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PAUL VĂDAN

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Mamei Mele,

Cea mai curajoasă persoană pe care o ştiu...

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Abstract

Today, the public has unprecedented access to the political decision-making process thanks to democratic norms, technological advancements in telecommunications, and archival capacities. Office-holders and prominent public figures are routinely placed under a social microscope, as their every move is dissected in an attempt to learn more about their character, intentions, and possibly their consequential decisions. However, students of ancient socio-political history do not benefit from similar levels of knowledge about the collective decision-making process, because of the nature of the extant evidence. Despite the centuries-old interest in the socio-political history of the Greco-Roman world, we have generally been limited to analyzing public decisions through the filter of historical hindsight, trying to dissect the oftentimes opaque and formulaic epigraphic voice of a seemingly confident and unified δῆμος. These limitations obstruct our efforts to gain insight into the tensions, intentions, and priorities that a collective decision-making body would have considered, which would in turn offer us a more in-depth understanding of ancient institutions and the social dynamics that governed them.

In my dissertation, I look to bypass these historiographic obstacles by employing the concept of risk to ancient decision-making. To do so, I adopt Decision Theory to highlight the cognitive processes behind a community's response to present and potential threats. I argue that ancient decision-makers understood risk as a deliberative craft – at times specifically referred-to as a τέχνη – that could be exercised to assess dangers, identify options, and decide on the response to a crisis. In the process, I explore the specific linguistic and cultural context that allowed ancient decision-makers to express and practice contingency planning and the quantification of uncertainty. With an added focus on epigraphic

documents, I also highlight the importance of collective memory, cult, and psychology, in developing risk mitigating tools by fostering social cohesion to elicit a strong communal response to danger.

My dissertation fills an important gap in Classical scholarship by providing the first study on the conceptualization of socio-political risk in antiquity. At the same time, it challenges sociological assumptions that the notion of risk is unsuited to the study of the ancient world. I thus argue against Ulrich Beck's dominant position that only modern society can be thought of as a "risk society," due to the advent of the systematic study of statistics in the 17th century. In the process, I show that Hellenistic decision-making enjoyed the same traits that have been identified as specific to modernity: namely, futurity, causality, and responsibility.

The organization of the dissertation follows the cognitive process of risk-taking, to emphasize the systematic conceptualization of ancient risk as "deliberative expertise" during the Hellenistic period. Chapter 1 lays out the philological foundation of the project, by showing how risk was expressed through the ancient Greek language. I look at the intellectual engagement of Hellenistic historians with Aristotelian ideas, and I argue that risk management was understood as the conceptual intersection between deliberation and τέχνη. Chapters 2 and 3 tackle the matter of identifying and assessing risks. I point to an established network of communication and information-sharing, that allowed Hellenistic communities to remain vigilant and respond rapidly to sudden upheavals. Chapter 4 explores the temporal aspect of ancient risk management, which in turn allows us to gain more insight into how Hellenistic communities undertook contingency planning. The conceptual pairing of τύχη with καιρός illustrates the importance of "reading" the circumstances of a crisis, and identifying the opportune moment to respond to present and potential threats. Chapter 5 takes a *longue durée* approach to ancient

socio-political risk, and looks at how historical precedents were employed by Hellenistic decision-makers to predict future outcomes in similar circumstances.

I conclude that we can indeed refer to Hellenistic society as a "risk society." At the same time, I highlight the continued dynamism and agency of the Greek *polis* in the post-Classical era, contradicting modern preconceptions of a general poliadic resignation to the post-Alexandrian realities. Moreover, we witness the workings of a society that is deeply conscious of futurity, as it constantly weighs short-term benefits against long-term developments. Finally, my conclusions render the Hellenistic *oikoumenē* more intelligible to modern audiences, as inter-disciplinary theoretical models allow us to replace schematic notions of antiquity with a complex portrait of socio-political realities. As in our own contemporary society, we witness the mechanics of an *oikoumenē* governed by numerous and sometimes conflicting intentions, inferences, estimations, speculations, as well as cultural contradictions.

Abbreviations

Ancient Authors

Ael. *VH.*	Aelianus, *Varia Historia*
Aen. Tact.	Aeneas Tacticus, *On the Defense of Fortified Positions*
Alciphron	Alciphron, *Letters*
Andoc.	Andocydes
Ap. Rhod. *Argon.*	Apollonius Rhodius, *Argonautica*
App. *Syr.*	Appian, *The Syrian Wars*
Arist.	Aristotle
APr.	*Prior Analytics*
Eth. Eud.	*Eudamian Ethics*
Eth. Nic.	*Nicomachean Ethics*
Int.	*On Interpretation*
Metaph.	*Metaphysics*
Pol.	*Politics*
Rhet.	*The Art of Rhetoric*
Arr. *Anab.*	Arrian, *Anabasis of Alexander*
Ath.	Athenaeus
Caes. *BCiv.*	Caesar, *Civil War*
Cass. Dio	Cassius Dio, *Roman History*
Cic.	Cicero
Rep.	*De Republica*
Tusc.	Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*
Dem.	Demosthenes, *Speeches*
Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.*	Dionysius of Halicarnassus *Antiquitates Romanae*
Diod. Sic.	Diodorus Siculus, *Library of History*
Frontin. *Str.*	Frontinus, *Stratagemata*
Herod.	Herodas
Hdt.	Herodotus, *The Histories*
Isocr.	Isocrates, *Speeches*
Just. *Epit.*	Justin, *Epitome of The Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus*
Liv.	Livy, *Ab Urbe Condita*
Lys.	Lysias, *Speeches*
Nep. *Eum.*	Cornelius Nepos, *Eumenes*
Onas. *Strat.*	Onasander, *Strategikos*

Paus.	Pausanias, *Description of Greece*
Pl.	Plato
Leg.	*Laws*
Phdr.	*Phaedrus*
Tht.	*Theaetetus*
Plut.	Plutarch
Ages.	*Life of Agesilaus*
Alex.	*Life of Alexander*
Cleom.	*Life of Cleomenes*
Dem.	*Life of Demetrius*
Eum.	*Life of Eumenes*
Mor.	*Moralia*
Nic.	*Life of Nicias*
Phoc.	*Life of Phocion*
Polyaen. *Strat.*	Polyaenus, *Stratagemata*
Polyb.	Polybius, *The Histories*
Sall. *Cat.*	Sallust, *The Catilinarian War*
StByz.	Stephanos of Byzantion
Strab.	Strabo, *Geography*
Suet. *Aug.*	Suetonius, *Life of Augustus*
Tac. *Ann.*	Tacitus, *Annals*
Thuc.	Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*
Xen.	Xenophon
Hell.	*Hellenika*
Hier.	*Hiero*
Hipp.	*Hipparchus*
Anab.	*Anabasis*
Mem.	*Memorabilia*

Reference Works and Editions

Austin	M. M. Austin. *The Hellenistic World from Alexander to the Roman Conquest: A Selection of Ancient Sources in Translation.* 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge. 2006.
BD	R. Bagnall and P. Derow. *The Hellenistic Period: Historical Sources in Translation.* Malden: Blackwell Publishing. 2004.
Bielman	A. Bielman. *Retour à la liberté: Libération et sauvetage des prisonniers en Grèce ancienne.* Lausanne: Université de Lausanne. 1994.
Billows	Billows. *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State.* Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997. 1997.
Burstein	S. Burstein. *The Hellenistic Age from the Battle of Ipsos to the Death of Kleopatra VII.* New York: Cambridge University Press. 1985.
FD	*Fouilles de Delphes.* Paris: De Boccard. 1902-.
FGrH	F. Jacoby. *Die Fragmente griechischen Historiker.* Berlin: Weidmann, then Leiden: Brill. 1923-.
Fontenrose	J. Fontenrose, *The Delphic oracle, its responses and operations, with a catalogue of responses.* Berkeley: University of California Press. 1978.
GHI	R. Meiggs and D. Lewis. A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions. Oxford, England. Clarendon Press.1969.
I. Didyma	A. Rehm. *Die Inschriften, Milet.* 3 vols. Berlin: Gebr. Mann. 1914.
I.Ephesos	H. Wankel et al. *Die Inschriften von Ephesos.* 8 vols. Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien 11-17. Bonn: Habelt. 1979-1984.
I.Erythrai	H. Engelmann and R. Merkelbach. *Die Inschriften von Erythrai und Klazomenai.* 2 vols. Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien 1-2. Bonn: Habelt. 1972-1973.
IG	*Inscriptiones Graecae.* Berlin: De Gruyter. 1873-.
I.Iasos	W. Blümel. *Die Inschriften von Iasos.* 2 vols. Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien 28. Bonn: Habelt. 1985.

I. Lampsakos	P. Frisch. *Die Inschriften von Lampsakos.* Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien 6. Bonn: Habelt. 1978.
I. Lindos	C. Blinkenberg and K. F. Kinch. *Lindos: Fouilles de l'Acropole1902-1914.* 2 vols. Berlin: de Gruyter. 1931-1992.
I.Magn.	O. Kern. *Die Inschriften von Magnesia am Maeander.* Berlin: Spemann. 1900.
Milet I^3	A. Rehm and G. Kawerau. *Das Delphinion in Milet.* Berlin: G. Reimer. 1914.
I.Pergamon	M. Fränkel. *Die Inschriften von Pergamon.* 2 vols. Berlin: Spemann. 1890-1895.
I.Priene^2	W. Blümel and R. Merkelbach. In coll. with F. Rumscheid. *Die Inschriften von Priene.* 2 vols. Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien 69. Bonn: Habelt. 2014.
I.Smyrna	G. Petzl. *Die Inschriften von Smyrna.* 2 vols. Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien 23-24. Bonn: Habelt. 1987-1990.
IosPE I^2	V. Latyschev. *Inscriptiones Antiquae Orae Septentrionalis Ponti Euxini Graecae et Latinae.* 2nd. ed. 3 vols. St. Petersburg: Archaeological Society of the Russian Empire. 1916.
IScM	D. M. Pippidi and I. I. Rusu. *Inscriptiones Scythiae Minoris Graecae et Latinae.* Bucharest, Romania: Editura Academiei. 1983-.
Ma	J. Ma. *Antiochos III and the Cities of Western Asia Minor.* New York: Oxford. 1999.
OGIS	W. Dittenberger. *Orientis Graecae Inscriptiones Selectae.* 2 vols. Leipzig: Hirzel. 1903-1905.
RO	P. J. Rhodes and R. Osborne. *Greek Historical Inscriptions 404-323 BC.* New York: Oxford. 2007.
SEG	*Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum.* Leiden: Sijthoff, then Amsterdam: Gieben, then Leiden: Brill. 1923-.
Syll.^{3}	W. Dittenberger. *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum.* 3rd. ed. Leipzig: Hirzel. 1915-1924.

INTRODUCTION

"Audentis Fortuna iuvat..."
- Vergil, Aeneid*, 10.284*

0.1 THESIS

The present dissertation explores the decision-making process of Hellenistic communities in times of crisis. I will look at how decision-makers identified, assessed, and responded to present and potential threats. My aim is to learn more about how *poleis* in the Hellenistic *oikoumenē* formulated and expressed their goals, priorities, and concerns during periods of domestic and regional upheaval. As such, my dissertation applies decision theory to the study of the ancient world, adopting an interdisciplinary approach by engaging with Cognitive and Social Sciences. As analysists Baruch Fischhoff and John Kadvany (2011) explain, decision theory is not in fact a theory in the classic sense of the word, but rather "an aid to practical reasoning, helping people to make the best decisions possible, given what they know (or could learn) about the decisions facing them."[1] As such, decision theory will help me understand how Hellenistic communities managed the uncertainties of choice and deliberation.

To illustrate the function of decision theory, I pause on the introductory Vergilian line, spoken by Turnus before the battle that was to seal his fate. Because of its popular reception, it has become a slogan for many contemporary institutions and individuals, inspired by its celebration of action and

[1] Fischhoff and Kadvany 2011: 5.

courage over complacency and hesitation. One may argue that its appeal stems from present cultural attitudes and the atmosphere of the times. In the Tech industry, for instance, Sheryl Sandberg has stated in a speech to the graduating class of 2015 at the Tsinghua School of Economics and Management, that "Fortune Favors the Bold" is an important pillar of the Facebook philosophy.[2] But as is often the case with the adoption of such out-of-context slogans, they hardly ever offer meaningful and practical advice. While daring is generally regarded as an important quality, the concise form of the slogan does not answer crucial questions as to when, how, and in what circumstances it is appropriate to act boldly. As Turnus' fate shows, daring is oftentimes not enough for ultimate success and survival.

Moreover, the assured tone of such sayings purports to offer certainty in matters where in fact there is none. Life is uncertainty, and as such, it cannot be reduced, demarcated, or addressed through a concise collection of maxims that purportedly address all combinations of situations, concerns, and goals. In contrast, Plutarch argued in his treatise "On the Fortune of Alexander" that, for Fortune to truly help the daring, it needs to be accompanied by deliberation and good judgment. Asking rhetorically whether the actions and accomplishments of the young conqueror revealed the caprice of Fortune (αὐτοματισμὸν τύχης), he answered that they in fact exhibited the human qualities "of one who did all things with sober and mindful judgment."[3] Plutarch further suggests that Alexander ought thus to be likened to a philosopher for his ostensibly virtuous character, given that "we consider all men intrinsically able to make correct decisions (ὀρθὰς κρίσεις). For nature by herself tends towards the good. But philosophers differ from most people in that they make strong and firm decisions (κρίσεις) in the

[2] Sandberg 2015.
[3] Plut. *Mor.* 332c: νήφοντι καὶ πεπνυμένῳ τῷ λογισμῷ πάντα πράττοντος.

face of danger."[4] Plutarch's observations reflect the collective human effort to deal with the uncertainties of life. More importantly, however, the emphasis on deliberation to make "correct" choices (κρίσεις ὀρθὰς) implies a certain "deliberative expertise" that could help decision-makers properly respond to dangerous, complex, and even unprecedented circumstances (παρὰ τὰ δεινά).

Modern institutions have identified "deliberative expertise" as risk management which has emerged as a powerful quantifying and decisional discipline to address uncertainties, formulate choices, and mitigate dangers in different circumstances.[5] Therefore, the present dissertation will determine whether the concept of risk can be applied to the Hellenistic world. The project is a timely contribution to Classics for several reasons. Firstly, a comprehensive study of socio-political risk in antiquity has yet to be produced. Its necessity has already been noted by scholars like John Ma (1999) who has called for a more in-depth understanding of the conditions in which communal decisions were made.[6] Léon Mooren (1998) agrees, adding that "the analysis of the process of Hellenistic decision-making is hampered by the fact that we know of countless decisions [...] but that we rarely receive good information about the debates that preceded them."[7] An exploration of ancient risk, therefore, will provide an in-depth explanation of how dangers were identified, assessed, and mitigated by, and among, Hellenistic decision-makers.

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[4] Plut. *Mor.* 333b-c: καίτοι κρίσεις μὲν ὀρθὰς πᾶσιν ἐνυπάρχειν ἀνθρώποις νομίζομεν· ἡ γὰρ φύσις ἀγωγός ἐστιν ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτῆς πρὸς τὸ καλόν· οἱ δὲ φιλόσοφοι τῶν πολλῶν διαφέρουσι τῷ τὰς κρίσεις ἔχειν ἐρρωμένας παρὰ τὰ δεινὰ καὶ πεπηγυίας.

[5] Zachmann 2014: 3, Skinns, Scott, Cox 2014: 3-8, Bernstein 1998: 2-6. Zweig 2012 follows Bernstein and argues that "All this suggests that risk is more than just a choice; it is also fate. As an investor, you can choose to take more risk or less, but you must take some. You can't eliminate risk. It is an inextricable part of investing, just as it is an irreducible part of life."

[6] Commenting on the character of public decrees as reflections of the ancient Greek communal decision-making, Ma writes that "The picture in the epigraphical sources is of a monolithic, totally mobilised, *polis*: there is no hint of internal debate, let alone conflict, shifts in policy, tensions, changes, indifference, or of the role played by individuals, or of the attitude of the citizenry (or groups of citizens) over a period of time concerning the changes brought about by royal conquest and its aftermath. Ma 1999: 21.

[7] Mooren 1998: 128.

Secondly, the dissertation will complement previous work on the economy of the Graeco-Roman world. Since the late 1980s, the work of Peter Garnsey (1988, 1989) and Thomas Gallant (1989, 1991) has drawn our attention to the environmental considerations and economic strategies that ancient farmers and households used to handle food supply problems, and predict periods of economic shortfall.[8] Their pioneering work has been a stepping stone for recent research on the ancient economy and markets. Vincent Gabrielsen (2011, 2016a) has shown how the socio-economic structures of Hellenistic *koina* functioned to increase trade and travel security, as well as to handle financial troubles. In turn, Alain Bresson (2016) has also illustrated the *polis* socio-economic stratagems established to insure long-term access to international markets, and a steady supply of imports-exports to mitigate the risk of resource scarcity or even famine.[9] Such initiatives have been interpreted as expressions of long-term considerations of danger, with the specific goal of prevention.

Finally, my dissertation will show that the difference between ancient and modern risk is one of form rather than substance. I set out to analyze the cognitive processes that constitute a cultural attitude which we identify as risk management by showing that Hellenistic perceptions of danger included considerations of responsibility, temporality, and causality. As such, I am confident that my conclusions and case-studies will inspire new avenues of interdisciplinary research pertaining to decision-making.

[8] Garnsey 1988 has shown that despite regular crop failure, *poleis* generally did not experience famine due to various social and economic measures implemented. These included setting up reserves, price moderation, and patronage. Gallant 1989, 1991 provides a general overview of the resource strategies that Greek households would implement to deal with shortfalls in production. He illustrates how an agricultural system could adapt to the pressures of land life cycles through strategies of crop diversification, intercropping, irrigation, and fragmentation of land holdings, for example.
[9] Bresson 2016: 429-438.

0.2 Ancient Risk: A Sociological Problem

The study of ancient risk has been problematic because of an overarching sociological principle which insists on a conceptual break between antiquity and the modern world, based on scientific and terminological considerations. The idea was first promoted by influential sociologist Ulrich Beck (1992), who considers risk as a modern, Western product of modernity, stating that "Risk may be defined as a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself." [...] In contrast to all earlier epochs (including industrial society), the risk society is characterized essentially by a lack: the impossibility of an external attribution of hazards. In other words, risks depend on decisions, they are industrially produced and in this sense politically reflexive."[10] In support of Beck's theory that risk denotes specifically modern socio-cultural and scientific concerns, scholars have pointed out that the ancient Greek and Latin languages do not have a specific term for risk. Anthony Giddens (1990), for example, heralded the advent of the modern era by declaring that "risk has replaced *fortuna*,"[11] to emphasize the conceptual divide between "traditional" societies, mired by a cultural surrender to divine fate, and the enlightened modern world. Proof of this assumed truism, Peter Bernstein (1996) notes, is the appearance of the term "risk" which coincided with the advent of probability and statistics in 17th century Renaissance Italy. The idea has become dominant also among Medievalists and early Modern historians. The recent edited volume by Dominique Bertrand entitled *Penser le risque à l'âge classique* (2014) attests to this intellectual modernist trend in the study of history. The opening contribution by Karen Rossignol embraces Giddens' approach to explain how the

[10] Beck 1992: 21, 183.
[11] Giddens 1990: 30.

introduction of the term "risk" signaled a novel way of conceiving danger and futurity, which did not exist in pre-modern times. As she explains in her own words, "la nouveauté consiste à traiter certains évènements en termes de risques et que cette nouvelle vision des choses est un trait caractéristique de la Modernité."[12]

This modernist attitude towards risk has been an obstacle to scholars who have attempted in the past to take the discourse on ancient risk beyond the confines of terminology. Specifically, Esther Eidinow (2007) has suggested in her work on *Oracles, Curses & Risk* that the meaning of the word κίνδυνος is close to our own colloquial understanding of "risk."[13] The premise in turn allowed her to analyze ancient Greek perceptions of risk through the archeology of cursing and oracular consultation at Dodona. She notes that these socio-cultural practices were used by individuals as tools to manage aspects of the uncertainty and risk of everyday life. Her approach, however, has attracted sharp criticism from Classically-trained sociologist of religion Kim Beerden (2013), who argues that "from an emic angle, the ancient risk-vocabulary is non-existent." Beerden, also a fervent follower of Giddens and Bernstein, further decries Eidinow's use of "risk" as an etic imposition, arguing that "risk" as quantified uncertainty is deeply rooted in probabilistic thought, "whereas from an etic angle, quantifications of

[12] Rossignol 2014: 17. Her views reflect those of Niklas Luhmann 1991, who subscribes to Giddens and Bernstein's views regarding the importance of introducing a new concept. Luhmann argues that the coining of a new term means the appearance of a new problematic conceptual situation, which did not exist in pre-modern societies, reflecting a situation that cannot be expressed precisely with the previously-available vocabulary. It is worth noting that Pierre-Charles Pradier 2004 criticized Luhmann's approach that the appearance and use of "risk" coincided with the rise of the pre-modern mercantile class, as an inexact intellectual construction. Pradier showed that the appearance of the term "risk" appeared before the Middle Ages, and that any attempts to claim a secure morphological evolution of the term from Latin is wrong. Nonetheless, Rossignol points out that Pradier's findings are limited to the languages of the Castille and Occitane regions, as early as the 12th century AD.

[13] Eidinow 2007: 4-5. In his review of Eidinow's work, Anders Rasmussen notes with regret that a study of the vocabulary of risk has yet to be produced. He argues that such a project is essential when arguing for ancient risk. Rasmussen 2010: 38-42.

uncertainty and application of risk-thinking are not present either."[14] For Beerden, risk is intimately linked to the modern sciences of statistics and probability, which would render any attempt to study ancient risk a logical fallacy. In these circumstances, the only result people in Greek *poleis* could hope for was to "get a grip on their uncertainties"[15] through appeals to the divine, concluding cheekily that "what risk assessment does for modern man, was what divination did for ancient man."[16]

Mathematical advancements in statistics and probability thus form the core of the modernist sociological attitude towards risk. By extension, the argument goes, the ancients did not see the future the way we do, namely through statistical risk. Their only tools were divination, sacrifice, prayer, and curses. Modern society, on the other hand, conceptualized risk and minimized it through quantification tools.[17] Beerden's position vis-à-vis the ancient world is but the latest installment of a direct line of argument that started with Ulrich Beck[18] and was furthered by his intellectual adherents. Niklas Luhmann (1991), for instance, stated dismissively that the ancients did not explore such cognitive processes beyond the practice of cosmology and a passive acceptance of divine agency. In turn, Bernstein considers the failure of "the Greeks" to engage with probability theory as "astonishing," and concludes

[14] Beerden 2013: 196-200. Beerden's criticism of Eidinow also extends to Peter Garnsey's work on *Famine and Food Supply in the Greco-Roman World* (Cambridge, 1988), and Jerry Toner's *Popular Culture in Ancient Rome* (Cambridge, 2009). As for the emic-etic distinction, Beerden thinks in terms of terminology and quantification. She claims that the concept of risk would have been too foreign to ancient thinkers because they did not think in terms of quantifiable uncertainty. As such, imposing an etic perspective to studying ancient risk must be rejected because risk is uniquely ingrained in "the probabilistic thinking of modern Western man." She considers such attempts as, "almost by default," a mere exercise in projecting uniquely modern perspectives onto the ancient world. Beerden, 203.

[15] Beerden 2013: 203.

[16] Beerden 2013: 203.

[17] Beerden 2014: 28. A similar attitude has been adopted by Bertrand 2014: 6-8.

[18] Beck 1992: 98 and Mythen 2004: 16. Beck talks about different forms of risk: "natural hazards" and "manufactured risks," that are paradigmatic of different societies. At stake is the idea of risk consciousness, pre-industrial societies are characterized by "natural hazards," as they considered famines, droughts and earthquakes to be caused by external (divine) forces. "Risk society," however, can calculate and quantify such phenomena while also dealing with risks created by modern occupational living, such as smoking and drinking.

that "Despite the emphasis that the Greeks placed on theory, they had little interest in applying it to any kind of technology that would have changed their views of the manageability of the future." Only after the mathematical revolution sparked by Pascal and Fermat did views about gambling move beyond ancient and outdated conceptions of chance; "The act of risk-taking floated free, untrammeled by the theory of risk management."[19]

The sociological stance has influenced the study of Classics as well. In her essay on "Risk and the Humanities: alea iacta est," Mary Beard has suggested that ancient societies perceived dangers according to the Roman view of chance as exhibited by dice games and oracles. She argues that the Romans embraced the uncertainty of life as "they constructed other areas of hazard in their lives on the model of dicing, so that the luck of the board game became a way of seeing, classifying and understanding what in our terms might be thought of as risk." Admittedly, Beard is primarily concerned with the need for grant-awarding institutions to recognize the importance of embracing a certain level of unknowability when it comes to financing academic research in the humanities. But in so doing, Beard relegated ancient risk-taking back to the narrow conception of daring, claiming that "anything like a calculation of the probability of danger, let alone a recognizable risk agenda," was absent in antiquity.[20]

Such statements affect our understanding of the relationship of ancient societies with the future and how they conceived of long-term developments. More importantly, however, they also promote an insidious argument about the special character of modernity, in that they fundamentally conceptualize the modern world's response to crises as, in some sense, original. They promote a "presentist" approach to decision-making by implying that contemporary issues have contemporary solutions. It follows that

[19] Bernstein 1996: 11, 16.
[20] Beard 2014: 91-92.

ancient experiences and past crisis-solving mechanisms become obsolete, relegated to the categories of superstition and credulity. Moreover, by explaining the continuity of "traditional" societies in terms of their unchanging, cyclical, and custom-oriented existence,[21] they deny them a fundamental level of cognitive rationality, institutional complexity, and social dynamism in dealing with crises, characteristics deemed staples of modernity. Beerden's position can be described as neo-primitivist, a viewpoint that has been consistently challenged by recent extensive studies on ancient cult that have sought to move past the primitivist attitudes of the so-called Cambridge ritualists and their intellectual successors.[22] Yet the persistence of neo-primitivism expresses the relative lack of scholarly attention to ancient decision-making.[23]

My dissertation, therefore, challenges modernist and primitivist assumptions and argues that we can in fact conceive of the Hellenistic *oikoumenē* as a "risk society." I preface my argument by offering some preliminary observations in response to the terminological and technological stance on risk. Firstly, given the varied contemporary uses of risk and the unclear etymological roots of the term, a terminologically-minded approach to risk is problematic. A significant pitfall is that accepting, as Rossignol does, that a new word equates with a new way of approaching the world, brings forth a

[21] Pre-modern world was a time "where products were and are crafted to last, where political structures are designed to endure and people conduct social relations with a fair measure of predictability." Whereas habits, customs, traditions, along with laws, contracts, and moral codes, made ancient futures more predictable, contemporary futures are marked by far greater uncertainties than were encountered in traditional societies due to the unprecedented levels of mobility, (technological) change, and speed. Adam and Groves 2007: 1, 11.

[22] See Fritz Graf's (1993: Ch. 2) comments on the history of the study of myth, and Kindt's (2012: 90-1) anti-primitivist position.

[23] Similarly, scholars on the ancient economy have recently sought to move past the decades-old debate between the "formalist" and "substantivist" schools of thought on ancient economic practices and systems. See in particular Alain and François Bresson's (2004) critique of Max Weber's primitivist views of ancient economic exploitation, together with Migeotte's (2002: 51-2, 121-2) criticism levied at the Primitivist School. Also noteworthy is Reger's (2005: 331-3) survey of recent scholarship rejecting the "primitivist-modernist" dichotomy in the study of ancient economies. For the Roman Imperial economy, see Jean Andreau and Elio Lo Cascio's attempts to find a middle ground between the two extremes, in Bang, Ikeguchi, and Ziche's (Eds.) 2006, *Ancient Economies, Modern Methodologies*: Edipuglia.

conceptual fallacy. As Peter T. Struck (2016) has very recently noted while discussing ancient perceptions of "intuition," the Greeks did in fact express a capacity for such a cognitive process, "and just expressed it in a cultural form sufficiently different from our own, that it shows up in entirely different terms." As such, to identify risk as a Hellenistic cultural attitude, it is more worthwhile to explore ancient risk by rephrasing the problem in terms of how the ancients thought about thinking in general, as Struck puts it.[24] To do so, I focus on how risk assessment in decision-making was conceived and expressed by Hellenistic decision-makers. My approach is inspired by Robert Kaster's (2005) work on cognition and ancient terminology. His non-lexical approach looks holistically at the cluster of affective experiences encapsulated by terms such as *fastidium* in Roman thought. For Kaster, cognition - the way we acquire knowledge and form judgments and beliefs based on our perceptions and memories - takes center stage, which in turn emphasizes the central role that culture has in shaping ancient expressions of emotions, "from the presentation of a phenomenon through evaluation to response." I will similarly explore not so much the various nuances that a word like κίνδυνος encapsulates, but the plurality of ways in which risk can be expressed and impressed upon the reader to vividly render the decision-making process of individuals and communities in crisis.

Secondly, the modern "risk society" stance betrays a narrow interpretation of quantification methods, while not taking into consideration different cultural perspectives on precedents and the building of "libraries of knowledge." Risk anthropologist Åsa Boholm (2015), for instance, has pointed out that statistics have limited function in explaining risk in non-technical contexts. She argues that context and perceptions must always be taken into consideration because people generally do not make

[24] Struck 2016: 21-22.

decisions according to optimization models. I will thus refer to cultural theory to look beyond modern technical terminology like "statistics," identifying processes of assessing and quantifying risk, and determining how they were communicated in their specific cultural context, what Boholm calls "cultural horizons of choice." The crux of the problem, therefore, becomes how Hellenistic decision-makers understood the degrees of danger facing them.

It is also worth noting that Beard's "aleatory society" is difficult to envision, primarily because people being "rational" on the one hand, and "religious" on the other, are not compatible stances. More will be said on this matter in Chapter 4, but as previous work on Greek cult and theology has shown, such distinctions are much more nuanced, to the point that they are not in fact distinct. Tim Whitmarsh (2015), for instance, has recently argued that atheism – what Richard Janko prefers to call "freethinking" - is a cross-cultural phenomenon, and should rather be understood as an ongoing dialogue about society, politics, and the nature of the gods. Also, the matter of "belief" has been decisively challenged by Henk Versnel (2011) as intrinsically absurd, while exploring the seemingly inconsistent, paradoxical, and dissonant behaviors and ideas of ancient Greeks towards their gods. Versnel encourages us to understand Greek gods from a "multiperspective" point of view where different spheres of being, belonging and behaving coalesced, that "allowed the Greeks to cope with the ambiguity of shifting from one point of view to the other, depending on what the context, focus, discourse or frame of mind required."[25] This is especially true when considering ancient perceptions of, and reactions to natural catastrophes. Groundbreaking work by Ludovic Thély (2016) shows that ancient seismologists – an aspect of ancient science overlooked by sociologists – rejected mythical etiologies, and instead focused on empirical

[25] Versnel 2011: 143.

observation, thus establishing the principles of natural philosophy and metaphysics. Telluric, hydrometeorogical, and climatic risks were in fact known to them. At the same time, their preventive attitude to diminish vulnerabilities – see architectural innovations, for instance – was not in fact opposed to cultic practices, which also shared a functional dimension to the relationship with the divine. As such, the claim that Hellenistic *poleis* thrived in a culture that "looked danger in the eye" while not considering averting or calculating danger, "but rather to assert (almost celebrate) the uncertainties, chances and dangers of human existence," does not tell the whole story of ancient decision-making.

Moreover, Beard's dice metaphor goes against her own argument, considering that it was dice games and gambling that ultimately led to the advent of modern probability theory. As she herself notes, ancient intellectuals from Aristotle to Cicero were themselves intrigued about dice permutations, suggesting that they intuited that there were certain observable rules and algorithms; they did not simply lend their lives to τύχη, but sought to understand its dynamics and gain some measure of control. Moreover, recent work by Fritz Graf (2005) and Stephen Kidd (forthcoming) shows that dice oracles and ancient gamblers were in fact aware of various probabilistic features of cubic dice or knucklebones and were engaged in calculating outcomes ahead of time. Specifically, Kidd has observed the surprising coincidence that the number of combinations of three cubic dice is equal to that of five four-sided knucklebones: 56. The coincidence seems to have been noticed by ancient observers and was deemed relevant in various social and cultic settings. This has led Kidd to suggest that we can in fact expect a certain level of mathematical sophistication at the ancient dicing table.[26]

[26] Kidd, presentation abstract at the SCS Annual Meeting in Boston, 5 January, 2018. Based on the forthcoming article "Greek Dicing, Astragaloi and the 'Euripides' Throw," *JHS*: 1-7.

On this issue, studies on ancient economic practices provide important comparanda, which modernist sociologists also do not consider. Alain and François Bresson (2004) have looked at ancient risk insurance practices and have shown that ancient communities did in fact have a technical understanding of quantifying danger. For example, they point to Demosthenes' description of a maritime loan contract in his *Contra Lacritos*, revealing how interest rates changed in accordance with the time of the year: during the high sailing season, the interest was estimated at 22%, while after the rising of Arktouros the rate could go as high as 30%. They in turn link the interest rates with the risk of shipwreck, which was in fact known to lenders from historical data. Estimations were precise enough not only to evaluate total damages but also to distinguish the number of shipwrecks related to the time of the year: while at the beginning of the sailing season one could expect one ship in five to sink, at the end of the season the chances could be as high as one in three. By also looking at grain trade prices, the Bressons further explain how the leverage investment system made borrowing preferable for the trader because he did not have to put his whole fortune at stake.[27]

The economic system was based on acquired experience and shared knowledge of everyone involved in maritime trading, making it possible to stimulate trade while also diminishing the inevitable risks of sea-faring for everyone involved; a business practice now known as "risk pooling."[28] On this note, James Franklin (2001) also points to investment loans in ancient Athenian maritime trading, which

[27] Bresson and Bresson 2004: 21-22. For studies on the use of accurate fractions in Hellenistic trade, see Finkielsztejn (2015) on weights and measures used in the Hellenistic Levant. See also Finkielsztejn (1999) for a description of a *sekoma* from Levantine Marisa, which records precise volume fractions for liquids, to the order of two: ½. ¼, ⅛ and $^1/_{16}$.

[28] Gerald Oesler (2015: 7-8) defines risk pooling in a modern business and insurance context as the consolidation of individual variabilities (measured with the standard deviation) in order to reduce total variability, and thus uncertainty and risk. Individual variabilities are consolidating and aggregating information. Risk pooling is also referred to as "statistical economies of scale." In a more general context, Douglas Hubbard (2009: 140) points to the essential function of risk analysis as providing a forecasting and predictive method. While exact prediction is not expected, he notes, we need to look at the average results of risk analysis "to outperform unaided human judges at predicting the likelihood of various events."

were meant to dilute the risk of the venture, though he shies away from the notion that the practice was necessarily understood and intended as such. He nonetheless acknowledges that the request of having witnesses present when ships left the Piraeus was an Athenian way to transfer the risk to the lender.[29] At the same time, Demosthenes –Franklin's own source - does in fact point to a Classical awareness of risk pooling: referring to those who have jointly come together and provided money and merchandise for a trading venture, he categorizes them as "those who have shared in the risk" (μετέσχηκας τοῦ κινδύνου).[30]

Ancient economists acknowledge that we are not dealing with advanced computational analyses, but argue that the examples at hand do reveal rational and profit-maximizing actors making empirical estimations based on present and potential circumstances; what they call "la rationalité des pratiques de gestion."[31] Along these same lines, Gabrielsen has shown that such "rationality of expertise" was behind the granting of *ateleia,* which provided traders with "sheltered monopolies" that made business more secure, more profitable, and more predictable for everyone involved: "Thus ancient states, especially big hegemonic powers, can be regarded as the first large-scale insurance companies that made it possible for privileged groups of merchants to be cost-effective and thus increase their profits substantially."[32] We are thus introduced to a market economy that strove for precision and long-term considerations, an economic reality that further challenges the modernist sociological stance. As such, my project on socio-political risk in the Hellenistic age will not only complement previous scholarly work on the ancient economy but will provide a cognitive bridge between ancient and modern societies. The conclusions of

[29] Franklin 2001: 259. For Athenian loans and witness requirements, Demosthenes is our main source: 34.28 and 35.10.
[30] Dem. 34.33. The context refers to a person who tries to extort insurance money from participants in a failed trading venture, even though he did not contribute anything to the venture - οὐ γὰρ μετέσχηκας τοῦ κινδύνου διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἐνθέσθαι.
[31] Bresson and Bresson 2004: 14, 16.
[32] Gabrielsen 2011: 237.

such an interdisciplinary project will promote new approaches to the study of decision-making in Social Sciences and the Humanities.

0.3 A Short History of Risk – Key Definitions

Peter Bernstein wrote that "the word 'risk' derives from the early Italian 'risicare' which means 'to dare.' In this sense, risk is a choice rather than a fate."[33] Although he offers an elegant explanation that supports his theory that risk was introduced by the advent of the Reformation and the appearance of capitalistic trade and bookkeeping practices,[34] he is wrong. Craig Hamilton (2007) points out that the etymology of risk is complicated because its origins are virtually unclear.[35] He points to several alternatives, such as the Latin word *rescare* (to cut), or the ancient Greek ῥιζικόν (to/for the root). The Arabic word *rizq* (sustenance, that which God allots) has also been proposed, while some have suggested a possible connection with the Middle Persian *roz* (day).[36] In turn, the uncertain etymology of the term makes risk difficult to define, given the many contexts in which it is used, as noted by the editors of *Risk – A Multidisciplinary Introduction*.[37] As a result, definitions are drawn from the many uses of the term, and not vice-versa. Karin Zachmann (2014) offers a general observation that "The modern understanding of risk presupposes subjects or institutions, accountable for their actions, that make decisions under conditions of apparent uncertainty."[38] From a slightly different perspective, Carlo Jaeger and his

[33] Bernstein 1996: 8. Bertrand 2014: 6, Zweig 2012, and Mercantini 2015: 2, have accepted Bernstein's theory as axiomatic.
[34] Bernstein argued that the removal of the confessional by Reformation movements "warned people that henceforth they would have to walk on their own two feet and would have to take responsibility for the consequences of their decisions. Capitalist practices also purportedly stimulated the drive to create wealth, and take risks doing it." Bernstein 1996: 20-1.
[35] Hamilton et al. 2007: 164.
[36] The implied meaning behind ῥιζικόν being "what soldiers can obtain through the fortunes of war," Zweig 2012.
[37] "Risk is a multi-faceted and complex phenomenon; one that defies pure disciplinary treatment and whose analysis and evaluation requires interdisciplinary competencies." Claudia Klüppelberg, Daniel Straub and Isabell M. Welpe 2014: v.
[38] Zachmann 2014: 3.

colleagues (2001) focus on the inherent potential of loss, defining risk as "a situation or event in which something of human value (including humans themselves) has been put at stake and where the outcome is uncertain."[39] To uncertainty and loss, Fischhoff and Kadvany add the element of threat, such that "risks involve threats to outcomes that we value. Defining risk means specifying those valued outcomes clearly enough to make choices about them."[40]

Significantly, by highlighting choice as determined by perceived value, Fischhoff and Kadvany argue that risk is perceived, rather than objectively calculable; what is dangerous to some, is an opportunity for others, or is ignored altogether. These slightly different angles of risk corroborate Skinns, Scott, and Cox's (2011) observation that risk can be thought of in a variety of ways, depending on the social and professional contexts in which it is used, which makes it difficult to define concisely.[41] To bypass the quagmire of specific definitions, I adopt the approach of the Society for Risk Analysis which perceives risk as a process rather than a clearly defined condition.[42] As such I will henceforth refer to ancient socio-political risk as the cognitive process of collective decision-making that involves identifying, assessing, and responding to perceived threats in a state of uncertainty.

Furthermore, I have focused on communal decision-making during periods of crisis for two inter-related reasons. On the one hand, the concept of "crisis" is intimately connected to risk through the temporal value that it offers decision-making; risk is most acute when time is at the essence. A case in point is the contrast observed by ancient thinkers between the urgency of decision-making among jurors and physicians in real-time situations, and the philosophical leisure that allows one to revisit

[39] Jaeger et al. 2001: 17.
[40] Fischhoff and Kadvany 2011: 22.
[41] Skinns et al. 2014: 3.
[42] http://www.sra.org/about-society-risk-analysis.

subjects and problems seemingly without consequence.[43] As such, Gregory Golden (2013) explains that "crisis" refers to "a situation in which a decision maker, or a group designated as the decision makers within a community, perceives a threat to itself or to things upon which the decision makers place very high value (core values). If a response is not made to the threat within a limited time frame, the expectation is that core values will be negatively impacted, possibly to the point of destruction." The temporal element suggests not only that crisis requires a timely response, but also that its consequences may have temporary or lasting effects.[44] Crisis, then, also reveals the causal considerations of a community's risk management, in the process revealing its decision-making priorities.

On the other hand, my focus on crisis situations also raises important considerations regarding perceptions of danger. In their forthcoming edited volume *After the Crisis: Re-anchoring and Innovation in Post-War Societies* (forthcoming), Jacqueline Klooster and Inger Kuin argue that "crises are to an important degree in the eye of the beholder. [...] Crises do not simply happen, but are created when influential actors decide to present an event or a state of affairs as such."[45] Klooster and Kuin also reject terminological approaches to the ancient world, and challenge Reinhart Koselleck's stance that "crisis" as we know it is a modern invention. By pointing to communal perceptions of socio-political upheavals like *stasis,* they show that "crisis" allows us to explore how epochal events were defined and framed within a narrative structure that helped a community come to terms and adapt to change.[46]

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[43] Pl. *Tht.* 172d4-e1. For a commentary on the "time-rich" character of the Platonic passage, see Greenwood, 97-99. For a detailed discussion on the centrality of καιρός in ancient medicine, see Miller 2017: 124-149, and Greenwood 2016: 92-4.
[44] Golden 2013: 4-5. Inaction is also a kind of response that may bring a solution. Golden follows the definition of Brecher 1993: 2-8.
[45] Klooster and Kuin [forthcoming]: 1.
[46] Koselleck 2006: 358-61, 371, Klooster and Kuin [forthcoming]: 3-4, 13.

Ulrich Beck disregarded perception as a meaningful conceptual tool for the study of risk, observing with irony that "Science 'determines risks' and the population 'perceives risks'." Such a discrepancy purportedly indicated the extent of "irrationality" and "hostility to theory."[47] Åsa Boholm, however, stresses the importance of understanding how crises are perceived, to understand a group's risk-taking attitudes. The work on Prospect Theory by behavioral psychologist and Nobel laureate David Kahneman (2011) provides invaluable assistance in this matter. Kahneman proposes a dual-system psychological approach to decision theory: the impulsive and intuitive (System 1) versus the computational and subjective deliberative (System 2) process of the mind. While System 1 uses association and metaphor to produce a quick impression, System 2 uses more deliberative functions to analyze situations. The problem, however, is that, because System 2 generally chooses to rely on the generalizations of System 1, we end up with "cognitive biases" that distort people's judgment and decision-making, due to unconscious errors and expectations.[48] Decision-makers, then, do not operate strictly according to "profit maximizing" strategies when faced with uncertainty and danger. Instead, perceptions born out of subjective judgements play an important role in determining a community's risk management and mitigation strategies to danger. To understand risk, then, we must understand psychology and cognition, whereas crisis scenarios provide ideal case-studies for real-time circumstances where psychology, emotions, and pragmatic calculations, all impact the decision-making process.

Finally, the subsequent choice to focus on the communal aspect of ancient risk has been informed by my specific research interests. I do not claim to offer new insights into the concept of the individual in antiquity, from a philosophical or psychoanalytic point of view. Rather, I am interested in

[47] Beck 1992: 57, with a commentary by Hamilton et al. 2007: 163.
[48] Kahneman 2011: 24-5, 415-8.

decoding the dynamics of group deliberation that inform ancient risk-taking. For this reason, the focus is not exclusively on the *polis* as a formal decision-making institution, but also on the interpersonal interactions of a group with collective agency and common goals, both within and beyond *polis* structures, such as factions, *xenoi,* military camps, and royal courts. The approach will allow me to better highlight socio-political risk as a cultural attitude in Hellenistic society, because it offers a holistic, extra-institutional perspective on community. To do so, I rely on the work of cultural theorists like Deborah Lupton (2006), who has insisted that risk perception and response are not individually informed, but are based on shared understandings of ideals, priorities, and danger, that emerge from membership and acculturation into socio-cultural groups.[49] As such, the cognitive processes of prominent leaders - be they benefactors, office-holders or generals – are thought to rely on, and in turn promote, broader communal attitudes towards risk. Far from claiming that individuals had no agency, I argue that their (re)actions were predicated on communal ideals that consistently sought to enforce group-centric risk-taking. The phenomenon is best observed in public decrees as expressions of collective memory, whose single, authoritative demotic voice physically epitomized the ideals of communal decision-making. My project, therefore, is a much-needed case study on the importance of the social setting in which risk ideas developed, thus answering Lupton's call for more interdisciplinary research on the dynamics of risk.[50]

0.4 A Perilous Oikoumenē: Context, Scope, Parameters

I have chosen to write my dissertation on the 3rd century BC, with a special focus on the *poleis* of Asia Minor, for both practical and scholarly reasons. On the one hand, the chronological boundaries of the

[49] Lupton 2006: 14.
[50] Lupton 2006: 21-22.

project draw attention away from Classical Athens and the eventual imposition of Roman authority in the Eastern Mediterranean. I thus reject age-old tropes about the Hellenistic period as being somewhat of an "in-between" period, conceptually defined by "change and continuity."[51] Instead, I look at the Hellenistic world from the vantage point of the communities themselves before drawing general conclusions. Epigraphy will be especially helpful, given that many *poleis* do not benefit from the kind of extensive local histories that the city of Athens boasts. Moreover, inscriptions offer "unmediated intentionality," free from the literary tradition of transmission and editing. While themselves products of public rhetoric with several stages of production, inscriptions represent a corroborative connection between the *dēmos* and Hellenistic intellectuals, providing signs of risk-taking cultural attitudes that I study primarily through literary sources.

More importantly, the 3rd century BC Aegean corridor offers an ideal setting for the study of ancient risk during periods of crisis. I characterize it as a "landscape of uncertainty and danger," both physically and conceptually. I am not suggesting that the Hellenistic Mediterranean was in some way more violent than other periods or regions. I do, however, draw attention to the geopolitical shocks that the advent and demise of Alexander the Great created, with profound concrete consequences to the lives of Hellenistic communities, particularly in Western Asia Minor. I thus subscribe to Peter Thonemann's (2016) suggestion that we can indeed talk about a *Pax Persiana* in the region, whose violent conclusion heralded several decades of near-continuous exogenous violence.[52] To be clear, I do not claim that war

[51] Bugh 2006: 1-3, and Erskine 2005: 1-3. The very adjective "Hellenistic" points to its fractured character. Green 2007: xvi.
[52] Thonemann 2016: 529.

visited all regions and cities equally and indiscriminately.[53] In fact, as I will discuss in the last two chapters of the dissertation, the contrary is true with important consequences for ancient risk mitigation strategies. Instead, I argue that those shocks were collectively perceived, as they irrevocably effected, in one way or another, the entire Aegean space. Livy's account of the diplomatic exchanges leading up to the war between Rome and Antiochos III illustrates the point nicely. Immediately after the Roman victory at Kynoskephalai, the Senate presented the Seleukid envoys with a harsh choice for their king: either abandon claims to the Asian *poleis*, or face war. Hegesianax, one of Antiochos' men, is said to have been baffled by this expression of Roman bluntness, pleading with a tinge of warning "not to rush into a decision which would shake the entire world."[54] As will be made amply clear in Chapter 2, Hegesianax's (and Livy's) reply was not merely a matter of rhetoric, but a succinct depiction of the reality that important events and conflicts could have Mediterranean-wide consequences.

I ask my readers to indulge me for a moment, and consider the great divide between the times before and after Alexander. No one living in the three generations before the battle at the Granikos river would have ever imagined that the Persian Empire, as they knew it, would be obliterated in a matter of months. Similarly, those who matured during the Grand Macedonian Campaign experienced a different, arguably more unstable world. The *Pax Persiana* in Asia Minor lay in ruins across the "landscape of uncertainty and danger." To illustrate my point, I turn to the history of Hellenistic Ephesos. As I discuss elsewhere, Philip II and Alexander III's actions in Asia Minor stirred unprecedented instability at Ephesos and elsewhere, re-igniting violent *staseis* across the region, that had

[53] For instance, Thonemann (2016: 530) points out that there is an uneven distribution of inter-communal warfare in different parts of Asia Minor. In Ionia, there is a startling concentration of evidence for inter-polis warfare in the Maeander delta region, in a way that was not true for the cities of the Çeşme peninsula.
[54] Liv. 34.59.7: Ne festinarent decernere, quo decreto turbaturi orbem terrarum essent.

been dormant for generations. These in turn emboldened serious Persian counter-offensive efforts that would remain a threat for cities like Ephesos for many years to come. The death of Alexander prolonged the period of uncertainty in the region, while Ephesian democrats scrambled to secure the benefits and legitimacy that they had been granted personally by Alexander.[55] To their domestic troubles were added external threats in the guise of various Successors. Specifically, the effects of the conflict between Lysimachos and Demetrios that often played out around Ephesos, rippled throughout the Aegean; the battle of Ipsos did not put an end to the violence but merely exacerbated the hostilities. While avoiding the now-rejected schematic view of the Diadoch period of forty years of war followed by stability, it is worth taking note of the destructive paths carved by the armies of both Demetrios and Lysimachos that scarred the entire Aegean.[56] These were of course royal macro-conflicts on a great scale, but as has been emphatically shown (Ma, 2000), regional conflicts were given new impetus under these uncertain circumstances.[57] These very often brought great suffering to many communities torn by imprisonment, enslavement, and ruin.[58] As is often the case in such tragedies, they included people not even involved in conflicts, as they were exposed to piracy or the requisition of property.[59]

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[55] Vădan 2011: 9-21, 46-64.

[56] On his return to the Chersonessos after a defeat: "[Demetrios] plundered the territory of Lysimachos", continuing towards Syria and ravaging the settlements on the Kilikian coast that fell in his way. We soon meet him again in the Peloponnesos besieging Messene and retaking the cities that had refused his authority, before crossing into Attika and starving Athens into submission, only to then turn his attention towards Sparta and Boiotia. Plut. *Dem.* 31-35. Meanwhile, back in Asia, Lysimachos sought to make good on his victory and establish his rule over the cities abandoned by Demetrios, prompting yet another return by Demetrios that once more affected both great and small communities in the peninsula, from Miletos to Tarsos. Plut. *Dem.* 46-47.

[57] Besides the Successor Wars, the Galatian Invasion was also one such devastating and wide-ranging conflict. We are told that once repelled by the Aitolians at Delphi, they "began to pillage the cities near the Hellespont with great audacity and violence," threatening with destruction numerous communities in the area by "plotting and making war against the cities located in the area." πορθούντων μετὰ πολλῆς ἀσελγείας καὶ βίας τὰς ἐφ᾽ Ελλησπόντῳ πόλεις [...] ἐπεβούλευον καὶ προσεπολέμουν ταῖς περὶ τούτους τοὺς τόπους ἐκτισμέναις πόλεσιν. Polyb. 5.111.2 and 6.

[58] For local accounts of civilians as collateral damage, see Anne Bielman (1994) and Pierre Ducrey's *Guerre et guerriers dans la Grèce antique,* Paris, France: Hachette (1999).

[59] The case of Teos is famous, as the entire community was held hostage by marauding pirates: "[This decree] shall be [for the safety] of the citizens themselves and their children and their wives [and the others who dwell in the city] and its territory;

The physical and conceptual transformation of the Hellenistic landscape is vividly captured by Angelos Chaniotis (2005), who writes that "travelling in Hellenistic Greece meant travelling in a landscape marked by war [...] burned fields and farms next to trophies, cenotaphs in front of ruined or hastily built fortifications, plundered temples next to statues of war heroes – these are some of the impressions the Hellenistic landscape must have left on a contemporary traveler."[60] Specifically, the territory of Ephesos is a testimony to the devastation of its drawn-out conflict with Lysimachos, that concluded with a large-scale urbanization project and the changing of the city's name.[61] According to Gabriele Larguinat-Turbatte (2014), the new city was conceived as a kind of Lysimachean capital, and would have taken many years to complete.[62] A few years later, Western Asia Minor would be traumatized by the Galatian invasion, whose horrors were put on display in public inscriptions.[63] Therefore, a citizen

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the citizens and [foreign residents] shall estimate their contributions [from] the day when the pirates leave the city." SEG 44.949 B.35-39, 65-69. Dating of the inscription is not concrete, falling somewhere between 230 and 205 BC. Teos suffered again soon after, when it was forced by both Romans and Seleukids to provide them with supplies, as they are treated by both sides as an enemy for being coerced to help the other. Liv. 37.27. See also Lilybaion and Pyrrhos, Diod. 22.10.6, and Magnesia and Philip V, Polyb. 16.24. See Bresson (2007b, 159-160) for Rhodos' role as the policeman of the Aegean.

[60] Chaniotis 2005: 1. The same picture of devastation is presented by Diodorus Siculus following a failed siege of Erythrai and Klazomenai by Lysimachos. Diod. 20.107.5. See also the pillage of Pergamene lands by Philip V. Diod. Sic. 28.5.1.

[61] We learn from Strabo that "after Lysimachos built a wall round the present city and the people being unwilling to move, he waited for a rainstorm and he himself closed off the water ducts, so as to inundate the city. And the inhabitants gladly moved. He named the city after his wife Arsinoë." Λυσίμαχος δὲ τὴν νῦν πόλιν τειχίσας, ἀηδῶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων μεθισταμένων, τηρήσας καταρράκτην ὄμβρον συνήργησε καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ τοὺς ῥινούχους ἐνέφραξεν, ὥστε κατακλύσαι τὴν πόλιν· οἱ δὲ μετέστησαν ἄσμενοι. ἐκάλεσε δ' Αρσινόην ἀπὸ τῆς γυναικὸς τὴν πόλιν. Strab. 14.1.21. The project to physically move the city took place sometime between 294 BC – the re-conquest of Ephesos by Lysimachos – and 289 BC, when its new name appears in the epigraphic record for the first time. *I.Milet.* 1.2.10 and I.Smyrna. 577. If we are to believe Stephanos of Byzantion, around ten thousand people lost their lives in the process. StByz. 2.E.179. François Kirbihler (2009) argues that even if exaggerated, the number of casualties must have still been high if we consider that the population of Ephesos certainly surpassed ten thousand people. While the argument of a population anywhere between 20.000 and 25.000 people based on chiliasteis may be erroneous, the fact that we have twenty-four such units may still suggest a large population. Kirbihler 2009: 309.

[62] Larguinat-Turbatte 2014: 466-8. Ephesos' neighbors were also affected, being forced to relocate and be subjected to an unwanted synoikism, with Lysimachos "bringing to it as settlers the Lebedians and the Kolophonians, after destroying their cities." ἐπαγαγόμενος ἐς αὐτὴν Λεβεδίους τε οἰκήτορας καὶ Κολοφωνίους, τὰς δὲ ἐκείνων ἀνελὼν πόλεις. Paus. 1.9.7. Apparently only Kolophon resisted Lysimachos and was razed (7.3.4-5). But Franco (1993) believes that this was an exaggeration, given that the city reappears in the Panionian decree in honor of Hippostratos dated to 289/8 BC. Syll.^{3} 368, Franco 1993: 118.

[63] See in particular the Priene inscription that records, "savagery (ὠμότητος), not encountering any resistance ... / but not only did they commit atrocities against the chora but also against the citizens / but ... also did they outrage the divine by pillaging the temples and / setting fire to the inner shrines (νασούς) ... /." Bielman 1994: 22, ll. 5-14.

growing old in the "revitalized" Arsinoeïa would have had to manage markedly more frequent and tense threats than his ancestors living under the so-called *Pax Persiana*. He would have witnessed great, even traumatic, local changes that carried with them the constant threat of violence. The study of ancient risk, therefore, will better explain how a community like that of the Ephesians adapted and responded to these new dangers. A starting point is to understand *polis* initiatives during a crisis as not exclusively reactions (Fernoux, 2004), and to abandon the binary trope of capture and destruction (Boehm, 2013), focusing instead on the process of inter-state negotiation, where cities could maintain discrete local, ethnic, and cultic identities and autonomy across periods of great political and social stress.[64]

As such, one might rightly interpret these transformations in Western Asia Minor through Thonemann's thesis on the "militarization" of civic culture.[65] For my part, the violent character of the 3rd century BC highlights the intensity of the decision-making process, to which Hellenistic communities were nevertheless able to adapt. We thus gain invaluable insight into how *poleis* could assess, mitigate, and take risks, in spite of tremendous time pressure and the burden of consequences. And while my interest is not purely on warfare, I have generally focused on military conflicts because the threat of violence on a large scale bore the greatest burden on all aspects of a community's life. Besides the obvious potential dangers, conflicts could also exacerbate any other problems, be they economic, social, or political, that a community faced. For instance, as we shall see in Chapter 4, sieges offer an unparalleled viewpoint for the violent interplay between defensive and offensive strategies in dealing with a crisis, placing risk analysis at the core of collective resistance and resilience. At stake, therefore, is a reconceptualization of *polis* agency in the Hellenistic period.

[64] Boehm 2013: 322.
[65] Thonemann 2016: 529.

0.5 Plan of the Dissertation

As stated above, my dissertation sets out to answer the fundamental question as to whether the concept of risk can be applied to the Hellenistic world. More to the point, can we identify cognitive processes that constituted a cultural attitude of risk management, that guided communal responses to perceived threats in times of crisis? In other words, was the Hellenistic *oikoumenē* a "risk society"? I will look for answers in the intellectual exchange between historiography, philosophy, and epigraphy, offering new readings and conceptual connections informed by recent theoretical approaches to risk in Social and Cognitive Sciences.

The organization of the dissertation follows the cognitive process of risk-taking, to emphasize the systematic conceptualization of ancient risk as "deliberative expertise." As such, Chapter 1 lays out the philological foundation of the project, by showing how risk was expressed through the ancient Greek language. I argue that risk management was understood as the conceptual intersection between deliberation and τέχνη. Specifically, I will show how Hellenistic decision-makers expressed degrees of danger through the language of qualitative probability. Their cognitive abilities to assess and take calculated risks will in turn reveal the speculative mindset that was central to communal decision-making.

Chapters 2 and 3 tackle the matter of identifying and assessing risks. I point to an established network of communication and information-sharing that allowed Hellenistic communities to remain vigilant and respond rapidly to sudden upheavals. Since trusting information meant trusting people, decision-makers relied on interpersonal connections to test the veracity and accuracy of the information to which they were privy. We are thus introduced to a complex system of diplomatic engagement that

reflects the incessant effort by Hellenistic states to discern the intentions of their geopolitical rivals through the language of trust and deception. At the core of these two chapters is the realization that Hellenistic decision-making was guided by the logic of compromise, which communities and their individual leaders used to calculate risk thresholds to make inter-state collaboration possible.

The next chapter explores the temporal aspect of ancient risk management by considering how Hellenistic communities undertook contingency planning. The conceptual pairing of τύχη with καιρός illustrates an important aspect of "deliberative expertise" concerned with "reading" the circumstances of a crisis and identifying the opportune moment when to respond to present and potential threats. The phenomenon reveals a communal awareness of both external, as well as domestic and individual factors that could become liabilities to risk-taking. I will explore the various military and civic solutions that were proposed to strengthen political unity, economic sacrifice, and the psychological resilience of individuals faced with the prospect of mortal danger. The Hellenistic *oikoumenē* will emerge as a society keenly aware of the "known unknowns" that could threaten local and regional stability, and one that did not allow itself to be bogged down into passivity when faced with an uncertain future.

The final chapter takes a longue durée approach to ancient risk, and looks at how historical precedents were employed by Hellenistic decision-makers to predict future outcomes in similar circumstances. I will show how, by recalling and considering historical precedents, Hellenistic communities effectively compiled "libraries" that helped them deal with ostensibly analogous crises. I argue that decision-making bodies were not only able to assess dangers based on historical precedents, but that they were accordingly able to make long-term plans about the future. As such, with risk as the intersection between deliberation and τέχνη, collective memory served as a playbook for the decision-making process, which in turn inspired and propagated a cultural memory of risk.

CHAPTER ONE

ΚΙΝΔΥΝΟΣ

"De ce ți-e frică, nu scapi."
"Whatever you're afraid of, you shall not evade."

- Romanian Proverb

1.1 RISK, BETWEEN φρόνησις AND τέχνη

The lack of risk terminology in antiquity has been one of the pillars upon which the sociological distinction between modernity and the ancient world rests. Yet as I already noted in the Introduction, the insistence on specific words that correspond to the modern concept is a flawed approach that creates false premises for the study of risk. Instead, I propose we look at the context and nuances of the ancient Greek vocabulary related to danger and deliberation, used to express the cognitive process of risk management. The use of κίνδυνος, for instance, is an illuminating example of both the limitations and richness of ancient Greek. Eidinow adopts the meaning of κίνδυνος ("threat," "danger," "risk") as axiomatic, briefly noting that "it was used to describe something bad and imminent, but that it also sometimes indicated a more neutral sense of possibility."[1] Risk and danger, however, are two

[1] She bases her assertion on the Liddell and Scott dictionary entry. Eidinow 2007: 240, n.16. The etymology of κίνδυνος, according to Robert Beekes (2009), is generally believed to stem from κίνδαξ and ὀνοκίνδιος ('easily moved', 'ass-driver'). Its semantics imply being somehow in danger, being stirred by circumstances. Another proposition saw the word as the result of vocalic assimilation from κυν-δυνος, meaning 'throwing or playing dice' ('the dog's unfortunate throw'), though it has been cast in doubt. Nevertheless, the chance and gamble aspects have been supported by others who have seen - not unreasonably,

interconnected but different concepts, - a difference that Eidinow does not explore – in that risk also involves the deliberative process in dealing with a threat.[2] Κίνδυνος by itself does not presuppose deliberation, as is clear from the myriad of examples where it is used to refer to danger, or simply to military clashes.[3] Nonetheless, Daryl Grissom (2012) points to Thucydides' extensive use of κίνδυνος to reveal what Arthur Eckstein (2006) calls "profit-maximizing behavior," concluding that "individuals who weigh the costs of their actions against the potential rewards are rational actors."[4] While Grissom is right to point out Thucydides' recourse to κίνδυνος as a way to underline the importance of rationality in tempering one's natural impulses in a dangerous world,[5] the linking between deliberation and κίνδυνος is not exclusive to Thucydides, as he claims.[6] Xenophon, among others, echoes Thucydides[7] when

according to Pierre Chantraine - similarities with the expression λίθος κινεῖν (colloquially understood to mean 'move the peon." Chantraine, s.v. κίνδυνος 532-533. The etymology of the word thus denotes the inherent element of chance in a decision or choice, which in turn influenced some translators and lexicologists to uphold its meaning as 'risk'.

