclusion happens to be true, though it might not be, since it turns out some raptors, such as owls, are nocturnal). Thus, the pattern of inference is not valid, even though its conclusion is, in this case, true.

[25] JL 136.
[26] JL 136
[27] Hegel takes issue with this claim in the *Science of Logic*. I treat this point of contention below in §4.

The specifically philosophical employment of this device has to do with relations between concepts. In the *Lectures on Metaphysics*, Kant writes, "[philosophical] analogy is a proportion of concepts, where from the relation between two members that I know I bring out the relation of a third member, that I know, to a fourth member that I do not know."[28] The nature of this proportion of concepts is further specified in the opening paragraphs of the *Critique of Pure Reason's* Analogies of Experience, where Kant describes philosophical analogy as being unlike mathematical analogy insofar as it gives "not the identity of two quantitative but of two qualitative relations, where from three given members I can cognize and give a priori only the relation to a fourth member but not this fourth member itself."[29] To sum up, philosophical analogies are proportions between conceptual relations that, given three terms, permit the inference that some fourth term stands in relation to the third term as the first does to the second. As such, judgments that proceed in this way are properly described in Kantian terms as being "regulative" rather than "constitutive" with regard to the fourth term.[30] This means that these judgments stipulate the existence of some such fourth term, but cannot provide any determinate specification of the fourth term that goes beyond its status as a relatum.

Analogy is important for reflective judgments in two ways. First, externally, the truth yielded by reflective judgment is analogous to the truth yielded by the determining judgment. As described above, it yields an "analogon of the logical." Second, the process of reflection can itself proceed by means of analogy (although, as noted, it does not *only* do so: induction is also a reflective procedure); analogy can thus also be internal to reflective judgment. The kind of analogy referred to in *Critique of Judgment* §59 is of the latter sort. The procedure just described is precisely what the "double function" of judgment that exhibits the supersensible ideas of reason by means of sensible intuitions consists in. To recall, Kant describes this process thus: "[judgment] applies the concept to the object of a sensible intuition; and then it applies the mere

[28] LM 99, quoted in Callanan (2008).
[29] CPR 298, A180/B222.
[30] See especially CPR 295-8, A176/B218-A182/B224.

rule by which it reflects on that intuition to an entirely different object, of which the former object is only the symbol."[31] Accordingly, to say that beauty is the symbol of the morally good is to say the rule that is applied in a judgment of taste provides a rule that judgment goes on to reuse or "apply again" in judging something to be morally good.

A comparison with the case of the Analogies of Experience in the first *Critique* fleshes this out further. In that case, knowing that the categories of relation apply to all empirical appearances gives us a warrant to search for the second term of a relation when a first term is given.[32] Put differently, the necessary relation that holds between logical relata and is stipulated by the categories of relation is applied analogically to empirical relata. In this way, this portion of the first *Critique* explains why knowers are entitled to search for, e.g., a cause when presented with an effect.

Along these lines, we might understand the analogy between the beautiful and the morally good as similarly aimed at the production of a warrant to search for some fourth term in empirical experience. The judgment of taste's concept-seeking structure can be viewed as providing a model for the performance of an analogous search for a sensible intuition that corresponds to the pure rational idea of the morally good. In this case, terms (1) and (2) of the analogy would be: (1) an intuition, A, of some beautiful object and (2) an "indeterminate concept" or "aesthetic idea," X, provided via a judgment of taste.[33] Terms (3) and (4) would then be: (3) the rational idea of the morally good and (4) an unspecified intuition, B, that stands in relation to (3) as (1) does to (2). Formally:

intuition A: aesthetic idea X :: rational idea Y: intuition B

or

[31] CJ 227, K352.
[32] I'm grateful to Matt Boyle for discussion of this point.
[33] CJ 57 213, K341. By the end of this section I take it to be clear that Kant's technical name for the "indeterminate concept" provided by the judgment of taste is "aesthetic idea." There is not room to argue for this point here, however.

A : X :: Y : B

where ':' signifies the capacity of judgment's act of searching for a concept or intuition that is adequate to the term on the left side of the operator, and '::' signifies the reflective logical act of analogy.[34] The aim of the analogy, on the view I have gestured at above, would be the provision of a warrant for searching for term B in empirical experience. That is, a warrant for searching for an intuition that could serve as the demonstration of the rational idea of the morally good. Of course, this is barely a sketch of reading, and the precise nature of the analogy described in CJ §59 is a point of deep contention among Kant commentators.[35] Our main concern here, however, is with what this portion of the third *Critique* signifies for Hegel, who we are now in a position to return to.

As I stated at the outset of this section, Hegel rejects Kant's claim that sensible intuitions cannot be adequate to supersensible concepts. The preceding discussion of reflective judgment and the device of analogy permit us to understand the precise form that Hegel's rejection takes. He does not, as one might initially assume, simply claim that sensible intuitions schematically demonstrate supersensible concepts. An approach along those lines would result in reducing the supersensible to the sensible, with generally absurd results: Kant's paradigmatic example of this mistake in CJ §59 is anthropomorphizing the divine (imagine, for example, a young child who believes that rain is literally God crying). Hegel catalogues a slew of further examples in the "Observing Reason" section of the *Phenomenology*. The most famous of these is his disquisition on 19th century phrenology, which concludes by wryly noting that, were this pseudoscience truth-apt, we'd go around hitting people on the head in order to change their characters.[36] In the

[34] The positions of intuition and concept are reversed in the second half of the analogy: this reversal is not problematic because it is the *relation* of the terms, not the terms themselves, that is described by a philosophical analogy. This structure becomes more comprehensible when it is recalled that Kant floats the idea in CJ §49 that in some cases term (2) and term (4) turn out to be identical because an aesthetic idea derived in this way can stand in as an intuition for a concept of reason.
[35] See especially Allison (2001), Guyer (1979), Pippin (1996), and Zuckert (2002).
[36] PhS §321, 195.

contemporary debate, a somewhat more sophisticated version of this reduction can be seen in physicalist philosophies of mind that identify the mind with the brain.

Hegel takes a more promising tack. Specifically, he rejects the assumption that the process of reflection provides an epistemically inferior mode of exhibition to the process of determination. Reading Kant against himself, Hegel claims that, in fact, the third *Critique* discussion of the relationship between supersensible concepts and sensible intuitions points towards the possibility of an epistemically superior kind of conceptual exhibition. Thus, in his 1802 essay *Faith and Knowledge*, Hegel writes, "the reflecting judgment" is "the most interesting point in the Kantian system, the point at which a region is recognized that is the middle between the empirical manifold and the absolute abstract unity."[37] The text that comes after this comment indicates that Hegel is not thinking of reflective judgments in the abstract or even of judgments of taste alone, but rather of the specific discussion of reflective judgment that occurs in CJ §59 and the surrounding paragraphs of Kant's text.[38] Hegel writes that Kant's treatment of beauty in the first half of the third *Critique*, is for the most part "very empirical."[39] He notably dismisses under this heading both Kant's discussion of purposiveness without purpose ("lawfulness without law") and his description of the free play of the faculties.[40] This indicates that Hegel's interest in the procedure of reflective judgment is explicitly *not* simply an interest in the kind of reflection that is modeled by the Kantian judgment of taste, i.e. in the procedure of judgment that merely searches for a concept and comes up with an "indeterminate concept" or an "aesthetic idea." Hegel's emphasis is rather on the relationship between these aesthetic ideas and the ideas of reason. And this relationship only comes properly into view, Hegel argues, in

[37] FK 85-6.
[38] It is a point of contention in the literature whether or not the judgment of taste is properly an instance of reflective judgment, see, e.g. Allison (2001), Ginsborg (1990), Pippin (1996).
[39] FK 86.
[40] Ibid.

the final paragraphs of the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment" wherein Kant discusses the resolution of the antinomy of taste elaborated in CJ §56.[41]

I take Hegel's claim to follow from a reading of Kant's text that understands the resolution of the antinomy of taste as describing a potentially adequate relationship between rational ideas and aesthetic ideas. In the first Comment to §57, Kant indicates his awareness of the striking inverse parity between these two kinds of ideas: "An aesthetic idea cannot become cognition because it is an intuition (of the imagination) for which an adequate concept can never be found. A rational idea can never become cognition because it contains a concept (of the supersensible) for which no adequate intuition can ever be given."[42] Thus, just as the rational idea cannot be directly demonstrated, the aesthetic idea, Kant tells us, cannot be directly "expounded [*exponieren*]."[43] These two failures of adequation are both cases in which the faculties of imagination and understanding for whatever reason cannot "reach" [*erreichen*] one another: "Just as in the case of a rational idea the imagination with its intuitions does not reach the given concept, so in the case of an aesthetic idea the understanding with its concepts never reaches the entire inner intuition that the imagination has and connects with a given presentation."[44]

Earlier on in the third *Critique*, however, Kant has noted that, even though the imagination cannot "reach" to the ideas of reason, it *can* provide non-determinate presentations that illustrate these ideas. These presentations are "only supplementary [*Neben*-] presentations of the imagination, expressing the concept's implications and its kinship with other concepts, [and] they are called (aesthetic) attributes of an object, of an object whose concept is a rational idea and hence cannot be exhibited adequately. Thus [e.g.] Jupiter's eagle with the lightning in its claws is an attribute of the mighty king of heaven…"[45] Aesthetic attributes of this sort in turn

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[41] Ibid. "In resolving the antinomy of taste Kant comes upon Reason as "the key to the riddle." Förster (2010) seems to assume that Hegel's references to the third *Critique* antinomy in *Faith and Reason* are to the antinomy of judgment presented beginning in §70 of the "Critique of Teleological Judgment", but, at least in this passage, Hegel is explicit that he is referring to the antinomy of taste.
[42] CJ §57 215, K342.
[43] Ibid. 217, K344.
[44] Ibid. 216-7, K344.
[45] Ibid. 183, K315

generate aesthetic ideas via the concept seeking procedure that the faculty of judgment performs in the judgment of taste: "These aesthetic attributes yield an aesthetic idea, which serves the mentioned rational idea as a substitute for a logical exhibition."[46] Thus, the imagination can, in special cases, unite the ideas of reason with the aesthetic ideas albeit in a manner that is, as discussed in detail above, merely analogous to the synthesis of concept and intuition in a determining judgment.

In *Faith and Knowledge*, Hegel refers specifically to passages of this sort in the *Critique of Judgment*, evincing frustration with Kant's inability to decisively put together his un-expoundable aesthetic ideas with his indemonstrable rational ideas:

> The aesthetic idea is a representation of the imagination for which no [conceptual] exposition can be given; the idea of reason is a concept of reason for which no demonstration can be given—demonstration in the Kantian sense being the presentation of a concept in intuition. *As if the aesthetic idea did not have its exposition in the idea of reason, and the idea of reason did not have its demonstration in beauty.*[47]

But Kant does not concede Hegel's point. Or, at least, he does not do so until CJ §59, when he makes the claim that beauty [*die Schönheit*] is the symbol of the morally good [*das Sittlich-Gute*]. I believe it is this last section of text that causes Hegel to refer to the reflective judgment as the "most interesting point in the Kantian system." The reflective judgment is of particular interest, Hegel tells us, because "[i]t is…in the *reflective judgment* that Kant finds the middle term between the concept of nature and the concept of freedom."[48] And, as evidence, Hegel points us to the

[46] Ibid. 183, K315
[47] FK 87. My emphasis.
[48] FK 86. Translation modified for continuity.

portion of the text describing the analogical procedure that employs beauty as a symbolic intuition for exhibiting the rational idea of the morally good.[49]

In order to motivate Hegel's particular interest in this passage, we will need to understand at least a little more about what Kant intends by his claim that beauty is the symbol of the morally good. Before attempting to do so, however, I will pause here to address the apparent 'slippage' that has taken place in the course of our discussion between the practical and theoretical faculties of reason. Our original topic was the impossibility of finding intuitions adequate to the ideas of reason on the theoretical side of things. In CJ §49 and §59, however, Kant refers specifically to freedom and the morally good, apparently relocating us to the practical side of things. The requirement of exhibition in intuition is a criterion specific to Kantian theoretical knowledge. In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant is clear that the practical use of reason stands apart from intuition: "the concept of a being which has a free will is that of a *causa noumenon*" that is "in its origin independent from all sensible conditions."[50] This is necessarily so, because "no intuition, which can only be sensible, can be put under this application [of reason to pure beings of the understanding]" and thus the "*causa noumenon* [is] with respect to the theoretical use of reason, though a possible and thinkable concept, nevertheless an empty one."[51] The rational ideas of freedom and the morally good both refer back to the *causa noumenon*, albeit from different vantage points: freedom describes the nature of this cause, while the morally good describes the (necessary and constitutive) aim of free actions. Thus, it seems initially confused to talk about either of these apparently purely practical concepts as rational ideas that could require or receive theoretical demonstration by intuitions.

But, Kant emphasizes, even though the idea of the *causa noumenon* is an "empty" or indemonstrable theoretical concept, it remains a concept that is "possible and thinkable" for theoretical reason. It is simply the case that no knowledge can ever be gained from this thinking

[49] Ibid. 86-7.
[50] CPrR 48, 5:55.
[51] Ibid. 5:55-6

because there can be no intuition adequate to the theoretical concept of the free will.[52] Thus, freedom and the morally good are concepts for both theoretical and practical reason, but in the theoretical register they are concepts that cannot ever be substantiated by anything given in experience; they are mere ideas of theoretical reason. In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant even goes so far as to give a negative sketch of what would be necessary for theoretical knowledge of freedom to be attained:

> if reason sought to do this [i.e. go beyond the limits of experience in order to attain theoretical knowledge of freedom, EL] it would have to try to show how the logical relation of ground and consequence could be used synthetically with a kind of intuition different than the sensible, that is, how a *causa noumenon* is possible.[53]

Though Kant is quick to add that this is not something reason can do, this passage offers us two criteria for the theoretical knowledge of practical concepts: (i) the reception of some non-sensuous intuition, and (ii) the subsequent synthesis of such an intuition with the categories of the understanding, specifically with the relational category of cause and effect ("ground and consequence"). As we have seen, both of these things are definitionally impossible within the limits of Kant's philosophical system.

Yet, in the passages from the *Critique of Judgment* that Hegel points towards in *Faith and Knowledge*, something that approaches the satisfaction of both of these criteria emerges in Kant's text. This is first intimated in the CJ §49 discussion of the way judgment proceeds in synthesizing rational and aesthetic ideas that was already touched on above. In that part of the text, Kant describes the activity of the imagination when it engages in this process as offering a subjective

[52] Ibid.
[53] CPrR 43, 5:49

feeling of freedom from natural law, because it consists in an association of empirical intuitions that does not proceed in accordance with the categories of the understanding:

> For the imagination ([in its role] as a productive cognitive power) is very mighty when it creates, as it were, another nature out of the material that actual nature gives it[54]…We may even restructure experience; and though in doing so we continue to follow analogical laws, yet we also follow principles which reside higher up, namely, in reason (and which are just as natural to us as those which the understanding follows in apprehending empirical nature).d In this process we feel our freedom from the law of association (which attaches to the empirical use of the imagination); for although it is under that law that nature lends us material, yet we can process that material into something quite different, namely, into something that surpasses nature.[55]

For our purposes, the point of central importance in this passage is Kant's claim that the procedure followed by the imagination in synthesizing aesthetic and rational ideas follows *both* the laws of empirical judgment *and* the laws of reason. Towards the end of the passage, he even goes so far as to indicate that reflective judgments of this sort somehow "surpass nature," demonstrating something supersensible in spite of the sensible character of the intuitions they are synthesizing. These claims are suggestive: they seem to indicate a point of intersection between the sensible and supersensible aspects of theoretical representations, a nexus at which sensible intuitions and supersensible concepts come together in a way that potentially exceeds the merely analogical mode of exhibition.

Here, however, these thoughts are heavily qualified. Kant writes that the imagination "may" proceed in this way, but does not necessarily do so. Furthermore, the processes of

[54] Compare Hegel at PN §376Z, 444: "Spirit…wills to achieve its own liberation by fashioning nature out of itself; this action of spirit is philosophy."
[55] CJ §49, 182, 314. My emphasis.

aesthetic and practical rational judgment run, as it were, coincidentally parallel to one another, but they do not actually coincide. Kant emphasizes this dualism with his claim that "we continue to follow analogical laws, yet we also follow principles which reside higher up." Finally, it is important to note that Kant is here speaking about the symbolizing power of fine art specifically; the aesthetic ideas in question are thus 'man-made,' as Kant tells us, by the power of genius. As a consequence, these symbols are not features of the objective world but rather merely subjective expressions that may attain to universal *subjective* validity but cannot be objectively valid in the Kantian scheme.

In CJ §59, however, Kant develops the parity of judgments of taste and practical reason further in the specific context of a discussion of the rational idea of freedom and the aesthetic idea of beauty in general, in both art and nature. He writes:

> In this ability [i.e. taste], judgment does not find itself subjected to a heteronomy from empirical laws, as it does elsewhere in empirical judging—concerning objects of such a pure liking it legislates to itself, just as reason does regarding the power of desire. And because the subject has this possibility within him, while outside [him] there is also the possibility that nature will harmonize with it, judgment finds itself referred to *something that is both in the subject himself and outside him, something that is neither nature nor freedom and yet is linked with the basis of freedom, the supersensible, in which the theoretical and the practical power are in an unknown manner combined and joined into a unity.*[56]

In the italicized portion of the passage, Kant goes further than he does in CJ §49 by pointing towards an underlying unity of the theoretical and practical powers of judgment in relation to a "basis of freedom" that unifies these two modes of judging in some "unknown manner." Thus, it seems that in the judgment of taste, the laws of nature and freedom are not just simultaneously

[56] CJ §59 229, K353.

applicable in distinct ways as they were in CJ §49: rather, they are in some way unified because of their reference to this unknown but shared ground.[57]

On Hegel's view, Kant's description of a "basis of freedom" shared in common by practical and theoretical reason can be seen as presenting a challenge to his axiomatic denial of the possibility of providing intuitions that adequately exhibit the ideas of reason. For, in this particular case, the analogical process that draws on aesthetic attributes of some sensible object in order to derive an aesthetic idea that ought merely to symbolize a rational idea circles back on itself: this shared ground allows the imagination to, as it were, 'reach across the aisle' in order to theoretically judge a sensibly presented object in accordance with the laws of freedom. Pursuantly, the contingency of the relationship between the judgment of taste and the idea of reason that was emphasized in CJ §49 falls away here. The intuition of the beautiful belongs to the idea of the good necessarily because, it turns out, judgments of taste rely on a "reference" to the morally good in order to attain to the characteristic subjective universal validity that sets them apart from merely agreeable sensations.[58] In Kant's words: "the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good; and **only** because we refer [*Rucksicht*] the beautiful to the morally good (we all do so naturally and require all others also to do so, as a duty) does our liking for it include a claim to everyone else's assent."[59]

In *Faith and Knowledge*, Hegel takes this act of judgment that refers the judgment of taste to the idea of the morally good to satisfy Kant's above described second *Critique* criteria (reiterated in CJ §76) for the theoretical cognition of rational ideas by describing a non-sensible intuition. Hegel writes, "Kant himself recognized in the beautiful an intuition other than the sensuous."[60] It is of central importance to hear this claim in the context of the foregoing

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[57] It is an open question whether these claims revise or compliment the *Critique of Practical Reason's* "On the Typic of the Pure Practical Power of Judgment" discussion of the way that free actions show up in the physical world governed by the law of cause and effect. See Westra (2016) Chapter 6 for an in depth discussion of this topic in the Kantian context.
[58] See CJ §3 48, K207.
[59] CJ §59 228, K353. Guyer translates this passage in a way that elides the formal language, but it is there.
[60] FK 91.

discussion rather than as some sort of mystical non sequitur about intellectual intuition: Hegel is emphatically not saying anything here about the divine mind or even claiming that any cognitive apparatus in excess of that already described by Kant himself needs to be provided in order for such an intuition to be cognized. Rather, on Hegel's view, the possibility of supersensible intuition is *already* a live option for the Kantian perceiver within the bounds of Kant's own philosophy (though, Hegel emphasizes, Kant himself failed to see that this was the case). And this is so because, on Hegel's view, the reflective procedure of analogy described in §59 is in some way able to overcome its merely reflective status in order to provide genuine knowledge.

Hegel fills the thought out as follows:

> Since beauty is the idea as experienced or more correctly, as intuited, the **form of opposition between intuition and concept falls away**. Kant recognizes this vanishing of the antithesis negatively in the concept of a supersensible realm in general. But he does not recognize that as beauty, it is positive, it is intuited, or to use his own language, it is given in experience. Nor does he see the supersensible, the intelligible substratum of nature without and within us, the thing in itself, as Kant defines the supersensible, is at least superficially cognized when the principle of beauty is given a [conceptual] exposition as the identity of the concepts of nature and freedom.[61]

The "form of opposition" that Hegel refers to here is explicitly the opposition of intuition and concept. The manner in which the opposition between these two kinds of cognitive representations "falls away" in CJ §59 has specifically to do with the relationship between the sensible and the supersensible that is forged by the reflective act of judgment. As I have demonstrated, this reflective act offers the beautiful as a symbolic intuition for the rational idea

[61] FK 87-88. My emphasis. Translation modified for continuity.

of the morally good. Further, unlike in other analogically structured reflective judgments, Hegel reads Kant's text as hinting at the fact that this particular analogical judgment is distinguished by the necessary connection of its terms. This necessary connection, we have seen, allegedly stems from their shared basis in freedom.

Kant's understanding of this moment is "negative" on Hegel's view because Kant conceives of this as a case in which the imagination recreates nature in a 'higher' form, reprocessing law-governed material into free material. Put otherwise, Kant does not give up his distinction between the sensible and the supersensible in order to make sense of the relationship between beauty and the morally good. Kant himself is guilty here, according to Hegel, of performing a schematic reduction, albeit in the opposite direction from that discussed above: Kant equates the shared "basis of freedom" with the supersensible and, in so doing, reduces the sensible to this supersensible. This sort of reduction is somewhat more difficult to illustrate. Kant's own paradigm example of this sort of reduction is what he calls "deism" in CJ §59, a view on which every single aspect of the world just is God (and thus exceeds our cognitive capacities). Hegel's discussion of force [*Kraft*] in the "Consciousness" section of the *Phenomenology*—a portion of text that, not coincidentally, can be read as a critique of Kant's late philosophy of nature—exemplifies another such reduction insofar as it presents a scenario in which physical phenomena can only be explained by recourse to supersensible laws.

Hegel's own self-proclaimedly "positive" view intends to avoid this reduction. In contrast to Kant, Hegel conceives of the common ground between aesthetic and rational ideas as an "identity of the concepts of nature and freedom," i.e. as something neither merely sensible nor merely supersensible (a status that, Friedrich Schelling, Hegel's chief interlocutor at this point in his career, terms "absolute indifference" [*absolute Indifferenz*]).[62] For, what Hegel sees in the structure of analogy that relates the morally good to the judgment of taste is nothing more or

[62] See Schelling (2001) 343; as noted by Shaw (2011, 156n7), translator Michael Vater suggests in this connection that Schelling's use of the adapted English term '*Indifferenz*' rather than the more common German '*Gleichgültigkeit*' is intended to mark out the specifically logical connotations of the phrase.

less than this: the appearance of freedom as a sensible cause. And this appearance takes place specifically by means of the reflective action of the faculty of judgment. Thus, on the one hand, the judgment of taste does not provide a schematic intuition for the concept of the morally good insofar as intuition and concept differ in kind; the former is derived *a posteriori* while the latter belongs *a priori* to the faculty of reason. On the other hand, it does not provide a merely symbolic intuition either, because intuition and concept both refer back to a shared common ground, the "basis of freedom." In this way, §59 sketches a third possibility for theoretical judgment that we might describe as being reflective with respect to its form but determining with respect to its content: it describes a procedure of analogy that has a necessary outcome. At least, this is how I take Hegel to be reading Kant in *Faith and Knowledge*.

It is, of course, one thing to say this and quite another to make sense of what it actually entails philosophically, and Hegel's early text does not fully cash out his insight in a way that allows the reader to follow him. Thus, what I have aimed to do here is merely to indicate in some detail the substance of what I refer to as Hegel's "adequation objection" to the Kantian account of intuition. Whereas Kant emphatically denies the possibility of adequating rational concepts (the ideas of reason) with merely sensible intuitions, Hegel believes that overcoming this dichotomy is the central activity of cognition. And, as I have endeavored to show, he finds essential resources for understanding how such a procedure might be possible in Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, in particular in §CJ 59.

Taken together, the preceding surveys of the subjectivity objection and the adequation objection enable us to articulate two demands that Hegel's own account of intuition must satisfy. These are as follows:

1. Space and time, the Kantian forms of intuition, must be accounted for in some way that makes sense of the claim that these forms belong to the world itself rather than to the

minds of rational perceivers. In Kantian phrasing, Hegel must give an account of how it comes to be the case that space and time belong to things-in-themselves.

2. Hegel must make sense of the adequacy of sensible or 'empirical' intuitions to pure rational concepts. As we have just seen, this will involve giving an explanation of how the apparently merely empirical procedure of reflective judgment can provide necessary knowledge of the world.

This, I will argue, is precisely what Hegel takes himself to do in his mature system. However, he is not alone. As we will see in the subsequent chapter, Friedrich Schelling also takes himself to achieve these goals, and, moreover, to have beat Hegel to the punch in doing so.

Chapter 2: *Weitere Darstellungen*: Hegel With and Against Schelling

I. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I argued that Kant's "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment" contains overlooked resources for understanding the development of Hegel's view of intuition. I described two central objections that Hegel raises against Kant's view of intuition, and I articulated two demands that Hegel's own account of intuition must, by his own lights, satisfy in order to answer these objections. The two desiderata are as follows:

1. Space and time, the Kantian forms of intuition, must be accounted for in some way that makes sense of the claim that these forms belong to the world itself. In Kantian phrasing, Hegel must give an account of how we can know it is the case that space and time belong to things-in-themselves instead of merely belonging to the appearances perceived by finite rational cognizers.

2. Hegel must also make sense of the adequacy of sensible intuitions to pure rational concepts. In order to do so, Hegel must give an account of the synthesis of concepts and intuitions that presents an alternative to the Kantian description of judgment. My claim in the previous chapter was that Hegel finds a preliminary model for such an alternate picture already contained in Kant's third *Critique*, specifically in the section §59 discussion of symbolic intuition. On my reading, the Kantian procedure of analogy in which a finite intuition is taken to be the exhibition or *Darstellung* of the reality of a rational idea provides the inspiration for Hegel's mature understanding of the adequating action of cognition. But more work remains to be done in order to show that an apparently merely

empirical procedure of reflective judgment can be modified to provide necessary knowledge.[1]

In what follows, I lay further groundwork for understanding Hegel's proposed answers to these two demands by turning my attention to the philosophical dialogue between Hegel and one of his most important interlocutors, Friedrich Schelling. I show that, beginning in their earliest works, Schelling and Hegel demonstrate a shared interest in the project of introducing aesthetics into philosophy in a way intended to revolutionize both disciplines.[2] Further, both thinkers believe that modifying Kantian symbolic intuitions in a way that places them somehow on a par with schematic intuitions is the way to go about creating an aesthetic system of philosophy.

But, the two disagree crucially about what this system looks like. Schelling, on the one hand, proposes a disjunctive system that retains a modified version of Kant's schematic intuitions in the realm of philosophical thinking, i.e. in the arena of synthetic a priori judgment, while employing symbolic intuition only in the realm of fine art. Hegel, on the other hand, does not think Schelling's proposal goes far enough. In contrast, he believes it is necessary to incorporate symbolic intuition into a universal method of philosophy that cuts across all modes of knowledge. I argue here that Hegel's early rejection of Schelling's dualistic picture is of formative importance insofar as it leads to Hegel's own forays into the systematic

[1] Cf. my discussion of Förster at the outset of Chapter 3.

[2] Schelling's systematic thinking underwent constant transformation in the course of his career, but, for the purpose of understanding his early dispute with Hegel, the relevant moment in Schelling's thought is the one referred to as the '*Identitätsphilosophie*' or 'identity philosophy'. There is disagreement amongst Schelling scholars about the specific dates that delimit this period in Schelling's work. It is generally agreed that 1801-04 be included, though some scholars mark the beginning of this phase as early as 1798 and the end as late as 1808. For our purposes, it is most important to note that all of the proposed dates align with or at least significantly overlap the time between 1801, when Hegel first arrived in Jena and rekindled his philosophical intercourse with Schelling, and 1807, when the *Phenomenology of Spirit* was published, signaling a definitive philosophical break between the two thinkers. So, the precise historical termini aside, we can be certain that the Schelling of the identity philosophy is in some regard the Schelling who is a formative influence for Hegel during the period under consideration. I draw on multiple Schellingian texts from in and around this period. Regarding the disputes on periodization in Schelling, see Bruno (2013) 1.

methodological employment of symbolic intuition and his ultimate embrace of the syllogism as the only proper method of philosophy.

The chapter proceeds in five parts. I begin in §2 with a discussion of the shared project of aestheticizing reason that is laid out in the so-called *Oldest System-Program of German Idealism*. In §3, I discuss in broad strokes the way this early project inflects Hegel and Schelling's respective mature systems of thought. In §§4-5, I take up Hegel's specific critiques of Schelling thought in greater detail. Finally, I conclude by revising the desiderata for a Hegelian theory of intuition that were arrived at in the previous chapter via Hegel's critique of Kant in light of Hegel's additional aim of going beyond Schelling's theory of intuition.

2. Philosophy and Aesthetics in the Oldest System Program

In 1917, Franz Rosenzweig published a short fragment of text that he had discovered in the archives of the Prussian State Library while doing research for a book on Hegel's political writings. The text in question, which was almost certainly written in Tübingen in 1796, has since come to be known by the name that Rosenzweig gave it when he published it in 1920: *The Oldest System-Program of German Idealism*. The authorship of the manuscript has been disputed since the moment it entered the public domain. Although the text is copied out in Hegel's handwriting, the grandiose tone seemed to Rosenzweig to belong distinctly to Schelling. Subsequently, Hegel scholars, such as Otto Pöggeler, claimed that the text was Hegel's own. Others, such as poet Yves Bonnefoy, have since gone on to attribute the text to Hölderlin, the third Tübingen Stift roommate.[3] Considering the interest that the three men shared in collaborative philosophical thought (what Jena romantics such as Friedrich Schlegel sometimes called '*Symphilosophie*'), it is

[3] Bonnefoy (1992) 241. Förster (1995) presents a convincing case for Hölderlin's authorship that centers on Hölderlin's engagement with Schiller's aesthetics around the time the fragment was authored. Förster's argument lays particular emphasis on the importance of Schiller's 1795 poem, "Realm of Shadows" for the development of Hölderlin's views. In a 1796 letter to Goethe, Schiller equates the realm of shadows with the realm of beauty. Many years later, Hegel famously uses the same phrase—"realm of shadows"—to describe the project of his *Science of Logic* (see SL 21.42)

just as likely that, in the final instance, the text does not properly have one author. Today, it is included in the oeuvres of all three writers.[4]

For our purposes, it is not ultimately the facts of the fragment's authorship, but rather the ideas contained within it that are of particular interest. The extant portion of the OSP articulates a programmatic demand that I take to be essential for understanding Hegel and Schelling's early writings regardless of who penned the text. Specifically, the author or authors propound that the coming philosophy (i.e. the post-Kantianism of which Hegel and Schelling will themselves form the vanguard) must recognize the paramount importance of beauty and aesthetics for philosophical thinking:

> Finally, the idea that unites everyone, the idea of beauty, the word taken in the higher, platonic sense. I am now convinced that the highest act of reason, by encompassing all ideas, is an aesthetic act, and that truth and goodness are only siblings in beauty. The philosopher must possess as much aesthetic power as the poet. Those people without an aesthetic sense are our philosophers of literalness [*Buchstabenphilosophen*]. The philosophy of spirit is an aesthetic philosophy. One can be spiritually brilliant [*geistreich*] in nothing, one cannot even think about history – without an aesthetic sense. Here it should become apparent what those humans actually lack, who do not understand ideas – and are simple enough to admit that they are in the dark as soon as things go beyond tables and rosters.[5]

At first blush, this demand for the cultivation of aesthetic sense in philosophy reads like a mere piece of rhetorical enthusiasm on the part of some young philosophy students who find their discipline lacking in stylistic flair. As I have drawn attention to in the previous chapter, however, precisely such an attempt to unite rational and aesthetic ideas lies at the heart of Hegel's critique

[4] On Rosenzweig's discovery of the OSP and the subsequent reception, see Förster (1995) who attributes it to Hölderlin via his reading of Schiller.
[5] OSP 186.

of Kant in *Faith and Knowledge*. Thus, if my proposal that the OSP reflects a line of thought already shared by Hegel and Schelling in 1796 is correct, this early text has the potential to provide a shared context for both Hegel's own attempt to unite reason and beauty, and for the parallel line of Schellingian thought that will be my topic in this chapter. The question that arises, then, is whether or not a substantive philosophical position can be pulled out of this text as it stands and, if so, what that position entails.