[2] Risk denotes the centrality of deliberation at the core of decision theory, which articulates concepts whose emergence began with the first human thought about uncertainty. Fischhoff and Kadvany 2011: 2.

[3] To give a few examples, Polybios mentions the establishment of the kingdom of Tylis in Thrace as a serious threat to Byzantion: "εἰς ὁλοσχερῆ κίνδυνον ἤγον τοὺς Βυζαντίους." Polyb. 4.46.2. Diodorus Siculus also mentions how during the attack of the Syracusean commander Archagathos "ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς πολιορκίας οὐκ ἦν κίνδυνος, ἀπροσίτου τῆς πόλεως οὔσης διὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν τειχῶν καὶ τῆς θαλάττης ὀχυρότητα." Diod. Sic. 20.59.2. For battle or conflict: "οἱ μὲν πλεῖστοι τῶν Λιβύων ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ κινδύνῳ διεφθάρησαν…", "καταβαίνειν εἰς τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς βασιλείας κίνδυνον." Polyb. 1.87.8 and Diod. Sic. 17.30.7, see also 1.23.3, 3.43.8. For its uses in Thucydides, see Grissom 2012. Diod. Sic. 17.27.1., 19.104.2, 22.13.4. Many inscriptions, especially from the time of the Galatian invasion, also record an atmosphere of "πο[λλῶν δὲ φό]βων καὶ κινδύνων περιστάντων." I. Ery. 10-11. Of note are I.Priene^2 6, IG XII.4 95, 98, 99, Syll^3 398, I Ery. 29 and 31, I. Lampsakos 4, OGIS 229. This stock phrase is also found in literary sources. See in particular Polyb. 5.111.7: "Prousias, therefore, led an army against them and after destroying all the men in a battle (κατ' αὐτὸν τὸν κίνδυνον) […] he delivered the Greeks from φόβου καὶ κινδύνου."

[4] Grissom 2012: Ch. 2.4. The most fitting examples for Grissom's thesis include the Athenians' delegation at Sparta on the eve of the Peloponnesian War, and the Corinthians' reply and call to the Lakedaimonians to act against "the tyrant-city": "Delay not, fellow allies, but convinced of the necessity of the crisis and the wisdom of this counsel, vote for the war, undeterred by its immediate terrors, but looking beyond to the lasting peace by which it will be succeeded." ἀλλὰ νομίσαντες ἐς ἀνάγκην ἀφῖχθαι, ὦ ἄνδρες ξύμμαχοι, καὶ ἅμα τάδε ἄριστα λέγεσθαι, ψηφίσασθε τὸν πόλεμον μὴ φοβηθέντες τὸ αὐτίκα δεινόν, τῆς δ' ἀπ' αὐτοῦ διὰ πλείονος εἰρήνης ἐπιθυμήσαντες. Thuc. 1.124.2-3.

[5] Grissom 2012: 2.

[6] Grissom looks at the frequency of use – Thucydides uses κίνδυνος no less than 200 times, while Herodotus does so only forty-five times, and Xenophon a mere forty times in his *Hellenika* - to suggest Thucydidean particularities.

[7] Grissom does not consider Xenophon in his dissertation because of the supposedly purely martial context in which he uses κίνδυνος in the *Hellenika*, though he erroneously dismisses passages 4.2.20, 4.4.2, 5.1.4, 5.1.16, 6.5.42, 7.4.34, 5.4.5 as lacking calculation of risk. Moreover, Grissom does not consider the entire Xenophontean corpus. In the Anabasis, there are several important passages that clearly refer to calculation of risk: 1.1.4, 1.4.14, 1.8.7, 2.1.19, 2.5.5-7.

recording Teleutias' speech to the Lakedaimonian sailors when he states that "[Sparta] gained possession of what is good and great not by idle negligence but because it was willing (ἐθέλουσα) to suffer toil and take risks (κινδυνεύειν), whenever it needed to."[8] Yet instead of underlining the importance of danger per se, Xenophon shifts the weight of the message from κίνδυνος to the willingness of Sparta to take risks. Many Hellenistic examples also highlight the willingness to undergo danger, such as Diodorus Siculus' depiction of the brave Spartan commander Xanthippos.[9] Also noteworthy is the example of the Pergamene king Eumenes II, whom Polybios credits with saying before the Roman Senate that "we shared in all the dangers (τοὺς κινδύνους δεδώκαμεν) with your leaders. We also endured (ὑπεμείναμεν) to be shut in, being besieged in Pergamon itself, and to risk (κινδυνεύειν) my life and rule because of my goodwill towards your people."[10] These examples show us that to understand how risk was conceptualized in antiquity, it is more worthwhile to focus not so much on the terminology of danger, but rather on how the deliberative process was expressed in dealing with a difficult situation.

The significance of one's willingness to undertake an action was seized-upon by Aristotle as a key component of choice (προαίρεσις), which he defines as "a voluntary action preceded by deliberation,

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[8] Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.16. The example is almost identical to the Athenians' statements that "In our action during that war we ran great risks to obtain certain advantages: you had your share in the solid results; do not try to rob us of all share in the good that the glory may do us," and "no one can quarrel with a people for making, in matters of tremendous risk, the best provision that it can for its interests." καὶ γὰρ ὅτε ἐδρῶμεν, ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ ἐκινδυνεύετο, ἧς τοῦ μὲν ἔργου μέρος μετέσχετε, τοῦ δὲ λόγου μὴ παντός, εἴ τι ὠφελεῖ, στερισκώμεθα. [...] πᾶσι δὲ ἀνεπίφθονον τὰ ξυμφέροντα τῶν μεγίστων πέρι κινδύνων εὖ τίθεσθαι. Thuc. 1.73.2 and 1.75.5 (Trans. By Grissom).

[9] Xanthippos was instrumental in organizing and maintaining order in the Carthaginian camp, "while he himself would charge into battle and display his manliness in danger." As such, "through his own virtue he not only snatched the Carthaginians from their desperate circumstances, but also reversed the course of the whole war." αὐτός τε καθηγήσεσθαι τῆς μάχης καὶ πρῶτος ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις ἀνδραγαθήσειν [...] Ξάνθιππος δὲ τῆι καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἀρετῆι τοὺς Καρχηδονίους οὐ μόνον ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν δεινῶν ἐξήρπασεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν ἅπαντα πόλεμον εἰς τοὐναντίον περιέστησε. Diod. Sic. 23.14.1 and 23.15.5.

[10] Polyb. 21.20.9-10: εἰς πάντας δὲ τοὺς κινδύνους δεδώκαμεν αὐτοὺς ἀπροφασίστως μετά γε τῶν ὑμετέρων ἡγεμόνων. τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον ὑπεμείναμεν συγκλεισθέντες εἰς αὐτὸν τὸν Πέργαμον πολιορκεῖσθαι καὶ κινδυνεύειν ἅμα περὶ τοῦ βίου καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν ὑμέτερον δῆμον εὔνοιαν.

since choice involves reasoning and some process of thought."[11] The very definition of αἵρεσις with the prefix προ- implies preferential choice resulting from prior deliberation.[12] For Aristotle, then, human agency is central to deliberation, since we deliberate only about things that are in our control and are attainable by action.[13] The challenge, he claims, is the inherent uncertainty of dealing with matters that have no comprehensive guidelines, which in turn force us to consider the means of attaining our goal, rather than the ends.[14] For Aristotle, then, the decision that follows the process of deliberation is a determination of a process of causation, one step following another towards the desired end.[15] These observations are critical for conceptualizing ancient risk because they fit well with our modern understanding of risk in terms of deliberation and choice.

One may argue, however, that Aristotle was only interested in personal deliberation, and did not specifically refer to dangerous circumstances but rather to legal arguments. By looking at Athenian decision-making, Daniela Cammack (2017) argues that we can bridge the divide between individual and communal decision-making by considering the public deliberative process as the individual internal evaluation of arguments presented by the few who spoke before the assembly. She concludes that for Aristotle the communal decision about a course of action was expressed through the voting process and outcome, while the dominant deliberative paradigm was internal.[16] As for evaluating danger, Felix Maier (2012) has shown that historical interpretations of later historians were influenced by Aristotelian

[11] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1112a15.
[12] Taylor 2006: 156.
[13] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1112a20.
[14] Reeve 2012: 188-189. See Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1112b15.
[15] Rapp 2012: 101-102.
[16] Cammack focuses on βουλεύομαι to highlight the fact that we do not have instances of active vocal deliberation among assembly-members and jurors, beyond the arguments and positions taken by rhetoricians. Cammack [forthcoming]: 5-9.

ideas.[17] In particular, Aristotle's use of προαίρεσις to denote preferential alternatives - each with their own uncertainties in striving to reach (or avoid) a specific end[18] - was adopted by Polybios. His discussion about responsibility and decision-making is aimed at

> Those who will be charged with conducting public affairs (μελλόντων χειρίζειν παρ᾽ ἑκάστοις τὰς κοινὰς πράξεις), so that by memory or actual sight of such actions, they become zealous to handle hazard (παράβολον) and danger (κινδυνῶδες), while undertaking daring with caution (ἀσφαλῆ), and admirable design (ἐπίνοιαν), and their choice (προαίρεσιν), whether it will have been a success (κατορθωθέντα) or a failure (διαψευσθέντα), will forever be remembered, so long as their deeds are guided by reason (σὺν νῷ) alone...[19]

Polybios offers prescriptive advice to decision-makers, encouraging them to take initiative after assessing danger. The terminological variety serves to draw attention to the importance of rational deliberation in dealing with pressing matters. Polybios thus seeks to convey the message that determining the right course of action must be the result of ἐπίνοια, προαίρεσις, and νόος. The fact that the historian does not distinguish between military and public policy crises conveys his interpretation of the universal nature of the decision-making process.

As public inscriptions show, the language of choice and initiative used by Aristotle and Polybios, was most likely inspired by the public discourse that regularly took place around them at the heart of *polis* communities. The most evocative example is a decree from Priene in honor of Sotas son of Lykos, commemorating his courage and initiative against the Galatian invaders, ca. 278-270 BCE. The decree first mentions a long list of outrages that the locals suffered at the hands of the barbarians who unleashed

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[17] For more on Aristotle's influence on Polybios with respect to framing contingency planning, see Chapter 4, and Maier 2012: 158-161.

[18] For a developed explanation of this phenomenon, see Rapp 2012: 98-99, and Irwin 2002: 340-1.

[19] Polyb. 9.9.9-10: ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὐχ οὕτως τοῦ Ρωμαίων ἢ Καρχηδονίων ἐγκωμίου χάριν εἴρηταί μοι—τούτους μὲν γὰρ ἤδη πολλάκις ἐπεσημηνάμην—τὸ δὲ πλεῖον τῶν ἡγουμένων παρ᾽ ἀμφοτέροις καὶ τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα μελλόντων χειρίζειν παρ᾽ ἑκάστοις τὰς κοινὰς πράξεις, ἵνα τῶν μὲν ἀναμιμνησκόμενοι, τὰ δ᾽ ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν λαμβάνοντες ζηλωταὶ γίνωνται παράβολον ἔχειν τι καὶ κινδυνῶδες, τοὐναντίον ἀσφαλῆ μὲν τὴν τόλμαν, θαυμασίαν δὲ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν, ἀείμνηστον δὲ καὶ καλὴν ἔχει τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ κατορθωθέντα καὶ διαψευσθέντα παραπλησίως, ἐὰν μόνον σὺν νῷ γένηται τὰ πραττόμενα. . . .

"savagery that no one resisted [— | —] and not only in the countryside did they commit [outrages] against their prisoners [— || but they also] committed sacrilege against the divinity by ravaging the sacred precincts and [the | altars] and temples [—] | omitting no disgraceful act toward the divinity."[20] It was during such trying times that Sotas sprang into action and organized a resistance force that, after great efforts, managed to push back the invaders:

> And having decided (προελόμενος) to save the citizens in the countryside, them|selves and their children and wives and [property in] the countryside, in order to bri|ng them safely into the city, occupied in the countryside the [most || strategic] places [— | —]with his comrades sharing in the danger (συγκινδυνε[υόντ]ων), and many of the citi\zens [—] being led away captive [by] the Galatians [and] some [—] he saved, | [having dared (to face)] (τολμήσα) their savagery. Having decided (ἑλόμενος) [—1| —] for the citizens, keeping together those who with him were risk|ing their lives [for the sake of] the common salvation of the [People], he remained in the countryside | [fighting against] the barbarians [— | —] with himself many of the citizens, and in general [—] | against the barbarians and coming to the rescue of the countryside.[21]

The narrative of events paints a vivid picture to contrast the gravity and danger of the crisis on the one hand, and Sotas' determination and courage on the other. His decision to organize the resistance is not automatic, but the decree emphasizes his deliberate choice through the rapid repetition of the aorist participle form προελόμενος of the more forceful verb προαιρέω (literally deliberate choice, preference, election – hence the noun προαίρεσις). The emphasis on the risk that Sotas and the Prienean youths undertake is not only highlighted through the verb συγκινδυνε[υόντ]ων (sharing in the dangers), but also

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[20] Burstein 17, ll. 9-13 (trans. Burstein): [. . c.8 . . .]κομένους ὠμότητος μηθένα ἀντιτάσσεσθ[αι . c.3 .] / [. c.6 . .] οὐ μόνον δὲ ἐν τῆι χώραι εἰς τοὺς [ἀλ]όντας παρε[ν]ό[μουν,] / [ἀλλὰ . c.3 . κ]αὶ τὸ θεῖον ἠσέβουγ, κείρο[ν]τες τ[ὰ] τεμένη καὶ [τοὺς] / [βωμοὺς] καὶ τοὺς ναοὺς καθα . αν[. . . 12-13 . . . .]οῦντες, [μηθὲν] / [ἐλλείπον]τες τῆς εἰς τὸ θ[εῖ]ον ἀναιδ[εί]ας.

[21] Burstein 17, ll. 22-34 (trans. Burstein): καὶ σώ[ιζ]ειν προελόμενος τοὺ[ς] π[ολίτ]ας τοὺς ἐν τῆι χώραι αὐ/τοὺ[ς] καὶ τ[έ]κνα καὶ γυναῖκας κα[ὶ τὰ ἐν] τῆι χώραι, ὅπως ἀνασ[ώι]/{σωι}[σηι αὐτ]οὺς εἰς τὴμ πόλιγ, καταλ[αβὼν τ]οὺς [ἐ]ν τῆι χώραι [ἐπιτη]/[δειοτάτ]ους τῶν τόπων, ὡς συν[. . . . . c.14 . . . . .] . οις Κ . . Σ[. c.5 .] /[. c.2 .]μ[. c.5 .]ησε μετὰ τῶν συγκινδυνε[υόντ]ων, καὶ πολ[λοὺ]ς τῶν πο[λι]/[τῶν . c.5 .]το, ἀγομένου[ς] ὑποχειρίου[ς ὑπὸ] τ[ῶγ Γαλ]α[τ]ῶν, τινας [δὲ] /[. c.2 .]λελείας γενομενο[. c.4 .] κα[ὶ] ἑλομ[ενο .] . Ο[.]ΡΑΣ?[. c.3 .]ς ἔσωσεν, /[τολμήσα]ς τὴν ἐκείνων ὠμότητα σ[.]Λ[.]Λ[ῆ]σαι, ἑλόμενος Τ . . . [—] /[.]Λ . [. .]Ο[.] τοῖς πολίταις, συνέχων τοὺ[ς μετ]ὰ αὐτοῦ κινδυνεύον/τα[ς ὑπὲρ τ]ῆς κοινῆς σωτηρίας τοῦ [δήμου,] διέμεινεν ἐν τῆι χώραι /[ἀντιτασ]σόμενος πρὸς τοὺς βαρβ[ά]ρους, καὶ? οὐθενὸς κοινοῦ ἀναλιϙ/[. c.4 .]ωμ μεθ' αὑτοῦ πολλοὺς τῶμ πολιτῶν, καθούλου δὲ ΕΝ?[. c.4 .] /[π]ρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους καὶ βοιηθῶν τῆι χώραι.

through the verb τολμήσα (to dare), drawing attention to Sotas' decision to face the savagery (ὠμότητα) of the Galatian barbarians.[22] As in the case of Aristotle's description of Athenian deliberation, the grammatical structure underlines the chronology of the thought process, deliberation being expressed through participles, while the aorist signaled that the decision has subsequently been made.[23]

Returning to Polybios' text, his description of a successful outcome as a κατόρθωσις[24] - something set straight, corrected, or done properly – reveals a rational, even technical, aspect of evaluating outcomes; hence the contrast with εὐτύχημα, success through chance.[25] Moreover, the added emphasis on the remembrance (ἀείμνηστον) of such outcomes highlights the importance of history that could offer such insight to a decision-maker: "in our time all subjects of investigation (πάντα τὰ θεωρήματα) have advanced so much that knowledge of most of them has become a kind of system (τρόπον τινὰ μεθοδικάς). Thus, this is the most useful part of history properly written."[26] The assertion that decision-making can be understood as a μεθοδική, a system based on certain rules, signals an engagement with the Aristotelian concern with the deliberative process. In his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle explores the concept of wisdom by stating that those who are to be considered φρονίμους (sagacious) are those who can deliberate well (καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι) about things that are generally good and advantageous: "a sign of this is that we consider φρονίμους with respect to a specific thing, those who can calculate well (εὖ λογίσονται)

[22] The construction implies the fear generated by the invaders, but also the deliberative and decisional process of Sotas, who gathers up the courage to face them. The emphasis on Sotas' individual choice is certainly part of the rhetorical message of the honorary decree promoting his selfless devotion to his *patria*, though the historical record is clear about the gravity of the situation and the collective risks that he and the rest of the Prieneans considered and took upon themselves. For more on the destructive Galatian invasion, see Bielman 1994, Errington 2008, and Nachtergael 1977.
[23] Cammack [forthcoming]: 7.
[24] For the etymology and usage of ὀρθός, see Beekes 2010: 1101, s.v. ὀρθός.
[25] Chantraine 1999: 819, s.v. ὀρθός.
[26] Polyb. 10.47.12: πάντα τὰ θεωρήματα καθ' ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰληφέναι τὰς προκοπάς, ὥστε τῶν πλείστων τρόπον τινὰ μεθοδικὰς εἶναι τὰς ἐπιστήμας. διὸ καὶ τοῦτο γίνεται τῆς δεόντως ἱστορίας συντεταγμένης ὠφελιμώτατον.

towards an important goal, on matters for which there is no τέχνη. Therefore, the sagacious man (φρόνιμος) is he who deliberates (βουλευτικός)."[27] At first sight, Aristotle's analysis poses a problem because, as Zachmann has shown, the evolution of modern conceptions of risk highlights a process of systematization and the drafting of risk assessment, management, and mitigation principles. Indeed, the production of technical knowledge beginning in the 19th century led to the establishment of regulations by coalitions of experts from a broad range of fields such as insurance, nutrition, and nuclear power. The result has been the development of decision theory, described as a toolkit for identifying and organizing knowledge that might prove helpful in making risk decisions.[28] To be sure, decision theory is not a panacea that ensures good decisions for those who master it, but is rather meant as a guide to practical reasoning based on knowledge and experience.[29] As Gerd Gigerenzer (2002) put it, decision theory can teach "clear thinking" to accept and manage uncertainty in our lives. He asks his readers to accept the fact that everything includes some level of uncertainty, encouraging them to get clear information about the risks that people face while becoming aware of one's fear of the unknown.[30]

But, as is often the case, Aristotle's argument is more complex. While a comprehensive analysis of τέχνη and τέλος in Aristotelian philosophy is beyond the bounds of this dissertation,[31] a few observations are needed. As David Wiggins points out, Aristotle is more concerned with making clear that there is no empirical theory for reaching the general goal of living well (εὖ ζῆν ὅλως), while

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[27] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1140a25-30: δοκεῖ δὴ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν, πρὸς ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι καὶ τοὺς περί τι φρονίμους λέγομεν, ὅταν πρὸς τέλος τι σπουδαῖον εὖ λογίσωνται, ὧν μὴ ἐστι τέχνη. ὥστε καὶ ὅλως ἂν εἴη φρόνιμος ὁ βουλευτικός.

[28] Fischhoff and Kadvany 2011: 20. Examples include Frank Knight's (1921) conceptualization of risk as "calculable uncertainty."

[29] Fischhoff and Kadvany 2011: 14.

[30] For instance, Gigerenzer (2002) points to the concept of "representation training," which translates abstract numerology into accessible representations of real phenomena.

[31] For more on this topic, see especially Angier 2010, and Broadie 2007.

deliberating about the goal of happiness would be absurd. However, Aristotle does agree that one may seek by deliberation to make more specific and more practically determinate goals, as suggested by the phrase πρὸς τέλος τι σπουδαῖον εὖ λογίσωνται.[32] From this point of view, as Dhananjay Jagannathan (2017) has very recently argued, when it comes to specific goals it is possible to speak of some systematization in ethical considerations. Jagannathan's "moderate intellectualism" points to the usefulness and necessity of experience that allows for generalizations, "knowledge of which constitutes ethical experience." Experience in turn is only useful when considering specific situations that one finds oneself in.[33] More will be said about Aristotelian experience in Chapters 4 and 5,[34] though for now it suffices to point out that experience, while not reducible to a system of rules, does offer guidance in moments of crisis when time is of the essence because, as Martha Nussbaum (1990) puts it, "it does urge on the recognition of repeated as well as unique features. Even if rules are not sufficient, they may be highly useful, frequently even necessary."[35] A case in point is Aristotle's observation that even for experts in crafts like generalship, medicine and navigation, situational awareness and an understanding of contingencies – to be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 - are important factors that have to be considered.[36] In particular, Aristotle assigns to the craft of strategy the ἐπιστῆμη of opportunity, καιρός.[37] In other words, τέχναι are also prone to variation that must be considered by the φρόνιμος. In this

[32] Wiggins 1980: 227.
[33] Jagannathan 2017: 146, 149.
[34] For a detailed study of Aristotle's concept of ὀρθὸς λόγος and its relation to experience, see Glidden 1995.
[35] Nussbaum 1990: 75.
[36] Aristotle here alludes to the Stranger's fable in Plato's *Statesman* (298b7-d5). The examples of medical and sailing expertise are not random but fit perfectly with political expertise because they too are undertaken under conditions of danger and uncertainty. Sørensen 2016: 75-76. See, for instance, Nikias asking the unnamed prytanis to put the matter of the Sicilian expedition to a second vote: "you will thus be the physician of a misguided city." τῆς δὲ πόλεως <κακῶς > βουλευσαμένης ἰατρὸς ἂν γενέσθαι. Thuc. 6.14.
[37] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1096a29-32: ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τῶν κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν μία καὶ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων ἦν ἂν μία τις ἐπιστήμη· νῦν δ' εἰσὶ πολλαὶ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ μίαν κατηγορίαν, οἷον καιροῦ, ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν γὰρ στρατηγικὴ.

instance, at least, he agrees with Plato's assertion that τέχνη should be considered to cooperate with occasion, καιρός; a cooperation between τέχνη and φρόνησις.[38] This explains, as Aristotle notes, why even the most skilled physicians or the most brilliant generals can sometimes fail; circumstance and skill go hand in hand.[39] Through an Aristotelian lens, therefore, risk may in fact be conceptualized as the point of intersection between deliberation and τέχνη.

From this point of view, Polybios' references to κατόρθωσις and μεθοδική in decision-making can be interpreted as building on, or refining, Aristotle's observations from a more practical point of view. His report on the battle of Mantinea between the troops of Philopoemen and the mercenaries of Machanidas in 207 BC, is an expressive example. Polybios stops his narrative to comment on the intellectual qualities needed to be a good leader:

> At that moment occurred an instance that manifestly convinced all of what some at times doubted, that most deeds accomplished in war are decided by the experience (ἐμπειρία) or, conversely, the inexperience (ἀπειρίαν) of leaders. For while it may be a great thing to be able to follow up on initial success, it is a greater thing, when one is thrown off by initial upsets, to remain coolheaded (μεῖναι παρ' αὑτὸν) and detect (συνιδεῖν) any lack of judgment (ἀκρισίαν) from the victors, and take advantage (συνεπιθέσθαι) of their mistakes. For it is often the case that those who think they have prevailed are shortly afterwards totally overwhelmed, whereas those who seemed at first to have stumbled, they pick themselves up through sagacity (ἀγχίνοιαν), and manage to unexpectedly succeed (κατωρθωκότας).[40]

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[38] Pl. *Leg.* 709b-c: Athenian Stranger: That the divine controls all that is, and that Chance and Occasion cooperate with the divine in the control of all human affairs. It is, however, less harsh to admit that these two must necessarily be accompanied by a third factor, craft. For that navigation should cooperate with Occasion - I, for one, would consider it a great advantage. Is it not so? Clinias: It is. ΑΘ. Ὡς θεὸς μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ θεοῦ τύχη καὶ καιρὸς τἀνθρώπινα διακυβερνῶσι ξύμπαντα. ἡμερώτερον μὴν τρίτον ξυγχωρῆσαι τούτοις δεῖν ἕπεσθαι τέχνην· καιρῷ γὰρ [χειμῶνος] ξυλλαβέσθαι κυβερνητικὴν ἢ μὴν μέγα πλεονέκτημα ἔγωγ' ἂν θείην. ἢ πῶς; ΚΛ. Οὕτως. Noteworthy is also Sokrates' emphasis on expert knowledge and expertise regarding "correct rule" of a city. Knowing what is beneficial for a community is the exclusive domain of expert knowledge. Sørensen 2016: 81-82, commenting on Pl. *Plt.* 296e1-297a1.

[39] Arist. *Eth. Eu.* 1247a10-15.

[40] Polyb. 11.14.2-4: ἐν ᾧ δὴ καιρῷ τὸ παρ' ἐνίοις ἀπορούμενον τότε παρὰ πᾶσιν ὁμολογούμενον ἐγένετο καὶ συμφανές, ὅτι πλεῖστα τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον συντελουμένων παρὰ τὴν τῶν ἡγουμένων ἐμπειρίαν καὶ πάλιν ἀπειρίαν ἐπιτελεῖται. μέγα μὲν γὰρ ἴσως καὶ τὸ προτερήματος ἀρχὴν λαβόντα προσθεῖναι τἀκόλουθον, πολὺ δὲ μεῖζον τὸ σφαλέντα ταῖς πρώταις ἐπιβολαῖς μεῖναι παρ' αὑτὸν καὶ συνιδεῖν τὴν τῶν εὐτυχούντων ἀκρισίαν καὶ συνεπιθέσθαι τοῖς τούτων ἁμαρτήμασιν. ἰδεῖν γοῦν ἔστι πολλάκις τοὺς μὲν ἤδη δοκοῦντας πεπροτερηκέναι μετ' ὀλίγον τοῖς ὅλοις ἐσφαλμένους, τοὺς δ' ἐν ἀρχαῖς δόξαντας ἐπταικέναι πάλιν ἐκ μεταβολῆς παρὰ τὴν αὑτῶν ἀγχίνοιαν τὰ ὅλα παραδόξως κατωρθωκότας.

Polybios' *mise en scène* highlights the sequence of steps that a losing general undertakes to turn the situation around: one must begin with clear-headed acceptance, then move to sagacious assessment, and finally to swift response, should circumstances allow it. The goal of deliberation is just as much about an accumulation of ἐμπειρία as it is about perceiving potential opportunities, which, if used well, can lead one to handle a situation properly, κατωρθωκότας.

Other historians also promulgated the linking of these two concepts to explain successful Hellenistic decision-making. For instance, Diodorus Siculus echoes Polybios when he notes that "it is not surprising that the sagacity (σύνεσις) of a general and his experience (ἐμπειρία) prevailed over affairs that seemed insurmountable. For with sagacity (σύνεσις) all things become possible and accessible, since in all matters τέχνη subdues force."[41] Thought and experience thus form the cognitive skills that are crucial to risk management. John Ma's (2013) exploration of Alexander the Great's decision-making as described in the literary sources, offers a case in point. Alexander takes action after he observes (κατίδον) and assesses (γιγνώσκω) the circumstances,[42] which lead him to judge (κρινεῖν) the best course of action. Similarly, his Tyrian rivals finally surrender after undergoing eight months of grueling siege, when they understand (κατίδοντες) and acknowledge (ἀπέγνουσαν) that they can no longer resist, given the unfavorable circumstances.[43] By looking at Macedonian decision-making, John Ma conjectures that "we are looking at a body of fourth-century thought about cognition and intellectual process—one which is

[41] Diod. Sic. 23.15.10.
[42] See, in particular, Arr. *Anab.* 5. 22.4, 6.9.5, 7.15.3, 7.28.3, cf. 7.30.3, 5.22-4, Diod. Sic. 17.53.1, 17.99.1.
[43] Ma 2013: 6.

likely to have some relation to Aristotelian dialectic," which, he speculates, may have been adopted or adapted for practical purposes like education, administration, and war-making.[44]

An inscription from Kalymna honoring a certain Lysandros son of Phoinix sometime at the end of the 3rd century BCE provides rare insight into this matter. The decree narrates a series of sudden attacks against the islands around Kos launched by Kretan pirates:

> When war was waged upon our entire people (σύμπαντι δάμωι) unjustly (ἀδίκως) by the Hierapytnaeans, the warships and light ships were manned, and Lysandros son of Phoinix was elected (κεχειροτονημένος) *archon* of the tender-boat; and while he was serving on this boat, news arrived that the enemy was about to [sail] against the city and territory and islands of / Kalymna with a larger [fleet], and the *nauarch* deciding (κρίναντος) to sail against [the enemy]; Lysandros proved to be a good man (ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς) in the encounter against the enemy off of Laketera, and after withstanding them (συμπαραμείνας) and most gloriously incurring danger (ἐνδοξότατα κινδυνεύας), he took prisoners . . . [45]

The decree honors Lysandros for the personal risk that he undertook on behalf of his peers and neighbors, facing the initial danger gloriously (ἐνδοξότατα κινδυνεύας) in a successful effort to repel the raiders. But the detail that makes this decree stand out is the reference to the nauarch's decision to engage the enemy, described as a κρίσις - a choice made based on his judgment. The verbal form κρινεῖν (to separate, to decide, to choose, to discern) is mostly present in the legal context of trials or arbitration, implying a decision based on circumstances and evidence.[46] The importance of κρίναντος is revealed by the context of the events it refers to. We are told that the Kretan War was ignited after pirates harassed

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[44] Ma 2013: 8.

[45] Syll.^{3}, 567, ll. 4-13: ἐπειδὴ τῶι σύμπαντι δάμωι πολέμου ἐξενεχθέν/[το]ς ὑπὸ Ιεραπυτνίων ἀδίκως, καὶ πληρωθεισᾶν μα/[κρᾶν] τε ναῶν καὶ λεπτῶν πλοίων, Λύσανδρος Φοίνι/[κος κεχ]ειροτονημένος ἄρχων ὑπηρετικοῦ καὶ στρα/[τευσάμεν]ος ἐν αὐτῶι, ποταγγελίας γενομένας ὅτι μέλλοντι τοὶ πο/[λέμιοι ἐπιπλ]εῖν ἐπὶ τὰν πόλιν καὶ τὰν χώραν καὶ τὰς νάσος τὰς Κα/[λυμνίων στόλ]ωι καὶ πλείονι, καὶ τοῦ ναυάρχου κρίναντος ἀπαντᾶ/[σαι τοῖς πολεμίοι]ς, ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ἐγένετο ἔν τε τᾶι συμπλοκᾶι τᾶ[ι] [γενομέναι ποτὶ τὸς π]ο̣λεμίος κατὰ τὸν Λακητῆρα, συμπαραμείνα[ς] [τε αὐτοῖς ἰσχυρότατα καὶ κιν]δυνεύσας ἀνάγαγε αἰχμαλώτος. Ο̣Ι [έ]πάμ̣ιλ[λαι] διατάγμασι. Σύμπαντος δάμος refers to the *sympoliteia* of Kalymna with the greater polis of Kos a few years earlier. The fact that the attack is called ἀδίκως suggests that this was an unprovoked strike, and we can sense the outrage and anxiety that the attack caused at the time.

[46] See the collection of public decrees recording inter-state arbitration agreements in Ager 1996.

the Rhodian[47] merchant ships: "With a fleet of seven ships the Cretans began to engage in piracy, and plundered many vessels. Because traders became disheartened, the Rhodians, reflecting that this lawlessness would affect them also, declared war on the Kretans."[48] But there is more to the story than just piracy, as local security was threatened by the regional and international ambitions of king Philip V of Macedon.[49] In these circumstances, Chaniotis (1996) and Brulé (1978) both agree that the Kalymnean inscription is an account of the first chaotic moments of the conflict that would scar the Aegean corridor for almost a decade.

As such, the rare emphasis on the *nauarch's* κρίσις points to a communal assessment of the greater circumstances of the pirates' raids, and of the implications that they were but the prelude to open war with the Macedonian king.[50] This reading is further supported by another inscription relating to the same event from Halasarna, honoring a certain Theukles son of Aglaos, who "judged it appropriate (κρίνων καθῆκον) during the most constraining circumstances (ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαιοτάτοις τῶν καιρῶν) to make a display of his attitude; and in the Kretan war, seeing that the most accessible places were

[47] At the end of the 3rd century BC, Kos and by extension Kalymna, were allies of Rhodos, supported and guided by the Ptolemaic kingdom. This has led historians to believe that the *nauarch* in question was in fact Rhodian. Brulé 1978: 38. The fact that the attack is considered ἀδίκως expresses the local anger and frustration with such a predatorial behavior. Baker 1991: 27 and Brulé 1978: 37.

[48] Diod. Sic. 27.3.1: ὅτι Κρῆτες ναυσὶν ἑπτὰ πειρατεύειν ἐπιβαλόμενοι τῶν πλεόντων ἐλήστευον οὐκ ὀλίγους. διὸ καὶ τῶν ἐμπόρων ἀθυμούντων, Ρόδιοι πρὸς αὐτοὺς τἀδικήματα νομίσαντες ἤξειν πρὸς τοὺς Κρῆτας πόλεμον ἐξήνεγκαν.

[49] We know that since 217 BC Philip V of Macedon had been the prostates (president, leader) of the Kretan league. After settling affairs on the Greek mainland, the Macedonian king turned his expansionist ambitions to the Aegean corridor. These actions represented a challenge to Rhodos' regional prominence, and Philip employed for this purpose Dikaiarchos of Aitolia: "He ordered him to levy tribute on the islands and to support the Kretans in their war against the Rhodians. Obedient to these commands Dikaiarchos harried commercial shipping, and by marauding raids exacted money from the islands." Diod. Sic. 28.1. For an in-depth description of the conflict, see Chaniotis 1996.

[50] Philip, of course, is not mentioned in the text, but as I argue in another chapter, networks of information that circulated in an inter-connected Mediterranean and accelerated in moments of crisis make it highly likely that the Rhodians would have learned about Philip's plotting and preparations – see the use of ποταγγελίας (news). We are given tantalizing hints about these developments in the reference to a diatagma in the lost lines, which implies not just a letter, but a clear order from a military superior; this was not just a Rhodian counter-attack, but a statement of intent against Philip's ambitions.

undefended and needed assistance, he called a vote and provided the funds for this."[51] The public sphere of these deliberations leaves no doubt about the communal engagement in the decision-making process, as individuals like the nauarch, Lysandros, and Theukles were expected to properly assess circumstances and propose appropriate action based on their expertise and judgment.

Our observations thus support Ma's conjecture regarding fourth-century thought about cognition being adopted and adapted to deal with the practical considerations of responding to a crisis. Chapter 5 will shed more light on the long-term transmission and systematization of knowledge, and will explore how communal experiences provided frameworks to deal with new threats. Presently, however, the idea of adaptation shows that there is in fact a connection between the deliberation process of the fourth and third centuries BC and Aristotelian dialectic, as Ma supposed. It also explains why Aristotle's philosophy of knowledge was initially not concerned with determining practical and advantageous courses of action in the future.[52] Therefore, we can approach ancient conceptions of risk management through the lens of cognition as a τέχνη, which further allows us to identify its governing principles, as they are expressed in our sources. The following sections of the chapter will explore the mechanics of ancient estimation and speculation by specifically focusing on ancient risk quantification and game theoretical models.

[51] IG XII.4 99. ll. 5-9.

[52] The name of Epameinondas of Thebes has been suggested as one possible source for the development of cognitive and intellectual thinking for military strategy and generalship. Ma 2013: 8. See Pierre Vidal-Naquet's study on "Epaminondas pythagoricien et le problème tactique de la droite et de la gauche", *Historia* 9 (1960), 294-308.

1.2 Ancient Risk Calculations

The contrast between danger (κινδυνῶδες) and caution (ἀσφαλῆ) is often highlighted in our sources vis-à-vis ancient decision-making, and begs the question to what extent Hellenistic decision-makers understood and implemented risk assessing and quantification principles. The modernist sociological stance, as we have seen, is that we cannot talk about ancient probabilistic thought given the absence of formal statistical models – a product of extensive mathematical research and collaboration that had its advent during Renaissance times. Kim Beerden, for instance, insists that the ancient philosophers' interest in permutations (see Introduction) cannot be used to talk about ancient probability models in the modern sense. But considering James Franklin' (2001) insistence that ancient practices and accounts having to do with odds and chances, if only rudimentary, nonetheless signal deductive logic and calculation,[53] one must nuance what probabilistic thinking entails. To illustrate the point, Xenophon's arguments in favor of the Common Peace in 371 BC reveal a special awareness of what is now conventionally called the Gambler's Fallacy.[54] Through the mouth of Kallistratos the Athenian envoy, Xenophon uses the language of gambling to suggest that decision-makers need to consider the fluctuation of odds that may change depending on circumstances. He likens the situation of Athens and Sparta with that of victorious athletes "who love winning so much that they do not stop until they are defeated and cease their training," or with that of winning gamblers who obsessively continue gambling until they are ruined: "for I have noticed (ὁρῶ) that most of these people become utterly helpless (ἀπόρους)."[55] These examples exhibit emotion and wishful thinking overcoming rationality, as both

[53] Franklin 2001: 132-133.
[54] The mistaken belief that odds that an event will occur increase or decrease depending on recent results.
[55] Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.16.

boxers and gamblers worship τύχη, in a sense. Conversely, Xenophon prescribes to his audience how to resist such behavior and take control of one's fortunes through awareness of circumstances and their future trends. Such a rational attitude would in turn help decision-makers correctly assess their best expected outcome. In the case of the Athenians and the Spartans, he called on them "to not engage in such a contest that we either win all or lose all, and instead be friends with one another while we are still strong (ἐρρώμεθα) and successful (εὐτυχοῦμεν)."[56] This is not the language of an "aleatory society" that mindlessly embraces the uncertainties of Chance, but one that seeks to resist and control it, in its ongoing effort to calculate odds and quantify dangers, so as to construct realistic expectations of success.[57]

The narrow notion of "statistics" promulgated by Beerden and Beard, is further problematized by ancient accounts that attest to ancient perceptual gradations of risk levels. See, for instance, Polybios' description of the Roman practice of "decimation." He considers it a good deterrent against cowardice in battle because "as the danger and dread of drawing the lot hang over all equally, as the outcome is uncertain; and as the public disgrace of receiving barley rations falls on all alike, this practice is employed to deter and correct the mishap."[58] In modern terms, the experience is labeled "relative perception of risk," where people are willing to accept a probability of harm up to a certain threshold, beyond which - in this case 10%, or one in ten - the risk is considered unacceptable.[59] One may be tempted to argue that

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[56] Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.17.

[57] See Grissom 2012: Ch. 2.3.2, on Thucydides' examples of calculating outcomes by generals Demosthenes and Lamachos.

[58] Polyb. 6.38.2-4: λοιπὸν τοῦ μὲν κινδύνου καὶ φόβου τοῦ κατὰ τὸν κλῆρον ἐπ᾽ ἴσον ἐπικρεμαμένου πᾶσιν, ὡς ἂν ἀδήλου τοῦ συμπτώματος ὑπάρχοντος, τοῦ δὲ παραδειγματισμοῦ< τοῦ> κατὰ τὴν κριθοφαγίαν ὁμοίως συμβαίνοντος περὶ πάντας, τὸ δυνατὸν ἐκ τῶν ἐθισμῶν εἴληπται καὶ πρὸς κατάπληξιν καὶ διόρθωσιν τῶν συμπτωμάτων. Decimation practiced by Octavian, Marc Antony, Domitius Calvinus, Caesar. Liv. 2.59.11, Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 9.50.7, Cass. Dio 48.42.2, 49.27.1, 38.4, Front. *Strat.* 4.1.37, Suet. *Aug.* 24.2.

[59] Risk perception depends on the reference point, which, once changed, could change preferences even though the result may remain the same. At the same time, people are more likely to take a certain percentage of risk when it comes to trivial

Polybios here is in fact mentioning a strictly Roman practice and a culture-specific conceptualization of danger. However, our sources clearly show that the phenomenon was not limited to Polybios, nor was it foreign to his Greek audience.[60] Diodorus Siculus, for instance, writes about the panicked call by Pancylus Paucus to his fellow Capuans to surrender to Hannibal during the Second Punic War:

> He was driven out of his mind for fear of Hannibal, and he swore to his fellow citizens a peculiar oath: 'If,' he said, 'there were still one chance in a hundred for the Romans, he would not go over to the Carthaginians; but since the superiority of the enemy was clear and danger was at their gates, it was necessary to yield superiority.'[61]

Such utterings have a powerful rhetorical element to them, working to highlight fear as a driving force in shaping a group's risk calculations - a topic that we shall return to in Chapter 4. But in spite of the language of fear and the inescapable image of emotions overcoming reason, the logic of probability that assigned a fraction to a dangerous outcome suggests that Paucus' audience - and Diodorus', for that matter – would have nonetheless understood his message because they understood the concept. Similarly, Xenophon remarks that his fellow Greeks stranded in Asia Minor were prompted by Phalinos, the envoy of the Persian King of Kings, to surrender, with the caveat that "if you have one chance in ten thousand to save yourselves by continuing to fight against the King, I advise you not to give up your arms."[62] The envoy's argument was meant as a case of reverse psychology, to suggest that they in fact

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choices, but not for important, life-altering, decisions. "Loss aversion" phenomenon also claims that people are risk-averse when decision involves rhetoric of salvation, but risk-seeking when they are faced with loss of life rhetoric, even when the results are exactly the same. Finschhoff and Kadvany 2011: 75-77.

[60] On Polybios and his Greek audience, see Luce 1997: 89.

[61] Diod. Sic. 26.10: ὁ δὲ ἐκτὸς τῶν φρενῶν γεγονὼς διὰ τὸν Αννίβου φόβον ὤμοσε τοῖς πολίταις ἰδιότροπον ὅρκον. ἔφησε γάρ, εἰ τῶν ἑκατὸν ἐλπίδα μίαν εἶχεν ἐν τοῖς Ρωμαίοις, οὐκ ἂν μετέστη πρὸς Καρχηδονίους· νῦν δὲ φανερᾶς οὔσης τῆς τῶν πολεμίων ὑπεροχῆς καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ταῖς πύλαις ἐφεστῶτος, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς εἴκειν.

[62] Xen. *Anab.* 2.1.19: ἐγώ, εἰ μὲν τῶν μυρίων ἐλπίδων μία τις ὑμῖν ἐστι σωθῆναι πολεμοῦντας βασιλεῖ, συμβουλεύω μὴ παραδιδόναι τὰ ὅπλα· εἰ δέ τοι μηδεμία σωτηρίας ἐστὶν ἐλπὶς ἄκοντος βασιλέως, συμβουλεύω σῴζεσθαι ὑμῖν ὅπῃ δυνατόν.

had no chance of escape, but for David Spiegelhalter (2014) such expressions of numerical "odds" are sufficient when arguing about one's cognitive ability to understand and represent probabilities.[63]

Linguistically, the deductive logic of risk assessment was expressed through terms like εἰκός, denoting likelihood of an outcome. Bernstein dismisses the possibility that such terms could be used to denote probability, by settling on an extremely narrow understanding of εἰκός through Sokrates' definition as "likeness to truth." Without providing further explanation nor looking at the full use of the term, Bernstein supported his argument by employing a skewed and incomplete reference to Schmuel Sambursky's (1956) translation and interpretation of Plato's *Phaedrus* (273d). He thus claimed that the Greeks did not delve into probabilistic thinking because "their insistence on proof set truth in direct opposition to empirical experimentation."[64] However, Sambursky had tried to make the exact opposite argument when it came to Sokrates' use of εἰκός. Indeed, as Michael Gagarin (2007) explains, Sokrates was in fact reacting to the practical reality of the Athenian courts, "where the sophists and forensic orators saw likelihood as an alternative type of argument that could, and often had to be used in situations where the truth was impossible to determine."[65] As a result, from a practical point of view, likelihood was considered persuasive (πιθανός).[66]

Many such arguments are found in forensic oratory,[67] and they were significant for Aristotle because they denoted practical wisdom. To the philosopher, likelihood was that which usually

[63] Spiegelhalter 2014: 21-22.
[64] Bernstein 1996: 16-17.
[65] Gagarin 2007: 31.
[66] Pl. *Phdr.* 272d-e.
[67] For detailed discussions and examples of argumentation through likelihood (*eikos, eikota*) in forensic oratory, see the contributions by Michael Gagarin and Craig Cooper in *A Companion to Greek Oratory*, ed. by Ian Worthington, Blackwell. 2007: 27-36 and 203-219, respectively.

happens.[68] Εἰκός, then, could be considered a stabilizing concept because it allowed for reasonable inferences based on general categories and experiences.[69] Such observations will be important when we discuss contingency planning and memory in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively, though for now it is worth noting the rationale of ancient audiences and writers regarding likelihood as chance of success. By analyzing the theoretical example of whether a weak man is (un)likely to be charged with assaulting a strong man (and vice-versa), Gagarin argues that, from the time of Protagoras of Abdera and Corax of Syracuse, rhetoricians explored the complexities and persuasive capabilities of arguments from likelihoods.[70] For them, likelihoods were closely dependent on one's reputation and the circumstances that each rhetorician chose to highlight.

But beyond rhetoric, the historians' use of probabilistic language has often been ignored. Thucydides, for instance, often explained his protagonists' actions and motivations along such lines. Referring to the Athenian strategy against Sparta and its allies, he tells us through an Athenian voice that "For many reasons we are likely (εἰκὸς) to prevail: firstly, because we are superior in numbers and military experience, then because we follow all orders . . . so if we win a single victory at sea, they are most likely (κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς) defeated."[71] Likelihood was not a matter of guesswork or rhetoric, but the product of calculation based on perceived experience, general inclination, as well as encouraging circumstances and resources. Indeed, according to Polybios' description of the fall of Epipolae in 212 BC, Marcus

[68] Arist. *Rhet.* 1357a22-b1.
[69] Grimaldi 1980: 389-390.
[70] On the one hand, the argument went, the weaker man would have smaller chances of success against a stronger man, which would make him wary of committing such a crime. On the other hand, given such general expectations of success, the stronger man would also be unlikely to assault a weaker man because everyone would think him to be the likely suspect; Gagarin calls it "a reverse argument from likelihood." Gagarin 2007: 32.
[71] Thuc. 1.121.1, 4: κατὰ πολλὰ δὲ ἡμᾶς εἰκὸς ἐπικρατῆσαι, πρῶτον μὲν πλήθει προύχοντας καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ πολεμικῇ, ἔπειτα ὁμοίως πάντας ἐς τὰ παραγγελλόμενα ἰόντας [...] μιᾷ τε νίκῃ ναυμαχίας κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἁλίσκονται.

Marcellus' decision to storm the fortress was based on a calculation of likelihood of success based on old and new knowledge: after receiving helpful information from a traitor about the relocation of the Sicilian guards with the occasion of a festival, "Marcus recalled (προσαναλαβὼν) where the wall was lower, and considering it likely (νομίσας εἰκὸς εἶναι) [that the guards were drunk and weak,] he was determined to try his chance (ἐπεβάλετο καταπειράζειν τῆς ἐλπίδος)."[72] In line with Polybios' observation regarding προαίρεσις, Ma uses the example of Alexander the Great to highlight the cognitive process involved in making a calculated decision, described by ancient historians as a chain of intellectual assessments: upon observing (κατιδῶν) the situation, Alexander makes conjectures (εἰκάσε) that lead him to his decision (γνοῦς). Leaders like Alexander, in other words, were successful because they made good rational calculations of possibilities, while thinking through the possible consequences that each alternative offered.[73]

Such reasoning is called "qualitative probability" and represents "a theory of probability based on qualitative ordering of events in terms of their likelihood of occurrence."[74] There are of course alternative models to calculate probabilities. In the last chapter, we will analyze how Hellenistic decision-makers conceptualized "quantitative probability" by using historical precedents and cultural

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[72] Polyb. 8.37.2. Such instances corroborate John Ma's assertion that being able to determine what course of action was more likely to succeed was considered an essential talent for a leader to have. See also the deliberations of the Carthaginian Senate and assembly on the eve of the battle of Zama. After flatly refusing the Roman conditions for peace, "the senate had great hopes of victory given the assistance of Hannibal. The people decreed simply to dismiss the ambassadors without reply. But the politicians who had determined by any means to stir up the war again held a council and contrived the following plan..." τὸ δὲ συνέχον, οὐ μικρὰς ἀλλὰ μεγάλας εἶχον ἐλπίδας νικήσειν διὰ τῶν περὶ τὸν Αννίβαν. τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς ἔδοξε τοὺς πρέσβεις ἀναποκρίτους ἐξαποστέλλειν· τῶν δὲ πολιτευομένων οἷς ἦν προκείμενον ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου συγχέαι πάλιν τὸν πόλεμον, οὗτοι συνεδρεύσαντες μηχανῶνταί τι τοιοῦτον. Polyb. 15.1.12. Notice Polybios' use of the verb μηχανάω to refer to the careful planning of the Carthaginian war-mongers. Similarly, see the description of Hannibal in Polyb. 3.93.3, where he resembles Alexander in his ability to calculate (συλλογιζόμενος) the intentions of the Romans based on their actions.

[73] As John Ma explains, Γιγνώσκω is a particularly apt verb to denote Alexander's decision-making because "[it] is a verb of cognition, which literally means "to acknowledge", "to get to know"." Ma 2013: 6-7. Example from Arr. *Anab.* 6.9.5. The battle with the Mallians.

[74] Narens 2007: 29.

memory as libraries to inform their risk calculations across generations. These two approaches will be treated as complementary, as two sides of the same coin, as it were. For now, we will follow Gigerenzer's observations on "representation training,", approaching ancient risk assessment from a qualitative perspective that underscores the fact that every choice has an underlying level of uncertainty and risk. During a crisis, decision-makers ultimately had to choose between a set of difficult options, each with their own dangers and consequences, that could often be reduced to a binary response – "yes" or "no", action or inaction, attack or defend, go "here" or "there", do "this" or "that". Under such circumstances, preferable courses of action could be expressed through comparative adjectives. As with εἰκός, adjectives add "gradations" of risk to binary contrasts like dangerous/cautious. Diodorus Siculus' description of Peukestes' thought process as to what to do during the Successor Wars, reveals the usefulness of comparative adjectives in portraying risk assessment. Having been asked by other Macedonian satraps to send help against Antigonos Monophthalmos,

> At first [Peukestes] paid no heed to them [...] since he still bore a grudge for not receiving the generalship; but later, reasoning with himself (δοὺς αὑτῷ λόγον) he conceded that should Antigonos be victorious, the result would be that he himself would lose his satrapy and thus also risked (κινδυνεῦσαι) losing his life. Agonizing, therefore, about himself, and thinking (νομίζων) that he would be more likely (μᾶλλον) to gain the command if he had as many soldiers as possible, he brought forth ten thousand archers, as they requested.[75]

The many verbs of pondering used in such a short paragraph focus our attention on Peukestes' step-by-step thought process in a series of "if... then..." clauses, as we are privy to how he (purportedly) determined what his options were, along with their probable consequences. In this context, the

[75] Diod. Sic. 19.17.5-6: ὁ δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οὐ προσεῖχεν αὐτοῖς, μεμψιμοιρῶν ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ τετευχέναι τῆς στρατηγίας, ὕστερον δὲ δοὺς αὑτῷ λόγον συνεχώρησεν ὅτι κρατήσαντος Αντιγόνου συμβήσεται καὶ τὴν σατραπείαν αὐτὸν ἀποβαλεῖν καὶ περὶ τοῦ σώματος κινδυνεῦσαι. ἀγωνιῶν οὖν ὑπὲρ αὑτοῦ καὶ τῆς στρατηγίας μᾶλλον τεύξεσθαι νομίζων ὡς πλείστους ἔχων στρατιώτας προσήγαγεν, καθάπερ ἠξίουν, τοξότας μυρίους.

comparative μᾶλλον points to Peukestes' deductive logic based on what he deems more likely (and beneficial) to occur. However, the full force of the passage would be lost if we simply agreed that we are dealing with a "rational" actor who eventually makes the objectively "correct" choice. Diodorus Siculus' account is not merely retrospective, but tries to capture the internal doubt and discomfort inherent to having to make a difficult choice. Peukestes literally agonizes (ἀγωνιῶν οὖν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ) over the course of affairs, as he considers himself caught between two difficult outcomes. Having to help others at the expense of Antigonos, even though likely more beneficial, is not a particularly comforting thought considering the agonistic character of Macedonian politics that could easily descend into personal rivalries and double-crossing.

The formulation of "decisional trees" that is often highlighted as a staple of modern decision-making,[76] was in fact present in ancient Greek literature as early as Homeric epic and Classical tragedy. Protagonists are often depicted in Archaic and Classical literature weighing their options and the potential consequences of their actions in moments of κρίσις.[77] The heroic element of good decision-making persisted into Hellenistic times, as Hellenistic historians considered praiseworthy those who could most accurately weigh their options and envision the path with the least damaging circumstances. For Polybios, Hannibal and Scipio are prime examples of successful decision-makers who know what

[76] For a modern game theoretical approach to "decisional trees," see Ken Binmore's (2007) discussion on how various scenarios can be understood as logical games where the player calculates in abstract values the most profitable decision. Some classic examples include The Prisoner's Dilemma or Matching Pennies, Binmore, 4-5, 17-21. Simple logical games are expressed as "binary trees," though real-life situations are usually more complex. See, for instance, the Iran Hostage Crisis explained through game theory by Steven J. Brams, *Game Theory and the Humanities*, The MIT Press (2011), 219-225.
[77] See, for instance, Homeric monologues such as *Il.* 11.401-410, 14.90-102, 21.553-572, 22.98-130. For a discussion on the existence of rational decision-making in Homer and Greek tragedy, see Sharples 1997 and Gaskin 1999.

risks were worth taking when pressed by circumstances - ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων συγκλειόμενος.[78] Their successes reveal an awareness of what Felix Maier calls "a maintainable risk,"[79] where the protagonists are fully aware of the dangers that each option holds, and feel pressured to choose the one that seems most likely to succeed.[80] By contrast, the defeats and failures of Ptolemaios Keraunos are explained as a consequence of his lack of experience, but also because "he was by nature rash and impetuous, who foresaw none of the possible advantages: for when his φίλοι advised him to await for the reinforcements that were delayed, he did not heed to them."[81] By implication, risk assessment also signaled an awareness of how conditions changed over time.[82] Indeed, in all such instances knowing the opportune moment to act was considered an essential quality for any decision maker, and a detailed study of καιρός will be provided in a subsequent chapter. But for our immediate purposes such damning moral verdicts address the importance of having the risk assessing qualities needed to make successful decisions; namely, the experience (ἐμπρειρία), and foresight (προνοῖα) displayed by Ptolemaios' φίλοι.

It is in fact indicative that what we would call "statistical chance" to express degrees of risk in these accounts, was expressed through the term ἐλπίς. As Douglas Cairns (2016) reminds us, ἐλπίς does not simply mean "hope," as we refer to it in English. Its broader meaning also includes "expectation" in

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[78] Polyb. 21.20.6. For Hannibal, see Polyb. 9.4.6 and 9.7.2 where he calculates (συλλογιζόμενος) how to raise the siege of Capua. Also, Polyb. 3.15.10-12 and 3.34, for Hannibal's orchestrating of the war with Rome, and his famous crossing of the Alps. See also Diod. Sic. 34.60,

[79] Maier 2012: 162.

[80] See also the case of Agathokles, who "was compelled by the circumstances to dare and try to change something." Τῶν δὲ καιρῶν ἀναγκαζόντων τολμᾶν τι καὶ παραβάλλεσθαι. Diod. Sic. 20.64.4.

[81] Diod. Sic. 22.3.1: "Οτι Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Μακεδόνων βασιλεὺς τὴν μὲν ἡλικίαν νέος ὢν παντελῶς, πραγμάτων δὲ πολεμικῶν ἄπειρος, φύσει δὲ θρασὺς καὶ προπετὴς οὐδὲν τῶν χρησίμων προενοεῖτο· τῶν γὰρ φίλων αὐτῷ συμβουλευόντων ἀναδέξασθαι τοὺς ἀφυστεροῦντας, οὐ προσέσχεν.

[82] As the case of Molon - Antiochos III's rebellious satrap of Media - shows, good generals paid particular attention to the right time to act: "Molon calculated (λογισάμενος) that that a direct attack was precarious and hazardous by the rebels against their king during the day, so he determined (ἐπιβάλετο) to make his attempt by night." τῆς δὲ νυκτὸς ἐπιγενομένης συλλογισάμενος ὁ Μόλων ὡς ἐπισφαλὴς γίνεται καὶ δύσχρηστος τοῖς ἀποστάταις πρὸς τοὺς βασιλεῖς ὁ μεθ' ἡμέραν καὶ κατὰ πρόσωπον κίνδυνος, ἐπεβάλετο νυκτὸς ἐγχειρεῖν τοῖς περὶ τὸν Αντίοχον. Polyb. 5.52.9.

relation to rational deliberation and endurance.[83] From this point of view, the statements of both Phalinos and Pancylus Paucus can be taken as an attempt to persuade their audiences that their chances of success were slim to none if they decided to resist. Such "chances" were shaped by observation and deliberation, as decision-makers relied on the information that was available to them to assess future developments. For instance, in the build-up to the First Punic War, Hieron of Syracuse is described as observing (θεωρῶν) the anti-Carthaginian inclinations of the Sicilians, as well as the strength and recent successes of the Roman army, with the result that "he calculated (συνελογίζετο) from all of this that the prospects (ἐλπίδας) of the Romans were more promising (ἐπικυδεστέρας) than those of the Carthaginians."[84] The use of the verb λογίζομαι to express degrees of risk and likelihood was deliberate, given the verb's more technical function to express calculation and estimation.[85] Noteworthy, moreover, is the fact that bad outcomes as a result of failed assessments are generally explained in a variety of sources as the result of being "deceived in one's calculations" (πολὺ διεψεύσθη τῶν λογισμῶν),[86] or of becoming "weak in the ability to make such calculations" (ἐξησθένησε τοῖς λογισμοῖς).[87]

I argue, then, that the language of qualitative probability helped Hellenistic decision-makers conceptualize and communicate estimations of risk. It was especially important in crisis scenarios, considering that decision-makers faced various constraints and imperfect information.[88] Exploring risk, therefore, allows us to test the economic theory of choice under constraint in a socio-political context. During a crisis, risks could be reassessed, and decisions reconsidered as information arrived or when

[83] Cairns 2016: 43-44.
[84] Polyb. 1.16.4. Notice once again the functions of the participle and aorist to suggest chronological dimension of pondering, followed by decision-making.
[85] Beekes 2010: 841-2, s.v. "λέγω, and Chantraine 1997: 625-6, s.v. λέγω.
[86] Plut. *Dem.* 44.5. See also, Polyb. 3.16.5-7 and 34.27.1. See also the bad calculations of Antiochos III, Liv. 37.31.
[87] Diod. Sic. 20.78.1.
[88] Bresson 2007 : 25-26.

circumstances changed. A good example is the siege of the Pednelissans by their neighbors the Selgians during the summer of 218 BC. Polybios mentions that when the defenders were close to being overwhelmed by their attackers (κινδυνεύοντες ὑπὸ Σελγέων), the Pednelissans received news that Achaios granted the help that they had earlier asked for: "When he readily consented, they undertook the siege boldly, relying on their hopes (ἐλπίσι) of salvation."[89] The timely promise of assistance thus led the Pednelissans to alter their risk calculations because they felt that their chances of eventual success were increased, which in turn induced them to continue to endure the hardships of the siege. Hellenistic history offers numerous examples of obstinate resistance by communities or garrisons based on the expectation of eventual support from other cities or kings.[90]

Indeed, surrender was an option only when a critical situation was considered hopeless. As Aristotle explained, "In fear there needs to be an incentive for hope of salvation (ἐλπίδα σωτηρίας) from the cause of their distress. As such, fear makes one deliberate (φόβος βουλευτικοὺς ποιεῖ), whereas no one deliberates about things that are hopeless (περὶ τῶν ἀνελπίστων)."[91] In the case of the Pednelissans, Garsyeris, the general sent by Achaios to raise the siege, took a great risk as he sought to beat off the Selgian attackers, conscious of "having but very small hopes (ἐλπίδας) of success."[92] As it turns out, by

[89] Polyb. 5.72.1-2.

[90] Polyb. 18.142-3, 21.42.2-5: garrison commanders ask for 30 days of relief in order to contact their kings before surrendering the cities. Polyb. 5.60.1-2: the garrison leader resists attempts to bribe him because of presumption of Ptolemaic support. On this note, see also the famous Melian resistance to Athens on the presumption of Spartan support. Thuc. 5.105. See also Plut. *Dem.* 22.4, on Rhodian resistance. See also Polyaen. *Strat.* 4.2.4, Memnon, FGrH 434 T1 11.2: the Galatians lay waste to the territory of the Byzantines, who resist and ask for help. Diod. Sic. 20.107: Abydos resists Lysimachos after learning that forces of Demetrios are in the region. See Arr. *Anab.* 1.20-23 on the resistance of the Persian garrison at Halikarnassos, and Aen. Tact. 31 on sending secret messages. Liv. 37.32, 32.25, 34.40.

[91] Arist. *Rhet.* 1383a6-8 : ἀλλὰ δεῖ τινὰ ἐλπίδα ὑπεῖναι σωτηρίας, περὶ οὗ ἀγωνιῶσιν. σημεῖον δέ· ὁ γὰρ φόβος βουλευτικοὺς ποιεῖ, καίτοι οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν ἀνελπίστων. This explains why some protagonists caught up in desperate circumstances choose at times suicidal actions with only a sliver of hope left. Agathokles of Syracuse, for instance, "felt compelled by the circumstances to dare (τολμᾶν) to change something," in his war with the Carthaginians. Diod. Sic. 20.64.4.

[92] Polyb. 5.73.10.

using deception and the element of surprise, Garsyeris' gambit paid off. But the outcome was not merely a matter of chance when the small odds turned out in his favor. In accordance with Polybios' observation about the importance of experience and sagacity to turn around an unfavorable situation, Garsyeris assessed the situation (θεωρῶν τὸ συμβαῖνον) and chose the best of the limited options available to him. After surveying the battlefield and finding vulnerable spots, he took advantage of the enemy' proclivity, "who did not pay attention to what was to come, but completely dismissed his actions," and thus managed to win the day.[93]

Such examples provide context to Diodorus Siculus' contention that "life holds many unexpected turns. Those who find themselves in distress (δυστυχοῦντας), then, must pursue their venture even in the greatest dangers (τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνοις). But it is not good for those for whom fortune (τύχην) flows well, to allow themselves to become vulnerable to reversal."[94] Despite the emphasis on τύχη, Diodorus Siculus' passage is not a comment on the vicissitudes of fortune.[95] On the contrary, the historian highlights what has been identified in modern terms as "reference point-based risk-taking." Daniel Kahneman explains that reference points elucidate risk-seeking behavior of decision-makers when all their options are bad.[96] They are conceived in terms of utility, helping the decision-maker determine the risks worth taking, whose benefits will undermine a more negative certain outcome. The example of the siege of Abydos by Philip V offers the most vivid example of Hellenistic reference point-based risk-taking, as the Abydeneans resisted until the end by relying on the thinnest sliver of hope

[93] Polyb. 5.73.11: Σελγεῖς καταπεπληγμένους καὶ δεδιότας τὸ μέλλον ἀποχωρήσειν οὐ προσέσχον, ἀλλ᾽ ἁπλῶς ὠλιγώρησαν.
[94] Diod. Sic. 27.17.4: "Οτι ὁ βίος πολλὰ ἔχει παράδοξα. δυστυχοῦντας μὲν οὖν παραβάλλεσθαι χρὴ καὶ τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνοις θηρᾶσθαι τὴν παραβολήν. οὐ καλὸν δὲ τὴν τύχην εὐροοῦσαν ἔχοντας1 αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸ παράβολον διδόναι.
[95] For details on Diodorus' views of Tychē, see Fromentin 2006.
[96] Kahneman 2011: 272-6.

against an incontrovertibly stronger enemy.[97] Finding themselves almost without hope of salvation (σχεδὸν ἀπελπικότες τὴν σωτερίαν), they staked literally their all on one final stand, entrusting fifty of their older peers with the following ghastly task:

> That whenever they would see the inner wall taken of the enemy they would slaughter all the women and children, set fire to the ships, and throw the gold and silver into the sea with curses. After these things, they called the priests before them and all swore either to defeat the enemy or die fighting for their fatherland.[98]

Polybios makes a point in mentioning that such desperate stances had been adopted with success by other communities "who were by no means overcome by hopelessness and continued to cling to hopes of victory."[99] But to the horror of all who witnessed or heard about the outcome at Abydos, once their defeat became inevitable, almost all of the defenders went through with their collective decision: "for when [Philip V] witnessed the number and the fury of those who killed themselves and their women and children, either by cutting their throats, or by burning or by hanging or by throwing themselves into wells or off the roofs, he was panic-stricken (ἐκπλαγὴς)."[100]

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[97] For a while, the people of Abydos "were not without hope (οὐκ ἀπελπίζοντες) that they would fight off the enemy." But after Philip's sappers managed to collapse a perimeter of the defensive wall, they appealed to the Macedonian king and asked for a truce, offering him very favorable terms of surrender on condition that the population be allowed to leave unharmed after handing over all their belongings and resources. Philip's demand "either to entrust themselves to him in all respects, or fight bravely," made it clear that enslavement, murder, and rape were in store for the Abydeneans. τοῦ δὲ Φιλίππου προστάττοντος περὶ πάντων ἐπιτρέπειν ἢ μάχεσθαι γενναίως. Polyb. 16.30.5-8. In fact, statistics have shown that it was generally better for a city not to persevere with its defense, since an assault could have vastly more serious consequences for civilian populations than military surrender and capitulation. Capitulation after negotiations was much to be preferred even if at times the conquered would be treated badly. Ducrey 2015: 195-196.

[98] Polyb. 16.31.5-6: ἐὰν ἴδωσι τὸ διατείχισμα καταλαμβανόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, κατασφάξειν μὲν τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, ἐμπρήσειν δὲ τὰς προειρημένας ναῦς, ῥίψειν δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀρὰς τὸν ἄργυρον καὶ τὸν χρυσὸν εἰς τὴν θάλατταν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα παραστησάμενοι τοὺς ἱερέας ὤμνυον πάντες ἢ κρατήσειν τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἢ τελευτήσειν μαχόμενοι περὶ τῆς πατρίδος.

[99] Polyb. 16.32.1-2: Οὐκ εἰς τέλος ἀπηλπισμένας ἔχοντες τὰς τοῦ νικᾶν ἐλπίδας.

[100] Polyb. 16.34.9-10: θεωρῶν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὴν ὁρμὴν τῶν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἀποσφαττόντων, κατακαόντων, ἀπαγχόντων, εἰς τὰ φρέατα ῥιπτούντων, κατακρημνιζόντων ἀπὸ τῶν τεγῶν, ἐκπλαγὴς ἦν. Τύχη - "who granted victory and salvation to the hopeless, but in the case of the Abydenes chose differently" – should once again be understood as a rhetorical stand-in for the communal decision-making process. περιθεῖσα τὴν νίκην ἅμα καὶ τὴν σωτηρίαν τοῖς ἀπηλπισμένοις, περὶ δ' Ἀβυδηνῶν τὴν ἐναντίαν εἶχεν διάληψιν. Polyb. 16.32.5. For more on Tychē as rhetorical device, see Walbank 2002: 181-182.

Therefore, the conventional idea of ancient communities relying on capricious τύχη stands in stark contrast to the Abydeneans' deliberations in the assembly (συνελθόντες εἰς ἐκκλησίαν βουλεύοντο), where they took a series of organizational decisions for their final stance (ἔδοξεν αυτοῖς ... κατέστησαν ...), aware of their slim chances of success.[101] We can identify an element of "bounded rationality" in socio-political decision-making, as already observed in studies on the economy of ancient commercial insurance.[102] It portrays ancient Hellenistic communities making rational calculations that take into account socio-political constraints. The element of "chance" (τύχη) was thus incorporated into their calculations, as they strove towards some predictability for the outcomes of their choices.

1.3 Risk as Speculative Thought

Ancient risk assessment thus renders Hellenistic decision-making predictive in nature. As earlier references to likelihood and chance show, futurity was imbedded in the thought process of actors who were primarily concerned with the course of action that would bring the most benefit. More will be said in later chapters about how the future was approached by Hellenistic decision-makers, but it is worth noting that up to this point we have mainly focused on "either/or"-type decisions - either we win or we lose, what the chances are for each course of action, and whether those chances are worth pursuing in certain circumstances. However, risk calculation in interpersonal and inter-state affairs is never considered in isolation, but is constantly negotiated among at least two actors. The issue has previously been touched upon by Josh Ober and Barry Weingast (2015), who adopt the "Nash Equilibrium" game theory model to explain Hellenistic socio-political interaction. For them, *polis* institutions and inter-

[101] Polyb. 16.31.4. Their decision may have been published, given Polybios' mention that the Abydenes προθέμενοι (proposed/put forth) and πράξαντες (accomplished) unanimously these decisions according to the δόγμα (decision/decree).
[102] Bresson and Bresson 2004: 15-16.

state interactions are an expression of a cohabitation achieved between communities, local elites, and Hellenistic kings. Their behavior was governed by cost-benefit calculations, which in turn allowed for the continued economic "florescence" of Hellenistic *poleis*. While Ober and Weingast's portrayal of Hellenistic society is reductive,[103] they are right to point out the Hellenistic decision-makers' ability to make estimations and determine the potential payoffs of their actions, while considering the element of chance – what they call "the lottery." Equilibrium, they argue, was attained because all players could conceive of common solutions to a scenario, as expressed by the performative language of city-king communication that facilitated their coexistence.[104] They are also correct in pointing out that if probability of city success or failure changes, then payoffs will change as well.[105]

However, Ober and Weingast do not sufficiently address how expectations were conceptualized beyond the matter of collecting information, nor how changes were perceived and adapted into the decision-making process. As such, while portraying Hellenistic protagonists as rational actors, they do not sufficiently explore the Hellenistic decision-making rationale, beyond the point of generic profit-maximizing calculations of an economic nature. They thus open themselves up to challenges from political scientists like Arthur Eckstein (2006) who describe the Hellenistic world as an anarchic system where powers are actively seeking to destabilize conditions to their advantage - see the Aitolian example below. Be that as it may, there is certainly something to be said about the speculative nature of Hellenistic opportunism. For instance, it is true that in the aftermath of the earthquake that hit Rhodos in 227/6

[103] For a more comprehensive explanation of the role of prominent members in Hellenistic communities in the first half of the Hellenistic Period, see Ma 2013a. Specifically, Ma explores the nuanced, even convoluted, position of benefactors in Hellenistic democracies, as they are engaged in an "enactment of relationality" with the civic community. A monument thus signaled the melding of the community with its prominent individuals, to the point that the relationship meant both co-dependency and rivalry, that in turn defined each of them and gave sense to both. Ma 2013a: 291.
[104] Ma 1999: 179-242.
[105] Ober 2015: 327.

BC, the magnanimous relief efforts of kin cities and kings were motivated by a desire to maintain the economic status quo around Rhodos as a revitalized trade hub.[106] Such initiatives never came with altruistic intentions, but were seen as opportunities for self-promotion and the acquisition of influence by benefactors.[107] Around the same time, Philip V's campaign in Asia Minor "further embroiled the palimpsestic history [of the region]," when the Rhodians seized the opportunity and sought to reconquer the Peiraia from 201 BC onwards. Not surprisingly, they used the same language of ancestral dominion and reacquisition as Antiochos III.[108] Therefore, even when community leaders sought to actively re-establish the status quo, they did not do so along earlier geo-political and economic characteristics, but followed their latest interests and speculations, as later examples will show. Simply put, there was an unrelenting effort to fill whatever void of influence or autonomy that circumstances provided, which was at times forced by calculations or by sudden and unexpected natural occurrences.[109]

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[106] Economic interests are the main reason for helping in such instances, according to Müller 2011: 335-8. See, for instance, the granting of *ateleia* to the Rhodians by Hiero and Gelo of Syracuse, Ptolemy III, and Seleukos II. The measure brought financial benefits to the honorands as well. Oliver, 2007: 32. Polyb. 5.88.4 offers the best account of the earthquake and its aftermath.

[107] Meißner 2004: 51-3 notes that cities can ironically come out of disasters reinvigorated and better off. Catastrophe relief and benefits can strengthen inter-city bonds. For kings, disasters offer opportunities to emphasize their power, authority, and outreach, while procuring recognition. The experience also forces them to consider contingent catastrophes and thus try to find ways to mitigate the risk. For current work on this topic, see Kuin and Klooster [forthcoming]. See also Jonas Borsch and Laura Carrara's 2016 edited volume *Erdbeben in der Antike: Deutungen – Folgen – Repräsentationen*. Some natural disasters, like the one that decimated Iasos in 199 BC, were used by kings to exert more control over autonomous *poleis*, or even render them dependent on them. See in particular Ma Document 26A. By accepting the benefaction of Queen Laodike, the previously autonomous Iasians had to inadvertently accept a Seleukid version of their history which in turn strengthened Antiochos III's claims to the ancestral possessions of the Seleukids over western Asia Minor. Ma 1999: 196-8.

[108] Ma 1999: 81. See the similarity of language in Syll. 586 and I. Lindos 151. See also Liv. 33.18.1: ad vindicandam a Philippo continentis regionem—Peraeam vocant—possessam maioribus suis, "to recover from Philip the region on the mainland—they call it Peraia—which had been owned by their ancestors" (Trans. Ma). However, since the earthquake that hit Iasos also affected Rhodos' military (Just. *Epit.* 30.4.3), it has been argued that the occurrence weakened the state's capacity for military operations against the Seleukids in the Peiraia. Ma 1999: 88.

[109] For a discussion on the void-filling phenomenon on the international stage, see Eckstein 2006: 104-117, on the death of Ptolemy V and the secret pact between Philip V and Antiochos III; what Eckstein calls "power-transition crisis".

Moreover, Ober and Weingast do not address the fact that in such crises individual communities take seemingly "irrational" decisions - as per their own model - that go against their potential economic benefit, as is the case of the Abydenes' resistance to Philip V.[110] Before one is tempted to claim that communities at times make bad calculations, it is worth remembering that part of the limitation in tackling these issues is that Ober and Weingast, to their own acknowledgement, oversimplify their game model by assuming that the players are formally rational, expected-utility maximizers.[111] But as Kahneman has pointed out, such an approach can only provide limited - if not superficial - explanations to how individuals and communities make decisions, given that oftentimes protagonists do not make objectively rational or advantageous choices, but intuitive and immediately tempting ones.[112]

In this respect, the study of ancient risk can help because it accounts for such "contradictions" by incorporating the perceptive sphere of the "Nash Equilibrium" model. Specifically, economist Ken Binmore (2007) explains that such game theoretical calculations are not only informed by hard data, but also by speculation based on experience and perception. In such a nuanced scenario, each agent attempts to make the best possible decision while considering the probable decisions of the other agent(s).[113] In his characteristically didactic tone, Polybios singles out the skill of being able to infer the intentions of other protagonists as essential to good strategy and sagacity:

> One cannot put it differently, for if someone thinks that there is something more important (κυριώτερον τι μέρος) to generalship than to know (γνῶναι) the choice (προαίρεσιν) and nature (φύσιν) of the opposition leader, he is both ignorant and foolish. [...] for those who are in charge

[110] Their decision to resist in a first instance, and then stubbornly endeavor in a final desperate stand would not be deemed rational because it is not profit-maximizing behavior.
[111] Ober 2015: 326.
[112] Kahneman 2011: 271.
[113] Binmore 2007: 14-15.

> must see not just what part of the enemy general's body is vulnerable, but what aspect of his mind (ψυχῆς) can be glimpsed (παραφαίνεται) to be easy to overcome.[114]

Through the invocation of "correct" knowledge and perception, Polybios once more draws our attention to the technical qualities of deliberation that could be exercised. Furthermore, the emphasis on the enemy's φύσις and ψυχή further expounds the idea that circumstances can be mastered if one is versed in the laws of human nature that govern choices and actions.

Whatever Polybios' actual views on human nature may be - a topic that is beyond the scope of this dissertation -, his allusions to speculative thought are informed by the character of Hellenistic structures of power. Put differently, knowing how political actors are likely to behave, based on the specific socio-political culture, allows one to make estimations and force outcomes in their favor. Diodorus Siculus' passage on the capture of king Lysimachos by the Getae in 292 BCE is an excellent illustration of speculative risk assessment: as the Getae were deliberating (βουλεύσασθαι) over the fate of the subdued invader, their leader Dromichaites convinced them to spare Lysimachos' life, arguing that

> Should he be executed, other kings, possibly more fearsome than their predecessor, would take over the kingship of Lysimachos. But should he be spared, he would owe a debt of gratitude to the Thrakians, and the forts that had previously belonged to the Thrakians would be returned to them without danger (κινδύνων).[115]

It has been argued that such a debate in the camp of the Getae is not an accurate depiction of deliberations, but rather a literary trope criticizing the agonistic and predatory behavior of Hellenistic

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[114] Polyb. 3.81.1-3: ὡς εἴ τις οἴεται κυριώτερόν τι μέρος εἶναι στρατηγίας τοῦ γνῶναι τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ φύσιν τοῦ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡγεμόνος, ἀγνοεῖ καὶ τετύφωται. [...] οὕτως χρὴ καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων προεστῶτας σκοπεῖν οὐχ ὅπου τι τοῦ σώματος γυμνόν, ἀλλὰ ποῦ τῆς ψυχῆς εὐχείρωτόν τι παραφαίνεται τοῦ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡγεμόνος.

[115] Diod. Sic. 21.12.3: ἀναιρεθέντος μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ βασιλεῖς ἄλλους καταλήψεσθαι τὴν Λυσιμάχου δυναστείαν, φοβερωτέρους, ἄν τύχῃ, τοῦ προϋπάρξαντος· διαφυλαχθέντος δὲ χάριν ἕξειν ὀφειλομένην τοῖς Θρᾳξὶ παρὰ τοῦ σωθέντος, καὶ τὰ φρούρια τὰ πρότερον ὑπάρξαντα Θρᾳκῶν ἀπολήψεσθαι χωρὶς κινδύνων.

kingship, placed in the mouth of a barbarian king.[116] However we receive these details, our sources do agree that Lysimachos was indeed captured and subsequently released, and there are reasons to believe that his release came as part of an agreement or alliance. Plutarch, for instance, describes Lysimachos being set free by using the perfect participle form of the verb διΐημι.[117] Moreover, Helen Lund (1996) has suggested that the mention of "more fearsome kings" who might succeed Lysimachos points to Hieronymos as a possible source of the account, as an indirect compliment to his patron Demetrios.[118] The implication is that ancient authors recognized that some form of ritualized agreement did in fact take place between the two kings. Such details give credence to the fact that, in such a geo-political environment, ancient historians and leaders could securely speculate that power voids would be immediately filled, which would help decision-makers conceive of calculated risks about the long-term stability of the region.[119]

Fischhoff and Kadvany have considered speculative thought as integral to risk management because it discloses the critical examination of the forces that shape society in terms of its members' responses to dangers.[120] Being able to make such speculations, then, meant that decision-makers could in turn attempt to anticipate the reactions of others on the international political stage and make decisions accordingly. The strategic "game" between Kleomenes III and Antigonos Doson during the

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[116] For a discussion on the presumed "poverty" of the barbarians as a trope against Macedonian luxury, see Constantin Daicoviciu, "Il paese di Dromichaete", in C.Daicovicu (ed.) *Dacica*, Cluj, Bibliotheca Musei Napocensis, 1973.
[117] Plut. *Dem.* 39.3. The verb appears very rarely in the Greek corpus, not to mention in the context of the release of prisoners. Bielman 1994: 255-7 has shown that -ίημι compound verbs, especially ἀφίημι, were generally used to suggest the release of prisoners by a magnanimous and merciful leader, with the expectation of later services or other immaterial benefits. See also Paus. 1.9.6 where Lysimachos presumably gave one of his daughters in marriage to the Getan leader.
[118] Lund 1992: 48.
[119] For the incessant attempts of the Antigonids for world domination, see Walbank 2002: 128-130. See also Eckstein 2006: 85-94, on the agonistic and unstable character of Hellenistic kingship, whose consistent refusal of a status quo is best exemplified by the secret pact between Philip V and Antiochos III.
[120] Fischhoff and Kadvany 2011: 149.

Kleomenean War reveals the virtues of speculative thought, as both rivals were preoccupied with guessing and anticipating each other's intentions. In the winter of 222 BC, the Spartan king sought to provoke the Macedonian king, who was at the time wintering with few forces at Argos, in the hope of getting him to fight an open battle. If the Macedonian king did not take the bait, Kleomenes reasoned, there was a good chance that through his inactivity Antigonos would compromise his authority before his allies. Plutarch describes Kleomenes' rationale as not at all reckless or frantic, as "some" commentators had described it, but one with much forethought (ἔδοξε μὲν τετολμῆσθαι παραβόλως καὶ μανικῶς, ἐπράχθη δὲ μετὰ πολλῆς προνοίας).[121] His assessment follows that of Polybios, who stated that "to many [his plan] seemed rash and hazardous, owing to the great strength of the frontier, but to those who calculate correctly (τοῖς ὀρθῶς λογιζομένοις) it was in fact safe and sensible."[122] As in previous examples, Kleomenes' calculations were deemed "correct" not so much for the outcome, which was considered irrelevant in the historians' valuation, but because his actions were guided by a careful assessment of circumstances (εἰδὼς). In turn, assessment allowed for speculating (λογιζόμενος) how events were likely to unfold, and what degree of danger he could expect to walk into:

> For when he saw (ὁρῶν) that Antigonus had dismissed his forces, he knew well (ᾔδει σαφῶς) that, in the first place, he will make his entrance without danger (ἀκινδύνως), and secondly, that, if the country were laid waste all the way to the walls, the Argives on seeing what was happening would certainly (ἀνάγκη) be vexed and blame Antigonos.[123]

Kleomenes' speculative thinking is highlighted by *ἀνάγκη*, implying that the expected reaction from the Argives, given the specific circumstances, was virtually a certainty; he was indeed correct. Antigonos

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[121] Plut. *Cleom.* 25.4.

[122] Polyb. 2.64.2.

[123] Polyb. 2.64.3-4: ὁρῶν γὰρ τὸν Αντίγονον διαφεικότα τὰς δυνάμεις, ᾔδει σαφῶς ὡς πρῶτον μὲν τὴν εἰσβολὴν ἀκινδύνως ποιήσεται, δεύτερον ἔτι τῆς χώρας καταφθειρομένης ἕως τῶν τειχῶν ἀνάγκη τοὺς Αργείους θεωροῦντας τὸ γινόμενον ἀσχάλλειν καὶ καταμέμφεσθαι τὸν Αντίγονον. Once more, the deliberative process is emphasized by the participles followed by aorists.

Doson, however, was not to be undone, and decided not to respond to Kleomenes' challenge, despite the Argives' frustrations and opprobrium. Plutarch draws our attention to Antigonos' weighing of options and deliberation over what course of action would bring most benefit. Finally, "he did not go out, but stuck to his own calculations, for it was shameful to recklessly risk and throw away security, but not to heed erroneously and be led by the people outside." Such prudence and the ability to constantly assess one's initial λογισμοῖς in the context of developing circumstances is commended by Plutarch as an attitude "that befits an intelligent (ἔμφρονα) general."[124] The Roman historian most likely followed Polybios' didactic praise of Antigonos for acting "like a true ruler and king," who kept silent and followed his reason (κατὰ λόγον) to handle his affairs.[125]

Such instances of intentionality and predictive thought provide an added level of complexity to international politics because they allow us to witness how individual risk management translates into *polis* initiative. The pan-Aegean crisis at the beginning of the 2nd century BC is an excellent case study. The behavior of a dissatisfied Aitolian league after the battle of Kynoskephalai, for instance, is emblematic of the speculative mindset of all major powers that inevitably involved all other communities and kingdoms that were caught between their strategic interests. Through the speech of Leon son of Kichesias, Polybios imputes a cooling of relations between the Aitolians and their erstwhile Roman ally to the leading Aitolian decision-makers who, "blowing" (πνεύσαντες) like a storm from Europe and Asia,

[124] Plut. 25.5: ὁ δὲ Αντίγονος, ὡς ἔδει στρατηγὸν ἔμφρονα, τὸ κινδυνεῦσαι παραλόγως καὶ προέσθαι τὴν ἀσφάλειαν αἰσχρόν, οὐ τὸ κακῶς ἀκοῦσαι παρὰ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἡγούμενος, οὐ προῆλθεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐνέμενε τοῖς αὑτοῦ λογισμοῖς.

[125] Polyb. 2.64.6-7: ὁ δὲ καὶ λίαν ἡγεμονικῶς καὶ βασιλικῶς οὐδὲν περὶ πλείονος ποιούμενος τοῦ κατὰ λόγον <χρήσασθαι τοῖς> πράγμασιν ἦγε τὴν ἡσυχίαν. Polybios extolls the war of minds between Hannibal and the Romans around the siege of Capua, as the Carthaginian general hoped to relieve his allies by putting pressure on Rome itself, while the Senate made sure that the siege continued, no matter the circumstances. In this respect, Rome behaved more intelligently than the Spartans who, put in a similar predicament, chose to save their homeland from the Theban Epameinondas at the cost of losing Mantineia. Polyb. 9.9.7-8 and 9.9.4-8.

"confounded (συνετάραξαν) the people and compelled them to say and do everything contrary to their nature (παρὰ φύσιν), and recklessly (κακῶς φρονοῦντες) plotted (ἐβουλήθησαν) against you [i. e. the Romans], thus becoming the reason for their own troubles."[126] Leon builds on the imagery of nature by comparing the people as a calm and welcoming sea that is stirred only when violent winds hit its waters, "compelling it to move contrary to its own nature."[127] The Athenian's insistence on the ill-advised and "unnatural" behavior of the masses (τοὺς ὄχλους) was of course a rhetorical attempt to shift the blame from a passive and gullible community to a few prominent Aitolians, thus trying to isolate the wrongdoing.

That is not to say that local politicians did not in fact run personal risks when drawing up policy – a topic for a later chapter. But Livy, inspired by Polybios, makes it clear that the anti-Roman behavior of the Aitolians was not mere demagoguery but a matter of federal policy. He explains that soon after Kynoskephalai the disgruntled Aitolians "proposed that ambassadors be sent around to the kings, who should not only tempt them but also rouse each of them by whatever inducements for a Roman war."[128] These inducements were based on speculative calculations, as the Aitolians sought to put a strain on the existing equilibrium in order to create disruption and thus restructure the balance. Their expectation

[126] Polyb. 21.31.10-14: καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνην κατὰ μὲν τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν ἀεί ποτ᾽ εἶναι γαληνὴν καὶ καθεστηκυῖαν καὶ συλλήβδην τοιαύτην ὥστε μηδέποτ᾽ ἂν ἐνοχλῆσαι μηδένα τῶν προσπελαζόντων αὐτῇ καὶ χρωμένων· ἐπειδὰν δ᾽ ἐμπεσόντες εἰς αὐτὴν ἄνεμοι βίαιοι ταράξωσι καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ἀναγκάσωσι κινεῖσθαι, τότε μηθὲν ἔτι δεινότερον εἶναι μηδὲ φοβερώτερον θαλάττης· ὃ καὶ νῦν τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Αἰτωλίαν συμπεσεῖν. "ἕως μὲν γὰρ ἦσαν ἀκέραιοι, πάντων τῶν Ελλήνων ὑπῆρχον ὑμῖν εὐνούστατοι καὶ βεβαιότατοι συνεργοὶ πρὸς τὰς πράξεις· ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς Ασίας πνεύσαντες Θόας καὶ Δικαίαρχος, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς Εὐρώπης Μενεστᾶς καὶ Δαμόκριτος συνετάραξαν τοὺς ὄχλους καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ἠνάγκασαν πᾶν καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν, τότε δὴ κακῶς φρονοῦντες ἐβουλήθησαν μὲν ὑμῖν, ἐγένοντο δ᾽ αὑτοῖς αἴτιοι κακῶν.

[127] Polyb. 21.31.11: παρὰ φύσιν ἀναγκάςωσι κινεῖσθαι.

[128] Liv. 35.12.5: Legatos censuit circa reges mittendos, qui non solum temptarent animos eorum, sed suis quemque stimulis moverent ad Romanum bellum.

was that all three kings, Nabis of Sparta, Philip V, and Antiochos III, would move against Rome, thinking that the others were only waiting on their own initiative to join them:

> "Then he [i.e. the Aitolian ambassador to Antiochos] employed a gratuitous lie regarding Philip and Nabis: each was ready to rebel and would seize the first opportunity to regain those possessions which they had lost in war. Thus, throughout the whole world at the same time the Aitolians were arousing war against the Romans.[129]

To the Aitolians' frustration, the kings were not wholly convinced because they themselves, along with everyone else caught in the middle of this crisis, followed their own calculations, speculating how events would fall into place based on their counterparts' presumed intentions and conditions. Antiochos III, for instance, sought allies in the king of Bithynia, Prousias I, as well as the Pergamene king Eumenes II. Ultimately, they both refused to join his cause albeit initially inclined to do so. Prousias refused Antiochos after receiving assurances from the Romans that his rule was secure, should he remain friendly towards them. For his part, Eumenes considered the imbalance of power between Pergamon and the Seleukid kingdom, speculating that a powerful neighbor is always a bad one: "Even if some misfortune would befall him, it was better to endure whatever fate with the Romans as allies than alone submitting to the rule of Antiochos, or, if he refused, compelled by force and arms."[130] Eumenes, in other words, employed reference-point risk-taking as he calculated that the potential benefits of an alliance with Rome made it worth his while to incur the danger of resisting Antiochos.[131]

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[129] Liv. 35.12.18: Tum de Philippo et Mabide libero mendacio abutebatur: paratum utrumque ad rebellandum esse, et primam quamque occasionem reciperandi ea, quae bello amisissent, arrepturos. Ita per totum simul orbem terrarum Aetoli Romanis concitabant bellum.

[130] Liv. 35.13.8-9: Etiam si quid adversi casurum foret, satius esse Romanis sociis quamcumque fortunam subire quam solum aut imperium pati Antiochi aut abnuentem vi atque armis cogi.

[131] Eumenes II explicitly emphasized his choice before the Roman Senate when he spoke about the risk that he had chosen to undertake when choosing to resist the Seleukid yoke. See again Polyb. 21.20.9-10 in ff. 74. The kings' refusal subsequently forced Antiochos to change his strategy, "Antiochos thus being disappointed in this expectation (ἐλπίδος), left for Ephesos, and calculating (συλλογιζόμενος) that the only way he would be able to stop the enemy troops from crossing and generally avert the war from Asia ... was if he would command the sea, he thus decided to fight a naval battle and decide (κρίνειν) matters through the dangers of the sea." Polyb. 21.11.13: Αντίοχος δὲ ταύτης ἀποπεσὼν τῆς ἐλπίδος παρῆν εἰς Εφεσον καὶ

As such, decision-makers - be they office-holders or royal councillors – were keenly aware of the possible consequences that their actions would have upon the decision-making process of others. It was not only a matter of strategy, but also an understanding of the nature of *polis* culture and how inter-polis interaction functioned, as displayed by Antiochos III's strategy in Asia Minor. He considered it essential not to tolerate their resistance, aware of the high probability that "there was the danger that if he conceded what they demanded, other cities would follow the example of Smyrna in Aiolis and Ionia, and the example of Lampsakos in the Hellespont."[132] At the same time, as Ma and Walbank have shown, Lampsakos and Smyrna's anti-Seleukid actions were the result of calculations that relied not so much on their own desire for independence, but on their close diplomatic relations with Rome and its Greek allies. Indeed, even before he came to blows with Rome, the Seleukid king laid out the groundwork for his invasion, as suggested by the distinct concern with the future displayed in his earlier agreements with Asia Minor *poleis*: decrees record benefactions and promises of further support, "If you remain as is right in your behavior towards my brother and generally towards our house, and if you gratefully remember the benefactions which you have met with."[133] Diplomatic precedent, therefore, was considered indicative, at least to a certain extent, of the political intentions of others. Such awareness of predictable *polis* behavior explains Eumenes II's demand of the Romans not to grant the Rhodians' plea for the freedom of the inhabitants of Asia following the battle of Magnesia in 189 BC. The Pergamene king

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συλλογιζόμενος ὅτι μόνως ἂν οὕτω δύναιτο κωλῦσαι τὴν τῶν πεζικῶν στρατοπέδων διάβασιν καὶ καθόλου τὸν πόλεμον ἀπὸ τῆς Ασίας ἀποτρίβεσθαι . . . βεβαίως κρατοίη τῆς θαλάττης, προέθετο ναυμαχεῖν καὶ κρίνειν τὰ πράγματα διὰ τῶν κατὰ θάλατταν κινδύνων.

[132] Liv. 33.38.3-4: Smyrna et Lampsacum libertatem usurpabant, periculumque erat ne, si concessum iis foret quod intenderent, Smyrnam in Aeolide Ioniaque, Lampsacum Hellesponto aliae urbes sequerentur.

[133] Austin 26, ll. 25-29 (trans. Austin). See also Lampsakos' outreach to Flamininus, where the promise of future help seems to be the central theme of the decree: He recognizes the [close kinship] which exists between us and the [Romans, and he promised] that if he should conclude friendship or an alliance with anyone, he would include [in them] our city, and would protect [the democracy], autonomy and peace (of the city) [and / that he would do anything in his] power to favor us, and that if anyone [tried to harass us] he would not allow this but would prevent it. Austin 197, ll. 30-36 (trans. Austin).

spoke of Rhodian underlying intentions (τὴν ἐναντίαν ἔμφασιν) to their seemingly altruistic initiative. He explained that the impression of other *poleis* of owing their freedom to the Rhodians would create a presumption of obligation that would eventually turn them from being Rhodian allies into *de facto* subjects. By stating that "such is the nature of things,"[134] Eumenes made the case that an understanding of Greek affairs was a matter of sagacity based on knowledge of statecraft that could be acquired through observation and awareness of *polis* political culture; later events would show that he was not wrong.

The Aegean political map, therefore was not just as an amalgam of interconnected forces caught in a cycle of action and reaction. It was a complex network of interrelated intentions, estimations, and deliberations about present and potential situations. The language of expressing ancient risk reveals in turn how the temporal dimension was conceptualized by ancient decision-makers and integrated into their deliberations. They understood that present developments were but an instance caught between experience and memory on the one hand, and future possibilities on the other, as they considered all these facets in tandem. We can picture such a network of risk management as a fractal tree with branches of diplomatic intentions and estimations that would have been generated *ad infinitum*, were it not for the very real circumstantial constraints that demanded immediate or eventual concerted action.

Conclusion

I have shown that we can indeed talk about ancient risk as a cognitive process central to Hellenistic decision-making. The idea of risk as the conceptual intersection between deliberation and τέχνη was central to the historians' depiction of risk management in the decision-making process. The technical

[134] Polyb. 21.19.10: γὰρ πράγματα φύσιν ἔχει τοιαύτην·

qualities of deliberation that could be exercised further allowed us to explore questions about ancient risk calculations by showing that Hellenistic decision-makers had the cognitive skills to formulate degrees of danger through the language of qualitative probability. Experienced leaders were proficient in observing and assessing circumstances in a crisis, and knew how to use that information to determine the possible consequences and risks of their future actions. Their ability to assess and take calculated risks also revealed a speculative mindset that was at the heart of communal decision-making. Hellenistic communities were all too aware of the interconnectedness of their individual actions, as their decisions continually reshaped and strained the equilibrium of their Mediterranean *oikoumenē,* in a constant dialogue of consequences between the past and the future.

CHAPTER TWO

ΑΓΓΕΛΜΑΤΑ

"As we know, there are known knowns ...
We also know there are known unknowns...
But there are also unknown unknowns."
- Donald Rumsfeld

2.1 INFORMATION AS A HISTORICAL PROBLEM

Communal risk assessment fundamentally depends on informed decision-makers, who cannot respond to threats if they are not aware of them in the first place. The observation is ostensibly obvious, but as game theorist Yakov Ben-Haim (2006) points out, the question is not a simple matter of knowing or not knowing about something. Rather, it is about what decision-makers know versus what they could know. Information gap has an important impact on the type, accuracy, and success of a community's response to crisis. As Ben-Haim succinctly explains, "uncertainty is the complement of knowledge."[1] Inevitably, risk contains a certain level of uncertainty, but risk analysts agree that having access to data about incoming threats represents the first line of defense. For Roger Myerson (1991), decision-making under uncertainty in a modern context means choosing between lotteries, as it were, where choices are

[1] "Foremost among the properties of a good decision methodology is that it must be driven by available information, as distinguished from suppositions which are reasonable but unverified." Ben-Haim 2001: 2.

informed by calculations based on a whole host of variables and data. In the ancient context, we have already shown the impressive ability of ancient decision-makers to conceptualize risk and make important risk calculations.

But the issue of information-gathering is at the heart of the study of ancient risk, given the persistence of modern long-held beliefs that the ancient Mediterranean was a fragmented, locally-minded world, where communication was slow and information about international developments was lacking. Zachmann succinctly outlines this argument when she describes the pre-modern Mediterranean as a world "[where] uncertainty was no longer seen only as danger and passively endured as fate, but taken as a challenge that could pay off if their calculations worked out. Calculations, however, meant nothing but informed guesses at that time when available information remained exceedingly less than sparse."[2] Such an information model, however, does not fit the ancient world. John Ma (2003), for instance, used Peer Polity Interaction as a cultural expression of inter-state interaction, to highlight "the importance not simply of the *polis* but of the whole network of *poleis*."[3] Peer Polity Interaction is most clearly apparent in the famous Isthmian proclamation of Flamininus regarding "the freedom of the Greeks" after the defeat of Philip V:

> The Isthmian games being now close at hand, the most distinguished men from almost the whole world having assembled there, owing to their expectation of what would take place, many and various were the reports prevalent during the whole festival, some saying that it was impossible for the Romans to abandon certain places and cities, and others declaring that they would abandon the places which were considered famous, but would retain those which, while less illustrious, would serve their purpose equally well, even at once naming these latter out of their own heads, each more ingenious than the other.

[2] Zachmann 2014: 6. A Similar verdict was offered by Grissom 2012: 478, see ff. 284 for discussion.
[3] Ma 2003: 37.

The festival as an arena for contact and exchange of ideas, goods, and knowledge, has been discussed elsewhere.[4] But it is worth taking note of the extensive discussions and contacts that precede the main proclamation. We are witnessing a dynamic network of inter-personal communication in action, through discussion and speculation, that renders the eventual proclamation a simple matter of official clarification and endorsement, the details of which having been known or hinted-at well in advance.

Communities were in fact painfully aware of the vulnerable position that a lack of information invited. Polybios insists that uncertainty brought *ἀπορία*, which could paralyze a community's ability to make decisions, as in the case of the Lakedaimonians when they suddenly found themselves invaded by a young yet agile king Philip V. They are described as panic-stricken (ἐκπλαγεῖς) and terrified (περίφοβοι), being completely surprised by what had happened (θαυμάζοντες τὸ συμβαῖνον). Accordingly, "the Lakedaimonians became utterly terrified by the sudden turn of events (διὰ τὸ παράδοξον) and were uselessly at a loss (ἠπορούν δυσχρήστως) about the present danger.[5] The implications of τὸ παράδοξον to imply contingency will be discussed in Chapter 4, but it is important to pause on its temporal dimensions, because expressions of perceived suddenness are oftentimes brought upon by lack of knowledge of developing situations.[6] The same language of sudden shock and reversal also appears often in honorary decrees, highlighting the zeal and decisional ability of public benefactors. The famous Olbia decree in honor of Protogenes is a case in point. Upon learning from deserters of an impending swift

[4] See in particular Giovannini 2007: 55. See also Isokrates' comments on the importance of Panhellenic games where all meet. Panegyric 43-44. On the subject, also Xen. *Hier.* 1.11.

[5] Polyb. 5.18.4, 11.

[6] See also the example of the Athenians, who, due to a lack of information, mistook the fleet of Demetrios Poliorketes from that of Ptolemaios I: "nobody knew in advance (of his approach), but as soon as his fleet was seen in the vicinity, everybody thought that the ships belonged to Ptolemaios and prepared to receive them." προαισθομένου μὲν οὐδενός, ἐπεὶ δὲ ὤφθη πλησίον ὁ στόλος, ἁπάντων ὡς Πτολεμαϊκὰς τὰς ναῦς ὑποδέχεσθαι παρασκευαζομένων. Once again, suddenness is emphasized, as confusion (θόρυβος) settled over Athens, "as is generally the case when people have to ward off enemies making an unexpected landing." οἷον εἰκὸς ἐν ἀπροσδοκήτῳ πολεμίους ἀποβαίνοντας ἀναγκαζομένων ἀμύνεσθαι. Plut. *Dem.* 8.4.

attack by the barbarian peoples in the area, "the people met in an assembly in deep despair, as they saw before them the danger that lay ahead and the terrors in store."[7] Albeit rhetorical in nature, such testimonies nonetheless signal a collective concern for being caught unawares by sudden dangers. This explains the epigraphic emphasis on nighttime in inscriptions recounting sudden crises: "as darkness shelters illegal actions, it increases the fear of threats that may pass unnoticed, and it multiplies unexpected dangers,"[8] especially in the case of pirate raids.[9] Not surprisingly, tactical manuals continually emphasize the importance of being always on one's guard, to foresee the possibility of sudden threats[10] – a topic to be discussed at length in Chapter 4.

The element of surprise could indeed prove devastating, and leaders with a fine grasp of the τέχνη of generalship always found ways to take advantage of the flow of (mis)information, as expressed by the popular ancient proverb "πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου."[11] Alexander the Great, for instance, took advantage of false news about his untimely death to strike at the heart of the Theban rebellion, whose leaders, "not knowing the facts, conjectured (εἴκαξον) whatever brought them pleasure."[12] Their suppositions proved to be their undoing, and all of Hellas took note. And while some may be tempted to point to this instance as a telling example of a guesswork model of information flow in the Hellenistic world, it is worth emphasizing that while there was some confusion among the revolt's ringleaders, the same was not true

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[7] IOSPE I^2 32 B, ll. 22-23: ὧν ἕνεκεν συνελθὼν ὁ δῆμος διηγωνιακὼς καὶ τὸγ κίνδυνον τὸμ μέλλοντα καὶ τὰ δεινὰ πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ποιούμενος. For more on the language of *paradoxon*, *enargeia* and empathy in decrees, see Chaniotis 2013b.

[8] Chaniotis 2017: 100.

[9] For example, the 3rd century BC decree of Amorgos tells us of a crisis "when pirates made an incursion into the countryside at night and captured a total of more than thirty girls, women and other persons both free and slave Syll.^{4} 521; IG XII.7.386 (trans. Austin).

[10] For instance, Aen. Tact. 3.4 discusses guarding oneself against events that may happen ἀπροσδοκήτως.

[11] The proverb has been explained as a precursor to Clausewitz's famous metaphor "the fog of war," that stipulates the importance of deception in war; the goal being to create a void of information that would confuse and bring panic to the enemy. The proverb also expresses the ancient concern with foresight and expecting the unexpected. Wheeler 1988: 163.

[12] Arr. *Anab.* 1.7.3: οὐ γιγνώσκοντες τὰ ὄντα τὰ μάλιστα καθ᾽ ἡδονήν σφισιν εἴκαζον.

for Alexander and his network of informants. Arrian mentions that Alexander learned (πυθομένω.) about the commotion back on the Greek mainland, though the historian does not tell us how. At the same time, many people in Athens did know of Alexander's whereabouts, while others chose to ignore the truth in order to force a rebellion. It was not due to lack of knowing: "Those who were organizing the revolt stated that an army led by Antipatros had arrived from Macedonia, and obstinately argued that Alexander himself had been killed, while being ill-at-ease with those who were announcing that Alexander himself was at its head."[13] We are thus privy not to a lack of information and contact among people and communities, but to a violent dialogue between conflicting interests, a situation that Alexander used to his advantage. And while the issue of deception will be further analyzed in the next chapter, we shall see in the next sections that the concern with not having information about developing situations prompted ancient decision-makers to actively seek ways to address the gap problem between knowledge and uncertainty.

2.2 Navigating a Landscape of Danger

The connection between inter-state interaction and the flow of information has yet to be comprehensively addressed. Recent studies still adopt a formalist approach towards contact and interaction through the lens of formal diplomatic channels. Richard Billows (2007), for instance, focuses on formal agreements such as the establishment of *symbolai,* arbitration, treaties, *isopoliteia,* and *sympoliteia.*[14] His approach does not tell the entire story when dealing with immediate consequences

[13] Arr. *Anab.* 1.7.6: καὶ τότε δὲ οἱ πράξαντες τὴν ἀπόστασιν στράτευμα ἐκ Μακεδονίας Αντιπάτρου ἀφῖχθαι ἔφασκον, αὐτὸν δὲ Αλέξανδρον τεθνάναι ἰσχυρίζοντο, καὶ τοῖς ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ὅτι οὗτος αὐτὸς προσάγει Αλέξανδρος χαλεπῶς εἶχον· See also Eumenes managing to trick the opposing army into thinking they were going to fight barbarians. Nep. *Eum.* 3.5-6.
[14] Billows 2007: 307.

and reactions to a present or potential crisis. Yet time and again literary and epigraphic sources reveal a much more complex and dynamic network of interaction and communication beyond such formal responses that blurs the line between individual and state intervention. In the build-up to the war between Rome and Antiochos III, for instance, the advent of the Seleukid king in Asia Minor disturbed local communities, afraid of a possible concerted effort between him and Philip V. The Rhodian response was to block the royal Seleukid fleet's advance at Chelidoniai in Kilikia, relenting once news of the Kynoskephalai outcome reached them. Nonetheless, Livy tells us that

> They did not abandon their other purpose, that of preserving the independence of the cities allied to Ptolemaios [...] For some they helped with troops, others with advance warnings and intelligence on the undertakings of the enemy, and they were the cause of the independence of the peoples of Kaunos, Myndos, Halikarnassos, and Samos.[15]

The passage is telling of the local disruption that armies could cause local communities. More importantly, we also catch a glimpse into an interconnected world torn from opposite ends, where the string of consequences of one event could have an effect over a great variety of factors and regions. The fact that the Rhodians sent their neighbors "advance warnings and intelligence" about the enemy, reveals the extent of the communication and information sharing of the Hellenistic age in moments of crisis; theirs were not educated guesses, but actions based on known facts and pre-emptive logic. As Nikola Casule (2012) rightly observes, in the context of such a network of interdependent communities, we must no longer refer to Greek *poleis* or geographic regions in or around the Mediterranean as peripheral, non-important, or isolated.[16]

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[15] Liv. 33.20: Illam alteram curam non omiserunt tuendae libertatis civitatum sociarum Ptolomaei [...] Nam alias auxiliis iuverunt, alias providendo ac praemonendo conatus hostis causaque libertatis fuerint Cauniis, Myndiis, Halicarnassensibus Samiisque.
[16] Casule 2012: 228-9.

In the Mediterranean recreated here, information traveled fast and had an immediate effect over the lives of local communities,[17] as exemplified by the outbreak of *staseis* in times of war. A case in point is the wave of revolutions in Mainland Greece that erupted immediately after Demetrios' defeat at Ipsos in Asia Minor: not only had the Athenians turned their backs on their benefactor, but "as he coasted along the Isthmos, his affairs were in a bad state as his garrisons had been expelled from every place, and everywhere there was a defection to his enemies."[18] News of Demetrios' defeat reached the Greek mainland before his fleet, indicating the interconnectedness of this "landscape of danger." Being informed was an essential requirement for the success or very survival of a community, as underlined by Aristotle's claim that οἱ συμβουλεύοντες needed to possess or acquire a holistic knowledge on the condition, resources, constitution, territory, and international relations, "not only of one's own city but also of the neighboring states," to be able to make decisions, especially on issues of war and peace.[19]

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[17] We have a similar scenario when "Exiles from Chalkis, driven away by atrocities committed by Philip's men, brought word [to the Roman consul Appius Claudius] that Chalkis could be taken without a fight. With no fear of an enemy in the vicinity, they said, the Macedonians were drifting aimlessly all over town, while the townspeople were paying no attention to their city's defenses, reliant on the Macedonian garrison. Having learned these things [Claudius] set out [for Chalkis]." Liv. 31.23: Exules ab Chalcide, regiorum iniuriis pulsi, attulerunt occupari Chalcidem sine certamine ullo posse; nam et Macedonas, quia nullus in propinquo sit hostium metus, vagari passim, et oppidanos, praesido Macedonum fretos, custodiam urbis neglegere. His auctoribus, profectus. See also the driving out of Roman sympathizers from Iasos during the hostilities between Rome and Antiochos III. "for no other reason than their loyalty to the Romans, and those remaining in the city were subject to the same harshness from the king's troops because of which they became exiles." Liv. 37.17.5-6: Sibi exilii nullam aliam causam esse quam fidem erga Romanos; eadem vi regiorum, qua ipsi pulsi sint, teneri eos qui in urbe maneant. This appeal touched their Rhodian *syngeneis*, who in turn convinced the Roman general Aemilius to not attack the city.

[18] Plut. *Dem.* 31.1: παρέπλευσεν εἰς Ἰσθμόν, καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῷ κακῶς ἐχόντων (ἐξέπιπτον γὰρ ἑκασταχόθεν αἱ φρουραὶ καὶ μεθίστατο πάντα πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους). See also the sudden reaction at Ephesos to the news of the defeat and death of Lysimachos at Koroupedion in 281 BC. Memnon of Herakleia states that "the Herakleians on learning about the death of Lysimachos and that a man from Herakleia had killed him, bolstered their resolve and acted bravely with regard to their longing for freedom, which they had been deprived of for eighty-four years both by tyrants of their own race and, after them, by Lysimachos." Memnon, FGrH 434. F1, 6.1: Ἐν δὲ τῶι ιγ̄ τοὺς Ἡρακλεώτας λέγει πυθομένους τὴν ἀναίρεσιν Λυσιμάχου καὶ ὡς εἴη ὁ τοῦτον ἀπεκτονὼς Ἡρακλεώτης, τάς τε γνώμας ἀναρρώνυσθαι καὶ πρὸς τὸν τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἀνδραγαθίζεσθαι πόθον, ἣν δ̄ καὶ π̄ ἔτεσιν ὑπό τε τῶν ἐμφυλίων τυράννων καὶ μετ᾽ ἐκείνους ὑπὸ Λυσιμάχου ἀφήιρηντο. Franco 1993: 99-102 insists that there is not enough evidence to claim a general anti-Lysimachean sentiment, but that it is rather a matter of factionalism, though events in other cities contradict him. Also worth noting that Magnesia-on-the-Maeander and other cities in the region reverted to posthumous Alexander coinage immediately after the death of Lysimachos. Vădan 2018.

[19] Arist. *Rhet.* 1.4.8-12.

These patterns of information-sharing mirror perfectly those observed in the economy of ancient Greece, where long-distance trade flowed between various regions, from southern France to Magna Graecia, through the Aegean, and onwards to the Black Sea or in the direction of Egypt.[20] This is not a coincidence, considering that "political domination accelerated processes of unification that the logic of the international market was already helping to establish."[21] Conversely, a sudden international crisis such as the attack of the Antigonids on Rhodos, or the starvation of Athens into submission, had a direct impact on regional commerce: we're told that "after seizing a ship heading for Athens, [Antigonos] hanged the itinerant merchant along with the captain, with the result that, as the others turned away on account of intense fear, hunger befell the city."[22] In fact, traders were particularly targeted by those on campaign partly because of the financial and military benefits they could bring,[23] but also due to the potential threat they represented to maintaining a siege.[24] As Vincent Gabrielsen (2011) and Alain Bresson (2016) have shown, trading in zones of conflict was disrupted as it sought

[20] We see this in the limited distribution of standardized regionally-dominant coinage of Massilia or Athens, and other trade goods such as Thasian wine, Egyptian grain, or the Neapolitan 'Campanian A' pottery that filled the Western Mediterranean markets after the Second Punic War. Bresson 2016: 345-376.

[21] Bresson 2016: 421.

[22] Plut. *Dem.* 33.3: καὶ ναῦν τινα λαβὼν ἔχουσαν σῖτον καὶ εἰσάγουσαν τοῖς Αθηναίοις ἐκρέμασε τὸν ἔμπορον καὶ τὸν κυβερνήτην, ὥστε τῶν ἄλλων ἀποτρεπομένων διὰ φόβον σύντονον λιμὸν ἐν ἄστει γενέσθαι. For the Antigonids' treatment of the Rhodian traders, see Polyaenus, 4.6.16. Antigonos promised immunity to traders, even Rhodian ones, as long as they did not return to Rhodos.

[23] Wars meant good business, as exemplified by the fact that Demetrios's army was accompanied by "a thousand privately-owned vessels belonging to those who plied their trade in the markets. For since the land of the Rhodians had not been plundered for many years, there gathered a whole host from all corners of men who were accustomed to profit from the misfortunes of others." Diod. Sic. 20.82.5: χωρὶς δὲ τούτων ἰδιωτικὰ πόρια συνηκολούθει τῶν χιλίων· πολλὰ γὰρ ἔτη τῆς χώρας τῶς Ῥοδίων ἀπορθήτου γεγενημένης συνέρρει πανταχόθεν πλῆθος τῶν εἰωθότων ὠφελείας ἰδίας ἡγεῖσθαι τὰ τῶν πολεμουμένων ἀτυχήματα.

[24] Notice Ptolemaios' support of the Rhodians through slipping them resources and assistance by sea. Also, the case of the pirate chief Mandro who ended up playing both roles, providing supplies to the Ephesians when their city was besieged by Lysimachos, only to turn traitor in exchange for a royal bribe and help the king's troops enter the city. Front. *Strat.* 3.3.7.

other channels for business.[25] Piracy was of course a predictable yet very serious consequence in such destabilizing circumstances.[26]

There is in fact an intimate relationship between sea travel and the gathering and transmission of information in an interconnected *oikoumenē*. When sailors would at times stumble into danger, they spread the news of what they heard, witnessed, or suffered, throughout the Mediterranean. Ephraim Lytle has recently pointed to the important role that adaptable sailors could play in creating socio-economic connectivity throughout the Mediterranean, especially through hubs such as Delos. At times we find these θαλαττοῦργοι working as fishermen or as rowers in a navy, or even as pirates.[27] Grain traders had a similar function, as the rhetorician Lysias acknowledges, while hurling invectives against them for unfair and predatory business practices.[28] Plutarch's description of how news of the Sicilian Disaster reached Athens is unequivocal in this regard: "a certain stranger, as it would seem, landed at the Piraeus, took a seat in a barber's shop, and made statements of what had happened as though the Athenians

[25] As Gabrielsen 2011: 301 notes, freedom of sailing the seas was recognized to be so central an issue that it often appeared as a special clause in peace treaties: "hindering [the voyage of] merchant vessels" (*ta ploia koluein*) and "forcing merchantmen into [a] harbor" (*ta ploia katagein*) became quasi-technical terms emblematic of the dangers at sea (e.g. *SV* 329 [346]; [Dem.] 17.19-21 [337]; IG II2, 416 [ca. 330 BC]). For an in-depth portrayal of international trade markets and networks, see Bresson 2016: Chs. 13 and 14.

[26] In fact, oftentimes "pirates" operated in the service of belligerents, thus blurring the line between pirates and allies or mercenaries. We are told that Kretan pirates in the service of Philip V seized the opportunity "to plunder a good number of vessels with seven ships. Because of this the emporoi were disheartened," while the Rhodians took action against them thinking that the pirates' lawlessness would eventually affect them as well. Diod. Sic. 27.3.1. As though this were not enough, Philip V took advantage of the situation and paid the dastardly Dikaiarchos of Aitolia to support the Kretans against Rhodos and levy tribute on the islands. Diod. Sic. 28.1.1.

[27] Lytle 2014: 305-306. Alciphron, 1.14. See also 1.10 and 1.20 for sailors being attracted by profit, risking their lives while roaming the seas. Lytle points in particular to the letters of Alkiphron where we have a stylized discussion between friends over what is λυσιτελέστερον, "more profitable": to enlist in the Athenian navy or to ply their fishing trade far away in order to avoid being dragged into the conflict? One can imagine how their flight from a zone of conflict would have carried the news of Athenian mobilization. Although writing in 2-3rd centuries AD, Alkiphron remains an important source for private life in Attica during the classical period. *BNJ* I, "Alciphron", 451.

[28] Lys. 22.15. They are accused of spreading rumors of fictive or exaggerated trouble so as to drive the prices of their product higher as people panic about what was to come. While this may suggest that they are not to be treated as reliable informants, it is worth mentioning that people believed them credible enough to listen to. Moreover, Lysias himself may be exaggerating their reputation for his own rhetorical purposes.

already knew."[29] The Athenians' reaction deserves special attention, but for our current purposes we must point out that this "rumor" reached Athens faster than the official news of the outcome in Sicily; Rumor proved indeed to be the swiftest god.

Alex Gottesman (2014) calls this phenomenon "the extra-institutional public sphere," within which communication was multi-vocal and multi-directional, as the status and sphere of the participants is wider and more fluid.[30] Such was the case of Alexander the Akarnanian,[31] who was accepted into the private councils (*consiliis arcanis*) of Antiochos III because "he was knowledgeable of Greece and not ignorant of Roman affairs."[32] There was in fact a whole sphere of interaction between communities and individuals with special knowledge, beyond the confines of elected office.[33] A case in point is the career of Apollonios son of Hierokles of Miletos, a physician honored by Tenos and the *koinon* of the Nesiotai in the early 2nd century BC. As Évelyne Samama (2003) and Sophia Aneziri (2011) have shown, physicians were extensive travelers, just like other Hellenistic professionals like rhetoricians, sophist

[29] Plut. *Nic.* 30.1: ξένος γάρ τις, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀποβὰς εἰς Πειραιᾶ καὶ καθίσας ἐπὶ κουρεῖον, ὡς ἐγνωκότων ἤδη τῶν Αθηναίων λόγους ἐποιεῖτο περὶ τῶν γεγονότων.

[30] Gottesman 2014: 11-12.

[31] He was a former companion of Philip V who went over to the "*opulentiorem regiam*" of the Seleukid king, in the context of mounting tensions between Rome and Antiochos III. See Habicht 2006: Ch. 3 for more on the topic of the freedom to switch allegiances if one *basileus* was not forthcoming or able to provide benefits and privileges at the court. Importantly, this was not considered treason.

[32] Liv. 35.18.1-3: peritus Graeciae nec ignarus Romanorum.

[33] Savalli-Lestrade 2012: 143-144 notes that some delegates were specifically called upon by other communities as arbitrators or representatives because of their specialized knowledge of local affairs or their local relations, as in the case of Hekatonymos of Miletos, who was "συ[ν]άγο[ρος τῶι δάμω]ι κατασταθείς" to Kalymna, whom he helped in a legal battle with Kos. He was subsequently honored with citizenship, right of property, proedria, and ateleia. IG XII 4, ll. 2-3. It certainly helped the Kalymnians' case that Hekatonymos was connected to the Antigonid court, to the point that he acted "καὶ κα]τὰ τὸ βασιλέως. [διάτ]αγμα Δαματρί[ου]." IG XII 4, ll. 11-12. T. Calymnii 7, ll.3-4. The Kalymnians specifically request Hekatonymos, I.Milet. 1.1.3. Apollodoros son of Poseidonios the Prienian was appointed as πρεσβευτής by his city in their dealings with the Phokaians because of his previous contacts with them, as shown by the fact that they previously honored him for hosting Massilian ambassadors in Priene on their behalf. I.Priene^2 101.

teachers,[34] or the Dionysiac *technitai*.[35] Apollonios himself was known for "his public travelling and performing duties on other islands,"[36] gaining a reputation for dedication and self-sacrifice: "when endemic sufferings afflicted the *koinon* of the Nesiotai, he remained in those places and offered his skill and remaining well-mindedness unhesitatingly to all who needed his help [...] and in other matters he conducted himself well and worthy of the Nesiotai and of his homeland."[37] A native of Miletos, Apollonios' career and reputation is illustrative of the regional network of cooperation and communication in the Aegean. Indeed, as we learn from other examples, a *technitēs* regularly kept in touch with one's city of origin, sending "decisions and official letters regarding the honors bestowed upon him by others."[38] The expressed link between the islanders and their πατρίς further suggests that someone like Apollonios provided important opportunities to establish or strengthen relations between various communities and their benefactor.[39] Natacha Massar (2006) corroborates this observation by looking at the circulation of decrees, showing that initiatives of joint honorific decrees or the publication of such inscriptions in common, were in fact means to extend a city's network of relations through their travelling *technitai*: "ce n'est donc pas uniquement le mode de communication, mais egalement l'objet

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[34] Samama 2003:25.

[35] These were travelers *par excellence*, being sought for their services by numerous communities. Aneziri 2009: 225, 233. The earliest epigraphic mentions of the Dionysiac associations highlight their mobility as they define themselves by the places to which or within which they move, the most relevant for our purposes being the "*Koinon* of the Artists of Dionysus (who are active) in or (who travel) to Ionia and the Hellespontine region" Κοινὸν τῶν περὶ τὸν Διόνυσον τεχνιτῶν ἐπ' Ιωνίας καὶ Ελλησπόντου. FD III 3, 218B ll. 5–8. As Aneziri explains the genitive + ἐπί may denote both the main region of activity for the association and the direction of its artists to the specific regions (Ionia, Hellespont) and their games." Aneziri 2009: 226, ff. 55.

[36] Samama 2003: 166, ll. 7. Often enough these travels also entailed accompanying armies and kings. See Xen. *Anab.* 3.4.30 and *Cyr.* 1.6.15. See below also the case of Apollophanes of Kos attests, who was praised for his skill and effectiveness by Antiochos III in his correspondence with Kos. Smama 2003: 133.

[37] περιστάντων δὲ π[αθῶν <ἐν>] δήμων κατὰ κοινὸν τοὺς Νησιώτας, παραμεμένηκεν ἐπὶ [τῶν] τόπων, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς προσδεηθεῖσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὴν τ[έχνην] καὶ κατὰ τὴν λοιπὴν εὔνοιαν ἀπροφάσιστον ἑαυτὸν παρ[έσχετο [...] ἔν τε τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνέσ[τραπται καλῶς καὶ ἀξίως τῶν τε Νησιωτῶν καὶ] τῆς ἰδίας πατρίδο[ς]· IG XII,5 824, B ll. 39-42, 45-46.