The initial invocation of the Platonic conception of the beautiful gives a helpful clue for doing so. Plato was of fundamental importance for Schelling's early thought in particular. Among Platonic texts, Schelling was particularly fascinated by the *Timaeus*, which he commented on in detail in a 1794 essay predating the OSP by two years. The central topic of the *Timaeus* as Schelling understands it in that essay is the relationship between sensible appearances and intelligible forms. In this context, Schelling writes, the Greek word typically translated as 'beauty', *to kalon*, "expresses not only beauty, but perfection itself, complete rule-governed regularity [*regelmäßigkeit]*."[6] Moreover, on Schelling's reading, "[Plato] locates *kalon* utterly and exclusively in its participation in the form of the understanding."[7] Thus, for the young Schelling, the Platonic idea of beauty refers specifically to the visibility of intellectual forms or, put slightly differently, the formally intelligible organization of the realm of sense experience. Generalizing this definition to the OSP, the later fragment's reference to "beauty in the Platonic sense" can be read as glossing aesthetics along these same lines. Thus, the OSP's claim that "the highest act of reason…is an aesthetic act" can be read as proposing that the sensible manifestation of intelligible forms is one of the definitive aspects of rationality. And the further claim that "the philosopher must possess as much aesthetic power as the poet" points out that, if the former point about the nature of reason is correct, the philosopher has no choice but to concern herself in some way with the sensible manifestation of intelligible forms.

[6] T 210. Translation modified.
[7] ibid.

The Kantian resonance of phrases such as "the form of the understanding" that Schelling deploys freely in the *Timaeus* essay is not coincidental and is also of interest in connection with the topic of uniting reason and aesthetics. In his essay, Schelling goes to great lengths to draw a parallel between Plato's metaphysical project and Kant's critical philosophy. He does so primarily by mapping the four existents that Plato describes in the *Philebus* onto the four divisions that structure Kant's tables of judgments and categories in the following way:

Plato's Existents	Kant's Categories
the unlimited [*to apeiron*]	quality
the limited [*to peras*]	quantity
the common [*to koinon*]	------
causality [*to tes aitias genos]*	relation

Obviously, the correspondence is not one-to-one. Most notably, Plato's category of commonality (*to koinon*), which refers specifically to the intermingling of the unlimited and the limited is, as Schelling would have it, only implicit for Kant. Schelling glosses *to tes aitias genos* as "the category of causality, through which both *peras* and *apeiron* are bound together in *koinon* [sic]," indicating that commonality is a result of a synthesis involving the other three categories—in Kantian terms, we would have to say that Plato committed a category error (eschewing the pun) by assigning categorical status to objecthood itself, which, properly understood, is rather the ontological situation that the categories are supposed to condition. Additionally, the Kantian categories of modality are not dealt with at all.[8]

[8] Interestingly, Hegel refers to similar passages from the *Philebus* in the *Logic of Being* discussion of the finitude of existence. Cf. SL 21.106; 91.

Regardless of its imprecisions, however, Schelling's early attempt at reconciling Plato and Kant is of interest for us here because it further fleshes out the sort of post-Kantian aesthetic project that Hegel, Hölderlin and Schelling might have in mind in the OSP. Specifically, it offers an example of how it is possible to experiment with the structures provided by Kant's critical philosophy in a way that modifies them along aesthetic lines. In the *Timaeus* essay, Schelling attempts this sort of aesthetic modification by means of a reinterpretation of the schemata that condition transcendental judgments. After aligning Plato and Kant's categories in the way described above, Schelling makes the following proposal: he argues that the four elements—fire, water, earth and air—discussed in the *Timaeus* serve as intermediary formal concepts by means of which the four forms of the understanding are applied to the empirical world. And, although Schelling does not explicitly name the portion of the first *Critique* that this invokes, the textual framing makes clear and constant reference to the first *Critique*'s Schematism chapter.

The parallels are myriad and striking once one begins to look for them. Schelling writes, for example: "The elements, insofar as they appear, are nothing less than *forms applied* to matter."[9] This echoes the functionality that Kant assigns to the schemata:

> Clearly there must be something that is third, something that must be homogeneous with the category, on the one hand, and with the appearance, on the other hand, and that thus makes possible **the application of the category to the appearance**.[10]

Further, Schelling's elements, like Kant's schemata, are pure forms that do not themselves appear empirically; they are, in Kantian terms, rules for synthesis that condition empirical appearances. Here's Kant:

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[9] T 230.
[10] CPR A138/B177, my emphasis. Following Pluhar.

> A schema of a pure concept of the understanding…is something one cannot bring to any image whatsoever. Such a schema is, rather, only the pure synthesis conforming to a rule, expressed by the category, of unity according to concepts as such.[11]

And here's Schelling:

> According to this, by the intelligible elements [Plato] understands not the particular physically existing intelligible substances of fire, water, and so on, but rather the ideas as such, the pure form of the understanding through which the world is ordered.[12]

Finally, both thinkers contrast their respective concepts against the idea of merely empirical universals formed by inductive reasoning from empirical sense data. Kant emphasizes the distinction between schemata and what he terms mere "images" [*Bilder*] abstracted from empirical experience, stating, "A schema of sensible concepts….is a product and, as it were, a monogram of the pure a priori imagination through which, and according to which, images become possible in the first place."[13] Similarly, Schelling rejects the understanding of Platonic forms as types that represent abstract generalization from token instances, and instead argues that Plato's elements are, like Kantian schemata, universal forms that constitutively condition appearances as such. Schelling writes:

> One thus sees clearly the extent to which Plato is speaking of intelligible archetypes of every individual object, namely, not insofar as he believed that every individual object

[11] CPR A142/B181, 214.
[12] T 238.
[13] CPR A142/B181, 214.

> has its particular *individual* archetype, but rather insofar as each individual object stands under the universal form of all existence.[14]

Much more could be said in this vein, but my aim here is not to evaluate whether or not Schelling's early Copernican reading of Plato is convincing. Rather, I simply want to highlight the mode in which Schelling proceeds. More particularly, I want to draw attention to his central interest, even at this very early point in his thinking, in drawing on and modifying the schematism section of the first *Critique* in connection with the project of giving a philosophical articulation of the intelligibility of the sensible world.

So how does this come to bear in the OSP? Although the fragmentary state of the text unfortunately precludes reaching any airtight conclusions about its aims, my proposal is this: the kind of aesthetic philosophy that the *Oldest System-Program* calls for is specifically achieved by means of an intervention into the synthetic process of transcendental judgments at precisely the juncture occupied by the Schematism chapter of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. There is ample additional evidence, both internal and external to the text, that something along these lines is intended.

To start, the above analysis of Schelling's *Timaeus* essay is indicative of the fact that the idea of replacing Kant's schemata with other forms had at least occurred to the young Schelling. And his willingness to propose that the elements fill this role demonstrates additionally that he was open to creative alternatives. The apparent oddness of the idea that an element like earth, fire, air or water could serve as a schema comes in part from the fact that, regardless of what Plato himself thought, Schelling certainly did not believe that the four elements provided satisfactory natural scientific explanations.[15] As is readily evident from his

[14] T 238.

[15] It is, in fact, questionable that Plato himself believed in this sort of physical picture. The question of whether the dialogue's cosmogony is literal or mythical has been a long-standing source of tension in the literature. See paradigmatically Vlastos (2006) and, more recently, Broadie (2012).

Naturphilosophie, Schelling was, for better or for worse, steeped in the most recent natural scientific advancements of his time. Moreover, Schelling's Plato himself does not seem to believe in the explanatory purport of the elements as such either. At least, there is a marked difference between taking fire, air, earth and water to be irreducible physical substances and taking them to be rules of synthesis that condition appearances. But, at the same time, unlike Kant's schemata, which link the categories to the forms of intuition in what is clearly intended to be a highly literal manner via various time determinations, the elements as they are presented here seem necessarily to be somehow metaphorical or mythological in character. That is, it is not at all clear what it could possibly mean to call a term like 'fire' a rule or a condition of possibility in any philosophically meaningful sense. The word is rather an evocative image that provides a sort of 'just so' story in place of the kind of account we typically conceive of as an objectively valid explanation. Recalling again the distinction between the kinds of intuition that Kant draws in CJ §59 it is tempting to say that, as they are being deployed in this situation, the elements are not schemata at all: rather, they are symbols.

The term "mythology" is particularly apropos in this regard, because this is precisely the kind philosophical intervention that the OSP calls for in its final paragraph. The author writes:

> I will speak here of an idea which, as far as I know, has not crossed anyone's mind – we must have a new mythology, but this mythology must be in the service of ideas, it must become a mythology of reason…Until we make ideas aesthetic, that is, mythological, they are of no interest to the people, and vice versa: until mythology is rational, it will be an embarrassment to philosophy.[16]

[16] OSP 187.

Since, as the author himself tells us, the development of this mythology of reason is intended to be an entirely new innovation in philosophical thinking, it is difficult to divine from this incomplete note what such a project could possibly consist in. At the close of his 1800 *System of Transcendental Idealism* [ST], however, Schelling raises the topic of mythology in the context of a discussion of the synthesis of philosophy and poetry. Here, he claims that these two fields were once united in the old mythology and that a "new mythology" will be the medium that facilitates this reunion.[17] Part of the novelty of this coming mythology is that it "shall be the creation, not of some individual author, but of a new race, personifying, as it were, one single poet."[18] Although on the face of it this claim seems mystical rather than technical, I believe Schelling is drawing a distinction between individual and collective (a "race personifying…one single poet") authorship here that accords roughly with Hegel's distinction between finite and absolute mind. The mythology that Schelling believes is required is thus one that is in some way universal and absolute, a shared symbolic structure or set of structures belonging to reason insofar as it is a shared human capacity that condition our understanding of the objects that populate the sensible world. As Daniel Whistler glosses it in his superb *Schelling's Theory of Symbolic Language*, "[for Schelling] mythology is symbolic—it exhibits the absolute absolutely in determinate forms."[19] I will return to this thought in greater detail below in §5; at this juncture, the important takeaway is that Schelling shared Hegel's early interest in using the symbol to aestheticize reason.[20]

As I have shown briefly in the above discussion of Schelling and at greater length in the previous chapter's discussion of Hegel's particular interest in the philosophical potential of symbolic intuitions, one of the central early concerns of both Schelling and Hegel is the emendation of Kant's schematism along symbolic lines. Thus, I believe there is good evidence

[17] ST 232. Interestingly, Schelling here refers the reader in a footnote to a "treatise [titled] *On Mythology* already sketched out a number of years ago."
[18] Ibid. 233.
[19] Whistler (2013) 156.
[20] I am concerned here with Schelling's early thinking about mythology, but he returns to the topic in his late philosophy. For a thoroughgoing treatment of Schelling's late philosophy of mythology and its relation to his critique of Hegel, see Gabriel (2016).

that the authors of the OSP understood an intervention into this portion of Kant's thought to be at least one of the aspects involved in the enumeration of a properly aesthetic philosophy. As I read Hegel and Schelling, this attempt to aestheticize philosophy is not merely an early caprice. Rather, as I aim to demonstrate in the remainder of the chapter, the incorporation of aesthetic thinking into a cohesive philosophical system remained a central concern for both thinkers throughout their careers. Furthermore, Hegel's disagreement with Schelling about the correct way in which to carry out this incorporation was of formative importance for his own thinking.

3. Systematic Aesthetics in Hegel and Schelling

Before arriving at Hegel's detailed critique of Schelling, it will be helpful to flesh out an account of precisely what the integration of aesthetic thinking into philosophy demanded in the OSP ends up looking like when it is put into practice. Towards this end, in this section I will offer a brief overview that compares and contrasts the incorporation of aesthetics into Hegel and Schelling's respective mature philosophies (or, in the case of the latter, one version thereof—as I have mentioned, I am looking primarily at Schelling's *Identitätsphilosophie,* dating to before 1809).

Up to this point, I have been tolerating some vagueness in the term "aesthetic." I have done so because I take Hegel and Schelling in their early writings to be relying and trading on this vagueness; their deployment of this multivalent term is not indicative of sloppy thinking, but rather of a desire to propose a philosophical project that cuts across the multiple topics that are collected under the heading of "aesthetics." But at this juncture it must be clarified that the term has three distinct meanings that are of relevance: first, it refers to *aesthesis* in the original Greek sense, referring simply to the capacity for sense perception possessed by en-souled beings with bodies. This is the sense picked up by Kant in the first *Critique*'s Transcendental Aesthetic, which describes space and time as the specifically human forms of sense perception. Second, aesthetics also refers to the "science of perception" inaugurated by the 18th century German thinker Alexander Baumgarten for the purpose of systematically describing the perfections of beautiful

art, in particular of poetry.[21] Finally, aesthetics can also refer to the related but arguably distinct formal philosophical project of investigating the epistemological underpinnings of certain sorts of judgments, specifically judgments of taste. Kant's *Critique of Judgment* is the paradigmatic example of this last.

The equivocal nature of the term becomes problematic when attempting to isolate the 'aesthetic' portion of Hegel and Schelling's respective systems. Are we to look for 'the aesthetic' in the philosophy of art, or rather in the context of the discussions of perception? On the one hand, both thinkers are interested in reconciling aesthetics in the broader perceptual sense with aesthetics in the more specific artistic sense. On the other hand, both thinkers treat perceptual intuition and art as separate topics in distinct texts or sections of text. Helpfully, however, both Hegel and Schelling give fine art pride of place, at the 'end' or culmination of their respective systems of philosophy. This means that, for both, art is a perceptual mode that discloses the kind of knowledge of 'the absolute'—that is, of the shared forms of being and thinking—that has historically been the domain of theoretical philosophy. Thus, for our circumscribed purposes here, picking out the systematic place of fine art as an epistemic mode will suffice for offering a general idea of the ways in which Schelling and Hegel attempt to unite the aesthetic and the rational.

I will begin with Hegel. One of the central innovations of Hegel's philosophical project as a whole is his attempt to demonstrate that fine art is one of three modes by means of which rational cognizers attain to knowledge of the essential nature of mind and world.[22] At the outset of the Absolute Idea section of the *Science of Logic*, Hegel describes the absolute idea as having the following five-fold structure:

[21] Koren (2010) 15.
[22] For a detailed treatment of this topic see Pippin (2014).

> Nature and spirit are in general different modes of exhibiting it's [i.e. the Absolute Idea's] *existence*, art and religion its different modes of apprehending itself and giving itself self-appropriate existence. Philosophy has the same content and the same purpose as art and religion, but it is the highest mode of apprehending the absolute idea, because its mode, that of the concept, is the highest.[23]

Here and throughout Hegel's system, art, religion and philosophy are grouped together as the three modes of the absolute idea's "self-apprehension [*sich erfassen*]" or, more literally, the ways in which the absolute idea gets ahold of itself. This self-apprehension is something that the absolute attains to by means of "giving itself appropriate existence [*ein sich angemessenes Dasein zu geben*]." This feature is of interest: the absolute idea is, definitionally, infinite, while any particular existent [*Dasein*] is finite. We can thus understand art, religion and philosophy as making possible some sort of transit between the infinite and the finite.

Hegel also tells us that these three particular modes perform this transit between infinite and finite in a way that is "self-appropriate [*sich angemessenes*]" or adequate. A detailed exposition of this trait is beyond the scope of the present inquiry, but it will be useful to say a bit more about this. Recall that, in *Faith and Knowledge*, one of Hegel's chief concerns is with overcoming the insuperable distinction that Kant draws between the sensible and the supersensible. In that text, he chides Kant for failing to understand the way in which rational ideas and aesthetic ideas can be paired up in order to provide adequate cognition. He goes on:

> But instead of asking for an intuition of the absolute identity of the sensible and the supersensible, Kant [once more] reverts to what is the very ground of the mathematical antinomies: an intuition for the idea of reason in which the idea would be experienced as

[23] SL 12.236, 735, translation modified.

> purely finite and sensuous, and simultaneously and contiguously experienced as a supersensible beyond of experience.[24]

Art and religion, as modes of absolute self-apprehension, are responsive to this dualism; in some ways, they seem to represent a concession to Kant's demands. Art, on the one hand, provides precisely such a "finite and sensuous" intuition [*Anschauung*] of the idea. In the *Lectures on Fine Art*, Hegel describes beautiful art, as that "which sets truth before our minds in the mode of sensuous configuration."[25] Religion, on the other, provides cognitions of the idea as supersensible, in the form of representation [*Vorstellung*]. And philosophy answers to Hegel's own demand, by combining the sensible and the supersensible in thinking [*Denken*]. Thus, Hegelian absolute mind has three cognitive forms that correspond to the absolute idea's modes of self-apprehension: intuition, representation, and thought. Among these, the cognitive act of intuition and the corresponding absolute mode of fine art deal specifically with the aesthetic or sensible aspect of the idea.

It is essential never to lose sight of the fact, however, that Hegel thinks all three of these modes in some way provide and aim at "the same content and purpose." Furthermore, religion and philosophy are not by any means entirely devoid of aesthetic aspects. The *Phenomenology*'s Absolute Religion section, for example, deals with art in its religious employment, as do the 1820 *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, and there is, obviously, a philosophical aesthetics articulated in the *Encyclopedia*. It would thus be incorrect to relegate the aesthetic aspect of Hegel's system to art alone. Rather, the aesthetic is at play in some way in all three modes, but it is introduced and particularly thematized in the element of fine art.

Schelling's proposal is crucially different. This is most readily apparent in his exclusion of religion from his equivalent of Hegel's modes of the absolute idea's self-apprehension. For

[24] FK 87. Translation modified.
[25] A 101.

Schelling, only art and philosophy provide this sort of knowledge, albeit from different vantage points. In the 1800 *System of Transcendental Idealism*, Schelling describes the relationship between art and philosophy in the following way:

> The whole of philosophy starts, and must start, from a principle which, as the absolute principle, is also at the same time the absolutely identical. An absolutely simple and identical cannot be grasped or communicated through description, nor through concepts at all. It can only be intuited. Such an intuition is the organ of all philosophy.—But this intuition, which is an intellectual rather than a sensory one, and has as its object neither the objective nor the subjective, but the absolutely identical, in itself neither subjective nor objective, is itself merely an internal one, which cannot in turn become objective for itself: it can become objective only through a second intuition. This second intuition is the aesthetic.[26]

According to this passage, philosophy and art are distinguished insofar as philosophy belongs to the "internal", i.e. merely mental, realm whereas art is objective, i.e. manifest in physical reality. Philosophical activity and artistic activity both proceed by means of intuition, but they employ different species of intuition: philosophy involves intellectual intuition, while art involves aesthetic or sense-perceptual intuition. In the Kantian terms I used above to parse Hegel's absolute modes, for Schelling, philosophy remains merely supersensible while it is art alone that moves from the subjective to the objective, uniting the sensible and the supersensible in a single object.

The key point of interest here is Schelling's distinction between two kinds of intuition: on the one hand, the intellectual intuition proper to philosophy, and, on the other, the aesthetic

[26] ST 229n1.

intuition proper to fine art. The contemporary reception sometimes emphasizes Schelling's reputation for having embraced Kantian intellectual intuition as the method of his philosophy. It is clear from the passage just quoted that this is, in some sense, true. But everything hangs on the qualification: as Schelling himself declares, intellectual intuition is deficient in relation to aesthetic intuition insofar as it "cannot in turn become objective for itself" but rather, "can become objective only through a second intuition."

At the end of the ST, Schelling reiterates and expands on this point in a note entitled "General Observation on the whole System." There, he writes:

> The reader…will doubtless remark as follows: That the whole system falls between two extremes, of which one is characterized by intellectual, the other by aesthetic intuition. What intellectual intuition is for the philosopher, aesthetic intuition is for his object. The former, since it is necessary purely for the purposes of that special direction of the mind that is taken in philosophizing, makes no appearance at all in ordinary consciousness…the one field to which absolute objectivity is granted is art. Take away objectivity from art, one might say, and it ceases to be what it is and becomes philosophy; grant objectivity to philosophy, and it ceases to be philosophy and becomes art.[27]

In this way, the philosophical mode of proceeding is dependent on fine art for the completion of its project: it requires art in order to complete the transit between infinite and finite that all three of Hegel's modes of absolute knowing complete in their own right. Thus, Schellingian intellectual intuition is in no way, as is sometimes thought, a divine creative power attributed to human beings. Instead, Schelling, following Fichte's 1794 *Wissenschaftslehre*, uses the Kantian idea

[27] ST 233. Translation modified.

of intellectual intuition to describe something quite close to the mode of rational self-critique that Kant assigns to discursive cognition's capacity for transcendental reflection.[28] This kind of cognitive activity remains merely mental. It is only in the higher mode of aesthetic intuition that objectivity, which here appears to mean something akin to universal or 'democratic' intelligibility paired with physical manifestation, is attained. As such, I believe it is this latter sort of intuition that is in particular need of closer scrutiny by scholars seeking to understand the positive influence that Schelling's philosophical method had on Hegel.

To sum up, Hegel and Schelling introduce the aesthetic into their philosophical systems in different ways. Hegel describes absolute knowing as having three modes—art, religion, and philosophy. Each of these is characterized by a distinct cognitive form, but they all ultimately (i) share a content (ii) describe a movement between the infinite and the finite (I take this to be what Hegel means when he claims that these modes "share a purpose"), and (iii) are aesthetically inflected in some way. Schelling, by contrast, preserves a dualism between philosophy and fine art that is drawn according to the kind of intuition that these cognitive activities respectively employ. Among these, only fine art unites the infinite and the finite or, rephrased, exhibits the movement between supersensible form and its sensible manifestation in finite objects. As we will see in the next section, this lingering dualism between philosophy and art is one of the chief targets of Hegel's critique of Schelling.

4. Hegel's Critique of Schelling: First Pass[29]

[28] Regarding Fichte's method see Breazeale (1998). For Fichte's influence on Schelling's method, see Breazeale (2014).

[29] The topic of this section, the Hegelian critique of Schelling, is relatively novel in the context of the secondary literature. The converse topic, Schelling's critique of Hegel, arises much more frequently. This situation has seemingly arisen from the more marginal status of Schelling's philosophy in the contemporary field, which requires Schelling scholars to engage with Hegel, but allows Hegel scholars to largely ignore Schelling (similar to the way in which anyone working on Hegel must have a firm grasp of Kant, whereas one can live and die as a Kant scholar without seriously engaging with Hegel—though perhaps this has changed somewhat in recent years). Consequently, it has been Schelling scholars who have generally had the last word on the debate between Hegel and Schelling and, as might be expected in that context, Hegel does not usually come out on top. One of my aims here is to provide an alternate perspective, at least within the limited scope of my topic. For some treatments of Schelling's critique of

In what follows, I will briefly lay out Hegel's critique of Schelling[30] insofar as it is relevant to the topics at hand; that is, to the dispute between the two thinkers regarding the question of how to carry out the aestheticization of reason and the related topic of the proper role of intuition in philosophy. In the subsequent section, I will examine Schelling's thought in the depth necessary to substantiate Hegel's claims. Then, in the final section of the chapter, I will revisit Hegel's critique, with the aim of refining and expanding upon the desiderata for Hegel's positive account of intuition that were arrived at in the last chapter.

Hegel's most explicit and substantive engagement with Schelling is contained in the series of notes compiled from university lectures delivered between 1819 and 1831 and published under the title *Lectures on the History of Philosophy.*[31] Here, Hegel combines an exposition of Schelling's thought with a critical assessment in the context of a history of philosophy

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Hegel see: Beiser (2008), Bowie (1994), Gabriel (2016) and Houlgate (1999). For a treatment of both see Lauer (2010).

[30] Regarding my choice of texts: The *locus classicus* for Hegel's critique of Schelling is sometimes alleged to be a frequently referred to and less frequently parsed aside that occurs in the Preface to Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. There, Hegel criticizes an unattributed formalistic strain of absolute idealism for portraying the absolute as "the night in which…all cows are black" (PhS §16). Context offers the substantive critique being leveled: "this formalism asserts that this monotony and abstract universality is the absolute, and it assures us that any dissatisfaction with such universality is merely an incapacity to master the absolute standpoint and keep a firm grip on it" (PhS §16). This is so because, for thinkers who subscribe to such a view, "what counts as the speculative way of considering things turns out to be the dissolution of the distinct and determinate, or, to an even greater degree, turns out to be simply the act of casting what is distinct and determinate into the abyss of the void" (PhS §16) Hegel concludes emphatically by dismissing the view under consideration as "an utterly vacuous naiveté in cognition" (PhS §16). It is clear from the quoted passages that the position being attacked is a monistic position that fails to adequately capture the philosophical importance of difference, of the "distinct and determinate" character of finite individuals. The criticism can be heard in at least two senses. It could refer to a position that understands the absolute form displayed by finite individuals to be their only metaphysically salient characteristic. Accordingly, the individuals themselves would not properly be individuals at all; rather they would merely be contingently distinct manifestations of one and the same absolute form. Alternately, Hegel could be referring to a position that understands the totality of the whole as the only genuinely extant being. On this view, finite individuals would be mere appearances, falling short of genuine existence, and, thus, of genuine philosophical importance. It is not that difficult to see how some version of either of these views could be derived from a sloppy reading of one of the various iterations of Schelling's thought, particularly from the versions of his philosophy of identity that were contemporary with the composition of the *Phenomenology*. As we saw in the previous section, however, the pre-1807 Schelling was, at least by his own lights, centrally concerned with providing an account of the way absolute form was made manifest in concrete individuals—so much so that he was willing to concede philosophy's epistemic pride of place to fine art in order to attain this end. Further, Hegel himself denied in correspondence that he was referring to Schelling in this passage. And, in a truly remarkable symposium riffing on Hegel's bovine metaphor that was published in the 1987 edition of the Canadian Philosophical Review, H.S. Harris and Michael Vater both argue convincingly that Hegel's denial was in earnest. See Harris (1987) and Vater (1987).

[31] I follow Haldane's English version of the text, supplementing it with my own translations and providing the German in notes where helpful.

beginning with the pre-Socratics and ending with Hegel's own speculative idealism. Schelling's thought occupies the penultimate chapter in the book, and, among modern philosophers, only Kant and Spinoza are given lengthier treatments. The LHP discussion of Schelling's philosophy has two primary loci: the philosophy of nature and intellectual intuition. Insofar as both topics are among the most controversial aspects of Schelling's thought, it is not surprising that Hegel devotes particular attention to them. His specific comments, however, run somewhat contrary to what one might expect given the contemporary currency of a view of Hegel's idealism as being either focused on mind [*Geist*] to the exclusion of nature or else naturalistic in a way that privileges the role of mind in nature.[32] As we will shortly see, Hegel lavishes praise on Schelling's philosophy of nature, which he takes to be the particular innovation of Schellingian idealism. And, as I understand it, his primary critique on this score is that Schelling's philosophy of nature *does not go far enough* in developing the idea of nature's participation in the forms of reason that it shares in common with *Geist*. This difficulty results from Schelling's philosophical method, which, as we have already seen, also falls short of Hegel's own by Hegelian lights: as the previous section anticipated, Hegel will indict Schellingian intellectual intuition for its failure to attain to objectivity by making absolute form finitely manifest.

My goal in this context is not to exhaustively assess or describe Hegel's critique of Schelling. Rather, sticking with the paired issues of aesthetics and intuition, I want to show that both Hegel's praise and his criticisms of Schelling's thought are bound up with Hegel's perception of Schelling's ultimate failure to accomplish the aesthetic philosophical project laid out in the OSP. More specifically, Hegel believes that Schelling does not ultimately overcome the Kantian dualism of intuition and concept or, what amounts to the same thing put otherwise, that Schelling fails to escape the schematic imposition of supersensible rational form onto sensible content, particularly in the domain of his *Naturphilosophie*.

[32] See emblematically Brandom (2002), McDowell (2013) and Pinkard (2012).

To begin, Hegel summarizes the Schelling's chief philosophical contributions in the following way:

> The main point in Schelling's philosophy is that it has to do with a content, with the truth, and that this content is grasped as concrete. Schelling's philosophy has a deep, speculative content; a content which, as content, is the one with which the whole history of philosophy has been concerned. The second great merit possessed by Schelling is that, in his *Naturphilosophie*, he has demonstrated that the forms of spirit can also be found in nature; thus electricity, magnetism [etc.] are for him only external modes of the idea, of the concept. [33]

Hegel picks out two points of importance. First and foremost, Schelling's philosophy is, at least in some wise, a genuinely speculative philosophy, and it attains to this status specifically by virtue of being concerned with the appropriate philosophical content. This point as it is stated here is somewhat obscure, but Hegel expands on the claim elsewhere in his discussion of Schelling.

Hegel opens the section by telling us, "It was Schelling who made the most significant, or, from a philosophic point of view, the only significant advance upon the philosophy of Fichte."[34] There is not room here to get into the details of Hegel's critique of Fichte, but, in rough and ready terms, Fichte's thought falls short in Hegel's eyes because it is one-sided. More specifically, it emphasizes self-consciousness and subjectivity to the exclusion of consciousness and objectivity, leading to difficulties throughout the Fichtean system.[35] Hegel notes that the Fichtean conception of nature is particularly problematic.[36] In light of this, we can expect that

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[33] LHP 542. My translation, preserving Haldane's reorganization of the German text. [*Das zweite Große Schellings ist, in der Naturphilosophie die Formen des Geistes in der Natur nachgewiesen zu haben; Elektrizität, Magnetismus, sind nur äußerliche Weisen der Idee, des Begriffs. Die Hauptsache in der Schellingschen Philosophie ist, daß es um einen Inhalt zu tun ist, um das Wahre, und dies als konkret gefaßt ist. Die Schellingsche Philosophie hat einen tiefen spekulativen Inhalt, der, als Inhalt, der Inhalt ist, um den es nach der ganzen Geschichte der Philosophie zu tun gewesen ist.*]

[34] [*Das bedeutendste oder in philosophischer Rücksicht einzig bedeutende Hinausgehen über die Fichtesche Philosophie hat Schelling endlich getan.*]

[35] ibid. 505, 516.

[36] ibid. 501. Hegel develops this critique in the *Philosophy of Nature*, where he calls out Fichte for having subscribed to a point of view he terms "finite teleology" (PN §245, 4).

the advance of the Schellingian philosophy will be a comprehensive 'two-sidedness' that takes into account both consciousness and self-consciousness. And this is precisely what Hegel claims:

> Schelling makes Jacobi's principle of the unity of thought and being fundamental, although he begins to determine it more closely. For [Schelling] concrete unity is this: that the finite is not more true than the infinite, the subjective idea no more true than objectivity, and that combinations in which both are brought together falsely as independently external in relation to one another, are likewise only combinations of untruths.[37]

Later on, Hegel unpacks Schelling's "further determination" of the unity of thought and being as meaning that absolute form is "a version of Spinoza's substance…that possesses activity within itself in accordance with the necessity of its own form, so that it is the creative power of nature, but at the same time of knowledge and comprehension." Hegel continues:

> For this reason, [absolute form] is the topic of philosophy. It is neither the [merely] formal union of Spinoza nor the subjective totality of Fichte, but totality with the infinite form: this is what we see developed in Schelling's philosophy.[38]

Thus, as both of these passages demonstrate, Hegel takes the central virtue of Schelling's philosophy to be its grasp of the fact that the proper topic of philosophy is an absolute form that is (i) shared in common by thought and being and additionally (ii) a principle that is internal to both thought and being—that is, it is not imposed on one by the other. As Hegel sees it, the

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[37] ibid. 512. [*Schelling legt Jacobis Prinzip von der Einheit des Denkens und Seins zum Fundamente, nur daß er es näher zu bestimmen anfängt. Die konkrete Einheit bei ihm ist dann die, daß das Endliche sowenig als das Unendliche etwas Wahres ist, die subjektive Idee sowenig als die Objektivität, und daß Verbindungen, in denen beide Unwahre als selbständig außereinander verknüpft werden, auch nur Verbindungen von Unwahren sind.*]

[38] ibid. 516. *[…die Spinozistische Substanz…als eine in sich tätige Form, nach der Notwendigkeit ihrer Form gefaßt, so daß sie das Schaffende der Natur ist, aber ebenso auch Wissen und Erkennen. Darum ist es in der Philosophie zu tun. Es ist nicht formelle Vereinigung des Spinoza, noch subjektive Totalität wie bei Fichte, sondern Totalität mit der unendlichen Form; dieses sehen wir in der Schellingschen Philosophie hervorgehen.*]

explanation of the unity of thought and being is the proper topic of philosophy. Therefore, insofar as Schelling has this unity in view as the object of his philosophical project, the content of Schelling's philosophy is true, deep and speculative.

It should be obvious by now that Hegel's laudatory remarks about the philosophy of nature are intimately bound up with the comments just touched upon. For, as the text indicates, the philosophy of nature provides precisely the objective aspect that is lacking from a merely subjective approach such as Fichte's. Put positively, the philosophy of nature is the medium in which the objective side of philosophy must be developed. This portion of philosophy constitutes the demonstration of the fact that absolute form belongs to being, "is the creative power of nature", in addition to belonging to thought. Thus, Hegel writes, "Schelling…was the first to exhibit [*darstellen*] nature as the sensuous perception or the expression of the concept and its determinations."[39] Schelling accomplished this by exorcising "such meaningless terms as perfection, wisdom, outward adaptability" from the treatment of nature.[40] That is to say, he did away with the idea that nature should be subject to normative conventions provided externally by human observers. Instead, he recognized "the same schematism, the same rhythm, in objective existence as is present in the ideal."[41]

Notably, the novelty of Schelling's philosophy of nature emphatically *does not* consist in having been the first treat nature philosophically. Hegel is well aware that "the philosophy of nature is no new science; [in the course of these lectures] we met with it continually—in the works of Aristotle, for instance, and elsewhere."[42] Rather, Schelling's contribution consists specifically in the post-Kantian character of his natural philosophical project:

[39] ibid. 535.
[40] ibid.
[41] LHP 534-5.
[42] ibid. 535.

> If philosophy passes beyond the form of the understanding and has apprehended the speculative concept, it must alter the determinations of thought, the categories of the understanding regarding nature. Kant was the first to set about this; and Schelling has sought to grasp the concept of nature instead of contenting himself with the ordinary metaphysics of the same…that for which we have to thank Schelling, therefore, is not that he brought thought to bear on the comprehension of nature, but that he altered the categories according to which thought applied itself to nature. He introduced forms of reason and applied them…as he did the form of the syllogism in magnetism, for instance—in place of the ordinary categories of the understanding.[43]

Hegel's comments here indicate that the innovations presented by Schelling's philosophy of nature contribute to the thinkers' shared interest in completing the Copernican project begun by Kant. On Hegel's view, Schelling's philosophy of nature completes and goes beyond Kant on the deepest level, by changing the very categories according to which nature ought to be understood. This is a very complex claim, which I will return to in depth in the fourth chapter. Here, we can understand Hegel's meaning in a glancing way by recalling his claim in the *Encyclopedia* that Kant suffers from an excessive "tenderness for the things of this world"—in more technical parlance, Hegel is indicting Kant's empirical realism.[44] Schelling, by contrast, exhibits no such tenderness, a fact which is readily evident in his recourse to a different set of categorial forms that emphasize forces and processes rather than the subsistence of mid-sized material objects: here, Hegel marks out magnetism in particular because of the way Schelling uses the two poles and the indifferent center of the magnet to demonstrate the existence of 'triplicity' (which, for Hegel, is always a reference to the syllogistic form) in nature.[45]

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[43] ibid. 535-6.
[44] EL §48, 92.
[45] The point is not quite as farfetched as it may seem on the face of it: the magnet has two charged poles and a neutral center. In Schelling's *Identitätsphilosophie* the image of the magnetic line serves as a visual model for the formal relation of thought and being. See Grant (2006) 175.

In sum, Hegel's praise of Schelling centers on Schelling's attribution of a shared absolute form to thought and being, and Schelling's connected attempts to demonstrate the rational form of objective being in his philosophy of nature. Hegel's criticisms follow suit by focusing primarily on the various ways in which he takes Schelling to have failed to accomplish the worthwhile tasks he set for himself. Thus, Hegel largely approves of Schelling's ends, but disapproves of his means specifically insofar as the latter have prevented Schelling from achieving the former.[46] Hegel is by far the most disparaging of the faculty of intellectual intuition that Schelling understands to be the "organ of all transcendental thinking."[47] In the LHP, Hegel levels at least five distinct criticisms at this cognitive capacity. On Hegel's view, the defects of intellectual intuition include its (i) immediacy[48], (ii) externality to its subject matter[49], (iii) failure to attain to objectivity[50], (iv) presupposition of the indifference point that it aims to discover[51], and (v) employment of the geometric form, following Fichte and Spinoza.[52] Hegel also offers two additional criticisms of the systematic structure of Schelling's philosophy that are less directly aimed at intellectual intuition, but which I believe stem from Hegel's view of the philosophical insufficiency of this capacity: (vi) Schelling's failure to provide an exhaustive account of absolute form along the lines of what Hegel offers in the *Science of Logic*[53], and, finally, (vii) Schelling's failure to provide a philosophy of spirit.[54]

There is obviously not room here to pursue all of these points of criticism in detail. Some, such as (iii) the failure of intellectual intuition to attain to objectivity, have already been touched on previously, and others will come into sharper focus in the subsequent treatment of

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[46] Hegel seems to assume throughout that he and Schelling share a philosophical goal. In fairness to Schelling, it is equally likely that this is simply not the case at this point in their respective philosophical trajectories. Thus, though Schelling falls short by Hegel's criteria, a separate study would be required to decide whether or not Schelling succeeds according to his own criteria. Gabriel (2016) tackles this topic in depth.
[47] ST 27.
[48] LHP 527.
[49] ibid. 526
[50] ibid. 524
[51] ibid. 525-6.
[52] ibid. 529.
[53] ibid. 518.
[54] ibid. 534.

Schelling. Here, however, I would like to offer a brief holistic discussion of how Hegel's criticisms of intellectual intuition relate to the topic of the aestheticization of reason that occupied the first half of the chapter. It may seem that we have come far afield of our initial topic, but that is not actually the case. For, the majority of Hegel's quibbles with intellectual intuition have ultimately to do with the way that this mode of cognition describes the manifestation or display of absolute form in the world, insofar as the world is sensible, physical, and objective. And this is exactly the same concern at issue in the debate about schematic and symbolic intuitions: precisely because intuitions exhibit, *darstellen*, concepts, the question about which sorts of intuitions can perform this function for which sorts of concepts and how they do so is of fundamental importance for defining the nature of objectivity.

It will be helpful here to briefly recall Hegel's motivating disagreement with Kant from the previous chapter about the dualism of intuitions and concepts in the critical account of cognition. In the *Encyclopedia Logic*, Hegel levels a related accusation at the critical philosophy in the register of the debate at hand. There, he takes Kant to task for preserving the empiricist stance that experience is the "only basis for our cognitions" while at the same time denying that empirical experience is objective.[55] The critical philosophy is thus faced with a need to locate objectivity elsewhere, and its only recourse is to the only non-empirical ingredient in our cognitive representations: namely, thought itself. In Hegel's words:

> critical philosophy holds on to the *factum* that universality and necessity, being also essential determinations, are found to be present in what is called experience. And, because this element does not stem from the empirical as such, it belongs to the spontaneity of thinking, or is a priori.—The thought-determinations or concepts of the understanding make up the objectivity of the cognitions of experience. In general they

[55] EL §40, 80.

> contain relations, and hence synthetic a priori judgments…are formed by means of them.[56]

But, as Hegel sees it, this becomes problematic because thought itself is also ultimately taken to be something subjective in the Kantian picture:

> In this context "objectivity" means the element of universality and necessity, i.e. of the thought-determinations themselves—the so called a priori. But the critical philosophy extends the antithesis in such a way that experience in its entirety falls within subjectivity; i.e. both of these elements together are subjective and nothing remains in contrast with subjectivity except the thing-in-itself.[57]

Thus, on Hegel's reading, Kantian cognition ultimately surrenders its claim to genuine objectivity entirely, by virtue of the fact that both the forms of spontaneous thought, i.e. the categories of the understanding, and experience itself, i.e. what is given in intuition, belong *only* to the thinking subject. It is immaterial in this context whether or not this is a correct reading of Kant; what is important here is that this is the picture both Hegel and Schelling are trying to push back against in their philosophical systems.

Both Hegel and Schelling want to remain post-Kantian idealists while simultaneously recuperating a view of objectivity that attributes universality and necessity to things in themselves. In order to do so, they are burdened with the task of demonstrating that there is no "gap" between the universal and necessary forms that Kant attributes to thought alone, and the forms of so-called things-in-themselves, i.e. of what exists. In the preceding discussions we have seen two of the angles that Hegel and Schelling work in order to attempt such an alteration.

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[56] ibid. 80-1.
[57] ibid. §41, 81.

First, they propose, contra Kant, that a posteriori intuitions can be adequate to a priori concepts; that is, that finite symbolic intuitions can exhibit a priori concepts of the understanding or of reason. If this is the case, then at least some empirical objects (such as works of fine art) attain to the level of universality and necessity that Kant reserves for the forms of thought alone. This is the central stake of Hegel and Schelling's shared project of aestheticizing the rational. Second, Schelling puts forth and Hegel defends the idea that there can be a post-Kantian philosophy of nature that demonstrates the sensible manifestation of absolute form in another way, namely in the realm of non-artificial physical existence.

This is the point at which Hegel's above described criticisms of Schelling become relevant. For, as we saw in the previous section, Schelling's maintains a dichotomy between two kinds of intuition: aesthetic intuition and intellectual intuition. Only the former kind mode of intuition unites infinite and finite terms adequately and attains to the kind of objectivity that Hegel and Schelling valorize. Intellectual intuition, in contrast, is merely a subjective capacity. As Hegel sees it, this creates a problem for Schelling because intellectual intuition is also supposed to be the capacity that articulates the philosophy of nature, the primary locus for the demonstration of absolute form's objective manifestation in the physical world. But how can a merely subjective capacity be authoritative regarding this sort of objectivity?

By Hegel's lights, at least, it cannot. Consequently, because Schelling relies on intellectual intuition to articulate his philosophy of nature, the Schellingian philosophy of nature falls short of its goal and fails to show how thought shares its forms in commons with what exists. Thus, Hegel writes, Schelling fell short of genuine conceptuality:

> [Schelling's] defect is that this [absolute] idea in general, its distinction into the ideal and the natural world, and also the totality of these determinations, are not shown forth and developed as necessitated by the concept. As Schelling has not risen to this point of view, he has misconceived the nature of thought; the work of art thus becomes for him

> the supreme and only mode in which the idea exists for spirit. But the supreme mode of the idea is really its own element; thought, the idea apprehended, is therefore higher than the work of art.[58]

In this passage, Hegel's claim is that Schelling's elevation of the object of aesthetic intuition, the work of art, results from his misunderstanding of the kind of cognitive activity that takes place in philosophy. Because Schelling does not see that philosophical thinking also completes the movement between infinite and finite and that it does so in a way that is somehow superior to aesthetic intuition, he fails to properly describe the manifestation of absolute form in "the ideal and the natural world", i.e. in the realms of spirit and nature. In Hegel's words:

> With Schelling, on the other hand, form is really an external scheme, and his method is the artificial application of this scheme to external objects. This externally applied scheme takes the place of dialectic progress and this is the special reason why the philosophy of nature has brought itself into discredit: it has proceeded on an altogether external plan, has made its foundation a ready-made scheme, and fitted into it nature as we perceive it.[59]

Thus, while Schelling's philosophy of nature sets itself the correct goal of demonstrating the manifestation of the idea in the physical world, it falls short of actually doing so. Instead, because of the myriad flaws of intellectual intuition enumerated above, Schelling ends up with an "externally applied scheme" that takes the place of "dialectical progress" (this last will, famously, be Hegel's own method; it will also be my topic in the next chapter). In the final instance, then, Hegel finds that Schelling, like Kant, does not fully escape the constraints of a merely subjective

[58] LHP 542.
[59] ibid.

account of absolute form in nature. And this is a direct consequence of his insistence on a dualism between the methods of philosophy and art that arrogates objectivity to aesthetic intuition alone.

5. Schelling's Philosophy

In the previous section, I gave an account of Hegel's reading of Schelling in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*. In what follows, I will offer some exegesis that spans across various early (pre-*Phenomenology*) Schellingian texts with the aim of getting the specific aspects of Schelling's systematic thought that hold interest for Hegel into clearer view. In particular, I will examine three points from Schelling's pre-1807 philosophy: (i) the structure of his system as a whole, (ii) his account of the capacity of intellectual intuition, and (iii) his account of the capacity of aesthetic intuition.

5.1 Schelling's Early System

At the moment in his thinking with which we are concerned, Schelling understands philosophy to consist of two principle parts: the transcendental philosophy, on the one hand, and the philosophy of nature, on the other. The two parts differ primarily in terms of their starting points and, accordingly, in what Schelling refers to as the "direction" of their logical movement. The transcendental philosophy begins with the subjective and moves to the objective, while the philosophy of nature begins with the objective and moves to the subjective. In Schelling's words, "all philosophy must go about either to make an intelligence out of nature or a nature out of intelligence."[60] And in light of this, "the philosophy of nature and transcendental philosophy have divided into the two directions possible to philosophy."[61]

[60] ST 7.
[61] ibid.

According to this view, the Schellingian system of philosophy as a whole has a chiastic structure that consists in two inverse trajectories:



Figure 1.

In Figure 1, the blue arrow represents the philosophy of nature, the red arrow represents transcendental philosophy, and the point at which the two arrows cross is the point of what Schelling refers to as "indifference," a point of balance between subjectivity and objectivity. One way of understanding the philosophy of identity is as the project that comprehends the conditions of possibility for the existence of such a point.

One of the better secondary treatments of this topic is still the one given by Hegel in the 1801 *Differenzschrift*, where he succinctly captures the structure of the identity philosophy in the following passage from the beginning of his discussion of Schelling:

> For absolute identity to be the principle of an entire system it is necessary that both subject and object be posited as subject-object. In Fichte's system identity constitutes itself only as subjective subject-object. [But] this subjective subject-object needs an objective subject-object to complete it, so that the absolute presents itself in each of the

> two subject-objects, and finds itself perfected only in both together as the highest synthesis that nullifies both insofar as they are opposed. As their point of absolute indifference, the absolute encloses both, gives birth to both, and is born of both.[62]

Although all this talk about objective and subjective "subject-objects" can seem a bit obscure, what Hegel is describing is precisely the structure illustrated in the diagram I offered above. A "subject-object" is thus a trajectory between subject and object, between the subjectivity of mind and the objectivity of the natural world; a subject-object can then further be described as "subjective" or "objective" depending on whether it has a subjective or objective starting point. Thus, Hegel's point can be simply restated as saying that, in order to show that mind and world are mutually intelligible because they share a form (i.e. that an absolute form exists), it is necessary to demonstrate that it is possible to describe a path from mind to world and back again, beginning at both extremes. Hegel further points out that the particular innovation of Schelling's system over and above Fichte's is its inclusion of a trajectory that begins with nature and moves to mind; namely, the trajectory described above by the blue arrow. According to the view that Hegel and Schelling share, the principle task of philosophy is the description of these two trajectories in order to demonstrate the existence of a single absolute form shared by mind and world.

As we have already seen, Hegel maintains his admiration for the formal innovation represented by Schelling's philosophy of nature in the mature texts compiled in the LHP, where he foregrounds the elaboration of a trajectory that runs from objectivity to subjectivity as being the principle virtue of Schelling's thought. Looking forward to Hegel's own system of science, the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of spirit will respectively perform formally similar roles to Schelling's philosophy of nature and his transcendental philosophy, albeit with some

[62] D 155.

crucial differences owing to Hegel's attempts to remedy what he perceives to be the defects of Schelling's formal scheme.

5.2 Intellectual Intuition

We will turn now from the structure of Schelling's system to the method by means of which his philosophy proceeds, namely, intellectual intuition. There is, at times, a fundamental ambiguity in the way Schelling dicusses this activity: at times he talks about it in a robust, metaphysical way as the activity of being itself, while at others he talks about it as an epistemic approach taken by human beings. Our interest here is in the latter version.[63]

At the outset of the *System of Transcendental Idealism*, Schelling states simply, "intellectual intuition is the organ of all transcendental thinking."[64] In the ST he arrives at this conclusion by relying heavily on transcendental philosophy's subjective character. The account is highly Fichtean in character and reflects the extensive influence of Fichte's 1794 *Wissenschaftslehre* on Schelling's thought at this time.[65] Schelling writes, "the sole immediate object of transcendental concern is the subjective…[and] the sole organ of this mode of philosophizing is therefore inner sense."[66] Thus, intellectual intuition is equated with inner sense, the kind of reflective 'self-feeling' that belongs to self-conscious thought. This is made explicit in Schelling's claim that, "two conditions are therefore required for the understanding of philosophy, *first* that one be engaged in a constant inner activity, a constant producing of these original acts of the intellect; and second that one be constantly reflecting upon this production; in a word, that one always remain at the same time both the intuited (the producer) and the intuitant."[67] In this way, intellectual intuition is bound up with the kind of doubling that is endemic to the self-conscious nature of thinking: as self-conscious beings, we can both think and think about our thoughts.

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[63] I am grateful to David Wellbery for pressing me on this point.
[64] ST 27.
[65] See Breazeale (2014). In the LHP, Hegel notes that Schelling self-identified early on as a Fichtean (LHP 512).
[66] ST 13.
[67] ibid.

This latter kind of second-order thinking, what Schelling terms "reflection," is what is made possible by the fact of our self-consciousness and it is what is made actual by philosophy.

The fundamentally deflationary character of this point is worth remarking on again: what Schelling intends by intellectual intuition does indeed involve the kind of creative capacity that the philosophical tradition associates with divine knowing, but, because self-conscious thought is both the subject and the object of this cognitive activity the purview is highly restricted. In essence, Schelling uses the Kantian idea of intellectual intuition to describe the mode of rational self-critique that Kant assigns to discursive cognition. In the ST, Schelling is very clear about the limited scope of his approach: "Since I seek to ground my knowledge only *in itself*, I enquire no further as to the ultimate ground of this primary knowledge (self-consciousness), which, if it exists, must necessarily lie *outside* knowledge. Self-consciousness is the lamp of the whole system of knowledge, but it casts its light ahead only, not behind."[68] =

Now, the *System of Transcendental Idealism* is, as the title makes apparent, only intended to deal with one half of philosophy as Schelling conceives it. A substantial question thus remains regarding exactly how the apparently merely subjective method of intellectual intuition comes to bear on the philosophy of nature. As I showed in the previous section, this is one of Hegel's chief dissatisfactions with Schelling's thought. Giving a thorough hearing to Schelling's own answer to this question would require an entire project of its own, but I will attempt to summarize Schelling's view programmatically.

First, it will be necessary to say something about the relationship between the transcendental philosophy and the philosophy of nature. In order to this, we will need to get a bit more of Schelling's formal apparatus on the table. Schelling's thought is structured throughout by a tripartite layering of 'potencies', what the literature terms "the *Potenzlehre*", wherein different potencies have different ontological and logical statuses. The doctrine is

[68] ibid. 18.

complex and obscure, a difficulty that is further compounded by the fact that the theory evolved over the course of Schelling's career.[69] I use the term "layering" to describe Schelling's potencies because, unlike Hegelian dialectical moments, there are not smooth, organic transitions between potencies; this is so because the potencies are not logical moments that form a unified trajectory but independent wholes that are at the same time ordered in relation to one another (the kind of ordering that Hegel would likely scorn as being 'merely external'). Whistler notes that the potency theory is fundamentally and purposefully anti-dialectical.[70] To offer an image: if Hegel's dialectic is a "circle of circles" then Schelling's potencies are more like geological strata.[71]

The *Potenzlehre* is relevant to the topic of method in Schelling's philosophy of nature because Schelling conceives of nature and mind as two distinct potencies. This means that nature and mind are distinct from one another, but 'equiprimordial' in both the order of discovery and in the order of being. This is crucially different from Hegel's view. Hegel, by contrast, holds that nature comes first in the order of discovery, but the absolute idea has ontological precedence: "[i]n time nature comes first, but the absolute *prius* is the idea."[72] For Schelling, pursuantly, the being of nature is possessed of the kind of priority that Hegel attributes to absolute form alone.[73] In early natural philosophical work such as the 1799 *First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature* [FO], he expresses this claim in gnomic formulations such as the following: "It is not, therefore, that WE KNOW nature as a priori, but nature IS a priori; that is, everything individual in it is predetermined by the whole or by the idea of a nature generally."[74] Thus, at least in one of the two trajectories that comprise philosophy, nature's being comes before the subjectivity that constitutes self-conscious knowledge; like the Kantian a priori, Schellingian nature is a condition

[69] Whistler (2013) 113.
[70] ibid. 113.
[71] SL 12:251, 751.
[72] PN §248z, 19.
[73] See Grant (2006) 174. There are points in Schelling's later work that contest or at least complicate this relationship. In the LHP, Hegel writes that nature is ground and 'God' in Schelling's system (LHP 540-1). In the 1801 *Presentation of My System of Philosophy*, however, Schelling writes, "all potencies are absolutely contemporary" (PSP 363).
[74] FO 197-8.

of possibility for subjective knowledge and, at the same time, it is a condition of possibility for subjective existence as well.

This is all well and good if one is an empiricist, but it poses a difficulty for someone allegedly trying to take up the mantle of post-Kantian idealism. Schelling is inconsistent in his attempts to reconcile his idealism with his philosophy of nature. On the one hand, in his earlier works such as the *First Outline of a System of a Philosophy of Nature*, Schelling acknowledges this difficulty and explicitly repudiates the employment of the same philosophical method in transcendental philosophy and natural philosophy: "there is no place in [the philosophy of nature] for idealistic methods of explanation, such as transcendental philosophy is fitted to supply…For every idealistic mode of explanation, dragged out of its own proper sphere and applied to the explanation of Nature, degenerates into the most adventurous nonsense."[75] Against such 'nonsense', Schelling's positive proposal in this text is:

> The first maxim of all true natural science, to explain everything by the forces of Nature, is therefore accepted in its widest extent in our science, and even extended to that region at the limit of which all interpretation of Nature has until now been accustomed to stop short: for example, to those organic phenomena which seem to presuppose an analogy with reason.[76]

Thus, in this early version, Schellingian philosophy of nature looks essentially identical to ordinary physics (insofar as that term refers to the study of nature), differing only insofar as it has a broader scope. This is so because Schelling's philosophy of nature "occupies itself solely and entirely with the original causes of motion in Nature, that is, solely with the dynamical phenomena…[with] the inner clockwork and what is non-objective in nature."[77] And, thus, the

[75] ibid. 194-5.
[76] ibid. 195.
[77] ibid. 196.

method by which this science proceeds is initially the same as the one preeminently employed in early nineteenth century natural science: it performs "an invasion of nature…through freedom," and, he goes on, "[s]uch an invasion of nature we call an experiment."[78] So, as Schelling sees it, natural scientific experimentation employed for the sake of understanding the internal workings of nature (whatever that latter phrase may mean) permits the natural philosopher to produce nature in the same way that the transcendental philosopher can be said to produce mind:

> Every experiment is a question put to nature, to which it is compelled to give a reply. But every question contains an implicit a priori judgment; every experiment that is an experiment, is a prophecy; experimenting itself is a production of phenomena. The first step toward science, therefore, at least in the domain of physics, is taken when we ourselves begin to produce the objects of that science.[79]

Thus, the methods of the two sorts of philosophy as they are described in the *First Outline* run parallel to one another, but are apparently divergent in their modes of proceeding. More specifically, the philosophy of nature appears to be a modified version of natural scientific empiricism, which stands alongside a transcendental philosophy that is largely modeled on Fichte's Kant.

Only a few years later, however, Schelling published material that endorsed intellectual intuition as a shared method for both transcendental and natural philosophy. In two texts published in rapid succession between 1801-2 in his own *Journal for Speculative Philosophy,* Schelling himself attempted to make sense of intellectual intuition as a universal philosophical method. In the 1801 *Presentation of My System of Philosophy*, Schelling comes the closest he ever will to

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[78] ibid. 196-7.

[79] ibid. 197. Here we can begin to see the seeds of some of Hegel's later objections: for example, who is to say whether or not the "prophecy" contained in any given experiment is the correct one? The experimenter, like the transcendental thinker, is subject to a similar difficulty involving the immediacy of the presuppositions that inform her productions.

something resembling Hegel's *Science of Logic*, describing a formal system written from the standpoint of indifference (i.e. from a point of view neither merely natural nor merely transcendental), which he describes as "the system…that I always had in view in the different earlier presentations, which I constantly used as my personal guide-star in both transcendental and natural philosophy."[80] In the 1802 *Further Presentations*, Schelling reiterates the methodological unity of the two parts, claiming, "the condition of the scientific spirit in general and in all the divisions of knowledge is not just a passing intellectual intuition but one that remains as the unchangeable instrument of knowledge. For it is simply the capacity to see the universal in the particular, the infinite in the finite, the two combined into a living unity."[81] Here and at other points in this latter text especially, Schelling seems at times to claim a constitutive element of finite objectivity for intellectual intuition. This attempt obviously did not satisfy Hegel, however, as he cites this very document several times in the LHP in support of the criticisms that have already been outlined.

This is likely so because, even in these later methodological texts, Schelling does not alter at least two of the traits of intellectual intuition that Hegel finds most problematic. Specifically, Schelling retains the ideas that (i) this capacity can be somehow be immediately accessed by certain cognizers but not others, and (ii) the geometric form is the appropriate model for describing the activity of intellectual intuition. The latter point bears particular attention in this context because it specifically concerns the way in which intellectual intuition unites concepts and intuitions in order to arrive at synthetic a priori judgments. Schelling, like Fichte before him, takes his methodological cues for describing a priori synthesis from Kant's account of the constructive synthesis of intuitions and concepts in geometric cognition in the *Critique of Pure Reason*'s Doctrine of Method.[82] In that text, Kant writes that geometric construction's

[80] PSP 344.
[81] FPSP 377.
[82] cf. Breazeale (2014) and Whistler (2013) 117-137.

methodological distinctness has specifically to do with the kind of intuitive exhibition that it involves:

> to construct a concept means to exhibit [*darstellen*] a priori the intuition corresponding to it. For the construction of a concept, therefore, a non-empirical intuition is required, which consequently, as intuition, is an individual object, but that must nevertheless, as the construction of a concept (of a general representation), express in the representation universal validity for all possible intuitions that belong under the same concept.[83]

According to the view expressed here, the intuitions that adequately display geometric concepts are "non-empirical." This does not mean that they are non-sensible—Kant is obviously not denying that one might, for example, draw a geometric diagram on a chalkboard in order to exhibit a Euclidean proof. But the sensible aspect of such representations is immaterial to their cognitive significance. Unlike the intuitions that comprise experience, the sensible element of the geometric display does not provide its being—the laws of geometry may be said to exist independent of being perceived.

Kant emphasizes this difference between the intuitions that display philosophical concepts and the relation of intuitions and concepts in other sorts of cognition in the Schematism chapter, where he notes that "the [schematism] is needed to show how it is possible for *pure concepts of understanding* to be applied to appearances as such. In all the other sciences no such need arises. For there the concepts through which the object is thought in a universal way are not so distinct and heterogeneous from the concepts presenting the object *in concreto*, as it is given."[84] By proceeding geometrically, then, intellectual intuition may indeed produce intuitions that are sensibly manifest, such as the results of natural scientific experiments. But, the sensible

[83] CPR A717/B741, [following here the Guyer and Wood translation].
[84] CPR B177/A138.

element of these intuitions is not what is cognitively significant about them. As Schelling himself says in the *Further Presentations*, "that in which the infinite and the finite are one is the eternal. Absolute science is consequently a science of the eternal...[and] the eternal as such lies entirely outside the world of sense."[85] I believe that this is one of the central reasons for Hegel's dissatisfaction with the geometric way of proceeding. Looking forward to the next section, it will only be in aesthetic intuition that Schelling's system truly succeeds in uniting the infinite and finite in a way that satisfies Hegel's interest in doing justice to the philosophical significance of the sensible world.

5.3 Aesthetic Intuition

We are at last in a position to return to the topic that opened the chapter: the project of uniting the rational and the aesthetic that is outlined in the *Oldest System Program*. In Schelling's early work, this topic is treated in both the *System of Transcendental Idealism*, and then in greater detail in his *Philosophy of Art*, which is compiled from a set of lectures given between 1801 and 1804.[86] There are two aspects of the *Lectures* that are of particular interest for us here: the capacity of aesthetic intuition itself, and the tripartite taxonomy of aesthetic forms that Schelling describes in the text.

As has already been discussed, for Schelling during the period with which we are concerned, aesthetic intuition is said to 'go beyond' the intellectual intuition characteristic of philosophy. It does so specifically insofar as it attains to what Schelling describes as "universally acknowledged and altogether incontestable objectivity," in contrast to the merely subjective status of philosophy.[87] To further flesh out the relation of the two, Schelling notes that aesthetic

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[85] FPSP 382n6.
[86] In this section of the chapter in particular, I owe a large debt to Daniel Whistler's *Schelling's Theory of Symbolic Language*, referred to throughout. It was this book that first drew my attention to the philosophical import of Schelling's *Philosophy of Art*, and allowed me to begin to see the way Schelling's work in the *Identitätsystem* dovetails with my interest in demonstrating the importance of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment for Hegel's reception of the third *Critique*.
[87] ST 229.

intuition shares what could be called a common 'source material' with intellectual intuition: "philosophy sets out from an infinite dichotomy of opposed activities; but the same dichotomy is also the basis of every aesthetic production."[88] In light of what has already been discussed, the dichotomy in question can be identified as the dualism between the subjectivity of mind and the objectivity of the world. The distinction between art and philosophy, then, lies in what they are able to accomplish with regards to this dualistic source material. Specifically, aesthetic intuition is able to resolve the dualism of subject and object, whereas the two trajectories between subject and object that comprise philosophy cannot completely do so on Schelling's view. Thus, Schelling writes: "art is paramount to the philosopher precisely because it opens to him, as it were, the holy of holies, where burns in eternal and original unity, as if in a single flame, that which in nature and history is rent asunder, and in life and action, no less than in thought, must forever fly apart."[89] Rephrased more technically, the unity of thought and being, of subject and object, can only be expressed adequately in the work of art. Or, again, in Hegelian terms, the original unity of the absolute concept is only recaptured in the work of art.

We can say a bit more about why Schelling claims this is so. It has specifically to do with the way in which the work of art displays, i.e. provides a *Darstellung* for, universal form in a finite, particular instance. "Nothing is a work of art," Schelling tells us, "which does not exhibit [*darstellen*] an infinite."[90] By "infinite" here, Schelling means something along the lines of Hegel's Concept: a form of a priori unity that confers intelligibility on all existents. Thus, the terms is interchangeable in this context with "universal."

This calls to mind touchstones in both Kant and Hegel's work. In Kant's case, the exhibition of the infinite in the finite is precisely the work performed by the symbolic intuition (though, of course, for Kant, this exhibition is not fully adequate to its concept). And, for Hegel, this kind of display of the infinite in the finite takes place in art, religion *and* philosophy. So,

[88] ibid. 230.
[89] ibid. 231.
[90] ST 231.

Schelling's theory in this iteration sits somewhere in between the two, splitting the difference. He acknowledges, on the one hand, the insufficiency of empirical intuitions to a priori concepts in the philosophical register, while proposing that the situation is otherwise in the register of aesthetic intuition.

In the *Philosophy of Art*, Schelling goes on to articulate the relationship between infinite, universal terms and finite, particular terms that art works offer greater detail. In that text, he describes a threefold division of artworks that is carved up according to the different ways in which the universal and the particular are united. The three species he arrives at are schematic artworks, allegorical artworks, and symbolic artworks:

> That representation in which the universal means the particular or in which the particular is intuited through the universal is schematism. That representation, however, in which the particular means the universal or in which the universal is intuited through the particular is allegory. The synthesis of these two, where neither the universal means the particular nor the particular the universal, but rather where both are absolutely one, is the symbolic.[91]

As this passage intimates, the symbolic work of art is supreme among these three modes; it occupies a sort of Aristotelian mean between the allegorical and the schematic.[92] This is because the symbolic alone is the mode in which both universal and particular are equally represented. In Schelling's words: "Representation of the absolute with absolute indifference of the universal and the particular **within the particular** is possible only symbolically."[93] Pursuantly, the

[91] PA 46.
[92] Perhaps more accurately a median, since, as Whistler notes, the three sorts of art are intended to map onto the potencies as represented on the magnetic line. Whistler (2013) 82.
[93] PA 45.

symbolic artwork is the most adequate mode of presentation available to absolute form in its particular manifestation.