[38] Samama 2206:341, ll. 15-18.

[39] Ma 2003: 14-5.

de communication [...] qui permettent d'exprimer et de transmettre un message diplomatique."[40] We are thus dealing with individuals who could acquire knowledge and develop personal expertise on local, regional, and international matters, and who also had the contacts and means to share information wherever their interests took them.

These examples complement the work of Gary Reger (2013) on Network Theory who analyzed how social networks made up of enterprising individuals smoothed the flow of economic information over vast geographic expanses.[41] In line with Reger's work, Vincent Gabrielsen (2016b) has also shown how the multi-branched private associations of the Hellenistic period (and beyond) established networks of commercial trust and information-sharing over long distances. These types of interaction, then, provide the missing pieces that explain the swift and calculated steps that Hellenistic communities often took in moments of crisis. Polybios' account of the war between Byzantion, Rhodos, and king Prousias of Bithynia in 220 BC is an excellent illustration of how these networks of communication and information-sharing worked in practice:

> Kavaros the king of the Galatians arriving at Byzantion and hurrying to end the war, holding forth his hand in harmony, both Prousias and the Byzantines heeded his exhortations. But the Rhodians finding out about Kavaros' effort and the compliance of Prousias, and hurrying to bring to an end their own goal, chose Aridikes as ambassador to the Byzantines, and Polemokles

[40] Massar 2006: 87.

[41] Reger 2013: 148-150. In an earlier contribution, Reger emphasizes the role of traders and travelers in the flow of information between the Black Sea and the Aegean, such as Ploutida(?) of Odessos or Erasinos of Kallatis who are found performing benefactions in Rhodos. Epitaphs IG XII, 1, 147. Reger also uses Arrian as a fitting example of why one chose to travel – sometimes quite extensively – beyond economic reasons. Individuals could bring back a wide array of information about the region, especially regarding political and diplomatic affairs. Reger 2007: 281-283. This further highlights Sylvie Crogiez's point that states never really bothered to set up a special service for the transportation of information because messengers latched on to the networks already in place, choosing military or trade vessels for the purpose. Crogiez 2002: 67. It was by this means of communication that a certain Diodoros, Antigonid commander at Ephesos, was in contact with Lysimachos about handing the Ionian city over to him for the price of fifty talents. To his misfortune, Demetrios learned about the plot after intercepting the messages from captured boats. Polyaen. *Strat.* 4.7.4. Hemiolia is a light vessel with one and a half banks of oars, preferred by pirates because of their swiftness.

> they also sent along in charge of three triremes, wanting, as it is said, to send to the Byzantines both the spear and the herald's cane.[42]

Polybios never specifies how the Rhodians find out about the intervention of Kavaros so quickly as to be able to send their own representatives in time for the deliberations. I suspect that his comments were never meant to focus on that kind of information, being more interested in emphasizing Kavaros' initiative and the Rhodian eagerness to be represented at Byzantion.[43] We may suppose further that the intermediary logistical steps were taken as a given by the ancient audience, but for modern readers these missing details are of crucial importance to understand the means and atmosphere within which these states operated. As it is, within this information network it makes sense that the Rhodians learned about what was going on in Byzantion. If anything, this example is a testament to the performance of the system as it allowed for timely reactions to reach out and settle the conflict. Information could transpire from multiple directions, as events were unfolding in real time, with an immediate effect on the decision-making process.[44]

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[42] Polyb. 4.52.1-3: Καυάρου δὲ τοῦ τῶν Γαλατῶν βασιλέως παραγενομένου πρὸς τὸ Βυζάντιον καὶ σπουδάζοντος διαλῦσαι τὸν πόλεμον καὶ διέχοντος τὰς χεῖρας φιλοτίμως, συνεχώρησαν τοῖς παρακαλουμένοις ὅ τε Προυσίας οἵ τε Βυζάντιοι. πυθόμενοι δ' οἱ Ρόδιοι τήν τε τοῦ Καυάρου σπουδὴν καὶ τὴν ἐντροπὴν τοῦ Προυσίου, σπουδάζοντες δὲ καὶ τὴν αὑτῶν πρόθεσιν ἐπὶ τέλος ἀγαγεῖν, πρεσβευτὴν μὲν Αριδίκην προεχειρίσαντο πρὸς τοὺς Βυζαντίους, Πολεμοκλῆ δὲ τρεῖς ἔχοντα τριήρεις ὁμοῦ συναπέστειλαν, βουλόμενοι, τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον, καὶ τὸ δόρυ καὶ τὸ κηρύκειον ἅμα πέμπειν πρὸς τοὺς Βυζαντίους.

[43] The same phenomenon also explains Plutarch's account of the conflicts between the Antigonids and Ptolemaios I: "Antigonos himself was tarrying in Phrygia when he heard that Ptolemaios having gone from Cyprus was ravaging Syria and forcing the cities to turn their allegiance. He sent against him his son Demetrios, who was only twenty-two years old and for the first time in charge of a campaign over important affairs." Plut. *Dem.* 5.2: αὐτὸς μὲν Αντίγονος ἐν Φρυγίᾳ διέτριβε, Πτολεμαῖον δ' ἀκούων ἐκ Κύπρου διαβάντα πορθεῖν Συρίαν καὶ τὰς πόλεις ἀπάγειν καὶ βιάζεσθαι, κατέπεμψε τὸν υἱὸν Δημήτριον, δύο καὶ εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν ὄντα καὶ στρατείας τότε πρῶτον αὐτοτελῶς ἐπὶ πράγμασι μεγάλοις ἁπτόμενον.

[44] For instance, peasants from around Samos informed the Romans and their Rhodian allies at the beginning of the 2nd century BC about the location and the stages of preparations of the enemy fleet. Liv. 37.14.3: Eodem Timasicrates Rhodius cum duabus quadriremibus ab Samo nocte intempesta venit, deductusque ad Aemilium praesidii causa se missum ait, quod eam oram maris infestam onerariis regiae naves excursionibus crebris ab Hellesponto atque Abydo facerent. See also the vivid descriptions in Apollonius Rhodius' *Argonautika*: "When war starts among peoples/concerning boundaries, / and a peasant fearing that they will harvest his fields, / seizes in his hand a curved sickle, newly sharpened, and hastily / cuts the unripe crop without waiting for / the season when it is dried by the beams of the sun." Ap. Rhod. *Argon.* 3.1386-90: ὡς δ' ὁπότ' ἀγχούροισιν *ἀμφ' οὔροισιν* ἐγειρομένου πολέμοιο / δείσας γειομόρος, μή οἱ προτάμωνται ἀρούρας, / ἅρπην εὐκαμπῆ νεοθηγέα χερσὶ μεμαρπὼς / ὠμὸν ἐπισπεύδων κείρει στάχυν, οὐδὲ βολῇσιν / μίμνει ἐς ὡραίην τερσήμεναι ἠελίοιο· Epigraphic evidence also speaks

Within the Hellenistic landscape of danger, communities showed an impressive ability to react swiftly to sudden disruptions to gather information and stage an appropriate response. The pan-Aegean reaction to the conflict between Antigonos Monophthalmos and Rhodos is a revealing case study: while the siege of the island-polis was already underway "envoys from the Athenians and other Hellenic cities came to Demetrios, their number being greater than fifty, all entreating the king to end hostilities against the Rhodians."[45] Greek cities *en masse* got wind of developments at Rhodos and staged a coordinated intervention in an attempt to solve the conflict whose consequences threatened to affect them all. In turn, kings relied on this network of communication to gain supporters or weaken the resolve of their adversaries. Such was the case after the naval victory in the Hellespont when Antigonos sailed his victorious and decorated fleet close to the cities on the shore so that the news of his great victory might spread.[46] Both kings and cities recognized that they lived in a highly interconnected world where events and crises were interrelated, and could have wide-ranging consequences.

Our observations offer a significant – and timely – departure from Moses Finley's influential claims that the Hellenistic economy was fragmented into local and isolated *foci* of trade, a world eventually united under the Roman empire but without any sort of interconnected markets.[47] Socially and politically, the Hellenistic stage of interstate interactions reveals itself as a reflection of its own

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of the impact that deserters had in unraveling imminent dangers. For example, the city of Olbia on the north-western shores of the Black Sea, was thrown into confusion when Deserters were reporting that the Galatians and the Skiroi had formed an alliance, that a large force had been collected and would be coming during the winter." IOSPE I^2 32, B 1-21.

[45] Diod. Sic. 20.98.2-3: καθ' ὃν δὴ χρόνον ἦκον πρὸς τὸν Δημήτριον πρέσβεις παρά τε Αθηναίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ελληνίδων πόλεων, τὸν ἀριθμὸν μὲν ὄντες ὑπὲρ τοὺς πεντήκοντα, πάντες δὲ ἀξιοῦντες διαλύσασθαι τὸν βασιλέα 3πρὸς τοὺς Ροδίους.

[46] Polyaen. *Strat.* 4.6.9. See also the debate over the fate of Athens, when Antigonos firmly refused to impose a garrison: "he said that goodwill was a good and firm ladder, and that Athens, the watchtower of the world, would swiftly flash with glory their deeds to all people." Plut. *Dem.* 8.2: μὲν ἔφη καλὴν καὶ ἀσάλευτον εἶναι τὴν εὔνοιαν, τὰς δὲ Αθήνας, ὥσπερ σκοπὴν τῆς οἰκουμένης, ταχὺ τῇ δόξῃ διαπυρσεύειν εἰς ἅπαντας ἀνθρώπους τὰς πράξεις.

[47] Finley 1973: Ch. 1 makes the strongest claims about the nature of the Hellenistic economy, against the idea of a market. For more on Finley and his influence, see Introduction to *The Ancient Economy* 2010, ed. By Scheidel and von Reden.

economy: a "lock-in" system which no one could escape, nor be *autarkēs* within it.[48] Conceptually, these spheres are separated merely by convention. They melded into a single expression of interaction and communication. Ironically, the coin that appears prominently on Finley's book cover evokes this very point most clearly: namely, the coinage of the Hellenistic world formed, as Peter Thonemann (2015) recently put it, a kind of monetary "common language zone" imposed through the popularity of the standardized posthumous Alexanders. We may now extend his observation and add that, similarly, the currency of information circulated freely and swiftly throughout the Mediterranean basin.

2.3 *Proxenoi* as Informants

As a further extension of this development, the granting of *proxenia* speaks to the cities' need to have quasi-permanent contact and dependable sources of information. Lynette Mitchell echoes Gabriel Herman (1987) to underline how *proxenia* evolved as an institutionalized and politicized version of the Archaic personal relationship of *xenia*.[49] *Proxenoi* were essentially citizens of one state appointed by another state to act as their local representatives, whose functions varied according to circumstances and needs. The strictly public and thus official character of such honor is highlighted by inscriptions where we find grants exclusively of *proxenia* and never of *xenia* by a community's governing bodies. Yet the stones still preserve remnants of the earlier personal aspect of such a guest-friendship relationship through the offering of ξένια (neut. pl.), as shown by a fragmentary inscription from Ephesos: "And the *oikonomos* is to send to him ξένια (friendly gifts), so that all may know that the People honors according

[48] Bresson 2016: 381-382, 438. in support of Aristotle's statements: Arist. *Pol.* 1.3.12-13, 7.5.4.
[49] Herman 1987: 132-135, Mitchell 1997: 28-37.

to worth those who share their well-mindedness for the benefits of the city."[50] We may include here the fact that the *proxenos* also acted as personal host. These were gestures of protocol where an ambassador received gifts in order to 'personalize' the relationship, as it were.[51]

Numerous sources make it clear that *proxenoi* also functioned as informants. Thucydides, for instance, tells us that it was the Tenedians, the Methymnians, as well as πρόξενοι Αθηναίων who alerted the Athenians to the Mytilenean revolt.[52] Yet the most evocative example is found in Xenophon's *Hellenica* through the speech of Polydamas of Pharsalos. This passage has multiple facets that will be analyzed in due time, but for now it is worth noting that Polydamas' attitude reflects the duties of *proxenia.* In the advent of the threat posed by Iason of Pherai in Thessaly, Polydamas begins his speech before his Spartan allies by saying, "Men of Lakedaemon, I am your diplomatic agent (πρόξενος ὑμῶν) and 'benefactor,' (εὐεργέτης) as all my ancestors have been of whom we have any knowledge; I therefore deem it proper, if I am in any difficulty, to come to you, and if any trouble is gathering for you in Thessaly, to point it out to you (σημαίνειν)."[53] His role as informant is thus underlined not only as an institutional obligation attached to his position as πρόξενος and εὐεργέτης, but also as a moral obligation imposed upon him by the ancestral relations with Sparta.

André Gerolymatos has already commented on the role of *proxenoi* as informants, identifying three distinct categories: *proxenia* as reward for providing information, *proxenoi* functioning as intelligence agents, and those awarded the title with the specific duty to carry out intelligence work.[54]

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[50] καὶ ξένια [τὸ]ν οἰκονόμ[ον, ὅπως ἅπαντες εἰδῶσιν ὅτι] / τοὺς εὐνοιαμ παρεχομέ[νους περὶ τὰ συμφέροντα τῆς] / πόλεως τιμᾶι ὁ δῆμος κατα[ξίως. I.Ephesos 1469, ll. 1-3. For a study on the Archaic and Classical use of ξένια, see Spitzer 1993.
[51] These ξένια at times took the form of money, but was never addressed as such because it was considered impolite.
[52] Thuc. 3.2.3.
[53] Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.4,
[54] Gerolymatos 1986: 83.

His interpretation reflects the duties that were entailed in the title of *proxenos*, but at the same time the need to make such distinctions is redundant. *Proxenia* was by definition awarded because of benefits provided in the past,[55] while it also entailed potentiality. *Proxenoi* were in fact morally obligated to continue the kinds of benefits – the sharing of information, in particular - for which they were recognized as such in the first place. This brings us back to Polydamas, whom Gerolymatos identifies as an "information agent" whose local prominence and friendship with the Spartans allowed him to acquire information about Iason's plans.[56] Except that, looking at the circumstances themselves, such a label is erroneous though necessary to support Gerolymatos' own thesis of *proxenia qua* espionage and treason. As we of course know from Xenophon, it was Iason himself who disclosed his own plans to Polydamas and allowed him, even encouraged him, to make his case before the Spartans so that the former realize the reluctant character of his supposed allies. Polydamas, therefore, acts out of moral obligation, as suggested by his reference to ancestral relations.

Such claims must not be dismissed lightly given the inter-personal aspect of Greek public life and its emphasis on personal trust. It is in fact telling that Polydamas astutely brushes aside any potential doubts that his audience might raise regarding the situation in Thessaly by making an appeal to the trust they have towards him and his word: after giving a detailed account of the situation and of the character of Iason, he concludes his speech by adding "It is about these matters, then, that I have come to you, and I tell you the whole situation there as I myself see it and have heard it from his lips."[57] Polydamas' conclusion is basically an invitation to trust. Given his history with the Spartans and the fact that he

[55] Gauthier 2011: 131.
[56] Gerolymatos 1986: 85.
[57] Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.14: Περὶ τούτων δὴ ἐγὼ ἥκω πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ λέγω πάντα ὅσα ἐκεῖ αὐτός τε ὁρῶ καὶ ἐκείνου ἀκήκοα.

himself was witness to Iason's disclosure, the Spartans, he implies, have no choice but to accept his testimony and assessment. In the end, the Spartans decide not to assist the Pharsalians, but the text makes it clear that they do believe Polydamas' account. They thank him for his initiative but admit that they cannot momentarily match Iason's force as described by Polydamas himself.[58]

William Mack's (2015) very recent study on the relationship between *proxenia* and *polis* exhibits the many roles that these agents played in Hellenistic society, though he omits the critical role of *proxenoi* as purveyors of information. Yet this function is commonly referred to in literary sources, as in the account of the unexpected invasion of Attika by Sphodrias, when the Athenians

> Speedily armed themselves, while horsemen and hoplites were placed on guard of the city. But there also happened to be *presbeis* from the Lakedaimonians at Athens staying with Kallias their *proxenos*, Etymokles, Aristolochos, and Okyllos. These the Athenians seized and kept under guard, after the affair was disclosed, because these might also have been in on the plot.[59]

Significantly, the Athenians immediately assumed that treachery was afoot and connected it with the Lakedaimonian envoys. Their self-defense speech is even more indicative in this respect. The Lakedaimonians in the city first plead ignorance regarding the invasion, arguing that they would not have come had they known about the invasion, and would certainly not have resided with their *proxenos* where the Athenians would first look for them to make an arrest. Furthermore, "they said that it would become clear to the Athenians that neither was Sparta aware of these developments. For they claimed to know well that they will learn that Sphodrias had been put to death by the city."[60] On these grounds the Athenians released them. Their trustworthiness is implied, since the Athenians believed that these

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[58] Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.17-18.

[59] Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.21-22: οἱ μὲν δὴ ταχὺ ὁπλισάμενοι καὶ ἱππεῖς καὶ ὁπλῖται ἐν φυλακῇ τῆς πόλεως ἦσαν. τῶν δὲ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ πρέσβεις ἐτύγχανον Ἀθήνησιν ὄντες παρὰ Καλλίᾳ τῷ προξένῳ Ετυμοκλῆς τε καὶ Αριστόλοχος καὶ Ωκυλλος· οὓς οἱ Αθηναῖοι, ἐπεὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἠγγέλθη, συλλαβόντες ἐφύλαττον, ὡς καὶ τούτους συνεπιβουλεύοντας.

[60] Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.23: γὰρ εὖ εἰδέναι ἔφασαν ὅτι ἀπολωλότα πεύσοιντο ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως. κἀκεῖνοι μὲν κριθέντες μηδὲν συνειδέναι ἀφείθησαν. οἱ δ᾽ ἔφοροι ἀνεκάλεσάν τε τὸν Σφοδρίαν καὶ ὑπῆγον θανάτου.

agents could and would indeed πεύσοιντο the information that they promised to deliver. Conversely, Agesilaos' behavior towards petitioning local representatives is a good case for "the exception that strengthens the rule," as it were. In the wake of the taking of Oinoe, we are told that

> Many embassies from various states presented themselves, while from the Boiotians in particular ambassadors had come to ask what they should do in order to obtain peace. Agesilaos, however, conspicuously pretended to not even see these ambassadors, although Pharax their *proxenos* was standing beside them so that he may introduce them; but sitting in the circular structure near the lake, he occupied himself overseeing the booty that was being brought out.[61]

Agesilaos' behavior had important diplomatic implications, but foremost in the passage is the role of Pharax the *proxenos* as trusty envoy to the king on behalf of the Boiotians. His snub by the king was very unexpected, given that it broke from the well-established custom of *proxenia*, which also may have signaled the invalidation of such an inter-personal relationship.

The 3rd century BC epigraphic corpus further supports these claims. Taking the decrees of Magnesia-on-the-Maeander as a case study, the extensive use of *proxenoi* as informants is obvious:

> Since / Archelaos son of Airopos the Macedonian / is well-minded and zealous towards the / people of Magnesia both in common / and in private with whomever meets him / whenever summoned, he / offers his services, let it be given by / the Council and the People: to praise / Archelaos for the sake of his virtue and well-mindedness / which he holds towards the Magnesians / to be given to him / *proxenia* and citizenship and right of property / of all things and access to the Council and the People first / after the holy matters ...[62]

The decree is one of the few instances where the role of a prominent individual as consultant is explicitly mentioned. Archelaos son of Airopos the Macedonian appears as one who is called upon to help the

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[61] Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.6: πρεσβεῖαι δὲ ἄλλοθέν τε πολλαὶ παρῆσαν καὶ ἐκ Βοιωτῶν ἥκον ἐρησόμενοι τί ἂν ποιοῦντες εἰρήνης τύχοιεν. ὁ δὲ Αγησίλαος μάλα μεγαλοφρόνως τούτους μὲν οὐδ' ὁρᾶν ἐδόκει, καίπερ Φάρακος τοῦ προξένου παρεστηκότος αὐτοῖς, ὅπως προσαγάγοι· καθήμενος δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ περὶ τὴν λίμνην κυκλοτεροῦς οἰκοδομήματος ἐθεώρει πολλὰ τὰ ἐξαγόμενα.

[62] I.Magn. 5. Ll. 11-25: ἐπειδὴ / Αρχέλαος Αιρόπο[υ] Μ[α]κ̣ε̣δὼν εὖ/νους καὶ π[ρ]όθυμός ἐστιν [πε]ρὶ τὸν / δῆμον τὸμ Μαγνή[τ]ων [κ]αὶ κοινῆι / καὶ ἰδίαι τ[ο]ῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι τῶμ πο/λιτῶν, εἰς ὅτι? ἂμ παρακαλῆται, τὰς / χρείας παρέχεται, [δε]δόχθαι τῆι βου/λ[ῆ]ι καὶ τῶι δήμωι, [ἐ]παιν[έσ]αι μὲν / Αρχέλαον ἀρε[τ]ῆς ἕνεκ[α κ]αὶ εὐνοία[ς] / ἣ[ς] ἔχων διατελεῖ περὶ τὸν δῆμον / τὸμ Μαγνήτων, δεδόσθαι δ' αὐτῶ̣ι / προξενίαν καὶ πολιτεία[ν] καὶ ἔγκτη/σιν πάντων καὶ ἔφοδον ἐπὶ τὴμ βου/λὴν καὶ τὸν δῆμον πρώτωι μετὰ τὰ ἱερά.

Magnesians. This was not a reference to an isolated instance given the emphasis on "ὅτι? ἂμ παρακαλῆται." The phrase highlights the expectations that a community had from its *proxenoi*.[63] Keeping in mind that the granting of *proxenia* was an official recognition of past services with a potential aspect (Herman, 1987), the recipient was supposed to continue his efforts and services as he had done before. As such, the granting of *proxenia* may be identified as an institutionalized response that, if accepted, guaranteed future benefits from the honoree as circumstances demanded.

That these services also included conveying information is suggested by the connection between the granting of *proxenia* and giving Archelaos "access to the Council and the People first after the holy matters." Mack hints at this particularity, but does not specify it, limiting himself to say that such grants were meant "to facilitate the habitual and emotionally involved relationship."[64] It is critically important to understand that such a clause served both parties equally. On the one hand, it was a gain for the individual to have access to, and influence over, a community's deliberations and decision-making process for his own interests (more on this in Chapter 3). On the other hand, by granting such a privilege, the Magnesians facilitated the access to information that Archelaos might possess. In fact, the personal language of such awards, as well as the potential nature of the honors, made it a moral obligation for the recipient to help his host community whenever it was deemed necessary.[65]

Magnesia-on-the-Maeander is an intriguing case because most of its inscriptions published before the establishment of the festival for Artemis Leukophryene in 208/7 BC are grants of *proxenia*. Access to the Council and the People is expressly stipulated, and in some cases also access ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς,

[63] Mack 2015: 50-51.
[64] Mack 2015: 127-128.
[65] Mack2015: 131.

suggesting that the agent could immediately contact the office-holders directly.[66] We have already seen this phenomenon in action though the Milesian honorary decree to Hegestratos, which specifically states that the *epistatai* "are to bring Hegestratos before the assembly, and that the People, having heard (Hegestratos and the letters) is to take counsel for what seems best."[67] These Magnesian decrees also stand out because of the origins of the honored *proxenoi.* A cursory look at the honorees reveals that at least half of them come from Macedonia.[68] It is of course difficult to link them with a specific chronology and events due to the lack of context. But they nevertheless suggest that the Magnesians undertook a series of initiatives during the 3rd century to create bonds of cooperation with people from the Northern Greek mainland. Whether they signify a targeted *rapprochement* towards the Antigonid-controlled communities, or simply the establishment of relations with individuals connected with one of the Macedonian royal courts, is difficult to tell.[69] Any of these two options are possible given the convoluted regional history of 3rd century Asia Minor. Yet since *proxenia* is, by definition, a system of interstate representation and contact, we have reasons to believe that Magnesia-on-the-Maeander did in fact seek out links with Macedonian communities such as Lete, Aigai and Abdera, which may in fact indicate a pro-Antigonid orientation. Prosopography suggests that this was indeed the case, given that the fathers of some of these *proxenoi* may have worked with Demetrios.[70] It is important to remember, however,

[66] I.Magn. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12.
[67] BD, 21B.
[68] I.Magn. 2, 4, 5, 10, 11.
[69] Given the mobility offered by Alexander's conquests, it would of course be deceptive to think that if someone originates from Macedon or Thrace they necessarily served the Antigonid or Lysimachean kings.
[70] We have a Lysanias from Macedonia (I.Magn. 2) fighting in the army of Antigonos against Eumenes (Diod. Sic. 19.29.2) who may be the same person assisting Alexander in his Thrakian campaign of 335 BC (Arr. *Anab.* 1.2.1). Billows 1997, nr. 64 and Berve nr. 479. We also have an Archelaos from Macedonia (I.Magn. 5) who was placed by Demetrios as his commander in Babylon in 310 BC. He may also have operated under Perdikkas after the death of Alexander. Billows 1997 nr. 14.

that while such contacts were at times aimed to establish long-term access to royal Hellenistic courts, at the local level such contacts established or strengthened relations between the communities themselves that flowed through the *proxenos*.

These instances of interstate interaction through able and willing individuals gives us an important glimpse into the nature of regional communication and collaboration, as communities reacted in real time to worsening circumstances, beyond 'formal' agreements and treaties. At the same time, they contradict D. J. Mosley's (1973) conclusions on *Envoys and Diplomacy in Ancient Greece* that "if Greek diplomatic procedure was a handicap in dealing with emergencies, they developed with a corresponding, if not proportionate, lack of speed."[71] Mosley's comment was based on an evolutionary model of interstate interaction where diplomatic swiftness meant "diplomacy by conference" where one can expect to encounter permanent Venetian-style career diplomats. His assertion betrays an institutionalist bias where, with the absence of such modern developments, the world of Classical Athens and Sparta analyzed by Mosley is necessarily perceived as slow, executively hindered, and ad hoc.[72] This model, however, cannot account for the swift Rhodian initiative vis-à-vis Byzantion in 220 BC or the joint Hellenic outreach to Demetrios during the siege of Rhodos. Yet even contemporary analysts fall into the institutionalist trap when discussing Hellenistic diplomacy. See, for instance, Eckstein's dismissive attitude towards "the primitive character of interstate diplomacy,"[73] which is unwarranted given what we now know. His observations on the lack of permanent diplomats or channels to warn and inform states in advance over developing situations are not only wrong, but they

[71] Mosley 1973: 95.
[72] Mosley 1973: Preface.
[73] Eckstein 2006: 97.

also miss the mark regarding the character of ancient diplomacy. What he deems as "informal" is much more nuanced than what we might have expected. As we have just shown, the use of *philoi* or *proxenoi* was not just occasional but operated as an interpersonal flow of information that could in fact work to avert or defuse conflicts, or could at the very least warn states about threatening circumstances.[74] What I propose, then, is the adoption of a more fluid approach to socio-political interaction beneath and beyond the so-called "public" and "official" sphere that provides a more in-depth explanation of Hellenistic attitudes, reactions and responses to crisis.

As such, considering that even small communities had at times hundreds of *proxenoi,* and that many of them often received unrestricted access by land and sea because of their trade endeavors,[75] the network of information collection and transmission that we have constructed becomes even more complex. In the landscape of danger that we have presented, the escalation of hostilities threatened everyone's interests and as such spurred both individuals and communities to react. Philippe Gauthier (2011), then, rightly claims that the activities of *proxenoi* almost always appear under extreme circumstances.[76] See, for instance, the Ilian decree in honor of Metrodoros the physician which states that

> Since king Antiochos [I Soter] asserted that / suffering a wound near the neck during battle, / being treated by Metrodoros the / physician outside of any danger, and / his strategos Meleagros affirmed also / about him with an eye for / the benefit of the city. It seemed right to the Council /and the People: to praise Metrodoros son of Timokleides from Amphipolis for the sake of his honor and well-mindedness towards the kings Antiochos and Seleukos as well as the people! Let him be a *proxenos* and benefactor of the city! And offer him also citizenship and right of property as well as access to the Council and the People first after the holy matters.[77]

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[74] Eckstein 2006: 102-103. One example that Eckstein does not discuss is found in Polyb. 20.12.1. The Spartans appeal to a proxenos of Philopoimen in order to convince him to come to Sparta in an effort to end hostilities diplomatically.
[75] Mack 2015: 62-64, For the numbers, see 128 and 165.
[76] Gauthier 2011: 137.
[77] Samama 2003: 182, ll. 1-19.

Évelyne Samama (2003) reads it to suggest that the city simply obeys the demand made by the king and his *strategos* to grant honors towards the physician as a favor to Metrodoros for his services.[78] But given the context of its publication during Antiochos I Soter's campaign against the Galatians in the region, as well as Metrodoros' well-mindedness towards τῷ δήμῳ, we are witnessing the establishment of a network from which all parties involved had something to gain at a critical time. While blurring the distinction between private and public intervention, such individuals were an integral part of the Hellenistic network of communication and information transmission that helped communities become informed about adverse circumstances and mount an appropriate response.

Part of the *raison d'être* for these honors was to help a community stay informed and provide avenues to communicate and negotiate with other Hellenistic *poleis* in times of crisis.[79] Because of the inherent trust and moral obligations that went into these relations, people could count on able and willing individuals to gain information and accurately convey it. As such, their gradual integration into public *polis* life through *proxenia* and citizenship underlines the community's efforts to put in place ever-more reliable and stable channels of information transmission to support its decision-making process. We see these practices in action during the crisis that befell the Achaians when faced with Lakedaimonian aggression in 225 BC, stirred by Aitolian plots. To create a safeguard against potential Aitolian opportunism while they were kept busy and distracted by the Spartan Kleomenes, the leader of

[78] Samama 2003: 304, ff. 12 and 17.

[79] The granting of citizenship functioned along the same lines as *proxenia* and represents the culmination of this process of information control. The grants of citizenship by the city of Arsinoe/Ephesos provide an excellent case-study. The already familiar Apollonides is heralded as "the friend of the king [Demetrios Poliorketes] who also announced the well-mindedness of the king to the people and which he himself holds towards the king and the people of the Ephesians." Besides being offered citizenship he was named benefactor, was offered *proedria*, as well as "access to the council and the people first after the holy matters." καὶ προσόδον εἰς] / [τ]ὴμ βουλὴγ καὶ τὸν δήμο[ν πρώτωι μετὰ τὰ ἱερὰ I. Ephes. 1448, ll. 18-19. Another identical example is I. Ephes. 2007 dedicated to an anonymous individual.

the Achaians, Aratos of Sikyon, decided to reach out to Antigonos Doson for an alliance should the Aitolians decide to invade. The secrecy surrounding Aratos' actions will receive special attention elsewhere, but it is significant to note that the diplomatic channels were maintained through his πατρικοὶ ξένοι in Megalopolis, Nikophanes and Kerkidas. In the end, Aratos gave his public consent for concerted action with Antigonos, should it prove necessary, but only "after being informed in private by Nikophanes about the king's favorable inclination towards the Achaians and himself."[80] Collective action and individual initiative thus conspired to respond to a growing crisis, to the point that formal boundaries between "public" and "private" initiatives became blurred beyond recognition.

Conclusion

The present study paints a picture of a world torn by conflict. In this landscape of danger, we find highly-connected communities that rapidly reached out to one another when crisis threatened their stability, status, and continuity. Their educated, wealthy, able, and willing individuals acted as nodes of information in a complex network of communication, as the public and private spheres operated simultaneously and blended together. The inter-personal nature of this knowledge network was based on trust, and was in turn imbued with moral obligations and responsibilities. *Proxenia* and citizenship grants not only recognized one's contributions towards a community, but were in fact means to ensure future similar benefits that included the transmission of information. We thus witness the effects of institutionalizing these channels of communication to render them more reliable and stable in future times of need. At stake is a conscious concern with future developments as communities were forced to

[80] Polyb. 2.50.5: διακούσας κατ' ἰδίαν τῶν περὶ τὸν Νικοφάνη τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως αἵρεσιν, ἣν ἔχοι πρός τε τοὺς Αχαιοὺς καὶ πρὸς αὐτόν.

conceive of situations in the long-term. It was the ugly reality of ubiquitous war that pushed communities to always be on the lookout for what the future might bring, with the unnerving feeling that they could be affected even by conflicts from far away. Yet at the same time, they were comforted by the knowledge that should the eventuality occur, they were prepared to meet it. In the next chapter, however, we will see how their expectations and certainties were tested and could be turned against them through the harsh art of deception.

Chapter Three

ΠΙΣΤΙΣ

"Доверяй, но проверяй."
"Trust but Verify."

- Russian Proverb

3.1 The Negotiation of Trust

The establishment of Mediterranean networks of communication raises an important question about the extent to which Hellenistic decision-making bodies could trust the information to which they were privy. The answer has important implications for the study of ancient risk, seeing that the reliability and accuracy of information could prove decisive in properly responding to a local or regional crisis. As such, Xenophon's comment that "there is really nothing more profitable in war than deception,"[1] points to an important problem in the study of ancient risk, having to do with how decision-makers navigated the thorny issue of trust and the veracity of information that circulated on the international stage. At the same time, Xenophon does not imply that there was a certain aversion against interstate communication due to a presumed fear of being deceived. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the risk of misinformation did not stop *poleis* from maintaining extensive contacts with individuals and other communities throughout the Mediterranean. If anything, Xenophon suggests that contacts were

[1] Xen. *Hipp.* 5.10: ὄντως γὰρ οὐδὲν κερδαλεώτερον ἐν πολέμῳ ἀπάτης.

maintained *despite* the risk of deception. Determining how *poleis* dealt with the ever-present danger of misinformation will thus provide a clearer idea as to how communities could bring themselves to assume certain risks when responding to crises.

On his part, Arthur Eckstein remains unconvinced - for reasons already mentioned - that states had any means of knowing in advance of troubling developments happening elsewhere, or to caution others about arising problems. He insists that there were "no institutional means of averting or defusing at an early (and hence easier) stage of events the possible severe conflicts of interest between states."[2] His position, however, skirts the issue of Hellenistic information assessment altogether by proposing a binary scenario where communication is either completely reliable or not at all. But as Raymond Descat (2006) points out, trust and reliability in ancient Greece were not abstract notions, but were informed by social interactions in economic and political spheres that in turn enabled the transmission of information in ancient Greece; for Descat, trusting information meant trusting people. Vincent Gabrielsen (2016a) agrees with Descat, showing how trust in long-distance trade could be fostered through membership in private associations, which operated according to specific institutionalized practices and social relationships (i.e. friendships and *xenia*) that in turn sustained an economy of security; trustworthiness was considered the best capital for business.[3] Along these same lines, I argue that a city's decision-makers valued a source as reliable based on pre-existing interactions and status, to

[2] Eckstein 2009: 97. His position was meant to support his assertion that self-help attitudes were the natural recourse.

[3] Gabrielsen 2016a: 96-8. The example of Apollodoros, the son of the wealthy former slave Pasion, is a case in point. According to Demosthenes, he was able to easily secure much-needed loans while away on business "on account of my being Pasion's son, and the fact that he was connected by ties of hospitality with many." In fact, Pasion's reputation was so widespread and impeccable that he was "trusted throughout the Greek world." Dem. 50.56: διὰ γὰρ τὸ Πασίωνος εἶναι καὶ ἐκεῖνον ἐπεξενῶσθαι πολλοῖς καὶ πιστευθῆναι ἐν τῇ Ελλάδι οὐκ ἠπόρουν, ὅπου δεηθείην, δανείσασθαι. ὡς οὖν ταῦτα ἀληθῆ πρὸς ὑμᾶς λέγω, τούτων ὑμῖν τὰς μαρτυρίας παρέξομαι.

the extent that they sometimes rejected accurate information because they did not trust the source.[4] Therefore, it would be a mistake to follow Eckstein's student Darryl Grissom and interpret a community's skepticism to circulating rumors as an indication of "a lack of reliable intelligence about other *poleis'* motives and capabilities."[5] Rather, we may explain such skepticism as a natural communal reaction to the lack of prior contacts, as discussed in the previous chapter, that a *polis* would normally rely on to verify those rumors.[6] Indeed, we need only to turn to Polyainos' *Stratagemata* for many tragic examples of deception, particularly when communities put too much trust in unverified sources.[7]

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[4] See the initial suspicion of the Athenians towards the sailor who first breaks the news of the disaster that enveloped the Sicilian Expedition. Plut. *Nic.* 30.1. See Ch. 2, for more details on the matter of information transmission. See also the example provided by Livy of the captured Seleukid soldier during a naval stand-off between pro-Roman Hellenes and the fleet of the Seleukid King Antiochos III: "On being interrogated as to what was going on at Ephesos – being unclear whether from fear or lack of loyalty towards his own people – he disclosed everything: the fleet was prepared and equipped in the harbor, the whole body of rowers was sent to Magnesia, a few ships were beached and the docks were dismantled; never before had the naval effort been so energetically undertaken. These things were not accepted as true, because the [prefect's] spirit was consumed by falsehood and false hope." Liv. 37.11.1-3: is percunctanti, quid Ephesi ageretur, incertum metu an erga suos haud sincera fide, omnia aperit: classem instructam paratamque in portu stare; remigium omne Magnesiam missum; perpaucas naues subductas esse et naualia detegi; numquam intentius rem naualem administratam esse. haec ne pro ueris audirentur, animus errore et spe uana praeoccupatus fecit.

[5] Grissom 2012: 478. One such circumstance was the aftermath of the battle of Magnesia in 190/89 BC when "a rumor circulated with no definite authority among the multitude about events in Asia, and a few days later trustworthy messengers and the ordinances of the consul reached Rome, which brought joy after recent fear." Liv. 37.51.9: Fama dein de rebus in Asia gestis temere vulgate sine auctore, et post dies paucos nuntii certi litteraeque imperatoris Romam adlatae, quae non tantum gaudium ab recenti metu attulerunt. News of Antiochos' defeat relieved fears in Rome particularly because Hannibal Barca himself had been the king's head of operations. Rumors had circulated about Hannibalic victories against the Romans in Asia.

[6] Such is the case of Egesta and Athens during the Sicilian expedition. The Athenian envoys initially went to inspect the conditions and wealth of the Egestans, to make sure that they were being true to their words. Thuc. 6.8.2. They would later find out that the Egestans actually tricked them into thinking that they were wealthier and readier to offer support than they actually were. This reversal caused the Sicilian expedition to stumble right from the start. Thuc. 6.46.1-5.

[7] See the case of Diodoros (discussed also in Ch. 2) the Antigonid commander at Ephesos, who agreed to betray the city to Lysimachos for fifty talents (Polyaen. *Strat.* 4.7.4). The case of Herakleides of Taras, an agent of king Philip V, also stands out: he brought fake letters to the Rhodians containing supposed war instructions by the king to be used against them, with the result that "the Rhodians trusting in the letters accepted that Herakleides would offer some assistance to them against Philip, but during the night after keeping a close eye on the blowing wind [Herakleides] burned the ships of the Rhodians. Thirteen docks were destroyed and as many triremes as there were within them." Polyaen. *Strat.* 5.17.2: Ῥόδιοι ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς πιστεύσαντες Ἡρακλειδην ὑποδεχονται ὡς δυνησόμενον αὐτοὺς ὠφέλιμον κατὰ Φιλίππου γενέσθαι, ὁ δὲ νύκτωρ πλεῦμα ἐπίφορον παραφυλάξας τὰ νεώρια Ῥοδίων κατέπρησεν. τριακαίδεκα νεώσοικοι διεφθάρησαν καὶ ὅσαι τριήρεις ἐν αὐτοῖς. Interestingly, the Rhodians were initially suspicious of Herakleides (Polyb. 13.5), and only admitted him after he revealed to them evidence of his good intentions in the form of fake secret letters sent to the Kretans. Given that the Rhodians and their allies were engaged in war against the Kretans, the letter would have confirmed their suspicions that Philip was involved in

Not surprisingly, then, the same language of friendship and personal affinity that facilitated business relations, also governed the public interaction between *polis* decision-making bodies and royal agents. Honorary decrees repeatedly emphasize their reliability, praising their dependability as benefactors-*qua*-agents, with whom communities enjoyed regular interactions, particularly in times of great stress. Such is the case of Archestratos son of Nikon the Macedonian who was honored by the Ephesians in 301 BC. As *strategos* for Demetrios at Klazomenai during the conflict with Lysimachos, the decree informs us that "he showed himself trustworthy (πιστόν) towards the affairs (πράγματα) of the king, and saved the boats bringing grain to the city."[8] Indeed, the social dynamics of the Hellenistic royal courts insisted that trustworthiness implies punctual and accurate communication. Rolf Strootman (2014) explains how individuals like Archestratos who are specifically called "an intimate of the king" (οἰκεῖος ὢν τοῦ βασιλέως), formed the core of the king's entourage, and worked together to achieve common goals. Strootman calls their interaction "fictive equality," where *philoi* made up the advisory and military board of the king. They in turn created a sense of accord and facilitated common action.[9] These men were the "mouth and ears" of the king during secret conversations,[10] echoing Aristotle's metaphor to describe royal agents:

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stirring up Kretan hostility against them. The Rhodians thus appeared eager to find support against this alliance, deceiving themselves in the process because they wanted to believe that Herakleides could indeed help. For Philip's plotting against the Rhodians, see Diod. Sic. 27.3.1. and 28.1.1. See also the inscriptions recording the initial unprovoked aggression of the Kretans Syll.^{3} 567, 568, 469, and I.Kos 10. For a detailed reconstruction of the conflict, see Brulé 1978 and Baker 1991.

[8] I.Eph. 1452, ll. 2. The date of the decree after the battle of Ipsos has been suggested by the fact that it does not mention Demetrios' father Antigonos Monophthalmos, who fell in that battle. This particular use of πιστός stands out because it is unique in Ephesian honorary decrees before the Christian era. It is more widely used in other cities such as Athens since the 5th century BC, especially in the context of alliance oath-swearing, paired with ἀδόλος. For examples, IG I^3 48 (ἔσομαι πιστὸς τ]οῖ δέμοι τοῖ Αθεναίον·), IG I^3 53 (ἐσόμεθα πισ [τοὶ καὶ δίκαιοι καὶ ἰσ]χυροὶ) and IG I^3 75 (ἐ]μμενοῖμεν ταῖς χσ[υνθέκαις πιστοῖς καὶ ἀδόλος Αθεναί]οις·). The decree was published in the wake of rising tensions between the two Hellenistic kings, that culminated in the battle of Ipsos. The war promised to reshape the power balance in western Asia Minor. The Ephesians were hostile to Lysimachos, and supported Demetrios, as discussed in Chapter 2.

[9] Strootman 2014: 148-149.

[10] Savalli-Lestrade 1998: 355-356.

> Since even as it is, monarchs make many eyes and ears and hands and feet their own, for they make people who are friendly to their rule and to themselves their fellow-rulers. Although therefore if they are not friendly they will not act according to the monarch's policy. But if they are friends of his and of his rule, for a friend is one's equal and like, so that if the monarch thinks that his friends ought to rule he thinks that people who are equal to and like himself ought to rule like himself.[11]

Given that kings could only afford to send off their most trustworthy *philoi* on faraway diplomatic missions,[12] cities could rely on the agent to faithfully transmit sensitive, even secret, information back to his king.[13]

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[11] Arist. *Pol.* 1287b: ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ὀφθαλμοὺς πολλοὺς οἱ μόναρχοι ποιοῦσιν αὑτῶν καὶ ὦτα καὶ χεῖρας καὶ πόδας· τοὺς γὰρ τῇ ἀρχῇ καὶ αὐτοῖς φίλους ποιοῦνται συνάρχους. μὴ φίλοι μὲν οὖν ὄντες οὐ ποιήσουσι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ μονάρχου προαίρεσιν· εἰ δὲ φίλοι κἀκείνου καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς, ὅ γε φίλος ἴσος καὶ ὅμοιος, ὥστ' εἰ τούτους οἴεται δεῖν ἄρχειν, τοὺς ἴσους καὶ ὁμοίους ἄρχειν οἴεται δεῖν ὁμοίως. Aristotle was specifically concerned with the nature of royal decision-making that oftentimes manifested itself through royal agents. However, his time spent at the Macedonian court, together with his correspondence with Alexander the Great, suggest that Aristotle was deliberate in his choice of words to describe royal agents as reliable channels of information. On the education of Alexander see Plut. *Alex.* 7. See also the possible role of Aristotle in Alexander's death, Arr. *Anab.* 7.27. For other examples of royal agents as purveyors of information, see also Burstein 1985: 1, ll. 2-10.

[12] Savalli-Lestrade 1998: 358. See Apollonides, who brought the news of Demetrios' victory at Salamis in 306 BC. Described as "the friend of the king who also announced the well-mindedness of the king to the people and which he himself holds towards the king and the people of the Ephesians," ἐπαινέσαι δὲ καὶ Απολλω[νίδην τὸν φίλον] / τ[οῦ] βασιλέως καὶ ἀναγγείλαντα τὴν εὖν[οιαν τοῦ βασι]/[λέ]ως τῶι δήμωι καὶ ἣν ἔχει αὐτὸς πρὸς τὸμ βα[σιλέα καὶ τὸν] / δ[ῆ]μον τὸν Εφεσίωγ καὶ στεφανῶσαι αὐτὸγ χρ[υσέωι στεφάνωι ἀπὸ] / χρ[υ]σῶν εἴκοσι· I.Ephesos 1448, ll. 11-15. Because of his credentials, as it were, the information he brings to the community is accepted and celebrated: "to rejoice together (συνησθῆναι) for the good news announced (ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐξηγγελμένοις) by the king and his army." I.Ephesos 1448, ll. 2-3. The fact that they celebrate the news and the establishment of contact is fascinating in the context of intermittent fighting in the area between Lysimachos and the Antigonids.

[13] Inscriptions only revealed what was "safe" to publish. Consequential discussions took place behind closed doors where details and clauses, perhaps even orders and threats, were expressed openly. References in inscriptions to "the other subject of our discussion" (see I. Ery. 31, 35-38) supports our earlier assertion (see Ch. 2) of an ongoing communication between the two parties, as well as the secrecy involved in such negotiations. Medievalists have done significant research on the topic of oral transmission of sensitive information and the discussion of important topics through trusted royal agents, the details of which are completely absent from our written sources. See in particular Leyser, K. "Barbarossa, Henry II and the Hand of St. James." *The English Historical Review* vol. 90 nr. 356 (July 1975). 481-506. Of note also is Eumenes' gesture of burning his correspondence, "not wanting that after his death because of their secrets accusations and calumnies appear against his correspondents." Plut. *Eum.* 16.3. For concerns about false letters, see Polyaen. *Strat.* 4.6.2 and Polyb. 5.43.5. A similar scenario of sharing secrets is found in the correspondence between Ptolemaios II and Miletos dating from c. 262 BC: "we have ordered Hegestratos to address you at greater length on these subjects and to give you our greeting." The practicalities that lay behind the text are discussed in person between Hegestratos and the Milesian representatives. This is reiterated in the Milesians' response, as the secretary of the *Boule* was to bring "the letter which Hegestratos brought from King Ptolemaios and to have it read to the *demos,*" while the *epistatai* "are to bring Hegestratos before the assembly, and that the *demos*, having heard (Hegestratos and the letters) is to take counsel for what seems best." Once again, the physical presence of the envoy is crucial. BD, 21A and B.

3.2. The Illusion of Trust

The repeated emphasis on trust in literary and epigraphic texts, however, should not be taken at face value. It in fact echoes a sense of unease at the possibility of falling victim to misinformation and betrayal. Tragically for the Hellenes, moral obligations and past benefits were not enough to protect them from deception, as the Rhodians learned the hard way when Philip V started an Anatolian campaign that led to the siege of the Bithynian city of Kios. Philip's aggression created great consternation among the Hellenes, specifically for the way in which the siege was carried out. Polybios reports that after news of Macedonian aggression in the region spread, many cities sent ambassadors

> Seeking to deliver the Kians from the present evils. After they were encouraged and entertained by him [e.g. Philip] day after day, they were compelled to be witness to things which they were least willing to see ... for when the envoy [of Philip] was making a defense speech in the theater to the Rhodians, emphasizing the great-heartedness of Philip ... a man who just landed came into the Prytaneion announcing the enslavement of the Kians and the cruelty of Philip.[14]

The swift intervention of states to find an amiable end to the hostilities, as well as the *ad hoc* means by which news of the Kians' fate reached Rhodos, are remarkable. And it is the Rhodians' reaction to the news of the disaster that exposed the limits of trust, as they "were not able to believe it because of his extreme faithlessness (ἀθεσία) [...] [while] Philip exalted and boasted at these actions as though at good deeds."[15] Philip's ἀθεσία was not just a matter of thwarted expectations, albeit serious in itself. The gravest issue was the king's use of a trusted envoy to maintain the deception in the public theater, before the Rhodian assembly and other Hellenic representatives. The very fact that Philip chose to subvert,

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[14] Polyb.15.22.4-23.3: οἳ παρῆσαν ἐξελούμενοι τοὺς Κιανοὺς ἐκ τῶν περιεστώτων κακῶν, ὑπὸ δ' ἐκείνου παρακαλούμενοι καὶ διαγελώμενοι καθ' ἡμέραν <ἠναγκάσθησαν> αὐτόπται γενέσθαι τούτων, ὧν ἥκιστ' ἂν ἐβουλήθησαν, [...]ὅτε γὰρ ὁ πρεσβευτὴς ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ τὸν ἀπολογισμὸν ἐποιεῖτο πρὸς τοὺς Ροδίους, ἐμφανίζων τὴν τοῦ Φιλίππου μεγαλοψυχίαν [...]παρῆν τις ἐκ κατάπλου πρὸς τὸ πρυτανεῖον ἀναγγέλλων τὸν ἐξανδραποδισμὸν τῶν Κιανῶν καὶ <τὴν> ὠμότητα τοῦ Φιλίππου τὴν ἐν τούτοις γεγενημένην.
[15] Polyb. 15.23.5-6: μὴ δύνασθαι πιστεῦσαι διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς ἀθεσίας ... ἐπὶ τούτοις ὡς καλοῖς σεμνύνεσθαι καὶ μεγαλαυχεῖν·

even pervert, this relationship of trust "roused such savage hatred in the Rhodians against him that they would no longer listen to a single word on behalf of Philip."[16] Presumably those words were attempted by the *presbeutes* who chose to follow Philip's instructions rather than cultivate further relations and benefits with the Rhodians.[17] If at first the Rhodians had been willing, perhaps even interested, to hear what he had to say, they would never allow him to address them again after such a public humiliation.

The reality, then, was that in the interactions between cities and kings trust was oftentimes – if not always – merely an illusion that facilitated diplomatic exchanges. What sustained these relationships was fundamentally the projection of a trustworthy reputation: "For I know that the words of the untrustworthy wander without consequence, without power, and without honor."[18] John Mearsheimer (2011) has pointed out that the power of reputation is not to be taken lightly because being perceived as a duplicitous character would render other leaders and states reluctant to communicate and reach future agreements.[19] Hellenistic kings were particularly concerned about reputation because it helped sustain their slogans as "defenders of the freedom of the Hellenes" or "saviors against barbarians."[20] Unsurprisingly, after his duplicitous behavior against the Rhodians, Philip V gained the reputation for being a swindler: "during conferences and gatherings, he ambushed, watched for opportunities, and

[16] Polyb. 15.22.5. Another example of such brazen betrayal is that of Logbasis who is sent by his fellow Selgians to negotiate preferable terms of surrender with their besieger, king Antiochos III. Given that he was *sunēthēs* and a *xenos* of the king, the Selgians considered him most naturally suitable (*euphuestaton*) to undertake such a mission, only to realize with dismay that he took the opportunity to plot the betrayal of the city to the Seleukid forces. Polyb. 5.74.4-7.

[17] The model of proper behavior as envoy is Polydamas, the *proxenos* of Sparta from Pharsalos. As shown in the previous chapter, he considered it a moral duty, given his ties to Lakedaimon, to give an honest appraisal and warn the Spartans of the impending threat posed by Iason of Pherai in Thessaly, and eventually against Lakonia herself. Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.1-6.

[18] Xen. *Anab.* 7.7.24: ὁρῶ γὰρ τῶν μὲν απίστων ματαίους καὶ ἀδυνάτους καὶ ἀτίμους τοὺς λόγους πλανωμένους.

[19] Mearsheimer 2011: 84.

[20] Chaniotis 2005: 44-5.

hatched plots as though a man at war, while when actually at war he behaved unjustly and very unnobly."[21]

As such, Mearsheimer has concluded that lying has very limited use in statecraft because it tends to provide diminishing returns. This would explain, according to him, why there are relatively rare instances of modern interstate lying. But as Mearsheimer himself acknowledges, outright lying is not the same thing as deception, which includes more intricate communication such as spinning, concealment, and half-truths.[22] Indeed, despite Polybios' vilification of Philip V, the reality was that relations between Hellenistic states, and especially between cities and kings, were rife with suspicion and deception.[23] Interactions always operated on two levels of communication: spoken and implied, a distinction that is not explicitly explored by Mearsheimer. An anecdote from the *Life of Demetrios* serves to illustrate the point. Plutarch mentions a display of affection from Demetrios towards his father Antigonos Monophthalmos, who at the time happened to be conversing with foreign delegates. We are told that Antigonos took the opportunity to point out to his guests "O men, carry back this report also about us, that this is the way we feel towards one another."[24] Plutarch uses this story to comment on the vicissitudes of empire given that such sights of purportedly genuine filial affection were considered rare at a royal court, a political forum generally ridden with intrigue. Yet from a different angle, we get a glimpse into communities' attempts to collect information through their representatives beyond the

[21] Polyb. 18.3.2: ἐν μὲν τοῖς συλλόγοις καὶ ταῖς ὁμιλίαις ἐνεδρεύειν καὶ παρατηρεῖν καὶ ποιεῖν τὰ τοῦ πολεμοῦντος ἔργα, κατ᾽ αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν πόλεμον ἀδίκως ἵστασθαι καὶ λίαν ἀγεννῶς. Before an agreeing assembly, Alexander then makes an inventory of Philip's many crimes which, to the repulsion of everyone, were committed against his very own allies, from Thessaly to Asia; the Kians getting special mention.
[22] Mearsheimer 2011: 16-30.
[23] Polybios goes so far as to describe kings as "frustrated by any good deed, though in general they do not miss their immediate interest." Polyb. 15.24.5: διὸ καὶ τοῦ μὲν καλοῦ διαψεύδονται, τοῦ δὲ παραυτὰ συμφέροντος ὡς ἐπίπαν οὐκ ἀποτυγχάνουσι.
[24] Plut. *Dem.* 3.3: "ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀπαγγέλλετε περὶ ἡμῶν, ὅτι πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὕτως ἔχομεν."

stated purposes of their diplomatic mission – notice that Plutarch does not bother with the details of the meeting itself – to discern the true condition and intentions of the Antigonids. Conversely, Antigonos himself was aware of the subtleties at play, and cunningly turned the circumstances in his favor by drawing attention to a gesture that conveyed stability and unity among the Antigonids - a gesture that was not to be taken lightly by friends and adversaries alike. Such interactions, then, signal the efforts of Hellenistic states to overcome the almost-insurmountable issue of intentionality.[25]

Ulterior motives dominated diplomatic contacts, while the dynamics of the Hellenistic court were designed to create an impression of clarity and straightforwardness. [26] Ambassadors from cities also followed their own agenda.[27] Diplomacy had at times diametrically opposed aims to its stated purpose, as demonstrated by intricate stalling tactics through exhaustive diplomatic appeals. The build-up to the great siege of Rhodos by Demetrios Poliorketes in 305 BC is a case in point. After an initial attempt to dissuade Demetrios from declaring war, the Rhodians "for some time kept sending envoys beseeching

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[25] Mearsheimer 2011: 29.

[26] For example, Polyainos tells us that Antigonos Monophthalmos used *hypomnemata* to recall the ambassadors' names that had petitioned him in the past, leaving a positive impression upon these when they visited him again. In doing so Antigonos "gained great fame," as he showed himself considerate and attentive. The implication of the story is that in fact the use of such *aide-mémoire* was not common - a point to which I will return elsewhere - though it is the impression that such a gesture was meant to create that stands out. Polyaen. 4.6.2. For a general survey on the use of the term in historiography, see Delfino (1990). However, Hellenistic royal documents such as *hypomnemata* and *ephemerides* have not been studied in much detail, except in the case of Alexander the Great. Berve 1926: 1.42-55. For interesting case-studies, see also Philip V burning his documents, Polyb. 18.33.2, and Eumenes burning his compromising and dangerous correspondence, Plut. *Eum.* 16.1-2. Even getting an audience with the king was not always easy, while some embassies were made to wait for even a month before being granted access. Waiting was an instrument of power as it elevated and distanced the king from the others. In the meantime, the delegates were entertained at luxurious formal receptions that conveyed the royal house's financial strength and reach. Strootman 2014: 195-196.

[27] Xenophon and Diodorus Siculus, for instance, record many instances where envoys were in fact sent to spy even on one's allies. During the tense stand-off between Xenophon's Hellenes and the Thracian king Seuthes, Thracian representatives arrived at the Hellenic camp under the pretense of trying to settle the dispute. But as Xenophon himself recalls, "they were talking about these matters only for the sake of spying (κατασκοπῆς ἕνεκα)." Xen. *Anab.* 7.4.13. A similar strategy was employed by Antigonos Monophthalmos when he sent Demetrios as ambassador to Sicily, in truth to spy on Agathokles of Syrakousai. Diod. Sic. 21.15.1. See also the deceit of Hannibal against the Syrakousan king Hiero. Having come ostensibly to offer his congratulations regarding Hiero's lastest successes against the Mamertines, he managed to stall time and sneak soldiers into Messana to assist the despairing Mamertines. Diod. Sic. 22.13.7-8.

him not to commit an irreparable act against the city. But as no one paid any attention to them, having given up on a potential truce they sent envoys to Ptolemaios, Lysimachos and Kassandros, asking them for help."[28] Diodorus' mention that nobody (οὐδεὶς) in the entourage of Demetrios addressed the Rhodians' initial pleas, suggests that war had already been decided on at the Macedonian court, while the silence was meant to delay Rhodian preparations. Stalling was again adopted at a later point in the conflict, when more than fifty Hellenic *polis* delegations reached out and asked Demetrios to put an end to the war. After initially agreeing on an armistice, "the envoys returned having accomplished nothing."[29] One gets the impression that both sides were not really looking for an end to the hostilities, partly because Demetrios had lofty aspirations regarding Rhodos and was confident in his forces, while the Rhodians adopted the armistice as a stalling mechanism, awaiting for support that the Ptolemies had pledged.

The events leading up to the Fourth Syrian War between king Ptolemaios Philopator and Antiochos III are a testament to the international scale of deception in Hellenistic diplomacy. The plotting of the two kings against one another drew the whole of the Eastern Mediterranean into the fray, as Ptolemaios' agents "began to communicate with Antiochos, and dispatching embassies at the same time to Rhodos, Byzantion, Kyzikos, and Aitolia invited these states to send missions to further truce negotiations." Despite the great diplomatic efforts undertaken by these delegations, Ptolemaios was not actually considering reaching a compromise, but used the opportunity to gain time and make proper preparations for war. The plan had been clear: "undertake the preparations of war and, in the meantime,

[28] Diod. Sic. 20.84.1: Οἱ δὲ Ρόδιοι μέχρι μέν τινος πρέσβεις ἐκπέμποντες ἠξίουν μηδὲν πρᾶξαι κατὰ τῆς πόλεως ἀνήκεστον· ὡς δ' οὐδεὶς αὐτοῖς προσεῖχεν, ἀπογνόντες τὰς διαλύσεις ἐξέπεμψαν πρεσβευτὰς πρὸς Πτολεμαῖον καὶ Λυσίμαχον καὶ Κάσανδρον, ἀξιοῦντες βοηθεῖν.
[29] Diod. Sic. 20.98.1-3: διόπερ οἱ πρέσβεις ἀπῆλθον ἄπρακτοι.

overwhelm Antiochos with negotiations."[30] Therefore, the interplay between trust and reputation pushed Hellenistic cities and kings to project a diplomatic disposition and a presumed willingness to enter negotiations, ostensibly to find solutions to crisis. In practice, however, such initiatives were merely opportunities to further one's own interests while trying to discern those of the others. On such occasions, every gesture, word, or moment of silence, was an expression of "Doublespeak," where praise could be interpreted as a warning, while each side sought to gain an advantage over the other when it came to information or shaping public opinion.[31]

3.3 (Mis)Trust and the Building of Compromise

The crux to understanding the mechanics of risk-taking in international politics lies in the seeming paradox that, despite the mutual suspicion due to the ever-present chance of deception, diplomacy nevertheless persevered throughout the Hellenistic world. A case in point is Plutarch' account of the suspicion harbored by Seleukos against Lysimachos, "whom he did not trust (ἀπισῶν) and whom he feared (φοβούμενος)." Yet his suspicion was not a deterrent for the two kings to form alliances against the Antigonids.[32] Such diplomatic maneuvering has attracted the attention of political scientists,

[30] Polyb. 5.63.1-6: ἐβουλεύσαντο γὰρ γίνεσθαι μὲν περὶ τὴν τοῦ πολέμου παρασκευήν, ἐν δὲ τῷ μεταξὺ διαπρεσβευόμενοι κατεκλύειν τὸν Αντίοχον [...] ἐξέπεμπον ἐπιμελῶς τὰς πρεσβείας πρὸς τὸν Αντίοχον. ἅμα δὲ διαπεμψάμενοι πρός τε Ροδίους καὶ Βυζαντίους καὶ Κυζικηνούς, σὺν δὲ τούτοις Αἰτωλούς, ἐπεσπάσαντο πρεσβείας ἐπὶ τὰς διαλύσεις.

[31] As noted elsewhere by Ma 2005: 177-195 and Chaniotis 2005: 68-71 the moral and personal language of inscribed royal correspondence is an example of expressing authority through language of false equality and false honesty.