Whistler argues persuasively that one aspect of what Schelling is up to in his elaboration of this taxonomy is the connection of Goethe's theory of the symbol to Kant's theory.[94] As we saw in the previous chapter, the dualism of schema and symbol is central to Kant's later theory of intuition. The dualism of allegory and symbol, in turn, belongs to Goethe, who was an even more important mentor for Schelling at this point in time.[95]

Although all of the three artistic modes that Schelling describes are his own appropriations of familiar terms, schematism stands out among them as being less obviously familiar as an aesthetic category. Schelling's own attempts to clarify what he means are often quite convoluted:

> one can see most clearly what a schema is from the example of the mechanical artist who is to create an object with some definite form according to its concept. This concept schematizes itself for him; that is, it becomes immediate for him in the imagination in its universality simultaneously as the particular and as an intuition of the particular. The schema is the rule guiding his production, but he intuits in this universal simultaneously the particular itself.[96]

The idea here seems to be that the artist who proceeds schematically attempts to create a work of art in the same way that a craftsman creates an object like a shoe or a table. He follows a merely rule-governed process and, as such, the object produced lacks a constitutive individual character. Along these lines, Schelling describes our everyday use of language as an example of a schematic practice insofar as in language "we make use of merely universal designations even for

[94] Whistler (2013) 50-3, 65.
[95] ibid. 65.
[96] PA 46.

the designation of the particular."[97] In many ways, we are in a better position now to understand the theoretical relevance of Schelling's conception of artistic schematism than his contemporary audience was—this kind of emphasis on the universal to the exclusion or under-emphasis of the particular is precisely one of the tenets of the conceptualism that became dominant in twentieth century art. For his part, Schelling is not always completely clear about what constitutes the schematic artwork; for example, he says early on in the text that painting is exclusively schematic, but later claims it is only allegorical or symbolic.[98]

Regardless of Schelling's actual success in cashing this idea out, however, his attempt to describe schematism as a particular sort of one-sided artistic failure is helpful for understanding what is at stake in challenging the idea that sense perception itself is paradigmatically schematic. For, the Kantian schematism presumes that our perception of the sensible world is rule-governed in a similar way to the productions of the schematic artist. And this sort of rule-governed approach to experience precludes the possibility that experiences might exceed these rules. I mean this last not in the sense of the rogue non-conceptual intuitions that are sometimes found in the Kant literature, but rather in the sense of aesthetic judgments, which comprise a fundamentally different cognitive action (the act of seeking) than determining judgments do.[99]

Schelling's paradigm case of a successful work of art is the symbolic artwork, which is so closely associated with his idea of mythology at this point in his thinking that he often uses the two terms interchangeably. Notably, Schelling is emphatic that mythology cannot merely be limited to Greek mythology; rather, mythology is historically malleable and, thus, the modern era must invent its own mythology (a task it has not yet fulfilled).[100] The defining characteristic of symbolic art is that it does not refer to anything outside itself. In Schelling's terms, "the requirement of absolute artistic representation is: representation with *complete indifference* such that

[97] ibid.
[98] PA 48, 147.
[99] See e.g. Hanna (2011).
[100] PA 51.

the universal ***is*** completely the particular and the particular simultaneously the entire universal, and does not merely mean or signify it."[101] Whistler terms this condition of self-contained referentiality "tautegory."[102] In this way, the symbolic artwork accomplishes the task set by Schelling in the ST: it completes the transit between absolute form and finite particularity as no other term in the Schellingian system does. As we saw previously in §3, it is exactly this movement between universal and particular terms that will be of specific interest to Hegel in his mature system—although Hegel believes this movement, which he calls 'absolute knowledge', can be captured not merely in art, but also in religion and philosophy.

6. Hegel's Critique of Schelling: Conclusion

At the outset of this chapter, I reiterated the two desiderata that I derived from Hegel's critique of Kant. To recall, these were:

A. Space and time, the Kantian forms of intuition, must be accounted for in some way that makes sense of the claim that these forms belong *both* to the perceptions of minded perceivers *and* to the world itself. In Kantian phrasing, Hegel must give an account of how we can know it is the case that space and time belong to things-in-themselves instead of merely belonging to the appearances perceived by finite rational cognizers.

B. Hegel must also make sense of the adequacy of sensible or empirical intuitions to rational or supersensible concepts. In order to do so, Hegel must give an account of the synthesis of concepts and intuitions that presents an alternative to the Kantian description of synthetic a priori judgment. My claim in the previous chapter was that Hegel finds a

[101] ibid. 49.
[102] Whistler (2013) 163-4.

preliminary model for such an alternate picture already contained in Kant's third *Critique*, specifically in the section §59 discussion of symbolic intuition.

I will conclude this chapter by refining these desiderata in light of the foregoing exploration of the relationship between Hegel and Schelling.

First, Hegel's engagement with Schelling has made more explicit what the demonstration of the shared forms, both conceptual and intuitive, of mind and world demanded in (A) will look like. Specifically, Hegel's particular praise of Schelling's philosophy of nature is indicative of the way in which Hegel's own philosophy of nature will be intended to provide a similar account of the way in which absolute form is manifest in the objective world. Hegel will adopt Schelling's two trajectories between subjectivity and objectivity. But he will supplement them with a third text, the *Science of Logic*, in which the absolute form that is shared by mind and world is described in abstraction from either of the two modes of its exhibition. This leads to a somewhat surprising conclusion: if Hegel offers a description of his forms of intuition in the absolute element, it seems they must be contained somewhere in the *Logic*. Yet, space and time arise at the outset of the *Philosophy of Nature*. This is a puzzle that must be dealt with in subsequent chapters.

Second, regarding the methodological point outlined in (B), it is what Hegel rejects from Schelling that is of particular interest. For, as we have seen, Hegel finds Schellingian intellectual intuition unpromising as a philosophical method because it does not succeed in bringing sensible particulars into the purview of philosophy. Put otherwise, Schelling's philosophy fails to accomplish the aestheticization of reason that is demanded by the OSP. It is only in Schelling's account of aesthetic intuition that Hegel finds the genuine union of universal and particular terms that he is seeking. And this capacity still falls short in Hegel's view insofar as Schellingian aesthetic intuition is limited to the realm of symbolic fine art, which, for Schelling, is the only objective modality of absolute form. What Hegel wants to find is a way of proceeding that preserves the objective union of concrete particulars and abstract universals offered by

Schellingian aesthetic intuition that can *also* be articulated philosophically. And this, I will argue in the next chapter, is what Hegel aims to do show is possible in his Concept Logic.

Chapter 3: Logical Content and the Exhibition of Conceptual Reality in *The Science of Logic*

1. Introduction

In what follows, I discuss Hegel's critique of Kant's theory of intuition as it is developed in the opening pages of the *Science of Logic*'s third and final book, the Logic of the Concept. Here, Hegel famously rejects Kant's claim from the *Critique of Pure Reason* that space and time, the Kantian forms of intuition, provide content for synthetic a priori judgments. Hegel argues instead that a priori concepts give themselves content. The mechanism by which this content is provided is poorly understood and remains a point of deep contention in the literature. Two potential sources have been defended most frequently: intellectual intuition and intuitive intellection. Here, I reject both of these and argue for a novel third option.

The option I propose is that of logically adequate (or "tautegorical") symbolization. This is a notion that I have discussed already in Chapters 1 and 2.[1] Very briefly: logically adequate symbolization is a mereological model originally based on Kant's account of symbolic intuition in the *Critique of Judgment* and subsequently developed by Schelling in his identity philosophy. Tautegorical symbolization is a relationship between whole and part in which the part is i) identical to the whole and ii) offers a "display of the existence" [in German: *Darstellung*; in Kant's Latin: *hypotyposis*] of the whole. Schelling argues that artworks are the paradigm sort of tautegorical symbol. The aim of the present section is to argue that Hegel uses this model in his account of a priori synthesis. Specifically, he claims that the forms of judgment and inference are tautegorical symbols of a priori concepts. I show that, understood in this way, the discursive forms of reasoning can be made sense of as conceptual forms that employ the concept itself as a priori intuitive content.

[1] I borrow the phrase from Daniel Whistler's work on Schelling. To my knowledge, I am the first person to apply it to Hegel.

In §2 I argue that offering an account of a priori conceptual content that does not involve spatiotemporal intuition is the central goal of Hegel's Concept Logic. In 1.2 I examine three candidate options by means of which such content might be provided: intellectual intuition, intuitive understanding, and symbolic intuition. I argue that, while Hegel's inheritance of the intuitive understanding is of crucial importance to his mature view of thinkable objects as modally actual, it is not sufficient for understanding his view of a priori conceptual content. I conclude by showing how my conception of tautegorical symbolic intuition augments Hegel's appropriation of the intuitive intellect in a way that *does* account for a priori conceptual content.

2. Hegel vs. Kant on apperception

On a first reading, the *Science of Logic* seems everywhere and always to strictly contraindicate the claim that there is anything even remotely akin to Kant's transcendental aesthetic contained anywhere within it. In the opening pages of the third book of the *Science of Logic*, The Doctrine of the Concept, Hegel goes so far as to pick out Kant's transcendental aesthetic as a particular target for sustained criticism. In this context, Hegel describes the transcendental aesthetic as being *the* specific flaw in Kant's thought that prevented him from fully comprehending and developing the insight he struck upon in the *Critique of Pure Reason*'s account of the transcendental unity of apperception. Hegel writes:

> [Kant's] original synthesis of apperception is one of the most profound principles for speculative development; it contains the beginning of a true apprehension of the nature of the concept and is fully opposed to any empty identity or abstract universality which is not internally a synthesis. –The further development, however, did not live up to this beginning. The term itself, "synthesis," easily conjures up again the picture of an external unity, of a mere combination of terms that are intrinsically separate. Then again, the Kantian philosophy has never gotten over the psychological reflex of the concept and

> has once more reverted to the claim that the concept is permanently conditioned by the manifold of intuition…Here accordingly we have again the supposition that apart from the manifoldness of intuition the concept is without content, empty…[2]

This passage makes two primary points. First, Hegel praises Kant's account of the synthetic unity of apperception for "contain[ing] the beginning of a true apprehension of the nature of the concept." Hegel's language and citations make it clear that he is referring to the second version of Kant's Transcendental Deduction, the "B-deduction." The "true apprehension" in question is here construed as having fundamentally to do with the description of an a priori conceptual form that is neither "empty" nor "abstract." Put positively, Hegel takes Kant's deduction to describe an a priori conceptual form that is contentful in its own right, apart from empirical experience.[3]

Thus far, this actually aligns Kant with Hegel, the latter of whom repeatedly describes his own logical project as being aimed at understanding the way in which logical form is contentful in the absence of empirically given content.[4] In the *Critique of Pure Reason*'s Transcendental Deduction, however, Kant argues precisely to the contrary that, absent the deliverances of the transcendental aesthetic, the categories of the understanding are "mere forms of thought, through which no determinate object is yet cognized."[5] As we might expect in light of this clear and fundamental disagreement, the second central point contained in the passage under

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[2] *Science of Logic* [SL] 520, 12.22-3.

[3] By "content" here I am interested in the kind of sensible content that, in the Kantian picture, is provided to the categories of the understanding by the manifold of intuition. My topic is, thus, the Hegelian equivalent of the transcendental deduction, not the metaphysical deduction. Pippin (2018) has influentially argued that Hegel does not require such a deduction. This is obviously true insofar as Hegel does not take sensible appearances to come to the unity of apperception via a different 'stem' of cognition. However, to my mind a question remains about how conceptual thought applies to itself. The answer to that question is what I am after here.

[4] See paradigmatically SL 12.25, 573. This issue becomes somewhat vexed when pursued because Hegel tends to run together two issues that are held apart by Kant: the formality of transcendental logic and the formality of pure general logic. Hegel does this because he holds i) that neither of these kinds of logic is merely formal, and, moreover, ii) that these two kinds of logic are not, in the final instance, distinct. The precise nature of the formality of Kantian logic is a point of contention in the Kant literature. Cf. MacFarlane (2000) 79-131, which offers a sensitive reading of the formality of Kantian logic that is broadly congruent with Hegel's criticisms.

[5] *Critique of Pure Reason* [CPR] B150, 256. All citations from the CPR are from Guyer & Wood (1998) unless otherwise noted.

consideration from the *Science of Logic* is Hegel's diagnosis of why Kant failed to understand his own insight properly.

The bone of contention between the two thinkers is encapsulated in Hegel's comment about the equivocal character of the term "synthesis." For Hegel, it is crucial that the synthesis that characterizes the transcendental unity of apperception must be "internal." We are not yet in a position to understand what such internal synthesis ought to consist in, but the passage under consideration offers some information about what it *does not* consist in. Hegel contrasts internal synthesis with "external unity" which he describes "as a mere combination of terms that are intrinsically separate." And Hegel diagnoses Kant as having ultimately arrived at such an external view of synthesis because of his inability to get over "the psychological reflex of the concept." Hegel identifies this psychological reflex with holding the views that (i) "the concept is permanently conditioned by the manifold of intuition" and (ii) absent the manifold of intuition, the concept is "without content, empty." So, to sum up, Hegel holds that Kant's insight in the Transcendental Deduction lies in his getting into view the essentially contentful character of conceptuality, while Kant's shortcoming lies in his inability to correctly account for the source of this content. And this shortcoming results directly from Kant's attachment to the idea that conceptual content is provided only by means of spatiotemporal intuition.

3. Sources of Logical Content: Three Options

Hegel's argument immediately provokes at least two questions. One question that naturally arises in light of this is that of *how* a priori conceptual thought comes to be contentful if it does not receive its content from a subjective faculty akin to Kantian intuition. This is the central topic of the Concept Logic and it will be my topic later on in this chapter. But there is also a more basic question that must be answered first. That is: what kind of content could Hegel even

be referring to? If the spatiotemporal deliverances of sensible intuition are ruled out as a candidate for the provision of conceptual content, what other candidates, if any, remain?

3.1 Intellectual Intuition

One option that will come to mind is intellectual intuition [*intellektuelle Anschauung*], which Kant himself often uses as a hypothetical contrast case to sensible intuition. But this path has already been foreclosed to us here by the investigation undertaken in Chapter 2. There, we examined Hegel's critique of Schelling, one of the great post-Kantian champions of intellectual intuition, in detail. This examination revealed that Hegel explicitly and repeatedly rejects the idea that intellectual intuition—and particularly the sort that relies on the geometric method, which Schelling adapts following Fichte and Spinoza—has a role to play in philosophical cognition. This is reiterated at the outset of the *Science of Logic*, where intellectual intuition is dismissed outright because of the philosophical impotence of this cognitive mode's "violent rejection of mediation and of demonstrative, external reflection."[6] Hegel believes he has already made the case for this in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

3.2 Intuitive Understanding

In the opening pages of the Concept Logic, Hegel does, however, refer twice to the philosophical value of the Kantian conception of an "intuitive understanding."[7] As Eckhart Förster importantly points out, although the intuitive understanding [*intuitiver Verstand*] is often mentioned alongside intellectual intuition [*intellektuelle Anschauung*], the two are not identical.[8] Whereas intellectual intuition describes a non-sensible intuition or a spontaneous faculty of intuitions, intuitive understanding describes a non-discursive faculty of cognition. Examining

[6] SL 21.64-5, 55.
[7] At SL 12.25, 522 and 12.26, 523.
[8] Förster (2009) 205.

Critique of Judgment §77, which discusses the resolution to the antinomy of teleological judgment, Förster finds two distinct definitions of the intuitive understanding already contained in Kant's writings. These are "a) the synthetically universal understanding; and b) original understanding, or rather…the cause of the world."[9] Förster argues, and I agree, that Hegel did not believe description b) to be a philosophically fruitful avenue of exploration.[10] This leaves description a), which Förster claims serves as an inspiration for both Goethe and Hegel's post-Kantian philosophical projects.

3.3 Note on Discursivity

In order to weigh in on Hegel's behalf, we will need to examine both this definition and the portion of the *Critique of Judgment* in question. But, first, the issue of cognitive discursivity must be addressed head on. Per Kant, the intuitive understanding is a definitionally non-discursive mode of cognition. As such, in order to assess the relevance of this notion for understanding Hegel's thought, we must get clear on whether or not Hegel subscribes to the Kantian thesis that human cognition is discursive. I submit that the answer is *yes and no*. The ambivalence here results from a disagreement between Kant and Hegel over the kind of conceptuality entailed by the term "discursivity." Kant employs the term "discursivity" to mean at least two things. The primary sense of discursive cognition is "cognition through concepts."[11] This immediately also means cognition by means of judgment: discursive cognition requires the synthesis of concepts in judgment in order to yield knowledge. I will call this notion of discursivity "Discursivity 1."

A secondary sense of discursivity emerges from this definition as a consequence of Kant's understanding of how conceptual cognition occurs. For Kant, as we have already

[9] ibid. Cf. Westphal (2017) 110-11 and Gram (1981).
[10] It is true that Hegel can sometimes sound as if he means something along these lines, but his religious language is (mostly) metaphorical; he certainly doesn't mean to argue that we are gods who can conjure objects into being with our minds.
[11] CPR B93.

discussed in detail, concepts without intuitions are "empty" and, as such, they are at best "mere forms of thought" which fall short of genuine cognition; this holds for both empirical and transcendental concepts.[12] In his Vienna Logic, Kant glosses this claim as follows: "Concepts without sensibility have no object at all. The condition of *all our concepts* finally lies in the senses."[13] Thus, for Kant, insofar as discursivity describes conceptual cognition it also describes cognition that is conditioned by sensible intuition. I will call this second sense of discursivity "Discursivity 2."

Hegel endorses Discursivity 1 but rejects Discursivity 2. He agrees with Kant that cognition is conceptual rather than intuitive, but, as we have already seen, he disagrees with Kant about what the relationship between conceptuality and sensible intuition is.

Hegel's endorsement of Discursivity 1 is, however, importantly qualified by his rejection of Discursivity 2. Kantian conceptuality requires an appeal to spatiotemporal intuition because, as we saw in Chapter 1, this is the only way in which Kant believes the existence of concepts can be exhibited. Further, for Kant, only concepts of the understanding can be exhibited in this way. The existence of "concepts" belonging to the faculty of reason cannot be demonstrated by means of spatiotemporal intuition, and, as such, these are merely notional concepts, what Kant calls "rational ideas." Hegel takes on Kant's distinction between the concepts of reason and the concepts of the understanding, but comes to exactly the opposite conclusion: he will argue that it is rational concepts—in fact, *the* rational concept, as there is ultimately just the one—that really exist, while it is the "concepts" of the understanding that are in some way privative.

Further, Hegel also agrees with Kant that it is precisely the different relationship of these two kinds of concepts to sensible intuition that distinguishes them. On Hegel's view, as we saw in 2.1 above, it is the dependence of concepts of the understanding on externally given intuitions for an exhibition of their objective validity that is precisely their defect, while the virtue of the

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[12] CPR B150, 256.
[13] *Lectures on Logic* [LL] 266, Ak 806. My emphasis.

rational concept is that it requires no such external complement. From this we can infer: either Hegel believes that the existence of what he calls "the rational concept" requires *no* demonstration or else he believes that its existence is demonstrated in some way that does not require spatiotemporal intuition. As we saw in outline above and are on the road to understanding in full, Hegel seems to hold the latter view, insofar as he claims that rational conceptuality has its own "internally provided" content. This is made clearer by paradigmatic comments such as this one from the opening pages of the Concept Logic, where Hegel notes that conceptuality without this internally provided content (i.e. as it comes on the scene at the beginning of the Concept Logic) remains "incomplete" and "abstract":

> It is conceded, in other words, that the cognition that does not go past the concept, purely as concept, is still incomplete, that it has only arrived at abstract truth. But its incompleteness does not lie in its lack of that alleged reality as would be given in feeling and intuition, but in the fact that the concept has yet to **give to itself its own reality, one that it generates out of itself**.[14]

The account of the generation of the content that fills the Hegelian concept is precisely the topic of the Concept Logic. In the course of this final book of the *Science of Logic*, Hegel describes the dialectical progression from the abstract universal that he refers to as "the unconceptualized concept, the concept not posited as such"[15] to the "absolute idea" which "has itself, as the infinite form, for its content."[16]

In light of all this, it should at least be clear that Hegel's endorsement of Discursivity 1 will differ crucially in kind from Kant's. For, though Kant and Hegel agree that cognition is

[14] SL 12.24, 522. My emphasis.
[15] ibid. 12.40, 537.
[16] ibid. 12.237, 736. My emphasis. In his typically contrarian fashion, Hegel insists that the rational idea is contentful whereas the rational concept is empty. This willful inversion of Kant is worth noting: it goes to Hegel's stringent disagreement with his predecessor over the nature of conceptual reality.

nominally conceptual and, as such, discursive, they fundamentally disagree about *what the paradigm case of a cognition-apt concept properly is*, and they thus also must disagree about what cognition by means of concepts, discursivity, is.[17]

3.4 The Intuitive Understanding and Modal Actuality

I raised the question of discursivity in order to offer a framework for evaluating the usefulness of drawing on CJ §77's discussion of the intuitive understanding for understanding what Hegel takes conceptual content to consist in. In light of the points just discussed, I believe it is apparent that the potential usefulness of these passages is not foreclosed by Kant's description of the intuitive understanding as non-discursive. Since Kant and Hegel disagree about what discursivity is, Kant's idea of what is "non-discursive" need not necessarily be synonymous with what Hegel would find "non-discursive." The salience of the passage will hinge instead on the kind of conceptuality under discussion: if Kant's intuitive understanding is concerned only with concepts of the understanding, it will be of limited help for reading Hegel, who is interested in the contentfulness of concepts of reason. As it turns out, the distinction between the different relationships of these two cognitive faculties, the understanding and reason, to the concrete singulars that Kant believes can only be given to us in intuition is the exact topic under discussion in CJ §77. This offers us a preliminary clue regarding what Hegel's interest in the passage might be.

At this juncture, it will be helpful to look more specifically at Hegel's references to the intuitive understanding in the Concept Logic in order to get into view exactly what we ought to be looking for when we turn to the *Critique of Judgment*. As I mentioned above, Hegel refers to the intuitive understanding twice at the outset of the Concept Logic. He does so in the following two passages:

[17] Cf. Pippin (2018) 89-91.

> It will always be a source of wonder how the Kantian philosophy did acknowledge that the relation of thought to sensuous existence (the relation at which it stopped) is only a relation of mere appearance, and also well recognized in the *idea* in general a higher unity of those two terms, even gave expression to it, as for example in the idea of an **intuitive understanding**.[18]

And again, a page later:

> If Kant had measured the idea of **an intuitive understanding** against [his] first definition of truth [as the agreement of cognition with its subject matter], he would have treated that idea which expresses the required agreement, not as a figment of thought but rather as truth.[19]

I read both of these quotations as supporting what I have argued for above: namely, that Hegel's interest in the intuitive understanding has to do with the way it transgresses Kant's claim that the existence of rational ideas cannot be adequately demonstrated in intuition. In the first passage, Hegel puts forth the by now familiar claim that Kant's philosophy went further than Kant himself properly saw. He claims, again, that this is specifically so insofar as Kant acknowledged that i) sensuous existence is "a relation of mere appearance" and ii) that the rational idea offers a higher unity of thought and sensuous existence. And he describes the intuitive understanding as an exemplar of Kant's expression of these claims within the critical philosophy. In the second passage, Hegel reiterates that reflection on the intuitive understanding should have shown Kant that the higher truth of his own system. Specifically, it ought to have shown Kant that the

[18] SL 12.25, 522.
[19] SL 12.26, 523.

rational idea expresses the agreement of cognition with its subject matter and, as such, is "not a figment of thought [i.e. a mere idea, E.L.] but rather…truth."

Both of these claims indicate that what we should be looking for when we look to the intuitive understanding is not a new formal theory for concepts of the understanding, but rather a new theory of the relationship between the rational concept (Hegel) or rational idea (Kant) and its content—a theory that might in turn be used to differentiate and elevate concepts that provide their own content (and, thus, their own demonstration of their reality) above concepts requiring externally given content.

With this in view, let's turn to Kant's text without further preamble. *Critique of Judgment* §77 arrives in the course of Kant's discussion of the resolution to the Antinomy of Teleological Judgment. There is not room here to treat this Antinomy with the sensitivity it no doubt deserves, but, in the simplest possible terms, the topic being considered is the apparent tension between the employment of mechanistic and teleological modes of explanation for natural phenomena. We might describe the problem as one of overgeneration: mechanism and teleology seem to offer two conflicting maxims that direct our investigation of the same set of empirical phenomena.[20] The solution that Kant provides to this Antinomy is relatively straightforward:

> all semblance of an antinomy between the maxims of strictly physical (mechanical) and teleological (technical) explanation rests **on our confusing a principle of reflective judgment with one of determinative judgment**, and **on our confusing the autonomy of reflective judgment (which holds merely subjectively for our use of reason regarding the particular empirical laws) with the heteronomy of determinative judgment,** which must conform to the laws (universal or particular) that are given by understanding.[21]

[20] Cf. Zuckert (2007) 146.
[21] Kant, *Critique of Judgment* [CJ] §71, 270, Ak 389. All citations are from Pluhar unless noted.

Distilled: the Antinomy arises from a confusion about which of our judgments of nature have objective validity and which have merely subjective validity. This confusion, in turn, arises out of a lack of clarity about which of our judgments are heteronomous and which are autonomous—that is, which involve demonstration by means of individuals given in intuition and which do not.

Importantly, this key difference between mechanistic determinative judgments and reflective teleological judgments has to do with which faculty of cognition the concepts they involve belong to. Mechanistic determinative judgments involve cognition through concepts of the understanding, whereas teleological judgments do not. This is so because, as Kant has demonstrated in the first *Critique*, mechanistic causation is a category of the understanding which can be combined a priori with spatiotemporal intuition and shown to be a necessary condition of our empirical experience of nature. Teleological causation cannot be combined with spatiotemporal intuition in this way, and, as such, "this principle is a mere maxim of judgment; and the concept of that causality is a mere idea."[22] Teleological causation is, moreover, an idea *of reason* because it has universal subjective validity for all finite rational cognizers—Kant argues that we must necessarily employ the idea of teleological causation as a regulative principle in order make sense of organized natural bodies, even though we can never demonstrate the objective reality of this mode of causation.

In this context, CJ §77 takes up the question of why it is possible that merely subjective judgments can seem to explain objective natural phenomena. Or, again, why it is that judgments that do not involve the intuitive provision of concrete singulars can seem to have explanatory purport for such singulars. The Kantian answer is complex and a matter of contention within the literature.[23] For our purposes, the point of interest here is Kant's introduction of the intuitive

[22] CJ §71, 269, Ak 389.
[23] On this topic see for example Ginsborg (2015) and Zuckert (2007) 130-167.

understanding as a contrast case with the discursive one in this context, and his further definition of this intuitive understanding as, to use Förster's gloss, a "synthetically universal understanding." Kant's argument is, roughly, that we are able to conceive of *how* some other understanding than our own (the intuitive understanding) could make objectively valid teleological judgments even though we ourselves cannot do this. In Kant's words:

> Our understanding has the peculiarity that when it cognizes, e.g., the cause of a product, it **must proceed from the analytically universal to the particular** (i.e., from concepts to the empirical intuition that is given…**But we can also conceive of an understanding that, unlike ours, is not discursive but intuitive, and hence proceeds from the synthetically universal (the intuition of a whole as a whole) to the particular, i.e., from the whole to the parts**. Hence such an understanding as well as its representation of the whole has no contingency in the combination of the parts in order to make a determinate form of the whole possible.[24]

The salient traits of the intuitive understanding as described here are: 1) that it proceeds from the synthetically universal to the particular, and 2) that, as a consequence of this way of proceeding, contingency is eliminated in the relationship between the parts and the whole that constitute its representations of its objects.

It is this latter claim about the modal status of the representations of the objects of the intuitive understanding that I take to constitute the most crucial distinction between the discursive and intuitive understanding for Kant as Hegel reads him. If an intellect were to be intuitive in the Kantian sense, it would, Kant claims, "have no objects except actual [ones]."[25] The reasoning behind this point is filled out in CJ §76, where Kant writes:

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[24] CJ §77 291, Ak. 407.
[25] CJ §76, 284, Ak. 402.

> I cannot presuppose that thought and intuition are two distinct conditions for the exercise of the cognitive powers of every such cognizing being, and hence for the possibility and actuality of things. An understanding to which this distinction did not apply would mean: All objects cognized by me are (exist); such a being could have **no representation whatever of the possibility that some objects might not exist after all, i.e., of the contingency of those that do exist, nor, consequently, of the necessity to be distinguished from that contingency**.[26]

And:

> our entire distinction between the merely possible and the actual rests on this: in saying that a thing is possible **we are positing only the representation of it with respect to our concept and to our thinking ability in general; but in saying that a thing is actual we are positing the thing itself [*an sich selbst*]**[27]

As I have already noted (following Förster), the account of the modal status of the objects of the intuitive understanding that Kant gives here can be heard in at least two ways. It could be taken to mean that the intuitive understanding brings its objects into being in a material sense by means of its cognitive acts. A reading along these lines would describe the kind of activity typically attributed to a hypothetical divine mind—that is, to a mind capable of creating physical objects by means of mental acts. This is a reading that clearly must be rejected outright if we wish to take Hegel's account of cognition seriously as having explanatory purport for human cognition.

But Kant's claim can also be construed as meaning something much more minimal. We can read it as a claim that simply describes the kinds of a priori formal determinations that would

[26] ibid. 286, Ak. 403. My emphasis.
[27] ibid. 285, Ak 402. My emphasis.

belong to an intuitive understanding. More specifically, these passages can be heard as putting forth a claim about the set of *modal categories* that an intuitive understanding would possess. On Kant's view, our discursive understanding has a set of modal categories (possibility, actuality, and necessity) which "do not augment the concept to which they are ascribed in the least, but rather express only the relation [of the object] to the faculty of cognition."[28] Our possession of a category of the merely possible, Kant tells us in the above quoted passages, indexes the fact that we cognize the world by means of both intuitions and representations. Because representations require intuitions in order to be demonstrated as actual, we are able to conceive of mere representations that have no intuitive counterpart and, thus, are not actual (what Kant describes as "empty" concepts). These possible-but-not-actual representations can run the logical gamut—unicorns, the present king of France, a hundred thalers that I don't have in my bank account.

An intuitive understanding, in contrast to discursive understanding, would not have two cognitive stems. As such, for this kind of mind, intuitions and concepts would not come apart, but rather would always come along together. On this view, we can hear CJ §76 as telling us that possibility would not be a valid category of thought for this sort of mindedness; this kind of thinker simply would not have the capacity for cognizing an empty concept. This is not to say that there would be no coherent account of modal possibility for such a thinker; it just means that, for this kind of mind, the merely possible could not be an object of knowledge. For the intuitive understanding, if something is cognized, then it necessarily exists, and if something exists, it is necessarily cognizable. On this reading, no claim is being made about how what is thought is *brought* into being; it simply describes a criterion on what must be the case about something that is thought by this kind of mind.

Someone familiar with Hegel's oeuvre will be able to detect a resonance between this reading of how the intuitive understanding relates to its objects and the famous *doppelsatz* in the

[28] CPR B266, 322.

Preface to the *Philosophy of Right* stating "what is rational is actual and what is actual is rational."[29] This is not a merely superficial resemblance: rather, I believe that what Hegel finds in Kant's intuitive understanding is exactly the germ of the actuality-centered modal theory of rational concepts that he alludes to in the PR Preface and develops in the Essence Logic. I focus on modality in greater detail elsewhere, but, in this connection, it is worth marking out here the fact that Hegel is critical of Kant's theory of modality throughout the *Science of Logic*. His critique turns specifically on the subjective and external status of the Kantian version of these categories in relation to the objects of thought.[30] In the articulation of his own theory of modality in the *Science of Logic*, Hegel follows Spinoza in order to offer a theory of modality according to which actuality has logical primacy over possibility.[31] This aspect of Hegel's thought is already present *in nuce* in *Faith and Knowledge*, where he claims that Kant's intuitive understanding gestures towards Kant's awareness of "reason and the in-itself" specifically insofar as it does away with a dichotomy between modal actuality and modal possibility:

> [In describing the nondiscursive understanding, Kant] himself shows that his cognitive faculty is aware not only of the appearance and of the separation of the possible and the actual in it, but also of reason and the in-itself. Kant has here before him both the idea of a reason in which possibility and actuality are absolutely identical and its appearance as cognitive faculty wherein they are separated.[32]

This, then, is what I believe Hegel takes from the Kantian intuitive understanding: the notion of a kind of cognition for which the thinkable coincides with the actual.

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[29] Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Right* [PR] 20.
[30] See e.g. SL 21.67, 57 and SL 21.323-4, 282-3. Modality will be one of my central topics in §3.
[31] SL 11.380-92, 477-88.
[32] *Faith and Knowledge* [FK] 89.

A bit more can be said about the formal reasons in virtue of which teleological judgments imply a different conception of modality than mechanistic ones—in what follows, I read Kant in the way I take Hegel to read him with no pretensions to providing a standalone piece of Kant interpretation. As Kant draws attention to in the third *Critique*, teleological judgments involve "[a] representation of the whole [which] has no contingency in the combination of the parts" and this, in turn, "make[s] a determinate form of the whole possible."[33] By this, Kant means to draw attention to the way in which teleological concepts are universals that are, in a certain sense, already equipped with the singulars that compose them. They are wholes that determine their parts. This is easiest to see in the case of maker's knowledge of artifacts: a watchmaker, for example, understands what component parts an object will have if that object is a watch. Yet, in the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant is arguing that we can treat natural objects this way as well. We can judge, e.g., the parts of animals as if they were the parts of an artifact like a watch. Doing so allows us to explain the parts of organic beings in virtue of the roles they play within an organized whole, rather than as a heap of mechanistically caused effects that happen to coincide in one object. This, in turn, allows us to articulate a kind of explanatory complexity that mechanistic explanation cannot capture.

Now, Hegel's particular interest in these sorts of judgments is in the way they are norm involving. That is, insofar as the whole determines the parts, when we run across a teleological object that we possess the concept of, we are entitled to compare the object with its concept. We can ask: is this a good watch? Is this a good rabbit? And if the watch or rabbit in question is missing a hand or a paw, we can judge the object as falling short of its concept. This is something we cannot do in simpler, non-norm involving predicative judgments like "the watch is gold" or "the rabbit is brown." In these latter cases, per Kant, the object given in intuition dictates the appropriateness of the predicate. In the teleological case, the concept dictates the

[33] CJ §77 291, Ak. 407.

appropriateness of our application of it to an intuition. In this way the teleological concept's reality is, at least notionally, given by the concept itself; teleological concepts come equipped with an internal set of criteria for evaluating whether their instances fully instantiate their concept or not.

In the *Science of Logic*, Hegel describes teleological judgments that are norm-involving in this way as "judgments of the concept" because "[t]he concept is at the basis of this judgment, and it is there with reference to the subject matter, as an ought to which reality may or may not conform."[34] And he links these judgments back to his earlier praise of Kant's glimmer of insight regarding the modal aspect of teleological judgments, noting, "the judgment of the concept has been called the judgment of modality."[35] The third of these judgments of the concept, the apodictic judgment, is, on Hegel's view, the highest form of judgment. It is the first form of judgment that Hegel describes as "truly objective" and, as such, he writes that this sort of judgment is "the truth of the judgment."[36] It earns this title precisely insofar as it demonstrates the way in which a conceptual norm can be shown to be instantiated in one of its instances. Hegel tells us:

> The subject of the apodictic judgment ("the house, as so and so constituted, is good," "the action, as so and so constituted, is right") includes, first, the universal, or what it ought to be; second, its constitution; the latter contains the ground why a predicate of the judgment of the concept does or does not pertain to it, that is, whether the subject corresponds to its concept or not.[37]

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[34] SL 12.84, 582.
[35] ibid. In the next sentence, Hegel eschews the term modality because of its implication that the evaluation of the correspondence between an object and its concept is merely subjective. He has a complex story about why this is the case that space prevents me from discussing here.
[36] ibid. 12.88, 585.
[37] ibid. 12.87-8, 585.

Specifically because of this constitutive aspect of normative assessment wherein a singular is affirmed or denied as instantiating a universal, Hegel argues that judgments of this kind display the kind of synthetic universality and modal actualism that Kant claims for the intuitive intellect in the third *Critique*. In Hegel's words, in the apodictic judgment:

> Subject and predicate correspond to each other, and have the same concept, and this content is itself posited concrete universality; that is to say, it contains the two moments, the objective universal or the genus and the singularized universal.[38]

In this way, apodictic judgments demonstrate the congruency of conceptuality across the two terms that comprise them; they show that a concept can be an objective universal (i.e. a normative concept) and a singularized universal (i.e. an instance of a normative concept instantiated in such a way that it satisfies the norm and, thus, exhibits it) at the same time. As a consequence, Hegel believes that these sorts of judgments should be seen as satisfying the intuitive intellect's criterion of modal actuality from within the bounds of discursive cognition: they offer a case in which a supersensible concept, the ideal of X, is shown to be manifest in a sensible object, a good instance of X. In other words, in the successor to Kantian teleological judgments that Hegel calls "judgments of the concept", the rational is shown to be at least potentially actual.

Much more would need to be said in order to get Hegel's highly complex theory of judgment fully (or even partially) into view. For our limited purposes here, however, this sheds some light on what Hegel takes the insight of Kant's account of the intuitive intellect in the context of the CJ §§76-7 discussion of teleological judgments to be.

4. Symbolic Content, First Pass

[38] ibid. 12.88, 585-6.

The question that opened this section was that of *what the content* of Hegel's rational concept *is* if it is not spatiotemporal intuitive content. The question we are now faced with is that of whether or not the intuitive understanding answers the previous question in a satisfying way. In what follows, I contend that it does not. I propose instead that we can only begin to make inroads in Hegel's notion of conceptual contentfulness by appealing to the conception of symbolic intuition that I have developed in Chapters 1 and 2.

I argued above that the intuitive understanding offers an exemplar of a kind of cognition possessed of a different notion of modality than Kant's discursive understanding. For the intuitive understanding, thinkability entails actuality and vice-versa. But, if we reject the idea that this modal claim about the objects of the intuitive understanding requires holding that the intuitive understanding creates objects by thinking them (which, I have claimed, we should), then we are back at square one in terms of accounting for exactly what set of objects it is that meets the terms set by this mode of cognition. And this leaves us without an understanding of what set of objects it is that offer the Hegelian concept its content.

It might be objected that, in the discussion of teleological judgment just referenced, we *are* offered such a set of objects: namely, the set of teleological objects, like houses, that can be judged "conceptually" in the norm-involving way that was discussed. But this is not quite right. We have misunderstood what Hegel is up to in the Subjectivity section of the *Science of Logic* if we take him to be concerned in this section with offering an account of the formal aspect of finite empirical objects. He *will* offer some such account, but he will do so further down the line in the aptly titled "Objectivity" section. In Subjectivity, Hegel is still concerned with logical form in its subjective formal element, in the forms of judgment and inference that Kant arrogates to pure general logic and that we typically associate with the cognitive activity of thinking carried out by rationally minded subjects.

Crucially, Hegel believes that Subjectivity already has a content in advance of Objectivity. He writes at the outset of the Concept Logic:

> This absolute form has in it a content or reality of its own; the concept, since it is not a trivial, empty identity, obtains its differentiated determinations in the moment of negativity or of absolute determining; and the content is only these determinations of the absolute form and nothing else—a content posited by the form itself and therefore adequate to it. This form is for this reason of quite another nature than logical form is ordinarily taken to be.[39]

Here we are offered a programmatic definition of what this content will be: the content of absolute form will be its determinations. In Subjectivity, these determinations are the dialectically developed set of conceptual, judgmental, and inferential forms. Thus, in the context of the case under discussion, that of the apodictic judgment of the concept, Hegel's interest is emphatically not in the way a certain kind of object serves as the content of a certain type of judgment. Rather, he is interested in the way this judgment itself, alongside other forms of judgments and inferences, may be said to serve as the content of absolute form.

This, then, is Hegel's provisional answer to the question of what the content of the concept will be, at least at the outset of the Concept Logic, in the Subjectivity section: the contentfulness of the concept will initially consist in the forms of pure general logic. And this leaves us far afield of anything proposed by *Critique of Judgment* §§76 and 77.

Having rejected both intellectual intuition and intuitive intellect as models, how are we to make sense of the idea that the set of objects that serve as the content of the Hegelian concept will include formal logical objects like concepts, judgments and syllogisms? My proposal is this: in Subjectivity, Hegel is drawing on the model of symbolic exhibition described by Kant and developed by Schelling in order to show how conceptual form exhibits its own reality within itself. Recall that Kant's aim in introducing symbolic intuition was to demonstrate the way in

[39] SL 12.25-6, 573.

which an aesthetic idea could be used in a reflective procedure of analogy in order to (inadequately) exhibit the existence of a rational idea. Schelling, in turn, modified the Kantian symbolic intuition in order to argue that certain finite individual objects (works of art) could *adequately* symbolize certain rational ideas (the idea of the universal or absolute). Hegel, finally, critiqued Schelling for denying that philosophy itself is possessed of this symbolic power. And in the Subjectivity section of the *Science of Logic*, I read Hegel as landing his counterargument: here, he shows that logical form is itself symbolic in the way that Schelling believed only art could be.

To recall, the unique feature of the Schellingian symbol is its "tautegorical" status, meaning its complete identity with the thing it symbolizes. In Whistler's words, the tautegorical symbol "does not refer to a referent outside itself; it participates in and so shares its being with this referent. The symbol presents *itself* and does not refer to anything outside itself…[it is] not just a copy of its referent; it is its referent."[40] It is, in short, a mode of intuitive exhibition, a *Darstellungsart*, that is non-schematic while being adequate to its concept. Whistler further notes that this sort of symbol displays the "unity of meaning and being."[41] This is so because the tautegorical symbol's self-referentiality requires that its meaning and its being always come along together; its existence consists in its meaningfulness and its meaning consists in its existence. It can thus be viewed as possessing the kind of modal actuality that Hegel praised Kant for attributing to the objects of an intuitive understanding.

These claims bear a marked resemblance to those that Hegel lays out at the beginning of the Logic of the Concept, when he praises Kant for having defined truth as the "agreement of cognition with its subject matter."[42] Hegel writes that this definition is one of "supreme value" and he adopts it as his own.[43] He then goes on to emphasize that absolute form, "in order to be true, must have a content in it which is adequate to its form."[44] This is so, he notes, because "it

[40] Whistler (2013) 39.
[41] ibid.
[42] SL 12.26, 523.
[43] SL 12.26, 523.
[44] SL 12.27, 524

necessarily takes two for an agreement"[45] Rephrased more technically, lacking a content, the Hegelian concept would lack truth. Yet, since he has already argued that the concept cannot be in any way conditioned by anything external to it, Hegel faces a challenge; he requires a *Gesprächspartner* (so to speak) for his rational concept that is not other than it. The solution he arrives at is quite elegant: he proposes that the reality of logical form is, at least in the first instance, exhibited by logical form*s*, plural. More specifically, the internal reality of the synthetic unity of transcendental subjectivity is demonstrated by the formal determinations that, in the Kantian system, belong to pure general logic. And I believe Hegel takes himself to be entitled to make this claim specifically insofar as the forms of pure general logic, properly understood, demonstrate the unity of transcendental subjectivity in precisely the manner of a tautegorical symbol. This is to say, on the view Hegel describes in Subjectivity, these determinate logical forms can claim to be truth-bearing only insofar as they exhibit the reality of the rational concept: the truth of these forms of conceptual determination inheres in their agreement with their concept, which is *the* Concept. And this agreement, rephrased one final time, is nothing other than the exhibition of the abstract universal concept by means of this set of concrete singular conceptual determinations.[46]

To return to the argument, on my reading, the formal structure that I have described as "tautegorical symbolization" is exactly what Hegel means to describe when he articulates the self-determining activity of the Concept as follows at the outset of "The Concept"—I will give

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[45] ibid.

[46] A quick note on the distinction between "reality" [*Realität*] and "existence" [*Dasein*] will be helpful here. Hegel is very clear in the Introduction to the Concept Logic that when he discusses the reality of logical form, he is not discussing existence (which we should translate here literally, as "being there") in space and time. He states, "Since it is logic above all and not science generally whose relation to truth is the issue here, it must be further conceded that logic as the formal science cannot also contain, nor should contain, the kind of reality which is the content of the other parts of philosophy, of the sciences of nature and of spirit."[46] As has hopefully become implicitly clear in the foregoing discussion and as I will state explicitly now, Hegel's argument for a priori conceptual content is dependent on decoupling the exhibition of conceptual reality [*Darstellung*] from anything having to do with spatiotemporal existence. I will discuss the fate of spatiotemporal intuition in the next chapter. For now, however, it is sufficient to flag that none of the comments in what follows about the concept's reality make any claims about what exists physically or materially or, perhaps most accurately, empirically. In a certain sense, showing the possibility of decoupling reality and existence is the entire point of the *Science of Logic*.

the whole quotation, which is quite convoluted, and then go through it sentence by sentence below:

> The true, infinite universal…determines itself freely; the process by which it becomes finite is not a transition, the kind that occurs only in the sphere of being; it is creative power as self-referring absolute negativity. As such, it differentiates itself internally, and this is a determining, because the differentiating is one with the universality. Accordingly, it is a positing of differences that are themselves universals, self-referring. They become thereby fixed, isolated differences. The isolated subsistence of the finite that was earlier determined as its being-for-itself, also as thinghood, as substance, is in its truth universality, the form with which the infinite concept clothes its differences – a form which is equally itself one of its differences.[47]

I have chosen this passage because it occurs at the very first moment of determination in the Concept Logic, at the point of transition from Universality to Particularity. The language of these sections of Hegel's text is particularly difficult, and a quick prefacing note on terminology will be helpful: I will rigorously follow di Giovanni's use of "singularity" as a translation for Hegel's "*einzelheit*" and its variations, and of "particularity" as a translation for Hegel's "*besonderheit*" and its variations. I will use "individual" to refer to the more general discussion of "singular" terms, e.g. outside of Hegel's specific discussion of singularity in the Concept Logic or across the works of different authors. With this in view, we are prepared to parse the text.

i. *"The true, infinite universal…determines itself freely; the process by which it becomes finite is not a transition, the kind that occurs only in the sphere of being; it is creative power as self-referring absolute negativity."*

[47] 12.36-7, 533-4.

Hegel describes the Concept (the "true, infinite universal") as determining itself freely. This is a reference to the way in which the model he is about to propose both results from and goes beyond the model of Spinozistic metaphysical necessity that he has described in the Essence Logic. I will explore this claim in §4 but merely describe and flag it for now. Still drawing on the argument of the Essence Logic, Hegel calls the Concept "creative power as self-referring absolute negativity" because universality is active and its activity simply consists in the fact that it is itself. For our purposes the most crucial phrase here is "self-referring": here Hegel describes conceptual determinations as displaying the kind of internal reference that tautegorical symbols have.

ii. *"As such, it differentiates itself internally, and this is a determining, because the differentiating is one with the universality."*

This sentence unpacks the previous sentence's use of "self-referring." It further underscores the way in which conceptual determinations do not differ in kind from the concept itself. Conceptual determinations are not external to the concept because the activity of differentiating *is* universality: put otherwise, the concept's determinations exhibit its existence and this existence is nothing other than the act of self-exhibition.

iii. *"Accordingly, it is a positing of differences that are themselves universals, self-referring."*

Because they are tautegorical symbols, the concept's determinations display the concept's form, including its self-exhibiting universality.

iv. *"They become thereby fixed, isolated differences."*

Because they display the concept's form, the symbols are universal in their own right, and not merely in reference to something else. As such, the concept's determinations can be

logically distinguished from one another (they are "isolated") and they have stable structures (they are "fixed") that can be described as meaningful in their own right, as universal forms (Hegel describes the determinations as being each "a lower genus"[48]).

v. *"The isolated subsistence of the finite that was earlier determined as its being-for-itself, also as thinghood, as substance, is in its truth universality, the form with which the infinite concept clothes its differences – a form which is equally itself one of its differences."*

In this sentence Hegel claims to have solved a problem carried over from the Essence Logic: specifically, the problem of how it is possible to understand singular terms as identical with universal terms. His claim is that only by understanding conceptual determinations as singulars that are simultaneously universals in the way just described, the way I have termed "tautegorical symbolization," can the idea of identity in difference, the agreement of concept and intuition, that characterizes the Hegelian concept be adequately demonstrated.

Thus, in the course of this abstruse passage, Hegel describes conceptual determination as a process that introduces a set of differentiated individuals that exhibit conceptual universality. He concludes here by describing a conception of logical singularity that I take to be his logical successor concept to the Schellingian tautegorical symbol.

This comes into sharper focus in Hegel's discussion of singularity at the end of "The Concept." Here, Hegel helpfully contrasts the different conceptions of individuality that have arisen in the three books of the Logic. He refers to the individual as "the this," a phrase originally introduced in the very early stages of the Logic of Being to describe the most minimal sort of finite individuality.[49] He writes:

[48] SL 12.36, 533.
[49] SL 21.104, 90

> The *this is*; it is *immediate*, it is a *this*, however, only in so far as it is *pointed at*. This "pointing at" is the reflective movement that takes hold of itself and posits the immediacy, but as something external to itself.[50]

In the Logic of Being, "the this" is described. In the Logic of Essence, the act of "pointing at" or referring to "the this" is described. But it is only now, in the Logic of the Concept that these two acts are united. Their union consists precisely in the sort of self-referential singularity that I have been tracking. In Hegel's words:

> The singular, which in the reflective sphere of concrete existence is as a this, does not have the excluding reference to the other that is characteristic of qualitative being-for-itself…the singular surely is also a *this*, as an immediate which is the result of mediation, but does not have this mediation outside it; it is itself repelling separation…yet is, precisely in its separation, a positive connection.[51]

Thus, the conception of singularity that is introduced in The Concept is that of a singular that is referred to but lacks reference to anything other than itself; it is, in short, self-referential or tautegorical. And, as we have already seen, it is also symbolic insofar as it exhibits the concept as a conceptual determination. It is, in short, an adequate symbolic exhibition of the concept. This is what I take Hegel to be getting at when he deploys such tortuous phrases as, "the turning back of the determinate concept into itself means that its determination is to be in its determinateness the whole concept."[52]

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[50] SL 12.52, 549
[51] SL 12.51-2, 549
[52] SL 12.51, 548. [52] It might be objected at this point that the formal relation between the Concept and its determinations that I have been articulating is specifically tied to the Subjectivity section of the *Logic* and, as such, is of limited use for understanding the rest of the Concept Logic. The first point is obviously true: the Subjectivity

I have proposed here that Hegel's claim in Subjectivity is that the correspondence of traditional logical forms to the a priori synthetic unity of the Concept, the Hegelian successor to the Kantian "I think," is a tautegorical symbolic correspondence. This means that these forms are concrete individuals that exhibit a conceptual universal *without differing in kind from it*. The key to understanding how Hegel arrives at this claim and how it works will require further examination of the details of the Subjectivity section as well as looking at the transition from Essence to Concept. I take up these topics in the next chapter.

5. A Note on Empirical Cognition

Before moving on, I would like to return briefly to a point that has already been mentioned in passing, but which will benefit from further consideration: namely, the fate of the cognitive contributions made by Kant's two stems of cognition, intuition and understanding, in Hegel's model of cognition. In the foregoing discussion, it has become clear that Hegel conceives of the logical role of intuition in a very different way than Kant does. This is centrally displayed in Hegel's rejection of the Kantian claim that conceptual thinking is conditioned by spatiotemporal intuition. In order to defend this position, Hegel rejects the idea that cognition through concepts requires the exhibition of representative concepts (as I will refer to concepts of the understanding, what Hegel terms "*Vorstellungen*," from here on out) by means of intuitions.

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section *is* the primary section of the *Science of Logic* in which traditional logical forms like judgments and inferences are discussed. But I believe there are at least three reasons why emphasizing the importance of this particular section of text does not preclude the global applicability of the model I am describing:

1) Subjectivity is the opening section of the Concept Logic and, as such, it grounds the two sections that come after it. Thus, any attempt to articulate Hegel's view of conceptual content will need to begin with this section and, at the very least, understand how and why further sections differ from it, if in fact they do differ.
2) Further, the language of judgment and syllogism will persist throughout all three sections of the Concept Logic, as well as into the *Philosophy of Nature* and the *Philosophy of Spirit*. Thus, these logical forms are clearly of more than local importance to Hegel.
3) Finally, and more speculatively, the topics treated in this section of the *Science of Logic* bring Hegelian logic into contact with a variety of traditional and contemporary views of logic, many of which make claims to being rigorously formal (Kant, Frege). In light of this, understanding how Hegel understands logical form to be contentful in these more recognizable cases will potentially be helpful for understanding the sort of intervention Hegel is trying to make in the less conventionally "logical" parts of the Concept Logic.

In light of these points, I believe my focus on this portion of the Concept Logic is warranted.

But this does not mean that Hegel thinks intuitions and representations have *no* philosophical role to play at all. In the opening pages of the Concept Logic, Hegel describes the relationship of these cognitive forms to logical form in the following way:

> such [cognitive] shapes as intuition, representation, and the like, belong to the self-conscious spirit which, as such, does not fall within the scope of logical science…spirit, as intuiting as well as sensuous consciousness, is in the form of immediate being, just as spirit as representational and also perceptual consciousness has risen from being to the stage of essence or reflection. But these concrete shapes are of as little interest to the science of logic as are the concrete forms that logical determinations assume in nature. These last would be space and time, then space and time as assuming a content, as inorganic and then organic nature.[53]

In this passage, Hegel is claiming that it is both possible and necessary to delaminate three aspects of the transcendental aesthetic that Kant himself does not believe can come apart. These are: (i) the sensory activity of perceiving and judging empirical objects, (ii) space and time as the transcendentally ideal forms of physical objects, and (iii) conceptual exhibition or *Darstellung*. This is a way of summing up the point we have been tracking throughout this section in considering the internally provided content of the Hegelian Concept.

In the Kantian picture, these three aspects of intuition hang tightly together. Space and time are the a priori forms of our human intuition and, as such, they condition all a posteriori acts of intuition. Exhibition [*Darstellung*] is the action whereby the objective reality (i.e. the being) of a concept is established by means of an adequate intuition. Hence, on Kant's view, all

[53] SL 12.19-20, 517.

conceptual exhibition, a priori or a posteriori, necessarily involves space and time because all of our intuitions are spatiotemporal, and all exhibition involves intuition.

In the Hegelian picture, things are otherwise: For Hegel, the sensory activity of empirical intuiting is discussed in the *Philosophy of Spirit*. Space and time as forms belonging to physical objects are discussed in the *Philosophy of Nature*. And, as I have just argued, conceptual exhibition or the demonstration of the reality of the concept, is the charge to be completed in the *Science of Logic*. In this way, Hegel divides up the tasks of the transcendental aesthetic across the three volumes of the Encyclopedia and treats them as three distinct topics that have structurally distinct roles to play in his account of the shared rational transparency of mind and world.

The Hegelian analogues to Kant's intuitions and representations, then, will belong to the kind of cognition discussed in the *Philosophy of Spirit*. Hegel alternately terms this kind of cognition "finite cognition," "empirical cognition," and, even, "self-conscious cognition."[54] These all describe the kind of cognition that we are engaging in most of the time, when we assess the world we move in as a matter of course in our daily lives. The *Philosophy of Spirit* account of finite cognition will be my focus in the final section of this project, but I will offer a brief preview here since it bears on the part of the *Logic* we will review below.

In the *Philosophy of Spirit*'s Psychology section, Hegel offers a robust treatment of the way in which finite cognition begins at the most minimal sense-impression (a mere feeling—*Gefühl*) and proceeds dialectically to rational thought. Whereas Kantian finite cognition has *two* stems, Hegel's version is, predictably, monistic. At the same time, however, Hegelian finite cognition (what he terms "Theoretical Spirit" [*theoretische Geist*] and which is best glossed along the more awkward but less enigmatic lines of "thinking about non-minded objects that appear in empirical

[54] ibid. Hegel's use of "self-conscious" to describe finite cognition may seem somewhat misleading since, on the view I am arguing for, he is obviously interested in giving an account of transcendental subjectivity in the *Science of Logic*. But I cannot "self-consciously" think logical form in the same way I can "self-consciously" think that something on the table in front of me is blue: this is the whole point of Hegel's rejection of intellectual intuition on the grounds of its immediacy. Philosophical thinking employs an act of reflection in order to make the self-consciousness of my judgments explicit; we can think of this act of reflection as consisting precisely in looking away from the empirical self in order to get the transcendental self into view.

experience") is internally articulated into dialectical moments. Depending on how one counts, there are around twelve of these. The three primary moments comprising Theoretical Spirit, however, are "intuition," "imagination" and "thought."

On the view I will argue for in the subsequent chapter, whereas the *Science of Logic* describes how conceptual form can be viewed as having its own content, the *Philosophy of Spirit*'s Psychology describes how perceptual content has its own conceptual form. In the Kantian terms from the third *Critique* that I have used before, the logic offers an account of the way in which a rational idea can be self-exhibiting, and the Psychology offers a corresponding account of the way in which an aesthetic idea can offer its own conceptual exposition. These two accounts are structurally parallel and split Kant's Transcendental Deduction into what Hegel takes to be its conditioned and unconditioned portions: while the *Logic* deals with the synthetic unity of the transcendental subject, the Psychology takes up the topic of figurative synthesis, offering a robust treatment of the role of the imagination in object perception.

Moreover, as Hegel already proposed in *Faith and Knowledge* and as we should expect if we read Hegel as taking on Kant's commitments in the transcendental deduction, the content of logical form coincides with the form of sensible content. The transition from Imagination to Thinking is described in the *Philosophy of Spirit* as the act of giving a sensible referent a name. This is so because an act of naming transforms a mute sensation into a rational term that can be used in an act of judgment or inference. Thus, the point of contact between finite cognition and infinite cognition is language. When we name the objects of figurative synthesis and then use these names in predicative acts, we demonstrate the commensurability of matter and form.

I mention this here because my topic in the next chapter will be the a priori contentful character of logical form as Hegel treats this topic in the Concept Logic. As such, we will be operating in a space where the empirical content of judgments and syllogisms does not have any standing. But this does not mean Hegel has no story to tell about these contents; Hegel's disentanglement of intellectual and figurative synthesis should not be taken as a wholesale

rejection of the philosophical relevance of the sensible. My ultimate aim is to show that just the opposite is true: Hegel goes to great lengths to separate the intelligible out from the sensible in order to offer the strongest possible holistic case that these realms are mutually interdependent.

Chapter 4: Hegel's Post-Kantian Theory of Apperception

1. Introduction

The goal of the chapter that follows is to make a claim about the particular sort of synthesis that characterizes the Hegelian version of the synthetic unity of apperception. I claim (1) that Hegelian apperceptive synthesis is crucially different from Kantian apperceptive synthesis and (2) that Hegel uses resources from Kant's thought in order to describe his own alternate account. Specifically, I argue that Hegel draws on Kant's *Critique of Judgment* §59 discussion of symbolic synthesis in order to offer an account of apperceptive synthesis that does not depend on the deliverances of spatiotemporal intuition.

Hegel's modification of Kant's account of apperception hinges on his rejection of Kant's transcendental aesthetic and specifically on his rejection of Kant's proposal that time is the form of inner sense. On my reading, Hegel holds that synthetic unity itself is a form of intuition. The question of what this means and how it is possible is the topic I aim to address here.

Throughout the chapter, I rely on the notion of logically adequate symbolic intuition that I have developed in earlier chapters of the dissertation. I have termed this "tautegorical symbolization" though here I use it interchangeably with "logically adequate symbolization"[1] Very briefly: this sort of symbolization is a mereological model originally based on Kant's account of symbolic intuition in the *Critique of Judgment* and subsequently developed by Schelling in his identity philosophy. Logically adequate symbolization is a relationship between whole and part in which the part is i) identical to the whole and ii) offers a "display of the existence" [in German: *Darstellung*; in Kant's Latin: *hypotyposis*] of the whole. Schelling argues that artworks are

[1] I borrow the phrase from Daniel Whistler's work on Schelling.

the paradigm sort of "tautegorical" symbol. I argue that Hegel thinks the forms of judgment and inference are logically adequate symbols of the Hegelian Concept, the "I think."

My further claim in this chapter is that the use of symbolic form permits Hegel to argue, contra Kant, that the synthetic unity of the "I" is available a priori as an object of intuition. Pursuantly, one of the central stakes of what follows is to show that Hegel's *Logic* contains an analogue to Kant's transcendental deduction.[2] However, this "deduction" looks very different than it does in the first *Critique* due to Hegel's rejection of Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic. What Hegel must show is how the rational Concept provides intuitive content to its own discursive forms. And this, I claim, is the work that symbolic form does in the *Science of Logic*.

The chapter proceeds as follows: I begin by looking at claims Kant makes in the first *Critique's* Paralogisms chapter about what is required for cognition of the "I think." Next, I contrast the schematic and symbolic modes of synthesis as Kant describes them. I then discuss Hegel's positive view as well as some additional points of contact between Kant and Hegel.

2. The Kantian "I think"

2.1 These rational psychologists—what do they really mean?

To start, I wish to frame the point at issue in terms of the Paralogisms chapter of the Transcendental Dialectic. In this chapter of the first *Critique*, Kant takes on the views about the soul held by his rationalist predecessors (among whom he mentions Descartes by name, and we can assume also Leibniz). One of the key arguments that Kant makes in the chapter is about the unavailability of the soul as an object of intuition. Kant believes that the rational psychologist is crucially confused on this point, and that many of the central arguments of rational psychology can be rejected if this confusion is cleared up.

[2] Pippin (most recently in 2018) has influentially argued that Hegel's Science of Logic takes its cues from Kant's metaphysical deduction. I think this is right as regards the Objective Logic. But I think this cannot make full sense of what Hegel is up to in "Subjectivity." Here, the derived thought determinations from the Objective Logic are brought to the Concept, i.e. the unity of apperception, and shown to be have a priori content. This, to my mind, is an echo of the project of the Transcendental Deduction.

For Kant, as we have seen time and again, only objects given in intuition can be cognized. The soul or the "unity of consciousness," per Kant, is not given in intuition. Thus, the rational psychologist is wrong to think that certain qualities of the soul (specifically, its substance, simplicity, and persistence) can be known.[3] Kant writes:

> rational psychology has its origin in a mere misunderstanding. The unity of consciousness, which grounds the categories, is here taken for an intuition of the subject as an object, and the category of substance is applied to it. But this unity is only the unity of thinking, through which no object is given; and thus the category of substance, which always presupposes a given intuition, cannot be applied to it, and hence this subject cannot be cognized at all.[4]

Thus, at least one element of the rational psychologist's confusion is that he attempts to treat the subject of cognition as an object of cognition. This is an unlicensed argumentative move, Kant argues, because it is impossible that the ground of cognition should be an object of that same cognition:

> the subject of the categories cannot, by thinking them, obtain a concept of itself as an object of the categories; for in order to think them [the categories, E.L.], it must take its pure self-consciousness, which is just what is to be explained, as its ground. Likewise, the subject, in which the representation of time originally has its ground, cannot thereby determine its own existence in time, and if the latter cannot be, then the former as a determination of its self (as a thinking being in general) through categories can also not take place.[5]

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[3] Cf. Kitcher (1982).
[4] CPR B422.
[5] Ibid.

Thus, because of it the "I"'s status as the ground of both the categories and the forms of intuition, Kant holds that the "I" cannot be either an object of the categories or the forms of intuition.

The refutation of rational psychology may seem to fall far afield of Hegel, who, as we have seen, takes Kant himself to task for the "psychological" character of his idealism. It is true that, at least in his Logics, Hegel is not interested in giving an account of the soul. He is, however, deeply interested in giving an account of the transcendental unity of apperception. Further, as we have seen in the Chapter 3, Hegel is also interested in demonstrating that there is an a priori logical content belonging to the transcendental unity of apperception that does not derive from spatiotemporal intuition. And, because of the approach Kant takes in his refutation of rational psychology, this is one of the issues at stake in the Paralogisms: they center on a question about whether or not the "I" is given in intuition.

In this context, we can hear Hegel's critique of Kant's idealism as overly psychological in a new way: Kant is guilty of psychologizing apperception because he runs together the empirical and the logical in his account of the "I think." This is evident in Kant's conviction that a spatiotemporal intuition would be required in order to cognize the "I think" as an object. Kant is clearly correct that the unity of apperception is not given in spatiotemporal intuition. But, he is wrong to assume that there is not some other way in which the I might cognize itself—Kant's attachment to his own psychologically bound Transcendental Aesthetic prevents him from exploring this possibility. At least, this is what I will argue Hegel thinks.

Kant takes himself to have provided a powerful refutation of the rational psychologist in the Paralogisms. But, from a Hegelian perspective, he has issued a challenge: what would need to be the case in order for an a priori intuition of the synthetic unity of apperception to be provided?

In fact, in the A-version of the Paralogisms, Kant himself speculates on this point. There, he muses that, if the "I" were an intuition, it could be cognized:

> For in that which we call the soul, everything is in continual flux, and it has nothing abiding, except perhaps (if one insists) the "I", which is simple only because this representation has no content, and hence no manifold, on account of which it seems to represent a simple object, or better put, it seems to designate one. If it were to be possible to bring about a pure rational cognition of the nature of a thinking being in general, **this "I" would have to be an intuition, which, since it would be presupposed in all thinking in general (prior to all experience), would, as an intuition, supply a priori synthetic propositions.**[6]

But Kant quickly curtails this line of thought:

> Yet **this "I" is no more an intuition than it is a concept of any object**; rather, it is the mere form of consciousness, which accompanies both sorts of representations and which can elevate them to cognitions only insofar as something else is given in intuition, which provides the material for the representation of an object.[7]

Hegel, of course, *does* think that what Kant here calls the "I", the synthetic unity of apperception, is a concept. In the Hegelian picture it is *the* Concept, the form of everything that is. In the remainder of this chapter, I wish to show that Hegel also thinks the "I", the synthetic unity of apperception, has an intuitive aspect and, more specifically, that this intuitive aspect is symbolic. This will be my topic in what follows.

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[6] CPR A381-2. Translation modified for clarity.
[7] Ibid. A382.

2.2 Note on Terminology

Before proceeding a note on terminology. The previous section follows Kant and Hegel in using several formulations interchangeably: the "I", the "I think", the form of self-consciousness, and synthetic unity. These all, at various points in the first *Critique* and the *Science of Logic*, are used to describe the unity of apperception.

On my reading, the key difference between Hegel and Kant's versions of apperception is Hegel's rejection of the Kantian claim that apperception is equivalent to the form of self-consciousness only. For Hegel, the unity of apperception is the form of both self-conscious mind and non-self-conscious world. Thus, we might describe Hegel's version of apperception as being more general than Kant's—self-consciousness is just one type of apperceptive mode in the Hegelian picture, whereas it is synonymous with apperception in the Kantian picture.