[32] Plut. *Dem.* 44.1 and 48.3. The alliance between Nikomedes I and Herakleia Pontika presents us with the same scenario. Memnon, FGrH 434, F1. See also the alliance against the Galatians between the Kingdom of Bithynia and the Hellespontine *poleis* in spite of the tensions that existed between the two sides. Polyb. 5.111. See also the rapprochement of Aratos of Sikyon towards Antigonos Doson to combat Spartan belligerence and the opportunism of the Aitolians, couched under claims to mutual benefit and friendship. Polyb. 2.50.11. Conversely, the Rhodians, after receiving assurances from Antiochos III's delegates that he had no intension to plot against them or Rome - especially after news of Philip's defeat at Kynoskephalai reached them - halted their naval preparations but nonetheless continued to subvert the Seleukid king's efforts in Western Asia Minor. Liv. 33.20.

particularly proponents of the Realist Paradigm such as Arthur Eckstein. He explains it as part of the anarchic Hellenistic interstate system in which states are basically governed by self-help strategies, which in turn leads to power-maximizing behavior.[33] Eckstein develops his argument by pointing out that the Hellenistic world did not have a supervising authority or enforceable international law – until the coming of Rome, that is -, which led each state to rely only upon its own resources for its survival and security. In such an environment, Eckstein argues, each state felt compelled to constantly try to increase its arsenal, thus creating a continually escalating atmosphere of distrust, fear, and a proneness towards violence.[34] Under these circumstances "war is normal", and it is certainly easy to agree with Eckstein considering how many local and inter-regional conflicts were fought in Asia Minor during the third century BC alone. But there is a certain dissonance between self-help strategies and the extensive diplomatic outreach in the Hellenistic period. That is not to say that diplomacy was not a form of self-help; that is a given. But considering the presence of inherent deception and ulterior motives in diplomacy, we need a more complex explanation that accounts for the assumed concessions a side was willing to make to collaborate. In other words, we need to better understand compromise.

Eckstein does not delve into the rationale of compromise because, as we have already demonstrated, he erroneously believes in "the prevailing primitiveness of diplomatic practice" and the deep lack of knowledge about one another's capabilities and intentions. Such presupposed conditions of information imbalance would have only allowed, according to Eckstein, for violent reactions to

[33] Eckstein 2014: 132-133.

[34] Eckstein 2009: 10-17. He builds his argument following the work of fellow political scientists and proponents of the Realist Paradigm, L. H. Keeley 1999, *War before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage,* H. J. Morgenthau 1973, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, R. W. Sterling 1974, *Macropolitics: International Security in a Global Society*, and leading scholar K.N. Waltz 1979, *Theory of International Politics.*

immediate crises.[35] A more penetrating explanation of compromise is provided by game theorists like Andrew Kydd (2015), also a proponent of international relations taking place in a state of anarchy. For him, compromise is a strategic interaction, which he explains as a social process where actors aim to reach certain goals rationally. Through this lens, diplomatic cooperation in anarchic circumstances is once more a matter of trust, defined in political terms as "believ[ing] it relatively likely that the other would prefer to reciprocate cooperation." He argues that "cooperation is possible if both sides' level of trust exceeds a minimum trust threshold that is determined by their motivations and the structure of the situation."[36] As those involved in cooperation undertake this "game," they learn more about each other's motivations, which in turn affects their continued cooperation. A translation of this model in the Hellenistic interstate system suggests that each side considered it worthy to deal with states whose motivations could ultimately be relied-on for a specific concerted goal. At the same time, each state was free to pursue one's own agenda within the bounds of the relatively conceived "trust threshold." This allowed Seleukos, for instance, to both trust Lysimachos against Antigonos, and at the same time distrust him regarding other matters. Conversely, Philip was thought to have crossed the "trust threshold" in his dealings with the Rhodians over Kios, and thus came to be seen as a liability that could not be trusted.

[35] Eckstein 2009: 76, 97. Understandably, he does not account for the machinations of Aratos of Sikyon just mentioned, who considered not only the actual Spartan threat, but also the potential danger posed by the opportunistic Aitolians, when he drew up his foreign policy. The solutions he sought were aimed at long-term conflict resolution by getting the Macedonian king involved through various diplomatic maneuvers. He thus sought to avoid an open conflict, while trying to strengthen interstate relations that would have brought more stability to the region. Moreover, cases where we do have explicit evidence for determent and conflict diffusion strategies pass unaddressed by Eckstein. See the creation of an alliance among rivals Herakleia and Nikomedes of Bithynia that dissuades Antigonos Gonatas from interfering in Hellespontine affairs (FGrH 434 F1 10.2), as well as the plan for long-term peaceful cohabitation with the kingdom of Lysimachos implemented by the Getan leader Dromichaites through the conclusion of kinship ties with his former enemy (Diod. Sic. 21.12.3.) – discussed in detail below.

[36] Kydd 2015: 6-9, 41.

A related explanation is provided by Steven Brams (2011), who is interested in bridging the divide between game theory and the humanities. By looking at the Iran Hostage Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis, Brams offers important insight into the process of induced cooperation through deception strategies. The aim, Brams explains, was to persuade others to choose paths favorable to the deceiver by taking advantage of missing or incomplete information on the part of the deceived.[37] We thus return to the realm of rhetoric, the anti-Antigonid coalition being an instance of how this worked in practice: once Kassandros and Lysimachos agreed that Antigonos Monophthalmos represented a common threat (κοινοὺ συμφέροντος), they sent envoys to the other kings, who in turn agreed with them based on what they were told, th at Antigonos did represent a common danger (κίνδυνον κοινόν). Significantly, however, each king was willing to join this coalition for no other reason than a perception of a personal threat from Antigonos.[38] Once they claimed victory at Ipsos, each king carried on with his business of plotting against the other. The second coalition that led to the battle of Koroupedion was formed out of identical concerns and ended with Ptolemaios Keraunos literally backstabbing his protector Seleukos Nikator and claiming the Macedonian crown for himself.[39] Given such comparisons, Hellenistic cooperation can be seen not so much as the result of an immediate reaction to necessity, following the principle "the enemy of my enemy is my friend," but as a series of considerations of immediate or eventual threats, as exemplified by the reasoning of Peukestes against the danger posed by Antigonos Monophthalmos, and that of Eumenes II against Antiochos III, as seen in Chapter 1.[40]

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[37] Brams 2011: 219-240. See example of Aitolians plotting against Rome in Ch. 1.3.
[38] Diod. Sic. 20.106. 3-5.
[39] App. *Syr.* 10(62).
[40] See also Polybios' account of the debate at Sparta on whether the Spartans should join the Aitolian or Macedonian alliance: For his part, Chlaineias suggests "even if you considered the matter for the first time (βουλευομένους), you should ally with the Aitolians rather than the Macedonians," then asking rhetorically "but if you remain determined and you have already made up your minds, what still remains to be discussed?" Polyb. 9.31.1-2: ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἀκεραίου βουλευομένους, μᾶλλον Αἰτωλοῖς

Compromise, then, was weighed against its short and long-term future consequences, as calculating decision-makers constructed likely scenarios and calculated their risks.[41] We find an excellent illustration of compromise through risk assessment in the negotiations between Philip V and his Hellenic-Roman counterparts at the conference at Nikaia. The atmosphere of mutual suspicion and disdain is immediately apparent when the Macedonian king refuses to disembark and join the talks, replying to a prodding Flamininus that "he fears no one, save for the gods, but he distrusts most of those present and especially the Aitolians." Surprisingly, Flamininus does not dispel his concerns but claims that "the danger is equal and the opportunity is the same for all." His gesture and words further speak to the charged atmosphere of the event, even to an admission of tension and danger, where no one is willing to offer or receive any guarantees. Philip, however, refused to compromise, contradicting Flamininus that "should Phainetos suffer any harm there were many who could be generals from among the Aitolians, but if Philip perished there was no one at present who would be king over Macedon."[42] The refusal to compromise evidences Philip's calculations of who stands to risk more, should trust prove to have been misplaced. Significantly, despite such overwhelming suspicion, all participants nonetheless engaged in the diplomatic game. A space was thus created where appearances were constructed or

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ἡμᾶς ἢ Μακεδόσιν ἐχρῆν συμμαχεῖν. εἰ δὲ καὶ προκατέχεσθε καὶ προδιειλήφατε περὶ τούτων, τίς ἔτι καταλείπεται λόγος. In response to Chlaineias' suggestion about the better *bouleuma* (consideration, reasoning, advice), Lykiskos utters with a rhetorical device of his own the famous line "all Hellenes must foresee the impending storm." Polyb. 9.38.1: Ἅπαντας μὲν οὖν δεῖ τοὺς Ελλήνας προϊδέσθαι τὸν ἐπιφερόμενον καιρόν.

[41] See, for instance, the debates at the peace of Apameia. Eumenes II warns the Romans against granting the Rhodians too much dominion, "[for] we think it best that you be suspicious on this issue, lest you will not notice (λάθητε) those who grow strong beyond what they ought to, while unreasoningly (ἀλόγως) weakening your friends, thus having become benefactors to enemies, you would disregard (παρορῶντες) and utterly neglect (κατολιγωροῦντες) your true friends" (Polyb. 21.19.11). The derivatives to the verb -ὁράω as used by Polybios are all meant to denote discernment (or lack of) between choice and consequence, where reason through argumentation – see the use of λόγος – is the determining factor.

[42] Polyb. 18.1.7-10: φοβεῖσθαι μὲν ἔπησεν ὁ Φίλιππος οὐδένα πλὴν τοὺς θεούς, ἀπιστεῖν δὲ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν παρόντων, μάλιστα δ' Αἰτωλοῖς. [...] φήσαντος ἴσον εἶναι πᾶσι τὸν κίνδυνον καὶ κοινὸν τὸν καιρόν [...] Φαινέου μὲν γὰρ παθόντος τι πολλοὺς εἶναι τοὺς στρατηγήσοντας Αἰτωλῶν, Φιλίππου δ' ἀπολομένου κατὰ τὸ 10παρὸν οὐκ εἶναι τὸν βασιλεύσοντα Μακεδόνων.

asserted, and where possible solutions could be fielded, however impractical or unacceptable, if only to discern the true intentions of one's rivals.

3.4 Oath-Taking and Deception

With dissimulation being the norm in Hellenistic interstate interaction, one commonly applied solution to lessening the likelihood of deception and misinformation was the imposition of oaths. The agreement between Eumenes I of Pergamon and his mercenary troops in 263 BC, is a noteworthy example. At Pergamon the oath was meant to solve past disagreements over money and service, concluding with the following clauses:

> I shall not conspire against Eumenes son of Philetairos nor shall I bear arms [against him, nor] shall I desert Eumenes, but I shall fight [for] him and his interests and sacrifice my life for him. [...] I shall not accept from the enemy any letters / and shall not receive any ambassadors nor shall I send any to them. / If anyone brings (letters) to me, I shall take the letters sealed up, and / deliver their bearers to Eumenes son of Philetairos as quickly as possible, / or to anyone I think will reveal the matter to him most quickly, / I shall take and deliver them [...] If I abide by the oath and maintain my goodwill towards Eumenes son of Philetairos may I and my descendants prosper, / but if I break the oath and violate any of the terms of the agreement, [may] I and my family perish.[43]

The emphasis on loyalty is evident, but the fact that an oath was deemed necessary points to previous tensions and lingering resentment between the parties involved in the swearing of the oath. Also noteworthy is the decree as an attempt to address the problem of the dissemination of erroneous or dangerous information. The text draws attention to a clear chain of command and procedure, both

[43] I. Pergamon 13 (OGIS 266), ll. 23-25, 27-30, 40-45, 49-51: ὀμνύω Δία, Γῆν, / Ἥλιον, Ποσειδῶ, Δήμητρα, Αρη, Αθηνᾶν ἀρείαν καὶ τὴν Ταυροπόλον / κ̣αὶ τοὺς ἄλλους θεοὺς πάν̣τας καὶ πάσας· [...] καὶ οὐκ ἐπιβ[ο]υλ[εύ]σω Εὐμένει τῶι Φιλεταίρου οὐδὲ ὅπλα / [ὑπενα]ντία θήσομαι [οὐ]δ' ἐγκαταλείψω Εὐμένη, ἀλλὰ μαχοῦμαι / [ὑπὲρ α]ὐτοῦ καὶ τῶ̣ν πραγμάτων τῶν ἐκείνου ἕως ζωῆς καὶ θανά/του.] [...] οὐ λήψο[μ]αι δὲ παρὰ τῶν ἐναντίων οὐδὲ γράμμ[α]/[τα ο]ὐδὲ πρεσβευτὴν προ[σ]δέξομ[α]ι οὔτε αὐτὸς ἀποστελῶ πρὸς αὐτούς· / ἐάν τέ τις ἐνέγκηι μοι, τά τε γράμματ' ἀνοίσω κατεσφραγισμένα καὶ / τὸν ἐνεγκόντα ἀνάξω ὡς ἂν τάχιστα δ̣ύνωμαι πρὸς Εὐμένη τὸν Φιλε/ταίρου, ἢ πρ[ὸ]ς ὃν ἂν ὑπολαμβάνω τάχιστ' [α]ὐτῶι / ἐμφανιεῖν πρὸς τοῦτο[ν] / ἀνάξω καὶ ἀνοίσω.

within and outside the camp. While on one level there was the worry that information might transpire that could create confusion, the more serious issue had to do with the tacit acknowledgment that soldiers or their captains might be tempted by the enemy to leave or sabotage the service of the king.[44] The oath, then, was supposed to provide an added layer of security against such "known unknowns."

Communities for their part regularly resorted to oaths when negotiating with external powers. And since asking for an oath implied a certain lack of trust, it is no surprise that they were imposed when the individual they were negotiating with was not a known benefactor or *proxenos*.[45] Such is the case of Aristoboulos, the Ptolemaic *dikastes* in Karia who was the mouthpiece of Ptolemaios II in concluding the alliance with the city of Iasos:

> The oath which Aristoboulos swore: I swear by Zeus, Ge, Helios, Apollo, Ares, Athena / Areia, all the gods and goddesses and the Tauropolos: I will protect the freedom / and the autonomy of the people of Iasos, I will allow the Iasians / to have and the approaches as well as all the harbors of the city, and for them to bear the contribution which the king / may impose: and if anyone hurts the Iasians, I will not turn away but will assist both by land / and by sea with all my power, and I myself will be well-minded towards the city of the Iasians/ and will do whatever good I can both in word and in deed without trickery or deceit. May good / happen to me if I abide by the oath, and the opposite of these things for he who does not abide by the oath.[46]

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[44] We see Demetrios having to deal with such an issue on the eve of the battle with Pyrrhos of Epeiros. Demetrios' soldiers are "seeking to abandon Demetrios for this [i.e. Pyrrhos] or another leader, few of them at first secretly deserted, then openly the whole camp was in agitation and disorder." That this was the result of information seeping into Demetrios' camp is implied by the statement that his soldiers "found out that he [i.e. Pyrrhos] treated prisoners of war mildly." Plut. *Dem.* 44.5: τότε δὲ καὶ πρᾴως κεχρῆσθαι τοῖς ἁλισκομένοις πυνθανόμενοι, πάντως δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ Δημητρίου ζητοῦντες, ἀπεχώρουν λάθρα καὶ κατ' ὀλίγους τό γε πρῶτον, εἶτα φανερῶς ἅπαν εἶχε κίνησιν καὶ ταραχὴν τὸ στρατόπεδον.

[45] Sommerstein 2014: 67. Therefore, according to Sommerstein, oaths are generally absent from business agreements; generally, people did not do business with people they considered untrustworthy.

[46] I.Iasos 3, ll.11-18: ὅρκον ὃν ὤμοσεν Αριστόβουλος· ὀμνύω Δία Γῆν Ηλιον Απόλλω Αρην Αθηνᾶν / Αρείαν θεοὺς πάντας καὶ πάσας καὶ τὴν Ταυροπόλον· διαφυλάξω τὴν ἐλευθερίαν / καὶ τὴν αὐτονομίαν τῶι δήμωι τῶν Ιασέων, τὰς δὲ προσόδους ἐάσω Ιασε[ῖ]ς / λαμβάνειν τὰς τῆς πόλεως πάσας καὶ τοὺς λιμένας, σύνταξιν δὲ φέρειν αὐτοὺς / ἣν ἂν ὁ βασιλεὺς συντάξηι· καὶ ἐάν τις ἀδικεῖ Ιασεῖς, οὐκ ἐπιτρέψω ἀλλὰ βοηθήσω / καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν εἰς δύναμιν εἶναι τὴν ἐμήν, καὶ αὐτὸς εὐνοήσω τῆι / πόλει τῶν Ιασέων καὶ πράξω ὅτι ἂν δύνωμαι ἀγαθὸν καὶ λόγωι καὶ ἔργωι ἄνευ δόλου / καὶ ἀπάτης·

Once again, the emphasis on trust exposes the suspicion or at least the precautions that both sides took to cement their agreement.[47] In the decree, Aristoboulos demanded certain unspecified pledges - πίστιν - and in turn swore an oath to abide by the contract and provide help should the need arise, "without trick or deception" (ἄνευ δόλου καὶ ἀπάτης). The phrase is as old as the epigraphic habit, appearing in the oldest recorded Hellenic treaty of alliance, underlining the centuries-old perennial worry of cities that they might be tricked or deceived by their counterparts.[48]

The oath as a conditional self-curse points to the future, as punishment was exacted by the gods should Aristoboulos not abide by the contract.[49] The Hellenes were acutely aware that in the end there was no greater (mortal) authority that could enforce and monitor decrees between states; the gods, with their curses and retribution, would have to do.[50] In practice, ignoring the divine could translate into physical punishment for those guilty of insubordination,[51] while the hegemon would attract a negative reputation which hurt him in diplomacy.[52] Be that as it may, Onasander makes it clear that, while piety and trust were admirable conditions, they could end up being costly liabilities:

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[47] Sommerstein 2014: 393 on kings and public authorities exacting oaths as assurance of loyalty from others.

[48] GHI 10. Alliance between the Sybarites and the Serdaioi in Magna Graecia, dated to 550-525 BC. Moreover, according to Bolmarcich 2007: 31, the grammatical construction is exclusively used in an imbalance of power between hegemon and subordinate. In this case, then, the Iasians were more anxious to seal the agreement and secure it with an oath.

[49] Konstantinidou 2014: 9.

[50] It is in fact Philip V's sacrilege which, according to Diodorus Siculus, eventually leads to his downfall. Diod. Sic. 28.2-3. See also the Phokians undertaking the risk of incurring divine punishment by knowingly committing sacrilege. Polyb. 9.33.5. Indeed, Onasander advises against breaking a treaty mainly because of its sacred nature, which would allow the enemy to take advantage of one's perceived *asebeia*. Onas. *Strat.* 37.1-5: δεῖ γὰρ οὐκ ἀσύνθηκον ἐν σπονδαῖς εἶναι ... ἐξὸν μετὰ τῆς τῶν ἰδίων πραγμάτων ἀσφαλείας πεῖραν λαμβάνειν τῆς τῶν πολεμίων ἀσεβείας·

[51] The agreement between Eumenes I of Pergamon and his mercenaries only speaks of being accursed, should a mercenary break faith, though it was perfectly under the purview of the general to impose physical punishment. See Polyb. 2.60, 4.23, 18.15, Diod. Sic. 27.4. See also execution of the Plataians, Thuc. 3.68. See also Xen. *Cyr.* 1.6.20 on punishing the disobedient. For more on the issue, see Lendon 2005: Ch. 3.

[52] Philip V (Liv. 32.21) and the Aitolians (Polyb. 4.62, 67) attracted a reputation as sacrilegious and opportunistic people, who did not abide by sacred regulations and deals. The same opprobrium was levied against Lysimachos (Paus. 1.9.7) and Pyrrhos of Epeiros (Diod. Sic. 22.12). See also sacrilege as the mark of a tyrant: Diod. Sic. 21.16 and 26.15. Onasander also adds that generals who did not enjoy a good reputation (ἔνδοξον εἶναι). Onas. *Strat.* 1.19.

> [For] those who leave to the gods revenge for what they have suffered, have pious intentions (εὐσεβὲς φρονοῦσιν) but do not make cautious decisions (οὐ ἀσφαλῆ ποιοῦσιν). For it is absolute folly to be careless of the dangers to themselves in the hope that treaty-breakers will pay the penalty - as though they would be saved as soon as the enemy perish! - when it is possible to test the impiety of the enemy while safeguarding their own affairs.[53]

Paradoxically, then, oaths did not provide the security that Hellenistic *poleis* sought. A testament to this unpleasant reality is the use of "anti-deceit" clauses in such contracts. Everett Wheeler (1984) considers these to be not just stock statements, but a phenomenon born out of real and immediate concerns of deceit through "sophistic interpretations."[54] The question, then, resurfaces as to why oath-taking persisted throughout the Hellenistic period, given the caveats and risks that it entailed. That is not to say that belief was not an important component of oath-taking. There were certainly many individuals who believed in divine retribution and the coming of Furies, should oaths be broken. But as mentioned in Chapter 1 through the works of Henk Versnel and Tim Whitmarsh, belief was not mutually exclusive to a more pragmatic approach to the realities of ancient diplomacy; even believers could be suspicious.

Part of the answer is provided by Donald Lateiner (2012) who points out that "oaths are good to deceive with," and just as they bound people to one another, they also offered opportunities to break

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[53] Onas. *Strat.* 37.4-5: οἵτινες δ' ἐπὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ποιοῦνται τὴν ὑπὲρ ὧν ἂν πάθωσιν ἐκδικίαν, εὐσεβὲς μὲν φρονοῦσιν, οὐ μὴν ἀσφαλῆ ποιοῦσιν. κομιδῇ γὰρ ἀνοήτων ἐστὶν ἐλπίδι τοῦ τοὺς παρασπονδήσαντας ἐκτίσειν δίκας ἀπρονοήτους ἔχειν τοὺς περὶ σφῶν κινδύνους, ὥσπερ αὐτοὺς σώζεσθαι μέλλοντας ἅμα τῷ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἀπόλλυσθαι, ἐξὸν μετὰ τῆς τῶν ἰδίων πραγμάτων ἀσφαλείας πεῖραν λαμβάνειν τῆς τῶν πολεμίων ἀσεβείας.

[54] Wheeler 1984: 259, 269. For instance, the stakes were certainly high for Iasos and we can infer that such an oath was not merely a routine gesture but held special importance, given the repeated reassuring mention of ownership over the city's harbors. Iasos was an important harbor-town which, according to Diodorus Siculus, in 313 BC "Ptolemaios [i.e. an agent of the Antigonids, not the king of Egypt] compelled to side with Antigonos. And in this way the cities of Karia became subjects of Antigonos." For a city caught between two kings vying for regional influence, an oath provided the promise of protection and reassurance that further changes would not be unilaterally imposed later. Diod. Sic. 19.75.5-6: ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν Ιασὸν πόλιν ἐκπεμφθεὶς Πτολεμαῖος μετὰ δυνάμεως ἱκανῆς ἠνάγκασε (Wesseling: ἠναγκάσθη) προσθέσθαι τοῖς περὶ Αντίγονον. The implication is that in the past there was a hostile takeover, while the present oath implies that Ptolemaios II drew these cities to his side through a more benevolent approach in ca. 307/6 BC. Yet Bagnall 1976: 90-91 has pointed out that while freedom and autonomy were heralded once again, the status of ἀφρούρητος and ἀφορολόγητος that had been promoted in previous correspondence is now replaced by a discussion on *syntaxis*, which suggests a change in relations or an assertion of control on the part of Ptolemaios II.

those sacred bonds. In fact, literary accounts provide many examples of "sophistic interpretations" vis-à-vis interstate agreements that sought to take advantage of the false sense of security conveyed by oaths, as exhibited by Antiochos IV's infamous behavior against the Pelousians.[55] Onasander, however, suggests that more intricate calculations are at play by pointing out that oaths are a good way to "to test the impiety of the enemy" (πεῖραν λαμβάνειν τῆς τῶν πολεμίων ἀσεβείας). In other words, behavior under oath signaled intent, as Onasander makes clear when he advises that "One must not break faith in a treaty, nor be the first to commit any sacrilegious act, but he must be suspicious enough to watch for festering deceit on the part of the enemy, for the intentions of those with whom the treaty has been concluded are uncertain (ἄδηλοι γὰρ αἱ τῶν σπεισαμένων γνῶμαι)."[56] Oath-taking, then, offered yet another avenue for diplomatic contact, and new opportunities to gain insight into the elusive yet critical issue of intentionality when calculating the limits of trust and compromise. A telling example is the Aitolians' condemnation of Philip V for enslaving the Kians who were nominally members of their *koinon,* while they themselves were on friendly terms with the king. Philip defended his actions by referring to the infamous Aitolian policy of "getting plunder from plunder." Following Philip's logic, two wrongs did make a right, and since he took Kios while helping his ally Prousias - so went the argument - the Aitolians of all people had no right to accuse him of breaking faith, since this was a standard practice that they

[55] Demetrios Poliorketes managed to sidestep an oath of silence he had made to his father to inform his companion Mithridates about Antigonos' intent to do away with him. Plut. *Dem.* 4. The city of Chios adopted a dubious interpretation of the oath they had made to surrender Leukonia to their rivals of Erythrai and leave the city unarmed, but by referring to an obscure local custom the Chians allow themselves to take their weapons as well. Polyaen. *Strat.* 8.66. The Chians were supposed to leave Leukonia with only their cloaks and tunics, but Chian women recall an ancient custom to call a cloak a spear and a tunic a shield. In a more severe case, Antiochos IV is said to have taken Pelousion "through a dubious stratagem" in spite of an agreed-upon truce, claiming afterwards that he did not break the then-agreed upon terms since he indeed made the seizure "after the truce." Diod. Sic. 30.18.2: Ὅτι ὁ Αντίοχος διὰ στρατηγήματος ἀμφιδοξουμένου ἐκυρίευσε τοῦ Πηλουσίου ... μετὰ τὰς ἀνοχὰς τὴν κατάληψιν πεποιημένον.

[56] Onas. *Strat.* 37.2-3: δεῖ γὰρ οὐκ ἀσύνθηκον ἐν σπονδαῖς εἶναι οὔτ' 2 αὐτόν τι φθάνειν ἀσεβὲς δρῶντα, ἀλλ' ὕποπτον,3 ὡς φυλάττεσθαι τὸ ἀπὸ τῶν4 πολεμίων ὕπουλον· ἄδηλοι γὰρ αἱ τῶν σπεισαμένων γνῶμαι.

liberally employed.[57] With these considerations in mind, I argue that the show of indignation by the Aitolians and the Macedonian king at each other's actions, was not actually about piety and faithlessness. Rather, it was the expression of a rhetoric of power and legitimation, as both sides learned from each other that any kind of compromise was not advisable,[58] and that the only viable option was to prepare for the alternative; the writing was on the wall, as it were, and it spelled war.

3.5 (Dis)Trusting Decision-Makers

When talking about decision-making, it would be a mistake to refer to communities as abstract groups that assess dangers in a highly formalized setting such as "the Council." The dynamics of deliberation were entangled, considering that such high-stakes decisions were conceived among individuals in a tense environment.[59] Accusations of bribery, for instance, suggest very present anxieties among the general population towards those involved in negotiations, dominated by concerns that in the process they would betray the community for personal gain. Even Flamininus, the champion of the Hellenes in their struggle against Philip V, had to deal with such accusations, his intentions being questioned after he granted the Macedonian king a fifteen-day armistice in preparation for an official round of negotiations:

> The suspicions against Titus burned twice as vehemently. For since bribery and doing nothing without a gift was a common notion in Hellas, and since this was a current characteristic among

[57] Polyb. 18.4.8: ἄγειν λάφυρον ἀπὸ λαφύρου.

[58] The Aitolian representative, Alexander he Isian, makes this point expressly clear when he calls Philip out, stating that "he neither sincerely desired peace at present nor did he make war bravely when he had to do so. Polyb. 18.3.2: μεταλαβὼν Αλέξανδρος ὁ προσαγορευόμενος Ισιος, ἀνὴρ δοκῶν πραγματικὸς εἶναι καὶ λέγειν ἱκανός, οὔτε διαλύεσθαι νῦν ἔφησε τὸν Φίλιππον ἀληθινῶς οὔτε πολεμεῖν γενναίως.

[59] Zuiderhoek 2011: 190-2 dismisses such dichotomies as *boule/demos* (Council/People) as too simplistic. In her study of elite practices in the Greek East under the Roman empire, she shows that there is heavy stratification among both "elite" and "common" groups. The distance between the lower end of the "elite" spectrum of ordinary councilors was much closer to the higher end of the "common" latter's spectrum of successful professionals.

> the Aitolians, they could not bring themselves to believe that such a change of Titus towards Philip happened without bribes.[60]

The passage illustrates not only the volatile atmosphere in which Flamininus operated, but also the character of Hellenic diplomacy, where those who relied on Flamininus found it perfectly feasible for him to be seduced with bribes.[61] Under such tension, negotiators had to tread carefully when dealing with delicate matters. Aratos of Sikyon did just that, operating behind the scenes when his Achaian confederation was debating how to respond to a resurgence of Spartan aggression under king Kleomenes: "suspicious of the daring of Kleomenes, Aratos reached out to Antigonos [Doson] in secret."[62] As Polybios explains, secrecy was necessary on the one hand because he could not risk his plans to become known to the Spartans and Aitolians, but on the other hand because "he would perplex many of the Achaians, fleeing for refuge to the enemy (ἐχθροὺς) and seeming to have entirely abandoned his hopes in them."[63] Consequently, "he was compelled both to do and to say many things contrary to his own intention in public, so as to keep his design concealed by creating the exactly opposite impression. For this reason, there are some of these matters that he does not even refer to in his memoirs."[64] The fact that the enemies of the Achaians are referred to as ἐχθροὺς in the perception of Aratos - a term that

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[60] Polyb. 18.34.6-7: διπλασίως ἐξεκάετο τὰ τῆς ὑποψίας κατὰ τοῦ Τίτου· ἤδη γὰρ κατὰ τὴν Ελλάδα τῆς δωροδοκίας ἐπιπολαζούσης καὶ τοῦ μηδένα μηδὲν δωρεὰν πράττειν, καὶ τοῦ χαρακτῆρος τούτου νομιστευομένου παρὰ τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς, οὐκ ἐδύναντο πιστεύειν διότι χωρὶς δώρων ἡ τηλικαύτη μεταβολὴ γέγονε τοῦ Τίτου πρὸς τὸν Φίλιππον.

[61] Antiochos III's attempt to ingratiate Scipio with the return of his son is just one example of bribery attempts. Diod. Sic. 29.8.

[62] FGrH 231, F4a: ὑφορώμενον τὸ θράσος τὸ τοῦ Κλεομένους, κρύφα τῶι ᾽Αντιγόνωι διαλέγεσθαι.

[63] Polyb. 2.47.8: τούς τε πολλοὺς τῶν Αχαιῶν διατρέψειν, καταφεύγων ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ δοκῶν ὁλοσχερῶς ἀπεγνωκέναι τὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐλπίδας.

[64] Polyb. 2.47.10-11: ἐξ οὗ πολλὰ παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἠναγκάζετο καὶ λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν πρὸς τοὺς ἐκτός, δι᾽ ὧν ἤμελλε τὴν ἐναντίαν ἔμφασιν ὑποδεικνύων ταύτην ἐπικρύψεσθαι τὴν οἰκονομίαν. ὧν χάριν ἔνια τούτων οὐδ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι κατέταξεν. How Polybios himself learned about such secret plans and intentions remains in the realm of speculation, Hans Beck suggesting most recently that "the likelihood is that he picked up the information about Aratos' role in the Megalopolitan approach to Antigonos III from a Megalopolitan source which was independent of Aratos." 'Aratos' FGrH 231, T5.

denotes not just military rivalry but a more personal, hateful animosity[65] - expresses the agonistic antipathy between these states, as well as the serious risk to which Aratos exposed himself to by following up on his dealings with Antigonos Doson.[66]

In his work on the history of trust in ancient Athens, Steven Johnstone (2011) is eager to explain how speakers in the public arena negotiated with their peers their position as trustworthy office-holders. But his explanation is static, when in truth there remained lingering doubts during moments of great collective stress that could erupt with very serious consequences, despite initially convincing rhetoric. The dynamic of stress has very recently been explored by Åsa Boholm (2015), who studies the anthropology of risk.[67] Starting from the premise that the perception of risk is contextual and fluid, she argues that it is constructed by social relationships, power relations and hierarchies, collective beliefs, collective experiences, and trust. In other words, risk is a relational term. She goes on to note that as relations of trust are renegotiated due to new developments over time, so does the perceived level of risk fluctuate.[68] Consequently, diplomatic undertakings are suddenly perceived as being more dangerous, and formerly trustworthy agents are treated with suspicion. In fact, our sources repeatedly show that politicians operating on the international stage walked a narrow path between faith and mistrust. Even the well-regarded fifth-century Athenian general Nikias was at one point suspected of plotting against his homeland because he spoke against invading Syrakousai.[69]

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[65] Chantraine 1999: 391, s.v. ἔχθρος.

[66] Aratos' initiative reveals the kinds of circumstances in which leaders of states with ambitious foreign policies are more likely to lie to their own people than to other states. Mearsheimer 2011: 6.

[67] She follows in the footsteps of Douglas 1973 in identifying risk as culturally constructed and context-based. This is the first meaningful departure from the works of Beck and Giddens, arguing that explanations of risk in modern society fulfil the same social function as "traditional" notions of destiny, supernatural agency or broken taboo. Boholm 2015: 74.

[68] Boholm 2015: 87, 105-106.

[69] Diod. Sic. 13.27.3: *ἀεὶ δὲ τῶν παρεπιδημούντων Συρακοσίων φροντίζων καὶ πρόξενος ὢν διατετέλεκεν*. Thucydides also reminds us that Perikles' authority before his Athenians is not infallible, as he had to continually persuade Athenians to follow along

Such suspicions and anxieties about the initiatives of leading negotiators are present in an inscription from Kyme, dating to 275-250 BC. It is mainly concerned with the periodic election of trustworthy and capable *strategoi,* who were forbidden

> to be cowardly, or to abandon the formation, or for none / of them to help the democracy, to struggle to save the city, / or to allow someone to make a proposition that it is necessary to turn over the city / to someone and receive a garrison, or to hand over the keys of the city / to dismantle the democracy, or to not seize, although being able, / he who makes the proposition, or to not inform the People of these things.[70]

Such a stance is *prima facie* reasonable if we think of tyrannical individuals like Demetrios of Phaleron in late fourth century BC Athens. Consequently, Patrice Hamon (2008) has read both clauses in the inscription as virtually identical, representing safeguards against the danger of *stasis* and the subversion of democratic institutions. However, the first clause would have sufficed for this purpose, whereas the hindrance of making certain propositions is reminiscent of the tyrant-killing laws studied by David Teegarden (2014).[71] As such, given that debate and fielding sometimes unpopular suggestions were (and still are) at least in theory an integral part of the decision-making process, the interdict implies something more. We witness an anxious, even stubborn, community when faced with the need to compromise on issues that it, at least in principle, was not ready or willing to do so. The vagueness, in

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with his initial plan. Thuc. 2.59: ὁ δὲ ὁρῶν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὰ παρόντα χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ πάντα ποιοῦντας ἅπερ αὐτὸς ἤλπιζε, ξύλλογον ποιήσας (ἔτι δ' ἐστρατήγει) ἐβούλετο θαρσῦναί τε καὶ ἀπαγαγὼν τὸ ὀργιζόμενον τῆς γνώμης πρὸς τὸ ἠπιώτερον καὶ ἀδεέστερον καταστῆσαι. For more on this, see Luce 1997: 87 and Rutherford 1994: 65.

[70] SEG 59, 1407. ll.18-21: ἢ ἐάσῃ τινα εἶ̣π̣αι ὡς χρὴ ἐπιτρέπην τὰν πόλιν / [τινὶ καὶ φρο]υ̣ρὰν παραδέχεσθαι ἢ τᾶν κλαΐδων παραχωρῆσα[ι] / [. . . . . .]ξ̣ καταλῦσαι τὰν δαμοκρατίαν, καὶ μὴ συνλάβῃ δυ[να/τὸς ἐὼν τὸν ε]ἴπαντα ἢ μὴ εἰσαγγέλλῃ εἰς τὸν δᾶμον τὸν τ[ούτων].

[71] Teegarden's thesis is that "tyrant-killing legislation" was set in place by many *poleis* in the Aegean in order to stave off a present or potential threat of tyranny or regime change. The idea was to solve a "revolutionary coordination problem" in the moment when people are thinking of fighting or resisting. Instead of responding with hesitation, they are confident in the knowledge not only that their peers will join and support them, but also that, should anything happen to them, their sacrifice will not have been in vain, nor fade from memory without recognition. Teegarden uses the theory of revolution action promoted by Kuran 1991, who accounts for the fact that the behavior of an individual affects the behavior of others, which in turn affects entire groups of people; a "cascading dynamic" is created.

turn, was a deliberate ploy to deter public figures from making such controversial suggestions, by heightening the possibility of being branded as a demagogue or, worse, a traitor.

The complex reality of socio-political discourse was addressed by Polybios in his excursus on treason, warning against jumping to conclusions:

> It is clear that we cannot pronounce offhand to be traitors those who take the initiative in engaging in common action with certain kings or leaders, nor again those who according to circumstances induce their countries to exchange their established relations for other friendships and alliances. Far from it, given that such men are responsible for the greatest benefits towards their own countries.[72]

He then goes on to defend individuals from other *poleis* who are accused by Demosthenes as traitors of Hellas simply because they believed that the interests of their own communities did not align with those of Athens during the stand-off with Philip II of Macedon.[73] While Polybios to a certain extent sought to reconcile himself with the Achaian betrayal of Philip V in favor of the Romans,[74] Demosthenes' earlier speeches are in fact indicative of a more general attitude of the opprobrium that unpopular opinions attracted in times of crisis.[75] A telling example is the career of Phokion of Athens. We are told that, when

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[72] Polyb. 18.13.4-6: δῆλον γὰρ ὡς οὔτε τοὺς ἐξ ἀκεραίου συντιθεμένους τῶν ἀνδρῶν πρός τινας βασιλεῖς ἢ δυνάστας κοινωνίαν πραγμάτων εὐθέως προδότας νομιστέον, οὔτε τοὺς κατὰ <τὰς> περιστάσεις μετατιθέντας τὰς αὑτῶν πατρίδας ἀπό τινων ὑποκειμένων πρὸς ἑτέρας φιλίας καὶ συμμαχίας, οὐδὲ τούτους. πολλοῦ γε δεῖν· ἐπείτοι γε πολλάκις οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν γεγόνασιν αἴτιοι ταῖς ἰδίαις πατρίσιν.

[73] Polybios focuses on the example of Aristainos who induced the Achaians to leave Philip V in favor of Rome, blaming Demosthenes "for having recklessly and injudiciously cast bitter reproach on the most distinguished men in Greece by saying that Kerkidas, Hieronymos, and Eucampidas in Arkadia were betrayers of Hellas because they joined Philip [II], [... more examples follow ...]. But in fact all the above men were perfectly and clearly justified in thus defending their own rights. [...] But if preserving the rights of their respective countries, they simply differed in their judgement of facts, thinking that the interests of Athens were not identical with those of their countries, they should, I maintain, not have been dubbed traitors for this reason by Demosthenes." Polyb. 18.14: διότι πικρότατον ὄνειδος τοῖς ἐπιφανεστάτοις τῶν Ελλήνων εἰκῇ καὶ ἀκρίτως προσέρριψε, φήσας ἐν μὲν Αρκαδίᾳ τοὺς περὶ Κερκιδᾶν καὶ Ιερώνυμον καὶ Εὐκαμπίδαν προδότας γενέσθαι τῆς Ελλάδος, ὅτι Φιλίππῳ συνεμάχουν, [...] καίτοι γε πάντων μὲν τῶν προειρημένων ἀνδρῶν πολὺν ἐχόντων λόγον καὶ φαινόμενον ὑπὲρ τῶν καθ' αὑτοὺς δικαίων, [...] εἰ δὲ τηροῦντες τὰ πρὸς τὰς πατρίδας δίκαια κρίσει πραγμάτων διεφέροντο, νομίζοντες οὐ ταὐτὸ συμφέρον Αθηναίοις εἶναι καὶ ταῖς ἑαυτῶν πόλεσιν, οὐ δήπου διὰ τοῦτο καλεῖσθαι προδότας ἐχρῆν αὐτοὺς ὑπὸ Δημοσθένους.

[74] Walbank 2002: 192.

[75] Demosthenes' "On the Crown" stands out. See also "most leaders of armies, when they are confronted with great misfortunes, follow the impulses of the many, fearing their opposition." Diod. Sic. 21.10: Ὅτι οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀγόντων

news of Alexander the Great's death reached Athens, "the people were bent on revolution." Phokion responded "well then if he is really dead, he will be dead tomorrow as well as the day after. Therefore, we can deliberate in peace, and especially with more caution."[76] The alertness of the community when news reached it, is worth noting, as well as the immediate suspicion and caution that Phokion advocated. Concerns about false rumors or even Macedonian deception needed to be addressed first. But in the heat of the moment, various courses of action were fielded that also challenged Phokion's position as a policy-maker. It did not help Phokion's career that he was also the only one to approve an earlier request from Alexander that the Athenians send him more triremes: "and after the orators were in opposition, 'I say this to you then,' he said, 'either be strong with weapons or be friends to those who are strong'."[77] Such a stance, including his "unpatriotic" opposition to the Lamian War and finally his handling of the Polyperchon garrison affair, ultimately led Phokion to be condemned to death as a traitor by the demagogues, a charge his peers would immediately regret.[78]

All accusations of treason are not necessarily groundless - this aspect will be treated at length in the next chapters. But there is an element of lingering worry that fueled the suspicion of the community against unpopular propositions, manifested through an emotive reaction against leading negotiators. Aineias Taktikos advises that in times of crisis "it is necessary to oversee those citizens who are badly disposed, and because of these considerations to not readily accept their advice."[79] For better or worse, it is the community at large that decided who was hostile or worthy of suspicion. In the early nineties

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στρατόπεδα, καθ' οὓς ἂν καιροὺς ἐν ἀτυχήμασιν ὑπάρχωσι μεγάλοις, ἀκολουθοῦσι ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν ὁρμαῖς φοβούμενοι τὰς ἐναντιώσεις αὐτῶν. This is a typical theme found in Classical authors, as discussed by Ober 1989: 315-317.

[76] Plut. *Phoc.* 22.4: ὁ δὲ Φωκίων ἐπῃρμένον ὁρῶν πρὸς τὸ νεωτερίζειν τὸν δῆμον ἐπειρᾶτο παρηγορεῖν καὶ κατέχειν. [...] "Οὐκοῦν," εἶπεν, "εἰ σήμερον τέθνηκε, καὶ αὔριον ἔσται καὶ εἰς τρίτην τεθνηκώς, ὥστε ἡμᾶς ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ βουλεύσασθαι, μᾶλλον δὲ μετὰ ἀσφαλείας."

[77] Plut. *Phoc.* 21.1: "Λέγω τοίνυν ὑμῖν," εἶπεν, "ἢ τοῖς ὅπλοις κρατεῖν ἢ τοῖς κρατοῦσι φίλους εἶναι."

[78] For the account of the unfair trial of Phokion and the later regret of the city, see Plut. *Phoc.* 31-38.

[79] Aen. Tact. 11.1: Ετι δὲ καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν δεῖ τοῖς ἀντιπροθυμουμένοις προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν καὶ μηδὲν εὐθέως ἀποδέχεσθαι διὰ τάδε.

Josiah Ober (1989) and David Cohen (1991) opened our discipline to the study of perceptions and social dynamics. They explained the effect that rumor could have on someone's reputation, and the importance of managing one's image in the agonistic arena of public debate. In such an environment, lack of compliance to perceived societal ideals could bring shame or ill-repute as the private-public dichotomy was blurred, which could do irreversible damage to one's standing among one's peers.[80]

Yet we must also steer clear of the temptation to brand all "mavericks" who break ranks from their peers as visionaries and community heroes. The reality was that oftentimes people ended up suffering because of dissent, disagreement, or obstinacy. A case in point is Alexander's destruction of Thebes in 335 BC, after conflicting rumors of Alexander's well-being fueled a rebellion against Macedonian authority.[81] Such rumors suited the interests of the revolutionaries: "not knowing the circumstances, they conjectured what was most desirable to them."[82] Blame, of course, does not fall squarely on the shoulders of these ringleaders, as we need to give credit to Alexander's ability to keep his opponents in a state of confusion. Perhaps he kindled such rumors himself and spread them through his acolytes. Successful generals certainly knew how to speculate and profit from the expectations or rashness of their enemies.[83] Dissimulation was indeed an important weapon in the arsenal of a good

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[80] See Ober 1989: ch. 3 and Cohen 1991: ch. 2 through 4.

[81] "Those who were organizing the revolt stated that an army led by Antipatros had arrived from Makedonia, and obstinately argued that Alexander himself had been killed, while being ill-at-ease with those who were announcing that Alexander himself was at its head." Arr. *Anab.* 1.7.6: καὶ τότε δὲ οἱ πράξαντες τὴν ἀπόστασιν στράτευμα ἐκ Μακεδονίας Αντιπάτρου ἀφῖχθαι ἔφασκον, αὐτὸν δὲ Αλέξανδρον τεθνάναι ἰσχυρίζοντο, καὶ τοῖς ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ὅτι οὗτος αὐτὸς προσάγει Αλέξανδρος χαλεπῶς εἶχον·

[82] Arr. *Anab.* 1.7.3: οὐ γιγνώσκοντες τὰ ὄντα τὰ μάλιστα καθ᾽ ἡδονήν σφισιν εἴκαζον.

[83] Other examples include Demetrios' taking of Athens: "nobody knew in advance (of his approach), but as soon as his fleet was seen in the vicinity, everybody thought that the ships belonged to Ptolemaios and prepared to receive them." Plut. *Dem.* 8.4: προαισθομένου μὲν οὐδενός, ἐπεὶ δὲ ὤφθη πλησίον ὁ στόλος, ἁπάντων ὡς Πτολεμαϊκὰς τὰς ναῦς ὑποδέχεσθαι παρασκευαζομένων. Philip V's submission of Sparta "Seeing from the city the army marching they became thunderstruck and extremely afraid, wondering at what came to pass. For they were at the peak of their excitement with thoughts of the things that were found out regarding Philip regarding the destruction of Thermos and the affairs as a whole in Aitolia, and there was some talk among them about sending Lykourgos to provide help to the Aitolians. But none of them gave a thought at all about the danger coming against them so swiftly from such a great distance, also because there was some contempt for the king because

commander, while members of the threatened communities were hard-pressed to exercise caution and simultaneously undertake personal risks in diplomatic ventures.

We are thus confronted with competing perspectives on risk held by office-holders on the one hand, and the population at large on the other, with all the personal rivalries and demagoguery in-between. To understand this dynamic, we must reconsider the functioning of Hellenistic democracies. The dominant view, held by Susanne Carlsson (2010), states that democratic ideals dominated socio-political relations to the point that democracy became a customary form of doing things, although she concedes that people's wealth prefigured the opportunities to gain public office and be actively involved on the political stage. Volker Grieb (2008) agrees that, in terms of political praxis, the stress falls on the role of local notables, made possible only through the final approval of the *polis*. This point of view has most recently been nuanced by John Ma in his work on *Statues and Cities* (2013a), where he proposes that despite an oligarchizing deep trend, public communitarian culture did not turn into a sham, but remained a vital element of civic history. It placed the city at the center of the moral universe of the individual, and assumed its primacy and its role as the site of recognition and honor within contexts of political speech and communitarian discourse.[84] However, Clifford Ando (2014) has of late pushed back against this view by re-emphasizing Carlsson's initial observation regarding the extraordinary constraints on the possibility of being honored for exemplary citizenship. He sees Hellenistic honorary

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of his young age." Polyb. 5.18.5-6: οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, θεωροῦντες ἐκ τῆς πόλεως παράγουσαν τὴν δύναμιν ἐκπλαγεῖς ἐγένοντο καὶ περίφοβοι, θαυμάζοντες τὸ συμβαῖνον. ἀκμὴν γὰρ ἦσαν μετέωροι ταῖς διανοίαις ἐκ τῶν προσπιπτόντων ὑπὲρ τοῦ Φιλίππου περὶ τὴν καταφθορὰν τοῦ Θέρμου καὶ καθόλου ταῖς ἐν Αἰτωλίᾳ πράξεσι, καὶ τις ἐνεπεπτώκει θροῦς παρ' αὐτοῖς ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὸν Λυκοῦργον ἐκπέμπειν βοηθήσοντα τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς. ὑπὲρ δὲ τοῦ τὸ δεινὸν ἥξειν ἐπὶ σφᾶς οὕτως ὀξέως ἐκ τηλικούτου διαστήματος οὐδὲ διενοεῖτο παράπαν αὐτῶν οὐδείς, ἅτε καὶ τῆς ἡλικίας ἐχούσης ἀκμὴν εὐκαταφρόνητόν τι τῆς τοῦ βασιλέως. See also Eumenes' ability to deceive the enemy's expectations through the dissemination of erroneous information. Plut. *Eum.* 15. See also Nep. *Eum.* 3.5-6.

[84] Ma 2013a: 294-297.

culture as symptomatic of an insidious manipulation of democratic ideals, rituals, and practices to (re)legitimize the hold that prominent members had over the community. To put it differently, the democratic pull in the Hellenistic *polis* is for Ando nothing but smoke and mirrors.[85]

The issue of the negotiation of power and the sharing of honors between prominent members and the people at large occupies a central place in the debate over the socio-political dynamics of Hellenistic democracies. It is worth pointing out, however, that these views are not necessarily mutually exclusive. By that I mean that the public of a Hellenistic *polis* was not generally opposed to delegating the decision-making process to the most competent, educated, and wealthy among them. In fact, I would posit that it is rather our own presumption, stemming from the (perhaps inescapable) Latin terminology, that enforces conceptually sharp distinctions between "elites" and the "commons."[86] Expressions of such seemingly contrasting groups would have been much more fluid to the Hellenes themselves. As a case-study, it is worth recalling the argument in the previous chapter on the blurring of "public" and "private" boundaries in Hellenistic diplomatic practices. As long as civic business went in a more or less predictable manner, the interaction between the act of leadership and delegation went relatively smoothly.

However, it is in moments of crisis that we encounter perceptions of risk threatening to develop into opposition. A case study is the community of Phokaia in Ionia where tensions due to a Roman presence in the harbor led to social unrest (ἐστασίαζον). This worried the magistrates because they saw that people's growing frustrations (ὁρμάς) fueled more vocal expressions of support for Rome's rival,

[85] Ando 2014.

[86] I refer to Jürgen Habermas1991: 1-12, where he points out the multiplicity of concurrent meanings of terms like "public", and the inability of replacing such traditional categories with more precise terms. Words like "political" with a Greek origin bear a Roman stamp that polarizes social spheres.

which could lead to violent civil war. To avoid further escalation, office-holders sent envoys to the Seleukid commander in the vicinity with assurances that, should he keep away from the city, they would keep quiet, wait for the resolution of the tense situation, and afterwards obey his orders.[87] The situation is an excellent depiction of Boholm's assertion on the perception of risk as contextual and fluid. It also adds depth to Edward van der Vliet's (2011) assumption that passive participation by common people could become active when discontent was too high.[88] The passing of time and the worsening of conditions forced people to reconsider their priorities and stance in the conflict between Rome and Antiochos III. But from the magistrates' point of view, escalation was the real danger because it could degenerate into open civil war, leading them to bypass democratic procedure and unilaterally pledge their allegiance to the Seleukids. There was a societal disconnect between those in office and those whom they represented, which translated into competing assessments of risk and personal dangers. As such, rather than accepting Polybios disparaging description of "πᾶν πλῆθός" as fickle, full of lawless desires, unreasoned passion, and violent anger,[89] that could not be relied on for long periods of time, we must keep in mind that we are witnessing the complex phenomenon of a community's reappraisal of the risk threshold that it is willing to assume.

A comprehensive analysis of the character and mechanics of Hellenistic democracies is beyond the scope of this dissertation. But the present chapter does problematize Grieb's explanation of political praxis by acknowledging the influence that risk perceptions have over the democratic process at critical moments in a community's history. As in the examples of Phokion, Aratos, or the Phokaian *stasis*, the

[87] Polyb. 21.6.1-3. The plan backfired because the commander immediately made for Phokaia once he realized the great opportunity afforded to him by *stasis*.
[88] van der Vliet 2011: 182.
[89] Plut. 6.56.11: πᾶν πλῆθός ἐστιν ἐλαφρὸν καὶ πλῆρες ἐπιθυμιῶν παρανόμων, ὀργῆς ἀλόγου, θυμοῦ βιαίου. Walbank 1967: vol. 1, 742 interprets Polybios' stance as representative of oligarchic views conventionally projected onto commoners.

so-called "popular" stance is not strictly followed by office-holders. Differing interpretations of danger and long-term interests generated competing agendas that could not readily and openly be upheld or explained, due to the personal and political risks that such an initiative entailed in tense circumstances. As will be made clear in Chapter 4, the single constant in the diachronic fluidity of risk was the ability of the effective decision-maker to grasp the opportune moment for action.

Conclusion

Trust was the thread that held together the many nodes of *poleis*, kings, and prominent individuals, whose continual interactions knitted, so to speak, a network that covered the whole of the Eastern Mediterranean. But as we have seen, the very emphasis on trust reveals the real possibility of deception and misinformation in interstate exchanges. In times of crisis, the thread of trust could unravel or break altogether, leaving people apprehensive of one another. But in this interconnected and shifting world, compromise was necessary, as communities exhibited an uncanny capacity to identify and take risks, even certain leaps of faith. The stakes were at times high, which resulted in anxieties fostered on the international stage seeping into the community, creating friction among its members. Nonetheless, Hellenistic communities did make decisions and took various stances, which speaks to their resilience against slipping into a passive role and an inability to act. In the next chapter we will explore the various risk mitigation strategies that *poleis* undertook in order to maintain social cohesion, all the while perfecting mechanisms of socio-political integration that allowed them to react and swiftly tackle the vicissitudes of fortune. In particular, we will explore how Hellenistic emotions (Chaniotis, 2011) and anxieties (Eidinow, 2013) were understood, and the efforts that were undertaken to channel them towards maintaining stability and promoting unity in the face of disaster.

CHAPTER FOUR

ΚΑΙΡΟΣ

"Love is all a matter of timing.
It's no good meeting the right person too soon or too late."

- 2046 film by Wong Kar-Wai

4.1 THINKING ABOUT CONTINGENCY

In a speech at the National Defense Executive Reserve Conference on the 14th of November 1957, the 34th President of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, discussed military education and preparations for war-case scenarios. He mentioned the eventual entry of the U.S. in the Great War, recalling how many had erstwhile dismissed the idea that America would be fighting in Europe as "silly," preferring to focus and provide instruction on what they considered to be "likely" theaters of war. Eisenhower thus addressed the issues about expectations and unlikely scenarios, pointing out that likelihood does not necessarily equate outcome. In doing so, he recalled a statement he had heard while in the Army: "plans are worthless, but planning is everything." The idea the president sought to convey was that strategies must also consider the unexpected and the unlikely, because "when you are planning for an emergency, you must start with one thing: the very definition of 'emergency' is that it is unexpected, therefore it is not going to happen the way you are planning." Eisenhower understood the

importance of contingency planning as an exercise in envisioning potential futures, and an awareness that their actualization depends on a variety of potentially sudden and uncontrollable factors, whether we are talking about a natural disaster or a series of inter-related events. Whatever the crisis, "if you haven't been planning you can't start to work, intelligently at least. That is the reason it is important to plan, to keep yourselves steeped in the character of the problem that you may one day be called upon to solve – or help to solve."[1] Eisenhower thus recognized that there was a dynamic of adaptability at play, as decision-makers were expected to react to unfolding or unforeseen events in a timely manner.

The former President's remarks are especially relevant for our purposes because the issue of contingency planning is an integral part of collective risk. I thus follow Andreas Schedler's (2007) definition of contingency because he approaches this notoriously broad and elusive concept from a political point of view. For Schedler, contingency has three interconnected concepts: indeterminacy, conditionality, and uncertainty. Indeterminacy suggests different possible worlds of action and outcomes, which in turn depend on various causal factors. Hence, conditionality refers to the relationship of dependence that exists between variables and a string of outcomes. Finally, Schedler points to two types of uncertainty: radical and limited. The former refers to accidents that simply could not be helped, such as sudden natural disasters. The latter, and more relevant for our purposes, are conditional upon certain factors, relying on specific calculable conditions.[2]

The application of contingency studies to the ancient world, however, has been consistently dismissed as anachronistic, because contingency planning is conventionally thought of as a product of

[1] *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower.* Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1957: 817-8.
[2] Schedler 2007: 71-73.

early modern thought, inspired by a clear deterministic understanding of scientific progress.[3] This is intriguing given that Eisenhower himself referred to the age of Perikles and of Alexander, "and down through the ages to this day," when asserting that "the only unchanging factor in war is the most changeable, uncertain, unpredictable element in war, and that is human nature."[4] A soldier and an avid reader of history, Eisenhower understood that the ancients grappled in times of crisis with the same phenomena that we today refer to as contingencies. His words were in fact voiced many centuries earlier by Onasander, when he advised generals that

> plans and counter-stratagems for victory that are originated at the very moment of battle are sometimes preferable to those which are conceived and contrived by generals in anticipation and before the engagement [...] the sight of present circumstances demands expedients based on the exigencies of the moment, which necessity of fortune (*ἀνάγκη τῆς τύχης*) rather than the memory of experience suggests.[5]

Given the similarities between the two statements, it is conceivable that Eisenhower had this very passage in mind when he made his address in 1957. At the same time, if we look at the intellectual history of contingency it is clear that reservations about its use in the study of ancient decision-making depend on competing worldviews, influenced by intellectual and historical circumstances in European history. David Wootton (2007) has shown that the concept of contingency was, somewhat ironically, dismissed by Enlightenment thinkers because it challenged the theological and philosophical arguments of the period. On the one hand, persisting medieval creeds were at pains to explain randomness and the

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[3] See Giddens' differentiation between traditional societies and modernity, with the former seen as passively accepting what we call contingencies to gods and nature. By contrast, "In conditions of modernity, the future is always open, not just in terms of the ordinary contingency of things, but in terms of the reflexivity of knowledge in relation to which social practices are organised." 32. See also 83-84, 104-105. His views are based on the work of Niklas Luhmann, *Trust and Power* (1979) and "Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives," in Diego Gambetta, ed., *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations* (1988).

[4] *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower.* Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1957: 818.

[5] Onas. *Strat.* 32.9-10.

arbitrary nature of developments vis-à-vis the omnipotence of an all-knowing Christian God. At the same time, for scholastic philosophers as for Cartesians the contingent element was equated with opinions and subjectivity.[6] Such perspectives subscribed to a deterministic way of understanding the historical process.

The influence of such ideas can be discerned in the outlook of some scholars upon the ancient world. For instance, Fernand Braudel's 'longue durée' approach to history tended to downplay arbitrariness and perceptions.[7] This is not to say that Braudel's approach is faulty, but that a focus on subjectivity provides alternative ways, or at least it nuances our understanding of historical processes. As such, an exclusive focus on scientific progress and/or theology will gloss over more intricate processes of deliberation and decision-making. The result is a recent trend in sociological studies to impose a progressivist view of the historical process, as exemplified by the work of Barbara Adam and Chris Groves (2007) on futurity. Starting from the assumption that antiquity was governed by tradition and cosmology, which in turn provided a certain level of foreknowledge and comfort, they concluded that our more complex, dynamic, accelerated, and secular contemporary society is marked by far greater uncertainties than were encountered in traditional societies.[8] Fundamentally, their argument rests on the assumption that ancient societies behaved in a non-contingent universe, where any anxiety about the future was "treated" through *manteia* and a reliance on custom.

However, there is another side to the history of contingency, where interest in the concept developed in tandem with deterministic arguments, with the likes of Niccolò Machiavelli breaking with

[6] Wootton 2007: 21-23.
[7] Murray, in his introduction to Braudel 2001: xvii. As Murray notes, these observations are based on Braudel's earlier work, while the surviving notes of his unfinished work hint that he intended to address the issues of contingency and randomness. Braudel 2001: xviii.
[8] Adam and Groves 2007: 9-11, 19-22.

the mold and arguing for the study of contingency in the realm of practical politics. Machiavelli was interested in how to control events that were ultimately beyond the decision-makers' reach. He looked at Medieval and Classical examples in support of his model of causality and reaction.[9] He reached similar conclusions to Eisenhower about one's ability to handle events as they developed, where decisions needed to suit the situation at hand. Nevertheless, scholarship on chance, like that of Michael Heller (2013), still incorporated Renaissance scholars such as Machiavelli into the progressive schema of the history of statistics.[10] Heller's narrow focus on mathematics has led him to assert that for the ancients – all being represented by Aristotle, according to Heller - chance was "a break of causality, and as such cannot be studied by science."[11] Heller relies on the passage in *Metaph.* 11.1064b where Aristotle notes that there is no ἐπιστήμη for "the accidental." Heller, however, is being purposefully reductive of Aristotle's argument, whose comment only referred to teleological necessities, arguing that if it were otherwise, it would mean that everything must exist out of necessity:

> The accidental, then, is that which comes about, but not always by necessity nor usually … clearly there can be no causes and principles of the accidental as there are of that which is per se; otherwise everything would be of necessity.[12]

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[9] Specifically, see Machiavelli's discussion on Fortune in *The Prince,* 25, claiming that "the prince who leans entirely on his fortune comes to ruin as it varies. I believe, further, that he is happy who adapts his mode of proceeding to the qualities of the times." Also, in his *Discourses* 1.6 he explores the relationship between probability and payoff from Venice to Sparta, by way of Fabius Cunctator: "In all our decisions we must consider well what presents the least inconveniences, and then choose the best, for we shall never find any course entirely free from objections."

[10] Heller has based his ideas on Ian Hacking's *The Taming of Chance* (1990), which explores how data from official records in the Napoleonic Era led to the drafting of laws and social reform based on statistical figures. Hacking points to the great impact that the increasing use of statistics had on government, as an early modern phenomenon. Yet, it is important to point out that Hacking was not concerned with the ancient world, or with the question whether pre-modern people understood or operated according to an understanding of contingency. For an explanation as to how statistics worked in the ancient world, see Chapter 1. Also, for an argument as to why statistical science did not develop in antiquity, see Franklin 2001: 330-340.