The thorniest difficulty in tracking this difference lies in the way that Hegel draws on terms that strongly suggest self-consciousness—words like "subjectivity" and "thought"—in order to describe both mental and physical items. But Hegelian subjectivity is not equivalent to mind—it is a more minimal formal notion. Many question and objections that I do not have room to consider here can, of course, be raised in response this claim. The discussion of Spirit and Nature in Chapter 5 go to some of these.

3. The Two Modes of A Priori Synthesis

3.1 Schematic synthesis

Hegel rejects the first *Critique* account of apperceptive synthesis by rejecting Kant's aesthetic. He finds resources in the third *Critique*, however, that provide the foundations for his own revised account of apperception—and, I will ultimately argue, for a "non-psychological" version of Kant's aesthetic.

As we saw in Chapter 1, in *Critique of Judgment* §59, Kant divides intuitions that provide content for *a priori* concepts into two sub-categories, the schematic and the symbolic:

> All **hypotyposis** (exhibition, *subjecto sub adspectum*), as making [a concept] sensible, is of one of two kinds: either **schematic**, where to a concept grasped by the understanding the corresponding intuition is given *a priori*; or **symbolic**, where to a concept which only reason can think, and to which no sensible intuition can be adequate, an intuition is attributed with which the power of judgment proceeds in *a way merely analogous* to that which it observes in schematization, i.e.*, it is merely the rule of this procedure, not of the intuition itself, and thus merely the form of the reflection, not the content, which corresponds to the concept*…[8]

Kant's designation of intuitions as either symbolic or schematic has to do with the kinds acts of synthesis in which these types of intuitions can respectively be involved. Schematic intuitions are used in acts of schematic synthesis, while symbolic intuitions are used in acts of symbolic synthesis. To start, I will look at schematic synthesis.

At the most basic level, the distinguishing trait of schematic acts of synthesis is that they involve intuitions and concepts that are provided by distinct cognitive faculties.[9] The incommensurability of the representations provided by these distinct cognitive faculties requires the introduction of a third term, a schema, that allows for their synthesis. Kant argues: "it is clear that there must be a **third thing** which must stand in homogeneity with the category on the one hand and the appearance on the other, and make possible the application of the former to the latter."[10] Kant goes on to state that the "third thing" in question must have a foot in both the conceptual and the intuitive domains by being both "intellectual on the one hand and sensible on the other" and he dubs the sort of representation that satisfies this requirement for cases of a

[8] CJ §59, my emphases. Translation adapted.
[9] Pursuing Kant's exact view on this topic leads into a variety of live debates in the Kant literature which cannot be taken up here. I believe, however, that the contrast between schematic and symbolic synthesis that Hegel wishes to draw will stand for any reading of Kant that does not altogether reject Kant's view that time as "inner sense" is somehow involved in objectively valid cognition. I am not aware of any readings of Kant that make this claim.
[10] CPR A138/B177, my emphasis.

priori synthesis a "transcendental schema."[11] Kant claims that, properly understood, such a schema facilitates the synthesis of the categories of the understanding provided in the transcendental analytic and the forms of intuition provided in the transcendental aesthetic. It is true that the precise role and function of Kant's schematism within his larger theory of cognition remains contested amongst Kant scholars. For our purposes, however, we need not be concerned in detail with how Kant's schemata function; we simply need to mark the fact that Kant thinks a third term of this sort is needed in order to effectively synthesize spatiotemporal intuitions and pure concepts of the understanding, even in the a priori case.

Hegel comments on schematic synthesis in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*. He writes:

> In the self-conscious mind there are pure concepts of the understanding and pure intuitions; the relationship between these is the *schematism* of the pure understanding, the transcendental imagination, which determines the pure intuitions in conformity with the pure categories of the understanding, and in this way makes the transition to experience.—**This relationship is one of the most attractive aspects of the Kantian philosophy**, by means of which pure sensibility and pure understanding, which have thus far been said to be distinct and absolutely opposed terms, are united. **It is an 'intuitive understanding' or an 'understanding intuition' [*verständiges Anschauen*]; but Kant does not grasp this, he does not put together the thought that he has here posited the two aspects of cognition as one, the in-itself itself.** [For Kant] understanding and sensibility both remain distinct particularities that are bound together in an external, superficial way, like a piece of wood and a leg bound together by a cord.[12]

[11] ibid.
[12] My translation of Hegel (2013), 346-7, Hegel's italics, my bold emphases. [Im Gemüte, Selbstbewußtsein sind also reine Verstandesbegriffe und reine Anschauungen; die Beziehung beider aufeinander ist der *Schematismus* des reinen

On the face of it, this passage can seem to signal Hegel's overall approval for the schematism, and particularly so in the parts I have put in bold. But this is not precisely correct, as is evidenced by the critical slant of the final sentence. Here, Kant's schemata are likened to a cord that externally binds two utterly disparate objects—a leg and a piece of wood—together. Ostensibly the image is of a splint, and, if we allow ourselves to place any stock in Hegel's use of figurative language, the metaphor seems to further telegraph that there is something corrective or perhaps even makeshift about Kant's external application of the transcendental schemata to his pure intuitions and concepts. In any case, Hegel is clearly not offering a straightforward endorsement of Kant's procedure.

What Hegel *is* approving of here is the relationship between intuition and concept that the schemata pick out. It is this relationship, not the schemata themselves, that Hegel refers to as "one of the most attractive aspects of the Kantian philosophy." The specific attraction of this relationship is in turn fleshed out as the provision of a single representation that involves both intuition and concept. Hegel describe this representation as being an "intuitive understanding" or an "understanding intuition." Note that this latter is specifically *not* intellectual intuition—the German is *verständiges Anschauen* not *intellektuelle Anschauung*. Further, Hegel is talking here about a specific kind of activity of mind and not marking out a distinct capacity that provides it. This is because Hegel's interest is to show that Kant's picture of discursive cognition already relies on the kinds of representations that Kant claims could only be provided by a non-discursive kind of mind. The schemata, on Hegel's reading, are the kinds of janus-faced representations that we

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Verstands, die transzendentale *Einbildungskraft*, welche die reine Anschauung, der Kategorie, dem reinen Verstandesbegriffe gemäß, bestimmt, so den Übergang zur Erfahrung macht. – Diese Verbindung ist wieder eine der schönsten Seiten der Kantischen Philosophie, wodurch reine Sinnlichkeit und der reine Verstand, die als absolut entgegengesetzte Verschiedene vorhin ausgesagt wurden, vereinigt werden. Es ist ein anschauender, intuitiver Verstand, oder verständiges Anschauen; aber so nimmt und begreift es Kant nicht, er bringt diese Gedanken nicht zusammen, daß er hier beide Erkenntnisstücke in Eins gesetzt hat, – das Ansich derselben. Denken, Verstand bleibt ein Besonderes, Sinnlichkeit ein Besonderes, die auf äußerliche, oberflächliche Weise verbunden werden, wie ein Holz und Bein durch einen Strick.]

have already discussed previously: they are simultaneously intuitive and conceptual. And Kant himself tells us in the Schematism that at least twelve of these are provided a priori by discursive cognition, albeit by the faculty of transcendental imagination.[13]

Although the fact that pure intuitions and pure concepts of the understanding rely on a third kind of "pure intuition-concept" (i.e. on transcendental schemata) is something of a coup for Hegel, it is not the final resting place of his defense of his own alternate picture of discursive thought. For, as we have seen, Hegel is concerned with pure concepts of reason. And the schematism does not provide for these—it remains ultimately concerned with the intelligibility of spatiotemporal objects. As we will see in the next chapter, Hegel is interested in this topic, but he believes that it falls within the purview of the philosophies of nature and spirit.[14]

3.2 Kantian Symbolic Synthesis

The problem at hand, however, remains the adequate a priori exhibition of the existence of the transcendental unity of apperception which, in the Hegelian picture, is a concept of reason. In *Critique of Judgment* §59, Kant argues that we need symbolic synthesis to offer even an inadequate exhibition of these concepts. Kant's account of how symbolic synthesis works is less explicit than his account of schematic synthesis. Nevertheless, as we saw in detail in Chapter 1, a rough account can be gleaned from Kant's discussion in the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment. To quickly refresh, Kant describes symbolic intuitions in as offering an *indirect* exhibition of a concept in contrast to the direct exhibition offered by schematic intuitions. The indirect nature of this kind of exhibition stems from a formal feature of the way in which symbolic intuitions are synthesized with concepts. Whereas schematic synthesis offers to view the existence of the concept as instantiated in a singular sensible instance, symbolic synthesis presents only a rule by

[13] "…the schema is in itself always only a product of the imagination" (CPR A140/B179).
[14] Looking forward for a moment, Hegel will ultimately agree with Kant that the schemata are artifacts of the imagination rather than of reason proper; the logical primacy of the schemata over concepts of the understanding will allow Hegel to argue that all representational acts of cognition (that is, all the Kantian *Vorstellungen*—intuitions, concepts, and schemata) are acts of imagination [*Einbildungskraft*].

means of which the concept in question is to be reflected upon. This reflective structure is called cognition by analogy, which Kant defines in the *Prolegomena* as "not…as the word is usually taken, an imperfect similarity between two things, but rather a perfect similarity between two relations in wholly dissimilar things."[15]

In the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant illustrates this procedure of reflective judgment using the following empirical example:

> a monarchy ruled according to its own constitutional laws would be presented as an animate body, but a monarchy ruled by an individual absolute will would be presented as a mere machine (such as a hand mill); but in either case the presentation is only symbolic. For though there is no similarity between a despotic state and a hand mill, there certainly is one between the rules by which we reflect on the two and on how they operate.

Taking the first example, this procedure of judgment can be laid out as follows:

> A monarchy ruled by its own constitutional laws is symbolized by an animate body.
> An animate body is a self-moving body.
> ∴ A monarchy ruled by its own constitutional laws can be understood as a self-moving state.

The conclusion yielded by this procedure is obviously not objectively valid. This is so because the thinker drawing the analogy bears the burden of making the comparison between the two terms and there is no guarantee that any two thinkers will draw the same conclusion given the

[15] *Prolegomena* 108, [4:357-8].

same symbolic intuition. If, for example, Louis XIV is the reasoner drawing the analogy, we might end up with something more like this:

> A monarchy ruled by its own constitutional laws is symbolized by an animate body.
> An animate body is a corruptible body.
> ∴ A monarchy ruled by its own constitutional laws can be understood as a corruptible state.

The contingency of symbolic presentations is also illustrated by the fact that they only run one way. If X symbolizes Y, Y will not also symbolize X. So, for example: when I look at the frontispiece of Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan*, which shows a crowned figure whose body is composed out of a mass of smaller individuals, my knowledge of the way organic bodies are composed might lead me to draw fruitful conclusions about Hobbes' theory of the state. If, however, I purchase an anatomy textbook and it offers an effigy of Charles I in lieu of a diagram of the human body, I will simply be confused.

Kant thinks that this contingency holds for the transcendental use of symbolic synthesis as well. In this employment, we use symbols to partially cognize concepts of reason that (Kant claims) exceed our intuitive capacity. In the *Prolegomena*, he describes the way in which we use symbols to analogically understand one such idea of reason, the idea of God or a "supreme understanding and will":

> If I say that we are compelled to look upon the world as if it were the work of a supreme understanding and will, I actually say nothing more than: in the way that a watch, a ship, and a regiment are related to an artisan, a builder, and a commander, the sensible world (or everything that makes up the basis of this sum total of appearances) is related to the

> unknown – which I do not thereby cognize according to what it is in itself, but only according to what it is for me, that is, with respect to the world of which I am a part.[16]

Here, the relationships between various kinds of actors and the objects that they act on are used to symbolize the relationship between God and the creation. As highlighted in Chapter 1, in the transcendental case this kind of analogy cannot provide the fourth term itself (which Kant here describes as "the unknown") but only offers us a way of understanding how this term relates to some given term (in this case, the sensible world as the "sum total of appearances"). Taking the first example of the watchmaker:

> God's relationship to the world is symbolized by the watchmaker's relationship to the watch.
>
> The watchmaker crafts the watch.
>
> ∴ God can be understood as crafting the world.

The transcendental case shares the form of the empirical case, and it is thus also contingent and unidirectional. The crucial distinction is that in the transcendental case there are and can be no available adequate intuitions of the idea in question—whereas instances of an empirical concept like "constitutional monarchy" can potentially be picked out in the world, a rational idea like God can *only* be symbolically demonstrated.

[16] ibid.

3.3 Hegelian Symbolic Synthesis

For Kant, symbolic synthesis is always indirect and logically inadequate. But Hegel believes that there is at least one adequate instance of symbolic synthesis in Kant's work, specifically in the *Critique of Judgment* §59 claim that beauty is the symbol of the morally good. In Chapter 1 I showed that, in his early essay *Faith and Knowledge,* Hegel seizes upon this example as being one of the most insightful moments in Kant's oeuvre. There, Hegel discovers that the sensible and supersensible belong to one another in a relationship of determinate negation.

Our interest here is not to revisit that particular analogy, but rather to consider the logical possibilities that open up when symbolic synthesis is taken to be an adequate procedure of synthesis. Before doing so, however, it will be helpful to briefly recall the structure in question. In Chapter 1, I argued that Hegel's specific interest in *Critique of Judgment* §59 is Kant's claim that an aesthetic idea (the beautiful) can symbolize a rational idea (the morally good). As in the cases we have looked at above, this is so precisely insofar as the two share a rule in common. Specifically, on Hegel's reading, they share in common the rule of seeking for their logical counterparts:

> The aesthetic idea of the beautiful is the symbol of the rational idea of the morally good.
> The judgments involving beauty seek for an adequate logical counterpart (a concept).
> ∴ Judgments involving the morally good seek for an adequate logical counterpart (an intuition).

According to Hegel, this case differs from the others in two ways: first, the four terms of the analogy are not merely contingently related. Rather, a case can be made that the beautiful and the morally good *are* the respective logical counterparts that they each respectively seek. The conceptual counterpart of the beautiful just is the good and the intuitive counterpart of the good

just is the beautiful. As such, this particular analogy only really involves two terms and an argument can be made that the analogy is necessary and, thus, objectively valid in a way that the other analogies we have looked at are not. I will not recapitulate my reconstruction of Hegel's defense of this necessity here.

For our purposes, we need simply to see that the necessary relation of the terms leads, in turn, to the second distinctive feature of this particular analogy: namely, that it is bidirectional, rather than unidirectional. The good is, in some sense, also a symbol of the beautiful; the good refers us to its sensible counterpart in the same way that the beautiful refers us to its supersensible counterpart. Insofar as the relationship of the beautiful and the morally good is necessary and bidirectional, Hegel believes we can say that the symbolic relationship of these terms is a logically adequate one.

I have focused above on the way in which adequate symbols are self-referring. Another feature of this logical form is highlighted by the discussion of Kant just undertaken: namely, the fact that this kind of synthesis involves two formally identical relationships between terms. To take one of Kant's examples, the builder constructs a ship in the same way that God constructs the world. The core of the analogy is the verb, "constructs," which is identical across the two sentences. I want to propose that Hegel's interest in the "Subjectivity" section of the Concept Logic is to show not only that the forms of judgment and inference symbolize the concept but also that the way in which they do so is by reproducing its activity of synthesis in just the same way that the verb "constructs" is reproduced in the analogy from the previous sentence. Thus, for example, a simple predicative judgment S is U (using Hegel's notation for "the singular is universal"—e.g. "the rose is red") synthesizes its terms in the very same way that the Concept itself synthesizes its terms. Further, the Concept and the forms of judgment and inference share a set of terms in common: The Concept is defined as being the identity of the singular, universal, and particular, and every predicative act is composed out of some configuration of these same three terms. We can say, using Kant's terminology for the ways in which concepts and intuitions

complement each other: the synthetic unity of the judgment expounds the synthetic unity of the concept and the synthetic unity of the concept demonstrates the synthetic unity of the judgment.[17] Parsed into the structure we have been using:

> The synthetic activity of the judgment symbolizes the synthetic activity of the concept.
> The synthetic activity of the concept consists in the unification of its terms.
> ∴ The synthetic activity of the judgment consists in the unification of its terms.

Hegel himself puts the point as follows:

> The copula "is" flows from the nature of the Concept: to be identical with itself in its externalization [*Entäußerung*]; as moments of the Concept the singular and the universal are the sort of determinacies that cannot be isolated. The preceding determinacies of reflection have among their relationships *also* the relation to each other, but their connection is only one of "having" not of "being"; it is not *identity posited as such* or *universality*. Hence, only the judgment is the genuine *particularity* of the Concept, for it is the determinacy or distinguishing of the Concept which continues to be universality all the same.[18]

Here, Hegel is touting the way in which Judgment reproduces the synthetic unity of the Concept in just the way I have been describing. Hegel's claim that the copula of the judgment "flows

[17] Rödl (2018) makes a similar claim, though he emphasizes the Aristotelian origins of this logical form rather than the Kantian origins as I wish to. He phrases the point in this way: "In judging, I refer my judgment to the power of knowledge as its source. It is not a given fact that my judgment springs from this power. My judgment springs from it in the manner of being itself the thought of this power as its source. We may put this by saying that I judge not only in accordance with this power, but from my idea of this power; I derive my judgment from the power" (116).
[18] EL §166, 244.

from the nature of the concept" just means that it refers back to the synthetic unity of the Concept. The further claim that the Concept is identical with itself in its externalization describes the symbolic relationship between the forms of judgment and the Concept. Hegel then goes on here to contrast the relationship between Concept and Judgment with the earlier relationships between terms that were examined in Essence ("the preceding determinacies of reflection") in order to mark out the specific formal advantage that the introduction of a logical middle term, particularity, has brought to the table—I discuss this in further detail below.

Hegel's aim in proposing this relationship between concept and judgment, moreover, is to show that the forms of judgment provide the look of the Hegelian world in the way that the transcendental schemata provide the look of the Kantian world. In the Schematism chapter, Kant describes the transcendental function of the schemata as being that of giving unity to the determinations of sensibility in general.[19] For Kant, the role of the schemata is to account for how it is that the categories show up in intuition, and, more specifically, how they show up in the medium of time that serves as the form of inner sense for finite rational cognizers. Kant writes:

> The schema of a pure concept of the understanding…is the pure synthesis, in accord with a rule of unity according to concepts in general, which the category expresses, and is a transcendental product of the imagination, which concerns the determination of the inner sense in general, in accordance with conditions of its form (time) in regard to all representations, insofar as these are to be connected together a priori in one concept in accord with the unity of apperception.[20]

[19] "The schema is in itself always only a product of the imagination; but since the synthesis of the latter has as its aim no individual intuition but rather only the unity in the determination of sensibility, the schema is to be distinguished from an image" (CPR A140/B179).
[20] CPR A142/B181, 274.

The difference with the Hegelian picture is that Hegel does not think that time is the medium of inner sense. He thinks, instead, that acts of judgment and inference are the instances of the "I think." And he is interested in how the "I" appears to itself in these acts.

3.4 A Worry About Decomposition

More work will be required to get these thoughts clearly into view. First, however, there is a worry about this proposal that must be dealt with. This is the question as to whether or not it is correct to understand Hegel's notions of concept and judgment as synthetic unities in the first place. On the one hand, there is copious evidence in the *Science of Logic* that Hegel understands the Concept as consisting in an activity of synthesis. In the Introduction to the Concept Logic, he states outright that "the concept is none other than the "I" or pure self-consciousness…[and] the "I" is in the first place purely self-referring unity… it is universality, a unity that is unity with itself only by virtue of its negative relating."[21] I take "negative relating" to underscore the fact that the unity of the Concept is, in the first instance, synthetic—i.e. that it involves the combination of terms that are fundamentally distinct in kind. Elsewhere, Hegel reinforces the actively synthetic nature of conceptual unity by describing the Concept as "free power" that "reach[es] out to its other and embrac[es] it."[22] This comment also implicitly refers to the way conceptual unity comes on the scene as a solution to the disjunctive relation of universality and individuality that structures the "Absolute Relation" section at the end of the Essence Logic.

On the other hand, it is *not* immediately clear that Hegel also understands judgment to be an activity of synthesis. Doubt is cast by the fact that, when he introduces judgment in "Subjectivity," Hegel describes it as "the self-diremption of the concept...the originary division of an originary unity."[23] This definition of judgment is, famously, a reference to a claim made by

[21] SL 12.17, 514.
[22] SL 12.35, 532
[23] SL 12.55, 552.

Hölderlin in his 1795 essay, *Urteil und Sein*.[24] It plays on the German etymology of the verb "urteilen," dividing the suffix from the verb stem and glossing the two parts together as "*ursprüngliche Teilung"* or "originary division." This definition of judgment seems to oppose judgment to the concept and, as such, to directly contraindicate the claim that I want to make about the way in which judgment and concept are characterized by a common activity of synthesis.

This definition of judgment only poses a problem for the line of argument under consideration, however, if division and synthesis are taken to be mutually exclusive activities. This might seem to be a non-starter, but the text surrounding Hegel's definition of judgment in fact suggests that it is not. In full, the passage states:

> Now any consideration of the judgment can start either from the originary unity of the concept or from the self-subsistence of the extremes. Judgment is the diremption of the concept through itself; therefore, it is by starting from the unity of the concept as ground that the judgment is considered in accordance with its true objectivity. In this respect, judgment is the originary division of an originary unity; the [German] word for judgment, *Urteil* thus refers to what judgment is in and for itself.[25]

Here, the unity of the concept is described as being both a starting point for the consideration of judgment and the ground of judgment. The further description of judgment as "the originary division of an originary unity" suggests that the dividing activity of judgment is not simply

[24] See e.g. Henrich (2008) xxviii.
[25] SL 12.55, 552. Translation modified. [Es kann nun die Betrachtung des Urteils von der ursprünglichen Einheit des Begriffes oder von der Selbständigkeit der Extreme ausgehen. Das Urteil ist die Diremtion des Begriffs durch sich selbst; *diese Einheit* ist daher der Grund, von welchem aus es nach seiner wahrhaften *Objektivität* betrachtet wird. Es ist insofern die *ursprüngliche Teilung* des ursprünglich Einen; das Wort: *Urteil* bezieht sich hiermit auf das, was es an und für sich ist.]

opposed to, but rather in some way properly belongs to the unity of the concept. Put otherwise, judgment does not simply cut the concept up into pieces, but rather carves at the joints.

Insofar as it proceeds in this way, it is not farfetched to say that the unity of the concept can still be seen in its divided parts—we can imagine the way in which a disassembled set of parts suggests (if vaguely) the unity of a piece of IKEA furniture or the way in which a set of disinterred bones suggests a skeleton. Moreover, we can also draw on the work done in the first half of the chapter and recall that each of the Concept's determinations refers back to it not only as a part to a whole but as a symbolic exhibition, i.e. in an identity relation where one term exhibits the existence of the other. If each determination exhibits the existence of the concept and the concept is defined by being an activity of synthesis, then each determination must exhibit just that activity of synthesis. In this way, we can say that judgment is both an act of division *and* a display of the synthetic activity of unity that is characteristic of the Concept. A discursive predicative form "spells out" or makes explicit the unity that is merely implicit in the Concept.

Hegel is not the first thinker to suggest that synthesis and division are primary and co-extant logical activities: as Heidegger notes in *Being and Time*, Aristotle himself claims that synthesis and division (*diairesis*) coexist in every *logos*—that is, in every sentence involving a name and a verb.[26] The context for this claim is *De Anima* III.6, in which the topic is, felicitously, the same as Hegel's topic at the outset of "Judgment": the relationship between the pure activity of the intellect (Hegel's Concept) and the logical forms that condition the intellection of finite things (Hegel's judgments and syllogisms).

In the Hegelian case, I believe the best way of understanding the coexistence of synthesis and division is as two modes of synthesis. Using the vocabulary of German Idealism, the first of these, Hegel's Concept, is intuitive-synthetic: it is immediate or simultaneous. The second mode,

[26] Heidegger (2010), 149. "Aristotle had a more radical view; every logos is a synthesis and diaireseis at the same time…every statement, whether affirmative or negative, whether false or true, is equiprimordially synthesis and diairesis."

by contrast, is discursive-synthetic: it is formally articulated or sequential. The second mode, as we have seen, refers back to the first mode. In these terms, another way of putting the point I am pursuing here is to say: the intuitive unity of the concept provides the content for the discursive forms of judgment.

Hegel offers additional information about exactly *how* synthesis and division coexist in the judgment in the very next sentence of the passage from "Judgment" just quoted. After describing judgment as being in and for itself "the originary division of an originary unity" Hegel continues:

> But the concept is present in the judgment as appearance [*Erscheinung*], since its moments have attained self-subsistence there, and it is to this side of externality that ordinary representation [*Vorstellung*] is more likely to fasten.[27]

This sentence indicates that the unity of the Hegelian judgment does not immediately show up where we would expect to find it.[28] That is, one would assume, based on the discussion so far, that the synthetic aspect of a judgment like "S is U" is to be found in the copula that unites the disparate subject and predicate terms. But, at least on a first look, this is not how things seem to be with the judgment. Rather, just the opposite appears to be true: when we consider an ordinary empirical judgment of the form "S is U" such as, for example, "The rose is red", it seems that it is the fact of the rose's being red that originally provides the synthetic unity of subject and predicate while the copula simply serves to reflect or describe the empirical state of affairs.

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[27] SL 12.55, 552. [Daß aber der Begriff im Urteil als *Erscheinung* ist, indem seine Momente darin Selbstständigkeit erlangt haben,—an diese Seite der *Äußerlichkeit* hält sich mehr die *Vorstellung*.]

[28] It should be noted that judgment and asserted sentence are not coextensive for Hegel. There are many sentences (mere "Sätze") that fall short of being judgments on Hegel's account. The decisive feature is whether or not a sentence involves individuality and universality. Thus, rightly or wrongly, Hegel holds that "the cat is black" differs fundamentally in kind from sentences like "the cat is in the neighbor's yard" (though the boundary is porous and sentences can be "made into" judgments when they are used in certain ways—an analogy with judgments of perception and judgments of experience in Kant is helpful for understanding how this is so). For a thorough discussion of this point see Martin (2016).

If we were Kantians, we would be satisfied to say, "Yes, this is how it is: spatiotemporal intuition provides the matter of the judgment." From there we might embark on any number of debates about how the synthetic unity of the object given in intuition relates to the synthetic unity of the judgment. But the entire point of Hegel's Concept Logic, as we have seen again and again, is that intuition does not provide the matter of the judgment. So, if we are to be good Hegelians, we must say instead: "This *cannot* be how it is. The Concept provides the content of the judgment—it only *looks at first as if* spatiotemporal intuition does so."

The illusory "spatiotemporal look" of judgment is what Hegel wants to pick out with his remark that ordinary representation fastens on to appearance. On Hegel's view, the simple predicative judgment is deficient precisely in virtue of the deceptive character of its hylomorphism: that is, a judgment like "The rose is red" appears to have material unity but not formal unity and, as such, it makes it look as though formal unity and material unity need not come along together. This is so because while we can simply look and see that some singular (the rose) is correctly identified as having some universal predicate (redness), it is not straightforwardly the case that the singular *in general* is identical with the universal *in general*. As we have seen, however, Hegel does in fact think that the singular in general is identical with the universal in general and, further, that it is nothing other than this identity of singular and universal that provides content to the judgment.

4. The Two Functions of the Concept

As it has turned out, the apparent tension between unity and division in Hegel's definition of judgment is not simply an objection to be dealt with. Rather, this tension points toward the organizing concern of the "Subjectivity" section: articulating the proper source of judgmental unity and, hence, the proper source of objective validity. I have proposed that Hegel finds the source of this unity in the rational concept itself, and that the way in which this unity shows up in the judgment is best described by the formal structure of logically adequate symbolization. My

aim in the rest of the paper will be to elaborate on the details of the way this claim positions Hegelian apperception in relation to Kantian apperception.

First, I will expand on two important aspects of Hegel's symbolic logical form: the emergence of conceiving and judging as the "two functions" of the Concept, and the role of particularity as a middle term in Hegelian logical form. I frame my discussions of this topics in relation to Longuenesse's Kant interpretation. I conclude with a brief note on the way Hegel's view is anticipated by Kant in his discussion of ideas of reason as rational analogues of schemata in the Transcendental Dialectic.

Above, I have claimed that the relationship between judgment and the Concept in Hegel's picture has this structure:

> The synthetic activity of the judgment symbolizes the synthetic activity of the Concept.
>
> The synthetic activity of the Concept consists in the unification of its terms.
>
> ∴ The synthetic activity of the judgment consists in the unification of its terms.

I wish now to get the details and stakes of this claim more clearly into view by looking at some of the other things Hegel says about the relationship between judgment and the Concept in "Subjectivity."

Hegel introduces judgment and conceiving as the two "functions" [*Funktionen*] that belong to the Concept: "Judging is therefore *another* function than conceiving; or rather, it is *the other function* of the concept, for it is the determining of the concept through itself."[29] Hegel's use of the term "function" evokes Kant's use of the same term in the first *Critique*, where, just prior to the elaboration of the Table of Judgments, function is defined as "the unity of the action of

[29] SL 12.53, 550. Hegel's emphases.

ordering different representations under a common one" (B93). For Kant, there are, famously, four such function headings in the Table of Judgments—quantity, quality, relation, and modality. We can immediately distinguish Hegel's use of "function" here from Kant's use of the term in the Table of Judgments in two ways. First, Hegel claims that the concept has only two functions. Second, these functions, judging and conceiving, are not only different from Kant's four functions in number; they are also, and more crucially, different from Kant's functions in the Tables insofar as Kant's functions organize *kinds* of judgments and concepts, whereas judgment and conceiving are themselves the functions belonging to the Hegelian Concept.

Hegel's use of function is thus closer to Kant's use in another passage from the first *Critique*. The passage in question is this one from the Metaphysical Deduction, in which Kant famously says the following about the relationship of the unity of judgments and intuitions:

> The same function that gives unity to the different representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations in an intuition, which, expressed generally, is called the pure concept of understanding.[30]

I take this to be the most promising starting point for making sense of Hegel's claim that the Concept has two functions.[31]

The passage in question has been important in the recent debate about "conceptualism" in the secondary literature on Kant. This debate centers on questions about the relationship between the Kantian faculties of intuition and understanding. It is particularly concerned with questions about the extent to which intuitive cognitive acts are dependent on the activity of the

[30] CPR A79/B104-5, 211-12.

[31] Conant (2016) also notes this passage as being of special importance to Hegel. He takes Hegel's interest in this claim to be the fact that the unity of the whole precedes the unity of the parts. I wish to show that there is not, strictly speaking, any such priority relation in the Hegelian case: rather, the whole and the parts are distinct but simultaneous logical moments. This is what it means on my view to call logical form adequately symbolic.

understanding.[32] The passage just quoted is often taken as evidence for the side that advocates in favor of the strong dependence of intuitions on the synthetic activity of the understanding.[33]

Now, to some extent, Hegel's interests in the part of the *Logic* that we are investigating obviously just run at a tangent to the interests of the Kantian interpreters on both sides of this debate. Hegel is simply not concerned with the relationship between the faculties of understanding and intuition in the Concept Logic; rather, Hegel is investigating the relationship of the faculty of reason to itself. Insofar as Hegel doesn't think empirical concepts even properly are concepts in the first place, we can infer that he would not have much interest in a debate about the relationship between Kantian concepts and Kantian intuitions. As we will see in Chapter 5, Hegel thinks all species of representation fall short of conceptuality proper, a premise which makes it hard to get a debate about conceptualism off the ground.

Even so, Hegel *is* concerned with the unity of apperception and he is also concerned with the way in which this unity can be shared across different logical moments of the Concept—namely, as our quote indicates, between the functions of conceiving and judging. In this regard, I take Hegel to be offering a clarification of Kantian apperception that he believes Kant himself should have offered precisely in order to avoid the kinds of debates about conceptualism that have cropped up in the secondary literature. Hegel is interested to show that there is a kind of conceptual unity ("conceptual" here referring to the unity of the Hegelian Concept) that conditions the possibility of any other kind of cognitive act.

On my reading, this brings Hegel's theory of apperception closest to the one described by Kant interpreters such as Longuenesse, who lay emphasis on the central importance of unity in Kant's own scheme. In drawing this comparison, I have in mind especially Longuenesse's claim that Kant's notion of apperceptive synthesis as it is laid out in the first *Critique's* Metaphysical and Transcendental Deductions describes a kind of *double* synthesis insofar as it

[32] cf. McLear (2014) 772-3.
[33] ibid. 787n68

describes both the synthesis of intuition and the synthesis of a priori judgment. Longuenesse's landmark study of Kant is extremely nuanced and I do not intend to do justice to it here. What I am after is just this one point, which she formulates most crisply in a reply to Allison and Sedgwick's comments:

> Judgment is a *synthesis* (of concepts) *by means of analysis* (of the sensible given). Categories are concepts of *the synthesis of intuition* necessary for the *analysis* of this same intuition that allows concepts of objects to be formed *and synthesized* in judgments. **So, if you like, the full process is: synthesis (of intuition) for analysis (into concepts) for synthesis (of these concepts in judgment).**[34]

The important aspect of this passage for our purposes is the way in which Longuenesse describes the relationship between the synthesis of intuition and the synthesis of judgment. I believe Hegel wishes to make a very similar point when he writes that conceiving and judging are the Concept's "two functions." In the Hegelian picture, of course, it is the synthesis of the Concept as conceiving that is echoed by the synthesis of the forms of judgment. Above I glossed Hegel's claim that judgment is an act of division as a way of saying that judgment is the discursive moment of the Concept. Here, I believe we can say with Longuenesse that Hegel's a priori forms of judgment also incorporate a kind of analysis. Specifically, an analysis of the Concept into its moments which are then parsed out into discursive combinations: that is, combinations of universality, particularity, and singularity. Bringing into view this doubled character of a priori synthesis allows us to unpack Hegel's "two functions" claim. Another way of putting the point is to say that the "negative self-reference" that we saw above to be the

[34] Longuenesse (2000) 94-5. Longuenesse's italics, my emphasis.

defining trait of Hegelian logical form is a successor to Kantian apperception precisely insofar as it recapitulates the two moments of synthesis described by Longuenesse.