[11] Heller 2013: 25.

[12] Arist. *Metaph.* 1065a.2-3, 7-9: ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ συμβεβηκός ὃ γίγνεται μέν, οὐκ ἀεὶ δ' οὐδ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐδ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ... Οτι δὲ τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὄντος οὐκ εἰσὶν αἰτίαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ τοιαῦται οἵαίπερ τοῦ καθ' αὑτὸ ὄντος, δῆλον· ἔσται γὰρ ἅπαντ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης.

Aristotle is simply saying that causality exists as different from necessity. Heller misses this point because he ignores the philosopher's deliberate choice of words, where συμβεβηκός refers to "the accidental." As Peter Vogt (2011) has recently shown, Aristotle's terminology signaled a significant difference between accident and something that is neither necessary nor impossible, thus interpreting possibility as part of reality. In his *Physics* (196a-b), Aristotle points out that what is conventionally considered an accident (ἀυτόματον, συμβεβηκός), or what is ascribed to τύχη, is in some cases the result of various causes (αἴτια). Thus, we are dealing with "an intersection of causal chains," a phenomenon which Aristotle considers παράλογον only insofar as it is hard to predict with any regularity due in part to the complex chains of events.[13] Aristotle took the next logical step and considered actual versus possible results, noting that what is considered "possible" (δυνατόν),

> … is used, on the one hand, of facts and of things that are actualized; it is "possible" for someone to walk, inasmuch as he actually walks, and in general we call a thing "possible," since it is now realized. On the other hand, "possible" is used of a thing that might be realized; it is "possible" for someone to walk, since in certain conditions he would.[14]

Moreover, Aristotle highlights the contrast between the terms ἀναγκαῖον and ἐνδεχόμενον – something that is neither necessary not impossible, but simply possible.[15] He is thus able to conclude that "rational potentialities issue in more than one way or in contrary results or directions."[16] The argument, therefore,

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[13] Filippi 2005: 119-125.

[14] ἔνιαι δὲ δυνάμεις ὁμώνυμοί εἰσιν. τὸ γὰρ δυνατὸν οὐχ ἁπλῶς λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὅτι ἀληθὲς ὡς ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν, οἷον δυνατὸν βαδίζειν ὅτι βαδίζει, καὶ ὅλως δυνατὸν εἶναι ὅτι ἤδη ἔστι κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν ὃ λέγεται εἶναι δυνατόν, τὸ δὲ ὅτι ἐνεργήσειεν ἄν, οἷον δυνατὸν εἶναι βαδίζειν ὅτι βαδίσειεν ἄν. Arist. *Int.* 22a.

[15] Arist. *Inter.* 21a: μὴ εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι. He reiterates his point in the Prior Analytics where he concludes that "that which is possible, then, will not be necessary, and that which is not necessary will be possible." Arist. APr. 16-29: ἔσται ἄρα τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον ἐνδεχόμενον. See also Vogt 2011: 65, for ἐνδεχόμενον as a logical category.

[16] Arist. *Inter.* 23a: ἔνια μέντοι δύναται καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀλόγους δυνάμεις ἅμα τὰ ἀντικείμενα δέξασθαι. The argument is continued in the Prior Analytics, where he notes that "that which happens or does not happen indifferently. describes the indeterminate, which is capable of happening both in a given way and otherwise." Arist. *APr.* 32b5-20: ἄλλον δὲ τὸ ἀόριστον, ὃ καὶ οὕτως καὶ μὴ οὕτως δυνατόν. The other inter-related sense of "the possible" describes "describe what generally happens but falls short of being necessary."

that "the ancients" did not conceptualize contingencies, is too simplistic when considering ancient perceptions expressed through specific cultural and philological filters. Moreover, Aristotle's conception of the "possible" further corroborates our connection between deliberation and τέχνη. As noted in Chapter 1, the ἐπιστήμη of καιρός is considered by Aristotle to be essential even to technical crafts like medicine, navigation, and strategy; one needs to understand the circumstances to know when to act.[17] As a result, we can conclude that καιρός is at the heart of Aristotle's use of a quotation from Agathon that "τέχνη loves τύχη, and τύχη loves τέχνη." Opportune moment is central to τέχνη concerned with "making" (ποιητὸν), rather than "doing" (πρακτόν), since "every τέχνη deals with contriving (τεχνάζειν) and speculating (θεωρεῖν) to bring something possible into existence, which may either exist or not," an act that requires reason (μετὰ λόγου).[18] One must think about and know when to act, and which possible courses of action to take, for his risk to pay off.

Modern scholarship, however, is still struggling with the issue of contingency in the study of history. Arnd Hoffmann (2005) has attempted to bridge the divide between the logic of action and intellectual discourse by suggesting that chance and contingency be approached not as abstract and disconnected false categories, but as causal factors in the structure of fictional and historical experience. He called for a re-examination of processual and determinist scenarios of history by bringing human experience and hopes to the forefront of historical reconstruction.[19] Following his lead, we will explain

[17] We may also add Aristotle's understanding that the goal of lawmaking is to address as many contingencies as possible, since "But what is most important of all is that the judgement of the legislator does not apply to a particular case, but is universal and applies to the future." Arist. *Rhet.* 1.1.7: ὅτι ἡ μὲν τοῦ νομοθέτου κρίσις οὐ κατὰ μέρος, ἀλλὰ περὶ μελλόντων τε καὶ καθόλου ἐστίν. He also recognizes that inevitably there will always appear certain contingent issues that will test the laws, and judges will be needed to provide a verdict. Ideally, however, judges should be called-upon as rarely as possible because of the inherently subjective and immediate character of their judgements.

[18] *Eth. Nic.* 1140a.1-2: ἔστι δὲ τέχνη πᾶσα περὶ γένεσιν καὶ τὸ τεχνάζειν καὶ θεωρεῖν ὅπως ἂν γένηταί τι τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι. Arist.

[19] Hoffmann 2005: 14, and Walter 2005.

the mechanics of contingency planning in the Hellenistic context by looking at conceptions of futurity in deliberations, and the role that individual and communal experiences played in the decision-making process. As Schedler puts it, in the realm of political contingency "the real world" coexists with competing "possible worlds."[20]

4.2 Contingencies and Calculations

Applying the concept of contingency to the Hellenistic context is not simply a matter of identifying patterns of behavior that denote rational calculations. We also need to understand how such cognitive processes were conceived and expressed by Hellenistic decision-makers, to get a better sense of how futurity and consequence were understood in the proper cultural and linguistic context. The cultural theory of risk offers a solution to bridge this chronological and conceptual divide between antiquity and modernity. A pioneer in the field, sociologist Mary Douglas (1966) argued against the Rational Actor Paradigm (RAP) which claims that human behavior operates according to "rational" optimization procedures.[21] Much of the criticism against RAP has revolved around the fact that it ignores moral choices while not addressing human behavior that is unpredictable, or is considered "irrational" because it is not "optimal."[22] Using an anthropological approach, Douglas did away with such normative approaches and showed how cultural beliefs help communities make sense of risk in various circumstances. She also argued that notions of risk are perceived not on an individual level, but are rather shared within a community. As such, while certain ancient approaches to collective risk may appear

[20] Schedler 2007: 74.
[21] O. Renn, et al. 1999: 35-59.
[22] Jaeger 2001: 190-192. Similar criticism has been levied against Utility Theory, which also assumes very orderly preferences and optimal choices for the greatest expected utility, though it cannot account for the complexity and novel nature of real-life choices. Fischhoff and Kadvany 2011: 73-75.

foreign to a modern viewer, they are merely cultural expressions of a similar phenomenon. To give just one instance that has already been touched upon, Hellenistic diplomacy, with its focus on reciprocity, moral obligations, and a strong sense of shared identity, provided the institutional structure within which individual decision-makers operated, and were in turn shaped by it.[23]

Futurity and consequence are tightly bound with one's understanding of possible outcomes. An awareness of timing was crucial, given that plans could be undone if the protagonists acted too rashly or, conversely, too cautiously.[24] The use of the term "καιρός" is illuminating because it carries an underlying sense of consequence exemplified by the famous reply of Lykiskos to the continued involvement of Rome in Hellenic affairs: "all Hellenes must foresee the impending moment."[25] Καιρόν in conjunction with προϊδέσθαι points to a particular moment in time when the Hellenes invariably have to assess the Roman problem in the present by considering how their decision will affect their future. Kassandra Jackson Miller (2016) has very recently noted that καιρός differs from χρόνος because "it is morally charged, in that a kairic moment calls for decisive action, [while] *chronos* carries no moral freight."[26] Surprisingly, however, the role of καιρός in politics and decision-making has long been ignored. Instead,

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[23] Rayner 1992: 86. Wildavsky 1993 looks at similar examples to argue that culture explains the preferences that people have for different ways of life and the way they justify their actions. While other psychologists and anthropologists of risk agree that culture has a deep impact on how groups of people perceive and respond to risk, they do raise the point that it has still not been made clear how "way of life" should be defined, and how it influences people's priorities and reactions. See particularly Boholm's 1996 criticism of simple and rigid classifications of society in some Cultural Theory studies. See also Breakwell's (2014) discussion on the latest developments in Cultural Theory.

[24] Aratos of Sikyon was at times guilty of such shortfalls in Polybios' eyes. Polyb. 4.8.1-2, 5, 8. See also Diod. Sic. 23.11, or the caution shown by Jason and his crew when approaching Aeetes, Apol. Rhod. 2.1278. Flamininus, on the other hand, is not cautious at all, and falls into Hannibal's trap, Polyb. 3.81.1.

[25] Polyb. 9.38.1: Ἅπαντας μὲν οὖν δεῖ τοὺς Ελλήνας προϊδέσθαι τὸν ἐπιφερόμενον καιρόν."

[26] Miller 2016: Ch. 5, pp. 3. For our purposes, see the tense peace negotiations between Philip V and the Aitolian-Roman coalition after the battle of Kynoskephalai. Dissatisfied with the proceedings, the Aitolian *strategos* Phaineias expressed his concern that "all things that had taken place were of no use. For if Philip could wiggle out of this present circumstance, he would reestablish his power." Polyb. 18.37.11: τοῦ δὲ Φαινέου μετὰ ταῦτα βουλομένου λέγειν ὅτι μάταια πάντα τὰ πρὸ τοῦ γέγονε· τὸν γὰρ Φίλιππον, ἐὰν διολίσθῃ τὸν παρόντα καιρόν, ἤδη πάλιν ἀρχὴν ἄλλην ποιήσεσθαι πραγμάτων· Phaineias clearly had in mind the difficult situation that a defeated Philip V was in, suggesting that it was an important opportunity for the Aitolians and Romans to deal decisively with the Macedonian threat.

scholars have chosen to emphasize the function of καιρός in ancient rhetoric and philosophy to signal the "right moment" to speak or use a specific rhetorical strategy.[27] Miller further points to a conceptual evolution of καιρός in the works of Athenian philosophers, as the use of the term was extended in more practical realms of knowledge beyond rhetoric, such as navigation and medicine. The "right moment" to act was relative, in that it was based on the specific circumstances of a given situation or case.[28] Miller thus concludes that "To identify a *kairos*, one must assess the circumstances of the specific situation, a process which involves a combination of theory, experience, and improvisation."[29]

Miller's thesis, then, supports our own argument of risk as the intersecting conceptual space between deliberation and τέχνη. Monique Trédé (1992) observes that by the 4th century BC καιρός was considered a στρατηγικὴ τέχνη, that highlighted the decisive moment when developments could be turned into opportunities. She points to Thucydides, who connected the term to λογισμός and ἐπιστήμη, characteristics that a good general had to possess to bring about victory, which also involves understanding human behavior and psychology.[30] Καιρός as τέχνη was also picked up by Isokrates who highlighted καιρός as an element of *paideia,* best suited for diplomacy because "an individual or group that best understands the kairic dimensions of any particular issue has a distinct advantage over an adversary." An educated man considers context and consequence when making decisions: "[P]eople of

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[27] As Onians 1951 and Kinneavy 2002 have pointed out, καιρός first appears in Hesiod's *Works and Days,* carrying the notion of due measure and proportion. The authors signal an evolution of the concept of time and opportunity in Hellenic thought, as pre-Socratic interpretations of καιρός about measure, balance, and harmony were co-opted by Pythagorean thinkers to reflect timing, through their association of the term with the number seven. To them, combinations of sevens coincided with moments of "crisis," the ability to deal with such situations demanded "critical judgment." As such, Arlene Allan (2005) explains, καιρός became closely related to the moment of change (μεταβολή). For the use of καιρός by Gorgias in rhetoric to suggest the right time to speak, see also Poulakos 2002: 89-96.

[28] For a close reading of Plato's *Phaedrus,* 271d-272b, and Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics,* 1104a, see Miller, 4-6.

[29] Miller, 6.

[30] Trédé 1992: 209-222. For examples in Thucydides of the most intelligent generals who can discern καιρός and exploit it, see Athenian Phormion (2.84.3), and the Spartans Gylippos and Brasidas (4.126, 5.6, 5.10).

intelligence . . . ought not to think that they know what will happen, since they don't know what Fortune may bring, but just consider things in this way, as men do who exercise their best judgment."[31] Isokrates further adds that

> Prudent men ought not to take the same view of things in fortunate as in unfortunate circumstances, but rather should always consult their immediate circumstance and accommodate themselves to their fortunes, and not consider what is beyond their power, but seek at such times (καιροῖς) not what is just but what is beneficial.[32]

Isokrates, then, exhibits a clear understanding of the importance of contingency planning in diplomacy, which requires an adaptable and pragmatic mind to deal with (un)foreseeable circumstances.[33]

It is telling, however, that there is a marked difference in how often καιρός is used by Classical and Hellenistic historians. For instance, the term appears in Herodotus' *Histories* a meager thirteen times, while Thucydides uses it fifty-nine times, and Xenophon only twenty-five times throughout his entire corpus. By comparison, Isokrates uses καιρός seventy times. On the other hand, καιρός appears in Diodorus Siculus 402 times, while Polybios mentions it a staggering 952 times. I argue that such extreme discrepancy is due to a more explicit focus on contingency in Hellenistic historiography, in part due to a more pronounced cultural emphasis on τύχη. At the same time, the meaning of the word does not change, as Herodotus uses it to highlight critical moments of decision and action.[34] Thucydides, in turn,

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[31] Sipiora 2002: 13. Isocr. 8.8: Χρὴ δὲ τοὺς νοῦν ἔχοντας περὶ μὲν ὧν ἴσασι μὴ βουλεύεσθαι (περίεργον γάρ) ἀλλὰ πράττειν ὡς ἐγνώκασι, περὶ ὧν δ' ἂν βουλεύωνται, μὴ νομίζειν εἰδέναι τὸ συμβησόμενον, ἀλλ' ὡς δόξῃ μὲν χρωμένους, ὅ τι ἂν τύχῃ δὲ γενησόμενον ἀγνοοῦντας, οὕτω διανοεῖσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν.

[32]Isocr. 6.34: Λέγουσι δ' οἱ συμβουλεύοντες ἡμῖν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν εἰρήνην, ὡς χρὴ τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν γνώμην ἔχειν περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων εὐτυχοῦντας καὶ δυστυχοῦντας, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἀεὶ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ ταῖς τύχαις ἐπακολουθεῖν καὶ μὴ μεῖζον φρονεῖν τῆς δυνάμεως, μηδὲ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις καιροῖς ἀλλὰ τὸ συμφέρον ζητεῖν.

[33] Aristotle referred to καιρός along the same lines, as a meeting point between temporality and thought. He thus sought to emphasize human agency in terms of consciousness and the potential choices that one can make at any given moment. As such, one is faced with καιροί that one may choose to seize or let pass. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1110a14. For more on καιρός in Aristotle, see Moutsopoulos 1991.

[34] See the decision of the Athenian assembly to follow Themistokles' plan on the Laureion silver, presented as "optimal at this crucial moment (ἐς καιρόν)." Hdt. 7.144.1: ἑτέρη τε Θεμιστοκλέι γνώμη ἔμπροσθε ταύτης ἐς καιρὸν ἠρίστευσε... Other noteworthy passages are the decision to advance into Boiotia in the run-up to the battle of Plataia: "before he [Xerxes] reaches

sends a similar message. His use of καιρός is intimately connected to contingency planning, be it a simple matter of logistics and strategy, – after all, the καιροί of war do not wait on anyone[35] - or long-term geo-strategic developments. The most evocative example is the Athenians' response to the news of the Sicilian disaster, once they decide to resist to the last:

> [They decided] to provide timber and money, and to equip a fleet as they best could, to take steps to secure their allies and above all Euboea, to reduce expenses in the city, and to elect a board of elders to advise upon the state of affairs as occasion should arise (ὡς ἄν καιρὸς ᾖ προβουλεύσουσιν). In short, as is the way of the δῆμος, in the panic of the moment they were prepared to be disciplined (εὐτακτεῖν). These were resolved and they carried them into effect.[36]

The Athenian attitude is cautious and cerebral, and implies a demotic ability to construct possible scenarios in the wake of their recent crushing defeat. While waiting for the enemy's reaction, they were determined to take all necessary precautions. Thucydides' emphasis on καιρός as a critical moment of

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Attika, it is the opportune moment (καιρός) for us to advance into Boiotia." Hdt. 8.144.5: πρὶν ὧν παρεῖναι ἐκεῖνον ἐς τὴν Αττικήν, ἡμέας καιρός ἐστι προβοηθῆσαι ἐς τὴν Βοιωτίην. Notice the Spartan ephors' capacity to understand (φρενὶ λαβόντες) the possible implications, should they choose not to send their army up north (Hdt. 9.9-10). See also Artemisia's decision to crash against a Persian ship in order to escape, Hdt. 8.87.2, as well as the moment when Cyrus is asked by Tomyris' herald to turn back to Persia, before he seals his fate. Hdt. 1.206.1. Τύχη is absent from all of Herodotus' examples. A divine presence is suggested when the Delphic oracle tells the Athenians to use the "wooden wall," though the episode is presented as confirmation of Themistokles' plan. Hdt. 7.141. Instead, emphasis is placed on Themistokles' γνώμη. Contra Trédé, who claimed that the Themistokles episode in Hdt. 8.75-96 was part of a divine plan. Her suggestion was based on her view of Thucydides as more forceful on human agency than Herodotus. Trédé 1992: 203-206.

[35] Thuc. 1.142.1: τοῦ δὲ πολέμου οἱ καιροὶ οὐ μενετοί. Brasidas was notoriously good at taking opportunities as they came up. Thuc. 4.103.4. This use is also found in Polyb. 11.24.3, 17.16.4, among other examples. See also Diod. Sic. 18.8.7, "they were looking for an opportunity which Fortune quickly gave them." 20.10.2, 30.10.1.

[36] Thuc. 8.1.3-4: ὅμως δὲ ὡς ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἐδόκει χρῆναι μὴ ἐνδιδόναι, παρασκευάζεσθαι καὶ ναυτικόν, ὅθεν ἂν δύνωνται ξύλα ξυμπορισαμένους, καὶ χρήματα, καὶ τὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐς ἀσφάλειαν ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ μάλιστα τὴν Εὔβοιαν, τῶν τε κατὰ τὴν πόλιν τι ἐς εὐτέλειαν σωφρονίσαι, καὶ ἀρχήν τινα πρεσβυτέρων ἀνδρῶν ἑλέσθαι, οἵτινες περὶ τῶν παρόντων ὡς ἂν καιρὸς ᾖ προβουλεύσουσιν. πάντα τε πρὸς τὸ παραχρῆμα περιδεές, ὅπερ φιλεῖ δῆμος ποιεῖν, ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν εὐτακτεῖν. καὶ ὡς ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἐποίουν ταῦτα.

decision and action is highlighted by the several concurrent uses of τύχη,[37] which expressed a choice in particularly unfavorable circumstances, rather than divine influence.[38]

The connection between Kairos and Tychē in Socratic philosophy has long been noted,[39] though it has been generally believed that Kairos' subsequent lack of popularity was due to Tychē's growing role in addressing people's needs on chance and fortune.[40] Such a structuralist viewpoint is misleading, given that καιρός in fact never fell out of use to express opportunity and κρίσις. It is highlighted in Diodorus Siculus' observation that "most leaders of armies, at critical times (καιρούς) of great misfortunes (μεγάλοις ἀτυχήμασιν), follow the impulses of the many, fearing their opposition."[41] Defeat and failure had serious consequences in the socio-political life of a community (See Ch. 3), emphasized through the link between καιρός and τύχη. Valérie Fromentin (2006) has argued that for Diodorus Siculus the right moment to act was in fact provided by τύχη.[42] Her analysis is primarily interested in exploring the intervening role of Fortune as a divine force, though she ignores the subtle Hellenistic use of divine metaphors and personifications to express opportunity and consequence.[43] There was in fact significant

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[37] See also Hermokrates' speech to the Sicilians on the importance of peace given that there was always a chance for an Athenian invasion. He points out that the Sicilians happen to have chosen "the wrong moment" (μὴ ἐν καιρῷ) to fight and that the need for peace is vital "at the present juncture" (ἐν τῷ παρόντι). Thuc. 4.59.3: αὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα εἰ μὴ ἐν καιρῷ τύχοιεν ἑκάτεροι πράσσοντες, αἱ παραινέσεις τῶν ξυναλλαγῶν ὠφέλιμοι. ὃ καὶ ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι πειθομένοις πλείστου ἂν ἄξιον γένοιτο·

[38] Similar explanation for Perikles' emphasis on a soldier's choice to fight, in the most crucial moment of his life, τὸ δ' ἔργον τῷ σώματι ὑπέμειναν καὶ δι' ἐλαχίστου καιροῦ τύχης ἅμα ἀκμῇ τῆς δόξης μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ δέους ἀπηλλάγησαν, "and after a brief moment, while at the summit of their fortune, left behind them not their fear, but their glory." Thuc. 2.42.3.

[39] See Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant (1978), based on Plato's Athenian Stranger Pl. *Leg.* 709b.

[40] Smith 1991: 66. See also de Romilly *Time in Greek tragedy* (1968) on the connection between time and *tychē* in Classical Greek thought. Through an analysis of Ion's hymn to Kairos, Victoria Jennings (2007) has shown that the meaning of καιρός shifted from natural philosophy and rhetoric to a more practical meaning as "opportunity." The acquired divinity of Kairos, especially in the athletic context, signaled the evolution of traditional beliefs that victory was a sign of divine favor, as the victor was the one who could 'recognize' and take advantage of the god's presence. Allan 2005: 133-134.

[41] Diod. Sic. 21.10: Ὅτι οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀγόντων στρατόπεδα, καθ' οὓς ἂν καιροὺς ἐν ἀτυχήμασιν ὑπάρχωσι μεγάλοις, ἀκολουθοῦσι ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν ὁρμαῖς φοβούμενοι τὰς ἐναντιώσεις αὐτῶν.

[42] See in particular the example of the beginning of the Lamian War, as the Athenians are "waiting for a favorable καιρὸν, which τύχη quickly gave them" Diod. Sic. 18.8.7.

[43] See for instance, Xen. *Anab.* 3.4.14. See also Polyb. 2.32.5: ἔκριναν τῆς τύχης λαβεῖν πεῖραν καὶ διακινδυνεῦσαι. Conversely, Antiochos III's decision to withdraw from Lysimacheia and decide matters by sea – κρίνειν τὰ πράγματα διὰ τῶν κατὰ

caution when considering fighting decisive battles. Onasander, for one, advised against seeking out such circumstances because "some who defeat the enemy stand to win little, but in defeat their friends stand to lose much through such stratagems."[44]

Such caution has often been attributed to the capricious nature of τύχη that could bring about terrible misfortune to the erstwhile champion. As Diodorus Siculus put it, "life holds many reversals (παράδοξα),"[45] and it pays off to show moderation and leniency rather than rashness and harshness, lest one subsequently falls at the mercy of another.[46] But negative outcomes were not a matter of happenstance or divine favor. Instead, they were symptomatic of a flawed attitude towards the occasion. Notice for instance, the Achaians' plea to Antigonos Doson "to not throw away the opportunity (μὴ πρόηται τοὺς καιρούς), while it was still possible to save the Peloponnesians."[47] Should he choose not to help them, the argument went, he would risk (διακινδυνεύειν) a decisive battle over Macedon with an emboldened enemy. One may argue that Aratos' interpretation of events was ultimately unverifiable and merely a means of persuasion, meant to push the Achaian agenda. But the fact that it was convincing

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θάλατταν κινδύνων -, was universally criticized (Polyb. 21.10.13), and should be seen as the exception that strengthened the rule. His (mis)calculation (συλλογιζόμενος) is a classic example of a 'high risk versus high reward' attitude, which was at times encouraged, but only in desperate circumstances. See also the same verdict from Diod. Sic. 29.5 and Liv. 37.31.4. In Antiochos' case, however, his decision was bound to fail because it allowed the Romans to strengthen their position in the region and cross unhindered into Asia, all to Antiochos' disadvantage. Onasander argues that certain soldiers should be allowed to run desperate risks because if they are successful they bring great benefit, but failure is relatively costless. *Strat.* 32.2-3. Liv. 31.17. Cornered individuals are exceedingly dangerous. Front. *Strat.* 2.6.5. Plut. *Dem.* 48.3.

[44] Onas. *Strat.* 32.4: Οἵ τινες ἐν μὲν τῷ νικᾶν ὀλίγα λυπήσειν μέλλοντες τοὺς πολεμίους, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἡττᾶσθαι μεγάλα βλάψειν τοὺς φίλους ἀποχρῶνται τοιούτοις στρατηγήμασιν.

[45] According to Chaniotis 2011, the theme of reversal was not merely a literary trope. Along with vividness, reversal was a prominent feature in Hellenistic decrees, meant to emphasize, even exaggerate, the seriousness of a crisis and the glory of the community and its benefactors who managed to live through it. The Olbian decree in honor of Protogenes is a fitting example, as the community experiences several traumatic reversals of fortune, ultimately overcoming a series of dangers at the hands of neighboring barbarians, due to the honorable behavior of Protogenes. Austin 115. Tychē was especially invoked in the Archaic period during Hellenic "apoikization." It implied an acceptance of a certain leap of faith that was needed to face the dangers and the unknowns that lay ahead. Broucke 1994: 37.

[46] Diod. Sic. 27.17.3 and 31.3

[47] Polyb. 2.49.8.

and considered worth bringing up, suggests that Hellenistic statesmen operated on contingency planning and risk mitigation. For Polybios, failure to do so was inexcusable:

> We see that most generals and kings, that whenever they undertake decisive actions, they constantly keep their gaze upon the glory and profit from their undertakings, and often pay attention and consider how they will profit from everything, should affairs turn out according to their plan, they no longer consider the implications of misfortunes (*τὰ δ'ἐκ τῶν ἀποπτωμάτων*), nor do they keep in mind in what way, and what, must be done by each in the event of unexpected reversals (*τὰς περιπετείας*). However, in part this is necessary, and in part it requires much foresight (*προνοίας*).[48]

In a very pragmatic tone, Polybios makes it clear that decision-makers and generals were expected to consider contingencies at all stages, conventionally expressed through the vocabulary that was readily available, that of fortune and chance. *τύχη* or *ἀπόπτωμα* - developments that could not readily be controlled or predicted – were placeholders for the "known unknowns" that could potentially occur during a crisis. The general amazement and enthusiasm for Flamininus' famous proclamation at the Isthmian Games, can further be explained in terms of contingency planning. According to Polybios, what was truly *μέγιστον* for the Hellenes, of all things pertaining to the Romans, was that "no mischance (*τὸ μηδὲν ἐκ τῆς τύχης*) derailed their course, but all things without exception led to this one moment (*πρὸς ἕνα καιρόν*)."[49] We may add that Polybios did not merely refer to accidents, but to the existence of contingencies that could have proven too disruptive for the Romans during their contest with the Hellenistic monarchs. The implication was not that the Romans avoided unforeseeable accidents or bad

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[48] Polyb. 11.2.5-6: *τοὺς γὰρ πλείστους ἰδεῖν ἔστι τῶν στρατηγῶν καὶ τῶν βασιλέων, ἐπειδὰν συνιστῶνται τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων ἀγῶνας, τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν κατορθωμάτων ἔνδοξα καὶ λυσιτελῆ συνεχῶς λαμβάνοντας ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν, καὶ πολλάκις ἐφιστάνοντας καὶ διαλογιζομένους πῶς ἑκάστοις χρήσονται, κατὰ λόγον σφίσι χωρησάντων τῶν πραγμάτων, τὰ δ' ἐκ τῶν ἀποπτωμάτων οὐκέτι πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν τιθεμένους, οὐδ' ἐν νῷ λαμβάνοντας πῇ καὶ τί πρακτέον ἑκάστοις ἐστὶ κατὰ τὰς περιπετείας. καίτοι τὸ μὲν ἕτοιμόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ πολλῆς δεῖται προνοίας.*

[49] Polyb. 18.46.15: *τούτων δὲ μέγιστον ἔτι τὸ μηδὲν ἐκ τῆς τύχης ἀντιπαῖσαι πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβολήν, ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς ἅπαντα πρὸς ἕνα καιρὸν ἐκδραμεῖν, ὥστε διὰ κηρύγματος ἑνὸς ἅπαντας καὶ τοὺς τὴν Ασίαν κατοικοῦντας Ελληνας καὶ τοὺς τὴν Εὐρώπην ἐλευθέρους, ἀφρουρήτους, ἀφορολογήτους γενέσθαι, νόμοις χρωμένους τοῖς ἰδίοις.* In his *Historical Commentary*, Walbank limits himself to point out correctly that "there is no real personification of Tychē here," but simply a matter of the absence of any accidents. Walbank 1967: vol. 2, 614.

reversals of Fortune, but that their planning and their handling of contingencies was so efficacious and well organized, that nothing derailed them from achieving their goal.

This interpretation of τύχη in relation to καιρός is meant to nuance Jürgen Deininger (2013)'s argument about the distinction between τύχη and αἴτιαι; the latter being comprehensible events based on reasonable planning and action, while the former is a more unexpected force, neither predictable nor bound to the αἴτιαι of history. His view imposes a sharp contrast between the two concepts, and does not account for the fact observed by Deininger himself, that Polybios does not mention τύχη in isolation, without detectable αἴτιαι of human reasoning.[50] I argue that καιρός bridges the divide between chance and reasoning in human planning and action, allowing us to consider how Hellenistic communities and their historians conceived of developing circumstances and futurity. A case in point is Polybios' assessment of the rise and fall of Athens and Thebes in the 4th century BC. He explains that in spite of their earlier successes and splendor,

> after a sudden effluence of chance (τύχης) and circumstance (σὺν καιρῷ), as the saying goes, while still apparently prosperous and enjoying a bright future (μέλλοντας εὐτυχεῖν), they experienced a complete transformation (μεταβολῆς).[51]

It is clear from his subsequent explanation that the reversal in fortunes of these two *poleis* was not caused by a divine or unpredictable force, but was a matter of circumstances and poor decision-making.[52] The fall of these two cities, then, coincided with the absence of good leaders who could have taken better decisions about the crises that eventually engulfed the *polis*: they had escaped τὰς μεγίστας καὶ δεινοτάτας

[50] Deininger 2013: 108.
[51] Polyb. 6.43.3.
[52] In Thebes' case, the death of Epaminondas and Pelopidas marked the end of its supremacy (Polyb. 6.43.6-7), while Athens succumbed to the inherent ἀνωμαλία in the φύσις of the δῆμος, given that "the Athenian people always seems to resemble a ship without a master." Polyb. 6.44.3: ἀεὶ γάρ ποτε τὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον παραπλήσιον εἶναι συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀδεσπότοις σκάφεσι.

περιστάσεις owing to the ἀρετή of the people and of their leaders (προεστώτων), whereas they eventually failed because they they had neither plans (εἰκῇ) nor reason (ἀλόγως).[53]

The focus on fortune and foresight, therefore, expresses a cultural attitude towards the decision-maker's ability – even duty – to discern the right circumstances to act and force the best outcome. As we can see from Hellenistic honorary decrees, communities were keen to show how their benefactors acted at the right time to avoid a catastrophe, as a series of decrees in connection to the Kretan War demonstrates. Diokles son of Leodamas is honored by the people of Halasarna for accomplishing various benefits "τὰν πᾶσαν σπουδὰν και πρόνοιαν", especially for intervening at the very moment "καθ' ὅν καιρὸν" when the enemy is about to attack, "advancing into every kind of danger" (ἐπιδιδοὺς ἐς πάντα ⟨κ⟩ίνδυνον).[54] The Halasarnitans also praised Theukles son of Aglaos because "he judged it appropriate during the most constraining circumstances to make a display of his attitude; and in the Kretan war, seeing that the most accessible places were undefended and needed assistance, he called a vote and provided the funds for this."[55] The variety of verbs underscoring Theukles' foresight and discernment is noteworthy: ἰδών, προορώμενος, προενοιήθη, ἐφρόντιξεν, and προαυρεύμενος, emphasizing his expertise. The deliberative process thus emerges as a continuous effort, both on and off the battlefield, where stratagems, deceptions, and safeguards were continually (re)considered.

[53] Polyb. 6.44.8.
[54] IG XII.4 98, ll. 5-16.
[55] IG XII.4 99. ll. 5-8. The decree goes on to emphasize that the success of his numerous interventions is due to his foresight. The message the audience is meant to receive is that Theukles is always able to discern the course of events as they develop, and take appropriate action. See also the decree recorded in FGrH 278 T 2a, ll. 11. Leon of Alabanda is honored by his peers for resolving civic disputes through his πρόνοια.

4.3 The Psychology of Contingency Planning

The possibility of facing danger spurred powerful reactions from individuals, a contingency that the community could not afford to ignore. Sociological studies have shown that while people generally try to avoid risks, they are at pains to argue that voluntary risk-taking is an integral part of life and selfhood. There is thus an inherent tension between general safety and individual risk that has yet to undergo extensive study.[56] In this respect, the study of the ancient world can help. Arnd Hoffmann has proposed a starting point by looking at how human experience shaped contingency planning.[57] Following his lead, political theorist Philip Pettit (2007) believes that we need to understand contingency in terms of control-graded resilience, where members of a community are more resilient in scenarios where positive outcomes are more likely. Conversely, the levels of resilience are lower when facing highly unexpected or seemingly overwhelming obstacles. In such circumstances, "People may proceed under a more or less automatic cultural pilot in most cases, but at any point where a decision is liable to cost them dearly in self-regarding terms, the alarm bells will tend to ring and prompt them to consider personal advantage."[58] Since individuals themselves might be a liability, Pettit turns our attention to the policies and institutions that were meant to reinforce individual resilience and counteract dangerous reactions. The challenge that the community faced, then, was to reinforce or restore compliance, which could be achieved through expressions of cult and social acceptance.[59] Contingency planning can thus be understood by what Bruce Lincoln (2014) calls "ideological persuasion," which appeals to sentiment to

[56] Lupton 2006: 21. For details on sociological studies, see also Lupton and Tulloch 2003.
[57] Walter 2005.
[58] Pettit 2007: 85.
[59] Pettit 2007: 89.

create a sense of likeness, solidarity, belonging, and attachment. The purpose is to suppress any individual sense of estrangement that could be a threat to the very existence of the community.

I argue, then, that public appeals to sentiment revealed the need to manage the emotional and psychological strain that danger put on a collective due to doubts and concerns accompanying risky decisions.[60] The siege of Rhodes by Demetrios Poliorketes in 305 BC is an optimal case-study for understanding the mechanics of such public initiatives, where the priorities of individuals were refocused towards the community.[61] Indeed, powerful emotions were generated in dire circumstances by the terrifying prospect of destruction and enslavement that haunted Hellenic imagination since Homeric times.[62] News of such catastrophes had a powerful effect on public deliberations, to the point that they could be summoned as a rhetorical strategy during assembly debates to sway public opinion. As a result, public speakers appealed to people's emotions hoping to sway them to their cause.[63] But as

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[60] Chaniotis 2011: 264-267 invites us to see Hellenistic *poleis* as "emotional communities," where decisions were taken in an agitated atmosphere. Specific moods and emotions were brought to the fore during important events in the ritual public life in order to create a "prescribed mood" that elicited a specific reaction. For instance, grief for the dead could be used by the community to emphasize pride and patriotism. See Perikles' famous Funeral Oration. Thuc. 2.43. The topic was initially explored by Loraux 1986.

[61] For literature on Hellenistic Rhodes, see V. Gabrielsen, P. Bilde, T. Engberg-Pedersen, L. Hannestad, and J. Zahle, eds. *Hellenistic Rhodes: Politics, Culture and Society*, Aarhus (1999), Hans-Ulrich Wiemer *Krieg, Handel und Piraterie* Akademie Verlag, Berlin (2002), and Christian Amitzbøll Thomsen, *The Corporate Polis: the politics of association in Hellenistic Rhodes*, Copenhagen (2013).

[62] Audiences were familiar, for example, with Hektor's indignation at a potential Ilian defeat – "may I be dead and the piled earth hide me under before I hear you crying and know by this that they drag you captive" -, or with the account of Meleagros' wife "[who] rehearsed in their numbers before him all the sorrows that come to men when their city is taken: they kill the men, and the fire leaves the city in ashes, and strangers lead the children away and the deep-girdled women." Hom. *Il.* 6.463-465, 9.591-594. Such images were not merely poetic creations, but the product of Classical and Hellenistic military history, peppered with many such catastrophes, from Thucydides' laconic description of the Athenian enslavement of the Melians, to the crimes of barbarian invaders, or the pillaging of Asia Minor by a rampaging Philip V.

[63] The conjuring up of images of disaster could be accompanied by gestures, words, props or stances, to enhance the emotional impact. Chaniotis 2015. For a detailed account, see Chaniotis 2012. According to Aristotle, scare tactics were considered useful to rousing people to action, by emphasizing the real possibility of unexpected dangers. ὅταν ᾖ βέλτιον τὸ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτούς, ὅτι τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν οἷοι παθεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἄλλοι μείζους ἔπαθον· καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους δεικνύναι πάσχοντας ἢ πεπονθότας, καὶ ὑπὸ τοιούτων ὑφ᾽ ὧν οὐκ ᾤοντο, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ τότε ὅτε οὐκ ᾤοντο. Arist. *Rhet.* 2.5.15. Alexander Nehamas (1994) explains the success of rhetoric as the result of emotions involving cognitive and evaluative rational processes, that persuaded and set up the mood for the audience, 295-297. For example, the debate in the Aitolian assembly, where a speaker warns the audience against their alliance with Rome, on grounds that they were barbarians bent on pillaging and raping the Hellenes. He sought

Edward Grissom (2012) notes, insistent appeals to emotions could lead to "premature cognitive closure," the psychological condition when people fail to seriously consider alternatives and possible consequences of a decision, rendering them victims to either distress or rashness.[64] At the same time, a general sense of dread could also push a community into paralyzing fear to the point of *ἀπορία,* a state of perplexity that completely subverted any attempts to take decisive action.[65] Such reactions could erupt from thwarted expectations regarding the nature or extent of a crisis. Aware of such a possibility, decision-makers tried, whenever possible, to thwart expectations by keeping a tight hold of the news that

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to concretize an ambiguous future into a fearful certainty. Polyb. 11.5.6-7. For more on the topic of the dichotomy between Greek/civilized and barbarian/brute, see Paul Cartledge's *The Greeks: a Portrait of Self and Others,* 2nd Ed. Oxford University Press, 2002. Also, Jonathan hall, *Hellenicity: Between Ethnicity and Culture.* The University of Chicago Press, 2002. 172-189. The dichotomy was employed by Polybios to portray the Romans at one time as quasi-Hellenes, at another as barbarians, depending on the points he wanted to make. Champion, 2004. The examples concretize Chaniotis' assertion that the use of such emotional vocabulary in decrees not only reflected emotional overtones in assemblies, but also further encouraged emotionality in public life. Chaniotis 2012: 98.

[64] Grissom 2012: 210, 437. The foremost Thucydidean example is the build-up to the Sicilian Expedition (6.9-38), where Thucydides uses a highly emotional language to explain the subsequent defeat as due to the Athenian tendency to react emotionally, driven by an ethos of action as they considered only the potential benefits of the enterprise. See also the Mytilenian affair, where reason and emotions vie for the control of the message between political rivals. Thuc. 3.36-50.

[65] See Apol. Rhod. *Argon.* 2.448. The adventurers are seized by fear and unable to act upon hearing of the *drakon* that protects the fleece. Only Jason's decisiveness manages to stir them into action. See also the Lakedaimonian dread upon hearing of Philip V's sudden presence in Lakonia: "they were terrified on account of the reversal, being utterly at a loss and feeling powerless about their present predicament." Polyb. 5.18.11: οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, θεωροῦντες ἐκ τῆς πόλεως παράγουσαν τὴν δύναμιν ἐκπλαγεῖς ἐγένοντο καὶ περίφοβοι, θαυμάζοντες τὸ συμβαῖνον. Compare the Spartan reaction to that of the Roman Senate: even though the populace falls into a state of despair, "for many years they had not experienced either the word or deed of avowed defeat, and did not bear the reversal measuredly or with character. Not so the Senate, which persisted measured and calculating, and considered what was to come and what was to be done by everyone, and in what way to do it." Polyb. 3.85.7: πολλῶν γὰρ χρόνων ἄπειροι καὶ τοῦ ῥήματος καὶ τοῦ πράγματος ὑπάρχοντες τῆς ὁμολογουμένης ἥττης οὐ μετρίως οὐδὲ κατὰ σχῆμα τὴν περιπέτειαν ἔφερον. οὐ μὴν ἥ γε σύγκλητος, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος ἔμενε λογισμοῦ, καὶ διενοεῖτο περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος πῶς καὶ τί πρακτέον ἑκάστοις εἴη. The reaction of the Carthaginian senate in the closing stages of the Second Punic War also stands in contrast: "they expected that at any moment they themselves and their city would be in very serious danger, that in the end they became thoroughly dismayed and terrified. Nevertheless, as circumstances demanded to have foresight and take council concerning the future, the senate was full of divergent and troublesome opinions." Polyb. 14.6.8-9: ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος ὅσον οὐκ ἤδη προσδοκᾶν κίνδυνον, τελέως ἐκπλαγεῖς ἦσαν καὶ περίφοβοι ταῖς ψυχαῖς. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀναγκαζόντων ποιεῖσθαι πρόνοιαν καὶ βουλὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος, ἦν τὸ συνέδριον ἀπορίας καὶ ποικίλων καὶ τεταραγμένων ἐπινοημάτων πλῆρε.

reached citizens and soldiers, to avoid their potentially demoralizing effects or the spread of (sometimes baseless) panic.[66]

Oftentimes, fear was generated through the age-old strategy of intimidation. Hellenistic generals undertook psychological warfare, aware of its potential effect on the opposition's morale. Commenting on this topic and echoing Aristotle's views on perceptions of fear, Frontinus noted that instilling fear has more to do with deceiving the enemy into getting a skewed view of the seriousness of the impending danger.[67] Over the course of the siege of Rhodes, Demetrios himself sought to break the Rhodian resolve by employing visual and auditive effects to scare the resistance into submission. He took advantage of the particular geography of the island – "since the city is shaped like a theater (θεατροειδοῦς)" (Diod 20.83.2) - to exhibit the full scale of his forces across the Aegean "stage":

> Having drawn up his fleet as if for a naval battle in such a way as to inspire panic (καταπληκτικῶς), he sent forth his great ships [...] excessive in number, such that the entire place from the island to the opposite shore was perceived to be filled with his ships, which brought much fear and panic among those who were watching from the city.[68]

Moreover, Demetrios coordinated his attacks by land and sea, ordering his troops "to attack from all sides with shouts and trumpets, to throw the Rhodians into agony and terror, since the distractions were

[66] See the arrival of news at Rome that finally calms down the bad rumors circulating. Conversely, Onasander advised that a general should consider announcing good news in battle, even if false, because it could be advantageous for the troops' morale. Onas. *Strat.* 23.1. *Contra* Chaniotis 2012: 118 who asserts that "Communities which expect an attack do not collectively display fear but rather courage – genuine or not."

[67] Front. *Strat.* 2.4.6-10. See also Arist. *Rhet.* 2.5.2: ἐγγὺς γὰρ φαίνεται τὸ φοβερόν· "Th at which is fearful appears close at hand."

[68] Diod. Sic. 20.83.1: ὁ μὲν οὖν Δημήτριος ὥσπερ εἴς τινα ναυμαχίαν ἐκτάξας τὸν στόλον καταπληκτικῶς προηγεῖσθαι μὲν ἐποίησε τὰς μακρὰς ναῦς, [...]ὑπεράγοντα τῷ πλήθει, καθάπερ προείρηται, ὥστε πάντα τὸν ἀνὰ μέσον τόπον τῆς τε νήσου καὶ τῆς ἀντικειμένης παραλίας συμπεπληρωμένον φαίνεσθαι τοῖς πλοίοις καὶ πολὺν φόβον καὶ κατάπληξιν παρέχεσθαι τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως θεωροῦσιν. The impression was all the more effective considering that the island is terraced.

so many."[69] Such initiatives once again highlight the importance of knowing not only the circumstances but also the opposition's weaknesses, to adapt one's strategy accordingly.

The Rhodians, for their part, showed great resilience in the face of danger and did not give in to their fears. The source of their resilience, however, was not some innate quality, but the collective success of a series of measures adopted shortly before the siege, while also counting on ingrained socio-cultural norms consciously maintained over time. Their priority was to diminish the chance of treason as much as possible, by reaching out to the dwellers-about and to the foreigners in the city and giving them the option to stay and fight alongside the Rhodian citizens, or depart from the city. The decision was made "partly foreseeing (προνοήθεντες) a scarcity of necessities, and partly so that no one might become a traitor to the city, having become dissatisfied with the condition."[70] Such foresight was based on local experience, as well as the shortcomings of others.[71]

The Rhodians' measures also followed the reasoning of near-contemporaries like Aristotle and Aineias Taktikos, who asserted that plots were generally attempted by those who are "disaffected" with the political status quo.[72] Aineias Taktikos in particular was adamant that strict supervision and

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[69] Diod. Sic. 20.86.4: ὁ Δημήτριος παραπλησίαν ἐποιήσατο τὴν ἐπίθεσιν, κατὰ δὲ τὴν γῆν προσέταξεν ἅμα πανταχόθεν προσβάλλειν μετ' ἀλαλαγμοῦ καὶ σάλπιγγος, ὅπως εἰς ἀγωνίαν καὶ φόβον ἀγάγῃ τοὺς Ροδίους, πολλῶν τῶν ἀντισπασμάτων ὄντων. This course of action was imposed upon the king by the defensive stance of the Rhodians and the geography of the island, which made a prolonged siege unfeasible due to the potential costs and manpower that this would require. As such, Demetrios was forced to adopt what H. Delbrück has called "a strategy of annihilation". For more on the logistics of this strategy, see Bresson 2010, who argues that Demetrios' hope was to create an atmosphere that would overwhelm the Rhodians into surrendering. For a detailed account of Hellenistic siege warfare, as well as detailed information on the forces and resources available on each side, see Pimouguet-Pédarros 2011.

[70] Diod. Sic. 20.84.2: ἅμα μὲν τῆς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδείας προνοηθέντες, ἅμα δὲ καὶ τοῦ μηδένα τῇ καταστάσει δυσχεραίνοντα γίνεσθαι τῆς πόλεως προδότην.

[71] Aen. Tact. 11.3-5 discusses the case of Chios that was betrayed by one of its officials, presumably as part of internal stasis (Arist. *Pol.* 1306b, Ael. *VH.* xiv.25). See also Argos betrayed to Philip V's commander Philokles by Macedonian sympathizers, Liv. 32.25. Mandro betrays Ephesos to Lysimachos. Front. *Strat.* 3.3.7. See also the betrayal of the Selgians by their peer Logbasis, a proxenos to Antiochos III. The episode is so shocking for the locals that they are actively concerned that stasis will erupt in their midst. Polyb. 5.76.9.

[72] Aen. Tact. 11.1.

suspicion were to be practiced against anyone whose loyalty was in any way questionable, going so far as to suggest that he who was seen as most influential among them was to be physically separated from his peers as a precaution against subversion.[73] Perhaps not surprisingly, we find similarities between measures under siege and the tyrant-killing legislation studied by Teegarden. He argues that they were primarily preventive, to deter enemies of the state from engaging in treason or sabotage.[74] At the same time, the self-policing clause was also meant to create what Teagarden calls "a cascading dynamic" that encouraged individuals to spot and spread news of imminent threats. It was thus not merely a matter of collective responsibility, but also of instilling a mindset through very public acts and statements where each member was made aware that others were also aware that each of them could count on each other during a crisis. Teegarden calls it the creation of "metaknowledge" among members of a democracy that was aimed at solving the problem of mobilization.[75]

To these points, we may also add the Rhodians' measures to counteract the danger that non-citizens might pose, finding themselves in the middle of a conflict with which they had little to do; hence the voluntary call to arms addressed to the *xenoi*. At the same time, they also sought to strengthen their forces by offering freedom and enfranchisement to the slaves who acted valiantly in the face of danger.[76] They also ceremoniously publicized and lavishly rewarded notable deeds performed by foreigners, such

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[73] Other proposed measures called for severely limiting and monitoring people's mobility, while also proposing that rewards be given to anyone who reported suspicious activities. Authorities were at the center of every social event. Even in the case of weddings and funerals in a crisis, authorities had to be consulted. There were also stipulations that vagrants and strangers be periodically rounded up and expelled, while free association was strictly forbidden. Boarding a ship was also strictly limited and allowed only with special permit. Aen. Tact. 10.1-26. On these points, see Bresson 2010: 103-106.

[74] The decree of Demophantos (Andok. 95) is a prime example that Teegarden uses to emphasize the community's initiative in dealing with "pluralistic ignorance," when people do not act because they are not sure how others will act. Once people are convinced that others will also act, they become courageous, while the enemy is less likely to act once they realize that the population will quickly mobilize.

[75] Teegarden 2014: 40-43.

[76] Diod. Sic. 20.84.3: ἀγαθοὺς γενομένους ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις, Notice, however, the potential character of the grant. They would be freed and rewarded only if they survived, and were deemed ἀγαθοὺς during the siege.

as the double-crossing of the mercenary commander of the guard, Athenagoras of Miletos, who tricked Antigonid forces into thinking that he would turn traitor only to lead them into an ambush. He was consequently rewarded with a golden crown and a gift of five talents, as the Rhodians "strove to rouse the well-mindedness of other mercenaries and foreigners towards the people."[77] Diodorus Siculus' use of σπεύδοντες here is significant because of its emotional qualities, denoting a state of urgency and pressure, as the Rhodians appear anxious to capitalize on the sudden opportunity and its potential impacts for the city. An appropriate and public celebration of Athenagoras was even more important considering the suspicion generally directed against mercenaries due to their questionable allegiance. And considering the many examples of mercenaries turning against their own employers and hosts,[78] such a reputation does not appear misplaced, with many ancient historians like Aeneas Taktikos providing suggestions on how best to handle the presence of mercenaries.[79] Given their σπεύδη, the Rhodians themselves were conscious of the potential risk that hosting mercenaries entailed, and acted accordingly.

Yet the most serious threat that *poleis* like Rhodes sought to mitigate was the risk of cowardice from among their own citizens. Contrary to the Herodotean ideal that courage was best fostered under a democracy of equals,[80] Hellenistic communities did not take it for granted that each member was willing or able to unconditionally and enthusiastically face the very real possibility of bodily harm or

[77] Diod. Sic. 20.94.5: τὸν δ' Αθηναγόραν ἐστεφάνωσαν χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ καὶ δωρεὰν ἔδωκαν ἀργυρίου τάλαντα πέντε, σπεύδοντες καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μισθοφόρων καὶ ξένων ἐκκαλεῖσθαι τὴν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον εὔνοιαν.
[78] Diod. Sic. 20.45-46, Polyb. 1.43.1-8. Paus. 1.26.1-2. For a lengthier discussion on the relationship between cities and foreign soldiers, see Chaniotis 2002, "Foreign Soldiers-Native Girls? Constructing and Crossing Boundaries in Hellenistic Cities with Foreign Garrisons" in *Army and power in the Ancient World*, Chaniotis and Ducrey, Eds. 99-113. See also the study of the Kretan mercenaries caught between Miletos and Magnesia-on-the-Maeander, Baker 2013.
[79] Aen. Tact. 13.
[80] Hdt. 5.78. For the idealized view of Courage as a democratic trait, see Balot 2014.

death. For instance, the Platonic discussion on using a dread-invoking potion to test men's cowardice exposes the ever-present concern by lawgivers and generals with the resilience of their peers. Plato suggests that safely exposing a citizen to "misfortune and dread of all things present and future, until he reaches a state of abject terror, though he is the bravest of men," would be a good way to render him fearless (ἀναγκάζειν ἄφοβον γίγνεσθαι) and exercise (γυμνασάμενον) his courage.[81] Since such a potion did not exist, one common initiative that communities undertook was the imposition of oaths to mitigate the latent danger of cowardice.[82] The oaths' insistence on unflinching loyalty suggests that cowardice was a real concern for the community in times of crisis.[83] Some such citizens lacking in loyal fervor towards their *patria* are mentioned in the Olbian honorary decree to Protogenes:

> The people met in an assembly in deep despair, as they saw before them the danger that lay ahead and the terrors in store, and called on all who were able-bodied to help and not allow their native city, after it had been preserved for many years, to be subjected by the enemy. When no one would volunteer for all or part of the demands of the people, [Protogenes] promised he would himself build both the walls and would advance the whole cost of the construction.[84]

Even if we agree that the decree was primarily meant to emphasize - even exaggerate - the good and helpful character of the honorand, the harsh contrast with his peers is noteworthy, calling them out on

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[81] Pl. *Leg*, 648a, c: δυστυχῆ γίγνεσθαι, φοβεῖσθαι τὰ παρόντα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα αὐτῷ πάντα, καὶ τελευτῶντα εἰς πᾶν δέος ἰέναι τὸν ἀνδρειότατον ἀνθρώπων.

[82] Specifically, ephebic oaths emphasized loyalty to the *polis* and all those around them: "I will be friendly to Dreros and friendly to Knossos, and I will not betray the city of the Drerians nor their forts nor those of the Cnossians; and I will not betray men of Dreros or of Cnossus to the enemy."Austin 109, ll. 45-60. The wording is echoed by the oath of Jason's companions. They make sacrifices and libations and swear that they will help one another with one mind (ὁμοφροσύνηισι νόοιο). Homonoia is again emphasized, in whose honor the companions set up an shrine. Apol. Rhod. Argon. 2.715-718.

[83] On the common and traditional oath formulae, see Williamson (2013). See also oath between Kalymna and Kos "I will not allow the territory of Cos to be diminished, but I will increase it to the best of my ability." SEG 46.1082, ll. 26-27: οὐδὲ τὰγ Κώιαν ἐλάσσω γινομέναν περιοψεῦμαι, ἀλλ' αὐξήσω κατὰ δύναμιν τὰν αὐτοῦ· The famous "oath of Plataia" starts with the negative clause "I shall not bring shame upon the sacred weapons nor shall I desert the man beside me, wherever I stand in the line." RO 88, ll.i.6-8 The oath thus sought to redress the fact that people might not connect with potential strangers sharing the line of battle. It also sought to address the fact that people with shared animosity might have to fight side by side. As such, personal chagrins were to be set aside, at least when facing danger collectively.

[84] Austin 115 (B). ll. 119-128.

their lack of patriotic fervor. The phrase οὐδενὸς δ' ἐπιδιδόντος ἑαυτὸν stands out, considering that this instance is almost unique among Hellenistic decrees.[85] I suggest that, while many decrees such as those in honor of Diokles, Theukles, and Protogenes, were meant to honor the heroes' poliadic commitment, they can also be thought of as remembrances of the inability or unwillingness of others to help.

The challenge for Hellenistic communities, then, was altering individual perceptions as to what constituted an acceptable risk, perfectly conscious of the fact that "anticipation of great danger can produce cowardice."[86] In Aristotelian terms, "it is for enduring pain, then, that men are called brave," because courageous actions meant "enduring fears and taking risks for whatever is good."[87] Maria Patera (2013) interprets this attitude to suggest that fear and courage were perceived as cognitive processes that affected judgment depending on how individuals evaluated the dangers they faced. As such, the courageous man was he who feared with reason.[88] Thus, the community had to persuade individuals that courage and sacrifice were more worthwhile than flight. One solution that the Rhodians adopted was to vote posthumous benefits to those who might fall in defense of the city.[89] These incentives were meant to address the individual instinct of self-preservation or, to put it differently, to channel one's "selfish" attitude in the service of others.[90] The focus on the well-being of the *oikos* suggests that the goal was to allay an individual's worry about the future, should he perish in battle. Decision-makers were aware that,

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[85] Only one decree from Skythia Minor dated to 1st century BC, IScM I 54, contains the phrase μηδενὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιδιδόντος.
[86] Diod. Sic. 24.7.1: ἐμποιεῖν δειλίαν μέγεθος κινδύνον.
[87] Arist. *Rhet.* 2.5: τῷ δὴ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν, ὡς εἴρηται, ἀνδρεῖοι λέγονται. See also *Eth. Nic.* 3.9. For a detailed analysis of Aristotle in relation to the virtue of courage, see Nussbaum 1986: 340-342.
[88] Patera 2013: 112-119. See also Douglas Cairns' 2008 work *Look Both Ways* where he discusses the mistranslation of *pathos* as 'emotion.' In fact, it had much wider connotations, that involve psychological experiences implying physiological changes as well as new ways to evaluate states of affairs. Again, the emphasis is on evaluation, and not pure lack of reason.
[89] These included honoring the dead at a public funeral, support for elderly parents and young children at public expense, dowries to be provided to their unmarried daughters at public cost, and that for their sons, upon reaching maturity, to be crowned in the theater during the Dionysia festival and given a full suit of armor Diod. Sic. 20.84.3.
[90] Plato also believed that exhortations, admonitions and rewards, but also degradation for those who disobeyed, were a good way to render citizens fearless and get them to exercise their courage. Pl. *Leg.* 648b.

despite egalitarian democratic rhetoric, one's most intimate bonds remained with one's bloodline, which could eclipse poliadic allegiances in the event of an insurmountable crisis.[91] By taking such safeguards, then, the state could hope to induce individuals to alter their risk calculations, as Teegarden puts it, and carry on fighting. These basically economic measures had the hoped-for effect and "the eagerness of all was roused to endure the dangers courageously (εἰς τὸ τοὺς κινδύνους ὑπομένειν εὐψύχως)."[92] Diodorus Siculus' choice of words emphasizes the burden that all members of the community were willing to bear individually.

Our observations speak to modern approaches to risk, supporting Steve Rayner's (1992) thesis that "institutional structure is the ultimate cause of risk perception," as individual decision-makers acted within a social and organizational context.[93] Significantly, the same language of resilience is encountered in honorary inscriptions, as in the decree for Lysandros son of Phoinix, the naval archon when Kalymna, an ally of Rhodes at the end of the 3rd century BC, suffered a piratical attack:

> [when] news arrived that the enemy was about / to [sail] against the city and territory and islands of / Kalymna with a larger [fleet], and the nauarch decided to / sail against [the enemy]; Lysandros was ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς in the / encounter against the enemy off of Laketera, and after / withstanding them (συμπαραμείνας) and most gloriously incurring danger / (ἐνδοξότατα κινδυνεύσας), he took prisoners . . . / contending[?] with the orders . . .[94]

Being capable to risk one's life in the face of great danger was the result of a "negotiation of fear," as Eirene Visvardi (2015) calls it, between individual safety and civic duty, which brings to the fore the institutional importance of fostering socio-cultural cohesion. The sentiment of attachment through

[91] The argument problematizes the idea that Hellenes liked to associate familial concord with state concord. See van Bremen 2005: 324-326. If anything, we notice that such associations were consciously promoted precisely because they could not be taken for granted.
[92] Diod. Sic. 20.84.4.
[93] Rayner 1992: 86 and Jaeger et al. 2001: 185.
[94] Syll.^{3} 567, ll. 8-13.

cherished relations and membership in a collective group, Visvardi explains, provided an anchor for one's emotional response to unfolding events, as his mind raced and evaluated the choices available to him.[95] In other words, while fear invariably reached an individual when facing danger, it was his allegiance to his loved ones and the greater polis community that helped him not lose his nerve and carry on with the Homeric "dread dance of Ares."

In this matter, public festivals were the optimal milieu to foster group solidarity[96] because the ritual focus of the whole citizen body coming together allowed the community to periodically redefine itself and actualize its social, cultural, even political priorities. The reason, sociologist Carlo Jaeger (2001) explains, is that meaning is created through social interaction, and effective social policy depends on the successful creation of shared meaning.[97] For example, the institution of the *ephebeia* fostered social cohesion through social interaction.[98] It created bonds of indiscriminate camaraderie while instilling in the youths a *polis*-centric outlook.[99] As Chaniotis (2006) notes, such rituals were

[95] Following Aristotelian logic, Visvardi considers emotional responses to be processes that include evaluation based on belief, pleasure, or pain. Visvardi 2015: 90-92. I use here the term 'him' as generalization of the soldier as predominantly male, without negating the historical reality that many women actively participated in the fighting, especially during sieges, on quite a few occasions in antiquity.

[96] Hans beck explains that collective ritual practices "erlieh den eigentlichen Gegenständen der Erinnerung ungeahnte Emotionstiefe, die ihrerseits die Wahrnehmungsmuster der Bürgergemeinde prägte und ihren inneren Zusammenhalt stärkte." Translation; "gave actual objects of memory unprecedented depth of emotion, which in turn shaped the patterns of perception of the citizen community and strengthened its internal cohesion." Beck 2009: 76. On the topic of ritual as an emotionally loaded activity, see also Chaniotis 2012.

[97] Jaeger et al. 2001: 192.

[98] Most recently by Kozak 2013, though see in particular Pierre Vidal-Naquet's 1968 foundational *The Black Hunter and the Origin of the Athenian Ephebeia*. Andrzej Chankowski 2004: 72, argues that, since communities undergo this rite in spite of changing consequences in the late Hellenistic period, it means that they are still interested in perpetuating its values. See also Gehrke 2010: 27, on formalized socialization of the ephebes. For the practical duties of epheboi as protectors and patrollers of the countryside, see Chaniotis 2008: 105-151.