5. Conclusion

Even in light of everything we have discussed, the precise extent to which Kant's account of apperception anticipates Hegel's account remains a question. As I have shown, there are myriad similarities between the two accounts, particularly when we follow Longuenesse in thinking of the synthetic unity of judgment as a kind of echo or reiteration of the synthetic unity of intuition. At the same time, there is a fundamental difference between the two accounts that cannot be argued away: Hegel thinks that the unity of apperceptive synthesis is derived from a concept of reason (the "I think") that offers itself a content, whereas Kant thinks that apperceptive synthesis involves the figurative synthesis provided by the productive imagination.

Hegel does make room in his system for the synthesis of imagination. He does so, however, in his treatment of *Philosophy of Spirit*. Spirit, alongside Nature, will be treated in the next chapter.

Chapter 5: Exhibition and Indexicality in Hegel's Realphilosophie

1. Introduction

In the preceding four chapters, I have argued that Hegel draws on Kant's *Critique of Judgment* in order to describe a post-Kantian account of the relationship between sensible appearances and conceptual thought. My claim has been that a transformation of Kant's theory of intuition stands at the heart of Hegel's systematic philosophy. One strand of my argument has been that Hegel separates out three distinct topics treated by Kant in the first *Critique*'s Transcendental Aesthetic and assigns each of these a different place in his own philosophical system. To quickly recap, the three topics in question are: (i) conceptual exhibition [*Darstellung*]; (ii) space and time as formal determinations of physical objects; and (iii) the perceptual experience of finite embodied thinkers. In the previous two chapters, I have shown how (i) is treated in the *Science of Logic*. In this final chapter, I will turn to (ii) and (iii) as they are respectively dealt with in Hegel's accounts of Nature and Spirit.

My principle aim in the chapter will be to demonstrate two things. First, that Nature and Spirit are exhibitions of conceptual form. This means that they come into being by being shown to exhibit conceptual form in a similar way to how conceptual form displays itself. The difference between conceptual form's self-exhibition and the exhibitions of form in Nature and Spirit is that conceptual form, as described in the Logic, remains an abstraction from reality: the forms of judgment and inference have been shown to provide content to a priori form, but their various real instantiations in the mental and physical realms have not yet been described.

My second claim will be that the distinction between spatiotemporality and self-conscious sensing as distinct forms of intuition marks the specific difference between Nature and Spirit. This latter goes directly to making the case for Hegel's post-Kantianism as I understand it: it shows how Hegel alters Kant's theory of intuition in order to reject Kant's

empirical realism and demonstrate the possibility of treating mind, rather than nature, as the premier object of scientific inquiry.

I take my cue from this passage from the*Science of Logic*, where Hegel distinguishes amongst Logic, Nature, and Spirit in the following way:

> Spirit, as intuiting as well as sensuous consciousness, is in the form of immediate being, just as Spirit as representational and also perceptual consciousness has risen from being to the stage of essence or reflection. But these concrete shapes are of as little interest to the science of logic as are the concrete forms that logical determinations assume in nature. These last would be space and time, then space and time as assuming a content, as inorganic and then organic nature.[1]

Here, Hegel claims that sensation and spatiotemporality are the respective analogues in Spirit and Nature to the Logic's own starting point, Being. The trait that distinguishes Spirit from both Nature and Logic is, he continues, the fact that Spirit is "the self-conscious Spirit, which, as such does not fall within the scope of logical science."[2] My goal here is to show how the self-consciousness of Spirit is contrasted with the non-self-conscious character of Nature by means of their respective intuitive forms.

The chapter proceeds in four parts. First, I discuss what it means for something to be exhibition of conceptual form. Next, I take up Hegel's redefinition of the distinction between Nature and Spirit. I then look at Hegel's specific treatment of the intuitive aspect of nature and, finally, at the role of sensation in the *Philosophy of Spirit*.

2. What is a Realphilosophie?

[1] SL 12.20, 517.
[2] Ibid.

2.1 Realphilosophie is an activity of mimetic expression

In the Introduction to the *Encyclopedia Logic*, Hegel describes the philosophical task of the Realphilosophie in the following way:

> [philosophy gives] the content of the empirical sciences the essential form of the *freedom* of thinking (of the a priori) and in so doing provides the true *proof* [*Bewährung*] of empirical content's *necessity*, in place of the warrant for belief [*Beglaubigung*] derived from its being found to be present and experienced as a fact. In this way, the fact becomes the exhibition and imitation [*Darstellung und Nachbildung*] of the original and fully self-sufficient activity of thinking.[3]

According to this passage, the philosophical treatment of the topics traditionally falling under the purview of empirical science aims at a transformation in the epistemic status of the data, the content, that is collected by these sciences. Philosophy aims to show that this data is in some way "necessary" rather than merely contingent, and, in so doing, to offer a "true proof" of this empirically collected information that replaces the mere "warrant for belief" that is all that can be offered by empirical science on its own.

The way in which philosophy is to accomplish this transformation is by somehow giving the empirical content delivered by the empirical sciences the form of spontaneous thought. This, Hegel tells us, will in turn make this content into an "exhibition and imitation" of spontaneous thought.

In his treatment of this passage, Michael Rosen rightly notes that this is direct inversion of the traditional idea that thought is the mirror of nature.[4] In the Hegelian picture, the situation is precisely opposite: Nature and Spirit are real expressions [*Darstellungen*] of thought rather than

[3] EL §12R, 37. Translation modified.
[4] Rosen (2004) 79.

mental representations of reality. Rosen goes on to cite this helpful passage from the final sections of the LHP in which Hegel expands upon the details of this claim:

> What is actual Nature is an image [*Bild*] of divine reason. The forms of self-conscious reason are also forms of nature. Nature and the spiritual world—history—are the two actualities. We saw the emergence of the thought which grasps itself; it strove to make itself concrete in itself. Its first activity is formal. Aristotle was the first to say that *nous* is the thinking of thinking. The result is the thought that is in itself and at the same time encompasses the universe and transforms it into an intelligent world.[5]

Thus, the task of the Realphilosophie is a fundamentally mimetic one, but in precisely the reverse of the way in which we typically think about the mimetic relationship between thought and reality. The aim of philosophy outside the purview of the *Logic* is to confer intelligibility on Nature and Spirit, what Hegel calls "the two actualities," by showing that these actualities conform to the pure forms of thought described in Logic. To borrow a different Aristotelian phrase, Nature and Spirit must be staged as "imitations of the action" of pure thought in order that the items belonging to each of these realms can become available as rational objects to be assessed in terms of their truth rather than as empirical objects that can only be assessed in terms of their believability.

2.2 How are Nature and Spirit related to Logic?

[5] Translation modified. "Was als wirkliche Natur ist, ist Bild der göttlichen Vernunft; die Formen der selbstbewußten Vernunft sind auch Formen der Natur. Natur und geistige Welt, Geschichte, sind die beiden Wirklichkeiten. Den Gedanken, der sich selbst faßt, sahen wir hervortreten; er strebte, sich in sich konkret zu machen. Seine erste Tätigkeit ist formell; erst Aristoteles sagt, der nous ist das Denken des Denkens. Das *Resultat ist* der Gedanke, der bei sich ist und darin zugleich das Universum umfaßt, es in intelligente Welt verwandelt. Im Begreifen durchdringen sich geistiges und natürliches Universum als ein harmonierendes Universum, das sich in sich flieht, in seinen Seiten das Absolute zur Totalität entwickelt, um eben damit, in ihrer Einheit, im Gedanken sich bewußt zu werden."

It is far from immediately clear what this entails or how it is to be accomplished, but the work done in previous chapters will help us begin to understand what Hegel has in mind. In the previous two chapters, I have argued that Hegel offers his formal account of spontaneous thought in the "Subjectivity" section of the *Science of Logic*. My claim, put very briefly, has been that the crucial trait of Hegel's notion of spontaneous thought is that it is self-referential. The self-reference of spontaneous thought consists in the fact that the unarticulated synthetic unity of the Concept is displayed in the discursively articulated forms of judgment and inference. So, e.g., the judgment "S is P" provides an exhibition of the existence of the Concept. I have used the Schellingian/Coleridgean term "tautegorical" to describe this formal feature. Crucially, spontaneous thought is also pure activity. Put all together, spontaneous thought is a pure activity that displays its own existence by referring to itself.

We can infer that an "imitation" of spontaneous thought should also exhibit these formal features. I will propose below (in §3) that Nature and Spirit do so in virtue of the kinds of indexicality that they display. Nature is characterized by being "here" and "now" (i.e. spatiotemporal) whereas Spirit is characterized by the first-personal "I" (i.e. self-conscious thought).

But setting up this proposal demands the address of a more fundamental issue: namely, the issue about how the transition between the Logic and the Realphilosophie functions in the first place. This is a topic of perennial dispute in the literature.

In recent work on this topic, Christian Martin describes a helpful distinction between the "epistemic" and "metaphysical" aspects of this transition.[6] Within this frame, he argues that there is a crucial difference between questions about the epistemic progression from the

[6] Martin (forthcoming).

philosophical study of Logic to the philosophical study of Nature, and questions about the metaphysical progression from the realm of Logic to the realm of Nature.

I endorse Martin's use of this distinction wholeheartedly. I also agree with his further claim that it is an interpretive mistake to attempt to offer a ("dogmatic") metaphysical story according to which Nature is fabricated whole cloth out of Logic. Rather, I concur that Hegel's philosophical study of Logic assumes that this study is conditioned by the epistemic situation of the thinkers who undertake it. Hegel's philosophical study of Logic then goes on to offer an account of logical form that incorporates this epistemic condition by demonstrating that real expression is a fundamental trait of logical form.[7] In this way, the metaphysical issues attending the transition from Logic to Nature are already treated in the course of the Logic itself (specifically, in two places: throughout the Essence Logic and in the Concept Logic transition from Subjectivity to Objectivity).

The particular felicity of this approach is that it reduces the interpretive importance of the transition from Logic to Nature. Although, as Martin rightly notes, the epistemologically interested reader must have *some* story about how the metaphysical relationship between logic and reality works, she need not center this story around the textual transition between these topics.

I will say more about the metaphysical relationship between the real and ideal below in §3. In the remainder of this section, I will conclude by discussing the distinct epistemic approaches required by the philosophical treatments of Logic and the Realphilosophie. This is, on my view, a primarily methodological question: the epistemic distinction between Logic and Nature (and, later, Spirit) consists in how the topics that comprise each realm are to be investigated. It is thus no coincidence that the *Science of Logic* ends with an account of method and the *Philosophy of Nature* begins with such an account.

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[7] Ibid. 4-8, especially 7. I take it that Martin and I would eventually disagree about the precise details of what logical formal expression consists in, though we are agreed about the overarching picture.

2.3 Method, or, seeing with the eyes of reason

So, what is the method of Hegelian philosophy? Hegel discusses this topic in various places throughout his oeuvre. The most sustained discussion comes at the end the *Science of Logic*.

Here, Hegel defines method as the "manner in which [philosophical] cognition proceeds."[8] He writes that the "Absolute Idea," i.e. the set of determinate logical forms described in the *Science of Logic*, is "the sole subject matter and content of philosophy." He continues: "Since [the Absolute Idea] contains all determinateness within it, and its essence consists in returning through its self-determination and particularization back to itself, it has various shapes, and **the business of philosophy is to recognize it in these**."[9] Method, then, describes the manner in which thinkers engaging in philosophical cognition ought go about this business of recognizing the Absolute Idea in its various shapes.

As touched on already in Chapter 2, Hegel identifies five specific shapes or "modes" of the Absolute Idea: Nature, Spirit, Art, Religion, and Philosophy. These five modes are, in turn, divided into two kinds. Nature and Spirit are "modes of exhibiting [*darstellen*]" the Absolute Idea's existence whereas Art, Religion, and Philosophy are modes in which the absolute idea "apprehends itself" [*sich erfassen*] and "give[s] itself existence."[10] The distinction of these kinds along the lines of exhibition and apprehension is noteworthy; it is effectively a functional version of the Kantian distinction between intuition and concept.

After delineating this taxonomy, Hegel subsequently proceeds to offer a lengthy discourse on method. Unfortunately, particularly given the importance of the subject matter, this section of text is difficult to parse even by Hegelian standards. Even so, there are a couple of

[8] SL 12.237, 736.
[9] SL 12.236, 735. My emphasis.
[10] Ibid.

passages from this discussion that are of use for linking up method with our earlier consideration of logical form.

There are two claims Hegel makes in the course of the discussion of method that I take to be of particular relevance. These are (i) his reiteration that self-reference is of crucial importance to the theory of form articulated in the *Logic*, and (ii) his further claim that method itself is *also* a self-relation. More precisely, method is a reflective relation between finite thinkers engaging in philosophical cognition and the formal self-relation that is articulated in the *Science of Logic*. Passages like this one are exemplary:

> The method is the pure concept that only relates to itself; it is, therefore, the simple self-reference which is being. But it now is also the fulfilled concept, the concept that comprehends itself conceptually, being as the concrete and just as absolutely intensive totality. – In conclusion, there remains only this to be said of this Idea, that in it, in the first place, the science of logic has apprehended its own concept.[11]

Thus, Hegelian philosophical method involves, as I proposed already in §2.1, two self-relations. First, it involves the formal relation of self-reference that, as I have argued at length, characterizes conceptual form itself. And, second, it involves the further self-relationship that finite rational thinkers who undertake the activity of philosophical thinking enter into when they endeavor to recognize this self-reflexive logical form in its various manifestations.

Hegel himself phrases the point like this:

> [it is] reason's highest and sole impulse to find and recognize [*erkennen*] itself through itself in all things….The method is this knowledge [*Wissen*] itself, for which the concept

[11] SL 12.252, 752.

> is not only as subject matter but is as its own subjective act, the instrument and the means of cognitive activity, distinct from this activity and yet the activity's own essentiality.[12]

Although this gives us something of a schematic outline of Hegel's notion of method, the formulation remains highly abstract. Reading the *Science of Logic* for pragmatic clues about how to do philosophy at some point becomes a project of diminishing returns. Fortunately, there are more concrete statements about what the actual practice of method looks like scattered throughout Hegel's oeuvre.

In both the *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* and the *Lectures on Aesthetics*, Hegel indicates that method is a perceptual activity. More specifically, it is reason's way of perceiving itself. In the LPH he writes:

> …we conceive of reason as a means of perceiving the [Absolute] Idea, and even its etymology suggests that it is a perception of something expressed…in other words of the *Logos* – the true. The true acquires its truth in the created world. God expresses himself, and himself alone; he is that power whose nature is self-expression and whose expression can be perceived by reason. And what reason perceives is the truth and image of God….the Idea reveals itself to perception.[13]

The passage switches between the religious and philosophical registers, but the laxity of expression need not take away from the point. The primary take-away is that rational form is perceptually available to finite rational cognizers. Or, more simply: conceptuality is perceptible.

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[12] Ibid. 12.238, 737.
[13] LPH 67

Elsewhere, a refinement of this idea is suggested: not *all* acts of perception are perceptions of conceptual form. In the LPH Introduction Hegel, Hegel clarifies: "physical perception and a finite understanding are not enough [for the philosophical comprehension of history]; we must see with the eye of the concept, the eye of reason."[14] In the *Aesthetics*' discussion of the beauty of Nature, Hegel expands on this thought by stipulating that there are different gradations of rationality that distinguish different acts of perception. He frames this claim by appeal to the way in which the German "*Sinn*" can refer to both the sense organs and what something means:

> 'Sense' is this wonderful word which is used in two opposite meanings. On the one hand it means the organ of immediate apprehension, but on the other hand we mean by it the sense, the significance, the thought, the universal underlying the thing. And so sense is connected on the one hand with the immediate external aspect of existence, and on the other hand with its inner essence.[15]

Hegel is claiming here that rational form is always potentially available via the activity of perception; that is, that anything immediately available to our senses can lead us to what he terms its "inner essence," i.e. rational form. But he immediately goes on to note that not all perceptual acts will fulfill this potential in equal measure. Some perceptual acts will aim only at the superficial (as when I look at something in order to check what color it is); some may aim all the way at conceptuality (as when I look at something in order to consider the form of predication, as one might in a philosophy class). Here, Hegel is interested to say that there

[14] Ibid. 30

[15] A 128-9. „Sinn" nämlich ist dies wunderbare Wort, welches selber in zwei entgegengesetzten Bedeutungen gebraucht wird. Einmal bezeichnet es die Organe der unmittelbaren Auffassung, das andere Mal aber heißen wir Sinn: die Bedeutung, den Gedanken, das Allgemeine der Sache. Und so bezieht sich der Sinn einerseits auf das unmittelbar Äußerliche der Existenz, andererseits auf das innere Wesen derselben. (Ä148)

is a peculiar kind of perception that can simultaneously hold a thing in view as a sensible individual while getting its conceptual form into view. And it is this double sort of perception that is at work in the Realphilosophie.

Hegel marks out two 'Realphilosophical' modes in particular to which this kind of double vision applies: Nature and History. In this connection, he praises Goethe's scientific method:

> Of this sort [i.e. the double sort of perception, E.L.] was Goethe's observation and demonstration of the inner rationality of nature and its phenomena. With great insight he set to work in a simple way to examine objects as they were presented to the senses, but at the same time he had a complete divination of their connection in accordance with the Concept. History too can be so understood and related that through single events and individuals their essential meaning and necessary connection can secretly shine.[16]

Hegel even gives an example of what it looks like to perceive Nature in this way:

> If, for example, three natural realms are identified, the mineral, the vegetable, the animal, then in this series of stages we see foreshadowed an inwardly necessary articulation in accordance with the Concept, without abiding by the mere idea of an external purposefulness. Even in the multiplicity of products within these realms, sensuous observation divines a rationally ordered advance, in the different geological formations, and in the series of vegetable and animal species.[17]

In this passage, Hegel points toward our tendency to taxonomize nature, to view it as a "rationally ordered advance," as being exemplary of what it means to see something in

[16] Ibid. 129.
[17] Ibid.

accordance with the Concept. The idea is specifically *not* that there is some sort of a priori rational order that Nature itself presents to us sensible. Rather, it is we, as perceivers of the sensible world, who cannot help but arrange the objects presented to our senses into various hierarchies and schemes. This is what it means to see with the eyes of reason.

It seems to me that this is a large part of what Hegel means when he describes the Realphilosophie as consisting in the "exhibition and imitation" of the Concept. The method of the Realphilosophie is a kind of interstitial cognitive activity that goes past quotidian acts of perception but stops short of the sort of conceptual self-apprehension that takes place in Art, Religion, and Philosophy. In this way, the Realphilosophie offers up a kind of conceptually adequate picture—what Hegel describes as a "foreshadowing"—of rational form.

3. Leaving Mind/World Dualism Behind: Distinguishing Nature and Spirit

Yet, this is still not entirely satisfying: we want to say more about how it is that reason is "in" reality even before we take it upon ourselves to make reality rational—that is, about what aspects make Nature and Spirit potentially available as objects for our rational consideration in the first place. I have claimed that this is primarily a topic at issue in the *Science of Logic*. My discussion of judgment in Chapter 4 was aimed at shedding light on the formal dimension of this issue. But, there is more to say about this from the point of view of the Realphilosophie. In order to do so we must consider in further detail what Hegelian reality consists in.

3.1 My proposal, first pass

So far, I have noted Hegel's repeated claims that Nature and Spirit are exhibitions or images of rational form. The previous discussion of method sheds light on one way in which this is so: Nature and Spirit are images of rational form insofar as they present rational form to the senses.

In this section I will go a step further and suggest Nature and Spirit are sensible in another way as well. Specifically, each of these realms is characterized by a distinct intuitive-formal way of sensibly exhibiting rational form. Nature exhibits rational form spatiotemporally whereas Spirit exhibits rational form in a sensory-affective manner.

This distinction is important insofar as it shows one of the crucial ways in which Hegel reconfigures Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic. In the Hegelian picture, space and time are formal determinations that are specifically different from the forms of subjective intuition. In fact, Hegel wants to say that the formal character of space and time is a constitutive difference between Nature and Spirit.[18] This contrast is suggested already in Hegel's Jena writings on Spirit and Nature, where Hegel claims:

> Spirit is immediate, as generally intuiting [*anschauen*], so that a being is for it. But it comes back out of this immediacy, returns into itself, is for itself…[it is] this pure subject that is free of its content but also master of it, unlike space and time which are selfless.[19]

Here, the line between Nature and Spirit is drawn according to the difference between self-conscious intuiting and non-self-conscious intuiting.

It is well-known (and far from surprising) that Hegel takes self-consciousness to be a specific difference between Nature and Spirit. The contribution I wish to make here is to show that Hegel's view about whether or not something is self-consciousness has specifically to do with the kind of intuitive form that it involves.

My ultimate aim here is to show that the contrast being drawn between spatiotemporality and sensory-affection is a contrast between two kinds of indexicality. In its most immediate

[18] This places Hegel in an interesting relation to debates about Kantian conceptualism. Hegel's view is that it is space and time specifically that are extra-rational; on his view, space and time are simply descriptors for the non-conceptual. Sensible intuition, in contrast, is a constitutive moment of conceptual thinking.
[19] JeL 85-6.

form, Nature is comprised of a set of self-external "heres" and "nows" whereas Spirit consists in a set of self-internal sense-impressions that are accompanied by the first-personal "I".

3.2 The uniqueness of Hegel's theory of Nature; or, against "Hegelian Naturalism"

To start, I will say something about why Hegel requires a distinction along the lines of the one I am describing. My claim purports to respond to a difficulty about how to distinguish Spirit and Nature, but why should we think there is any such difficulty? This does not immediately seem to be a problem that we have, and this makes the view I want to attribute to Hegel look like a piece of gratuitous conceptual apparatus.

In order to motivate this problem, we must consider Hegel's views about how Nature and Spirit relate to one another more closely.

Both recently and historically, Hegel's notion of mind or Spirit [*Geist*] has received significantly more scholarly attention than his notion of Nature. The more extensive literature on Spirit has emphasized the highly unique character of Hegel's theory of mind. The scantier literature on Nature does not always recognize a similar uniqueness in Hegel's theory of the physical world. As I read Hegel, this is an oversight: the two concepts are members of a complimentary pair, and they stand and fall together.[20]

The difficulties that arise when Hegel's theory of nature is neglected can be seen in some of the contemporary attempts to make sense of the role that normativity plays in Hegel's notions of theoretical and practical reasoning. Recent debates about whether or not it is appropriate to attribute some species of ethical naturalism to Hegel is particularly illustrative. A quick overview of this interpretive question will help to bring out the stakes of properly understanding Hegel's notion of Nature.

[20] See Peters (2016), Moyar (2010) for explorations of this topic.

By use of the phrase "ethical naturalism" here I mean to pick out a set of views that aim to (i) attribute a novel theory of practical mindedness to Hegel and (ii) to ground this novel theory of practical mindedness in an already accepted view about nature. This strand of interpretation has arisen in part out of scholarly altruism: it is intended to push back against readings of Hegel that reject his theory of nature altogether for being nonsensical. In spite of these good intentions, however, this reading tends toward overcorrection. The implicit assumption seems to be that Hegel's view of nature is *either* assimilable to the dominant contemporary view of nature as the domain of (typically mathematical) natural scientific explanation *or else* that Hegel's view incoherent.

A critical caveat in any philosophical discussion of "nature" is that the term has a variety of distinct senses. The sort of "nature" that the ethical naturalist is interested in is, first and foremost, the specific nature of human beings. But, delineating human nature requires appeal to a broader notion of nature and it is in the course of this appeal that I take the ethical naturalist to run into difficulties. Although many scholars have attributed some strain of "ethical naturalism" along these lines to Hegel in recent years, I will look here at one version that I consider to be exemplary.[21] This is Terry Pinkard's articulation of the position in his book, *Hegel's Naturalism*.[22]

Here are some passages from Pinkard that exemplify the view I am interested in:

(1) on [Hegel's] view, it is when we properly rethink the nature of our own mindful agency, *Geist*, that we come to see nature as the "other" of *Geist*. In Hegel's more dialectical terms, "we" as natural creatures make ourselves distinct from nature. This nature, from which we have distinguished ourselves, **is not anything that stands, as**

[21] The view is widespread in the literature, particularly amongst British and Italian readers. Examples include Bird-Pollan (2019), Giladi (2014), Illeterati (2014).

[22] While John McDowell has also been a prominent figure in debates about Hegelian naturalism, I bracket out his view here because I do not think his position, especially in its most recent formulations, is guilty on this count. In fact, I take McDowell's most recent formulations of his reading of Hegel on the relationship of Nature and Spirit to be largely amendable to my own (see, e.g., McDowell's response to Corti in Sanguinetti (2018) 247-9). At the same time, McDowell's use of the term "naturalism" in his Hegel interpretation has almost certainly contributed to popularizing the view I want to reject here.

it were, in a friendly relationship with us or that is an expression of the grand providential plan of the universe. Indeed, such a disenchanted nature as a whole threatens no longer to be understood as responding to human aspirations at all, and if so, nature and religion part ways. **It is thus in disenchanting nature and coming to a new understanding of ourselves that we make way for a genuinely naturalist, scientific account of nature, and, in turn, the success of the natural sciences further underwrites this new conception of *Geist*.**[23]

(2) Hegel's conception of nature in general is that of a disenchanted Aristotelian naturalism…Hegel has no quarrel with the natural sciences.[24]

(3) The task of a *Naturphilosophie* thus is linking natural science with metaphysics in something like the following sense. It has to show what nature as a whole must be like if nature is indeed the kind of object that is best studied by empirical natural science.[25]

In (1) we see the central commitment to the innovative nature of Hegel's theory of mind. The further claim is that this innovative theory of mind comes equipped with a "genuinely naturalist, scientific account" of a nature that is "disenchanted."[26] In (2) and (3), Pinkard expands on what

[23] Pinkard (2012) 20-1.
[24] Ibid. 19.
[25] Ibid. 21.
[26] A brief note on the constellation of magical German terms including "enchantment" [*Verzauberung*], "disenchantment" [*Entzauberung*], and "re-enchantment" [*Wiederverzauberung*] that are often employed in debates about Hegel's natural philosophical views. In the passages from Pinkard that I have quoted from above, he uses the term "disenchantment" to describe an empiricist conception of nature. This application of the term was made famous by Max Weber in his *Science as a Vocation* (2004), where he employs it to describe the understanding of nature that arises out of the contemporary natural scientific world view of nature as an object of calculation that, as such, is quantifiable (12-14). It is, again, McDowell (2005) who is largely responsible for popularizing the notion of "re-enchantment" in the Hegelian context. The question at issue under this heading is not whether or not there is a divine or magical explanation of natural phenomena. Rather, it is about whether or not the only possible rational explanation of natural phenomena is quantitative. Hegel thinks there is more to nature than the calculable; in what follows we will see something about why.

this conception of nature entails. He reiterates that Hegelian nature is disenchanted and glosses this to mean that nature is "the kind of object that is best studied by empirical natural science." In short, Pinkard is at pains to attribute a notion of nature to Hegel that does not stand in tension with the empiricist view of nature that is dominant in the contemporary Anglophone study of philosophy. As the history of philosophy shows, Nature can be empirically studied in many ways—here, Pinkard describes his Hegel's brand of empiricism as "Aristotelian"[27]—but the important thing is that there is an apparent metaphilosophical consensus about what kind of object nature is (i.e. an empirically available object) and how knowledge of nature is to be attained (i.e. by means of empirical observation) that these approaches allegedly share in common.[28]

To reiterate, I take Pinkard to have Hegel's best interests in mind when he describes Hegelian nature as he does. One of Pinkard's interpretive aims is to make Hegel's thought accessible to an audience of philosophical readers for whom empirically obtained natural scientific knowledge is the epistemological gold standard. Towards this end, he wants, rightly, to combat the notion that Hegel has some sort of mystical or divine view of Nature that makes his thought impossible to take seriously.

At the same time, in the service of this goal, I believe Pinkard and those who advance similar interpretations are overeager to explicitly claim or implicitly assume that Hegel's view of Nature is congruent with some version of the dominant contemporary view. Hegel's writings on Nature make it very clear that he takes issue with the philosophical commitments that come along with a broadly empiricist approach to physics. In the *Philosophy of Nature*, Hegel writes:

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[27] Hegel does praise Aristotle's *Physics*, but for precisely opposite reasons to those for which Pinkard implies he might: in the LHP discussion of Aristotle, Hegel endorses Aristotle's account of nature insofar as it is conceptual and parts ways with it when it verges into empiricism.

[28] For an exemplary statement of this metaphilosophical view, see Maclaurin & Dyke (2010). My own claim is not that all of these views are, in actual fact, commensurate. My interest here is to pick out an unexamined prejudice rather than to argue for the point. I assume (with Hegel) that there are important fine-grained differences amongst different philosophical conceptions of nature and natural scientific knowledge.

> What distinguishes the philosophy of Nature from physics is…the kind of metaphysics used by them both. For metaphysics is nothing else but the entire range of universal determinations of thought, as it were, the diamond net into which everything is brought and thereby first made intelligible.[29]

According to this passage, there is a conflict between empirical physics and philosophy of nature over what it means to render something intelligible and, thus, metaphysically salient. Hegel further unpacks the relationship between empirical physics and philosophy as follows:

> Not only must philosophy be in agreement with our empirical knowledge of nature, but the *origin* and *formation* of the philosophy of Nature presupposes and is conditioned by empirical physics. **However, the course of a science's origin and the preliminaries of its construction are one thing, while the science itself is another. In the science itself, [empirical physics] can no longer appear as the basis of the science; here the basis must be the necessity of the Concept.**[30]

Thus, Pinkard is entirely correct that Hegel does not in any way reject empirically conducted natural science. Hegel thinks that natural scientific research carried out using empirical methods yields results that are valid within the constraints of these methods, and he is happy for natural scientists to carry on using these methods to produce these sorts of results. Further, as the second quote shows, he thinks the philosophical study of nature must even be in some way

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[29] PN §246Z, 11.

[30] PN §246R, 6. *"Von dem Verhältnis der Philosophie zum Empirischen ist in der allgemeinen Einleitung die Rede gewesen. Nicht nur muß die Philosophie mit der Naturerfahrung übereinstimmend sein, sondern die Entstehung und Bildung der philosophischen Wissenschaft hat die empirische Physik zur Voraussetzung und Bedingung. Ein anderes aber ist der Gang des Entstehens und die Vorarbeiten einer Wissenschaft, ein anderes die Wissenschaft selbst; in dieser können jene nicht mehr als Grundlage erscheinen, welche hier vielmehr die Notwendigkeit des Begriffs sein soll."*

informed by the results of the empirical study of nature. But, *pace* Pinkard, Hegel does not anywhere go so far as to claim that nature is *best* studied using empirical natural science. Here he is saying that nature can and must also be studied philosophically, in accordance with "the necessity of the Concept", i.e. in a way that is precisely not merely empirical. Moreover, on Hegel's view, it is the philosopher, not the physicist, who properly understands what Nature and its phenomena are.

Hegel's commitment to a philosophical conception of nature that is not coincident with the empirical view of nature is thus best understood as a metaphysical commitment. The question as to how nature is to be understood hinges on a question about what nature is. The motivation for posing such a question in the first place is most obvious on the theoretical side of things: if one is concerned, as Hegel is, to combat the idea that there is some sort of "gap" between mind and world, one approach to the problem is to redefine these terms in such a way that they are no longer opposed to one another in the way that causes the difficulty. (And this, I take it, is the point of John McDowell's foray into a "second nature" variety of naturalism: it is a consequence of his attempt to make sense of what changes about "nature" when mind and world are viewed as sharing a set of forms in common rather than as being formally distinct). On the practical side of things, this means that the ethical naturalist's project of grounding a novel theory of mind in a familiar theory of nature is not viable: it is a zero-sum conceptual landscape, and one cannot remap the territory arrogated to mind without also remapping the territory arrogated to the world. When the ethical naturalist "reaches back" to nature in order to ground his novel notion of mind, there is no such nature available to grasp.