[99] The futurity embedded in ephebic oaths points to potential crises that young men might have to face at some point in their lives, while the physical layout of the decrees recording the oaths themselves functioned as a topographic anchor, as Williamson 2013: 122 calls it, meant to constantly remind citizens of their duties: "I will not shame my sacred arms, nor will I desert the one standing in the line beside me, wherever I am stationed" or "I will not allow the territory of Cos to be diminished." RO 88 and Austin 153, ll. 26-27. The city is greater than personal rivalry with fellow citizen. Also, Berti 2006:

emotionally loaded activities that intensified emotions, which had a lasting impression on participants. Unflinching loyalty, order, and endurance, were demanded from everyone in the moment of danger, considering that these cardinal virtues were periodically re-affirmed during public festivals.[100]

The powerful effect that such institutionalized initiatives had over members of a community is demonstrated by the resilient behavior of the Rhodians in the most difficult moments during the siege of 305 BC:

> "The Rhodians, being always more numerous, enthusiastically undertook the danger (τὸν κίνδυνον ἑτοίμως ὑπομενόντων), as men do when they struggle for their fatherland and for their most precious things [...] many of the Rhodians were killed, among them also the *prytanis* Damoteles who was admired for his virtue."[101]

Diodorus Siculus' phrasing through the ὡς ἂν construction denotes a general truth, highlighting the conceptual shift from what Greg Anderson calls "social engineering", to conventional citizen behavior. According to Philip Pettit, such a transferal of intentions from deliberate to accepted behavior is induced by habit. The power of habit consists of the fact that it can be reasoned through, based on one's self-regarding considerations of social acceptance, that can in turn ensure that normative fidelity is robust or resilient if they come into play whenever someone begins to deviate, or contemplate deviation,

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202: "Stones were meant to remind people of the general important points of their agreements, not to provide details about the rituals that were celebrated on occasion."

[100] The Rhodians celebrated the Great Erethimia festival at Rhodes, where various age groups made a display of their martial virtues and skills. Chaniotis 2013a: 30. For an analysis of the inscription recording a list of victors, see Vassa Kontorini, "Les Concours des Grands Éréthimia à Rhodes" *BCH* 99 (1975): 96-117. This experiential dimension was meant to fuel one's enthusiasm in belonging to the *demos*, thus creating a coherent polis-centered ideology with very clear priorities and expectations Visvardi 2015: 90-92.

[101] Diod. Sic. 20.98.9: τῶν μὲν Ροδίων ἀεὶ πλειόνων γινομένων καὶ τὸν κίνδυνον ἑτοίμως ὑπομενόντων, ὡς ἂν ὑπὲρ πατρίδος καὶ τῶν μεγίστων ἀγωνιζομένων [...] πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν Ροδίων ἀνῃρέθησαν, ἐν οἷς ἦν καὶ ὁ πρύτανις Δαμοτέλης ἐπ᾽ ἀρετῇ γενόμενος περίβλεπτος. The episode reminds us of Nikias' speech to the Athenians in the thick of the crisis in Sicily, summoning before them the praiseworthy memory of their ancestors and the images of their families and homes, "appalled by the current state of affairs and seeing how great the nearing danger was." Thuc. 7.69.2: ὁ δὲ Νικίας ὑπὸ τῶν παρόντων ἐκπεπληγμένος καὶ ὁρῶν οἷος ὁ κίνδυνος καὶ ὡς ἐγγὺς ἤδη ἦν...

and can even help to restore or reinforce compliance.[102] Resilience in the face of danger can therefore be understood as an individual's deliberate choice based on personal beliefs and desires, that were in turn guided - if not to say determined – by what we may call a "demotic instinct". Hence Aineias Taktikos' specific instruction that when under siege "the festivals are to be celebrated in the city proper."[103] For the sake of maintaining resilience, the community could not afford to disrupt the very elements of ritual-*qua*-togetherness that gave it purpose;[104] what ancient authors refer to as the "pleasure" to participate in a collectivity that can override personal fear.[105]

In such an emotionally and ideologically charged context, the commemoration of illustrious individuals like Damoteles and Lysandros through monuments and eulogies gained a complex temporal dimension, as it looked both to the past and the future at the same time. Dedications and their periodic public celebration[106] were intended to inspire future generations of citizens to face danger when called upon by the community. The epitaphs of the war dead offer particularly powerful testaments to the almost obsessive communal insistence on the virtue of *andreia,* as showcased in a verse inscription from Priene: "No enemy will claim to have seen me, in the battle of the spears, shamefully carrying the shield on my back. I have always faced the enemy and have erected two trophies. I died doing what is worthy of my ancestors."[107] The mention of the ancestors alluded to two sets of expectations: those fulfilled by

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[102] Pettit 2007: 88-89.
[103] Aen. Tact. 10.4.
[104] See also Chaniotis 2006 for an appraisal of how togetherness was also consciously rendered through a variety of nouns used in the context of rituals and processions, that shared the the prefix συν- to emphasize their function as a public and communal activity of shared emotions.
[105] Visvardi 2015: 91.
[106] See in particular Ma 2013a: ch.1.4 and 292-293.The decree in honor of Lysandros was to be publicized also at neighboring Kos: ". . . at the elections for new magistrates, and exhort them {the people of Kos} to accept this and to make an announcement at the first Dionysia games after the libations; and the announcement shall be: 'the people of Kalymna crowns Lysandros [son of Phoinix]' . . ." Syll.^{3} 567, B.
[107] Most likely chosen by the survivors. I.Priene^{2} 277 (trans. Chaniotis 2012: 53). Notice that the inscription was that of a Messenian mercenary fighting on behalf of the city of Priene. Interestingly, even though not a Prienean himself, the reference

the dead man through his bravery in the face of danger, and on the other hand those expected of the later generations who would read the epitaph. Moreover, through vivid references to πολλῶν δὲ φόβων καὶ κινδύνων περιστάντων, monumental honorific decrees also played an important role in providing comfort and encouragement to members of a community during moments of extreme stress and alarm. By alluding to the rhetorical trope of reversal, as the hero managed to overcome incredible odds, the epigraphic narrative reminded its audience that seemingly insurmountable dangers could yet be overcome, just as they had been in the past. Reversal could thus be achieved through resilience and courage, as the Rhodians had managed to do when their harbor was on the verge of being taken in the midst of violent fighting, after responding προθύμως to the call that "τοὺς ἀρίστους τῶν πολιτῶν τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς κοινῆς σωτηρίας ὑπομεῖναι κίνδυνον."[108] A century later, the memory of their valor and sacrifice would inspire the Rhodians and their allies to persevere through fear and resist against marauding Kretans and their sponsor, Philip V of Macedon.

At the same time, the dead man from Priene shows us that shame followed close behind praise, as he, or rather the composer of the epitaph, was careful to emphasize the fact that he never turned his back before the enemy. Indeed, in contrast to the *exempla* of *andreia* just mentioned, communities also stressed the public opprobrium that awaited anyone who shirked from his duties in the service of the community when it needed them most. Such was the case of Halasarna, who honored Theokles son of Aglaos for his incredible efforts during the Kretan War at the end of the 3rd century BC. Among other things, Theokles was tasked to police his peers to make sure that orders were followed, at all costs: "he

to ancestors was meant to inspire Prieneans who would have read the epitaph. We thus witness how the community super-imposed itself over the dead to promote civic ideology and inspiring *exempla*.

[108] Diod. Sic. 20.88.3-4. For guerilla warfare and defense of city on land, see Bresson 2010: 115-117.

engaged in public affairs making a beneficial and energetic oversight against those who did not obey the decisions of the Assembly."[109] Such initiatives suggest that the danger of disobedience was indeed real and was taken very seriously. The prospect of falling short of communal expectations would attract an unbearable volley of reproach, as one's entire identity as a warrior, a citizen, and man, was attacked.[110] The prospect of such harsh treatment was once again meant to alter an individual's risk calculations in favor of the community, and functioned to reinforce compliance, as Pettit put it.

The dualism between honor and shame was purposefully apparent in inscriptions during times of crisis, as the promise of the former was implicitly contrasted with the threat of the latter. This was the strategy employed by Diokles son of Leodamas, the hero of Halasarna in the fight against the Kretans and Philip V, to insure the continued commitment of his peers to the common cause,

> Diokles son of Leodamas proposed: so that in every circumstance the citizens who are rendering assistance for our common safety be known, let it be: that each person who has openly promised, from among the citizens, the citizen-women, the *nothoi*, the *paroikoi*, and foreigners/ mercenaries. Let the names of those who have promised be announced immediately in the assembly … and, so that there be a memorial of those who dedicated themselves for the salvation of the fatherland and of the allies, let the poletes make sure that three stelai be produced and set up, one in the theater, another in the Asklepieion, and the third in the agora, beside the pedestal of Dionysos.[111]

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[109] I. Cos 99, ll.16-18: Πεπολίτευται συνφέρουσαν καὶ δυνατὰν διοίκησιν ποιησάμενος κατὰ τῶν ἀπειθούντων τοῖς δόγμασιν τᾶς ἐκκλησίας.

[110] To give just one example, see Alexander's siege of Halikarnassos: "The oldest Macedonians, who were exempt from dangers/combat on account of their age, but who had served with Philip on his campaigns and had been victorious in many battles, were roused to action by the events, and, being far superior in determination due to their war experience, sharply rebuked the unmanliness of the youngsters who sought to avoid battle." Diod. Sic. 27. 18: οἱ γὰρ πρεσβύτατοι τῶν Μακεδόνων, διὰ μὲν τὴν ἡλικίαν ἀπολελυμένοι τῶν κινδύνων, συνεστρατευμένοι δὲ Φιλίππῳ καὶ πολλὰς μάχας κατωρθωκότες, ὑπὸ τῶν καιρῶν εἰς ἀλκὴν προεκλήθησαν, φρονήματι δὲ καὶ ταῖς κατὰ πόλεμον ἐμπειρίαις πολὺ προέχοντες τοῖς μὲν φυγομαχοῦσι νεωτέροις πικρῶς ὠνείδισαν τὴν ἀνανδρίαν.

[111] IG XII.4 10. ll.2-23: Διοκ[λῆς Λεωδά]/μαντος εἶπεν· ὅ[πως ἐφ' ἑκάσ]/του καιροῦ φαίν[ωνται τοὶ] / πολῖται συνα[ντιλαμβανό]/μενοι τᾶς κοιν[ᾶς ἀσφαλεί]/ας, δεδόχθαι ἐ[παγγέλλε]/σθαι τὸς δηλομ[ένος τῶν τε] / πολιτᾶν καὶ πολ[ιτίδων καὶ νό]/θων καὶ παροίκω[ν καὶ ξένων], / τῶν δὲ ἐπαγγ[ειλαμένων] / τὰ ὀνόματα ἀναγορε[υσάντω παρα]/ χρῆμα ἐν τᾶι ἐκκλησ̣[ίαι, ὁ δὲ δᾶμος] / διαχειροτονείτω τὰν ἀ[ξίαν τᾶς δωρε]/ᾶς καὶ εἴ κα δοκῆι λαμβ[ανέτω· ὅπως δὲ ὑ]/πόμναμα ὑπάρχηι τῶν [ἐς τὰν σωτηρίαν τὰν] / {τοῦ} τᾶς πατρίδος καὶ [τῶν συμμάχων] / συνεπιδόντων ἐαυ[τούς, τοὶ πωληταὶ] / ἐγδόντω στάλας ἐρ[γάξασθαι τρεῖς καὶ] / ἀναθέντω μίαν μὲν ἐ[ν τῶι θεάτρωι, τὰν δὲ] / [ἄλ]λ̣α̣[ν ἐν τῶι Ἀ]σκλα[πιείωι, τὰν δὲ τρίταν] / [ἐν τᾶι ἀγορᾶι παρὰ τὸν βωμὸν τὸν τοῦ] / [Διονύσου …

The publication of the public decree in three copies was meant as an honor to those who offered to help by arms or money in the war effort. Conversely, it also speaks to real concern that some members of the community would fall short of their zealous promises of assistance. Its publication made it very difficult for anyone on that list to shirk from their commitment. To do so, for whatever reason, would be considered a very public act of defiance and dishonesty that would cause irreversible damage and shame in the eyes of their peers. Placed in the three most important public and sacred spaces of the *polis*, the decree put pressure on every individual on that list to keep one's promises, reminding them that one's deeds would never be forgotten; it was up to each to decide between fame and infamy.

The Rhodian defense, then, was the result of successfully implemented risk mitigating strategies. The account of their ultimate triumph is a testament to the Rhodians' intuition in terms of contingency planning around the emotions of risk that raised serious concerns about individual anxieties and social cohesion. They managed to transform their community into an ὁμονοῦντος organism by addressing potential weaknesses while capitalizing on their strengths. In this model city, the rich contributed to the war effort, the craftsmen offered their services, while every man was energetic, "each striving to outdo the others in *philotimia*;"[112] an entire city of benefactors, where each member understood the meaning of the Greek proverb, "κοινὴ ναῦς, κοινὸς κίνδυνος."[113]

[112] Diod. Sic. 20.84.4: ἅπας δ' ἦν ἐνεργός, τῇ φιλοτιμίᾳ τοὺς ἄλλους ὑπερθέσθαι σπεύδων.
[113] Strömberg, s.v. Aristaeneus.2.

4.4 Risk and the Gods

The ship of state, however, would not have been able to complete its tempestuous voyage without divine favor. When considering contingency strategies for alleviating fears and the mitigation of risk, we must remember that all public rituals and deliberations were undertaken under the auspices of the gods. Their acknowledgment was an integral part of a shared system of beliefs that could persuade peers to commit to common causes when facing dangers and uncertainties.[114] This explains the Rhodian emphasis on piety, dedicating weapons and the beaks of enemy ships after each victory, as thank offering for the gods' support.[115] They also pleaded with Demetrios not to force their hand to join a campaign against their Ptolemaic ally, because such action would have constituted a sacrilegious breach of faith, given that treaties were completed with the gods as witnesses. Yet their most significant collective decision was to not demolish the statues and decrees that they had dedicated in honor of their Antigonid besiegers, "thus making a wise decision with a view to both fame and self-interest." The gesture was in part meant to win the Rhodians diplomatic capital, as a safeguard against the παράδοξον of τύχη; basically, a contingency strategy, should the course of the war turn against them. However, the communal reaction to the proposal "to tear down the statues of Antigonos and Demetrios, because it was absurd to honor equally their besiegers and their benefactors," was expressed in pious terms: "the people were vehemently displeased with these words, rebuking them that they were committing an error."[116] The verb ἁμαρτάνουσιν is commonly understood to mean "to err, to miss the mark, to make a mistake." But in particularly egregious cases it also gains cultic connotations, referring to "sacrilege."[117] The dismissal of

[114] Williamson 2013: 119.
[115] Diod. Sic. 20.87.4.
[116] Diod. Sic. 20.93.6: ἐφ' οἷς ὁ δῆμος ἀγανακτῆσας τούτοις μὲν ὡς ἁμαρτάνουσιν ἐπετίμησεν.
[117] Pierre Chantraine calls it "une faute religieuse Chantraine 1999: 71 s.v. ἁμαρτάνω. See also Hdt. 1.138 and *OGIS* 55.31.

the proposal by the Rhodian assembly is understandable, considering that honorific dedications were imbued with a divine element through the sacred rituals, spaces, and utterings that accompanied them.[118] The vehement reaction and pious actions of the Rhodians signal the powerful psychological impact that sacred matters had over people in moments of crisis. As the old saying went, "all people are more likely to be mindful of the divine (δαιμονίου) in times of misfortune (ἀτυχίας), but often they scorn the gods as made-up stories in times of fortune and success."[119] The conceptual connection between τύχη and δαίμων is deliberate, given that popular belief held that one's personal fortune, which could extent to entire communities, was connected to one's δαίμων - a divine guardian.[120] As such, it was only natural to summon protective divine forces in times of distress. In the Rhodians' case, they drew comfort from their piety, convinced that they were fighting a righteous fight against sacrilegious, arrogant, and greedy warmongers.[121]

These Rhodian initiatives reflect the Hellenistic trend of communities turning to savior beings, σώτηρες, during periods of intensive and rampant warfare.[122] After all, summoning the divine brought reassurance when deliberating or undertaking great risks. It is probable, for instance, that similar

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[118] For more on this aspect, see Ma 2013a, and Kindt 2012.

[119] Diod. Sic. 23.13: Πάντες μὲν οὖν ἄνθρωποι κατὰ τὰς ἀτυχίας μᾶλλον εἰώθασι τοῦ δαιμονίου μνημονεύειν, καὶ πολλάκις ἐν ταῖς εὐημερίαις καὶ εὐπραξίαις ὡς μύθων πεπλασμένων τῶν θεῶν καταφρονοῦντες κατὰ τὰς ἐλαττώσεις ἀνατρέχουσιν ἐπὶ τὴν φυσικὴν εὐλάβειαν. The post-victory public thank-offerings were thus not merely a display of gratitude, but also a confirmation of a privileged relationship with the divine; without the gods, victory would have been very uncertain, perhaps impossible. The speech of Nikias to the Athenians during the crisis in Sicily, is a case in point, as he made "appeals to wives, children, and national gods – calling upon them believing that they will be of use in the current consternation." Thuc. 7.69.2: ἔς τε γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας καὶ θεοὺς πατρῴους προφερόμενα, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῇ παρούσῃ ἐκπλήξει ὠφέλιμα νομίζοντες ἐπιβοῶνται.

[120] Pollitt 1994: 14. For centuries one swore by the Tychē of Alexander. See also Graf, Fritz (Columbus, OH), "Agathos Daimon" in *Brill's New Pauly*. According to Assmann 2001: Ch. 9, the concept of Agathos Daimon was a development of Ancient Egypt's protective Ma'at divine concept of justice and harmony.

[121] See Hellenistic condemnation of Successor kings in Plut. *Mor.* 337-338, as maggots around a dying corpse, ignoble kings and rulers in their last death-struggle. Also, see Douris, FGrH 76 F 13 and Diod. Sic. 28.2-6.

[122] Chaniotis 2005: 157-160. The Galatian invasions were particularly traumatizing to the populations of Greece and Asia Minor. See the epiphanies of gods and heroes helping the Hellenes at Delphi. Paus. 10.21 and Diod. Sic. 22.9. See also Galatians and Aitolian League, connection with Persian attack on Delphi in Herodotus. Hdt. 8.36-39, Paus. 10.19.

oracular consultations were also undertaken by the Prieneans in 298/7 BC prior to igniting a revolution against the ruling tyrants. Their success was commemorated with a decree that stated

> … after incurring danger gloriously with /
> The foresight of the gods, it came to pass that those who were guarding the citadel/
> Were driven out of the city, and individually the citizens and in common /
> the people, were released from the dangers and their fears of the tyrant.
> […]
>
> With good fortune, let it be granted by the people:
> So that there always be a memorial of our struggle and opposition against the enemy
> for our autonomy and freedom both for the native citizens and for the foreigners,
> And that we show that we closely observe our piety
> towards our savior gods.[123]

The collective struggle shared by mortals and gods served to highlight the influence of the divine over individual and collective emotions. The emotionally charged formulations of the decree point to the relief that the community felt at the conclusion of the conflict, and also to the psychological stress that the planning and fighting must have caused the Prienean democrats as events unfolded.

Being able to claim special knowledge of the future was a powerful tool to sway communities into accepting difficult decisions. In this respect, omens were especially useful because they tapped into people's attempts to regain composure and a sense of control over events that appeared disastrous or chaotic.[124] There is in fact a noteworthy literary trend where seemingly negative omens are interpreted

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[123] SEG 35.1142, ll. 10-13, 15-21: καὶ κινδυνευ[σάντων ἐνδόξως μετὰ] / [τῆ]ς τῶν θεῶμ προνοίας, συνέβη τ[οὺς τὴν ἄκραν φρουροῦν/τ]ας [ἐκ]πεσεῖν [ἐ]κ τῆς πόλεως, ἰδίαι [δὲ τοὺς πολίτας καὶ κοινῆι / τὸν] δῆμον τῶν τε κινδύνωγ καὶ τ[ῶν φόβων ἀπὸ τοῦ τυραννεύ]/οῦ[τος ἀπ]ηλλάχθαι […] τ]ύ[χηι ἀγαθῆι δεδόχθαι τῶι] / δήμωι· ὅπως ἂν το[ῦ] τε γενομένο[υ ἡμῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτονομίας καὶ] / ἐλ̣ε̣υθερίας ἀγῶνος καὶ τῆς παρατά[ξεως — τῆς] / [θ᾽ ἡ]μέρας ὑπάρχηι κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν ἀεὶ τ[οῖς τε ἐνδημοῦσι τῶμ] / πολιτῶγ καὶ τοῖς παραγινομένοις τ[ῶν ξένων ὑπόμνημα,] / [καὶ τὴν] πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς τοὺς σώισαντ[ας ἡμᾶς εὐσέβειαν] φαινώμεθα διατηροῦντες …

[124] Flower 2008: 108-110. Xenophon, for instance, took advantage of a man's sneeze to break a deliberation deadlock among the Hellenes concerning the best course of action on their *anabasis*. Xen. *Anab.* 3.2.9. As he ended his speech with the words "with the gods we have many and good hopes for safety," the soldier's sneeze caused "all the soldiers with one impulse to prostrate themselves before the god. And Xenophon said 'it seems to me, men, that since we were talking about salvation a sign was shown to us (οἰωνὸς ἐφάνη) from Zeus Soter, that we make a vow to sacrifice (εὔξασθαι θύσειν) to this god whenever we reach a friendly land."

as carrying positive responses.[125] Some scholars have dismissed such interpretations as the products of mere rhetorical manipulation of people's "superstition,"[126] but Michael Flower (2008) points to the audience's reaction to suggest that we are dealing with a conventional belief that portents and omens clustered around momentous events and times of crisis, where verbal acknowledgment of the omen made it irrevocable in the sense desired by the person who accepts it.[127] As such, Onasander advised that, as a matter of practicality, any endeavor be initiated with a sacrifice, and that sacrificers and seers accompany any general; "it is best that the general himself be able to read the omens intelligently; for it is very easy to learn in a short time and thus one becomes a good advisor to himself."[128] Implicit in the act of deliberation through divination is the claim that knowledge beyond the reach of mortals could be bestowed by the favor of the gods.[129] For the best psychological effect, Onasander suggested that good omens be announced to the soldiers because "their abilities are emboldened tremendously when they believe that they are facing dangers with the favor of the gods."[130]

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[125] See the various stories about the founding of Alexandria, Erskine 2013. See also the famous case of the "wooden wall" on the eve of the Persian War, Hdt. 7.138-144.

[126] On the flawed concept of ancient superstition, see Kindt 2012: 90-122 and Faraone 1999: 15-30.

[127] Flower 2008: 112-114.

[128] Being able to interpret signs from the gods was a τέχνη that people could acquire through knowledge of signs and an understanding of circumstances. Xenophon himself was regarded as an authority on the matter. Xen. *Anab.* 5.6.16-18, 6.5.2, 6.4. 13.

[129] Being able to tap into such knowledge when everything else failed was considered an essential skill for a general to have. Xenophon is an optimal example. He writes that "being unable to decide, it seemed that it was best to take counsel with the gods." In the end, he shied away from the command after "the god explicitly signified to him as he was sacrificing neither to want the command nor, if they chose him, to accept it." Xen. *Anab.* 6.1.22, 24: Ἀπορουμένῳ δὲ αὐτῷ διακρῖναι ἔδοξε κράτιστον εἶναι τοῖς θεοῖς ἀνακοινῶσαι· [...]ὁ θεὸς σημαίνει μήτε προσδεῖσθαι τῆς ἀρχῆς μήτε εἰ αἱροῖντο ἀποδέχεσθαι. In another similar instance the Athenian commander was debating "whether it was better to stay with Seuthes on the conditions that Seuthes proposed, or to leave with the army." He left the decision to Zeus the King, who "directed him to leave." (Xen. *Anab.* 7.6.44.) See also example of Hermogenes, one of the speakers in Xenophon's *Symposion* 4.48, when he asserts that "because [the gods] know how every one of these things will turn out, they give me signs, sending as messengers sayings and dreams and omens, about what I ought to do and what not." διὰ δὲ τὸ προειδέναι καὶ ὅ τι ἐξ ἑκάστου ἀποβήσεται σημαίνουσί μοι πέμποντες ἀγγέλους φήμας καὶ ἐνύπνια καὶ οἰωνοὺς ἅ τε δεῖ καὶ ἃ οὐ χρὴ ποιεῖν.

[130] Onas. *Strat.* 10.25-26: Πάνυ γὰρ ἀναθαρροῦσιν αἱ δυνάμεις, ὅτ' ἂν μετὰ τῆς τῶν τεῶν γνώμης ἐξιέναι ωομίζωσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς κινδύνους. Soldiers themselves are on the lookout for omens, in order to cope with the stress of thinking about what is to come.

That decision-making bodies took divination seriously, is evident from their efforts to make *manteia* the exclusive prerogative of the *polis*. Various communities followed Aineias Taktikos' advice that "a seer must not sacrifice in private without the presence of a magistrate."[131] The measure targeted unauthorized efforts to foretell the future, not so much because they might contradict the official stance of the decision-making body,[132] but because presumed harbingers of doom were detrimental to morale.[133] Kim Beerden (2013) acknowledges that the advisory nature of divination was meant to diminish uncertainty, but denies that it can tell us anything about risk management and mitigation; it being an anachronistic term.[134] But to make such a claim is to ignore entirely the epigraphic habit which attests to the collective effort of sublimating the divine for alleviating potential risks of socio-political dissent, especially with regard to the temporality of inscriptions. The Priene decree quoted above, for instance, explicitly presented events as having taken place μετὰ τῆς τῶν θεῶν προνοίας, as part of the *polis* authorities' claim about their democratic regime as being divinely favored. The inscription sought to convey to future generations that protecting it was a sacred duty, should circumstances once more demand it, and that they could count on the gods' support in their darkest hour, all the while being expected to emulate the courage and zeal of their ancestors in the face of danger.

Pierre Bonnechere (2013) has interpreted the appeals to the gods during the decision-making process as a calculated effort to address problems that were a source of uncertainty or tension in the city.[135] The very fact that the heading of decrees included the phrase "ἀγαθῆι τύχηι" highlights the often-

[131] Aen. Tact. 10.4: μηδὲ θύεσθαι μάντιν ἰδίᾳ ἄνευ τοῦ ἄρχοντος.
[132] On this point, see the comment of the Illinois Greek Club translators of Aineias Taktikos, Loeb edition, 53, ff. 2.
[133] Thucydides vividly emphasized this detail in his exploration of human behavior at plague-stricken Athens or besieged Corcyra (Thuc. 2.47.4, 2.54.2). Clandestine and opportunistic oracle-mongers appeared in times of hardship and demoralized the frail population. The result could be the total breakdown of civic decency and discipline.
[134] Beerden 2013: 196-9.
[135] Bonnechere 2013: 375-380.

omitted fact that prescribed religious observances preceded the inscribed decision of the assembly.[136] It was not just a symbolic attempt to counter Tychē's unpredictable nature,[137] but a way to give legitimacy to a presumably contentious decision, while summoning a better future. In this respect too, Rhodos is no exception. The famed Lindos Chronicle ends with the epiphany of Athena during the siege of Rhodos, commanding her priest Kallikles "to announce to one of the *prytaneis* Anaxipolis – conveniently named city-lord -, that he should write to King Ptolemaios and should invite [him] to come to the aid of the city, since she would lead and she would secure both victory and dominance."[138] The mention of the epiphany was meant to bring comfort to both past and future Rhodians who might also have to face tremendous dangers. Athena was not going to abandon them to an unforeseen *tychē*, but on the other hand promised them that, should they not do what she commanded, "they would be sorry."[139] Significantly, Athena also guaranteed dominance, not just victory, giving the impression that her help was not limited to a single event but encompassed the whole history of Rhodos, as testified by the two earlier epiphanies of Athena.[140] Moreover, the specific mention of Athena's choice to manifest herself to her people through official channels - from priest to *prytanis*, and then to the council, but not the popular assembly – was meant to reinforce the authority of poliadic institutions in times of crisis, especially given earlier episodes of dissent over the issue of the royal honorary decrees. Bonnechere argues that such inscriptions were a matter of ratifying a decision already taken, to produce "pious

[136] McLean 2002: 219.
[137] Matheson 1994: 19.
[138] I. Lindos, D.98-104.
[139] I. Lindos D.104-6.
[140] For details on these earlier epiphanies, see I. Lindos D.1-78, with commentary by Bresson 2006: 527 and Higbie 2003: 141-150.

consensus."[141] Indeed, the recording of Kallikles' initial hesitation to follow through with Athena's command stands out, implying that there were heated discussions presumably on whether to appeal to one king to help them against another. Whatever the reason, the hesitation was meant to emphasize Athena's authority, while also suggesting an impressive level of pragamatism from the Rhodians, even during a crisis and despite their good relations with Egypt.[142] In the end, "the council members dispatched Anaxipolis to Ptolemaios…"[143] Athena followed through - as gods always do – on her promise of victory and domination, while the people of Rhodos were united throughout the entire ordeal.

The imposition of oaths was also used to ease tensions or at least to diminish the likelihood of open hostility, by singling out each and every member of the community to participate in the ceremony.[144] According to Irene Berti (2006, 204-6), the vivid violence of the execration formulae accompanying irrevocable promises before the gods points to fear as the fundamental effect of the ceremony. In the case of the *sympoliteia* between Smyrna and Magnesia-on-the-Sipylos, for instance, the

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[141] Bonnechere 2013: 379. Another example is the inscribed Milesian consultation of the prominent local oracle at Didyma on "whether it will be preferable and better both now and in the future for the demos to admit the Drerians and Milatians into the citizen community (πρὸς τὸ πολίτευμα), on whose behalf men have arrived in the city, and to share with them lands and other things which belong to other Milesians." I. Milet 1.3.33, fr. f.6-10. Fontenrose, H5. Considering the (not unfounded) suspicious reputation that mercenaries enjoyed, we can imagine that the debate over what to do with the Kretan 'guests' was considered a matter of *polis* security. Apollo answered unequivocally to "gladly (ἀσπασίως) welcome helpful (ἀρωγοὺς) men into your city, for it is preferable and better," addressing concerns and complaints while requiring all Milesians to abide by the decision. The aim was to discourage social and political dissent that could escalate into bursts of violence, or even *stasis*. I. Milet 1.3.33, fr. f.11-13. See also the Iasos inscription (OGIS 237) recording an oracle calling upon the Iasian to accept the authority of Antiochos III, while guaranteeing their internal autonomy: ὅ τε θεὸς ὁ ἀρχηγέτης τοῦ γένους τῶμ βασιλέων συνεγμεμαρτύρηκεν τῶι βασιλεῖ .... ll. 4-5. Significantly, the commemoration of civil war does not appear in epitaphs. This suggests that it is not desired. It does not carry miasma, however, to fight against tyrants. van Wees 2008: 42. As Loraux 2002: 39-40 observes, reconstructions of stasis are difficult because of such "repressed material."

[142] My guess would be that the Rhodians were worried that Ptolemaios would seek in turn to impose his own authority over the island's autonomy, which they counteracted through the offering of extensive honors and divine cult to Ptolemaios. Higbie 2003: 150-1.

[143] I. Lindos D.114-5.

[144] It was, as Ben Gray sees it, a vivid political ritual that created through performance a specific contractual type of civic order. "*Staseis* committed during festivals appear as a performance of anti-citizenship. During festivals such behavior is most vividly on display, as the occasion would have made an even greater impact. They have an orchestrated character." Gray 2016: 70.

integration of the populations was carefully orchestrated by explicitly stipulating that the governing bodies of both communities "shall [administer the oath after giving public notice] on the previous day that those in the city should stay at home as the oath is about to be taken as laid down in the agreement."[145] The provision was meant to counteract any attempt to bypass the mandatory swearing of the oath,[146] since oaths were speech acts that could not be unsaid. Their performance in the first person singular was a way to remind and reaffirm one's status as member of a collective, as the memory of hostility was rejected.[147]

4.5 Divine Inspiration as Risk Mitigation

Followers of Anthony Giddens' thesis (1991) insist that the kinds of contingency strategies discussed in the previous section do not reveal any calculation of chances, or probabilities of disaster and success.[148] In a narrow sense they are correct, since gods are binary creatures; either they exist, along with everything that such belief entails, or they do not. But their point of view is limited by their own reliance on the fact that decision-makers actually referred to the gods when they mentioned the divine. To clarify, let us turn to Polybios' diatribe against other historians whom he faults for describing great men who accomplish great deeds as being "someone who is favored by fortune (ἐπιτυχῆ), and who almost always succeeds

[145] Austin 174, ll. 80-81.
[146] Given that Smyrna had been an avid supporter of the victorious King Seleukos II in the Laodikean War, while Magnesia had supported Ptolemaios III, we can expect that the *sympoliteia* between these two rivalrous communities would have harbored great resentment on both sides, and some would have sought to avoid having to abide by the agreement.
[147] Loraux 2002: 130-3. This concern for the future stability of the community is explicitly stated in the peace treaty between Miletos and Magnesia-on-the-Maeander, where both sides undertook the oath "I swear by Artemis [Leukophryene and] | all [the other gods] and goddesses to maintain the treaty [and to abide by its | terms and] not to bear grudges for any previous [occurrences]." Burstein 37, ll. 83-88. The Milesians would have sworn by Apollo of Didyma instead of Artemis Leukophryene. For a detailed discussion on the peace treaty, see M. Errington's article "Peace Treaty between Miletos and Magnesia (I. Milet 148)" Chiron 19 (1989) 279-288.
[148] Beerden 2013: 202, see also ff. 14 *contra* Eidinow.

unexpectedly and haphazardly. [These writers] consider such men to be more divine (θειοτέρους) and worthier of wonder (θαυμαστοτέρους) than those who do things on each occasion κατὰ λόγον."[149] To make his point, Polybios refers to Publius Scipio and Lycurgus, the Spartan Lawmaker, as examples of prominent individuals whose actions were guided by sound judgment and mental ability.[150] The stark contrast between action as the result of planning and calculation, and the passive reliance on divine signs, is clear. Once again, foresight is central to planning, as "each accomplished everything μετὰ λογισμοῦ καὶ προνοίας."[151]

To be sure, such character portrayals are not limited to Polybios. John Ma (2013) has recently looked at Alexander the Great's decision-making process as a historical problem, noting that the same theme of rational calculation of possibilities and consequences dominates his biographies.[152] Once again, the emphasis in on observation (κατίδον), speculation and reasoning (εἰκάζε), and acknowledgment and decision (γιγνώσκω). Ma notes that these cognitive and intellectual processes that guided individual and collective military strategy are contrasted with pious explanations regarding Alexander's "genius" and "fortune." In both scenarios, the protagonists act and take risks based on practical considerations,[153] since they knew that "most men neither readily accept things contrary to expectations (παράδοξα), nor throw themselves boldly into terrible situations (τὰ δεινὰ) without hope from the gods."[154] The passage

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[149] Polyb. 10.2.6.

[150] Polyb. 10.2.7: τῶν εὐλογίστων καὶ φρένας ἐχόντων ἀνδρῶν.

[151] Polyb. 10.2.13. Lykourgos allegedly did not compose his laws prompted by divine fear (δεισιδαιμονοῦντα) or heeding (πάντα προσέχοντα) the Pythia, and Scipio did not succeed due to dreams (ἐνυπνίων) and omens (κληδόνων). Polyb. 10.2.9.

[152] Arr. *Anab.* 6.9.5 and Diod. Sic. 17.99.1.

[153] For Alexander, see Arr. *Anab.* 5.11.4 and 6.9.4.

[154] Lykourgos garnered support through the Pythia, while Scipio got his men to face danger by always instilling in them the belief that he undertook his projects with the inspiration of some divine force, thus making them more courageous (εὐθαρσεστέρους) and more zealous (προθυμοτέρους) towards undertaking fearsome deeds (τὰ δεινά)." Polyb. 10.2.10-12. Heavily reliant on Polybios' text, Livy (26.45.9) claims that Scipio promised his soldiers that Neptune would assist them. Walbank explains that the waters around the city of Nova Carthago would regularly subside at around the time of the siege, so Scipio would have relied on this knowledge to embolden his troops and begin the assault. True to Scipio's word, the waters

nicely emphasizes the main points of this chapter, as it hints at the fear and doubt that individuals might have before facing danger (τὸ δεινός), and the ways in which a decision-maker could get those around him to alter their risk calculations and trust in his plans.[155] The source of their concerns was precisely those παράδοξα that were hard to foresee, and even harder to handle.

These observations help explain the claims to divine favor of Hellenistic Successor kings. Angelos Chaniotis (2005) and Jon Mikalson (2006) are among the scholars who have pointed to the bestowal of divine honors and the institution of ruler cult by *poleis* towards monarchs. It provided a medium of communication between ruler and subject, while legitimizing the monarchical power in the new Macedonian reality of the 4th through 2nd centuries BC. Countless attestations of such exchanges, from Ptolemy I being acclaimed "Soter" by the Rhodians, to the recognition of Antiochos II as "Theos,"[156] highlight the protective and charismatic nature of royal benefactors. In such gestures, the line between recognition and flattery was deliberately blurry, as pointed out by Douris of Samos, annoyed by the Athenians' presumably slavish praise of Demetrios Poliorketes in 291 BC in a hymn highlighting the impact that such personalities could have over Hellenistic communities:

> … Hail son of the most powerful god Poseidon and Aphrodite! For the other gods are either far away, or they do not have ears, or they do not exist, or do not take any notice of us, but you we can see present here, not made of wood or stone, but real. So we pray to you: first make peace, dearest; for you have the power…[157]

Verity Platt (2011) explains these civic celebrations in the context of ἐπιφάνειαι, sudden manifestations of godly presence and power that were extended to Hellenistic kings. For Platt, such "hybristic"

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do subside, which amazes his troops, who are now ready to attack. Polyb. 10.11.5-8. Walbank adds that there is no evidence for Scipio believing in any kind of divine help with regard to the siege of Nova Carthago, while Scullard attributes the rationalism displayed in this passage to be entirely Polybios' own, and not a Stoic influence of any kind.

[155] See connection with φόβος, Chantraine s.v. "δείδω," 255.

[156] The title and the king's deeds are enthusiastically recorded in I. Didyma 358. See also I. Milet 1. 3. 123.

[157] Douris, FGrH 76 F 13; Athen. 6.253 D-F (trans. by Chaniotis 2005).

celebrations were not necessarily concerned with beliefs, but offered a powerful diplomatic tool by which the blessings of divine presence could be tightly bound to local issues of civic security and autonomy, in the context of the inherent tension between autonomy and more centralized royal power-bases. Great power needed to be accounted for, while cities took the opportunity to rephrase the language of reciprocity and the negotiation of power through ἐπιφάνεια.[158] The monumentalizing of kings' *isotheoi timai* through inscriptions highlighted the king-city relationship, though it was sustained and entertained only as long as the king upheld his promises.[159]

Beneath such public adulation, however, there is evidence to the contrary. On many occasions a community's decision-making and risk calculations in times of crisis were not affected by such epiphanic claims, as a king's grandstanding was at times met with derision rather than awe or distress.[160] There are also occasions where practical considerations trumped any claims to divine favor, as Demetrios Poliorketes learned in the harshest manner when his troops deserted him and went over to his enemy, Pyrrhos of Epeiros. Christian Habicht (2006) notes that at least in the case of one's *philoi*, such transfers of loyalty were not uncommon once a king was considered incapable of furthering their prestige and

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[158] Platt 2011: 145-6.

[159] As the dedication of divine honors by Teos to Antiochos III shows, once a king's power was thwarted, the cultic honors were rendered useless as the Teians chose to remove the inscribed pillar and move it to a less prestigious spot: "En abolissant les rites commémoratifs du culte royal, les Téiens rayèrent aussi le roi de leur mémoire collective." Chaniotis 2007: 171. Notice thus the importance of placing the inscription recording a king's manifest presence in an ἐπιφανέστατος τόπος, or denying it such a prime location. ἐπιφανέστατος τόπος combines both literal and metaphorical significance of epiphanes. It is practical because it points to the prime location. It also conveys the illustrious nature of the eikon awarded in his honor. Epigraphic use of the term epiphanes also has a reflexive quality, as it brings attention back to the text with a visibility of its own. Physical permanence is an honor in itself. Platt 2011: 141.

[160] It is said that even Alexander the Great mocked flatterers who referred to his blood as the ichor of the gods. Plut. *Alex.* 3-4. See also Arrian's explanation that Alexander would have claimed divine honors to make himself more impressive in the eyes of his subjects. Arr. *Anab.* 7.29.3. In turn, he himself was mocked for his Persian presentation by his Companions, as shown by the assassination of Kleitos the Black. Arr. *Anab.* 4.8-9. Plutarch in turn notes with great amusement that when Lysimachos received a Byzantine delegation by announcing that "the Byzantines come to me, now when I touch the sky with my spear," the leading ambassador Pasiades mocked him by replying "let us flee then, lest he pierce the sky with his spear!" Plut. *Mor.* 338 A-B.

wealth. Demetrios' setback is once more described in terms of unsuccessful planning and risk-taking, having made a series of strategic mistakes. After he first failed to foresee Pyrrhos' opportunistic attack of Beroia, Demetrios could no longer maintain discipline when news of the attack deeply troubled his troops. He was subsequently "deceived in his calculations" (πολὺ διεψεύσθη τῶν λογισμῶν) that his soldiers would not be swayed by an Epeirote foreigner at his own expense, but would seek to get revenge for the taking of Beroia.[161]

Therefore, fortune did indeed favor the bold, insofar as what was ascribed to τύχη was nothing more (or less) than one's (in)ability to plan for contingencies, and take worthwhile risks. Indeed, one's defeat is explained in terms of a transference of τύχη. Seleukos expressed this perception upon hearing of Demetrios' surrender when nothing was going well for him anymore, saying that "it was not the τύχη of Demetrios that saved him, but it was his own, which, in addition to her other blessings, offered him the chance to display his generosity and kindness."[162] The metaphor was extended to entire communities, as Polybios does to explain the fate of rivalrous cities such as Rome and Carthage, whose equal power (πάριστα δὲ ταῖς δυνάμεσι) at the start of the First Punic War (κατ' ἐκείνους τοὺς καιρούς), is described as the result of enjoying equal fortunes (μέτρια ταῖς τύχαις). Deininger's view of τύχη as a historical force, then, can alternatively be understood as an (im)balance of power, tilted by one's abilities and decisions to deal with contingencies.

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[161] Similar considerations affected Demetrios' common soldiery, as they ostensibly sought to rid themselves of Demetrios in favor of a more accomplished general, encouraged also by Pyrrhos' reputation of treating prisoners of war leniently (πρᾴως). In such circumstances, claims to divine favor offered no comfort or promise of safety (Plut. *Dem.* 44.4-5).

[162] Plut. *Dem.* 50.1: ἀκούσας δὲ Σέλευκος οὐκ ἔφη τῇ Δημητρίου τύχῃ σώζεσθαι Δημήτριον, ἀλλὰ τῇ αὐτοῦ, μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων καλῶν αὐτῷ φιλανθρωπίας καὶ χρηστότητος ἐπίδειξιν διδούσῃ. Indeed, defeat at the hands of a superior and more calculated rival was expressed by historians through Homeric imagery, as a battle among attending gods or as a loss of divine favor because of some sacred fault or *hybris.* Such is the case of the Antigonid defeat at Ipsos, or the victory of Eumenes over Neoptolemos and Krateros in Kilikia. Plut. *Dem.* 29.1-2. foretold in bad omens, as Demetrios dreamt that Alexander himself joined the enemy against him and his father, who in turn experienced unsettling signs.

We are thus witnesses to self-fulfilling prophecies, as one's abilities were ultimately tested on the field of battle, as victory could in turn inspire further successes. Conversely, the roadblock of defeat was explained as the loss of divine favor. The difference between the likes of Demetrios and more successful generals like Alexander the Great or Polybios' Scipio, was that they were better attuned to the psychological effects that their gestures and words had vis-à-vis their men's loyalty and confidence. This melding of pragmatism with the divine is captured by Arrian's explanation of Alexander's success:

> He was exceptional (δεινότατος) in knowing what needed to be done even when it was unclear, and was most successful (ἐπιτυχέστατος) in inferring what was likely from observed circumstances. He was also most experienced (δαημονέστατος) in organizing, equipping and marshaling his army. As to rousing the spirit of his troops and filling them with good hopes while banishing their fear in the midst of dangers by his own fearlessness, he was altogether most admirable (γενναιότατος).[163]

These superlative adjectives are common in Hellenistic character descriptions, and suggest the continuity of the vocabulary denoting aristocratic ideals of excellence from Archaic times,[164] that is inescapably intertwined with the divine.[165] Or, put differently, the vocabulary of talent and intelligence persisted in implying that exceptionality was, in form, divine. In substance, however, it intersected with the divinization of Successor Kings that grew out of the image of Alexander.

CONCLUSION

The art of rhetoric helped historians express in a specifically Greek fashion what they experienced and conceived of as prominent members of their communities.[166] Their works and the decrees they inspired,

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[163] Arr. *Anab.* 7.28.3 See also Ma's (2013) discussion on Arrian's use of the verb γιγνόσκω, 6-7.
[164] For Archaic *aretē*, see W. H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility* (1960).
[165] According to Chantraine 1999: 255, δείδω from δείδεμων meaning between two δαίμονες. Chantraine 1999: 222, γενναῖος meaning noble, of good birth, within aristocratic tradition of divinely-favored individual. Chantraine 1999: 247, δαίμων from δαίομαι, a divine force that imparts, attributes, shapes destiny.
[166] Erskine 2007: 281.

reveal a world that constantly struggled with present and potential dangers, where communities were keenly aware of socio-political contingencies that could threaten their continued existence. As such, the strategies they implemented in their pursuit of safety and stability, portray a society that did not let itself be bogged down into passivity. On the contrary, this was a "risk society" that kept an attentive focus on the future, aware of the need to counteract and adapt to various threatening circumstances; both foreign and domestic. *Homonoia* was the hoped-for result of successful domestic contingency planning, that relied on civic education and collective emotional support. Daily public life was thus a perpetual exercise in resilience because a community's best efforts were only truly tested in the darkest hours of a crisis. Whether it could overcome it in the "kairic moment," depended entirely on the τύχη that it had engineered for itself.

CHAPTER FIVE

MNHMH

"That's all history, Mike. This is about the future."

- Tony Blair[1]

5.1 ANCIENT LIBRARIES

My argument for contingency planning as an integral skill in Hellenistic deliberative expertise is challenged by modern assumptions about how ancient communities conceptualized the future. Sociologists Barbara Adam and Chris Groves, in charge of the Cardiff ESRC Project "In Pursuit of the Future," insist on a break between modernity and "traditional societies" along the lines of technological advancement and probability theory. To simplify, they argue that while ancient communities tried to render the future more predictable through socio-cultural practices like *manteia* and gift-giving, modern contemporaries use the science of probability to build models that generate potential goal trajectories and behavioral patterns.[2] Following the work of John Bury on *The Idea of Progress*, Adam and Groves argue that the advent of the science of probability in the 17th century brought about "a shift in knowledge

[1] The reply came as a Foreign Office authority on Iraq pleaded with Blair that "from all previous experience, the impending invasion of Iraq would likely be fraught and possibly calamitous." Wheatcroft 2016.
[2] Adam and Groves 2007: 19-22, 46-48.

practice"[3] that dismantled "traditional" views of a "providential" future predetermined by external (divine and ancestral) forces. Instead, they argue, probability theory heralded a new "progressive" future that could be predicted based on past recurring factors.[4] Their argument vis-à-vis the ancient world thus hinges on the idea that the relationship between the past and the future has been altered in modern times because it can now be analyzed and quantified through the tools of probability, to find the most viable solutions to present and potential threats.

I argue, however, that Hellenistic communities were perfectly capable of using the past to calculate risk by employing probabilistic thought. In a first instance, it is worth recalling John Marincola's (2007) observations that ancient historians considered the past as not very different from the present. And while the lessons of history were usually concerned with traditional values and morality, they were nevertheless governed by the assumption that the human character was consistent, which allowed historians to imagine probable outcomes and behavior based on precedents, and the motives that governed them.[5] Secondly, I also rely on Spiegelhalter's observations on putting numbers on risks and probabilities on events, to suggest that we nuance our understanding of quantifying uncertainty. Spiegelhalter notes that there are three ways to quantify uncertainty, which conform to the specific circumstances and the nature of the data available to decision-makers. The "classical symmetry" circumstance involves purely logical calculations within a system of assumed symmetries that allow equally likely outcomes, such as dice or lottery (See Introduction, 0.2). We have already explored the second "classical judgement" circumstance in chapters One and Four. Basically, one can make decisions

[3] Adam and Groves 2007: 54.
[4] Adam and Groves 2007: 53-4, 67-8.
[5] Marincola 2007: 19.

based on existing knowledge and the subjective judgments that agents make when analyzing contingencies, timing, and information, as events unfold.[6] Finally, in the current chapter I focus on the third circumstance of risk calculation through historical data. The so-called "frequentist" view defines probability as the limiting frequency in a (fictitious) infinite replication. Spiegelhalter explains that "the assessed probabilities are therefore based on assumptions about the continuity of past with future," where past experiences inform future situations, rendering potential responses and outcomes rather predictable.[7] Along these lines, then, I propose that the difference between ancient and modern probabilistic risk is one of form rather than substance, as communities made use of historical observations and experience to collect data and consider precedents to assess risks in a crisis.

Probabilistic risk first gained traction in historiography through the study of maritime insurance. The phenomenon was conveniently linked with the appearance of the term "risk" in 17th century Renaissance, relating to the balance between acquisitive opportunities and potential dangers.[8] As such, pre-modern maritime insurance was thought to support Bernstein's theory about quantitative conceptions of risk being bolstered by the probability theorems of seventeenth-century mathematicians.[9] Ancient historians like Covello and Mumpower (1985) had already been aware of insurance-like practices in antiquity, but they chose to follow the modernist interpretation to risk,

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[6] Spiegelhalter 2014: 18-19.

[7] Spiegelhalter 2014: 19. In the world of sport, for instance, data from past matches is collected and processed through an assumed mathematical model for how parameters interact, to give rise to appropriate odds on possible outcomes. There are several ways in which probabilities based on historical data may be expressed: we may use natural language, through words like "might" or "possible," or by using numerical 'chances' such as talking in percentages. There is also the frequency language using phrases like "one in x", or the language of "possible futures," where a variety of scenarios is presented, with the added information that only some of them carry specific outcomes, given certain conditions. 21-23. Such examples require us to think more broadly about probabilities, and how we integrated them into our lives, beyond the narrow confines of insurance.

[8] Mythen 2004: 13 and Rossignol 2014: 23. Wilkinson 2001: 91 has also suggested that risk in the late Renaissance developed from the unification of the Arabic concept of riz-q for wealth and fortune (from 'riz-q') with the Latin idea of 'risicare' used by sailors referring to entering unknown waters.

[9] Bernstein 1996: 68.

claiming that, prior to Pascal, there was virtually no history of probability.[10] They thus took an evolutionary approach by looking forward to modern technologies that would eventually make it possible to diminish risk in a meaningful way. While allowing for ancient public institutions put in place to prevent or respond to natural disasters, they argue that the ancient approach to risk through trial and error was a primitive way of observing and understanding causality.[11] But Spiegelhalter makes it perfectly clear that trial and error, be it simple observation or a careful record of historical precedents, is a perfectly valid way to assess risks, as evidenced by the risk-pooling techniques used in ancient trade and insurance practices (see Section 0.2).

Trade, however, was not the only area in Hellenistic society where historical data was considered useful in the decision-making process. Ancient historians repeatedly underlined the importance of precedents in all matters of governing.[12] In warfare, for instance, a record of past encounters was touted as indicative of likely outcomes. On the eve of the battle of Kynoskephalai, Flamininus is said to have delivered a short speech to his troops in which he asked rhetorically:

> Are these not the same Macedonians who when they held that desperately difficult position in Epirus you compelled by your valor to throw away their shields and take to flight, never stopping until they got home to Macedonia? What reason, then, have you to be timid now when you are about to do battle with the same men on equal terms? What need for you to dread a recurrence

[10] Covello and Mumpower 1985: 105.
[11] Covello and Mumpower 1985: 107.
[12] In the Latin context, we have examples from Caesar and Tacitus, that express probability through precedent. Specifically, in Caes. *BCiv.* 3.73 Caesar gives a speech before his troops after the battle of Dyrrhachium, urging them "not to be discouraged, or give way to consternation, upon what had lately happened, but oppose their many successful engagements to one slight and inconsiderable check" - ne ea quae accidissent graviter ferrent, neve his rebus terrerentur, multisque secundis proeliis unum adversum et id mediocre opponerent. He was careful to point out that their single loss was due to their small numbers, as well as unprecedented circumstances and – alas – unfavorable fortune, which was bound to turn in their favor. Similarly, Tac. *Ann.* 1.61-2. Tacitus mentions that Germanicus' soldiers were worried that they would suffer the same fate as the soldiers of Varrus back in 9 AD in Teutoburg Forrest. There were even stories of Varrus' ghost appearing and spooking other generals, an indication of the Roman psyche, thinking that the defeat of the past would be reduplicated due to fighting the same enemy in the same conditions: *en Varus eodemque iterum fato vinctae legiones!* Also worth noting Caecina's expertise due to his being on the fortieth campaign. His experience of success and peril had made him fearless: quadragesimum id stipendium Caecina parendi aut imperitandi habebat, secundarum ambiguarumque rerum sciens eoque interritus.

> of former danger, when you should rather on the contrary derive confidence from memory of the past! And so, my men, encouraging each other dash on to the fray and put forth all your strength. For with the gods willing, I feel sure that this battle will end like the former dangers.[13]

Polybios uses the speech to bring attention to the morale boost that the memory of past victories had over an army. More importantly, though, the historian touches upon the deliberative process that informs the soldiers' confidence. In other words, precedent did not elicit an automatic reaction on their part, but was mentally consulted. Flamininus elicits his men's observational skills to get them to realize that they are fighting under similar conditions, appealing to the image of the enemy's cowardice to make his point. He then encourages them to maintain their determination by showing them that there is no real reason to expect a different result.

The interplay between past and future is elegantly highlighted by the call "to foresee the past," which is likely to bring a similar outcome (προορᾶσθαι τῶν προγεγονότων, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τἀναντία δι᾽ ἐκεῖνα) – the phrase is reminiscent of the Latin proverb "post hoc, ergo propter hoc." Finally, the decision to fight and expect a similar result is impressed on the men through the reference to conviction (ταχέως πέπεισμαι ταὐτὸ τέλος ἀποβήσεσθαι), which marks the end of deliberation and the beginning of action. The concluding reference to θεῶν βουλομένων does not undermine Flamininus' point but in fact strengthens his probabilistic argument. As argued in the previous chapter, such appeals to the divine do not suggest that the protagonist surrendered his fate to Fortune, but signaled an awareness of the contingencies of war. Mindfulness of Fortune's contingencies was a sobering reminder for a general that every battle, like every maritime voyage, was unique, and that one had to take circusmtances into account when making

[13] Polyb. 18.23.4-7: οὐχ οὗτοι Μακεδόνες εἰσίν, οὓς ὑμεῖς προκατέχοντας τὰς ἀπηλπισμένας ἐν Ηπείρῳ δυσχωρίας ἐκβιασάμενοι ταῖς ἑαυτῶν ἀρεταῖς φεύγειν ἠναγκάσατε ῥίψαντας τὰ ὅπλα, τέως εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἀνεκομίσθησαν; πῶς οὖν ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι καθήκει, μέλλοντας ἐξ ἴσου ποιεῖσθαι τὸν κίνδυνον πρὸς τοὺς αὐτούς; τί δὲ προορᾶσθαι τῶν προγεγονότων, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τἀναντία δι᾽ ἐκεῖνα καὶ νῦν θαρρεῖν; διόπερ, ὦ ἄνδρες, παρακαλέσαντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ὁρμᾶσθε πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον ἐρρωμένως· θεῶν γὰρ βουλομένων ταχέως πέπεισμαι ταὐτὸ τέλος ἀποβήσεσθαι τῆς παρούσης μάχης τοῖς προγεγονόσι κινδύνοις."

calculations and taking action (See Ch. 1). Flamininus thus subtly reminded his soldiers that they could not completely rule out the possibility of unexpected and unfavorable dangers, where precedent was a rudder, as it were, that they could rely on for guidance. The speech, however, also hints at Flamininus' awareness that, as leader, he was ultimately accountable, as he suggested that he had done all that could be expected of him as general, and ought not to be blamed if any contingencies did manifest themselves.

One may claim that the passage is an exercise in rhetoric rather than an example of "proper" probabilistic risk. But Spiegelhalter points out that while we may talk about classical, historical, or subjective models, "probabilities are constructed based on existing knowledge, and are therefore contingent," which has led Bayesian statisticians to follow Bruno de Finetto's principle that "Probability does not exist." The implication is that probability expresses a relationship where "probabilities are not states of the world [...], but depend on the relationship between the 'object' of the probability assessment, and the 'subject' who is doing the assessing."[14] Such a novel way of understanding probabilities suggests that the patterns we choose to observe depend on the agent, a process that is rather subjective and rhetorical. However, it does not take away from the fact that we are dealing with decision-makers who conceived of historical patterns in probabilistic terms to inform their assessment of future outcomes.

A similar approach was adopted by Xenophon when delivering a speech before his Greek companions at the outset of the *Anabasis*. He claimed that he entertained – the gods willing - many and beautiful hopes of salvation,[15] not only because they themselves were righteous pious men fighting

[14] Spiegelhalter 2014: 20-21.

[15] Xen. *Anab.* 3.2.8: σὺν τοῖς θεοῖς πολλαὶ ἡμῖν καὶ καλαὶ ἐλπίδες εἰσὶ σωτηρίας... Notice again the emphasis on "beautiful hopes" to suggest good chance of success (See Ch. 1).

against perjurers, bound to incur the wrath of gods. He also relied on the record of the Greeks in their past encounters with the Persians, starting from the Persian Wars and on to their most recent encounters as part of their support in Kyros' bid to the throne of Persia, when "you stood in formation against the descendants of those [ancient Persians], who far outnumbered you, and were victorious with [the aid of] the gods [...] proving to be brave men."[16] The repeated reference to τοῖς θεοῖς is noteworthy because it also echoes Flamininus' appeal to θεῶν βουλομένων to acknowledge the contingencies of war and the inherent dangers that lie therein. But more importantly, Xenophon's mention of a tradition of victory against the Persians served not only to spur morale, but also to suggest that future successes are forthcoming by arguing that past encounters were instructive on how to deal with the same enemy:

> It is now more appropriate to be more daring to go against the enemy, for in the past you were ignorant about them, considering their host numberless, and nevertheless you dared to go against them with ancestral resolution. For now, when you've already had proof that they are unwilling to receive your charge even though they are many times more numerous, what reason is there for you to fear them?[17]

Xenophon further takes pains to explain to the Greeks stranded in enemy territory why the loss of their former allies, the lack of a cavalry to counteract the enemy's, and the absence of local guides, does not alter their chances for success.[18] His speech is a masterstroke in mass persuasion that discloses the great lengths to which commanders would go to equate present conditions to successful past enterprises. Its

[16] Xen. *Anab.* 3.2.15: καὶ τότε μὲν δὴ περὶ τῆς Κύρου βασιλείας ἄνδρες ἦτε ἀγαθοί·

[17] Xen. *Anab.* 3.2.16: νῦν δ' ὁπότε περὶ τῆς ὑμετέρας σωτηρίας ὁ ἀγὼν ἐστι πολὺ δήπου ὑμᾶς προσήκει καὶ ἀμείνονας καὶ προθυμοτέρους εἶναι. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ θαρραλεωτέρους νῦν πρέπει εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους. τότε μὲν γὰρ ἄπειροι ὄντες αὐτῶν, τό τε πλῆθος ἄμετρον ὁρῶντες, ὅμως ἐτολμήσατε σὺν τῷ πατρίῳ φρονήματι ἰέναι εἰς αὐτούς· νῦν δὲ ὁπότε καὶ πεῖραν ἤδη ἔχετε αὐτῶν ὅτι οὐ θέλουσι καὶ πολλαπλάσιοι ὄντες δέχεσθαι ὑμᾶς, τί ἔτι ὑμῖν προσήκει τούτους φοβεῖσθαι;

[18] Xen. *Anab.* 3.2.18-26.

plausibility notwithstanding, the effort shows how the gathering of knowledge and the historical record informed the decision-making process in terms of outcome likelihood.[19]

The topic of ancestral knowledge has previously been explored by Josiah Ober (2008), who has argued that the democratic institutions of Athens allowed the spread of knowledge needed by novice office-holders to govern the state. He presents an Athenian society made up of "demotic clusters" where administrative memory was transmitted across generations. Our evidence points to a similar, though more general phenomenon of compiling libraries that allowed decision-makers to assess the risks and chances of success of their intended initiatives. Indeed, when Xenophon mentioned the Persian Wars to his Greek companions, it was not merely a matter of rhetorical flourish - though it certainly helped in this respect. He also referred to an education tradition based on the experiences of one's fathers and forefathers, whose successes and failures guided current generations of leaders. Xenophon himself was especially attuned to the importance of conventional wisdom being passed down from one generation to another. As he makes clear in his *Memorabilia*, a conversation between Sokrates and the Athenian *strategos* Perikles about recreating Athens' former glory turns into an assessment of the skills and attitudes needed to be a good leader. The two men highlight virtues like respect, exercise, discipline, and socio-political harmony, agreeing that such characteristics can be instilled by "reminding" (ἀναμιμνήσκοιμεν) peers of their ancestors' accomplishments.

[19] The Melian resistance to Athens' demands can in fact be interpreted along these lines. They placed their hopes of resistance on several points of knowledge. Thucydides insists that they thought they could count on Spartan assistance, as well as on the gods. But that is only part of the story. The Melians also felt safe in the knowledge that they had resisted the Athenians in the past. Thuc. 3.91. Thucydides, however, does not emphasize this detail when unraveling the Melians' decisionality. From this angle, the Melians were not simply wrong to resist, though they did not account for the extreme determination of the Athenians to control Melos, which saw them bring a much larger military force that would eventually break the Melians' resolve: "Reinforcements afterwards arriving from Athens in consequence, under the command of Philocrates, son of Demeas, the siege was now pressed vigorously; and some treachery taking place inside, the Melians surrendered at discretion to the Athenians" Thuc. 5.116 (trans. by Richard Crawley).

Xenophon is clear that he is not only talking about emulation, but also about the importance of collecting examples of successful endeavors, from Herakles and Theseus to the Peloponnesian War. He describes these precedents as ἐπιτηδεύματα (affairs, pursuits, practices), to be remembered (μιμούμενοι) and exercised (ἐπιτηδεύοντες) by the present generation in order to become worthy successors to their ancestors.[20] To drive home his point, Sokrates-via-Xenophon contrasts Perikles with office-holders who are least knowledgeable (ἥκιστα ἐπιστάμενοι) in such affairs, on whose account the affairs of the state are going badly.[21] Sokrates credits Perikles' guaranteed upcoming success to his formation as a thoughtful leader - who is aware when he does not know something that might prove useful (ὅπως μὴ λάθῃς σεαυτὸν ἀγνῶν τι τῶν εἰς στρατηγίαν ὠφελίμων) -, and to his ability to learn from multiple sources with proven records of success: "and many principles, I believe, you have received from (παρειλήφοτα) your forefathers to preserve (διασώζειν), and many you have obtained from every source which is helpful in learning something about strategy."[22] The specific use of διασώζειν to emphasize the importance of preserving inherited knowledge also highlights the connection of memory with fending off danger, implicit in the act of salvation.[23]

Such conventional means of preparing decision-makers to deal with dangers through precedents eventually developed into a standardized form of education that culminated in the production of military manuals such as Aineias Taktikos' *On the defense of Fortified Positions.* Long considered a useful manual of technical expertise along the lines of Xenophon's *On Horsemanship,* or Onasander's

[20] Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.9,14.
[21] The best such example is Glaukon, son of Ariston, who sought public office, and to whom Sokrates showed why he would make a terrible leader. Xen. *Mem.* 3.6.
[22] Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.22: ὁπόθεν οἷόν τε ἦν μαθεῖν τι εἰς στρατηγίαν ὠφέλιμον
[23] Another meaning of the verb, used especially by Xenophon, involves "keeping in memory." See example of the Phokians, whose defense strategy has proven very successful and should be adopted by the Athenians.

Strategikos, the work is also valuable as a collection of historical precedents recalling important initiatives and outcomes. For instance, on the matter of plots and deception, Aineias Taktikos makes a point about not trusting in unreliable characters by providing παραδείγματα (examples, precedents) of cities that have been "utterly disrupted having been torn asunder" for being too credulous.[24] In the fourth century BC, therefore, we witness such case-study approaches to training good leaders being systematized, as exemplified by Aristotle's work on *The Craft of Rhetoric.* In his section on the knowledge necessary to be a successful politician, Aristotle specifies that on matters of war and peace, "it is also necessary to consider (τεθεωρηκέναι) how one's own wars, as well as those of others, have turned out (πῶς ἀποβαίνουσιν). For similar circumstances produce comparable results."[25] Precedents were thus understood as libraries that informed decision-makers as to what was likely to work in certain circumstances.

While our sources do not specifically mention probabilities of success, they hint at *longue durée* perspectives that ancient decision-makers purportedly took, as new pressures brought about the need for change and adaptation.[26] The continued supremacy of Athens, for instance, is explained by Thucydides as indicative of a general truth: "necessity states that, just as with a skill (τέχνης), improvements always prevail; and though unchanging customs may be best for undisturbed communities, constant necessities of action (ἀναγκαζομένοις) must be accompanied by the constant

[24] Aen. Tact. 11.1-2: Ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν δεῖ τοῖς ἀντιπροθυμουμένοις προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν καὶ μηδὲν εὐθέως ἀποδέχεσθαι διὰ τάδε. ῥηθήσονται δὲ ἑξῆς αἰἐπιβουλαὶ ἐκ τῆς βίβλου1 παραδείγματος ἕνεκεν, ὅσαι κατὰ πόλιν ἐξ ἀρχόντων ἢ ἰδιωτῶν γεγόνασιν καὶ ὡς ἔνιαι αὐτῶν κωλυθεῖσαι διελύθησαν.

[25] Arist. *Rhet.* 1.4.9: ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα μὴ μόνον τοὺς οἰκείους πολέμους τεθεωρηκέναι ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλων, πῶς ἀποβαίνουσιν· ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν ὁμοίων τὰ ὅμοια γίγνεσθαι πέφυκεν.

[26] Rutherford 1994: 55-6.

improvement of methods (ἐπιτεχνήσεως)."[27] Conversely, Plutarch refers to Sparta's eventual defeat at the hands of Epameinondas in terms of trial-and-error where experience ultimately proved decisive. In the words of Antalkidas, Agesilaos deserved reproach for "having taught those who were neither willing, nor knowledgeable about how to fight."[28] According to Plutarch, having to regularly fight against the Lakedaimonians ultimately forced the Thebans to become more warlike, "such that they were trained (ἐγγυμνασαμένους) through the many campaigns of the Lakedaimonians against them."[29] The example does not contravene our argument about building libraries from past experiences to estimate probabilities of success, since the very idea of practice implied by the verb ἐγγυμνάζειν points to a mindfulness of past failures and a constant attempt to improve one's chances of success. From the perspective of the agonistic culture of the Hellenistic world (see Ch. 2 and 3), we thus witness the dynamics of risk calculation, as various actors actively tried to upend the odds of success in their favor.

The theme of incremental success through trial-and-error is most often used by Hellenistic historians to refer to the rise of Rome. Polybios discusses the Romans' talent to adapt and learn through experience how to overcome in naval affairs their more established Carthaginian enemy. The author mentions their daring (τόλμη), having set their minds (ἐν νῷ λαμβάνοντες) to challenge the Carthaginian naval supremacy, "whose hegemony of the sea had been undisputed for generations."[30] The trope of Roman adaptation to, and ultimate triumph upon, their erstwhile superior enemies, was promoted in

[27] Thuc. 1.71.3: ἀνάγκη δὲ ὥσπερ τέχνης αἰεὶ τὰ ἐπιγιγνόμενα κρατεῖν· καὶ ἡσυχαζούσῃ μὲν πόλει τὰ ἀκίνητα νόμιμα ἄριστα, πρὸς πολλὰ δὲ ἀναγκαζομένοις ἰέναι πολλῆς καὶ τῆς ἐπιτεχνήσεως δεῖ. (trans. Crawley).

[28] His first defeat was mockingly called "a fine tuition fee that you claim from the Thebans for teaching them how to fight when they did not wish it, and did not even know how." Plut. *Ages.* 26.2: ἦ καλὰ τὰ διδασκάλια παρὰ Θηβαίων ἀπολαμβάνεις, μὴ βουλομένους μηδὲ ἐπισταμένους μάχεσθαι διδάξας.

[29] Agesilaos had contravened an ancient Lykourgan *rhetra* that specifically prohibited the Spartans to make frequent campaigns against the same enemy, in order that the enemy "might not learn how to make war." Plut. *Ages.* 26.3.

[30] Polyb. 1.20.12: Εὐθὺς ἐπιβαλέσθαι Καρχηδονίοις ναυμαχεῖν τοῖς ἐκ προγόνων ἔχουσι τν κατὰ θάλατταν ἡγεμονίαν ἀδήριτον.

many sources through various case-studies. And while Frank Walbank (1967) suggests that such stories are merely apocryphal,[31] they nonetheless suggest the authors' insistence on the importance of experience and precedent as educational tools that informed one's perceived probability of success.

Diodorus Siculus concisely captures both approaches to the probability of success when discussing the arguments between the Carthaginian and Roman envoys on the eve of the First Punic War. On their part, the Phoenicians appeal to precedent to suggest that they are bound to win any future encounters, "[as] they wondered how the Romans dared to cross into Sicily while the Carthaginians were the masters of the sea, for it was obvious to all that, should they not protect their friendship they would no longer dare even wash their hands in the sea."[32] Referring to the Carthaginians' record of success as φανερὸν πᾶσιν, was meant as a warning to anyone who might try to threaten their naval prowess. The Romans, on their part, emphasized the importance of accumulated experience to improve where they had failed in the past. As such, while not denying the Carthaginians' present naval power, they issued their own warning, that the Phoenicians' prominence would ultimately prove their own undoing: – as was the case with the erstwhile invincible Spartans - "for the Romans have always turned out to be pupils stronger than their teachers."[33] Precedents, therefore, informed the present in two interconnected ways, by signaling the chances of success under similar conditions, and by providing the trial-by-error experience that helped improve one's odds. These approaches are two sides of the same coin, so to speak, as ancient decision-makers assessed present circumstances in the light of past experiences, identifying and prioritizing recurring patterns that served either as guidelines or as warnings for their initiatives.

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[31] Walbank 1967: vol. 1, 75. For specific instances of Roman technical adaptation, see Polyb. 1.20.14-16, Diod. Sic. 5.40.3-5, Sall. *Cat.* 51.37-39, Cic. *Tusc.* 1.1, *Rep.* 2.30, Ath. 6.273.d-e, Poseidonius *FGrH* 87 F59.

[32] Diod. Sic. 23.2.1: οἱ Φοίνικες θαυμάζειν ἔφασαν πῶς διαβαίνειν τολμῶσιν εἰς Σικελίαν Ρωμαῖοι θαλαττοκρατούντων Καρχηδονίων· φανερὸν γὰρ εἶναι πᾶσιν ὅτι μὴ τηροῦντες τὴν φιλίαν οὐδὲ νίψασθαι τὰς χεῖρας ἐκ τῆς θαλάσσης τολμήσουσιν.

[33] Diod. Sic. 23.2.1: μαθητὰς γὰρ τοὺς Ρωμαίους ἀεὶ ὄντας γίνεσθαι κρείττους τῶν διδασκάλων.

5.2 Experience and Collective Memory

Experience, therefore, was a formative element of probabilistic risk. The idea of precedents as "libraries of knowledge" that signaled likely behaviors or outcomes fits well with the Aristotelian conception of τέχνη as a product of experience-*via*-memory. As Aristotle explains in his *Metaphysics,* "τέχνη is created when from many notions of experience (ἐμπειρίας ἐννοημάτων) a single universal estimation (μία καθόλου … ὑπόληψις) comes about concerning similar matters (τῶν ὁμοίων)."[34] The key detail here is τῶν ὁμοίων, which is regularly interpreted by modern translators as "similar objects", τέχνη being approached from an artisanal perspective. The translation can in fact be extended to more general considerations of circumstances, given the centrality of ὑπόληψις. Indeed, perception and judgement – note the presence of ἐννόημα, μαθητική and φρόνιμα[35] - play a key role in determining consistency among a string of conditions and experiences: "it is a matter of τέχνη [to estimate (ἔχειν ὑπόληψιν)] that it involves all such matters of a certain kind (κατ' εἶδος) through which they are distinguished."[36] As Tom Angier (2010) explains, "the value of such universal knowledge consists, crucially, in its affording systematic explanations of why certain types of individuals behave and interact the way they do."[37]

Having access to, and being able to synthesize information about past outcomes was considered by historians a great didactic tool. For Polybios, being able to handle averse or dangerous circumstances depends principally on one's ability to analyze precedents in the context of similar circumstances:

> By transferring likely scenarios (τῶν ὁμοίων) to our own circumstances, we have the means to anticipate what is to come (προϊδέσθαι τὸ μέλλον), and enables us at certain times to take

[34] Arist. *Metaph.* 981a, 6-8.
[35] See especially Arist. *Metaph.* 980a-b.
[36] Arist. *Metaph.* 981a, 10-13.
[37] Angier 2010: 39. For more, see Reeve 1992: 77–8. He explains that the formal deprivileging of the τέχναι reflects Aristotle's view that the crafts are grounded in experience of particular phenomena (see Arist. *APr.* 46a18–22 and Arist. *Metaph.* 981a3 above), which by their nature do not admit of a precise *logos.*

> precautions, and at other times, by recalling former occurrences (μιμούμενον τὰ προγεγονότα), to handle (ἐγχειρεῖν) more confidently impending threats (τοῖς ἐπιφερομένοις).[38]

Significantly, *contra* Beerden, there is not a single mention in the passage of any divinatory practice or divine force called-upon to infer the future. Instead, the language of τέχνη is prevalent, as precedents (τῶν ὁμοίων) are considered tools that one can use (ἐγχειρεῖν – lit. "handle") to understand and deal with the crisis at hand. As mentioned in previous chapters, the cognitive abilities of the decision-maker are decisive, where τέχνη is accompanied by the deliberative process that guides the mental transference (μεταφερεῖν) between the past and the present. In providing his analysis, Polybios was commenting on the ἰδίωμα (specific character) of history concerned with knowing (γνῶναι) the words actually spoken, and ascertaining (πυνθάνεσθαι) the reason (αἰτίαν) why that which was done or spoken either failed/was erroneous (διέπεσεν) or was done properly (κατορθώθη). History, therefore, provides the tools that assist the τέχνη of risk assessment. The didactic value of history according to Polybios has been comprehensively studied,[39] while our analysis further encourages us to consider history as a collection of precedents that could help a decision-maker improve the odds of an initiative. As Polybios put it, "there is no more appropriate correction (διόρθωσιν) for people than the knowledge of past actions (τῆς τῶν προγεγενημένων πράξεων ἐπιστήμης)."[40] Good decision-making is thus not simply a matter of personal experience,[41] but requires a comprehensive knowledge and understanding of past initiatives and outcomes that will in turn inform the decision-maker about the risks that are worth taking. Indeed, through the words of Aemilius Paullus, Polybios emphasizes the importance of history to determine risk

[38] Polyb. 12.25b.3.
[39] See Luce 1997: 90-94 and Walbank 2002: 231-241. For a general discussion on Polybios' *Histories* in relation to the works of Herodotus and Thucydides, see McGing 2010.
[40] Polyb. 1.1.3.
[41] Luce 1997: 92-96.

probabilities, stating that "the difference between the foolish and the wise is that the former are educated (παιδεύεσθαι) by their own misfortunes, while the latter by those of their neighbors."[42]

Such views on the role of history were not purely Polybian, but were echoed by other Hellenistic historians. For Diodorus Siculus, the link between experience, history, and τέχνη is fundamental to understanding the risks that individuals and communities took. In his introduction to his *Library of History,* he asserts that universal histories (κοινὰς ἱστορίας) are a schooling without danger (ἀκίνδυνον διδασκαλίαν) that provide their readers the most excellent experience (καλλίστην ἐμπειρίαν) of what is advantageous (συμφέροντος).[43] The ἀκίνδυνον quality of historical teachings signals the implicit probabilistic quality of history. The concept is clearly important for Diodorus' purposes, as highlighted by repetition of the maxim that "sagacity which comes about through the histories of the failures (ἀποτευγμάτων) and successes (κατορθωμάτων) of others, possesses an education without the experience of evils (ἀπείρατον κακῶν)."[44] The observer's distance from dangers afforded by history helps the decision-maker anticipate outcomes in similar circumstances, and take whatever initiatives may improve one's chances of success. Diodorus thus points to other forms of risk mitigation as a τέχνη. Indeed, by mentioning κατόρθωσις vis-à-vis the decision-making process, Diodorus refocuses our attention on the sagacity (σύνεσις) that history affords its students. Such formulations re-emphasize my argument about deliberation as a τέχνη (see Chapter 1) supported by the historian's explicit statement that historians

[42] Polyb. 29.20.4: τοῦτο γὰρ διαφέρειν ἔφη τοὺς ἀνοήτους τῶν νοῦν ἐχόντων, διότι συμβαίνει τοὺς μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἰδίαις ἀτυχίαις παιδεύεσθαι, τοὺς δ' ἐν ταῖς τῶν πέλας.

[43] Diod. Sic. 1.1.1: Τοῖς τὰς κοινὰς ἱστορίας πραγματευσαμένοις μεγάλας χάριτας ἀπονέμειν δίκαιον πάντας ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι τοῖς ἰδίοις πόνοις ὠφελῆσαι τὸν κοινὸν βίον ἐφιλοτιμήθησαν· ἀκίνδυνον γὰρ διδασκαλίαν τοῦ συμφέροντος εἰσηγησάμενοι καλλίστην ἐμπειρίαν διὰ τῆς πραγματείας ταύτης περιποιοῦσι τοῖς ἀναγινώσκουσιν.

[44] Diod. Sic. 1.1.2-3: ἡ δὲ διὰ τῆς ἱστορίας περιγινομένη σύνεσις τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἀποτευγμάτων τε καὶ κατορθωμάτων ἀπείρατον κακῶν ἔχει τὴν διδασκαλίαν.

"are rendered a kind of assistants of divine foresight."[45] The skill of risk calculation is thus not only a matter of personal experience and individual deliberative qualities, but also involves the study of history. Conversely, Roberto Nicolai's argument that the idea of history as a science is foreign to ancient authors, is not tenable.[46] For ancient historians, probabilistic risk was an acquirable skill that could be exercised, as decision-makers were expected to estimate the potential outcomes of present crises by considering their circumstances in light of historical precedents.

Diodorus Siculus' treatment of Agathokles, tyrant of Syracuse, offers an enlightening example of the function of text as a library meant to inform one's sagacity and actions, while also detailing the interplay between memory and text. Agathokles is presented as a generally resolute leader (ὑποστατικὸς) who would normally not be without hope (μηδέποθ' ἑαυτὸν ἀπελπίσας), only to lose his head when his authority was for the first time severely threatened: "he was no longer able to make calculations, and no longer remembered any of the experiences of Dionysios the tyrant."[47] Offering a further example of the importance of resilient leadership through observation and speculation (see Chapter 1), the passage highlights the power of precedent as a didactic tool. Indeed, Diodorus qualifies his earlier comments about Agathokles by recounting in detail Dionysios' actions "when he lost any hope about his continued rule, due to the magnitude of the impending dangers." The passage speaks to Marincola's argument that ancient historiography was a genre with pretentions to usefulness. It offered predicatability and the opportunity to correct one's own life based on past *exempla* that confirmed the historians' fascination with what joined them to the past, rather than what separated them from it.[48]

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[45] Diod. Sic. 1.1.3: ὥσπερ τινὲς ὑπουργοὶ τῆς θείας προνοίας γενηθέντες.
[46] Nicolai 2007: 18.
[47] Diod. Sic. 20.78.1: Συρακουσσῶν τε κυριεύσας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων καὶ ναῦς καὶ χρήματα κεκτημένος καὶ δύναμιν σύμμετρον, ἐξησθένησε τοῖς λογισμοῖς, οὐδὲν τῶν γενομένων περὶ Διονύσιον τὸν τύραννον μνησθείς.
[48] Marincola 2007: 21.

The point is further emphasized by the fact that Dionysios ultimately "managed to exert control over all the issues that seemed insurmountable and increased his rule even more, [...] leaving to his descendants the greatest dominion in Europe."[49] Significantly, however, he did so only after he was persuaded to persevere by his advisors Heloris, the eldest of his friends, and Megakles, his brother-in-law, who pointed out that past precedents dictated that a peaceful transition of power was never an option for tyrants.[50] The fact that Dionysios followed their advice was thus meant as an *exemplum* of resilience for his descendants. Allegorical precedents thus informed Dionysios through Heloris and Megakles, whose resilience was meant, in turn, to inspire Agathokles. Diodorus thus paints Agathokles' *aporia* as inexcusable because he was in a privileged position to benefit from inherited probabilistic knowledge, and plan his actions accordingly. Instead, "he was not supported by any of these considerations nor did he test his mortal expectations by experience but was abandoning his exalted rule on these terms."[51] Like Polybios, then, Diodorus makes it clear that personal experience, while singled out as distinct from history, is at the same time informed by it, as it occupies but the latest position in a diachronic spiral. Significantly, though, the Agathokles case-study, with its multiple temporal layers, affords Diodorus the opportunity to implicitly draw attention to the privileged position that his own

[49] Diod. Sic. 20.78. 3: τούτου γάρ ποτε συνδιωχθέντος εἰς περίστασιν ὁμολογουμένως ἀπεγνωσμένην καὶ διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν ἐπηρτημένων κινδύνων ἀπελπίσαντος μὲν τὰ κατὰ τὴν δυναστείαν, μέλλοντος δ' ἐκ τῶν Συρακουσσῶν ἐξιππεύειν πρὸς ἑκούσιον φυγήν, [...] ὑπὸ δὲ τούτων τῶν παρακλήσεων ὁ Διονύσιος μετεωρισθεὶς ἐνεκαρτέρησε πᾶσι τοῖς δοκοῦσιν εἶναι δεινοῖς καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν μείζονα κατεσκεύασεν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐν τοῖς ταύτης καλοῖς ἐγγηράσας ἀπέλιπε τοῖς ἐκγόνοις μεγίστην τῶν κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην δυναστείαν.

[50] Diod. Sic. 20.78.2-3: 'Ελωρις ὁ πρεσβύτατος τῶν φίλων ἐπιλαβόμενος τῆς ὁρμῆς "Διονύσιε," φησίν, "καλὸν ἐντάφιον ἡ τυραννίς." παραπλησίως δε τούτῳ καὶ ὁ κηδεστὴς Μεγακλῆς ἀπεφήνατο πρὸς αὐτόν, εἰπὼν ὅτι δεῖ τὸν ἐκ τυραννίδος ἐκπίπτοντα τοῦ σκέλους ἑλκόμενον ἀπιέναι καὶ μὴ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἀπαλλάττεσθαι.

[51] Diod. Sic. 20.79.1: 'Αγαθοκλῆς δ' ἐπ' οὐδενὶ τούτων μετεωρισθεὶς οὐδὲ τὰς ἀνθρωπίνας ἐλπίδας ἐξελέγξας τῇ πείρᾳ τηλικαύτην ἀρχὴν ἔκδοτον ἐποίει ταύταις1 ταῖς ὁμολογίαις.

work occupied within the inter-generational transmission of knowledge. His *Library of History* was thus touted as a physical library that propagated the very lessons it encapsulates.

5.3 Risk, Grudges, and Revenge

I argue, therefore, that probabilistic risk was a manifestation of collective memory, where the sense of the past gave collective continuity to experience.[52] Polybios' mention of ὑπομνήματα with regard to history is noteworthy, considering that a ὑπόμνημα refers both to the raw material for historians, and to a monument.[53] Indeed, the function of historical works as physical memorials of the past has long been discussed in the context of collective memory.[54] For our purposes, it is worth emphasizing the cumulative aspect of the phenomenon, as each generation (ideally) adds to the inherited ancestral knowledge. Thus, the remembrance and accumulation of precedents renders the likelihoods of outcomes in ostensibly similar circumstances more accurate. As Graham Oliver (2012) explains when pointing to the many factors that shape one's memory, "the intermeshing of individual memories create collective remembrance, feeds it, and maintains its continuity. It is through such remembrance that human societies develop consciousness as to their identity, as located in time."[55] The statement speaks to Hans-Joachim Gehrke's (2010) observations of history as part of the social *Lebenswelt* (life-world) with formative power over the community. The Hellenistic emphasis on precedent, then, signals that

[52] Cusumano 2013: 17.
[53] Luraghi 2010: 256. For the cult of Μνήμη in the Hellenistic city, see Chaniotis 2007.
[54] "Historical memory" was not exclusively transmitted by historians or scholar, but followed historians, poets, singers of hymns, pilgrims of sanctuaries, and mercenaries who visited touristic attractions. Chaniotis 2009: 254. On the matter of intertextuality in Greek historiography, see Hornblower 1994: 54-72. For specific examples, see Gagné 2006 on the Salmakis epigram from Halikranassos that traces a complex symbolic map of the city in space and time, representing the aitia of contemporary ritual events, while making several statements of kinship diplomacy. Also, Bresson 2006 on the role of the Lindos Chronicle to preserve damaged or perishable material, while making important claims about the prestige and extensive relations of Rhodos throughout the city's history. Histories and archives were used to bring these back to life.
[55] Oliver and Low 2012: 5.

probabilistic risk based on precedent was part of what Gehrke calls "intentional history,"[56] as yet another way for Hellenistic societies to accomodate the past into the present.

And just as the distant past could be summoned into the present, so too could it echo into the distant future. The collective remembrance of past crises also carried the knowledge of what was possible, even probable, to happen again, despite the lack of discernible looming threats; as the ancient proverb advised, "when at peace, prepare for war."[57] Public amnesty decrees, for instance, point to a community's efforts to raise awareness of potential dangers through oaths of allegiance and reconciliation, as part of the performance of political rituals intended to restore order.[58] Such is the oath taken by the people of Magnesia-on-the-Sipylos on the occasion of their city's absorption by Smyrna, an initiative backed by Smyrna's ally, Seleukos II:

> ... I shall transgress nothing of what is in the agreement, nor shall I change for the worse the things written in it, in any way or on any pretext whatsoever; and I shall be a citizen, with concord (ὁμονοίας) and without political strife (ἀστασιάστως), according to the laws of the Smyrnaeans and the decrees of the demos, and I shall join in preserving the autonomy and the democracy, and the other things which have been granted to the Smyrnaeans by King Seleucus, with all zeal and at all times ...[59]

Formal references to *stasis*[60] have been problematic for scholars who generally try to explain them as a communal effort to promote reconciliation and *homonoia*. The problem, according to Benjamin Gray

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[56] As Gehrke further explains, a group's identity is determined, beyond biology, by the subjective and collective self-categorization according to which one is a member of the community, an attitude or feeling, pre-conscious, on which one has reflected or accepted unquestioningly during the process of socialization, which is part of the "life-world" in question. Thus, communities are not natural creations, but intentional units. Gehrke 2010: 15-17.

[57] Onas. *Strat.* 37 and Liv. 30.31.

[58] Gray 2015: 57.

[59] OGIS 229 B ll.38-43 (trans. Bagnall and Derow).

[60] The few direct references to *stasis* in inscriptions should not be taken as any indication that the potential for future civil discord was not a concern for ancient Hellenistic decision-makers. According to Xenophon, such concerns were in fact at the heart of communal social contracts: "Everywhere in Hellas there is a law that citizens swear to be of one mind (ὁμονοῆσειν), and everywhere they swear this oath." The explanation he offers for the widely-used practice is "that the people obey the laws." Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.16: καὶ πανταχοῦ ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι νόμος κεῖται τοὺς πολίτας ὀμνύναι ὁμονοήσειν, καὶ πανταχοῦ ὀμνύουσι τὸν ὅρκον τοῦτον· [...] ἵνα τοῖς νόμοις πείθωνται. The connection between *homonoia* and *stasis* is evident, considering that violent

(2016), is that they "in fact rarely and conclusively actually terminate civic discord because there was always some lingering tension that remained or was alluded to."[61] Moreover, Hans van Wees (2008) has opined that the commemoration of past crises could in fact lead to further violence - a point to which we shall return.[62] These realities thus raise questions as to why Hellenistic communities indulged in an ostensibly Sisyphean effort towards long-lasting peace by means of (futile) public displays of *homonoia*.

I suggest that we can tease out a possible answer by approaching the issue from the point of view of precedents as cultivated memory. In the case of Magnesia and Smyrna, despite the purported celebratory tone of the decree, the lingering tension between the two rivals is palpable. We are privy to concerns of future conflict, paradoxically reiterated with every uttered claim meant to quell those very concerns. Indeed, the explicit use of the adverb ἀστασιάστως to strengthen the claim to ὁμόνοια, is not only a reminder of past troubles, but also implies that tensions and the threat of future violence permeated a *de facto* divided community (See also Ch. 4). The force of the message is made clear by the fact that ἀστασιάζειν is extremely rarely used in inscriptions. The only other text from the Hellenistic period that mentions the verb is an honorary decree from the island of Ios, dating from 306-1 BC. Though ostensibly it praises Antigonos Monophthalmos and his son Demetrios for "returning freedom and the ancestral laws to the people of Ios," the inscription clearly hints at domestic concerns, as the

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factionalism was often performed as a kind of anti-citizenship behavior that sought to challenge and supersede the authority of the established *polis* laws and its officers. For stasis as a struggle against the established laws of the state, see Arist. *Pol.* 1308b20-25. See also Gray 2016: 70, as an expression of anti-citizen behavior. It nullifies and invalidates present order and authority. Moreover, Angelos Chaniotis has pointed out that references to civil war do not appear on epitaphs, which suggest not that there was no stasis, but that it was considered a form of miasma that could affect the community's religious scruples. van Wees 2008: 42. To his observation we may add the reality that unpleasant memories recorded on epitaphs were also avoided because they might foster a cycle of personal vendettas.

[61] Gray 2016: 81. Attempts to explain this seeming paradox have recently focused on a kind of cultural failing rooted in the agonistic character of *polis* culture, with Gray 2016: 69, suggesting that to achieve long-lasting peace, a different "civic script" was needed which would require a complete socio-cultural transformation of Hellenistic poleis. On the *agon* in public trials as an expression of political tension, see Loraux 2002: 232-238.

[62] van Wees 2008: 42.

Iosians celebrate the newly-gained opportunity "that we may defend our city, being of one mind (ὁμονοῦ[ῦ]ντες) and without strife (ἀστασί[αστοι]..."[63]

The intimate and emotional appeals to *homonoia* without *stasis*, coupled with the open-ended temporal sphere of the texts, suggest that these inscriptions were meant not simply to remind the community of potential dangers, but rather to keep individual members invested in the collective poliadic project. Indeed, there was no discernible point in time when the drafters of the document imagined it to no longer be relevant; just as the terms of the agreement were to be for all time, so was the community's emotional investment in it supposed to be. A case in point is the reconciliation inscription set up at Didyma to mark the end of the war between Miletos and Magnesia-on-the-Maeander at the beginning of the 2nd century BC. Among its many contractual obligations, the text records the oath that each side was to take in turn: "I swear by Artemis Leukophryene/Apoll|o of Didyma and] all the other gods and goddesses to maintain the | [treaty and] to abide by its terms and not to bear grudges (μνησικακήσειν) for any | previous occurrences."[64] The oath was to be observed for all time. The phrasing was not merely a ritualistic formality but pointed to an awareness of the resilience of insidious grudges over long periods of time. It was ultimately an acknowledgement from both parties that there always remained a chance, no matter how small, that violence could once more erupt at some point in time, even if that moment was beyond the confines of discernible developments.[65] This explains the military

[63] IG XII Suppl. 168. ll. 4, 12. As noted in previous chapters, behind such calls for unity stood anxieties about internecine tensions and violence (Ch. 4). And for a community like Ios, caught in the conflict between the Antigonids and the Ptolemies at the end of the 4th century BC, the past problem of factionalism and partisan politics remained a distinct possibility after the setting up of the decree with the occasion of recent Antigonid successes in the region.
[64] Burstein, 37. Milet. I^3,148.
[65] And as we have already shown in Chapter 3, swearing oaths did not guarantee that individuals would abide by them, nor that the oath-takers were ever actually interested in reconciling with their erstwhile enemies. As the oligarchic coup in 404 BC at Athens shows, the very public rituals of reconciliation and *homonoia* that had been touted since 411 BC simply did

tacticians' repeated warnings against complacency about the future. Aineias Taktikos writes that "those who are going to contend for all these precious stakes must not ignore any preparation and effort, but must have foresight of many and varied activities, so that they may not be deemed responsible if they fail."[66] In turn, Onasander advises that "one must not break faith in a treaty or be the first to commit a sacrilegious act, but one must be suspicious (ὕποπτον) to guard against festering deceit (ὕπουλον) on the part of the enemy, for the intentions of those with whom the treaty has been concluded are uncertain."[67] These examples are an emphatic call for collective precaution against enduring sources of danger which, like a terrible infection, may fester for a long time beneath the surface of a seemingly healthy community.

The need for long-term collective vigilance against potential threats is best understood in the context of a long tradition of resentment and revenge in ancient Greece, with a particularly Homeric flavor. J. E. Lendon has shown that the ethos of Homeric vengeance persisted into the Classical period, as cities modeled their behavior in the image of Homeric heroes, for whom vengeance was a way to restore injured honor and lost status.[68] At the same time, Nick Fisher has observed that τιμωρία was a major motivation to engage in *stasis* because of its connection to *hybris*. Such agonistic and antagonistic language, Fisher explains, effectively guaranteed that the Archaic ideology of violence remained pervasive.[69] Beyond Archaic and Classical literary examples, epigraphic evidence attests that revenge continued to be an important factor in the self-perception of Hellenistic communities. Τιμωρία is

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not help in quelling simmering civic rivalries. If anything, according to Gray, they had the reverse effect of reinforcing oligarchic resentment against the democratic regime. Gray 2016: 58.

[66] Aen. Tact. Intro.3: τοὺς οὖν ὑπὲρ τοσούτων καὶ τοιούτων μέλλοντας ἀγωνίζεσθαι οὐδεμιᾶς παρασκευῆς καὶ προθυμίας ἐλλιπεῖς εἶναι δεῖ, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν καὶ παντοίων ἔργων πρόνοιαν ἐκτέον, ὅπως διά γε αὐτοὺς μηδὲν φανῶσι σφαλέντες·

[67] Onas. *Strat.* 37. 2: δεῖ γὰρ οὐκ ἀσύνθηκον ἐν σπονδαῖς εἶναι οὔτ'2 αὐτόν τι φθάνειν ἀσεβὲς δρῶντα, ἀλλ' ὕποπτον,3 ὡς φυλάττεσθαι τὸ ἀπὸ τῶν4 πολεμίων ὕπουλον· ἄδηλοι γὰρ αἱ τῶν σπεισαμένων γνῶμαι.

[68] Lendon 2000: 22. Talk about law courts.

[69] Fisher 2000: 84-89. For a detailed discussion on revenge in Classical Athenian historiography, with multiple literary examples, see also Fisher 2000: 103-111.

explicitly mentioned on several occasions, as in a decree from Samothrake in honor of Lysimachos from the beginning of the third century BC. It mentions the assistance provided by the king in the wake of a pirate raid, noting that after helping crush the sacrilegious raiders, "the king arrived / in the region and handed over the prisoners / to the city and sent them to / the people, so that they might receive the / punishment that they deserved."[70] Beyond the military assistance and the care that he showed towards the temple and the city, Lysimachos' most celebrated intervention was providing the *demos* with the opportunity to punish the attackers for their brazen sacrilege.[71]

Moreover, Hellenistic historians were perceptive to the drive for revenge among their protagonists, as in the case of Polybios' account of the negotiations between Philip V and Rome in 197 BC, when other states expressed their concern that a potential Roman retreat from Greece would render them vulnerable to Macedonian retaliation. For his part, King Amynander of Epeirote Athamania purportedly "expected that all have foresight (*πρόνοιαν*) towards him, so that, when the Romans had left Hellas, Philip may not direct his anger against him." Amynander's rationale was not solely based on his recent dealings with Philip, but also took into account the strained historical relationship between Athamania and its stronger Macedonian neighbor, claiming that "the Athamanians can easily be overcome (εὐχειρώτους) by the Macedonians on account of their weakness and proximity of its

[70] IG XII 8.150, ll. 13-17: παραγενόμενος ὁ βασιλεὺ[ς] / [εἰ]ς τοὺς τόπους δέδωκεν ἐγδότους / [τ]ῆι πόλει καὶ ἀφέσταλκε πρὸς τὸν / [δ]ῆμ]ον, ὅπως τύχωσι τῆς προσηκού/[ση]ς τιμωρίας.

[71] See also I.Milet. 1027, ll. 2-4, where someone is honored for getting revenge against evil-doers swiftly ([τὴμ πᾶσαν σπουδὴν εἰς τὸ τοὺς κακούρ]γους τιμωρίας τυ[χεῖν]), and Austin 60 ll. 5-10, where Apollo is credited for punishing the Galatians and avenging the Greeks. As Chaniotis 2017: 103 explains, the specific and repeated mention of the attack taking place during the night serves to paint the raiders as cowardly, but also to emphasize just how sacrilegious their actions had been. The temple of Samothrake was in fact a place where torches were lit to offer light to banquets, while the destructive torches of the attackers were considered a perversion of the sacred ancestral rituals. Such behavior could not go unpunished.

territory."[72] Historical precedents and circumstances dictated, according to Amynander, that sooner or later the Macedonian power would reimpose itself in the region and punish any past intransigence.

These examples support Lendon's argument that resentment was felt as a state of indebtedness, implying a constant search for the opportune moment to strike against one's offenders.[73] Time was thus on the side of the injured party, who could afford to bid their time to take revenge. Xenophon, for example, mentions how the Trapezontines took advantage of the presence of the Greek army in northern Anatolia to exact damage upon their neighboring enemies, at whose hands they had continually suffered harm.[74] Sheila Ager (2013) has pointed out that such general emotional attachments to land could lead to enduring rivalries that could last decades, sometimes even centuries.[75] In line with our observations on *kairos* (Chapter 4), Fiona McHardy rightly points out that revenge was not an automatic instinct, but a matter of calculations of risks and cost benefits that ultimately determined one's actions.[76] By extension, such calculations could sometimes lead one to no longer seek retribution if the cost-benefit assessment proved too steep,[77] but the important takeaway from these

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[72] Polyb. 18.36.4: εἶναι γὰρ εὐχειρώτους Αθαμᾶνας αἰεὶ Μακεδόσι διά τε τὴν ἀσθένειαν καὶ γειτνίασιν τῆς χώρας.

[73] Lendon 2000: 15. In Greek, revenge is at times described as ἔχθρη ἡ προοφειλομένη. Herod. 5.82. For passages associating revenge with the destruction of cities, see Herod. 6.101, Thuc. 3.38.1 for the example of the debate over the Mytilenean affair, and Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.10, describing the atmosphere at Athens after the disaster at Aigospotamoi.

[74] Xen. *Anab.* 5.2.2: οἱ δὲ Τραπεζούντιοι ὁπόθεν μὲν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ῥᾴδιον ἦν λαβεῖν οὐκ ἤγον· φίλοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἦσαν· εἰς δὲ τοὺς Δρίλας προθύμως ἤγον, ὑφ᾽ ὧν κακῶς ἔπασχον, εἰς χωρία τε ὀρεινὰ καὶ δύσβατα καὶ ἀνθρώπους πολεμικωτάτους τῶν ἐν τῷ Πόντῳ. Also noteworthy is the attempted reconciliation between Archidamos and Kleomenes, with the *patrikos xenos* Nikagoras as mediator. Instead of reconciliation, Kleomenes used the opportunity to murder his old rival. Polyb. 5.30.1,5-6.

[75] See the famous rivalry between Priene and Samos. Both states laid claim to territory on the mainland opposite Samos. inscriptions attest to their continued enmity and their attempts at arbitration solution over the centuries involving Bias of Priene, Alexander the Great, Lysimachos, Antigonos Doson, Antiochos III, Rhodes, Manlius Vulso, and the Roman senate (Ager 1996: nos. 26, 74, 99, 160). But such calls for arbitration were not actually undertaken with a view to long-term stability, but with cynical intent, as each hoped that they would gain an advantage against their rival with the backing of a great power. Ager 2013: 503, 508.

[76] McHardy 2013: 1-5.

[77] See, for instance, some cases of *sympoliteia.* While Boehm 2013 is right to point out that such initiatives were very disruptive and traumatic in the life of a community, that would usually lead back to some kind of fragmentation, that is not always the case. Labuff 2016: 86-7, 144-46 has noted that the *sympoliteiai* between Latmos and Pidasa (SEG 47:1563), and Keramos and Rhodes, persisted because the smaller communities eventually figured out that it was not worth the trouble to

examples is that revenge remained an option and a possibility that could not be ignored. Such is the illuminating case of the statue of Philites the tyrannicide at Erythrai, vandalized by pro-oligarchic supporters sometime after 301 BC, more than thirty years after the return to power of the democratic faction. As Teegarden explains, the display, restoration, and subsequent periodic crowning of the statue by the democrats was a way to generate "common knowledge" among the general population to help them mobilize, should *stasis* return to Erythrai.[78] These practices sought to create a "low revolutionary threshold" against the enemies of a political regime, carrying the realization that there remained a chance, however small, of future *stasis*. Thus, the Erythraian democrats mitigated the potential risk of stasis by not only remembering their violent past (just as their rivals did), but also by keeping themselves emotionally engaged in the democratic cause through mnemonic rituals.

Remembering *stasis*, then, had less to do with reconciliation and *homonoia*, and more with promoting collective mindfulness of persisting dangers that could be resurrected by resentful and vengeful factions, whenever convenient. Building on Nino Luraghi's (2010) observation that the setting up of inscriptions speaks to a community's efforts to stabilize for the future the memory of events - or rather the *demos'* version of it -,[79] I argue that references to *stasis* were meant to counteract the problem of "the underweighting of rare events" identified by David Kahneman. The phenomenon explains why decision-makers oftentimes consider the likelihood of a dangerous event to be negligibly small. The usual cause for such "underweighting" is that participants either never experienced a rare event, or they

secede. Either, as in the case of Pidasa, because the sympoliteia turned out to be economically beneficial for them, or, as in the case of Keramos, because "revolution" would have proven too costly. See also Reger 2004: 151-3 explaining the lengths that the Latmians went to, in order to make the Pisadians feel like welcome, and thus avoid potential *stasis*.

[78] Teegarden 2014: 171-172. I.Erythrai 503.

[79] The practice reveals an increasing awareness of the value of documents as foundations of a truthful knowledge of the past. Luraghi 2010: 257.

did so very sporadically. Kahneman explains that "when it comes to rare events, our mind is not designed to get things quite right" - the plunder of Elis by Philip V being an apt example.[80] Collective memory encapsulated in public inscriptions thus affirmed the logical deduction that if it happened before, there was a chance that it could happen again. And by drawing attention to *stasis*, inscriptions helped "overweigh" its possibility, thus keeping citizens alert.[81] The psychological and emotional implications of such "confirmatory bias of memory" is highlighted by the negative formulations of public oaths, as individuals often swore about anti-civic behavior that they "will not" engage in. Kahneman explains that when presented with a problem framed in negative terms, people become more cautious and vigilant, because humans are psychologically more affected by potential loss than by possible gain.[82]

We are thus dealing with Vincent Azoulay's (2014) "concurrence mémorielle," where public dedications were invested with both positive and negative connotations, as opposing factions offered alternative versions of the ideologies that those monuments represented or stood against.[83] Hence the apparent paradox that communities could not afford to completely erase the memory of crisis, even when they publicly exhorted their constituents to forget past internal conflicts. Indeed, the command highlighting the new-found reconciliation between Magnesia and Miletos in 196 BC, οὐ μνησικακεῖν (lit.

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[80] Polybios lays the blame on the Eleians themselves for the disaster that befell them, because "they did not act correctly with respect to foresight of future affairs," by no longer seeking to regain from the Hellenes their ancestral inviolability. Polyb. 4.74.2: οὐκ ὀρθῶς κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ποιούμενοι πρόνοιαν·

[81] Kahneman 2011: 332-333. Spiegelhalter 2014: 17 also talks about "probability neglect" along similar lines, which oftentimes manifests itself through an almost obsessive concern by members of a community with highly unlikely threats such as terrorism, while ignoring other more probable risks in day to day life. Spiegelhalter's observations are more focused on the power of psychology and emotions to influence people's concerns, a topic addressed in the previous chapter.

[82] Kahneman 2011: 281. The perceived asymmetry between positive or negative expectations or experiences has an evolutionary history. Organisms that treat threats as more urgent than opportunities have a better chance to survive and reproduce. See also the "prospect theory framing experiment" that has shown that people become more risk-averse when possibilities are framed in positive gain terms. Conversely, they become more risk-seeking when outcomes are described in terms of loss. Fischhoff and Kadvany 2011: 76.

[83] Statues remained a tense subject and represented a clash of memories even in Roman times. Azoulay 2014: 238-242.

to not remember past evils, to not hold a grudge), points to the enduring power of memory while expressing awareness of the frustrations and tensions that could linger and erupt into violence long after the treaty between the two cities was concluded. The verb *οὐ μνησικακεῖν* appears only in the context of very tense situations,[84] as in the famous imposition of the *diagramma* of Alexander the Great pertaining to the imposition of the Exiles' Decree:

> I swear by Zeus, Athena, Apollo, Poseidon, that I shall show goodwill to those who have returned whom the city resolved to receive back, and I shall not harbor grudges (**μνησικακήσω**) against any of them for what he may have plotted (?) from the day on which I have sworn the oath, nor shall I hinder the safety of those who have returned…[85]

One would think that the promise of *εὔνοια* would suffice to peacefully reintegrate the exiles. But by referencing *μνησικακία*, the drafters of the *diagramma* made it clear that they were aware of the consternation and resentment that Alexander's sweeping decision was bound to create. And rather than intending it as an exhortation to abandon resentment, the public call to forget present disturbances can be interpreted as a call to caution, as well as a subtle warning that Macedonian authorities would keep a watchful eye for any signs of resistance to Alexander's will.[86] This dual role of such initiatives is also evident in the public monumental commemoration of capital punishment against the enemies of the state. Multiple accounts mention how tyrants or traitors were, or should have been, publicly executed to deter others from potentially posing a threat to the regime. As the Eresos anti-tyranny dossier shows, the

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[84] The other few examples include IG II^3 488 from Athens dated to 336/5 BC, IG XII,5.109 from Paros, dated to after 411 BC, and IG II^2 111 from Athens dated to 363/2 BC.

[85] RO 101, ll. 57-61: *ὀμνύω Δία Αθάναν Απόλλωνα Ποσειδᾶνα, εὐν/οήσω τοῖς κατηνθηκόσι τοῖς ἔδοξε ταῖ πόλι κατυδ/έχεσθαι, καὶ οὐ μνησικακήσω τῶννυ οὐδεν[ὶ] τ[ὰ] ἂν ἀμ/π[ε]ίση ἀπὺ τᾶι ἀμέραι τᾶι τὸν ὅρκον ὤμοσα, οὐδὲ δια/κωλύσω τὰν τῶν κατηνθηκότων σωτηρίαν…* (trans. Rhodes and Osborne).

[86] See Athens' covert resistance to Alexander spearheaded by Demosthenes. They plotted, bidding their time for a potential defeat of Alexander that would provide them the opportunity to revolt. Arr. 2.13.5-6, Diod. Sic. 17.8.5-6. For Demosthenes' activities, see Just. *Epit.* 11.2.7, Diod Sic. 17.4.7-8. As for Sparta's refusal to participate in the Lamian War, see Paul Cartledge's 2004: 126 explanation that they considered the occasion ill-timed for a revolt.

recorded death sentence of the tyrants was meant to show that the pro-democratic majority would back up the threats codified in their anti-tyranny law.[87] It was thus addressed both to contemporary audiences (present or absent from the city) and to future generations, encouraging some and deterring others, while never taking for granted the possibility that the *polis* would not have to face the threat of tyranny again. We may thus extend Emily Greenwood's (2016) argument about the "time-rich" character of Greek prose to inscriptions, as the latter are also concerned with the relationship between human temporality and complex patterns of causation. Greenwood's statement that "these texts encapsulate vast stretches of time and the lessons of vast stretches of time," also holds true for public decrees, as they too exhibit a certaein self-consciousness about how the genre of historiography intervenes in and contributes to historical time.[88]

The general concern with the resilience of resentment and the inherent danger therein over great stretches of time, is further expressed by Aristotle's unease with μνησικακία. He insisted that the μεγαλόψυχος man "does not bear a grudge (οὐδὲ μνησίκακος), for it is not a mark of greatness of soul to recall something against someone (τὸ ἀπομνημονεύειν), especially negative things, but rather to overlook them."[89] We get the sense that Aristotle's comment was part of a greater philosophical drive to counteract the Hellenic tendency to seek revenge, as exemplified by Diodorus' account of Dion of Syracuse. He chose to not bear a grudge against his own peers who had slighted him, and agreed to assist them when Syracuse was under attack, being described as "a brilliant soul and sophisticated in his calculations, who did not bear grudges, on account of his philosophical education."[90] Such examples

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[87] Teegarden 2014: 128.

[88] Greenwood 2016: 97.

[89] οὐδὲ μνησίκακος· οὐ γὰρ μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἀπομνημονεύειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ κακά, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον παρορᾶν. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1125a5

[90] Diod. Sic. 16.20.2: ὁ δὲ Δίων λαμπρὸς ὢν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας παιδείαν ἐξημερωμένος τοὺς λογισμοὺς οὐκ ἐμνησικάκησε τοῖς πολίταις. On Dion's character, see also Diod. Sic. 16.17.5. We also have proverbs advising "[to] not maintain

support Martha Nussbaum's reading that for Aristotle "true excellence of character has a relational nature: without making political and other-related concerns ends in themselves, one will lack not only justice but also true courage, true moderation, true generosity, [true] greatness of soul…"[91] Indeed, historical precedents suggest that the ideological stance promoted by Aristotle was not the rule, but rather a reaction to prevalent competing grudges throughout the Mediterranean world that oftentimes influenced *polis* decisions.[92] Demosthenes, for instance, made repeated pleas to his Athenian peers to not hold grudges (οὐ μνησικακεῖν) against other Hellenes when having to face the greater threat of Philip II, implying that such grudges were a real obstacle to putting together a concerted effort against the more significant Macedonian threat.[93] Also, Diodorus Siculus repeatedly described the political developments in the Greek mainland after the Peloponnesian War as the results of accumulated grudges that were manipulated for selfish purposes by *poleis* like Sparta.[94]

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immortal enmity, since you are a mortal," with some explicitly referring to μνησικακία: "one must not bear the evils of the past in memory." οὐ χρὴ φέρειν τὰ πρόσθεν ἐν μνήμῃ κακά and ἀθάνατον ἔχθραν μὴ φύλαττε θνητὸς ὤν, Lazaridis, G69 and 88, respectively. See also the example of Scipio who does not recommend retribution against those who broke their oaths, in spite of the popular support for such an action. Diod. Sic. 27.12-13. His restraint prompted Diodorus Siculus to note that "the true share in honor is the opinion of those who have been fortunate, when the victor bears good fortune in a humane way." Diod. Sic. 27 14: γὰρ ἀληθὴς κλῆρός ἐστιν ἡ δόξα τῶν εὐτυχούντων, ὅταν ὁ κρατῶν τὴν εὐτυχίαν φέρῃ κατ' ἄνθρωπον.

[91] Nussbaum 1986: 351. Historical examples also speak against Williams' 2012, 60-61 philosophical critique of Nussbaum's argument as "incoherent", considering that Williams is offering a purely philosophical *ad literam* reading of Aristotle, without considering the world of the *polis* within which Aristotle operates. See also Stover and Polansky 2003 on μεγαλοψυχία as acquisition of honor from others, for the sake of virtue and in relation to virtue.

[92] See also Smith's 2001, 39-45 proposition that Aristotle called for a revaluation of traditional Greek noble/virile ethics. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1095a-b.

[93] Dem. 5.14-19. See also Dem. 1.6-7, to not bear grudges against those who had supported the Macedonian regime. Also, Dem. 15.16, call to leave aside past evils and excuse the Rhodians of their being led into error. Mention of the Athenians' desire to help the Byzantines against Philip II, even though they had previously found fault with one another, Dem. 18.94-96. Liberty and freedom to be protected against Macedon, without grudge, Dem. 18.101. Athens does not bear a grudge against those whose freedom is attacked, Dem. 18.185.

[94] Diod. Sic. 15.5.2, 15.17.4, 15.40.2, and 15.45.2. See also Carthage grudge against the Mikatani, Diod. Sic. 26.23.

While retribution was not an automatic response to recent or ancestral slights,[95] holding grudges was generally expected from the injured parties. Demosthenes himself was not an unequivocal proponent of leaving the past behind, and on occasion recommended that Athenians give in to μνησικακία.[96] Also, during the famous conference at Sparta in 211 BC to discuss the Roman presence in Greece, Lykiskos the Akarnanian accused the Aitolians of harboring unwarranted grudges against the Successor kings, "[who] are often responsible for bestowing benefits on some and evils on others, depending on the changing circumstances," on account of which "others might justifiably be resentful (μνησικακεῖν) against them."[97] It was due to this general Hellenic attitude towards revenge that Rome's ostensible clemency (ὑπερβολὴν ἐπιεικείας) and exceeding humanity (διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς ἡμερότητος) - "having harbored no unduly harsh resentment (οὐδενὶ μνησικακήσαντες)" - was all the more surprising, prompting "kings, cities, and entire peoples to surrender their hegemony to Rome."[98] It was against this general expectation of resentment, then, that communities and philosophers like Aristotle reacted.

Precedents and the prevalent culture of resentment thus taught Hellenistic communities that dangers, however distant and unlikely, could never be ignored.[99] Their main concern was preparing the citizen body for those moments when, not whether, a crisis would (re)emerge. As such, Hellenistic *poleis*

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[95] See ff. 608. Also, authors allowed for the possibility that resentments could at times be patched up, as explained by Diodorus Siculus: "For people, a benefaction surpasses vengeance, and reasonableness surpasses cruelty against the beleaguered." Diod. Sic. 27.15: ὅτι προτερεῖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς μὲν τιμωρίας εὐεργεσία, τῆς ὠμότητος ἡ πρὸς τοὺς ἐπταικότας ἐπιείκεια. This echoes Herodotus' Artaphrenes' approach towards the erstwhile rebellious Ionians 6.42, and Polybios' observation about Philip V's abiding by the treaties with the Messenians: "do a little to heal the terrible wound." Polyb. 7.14.2: περὶ τὰς σφαγὰς μικρὸν ἴαμα.

[96] Resentment has its place in society, Dem. 18.99. At times one must be vindictive against those who are inherently untrustworthy. Dem. 23-191.

[97] ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ κατὰ τὰς τῶν καιρῶν περιστάσεις οἷς μὲν ἀγαθῶν οἷς δὲ κακῶν ἐγίνοντο παραίτιοι πολλάκις· περὶ ὧν τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ἴσως ἂν ἐξείη μνησικακεῖν. Polyb. 9.34.5.

[98] Diod. Sic. 32.4.4-5: τοιγαροῦν διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς ἡμερότητος οἵ τε βασιλεῖς καὶ αἱ πόλεις καὶ συλλήβδην τὰ ἔθνη πρὸς τὴν Ρωμαίων ἡγεμονίαν ἠὐτομόλησαν. A similar attempt was undertaken by the Persian satrap Artaphrenes to put the memory of the Ionian Revolt behind, who made it a point to treat the Ionians fairly while offering good government. Hdt. 6.42.

[99] Teegarden 2014: 129, speaks of this phenomenon as the "threat credibility" generated by "interior and exterior games," that could never be eliminated.

are a historical case-study for Roberto Esposito's (2011) concept of "immunization" as a protective response in the face of risk. In line with Esposito's biopolitical approach to society, Hellenistic *poleis* understood that there was a kernel of violence within society that could never be removed, only tamed. To do so, collective memory of *stasis* internalized the threat in order to gain a measure of control over it. Hellenistic risk mitigation through precedents, then, can be thought of as the "immunization" of the community against *stasis*. Esposito repeatedly refers to this inherent tension in society as a *pharmakon* that both threatens and defines the body politic.[100] Along the same lines, ancient risk suggests that Hellenistic communities accepted *stasis* as a *pharmakon*, whose inescapable and underlying possibility both threatened and confirmed their socio-political interactions and self-perceptions.

Conclusion

The last chapter has shown that, if risk was the point of intersection between deliberation and τέχνη, collective memory served as a playbook for the decision-making process. By recalling and considering historical precedents, Hellenistic communities effectively compiled "libraries of knowledge" that helped them deal with ostensibly analogous crises. Painting present circumstances with the same historical "brush", so to speak, was useful to motivate the community and get its constituents to face dangers and take risks. But the practice of thinking about and assessing dangers through precedents reveals a society concerned with forecasting short and long-term developments. And while it was impossible to piece together the entire puzzle of uncertainty, the unknowability of the future was thus demystified, as patterns emerged that were clear enough for decision-makers to follow or be wary of. The literary and

[100] "If the cure against a poison is poison, then disease and health no longer lie along the axis of a frontal opposition, but in a dialectical relationship that naturally makes one the opposite of the other, but also and above all, the instrument of the other." Esposito 2011: 125.

stone monuments that were produced by this multi-generational archival project shaped the community's intellectual and urban spaces. And while they codified, in a sense, the didactic and cautionary value of probabilistic risk, they also commemorated a community's determination to consolidate its own future.

EPILOGUE

"...and He shall wipe away every tear from their eyes.
And death shall no longer exist,
neither sadness, nor crying, nor pain,
shall exist anymore..."
- Revelation, 21:4

"We do not claim to know all the ways of Providence,
yet we can trust in them,
placing our confidence in the loving God
behind all of life, and all of history."
- George W. Bush[1]

In the wake of the September 11 attacks on the Twin Towers, President George W. Bush made a series of statements outlining the nature of the attack and its perpetrators, and the steps needed to confront the elusive enemy not just of the United States and the West, but of the whole world. The conflict that was subsequently known as the War on Terror, was portrayed as "a calling" of history upon the United States to combat not simply terrorism, with all its earthly and geo-political connotations, but terror itself - the essence of evil as an amalgam of fear, death, and destruction.[2] The moral connotations of the War on Terror were laid bare on many occasions, as President Bush repeatedly stated that "We are in a conflict between good and evil," where America is "the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity

[1] State of the Union Address, January 28, 2003, in Bush 2003: 220-21.
[2] Lincoln 2004: 25. "The advance of freedom is the calling of our time. It is the calling of our country.... We believe that liberty is the design of nature. We believe that liberty is the direction of history. [...] And as we meet the terror and violence of the world, we can be certain the author of freedom is not indifferent to the fate of freedom." Remarks at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html.

[and] the hope of all mankind [...] That hope still lights our way. And the light shines in the darkness. And the darkness will not overcome it."[3] Bruce Lincoln (2004) has identified in the President's statements a bastardized form of Manichean dualism where the United States is the instrument of God for the accomplishment of his purpose for all humanity.[4] The War on Terror was thus imbued with cosmic connotations, systematically presented as a revelation of a conflict "[whose] course is not known, yet its outcome is certain. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them."[5] This is not just a war like any other, but the manifestation of the eternal conflict, whose conclusion in the mortal realm will bring forth the promise of eternal peace. With the decisive triumph of freedom, "God's will is accomplished, and history comes to an end."[6]

The apocalyptic rhetoric surrounding the War on Terror also implicitly attests to a collective desire for a life without risk, where present uncertainties are upended by the guarantee of divine purpose. My exploration of communal risk in the Hellenistic age, however, offers a case study for a starkly different promise: that the uncertainties of an unforeseeable future are unavoidable and unending. Hellenistic communities were keenly aware of this reality, and incessantly strove to impose some measure of control and predictability over future developments through a variety of social, cultural, and political initiatives. In doing so, they expressed a cultural attitude towards danger and futurity that we understand as risk. As I have shown throughout my dissertation, Hellenistic decision-makers conceptualized risk management as a "deliberative expertise" to assess, mitigate, and sometimes even avert communal risk. Hellenistic decision-makers thus relied not on divine Providence, but on the

[3] Anniversary of September 11, September 11, 2002, in Bush 2003: 183.
[4] Lincoln 2007: 98.
[5] Maier 2005: 303-4.
[6] Lincoln 2004: 26-27.

cognitive processes that allowed them to calculate odds, quantify dangers, and make difficult choices. Their reliance on deliberation and good judgment is exemplified by their qualification of Tychē with Kairos, the opportune moment that needed to be determined and acted upon with reason, not blind faith or heedless courage.

Significantly, however, the "deliberative expertise" at the core of the communal decision-making process was not a specific characteristic of the Hellenistic age. From the Homeric monologues, to Themistokles' planning, and Perikles' grand strategy, we can point to many instances where decision-makers would pragmatically assess the consequences of their own actions, and the risks involved. Yet the underlying argument in my dissertation is that the concept of ancient socio-political risk was for the first time systematically analyzed by the intellectuals of the Hellenistic period. The engagement of Polybios with Aristotle on cognition and decision-making is characteristic of a cultural attitude that crystallized in the Hellenistic age. By extension, ancient socio-political risk points to a chronological and conceptual connection between the Hellenistic period and earlier times in ancient Greek history. At the same time, it also signifies an intellectual space where philosophical and historiographical concerns intersected and interacted, producing a coherent vision of uncertainty and futurity. Inscribed public decrees in turn corroborate that academic considerations reflected societal concerns about futurity, as communities struggled to best respond to crises.

Fundamentally, ancient risk allows us to reassess how we approach the Hellenistic *polis*. Its predilection for speculation, compromise, and contingency planning reveals a resilient and resourceful collective political entity that was able to adapt to changing geopolitical and economic conditions, and create long-term goals for its continued survival. Ancient risk, therefore, removes the need for hindsight in our analysis, and reveals the dynamism and determination of Hellenistic communities in the face of

great challenges. We must therefore abandon the structuralist rhetoric of fall and decay because it all-too-often relegates the post-Classical *polis* to the realm of powerlessness and dissilusion. Quite the contrary, the Hellenistic *oikoumenē* reveals itself as a world defined by relentless intentionality, estimation, and risk-taking in a continual *agōn* for local and regional prosperity and stability, each *polis* according to its own abilities.

The funerary stele of a certain Demokleides son of Demetrios from the Piraeus perfectly portrays the pressures of this relentless *agōn.* The stone depicts a young and pensive Demokleides sitting beside his *hoplon,* on what looks like a trireme. The curator of the National Archaeological Museum of Athens describes him as turning sorrowfully towards the sea, where he lost his life in a naval battle. But instead of sorrow, I see exhaustion, as the young man is finally able to put down his *hoplon* and rest, all by himself, thus shedding the responsibilities and pressures of public life as he drifts calmly on the still waters of Styx. The stone is a powerful reminder that eternal peace will not be gained through a decisive battle, or found in an apocalyptic promise, but will only be achieved in death. Until that moment comes, however, we are taught that we must all partake in the trials and triumphs of the dread dance of life.

FIGURE A. Detail from the Funerary Stele of Demokleides son of Demetrios. National Archeological Museum of Athens. Inv. 752. Photo Credit: Paul Vădan.

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