How not? The key to understanding Hegel's view of Nature is to recall that Nature and Spirit do not exhaust Hegel's metaphysics. As we have seen in detail, there is also Logic, the set of rational forms. In the Hegelian picture, Logic is emphatically not an exclusively mental province. Rather, the set of rational forms that comprise Logic are instantiated in two ways: in Nature and in Spirit. Further, the set of rational forms described in the Logic that Hegel

attributes to both Nature and Spirit include both law-governed and spontaneous (free) forms. Thus, in the Hegelian picture, neither rationality nor freedom constitutes the specific difference between Nature and Spirit.

This is not as radical a claim as it initially appears to be. Hegel clearly does hold that there *is still a specific difference* between the mental and the physical. It is not a secret what this difference consists in: Spirit is self-consciously rational whereas Nature is rational without being self-conscious. In the Introduction to the *Philosophy of Nature*, Hegel illustrates this point by reference to Schelling's description of Nature as a "petrified intelligence."[31] McDowell phrases the point more perspicuously in these terms:

> The human realm, the realm of Spirit, is a region of reality that is distinguished from Nature by a distinctive form of intelligibility…what separates Nature and Spirit is a distinction between regions of reality whose intelligibility does not, in the case of Nature, and does, in the case of Spirit, constitutively involve self-consciousness.[32]

What is required in order to understand Hegel's notion of Nature, then, is an understanding of what it means, in a secular context, for something to be spontaneously rational without being self-conscious.[33]

3.3 My proposal, second pass

This is where I take the distinction between space and time and sense-affection to become relevant. If neither spontaneity nor rationality can be drawn on to serve as the distinguishing criterion between self-consciousness (Spirit) and what lacks self-consciousness (Nature), a

[31] PN §247Z 15.
[32] McDowell (2018) 247.
[33] For other approaches to treating this topic see also Stern (2017), Stone (2005), Rand (2017).

different criterion must be employed. My proposal is that the distinct intuitive-formal elements at work in each of these spheres can serve as such a criterion.

It may seem odd to contrast these ostensibly very different sorts of intuition. A call back to Kant's critical philosophy may perhaps help make the case. On Kant's view, space and time are forms of intuition involved in the theoretical cognition of objects, whereas certain kinds of sense-affection—like, e.g., moral feeling—belong to the realm of practical cognition. We can understand Hegel as taking this Kantian distinction and revising it in such a way that space and time are specifically opposed to all forms of sense-affection. In this very circumscribed way, Hegel's distinction between Nature and Spirit follows Kant's division between theoretical and practical cognition.

To what end? As I have already indicated, I believe Hegel uses these distinct intuitive-formal elements in order to formally distinguish between Nature and Spirit. The philosophically helpful difference that I believe Hegel sees between these two sets of forms is their contrasting sorts of indexicality. Nature is comprised of a series of "heres" and "nows" whereas Mind involves the self-conscious "I". One crucial difference between these two kinds of indexes is that whereas "here" and "now" are only contingently true because they depend upon externally provided context for their meaning, the asserted "I" always, necessarily refers to itself.[34]

One might be understandably hesitant to read anything akin to contemporary theory of reference anachronistically back into Hegel's thought. It might immediately be objected, for example, that Hegel is not talking about language and, thus, it is unclear how the linguistic issue of indexicality can be relevant to his thought. But, I have proposed that Hegel's central set of issues *are* broadly semantic. Hegel *is* in fact concerned with how the Logic makes the Realphilosophie true. And I do not think it is such a stretch to say that it does so in virtue of a situation of reference. Then, further, it might also be allowed that Nature and Spirit refer to the

[34] On the self-referentiality of I concepts in Kant see Longuenesse (2017), in Hegel see Redding & Bubbio (2014).

Logic in different ways. When Hegel describes Nature and Spirit as "exhibitions" of the Absolute Idea, I take him to have just this situation of reference in mind.[35]

This point can be phrased in more era-appropriate language by means of a final appeal to Kant. In the *Critique of Pure Reason's* B-Deduction, Kant describes judgments as "nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception." Bracketing out the language about judgment and the question of objectivity, the notion of bringing given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception is of interest to us here. As we have seen, Hegel's Concept is his version of Kant's transcendental unity of apperception. Further, the Realphilosophie differs from the Logic specifically insofar as it involves externally given content. Thus, the task of Hegel's philosophical method is something like the task of Kantian judgment; that is, the task of bringing what is given to the unity of apperception.

I mention this here because I believe that the unity of apperception, the Concept, is what the two different kinds of intuitive content provided by Nature and Spirit refer *to*. They do so precisely insofar as they exhibit its form. Nature and Spirit, then, are broad descriptions of the two different ways in which these two kinds of contents are to be brought to apperception.

Natural content must be brought by something outside of it. Spiritual content, by contrast, brings itself to apperception. And this is why Hegel repeatedly makes claims like this one:

> every mental image, the slightest fancy of mind, the play of its most capricious whims, every word, affords a superior ground for a knowledge of God's [i.e. the Absolute Idea's, E.L.] being than any single object of Nature…in every expression of Spirit there is contained the moment of free, universal self-relation. In Nature….each separate entity is without the Concept itself.[36]

[35] I have already argued, at length, that reference functions distinctively (I have said: tautegorical symbolically) in a non-representational logical context.
[36] PN §248R, 17.

4. Spatiotemporality (or, Nature)

In the previous section, I have suggested (i) that we should not assume in advance of treating Hegel's texts that we are equipped with an adequate understanding of what he takes the difference between the mental and the physical to consist in, and (ii) that, on Hegel's view, spatiotemporal form is one of the distinguishing hallmarks of the physical world. I have also framed the appropriate question to ask about Hegel's notion of Nature as: what does it mean for something to be spontaneously rational without being self-conscious?

In this section, I aim to put together these thoughts and answer this question as follows: Hegel's account of the spatiotemporality of Nature is an account of what it means for something to be spontaneously rational without being self-conscious. This is so because, in Hegel's philosophical picture, space and time are nothing other than formal determinations that specify the non-conceptual. This non-conceptual, spatiotemporal character of Nature is precisely the defect of the physical world that differentiates Nature from self-conscious conceptual thought (i.e. Spirit).

This may seem to be a very thin metaphysical account of Nature. A certain kind of metaphysically minded reader might object that there is much more to the *Philosophy of Nature* than the brief discussion of space and time at the outset of the text. Yet, closer attention to the text shows that Hegel himself thinks almost everything else that can be said about Nature has to do with the kind of knowledge human beings can have of it. Space and time, by contrast, are conditions of possibility on this knowledge. These forms are the feature that accounts for why Nature is available as a distinctly knowable object from mind itself.

In the first sections of the *Philosophy of Nature*, Hegel writes that space and time are "ideal" forms that can be articulated in advance of the transition to reality in the subsequent section on Matter. We have already seen that Hegel's notion of the "real" is method-involving:

that is, the Hegelian real is constituted in part by a subject confronting an object and seeing it as immanently rational (thus, Hegel also describes matter as "being for-self", which I think we should hear in this case as meaning "a being that is available to the self" i.e. to a self-conscious observer). As a consequence, I take Hegel's designation of space and time as "ideal" to signal their priority to the rest of the topics treated in the Realphilosophie. In Hegel's own language: "What is real is limited, and the other to this negation is *outside* [the real]."[37] As such, it is the ideal, spatiotemporal character of Nature that says more about what Hegelian Nature fundamentally *is*, on its own, in abstraction from any relation to human mindedness, than any of the various subsequent accounts of natural scientific explanation.

The meager character of Nature when it is "separated off" from Logic and Spirit in this way illustrates a fact about Hegel's thought: namely, that one of the ways in which Hegel's metaphysics is non-traditional is that it has little to say about Nature other than as an object for mind.

4.1 Three defining traits of Nature

That caveat aside, there is still *something* to be said.

In his textual account of Nature, Hegel introduces Nature as having three primary defining characteristics. On Hegel's view, Nature is: (a) intuitive (b) self-external or impotent [*Ohnmächtig*], and, finally, (c) spatiotemporal. These are not distinct traits; rather, each subsequent descriptor is a specification of its predecessor. I will treat each of these briefly in turn.

4.1.1 Nature is intuiting

[37]PN §258R, 35

At the end of the *Encyclopedia Logic*, Hegel describes nature as "the intuiting Idea."[38] The word "intuiting" is used in this context to mark the way in which Nature contrasts with Logic.

Hegel's choice of "intuition" in this context is somewhat surprising. It is not a term he typically employs technically, thus his precise meaning is not immediately clear.

The full passage in which this claim is made reads:

> *Considered* according to the *unity* that it has with itself, the Idea that is *for itself* is *intuition* [*Anschauen*], and the intuiting [*anschauende*] Idea is *Nature*. But as intuition [*Anschauen*], the Idea is posited in the one-sided determination of immediacy or negation, through external reflection.[39]

Here, we find two important clues about what Hegel means by using "intuition" and its cognates to describe Nature. First, intuition describes a specific kind of formal self-relation—it describes a way in which logical form (i.e. "the Idea") provides itself with content (i.e. is "for itself"). Second, this mode of content provision is marked out as being in some way defective or incomplete. This is signaled by three classic Hegelian red flags: "one-sided," "immediacy," and "external."

Thus, the distinction being drawn between Logic and Nature has to do with the way in which form and content are brought together in these two distinct domains. Whereas logical form provides itself with content—we have seen how it does so already in previous chapters—Nature is not self-sufficient in this way. More specifically, whereas the discursively articulated forms that belong to Logic bring themselves to the unity of apperception simply in virtue of their discursive form, Nature's contrasting formal character requires an act of "external

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[38] EL §244, 307.
[39] ibid. Hegel's italics. "Die Idee, welche *für sich* ist, nach dieser ihrer *Einheit* mit sich *betrachtet*, ist sie *Anschauen*, und die anschauende Idee *Natur*. Als Anschauen aber ist die Idee in einseitiger Bestimmung der Unmittelbarkeit oder Negation durch äußerliche Reflexion gesetzt."

reflection" in order to be brought to the unity of apperception. It is this requirement that is being marked by the term "intuitive."

4.1.2 Nature is self-external

Having distinguished Nature from Logic, it still remains to distinguish Nature from Spirit, the other extra-logical domain. Hegel draws this second distinction in terms of a further formal feature: self-consciousness. Hegel uses the terms "self-internal" and "self-external" to distinguish between what we might call the "first-personal" and "third-personal" character of the respective acts of external reflection required in order to bring objects in these two domains of reality to the unity of apperception.

Hegel does not make this point as explicitly as would be desirable, perhaps in part because he lacks an adequately rigorous philosophical language for doing so, but there is myriad evidence of his reliance on this distinguishing criterion throughout the Realphilosophie. Here are two exemplary passages, first from the *Philosophy of Nature* and next from the *Philosophy of Spirit*:

> Nature has presented itself as the Idea in the form of otherness. Since therefore the Idea is the negative of itself, or is external to itself, Nature is not merely external in relation to the Idea (and to its subjective existence, Spirit); the truth is rather that externality constitutes the specific character in which Nature, as Nature, exists.[40]

And,

[40] PN §247, 14.

> External Nature…like mind, is rational, divine, an exhibition [*Darstellung*] of the Idea. But in Nature, the Idea appears in the element of asunderness, is external not only to mind but also to itself precisely because it is external to that actual, self-existent inwardness which constitutes the essential nature of Spirit.[41]

These passages describe the self-externality of Nature as standing in specific contrast to the self-internality of Spirit. In offering this description, Hegel's aim is to show that the difference between Nature and Spirit is not simply given, but, rather, formally explicable.

Such an explanation is needed because Hegel has claimed in the Logic that thought and being share a set of forms in common. Yet, he *also* wishes to claim in the Realphilosophie that there is a philosophically salient difference between the mental and the physical. The contrast between self-internality and self-externality specifies this difference.

This specification stands alongside the analysis of the difference between Nature and Logic in the previous section. Nature and Spirit are both external to Logic. This means they both involve content that must be brought to the unity of apperception in a different way from immediately logical content. But, while Spirit can bring its own content to the unity of apperception, Nature cannot do so—it requires outside assistance, from Spirit.

Hegel glosses Nature's need for external assistance in bringing its representations to the unity of apperception as Nature's impotence or "*Ohnmacht*." The German term means both "without power" and "without self-consciousness." Hegel employs it in order to emphasize the coincidence of these situations. He further unpacks the term as having to do specifically with the contradiction between Nature's form and its content:

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[41] PS §381Z, 9.

> The contradiction of the Idea, arising from the fact that, as Nature, it is external to itself, is more precisely this: that on the one hand there is the necessity of its forms which is generated by the Concept, and their rational determination in the organic totality; while on the other hand, there is their indifferent contingency and indeterminable irregularity. In the sphere of Nature contingency and determination from without has its right, and this contingency is at its greatest in the realm of concrete individual forms, which however, as products of Nature, are concrete only in an immediate manner. This is the impotence of Nature, that it preserves the determinations of the Concept only abstractly.[42]

According to this passage, Nature is characterized by a disjunction between form and matter. Like anything that exists in Hegel's philosophical picture, Nature's form is logical form. But its matter is doubly external: Nature is both extra-logical and permanently so. The "concrete" or physical aspect of Nature stands in permanent opposition to its logical formal aspect. Hegel's point is that this opposition is constitutive: Nature simply *is* the realm of objects that are inadequate (per Hegel, "abstract") instantiations of logical form.

4.1.3 Nature is spatiotemporal

Space and time, finally, specify the precise way in which Nature is insufficient to logical form. They are, in Hegel's phrasing, the two forms of self-externality.[43] Hegel further notes that space and time are "pure form[s] of intuition, the non-sensuous sensuous" to which "the distinction of objectivity and a subjectivity confronting it…does not apply."[44]

Hegel defines space and time as follows:

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[42] PN §250, 22-3.
[43] Ibid. §253, 28.
[44] Ibid. §258R, 35

Space:

a) "the abstract universality of Nature's self-externality, self-externality's mediationless indifference" (PN §254, 28).

b) "a mere form, i.e. an *abstraction*, that of immediate externality" (PN §254R, 28-9).

Time

c) "the negative unity of self-externality…an out-and-out abstract, ideal being" (PN §258, 34).

d) "Becoming, directly *intuited*" (ibid.)

In all of these passages, space and time are firmly linked up with Nature's being self-external and intuitive. The minimal character of these formal determinations is underlined, as is their status as ideal rather than real.

Hegel then goes on to claim, somewhat unusually, that **only physical objects are in time:**

> Time… has no power over the Concept, nor is the Concept in time or temporal; on the contrary it is the power over time, which is this negativity only qua externality. Only the

> natural, therefore, is subject to time in so far as it is finite; the true, on the other hand, the Idea, Spirit, is eternal.[45]

This is a specifically anti-Kantian point. It is directed at claims Kant makes throughout the critical philosophy about time as the inner sense by means of which we get ahold of our own minds. It is the sensible compliment to the claims about the a priori logical content of apperception discussed in the previous chapter.

A quick look at Kant's *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* will help pick out the view Hegel is positioning himself against. In that text, the specific relationship between Kant's first *Critique* doctrine of intuition and his view of nature is filled out. In the *Metaphysical Foundations*, Kant proposes that nature just is the set of sensibly available objects. He writes:

> [Nature is] the sum total of all things, insofar as they can be objects of our senses, and thus also of experience. Nature, in this meaning, is therefore understood as the whole of all appearances, that is, the sensible world, excluding all nonsensible objects.[46]

Kant subsequently draws a further distinction between the objects of inner and outer sense:

> Now nature, taken in this meaning of the word, has two principal parts, in accordance with the principal division of our senses, where the one contains the objects of the outer senses, the other the object of inner sense. In this meaning, therefore, a twofold doctrine of nature is possible, the doctrine of body and the doctrine of the soul, where the first considers extended nature, the second thinking nature.[47]

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[45] Ibid. 34.
[46] Kant MFNS 3. Compare also *Prolegomena* 47-8.
[47] Ibid.

In Kantian terms, space and time are the respective forms of outer and inner sense.[48] So in this passage merely spatial appearances, the objects of outer sense, are being separated out from temporal appearances, the objects of inner sense. According to Kant, these two kinds of objects require distinct treatments: spatial objects are to be discussed in a "doctrine of body" and temporal objects in a "doctrine of soul."

By Kant's lights, however, only the doctrine of body treating spatial objects can ever properly become a science. This is so specifically because "mathematics is not applicable to the phenomena of inner sense and their laws."[49] As a consequence, Kant writes:

> the empirical doctrine of the soul can never become anything more than an historical doctrine of nature, and, as such, a natural doctrine of inner sense which is as systematic as possible, that is, a natural description of the soul, but never a science of the soul, nor even, indeed, an experimental psychological doctrine.[50]

Here, Kant relegates the study of mind to a position inferior to the study of nature. This epistemic hierarchy flows directly from Kant's theory of intuition and its constitutive division between inner, temporal sense and outer, spatial sense.

This consequence of Kant's critical philosophy is one of Hegel's primary grounds for objection to Kant's transcendental idealism. As we saw in §3.3, Hegel wants to claim, precisely to the contrary, that "every mental image, the slightest fancy of mind, the play of its most capricious whims, every word, affords a superior ground for…knowledge…than any single object of Nature." Having seen the origin of Kant's contrary view in his doctrine of intuition, we

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[48] In the first *Critique* Kant does note that *all* appearances, inner and outer, are in time (A34/B50). This claim is intimately bound up with Kant's views about the necessity of exhibiting the existence of objects by means of intuition. Questions can clearly be raised regarding whether or not Kant can coherently hold both that all appearances are in time and that the doctrine of body can be neatly separated from the doctrine of mind as Kant alleges in the MFNS.
[49] MFNS 7.
[50] Ibid.

are now in a position to see with more clarity why a transformation of Kant's theory of intuition stands at the heart of Hegel's own idealism.

5. Mind and Sensation

What remains to be discussed by way of conclusion is Hegel's own doctrine of the soul, his scientific account of mind in the *Philosophy of Spirit*. In this context, my aim is a relatively modest one. I will touch on three topics: (i) Hegel's characterization of the self-conscious "I", (ii) the way in which sense-affection replaces time as the intuitive form by means of which self-conscious mind gets ahold of itself and (iii) the role that sense-affection plays in linking up self-consciousness with the apperceptive form articulated in the *Science of Logic*.

5.1 The self-referentiality of the self-conscious "I"

To start, I will very briefly discuss the way in which Hegel takes Spirit to be a superior exhibition of conceptual self-reference to Nature. This has fundamentally to do with the way in which Spirit can appear to itself as what it is.

As noted previously, the first-personal, self-internal character of self-conscious thought contrasts with the third-personal, self-external character of Nature. One aspect of self-conscious thought's self-internality is the way in which mind can make itself into an object for itself: that is, the way in which rationally minded beings can perform actions that express intentions. It is of crucial importance here that Hegel's notion of rational mindedness is, famously, a social notion. He thinks that Spirit consists fundamentally in a plurality of individuals. Thus, when an individual actor appears to another rationally minded agent as acting, Hegel takes himself to be entitled to describe this situation as a self-internal one in which Spirit appears to itself.

Alznauer (2015) and Pippin (2008) draw attention to Hegel's emphasis on the (potential) parity between the "inner" and "outer" aspects of human action. Alznauer quotes Hegel thus in support of this point:

> The way a man is externally, i.e. in his actions (not of course just in his merely corporeal externality), that is how he is internally; and if he is only internally virtuous or moral etc. i.e only in his intentions and disposition and his outer is not identical with those, then the former is as hollow and empty as the latter.[51]

This picks up and directly contradicts Hegel's previously discussed comments on the specific lack of parity between inner and outer in the case of Nature. A natural object is a privative demonstration of the reality of rational form. A human action, by contrast, is a potentially sufficient demonstration of the reality of a human intention. Or, put otherwise, intentional action can adequately display the reality of an actor's rationality. And this rationality is nothing other than rational form.

The paradigm case of Hegelian perception, then, is the perception of a rationally minded being's action by a rationally minded perceiver. (This is the perceptual case that Hegel famously describes as recognition in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.)

I take the social character of Hegelian reason to be one of the key motivators behind Hegel's jettisoning of Kantian temporality as the intuitive form of inner sense. For Hegel, Spirit gets ahold of itself by perceiving itself. Because Spirit is social, this self-perception need not take place in a Humean sort of mental theater but, rather, occurs in sensible world. One person acts, another sees her act, and, since both individuals are part of collective human mindedness, Spirit sees itself acting. Thus, the non-temporal intuitive form by means of which mind (which I am

[51] Alznauer (2015) 127, quoting EL §140Z.

using interchangeably here with Hegel's Spirit) gets ahold of itself turns out to be a mode of sense-affection.

5.2 Sense-affection as a general intuitive form

The recognitive perception of another human agent may be the paradigm case of Hegelian perception, but it is, obviously, not the only case of perception. We perceive physical objects as well.[52]

I noted above that Kant distinguishes between time as inner sense and space as outer sense. In the first *Critique's* Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant qualifies this distinction. Insofar as all intuitions are ultimately mental representations for Kant, all Kantian intuitions, inner and outer, are also ultimately temporal. Thus, Kant writes, "time is an a priori condition of all appearance in general, and indeed the immediate condition of the inner intuition (of our souls), and thereby also the mediate condition of outer appearances."[53]

As we have seen, in the Hegelian picture, things are otherwise. On Hegel's view, space and time are *both* formal characteristics of Nature rather than Spirit. Thus, time is not the immediate condition of our inner intuition, nor is it the mediate condition of our (representations of) outer appearances. Instead, sense-affection serves this role.

Hegel discusses a variety of topics that fall under the general heading of sense-affection in the *Philosophy of Spirit*. The form I am interested in here is the most immediate mode of such

[52] "Physical objects" here is inclusive of both natural objects and artifacts. Hegel does not have much to say about artifact perception specifically, perhaps because artifacts are straightforwardly teleological objects. Their form, their purpose, is given them by Spirit and their matter is taken from Nature. This ostensibly makes them *better* than merely natural objects in the Hegelian picture. In this connection, Hegel is explicit that at least one class of manmade object, namely works of art, is superior to anything found in Nature. In his discussion of religious fetishism in the LPH, Hegel implies this is true of other manmade objects as well. Not coincidentally, the fetishism discussion is a forerunner to Marx's neo-Hegelian theory of commodity fetishism, which similarly proposes that (at least some) physical objects are not best understood as empirically real.
[53] CPR A34/B51

affection, the mode Hegel calls "sensation" [*Empfindung*]. Sensation also has a forerunner in Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic. There, Kant defines sensation thus:

> The effect of an object on the capacity for representation, insofar as we are affected by it, is sensation. That intuition which is related to the object through sensation is called empirical.[54]

Hegel's definition of sensation differs significantly from Kant's. While Hegel maintains that sensation is a form of perceptual affection, he denies that it either has anything to do with our representational capacity or that it is a merely empirical sort of intuition.

For Hegel, sensations are non-representational. Sensations are immediate whereas representations arise from reflection on sensations. Another way of putting this is to say that sensation is a mental state caused by passive sensory affection while representation is a mental act that potentially follows such a mental state.

This distinction results in what Hegel himself seems to take to be a crucial emendation of the Kantian picture. For Hegel, the distinction between mind and object does not exist until it is "put into place" by the act of reflection. Until this has happened, there is no distinction between mind and object. The point is phrased thus in one of the notes to the text: "the subjectivity of the sensing soul is one so immediate…that to the extent that it *only* senses, [the sensing soul] does not as yet grasp itself as a subject confronting an object."[55]

It is this immediacy that replaces Kant's description of sensation as the intuition of empirical objects. Hegel writes that sensation is rather

[54] ibid. A20/B34
[55] PS §400, 75.

> the form of the dull stirring, the inarticulate breathing, of the Spirit through its unconscious and unintelligent individuality, where every definite feature is still "immediate"….The content of sensation is thus limited and transient, belonging as it does to natural, immediate being—to what is therefore qualitative and finite.[56]

Hegelian sensation is "limited" and "finite" rather than empirical. This difference matters because Hegel is interested to say that sensation is not something a posteriori that must be strictly separated out from a priori form, but rather that sensation is the starting point by means of which self-consciousness begins to get ahold of logical form. If this is merely heard as meaning that experience is a condition on philosophical thinking, then Kant of course shares this view. But for Hegel it means something much more robust: with regards to physical objects, sensation is the starting point by means of which mind gets ahold of logical form insofar as sensation is the very first moment in which the external character of the physical world is overcome.

In the case of external sensing, this means the first moment in which the physical world is made mental or "ideal":

> What the sensing soul finds within it is, on the one hand, the naturally immediate, as ideal and made its own. [57]

On the other hand, mind also expresses itself physically, in the form of bodily expressions that are available to other human perceivers. This bodily expression of the mental is the Hegelian analogue to inner sense: in the first instance, a finite rational thinker gets ahold of mind by perceiving the expressions of other rationally minded beings rather than by perceiving her own

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[56] Ibid. §400, 73.
[57] PS §401, 75. "Was die empfindende Seele in sich findet, ist einerseits das natürliche Unmittelbare, als in ihr ideell und ihr zueigen gemacht."

mind. These two aspects of sensation, the mental idealization of the physical and the physical expression of the mental, provide Hegelian Spirit its first contact with both Nature and itself. In this way, this privative mode of affection underwrites all of Spirit's experience.

Thus Hegel writes:

> *Everything is in sensation*: if you will, everything that emerges in mental consciousness and in reason has its source and origin in sensation; for source and origin just means the first, most immediate manner in which a thing appears.[58]

Sensation is the intuitive form that serves as a starting point for self-conscious thinking.[59]

5.3 *Nachdenken*

Sensation is only a starting point. The aim of Hegelian cognition is to bring the first-personal content offered up in sensation to rational form and, in so doing, to make this content actual. This occurs by means of a complex process of reflection that Hegel describes with the verb "*nachdenken*."[60] Commentators sometimes emphasize the posteriority implied by the prefix 'nach',[61] but I prefer to hear the term in its directional sense: all Hegelian mental processes are directed *toward* thought in the same way that a flight is directed toward its destination.[62] Thought,

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[58] PS §400, 73.

[59] Hegel also attributes sensation to animals. This may seem to present an obstacle to the distinction I wish to draw between Nature and Spirit according to which of these intuitive forms each involves, but in fact it does not. Rather, this explains *why* animal life serves as a transition point between Nature and Spirit. The sensory capacities of animals make them potentially self-internal in the way that rational thinkers are. But they are animals precisely insofar as this potential is not realized.

[60] EL §5, 28. The notion of *nachdenken* may seem expressly Hegelian, but, in fact, it is an expansion of an idea that is already implicit in Kant's first *Critique* account of the categories of the understanding. Specifically, this reflective progression from sensation to thought is a dialectically elaborated version of the relationship that Kant describes as standing between the qualitative category of reality [*Realität*] and the modal category of actuality [*Wirklichkeit*]. (And, in this connection, it is no accident that the topics of quality and actuality are the respective starting and ending points of the Objective Logic as well—this progression is constitutive of anything that *is* for Hegel.)

[61] As in Hibben and v.d. Luft (20xx), 19: "after-thought" and in Inwood (1998), 46: "meta-thought."

[62] I hesitate to use the term "teleological" here since it is not clear to me that this directional process ought to be conceived as robustly purposive. It seems to me that a truly teleological understanding of Hegel's notion of thought would imply that all thought is for the sake of philosophy, a claim that Hegel wants to deny. I think a different

then, refers to the formal logical account of thinking articulated in Logic—that is, the Concept, Hegelian apperception.

I will not spend time summarizing the entirety of this elaborate reflective process (in the *Philosophy of Spirit*, Hegel describes upwards of twenty distinct moments that comprise this process) here, but rather will limit myself to some general remarks on what this process accomplishes.[63] The general aim of *nachdenken* is to bring the objects first encountered in sensation to the unity of apperception. How this is to be accomplished differs according to which kind of object, mental or physical, is under consideration.

We have been primarily tracking the way in which physical objects are externally brought to apperception by Spirit, so I will discuss that case here, leaving aside the details of how mind gets ahold of itself.[64] In the case of physical objects, the goal of *nachdenken* is to transform the idealized object experienced in sensation into a discursively articulated judgment. Hegel writes: "the very least that this thinking over [*nachdenken*] accomplishes is to change our feelings…into thoughts."[65] Since, as we have seen in previous chapters, discursively articulated judgments are themselves symbolic displays of conceptual unity, making the content of sensation discursive accomplishes the goal of bringing this content to apperception.

In the *Philosophy of Spirit*, Hegel indicates that he is specifically interested in the way in which sensations are transformed into names and predicates that are used in acts of linguistic assertion. Names are one of the final products won out of the process of thinking over, and Hegel describes names as "giving existence" to mental content.[66] But it is only in the exchange of words amongst rational beings that this existence is truly attained, when these words are enlivened by thought

notion is needed to capture the parity of the constituent phases of Hegelian cognition with the end they are directed at.

[63] For such an overview, see Corti and Houlgate's chapters in Sanguinetti (2018).

[64] Hegel's theory of mind's recognitive grasping of itself has, besides, been frequently and thoroughly treated in the literature. See especially Honneth (1992) and Pippin (2010).

[65] EL §5, 28.

[66] PS §462, 219.

> Words thus attain an existence animated by thought. This existence is absolutely necessary to our thoughts. We only know our thoughts, only have definite, actual thoughts, when we give them the form of objectivity, of a being distinct from our inwardness…[67]

The way mind gets ahold of itself by means of perceiving other minded individuals offers us a hint as to why language gives true existence to originally physical objects: the eventual expression of the immediate content given in sensation in language makes that content available to other rationally minded perceivers in the same way that our actions make our intentions available to others.

In one of the Zusätze to the 1830 edition of the *Philosophy of Nature*, Hegel is recorded as describing Spirit's relationship to Nature as follows: "Spirit [*Geist*]," the note reads, "wills to achieve its own liberation by fashioning nature out of itself; this action of Spirit is philosophy."[68] This desideratum is likely inspired by the third *Critique*, where Kant writes that "the imagination…is very mighty when it creates, as it were, another nature out of the material that actual nature gives it."[69] Kant certainly did not intend to go anywhere near as far as Hegel: for Kant, this "second" nature is a privative imitation of empirical reality. (Kant is specifically discussing representations of nature in works of mimetic art in this passage).

For Hegel, by contrast, it is this re-created Nature that is thinkable, speakable, and, thus, actual. In this way, Hegelian Nature is made rationally (rather than empirically) real by means of the cognitive action of Spirit.

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[67] PS §462, 221.
[68] PN §376, 444.
[69] CJ §49, 182.

Conclusion

In the course of these pages, my aim has been to rethink Hegel's so-called radicalization of Kant. I have had three primary goals in doing so: first, to provide a new framework for getting purchase on Hegel's philosophical system, which continues today to stymy interpreters as it has since publication; second, to show how Hegel's thought is shot through with aesthetic concerns, and, further, to show that these aesthetic concerns form the backbone of Hegel's post-Kantianism; third and finally, to suggest that the book is not yet closed on the Kant-inflected reading of Hegel. My greatest wish is to have shown that there are still myriad questions about Hegel's thought that remain to be answered, that can only be answered, by means of further study of Hegel's relationship to Kant. For all the greatness of their contributions, thinkers like John McDowell and Robert Pippin have only opened up this angle of approach; much work remains to be done.

I am not certain how much, if any, of that work I have accomplished here. This project, as it stands, is most accurately described as a genealogy of my thought process as I have worked over the problem of conceptual exhibition, of *Darstellung*, that I believe (and hope to have shown) stands at the heart of Hegel's departure from Kant. A fuller presentation would devote more time to the relation between essence and appearance as it is laid out in the Doctrine of Essence, as well as to cashing out the insights and arguments that are merely sketched here in this final chapter. The kinds of problems I discuss in these pages are the kinds of problems that you have to study for years, perhaps even decades, in order to even be properly wrong about them. I hope someday to return to these topics and to do so.

I will confess here, on a page very unlikely to ever be read by anyone besides perhaps a reviewer from the dissertation office, that I do not think it is misguided to be skeptical of Hegel's philosophical extravagance. It is probably misguided not to be skeptical. Anyone who has ever worked on the *Science of Logic* will be well-aware of the elusive character Hegel's text and his project; frequently, there is no sense to be made of it, and the inscrutability of the argument

often provokes a special kind of despair. It is a remarkable thing that a book that does not even properly have a subject matter can make a reader by turns viscerally, consumingly unhappy and, much more rarely, overwhelm her with delight in the sheer power of human thought.

So-called "first philosophy" is not a pressing project; things will not stop being true, or knowable, or in existence if we lack an adequate theory of truth, or knowledge, or being. We have perhaps never had any such theories, anyway, and we maybe we will never have them. This kind of work is devoid of pragmatic value. For this reason, at the end of his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle describes theoretical thinking as the most self-sufficient (glossed: free) activity available to human beings. It is also supposed to be most pleasant, and sometimes it is—theoretical philosophy, at the end of the day, is a kind of very high brow hedonism with absurd barriers to entry. We will never make money off of it or improve the state of the world.

But if anyone were ever to derive even a hint of that kind of pleasure, the divine kind, from anything I have written here, then I would consider the endeavor to have been utterly worthwhile.

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