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APPETITE FOR ECSTASY: CHRONIC DISPOSSESSION AND BIOCHEMICAL GOVERNANCE IN AMERICA, 1870-1920

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Table of Contents

List of Figures

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Abstract

"Appetite for Ecstasy: Chronic Dispossession and Biochemical Governance in America, 1870-1920" is a study of how appetitive bodies could verge on and converge around the ecstasies of biochemical alteration amidst the dispossessive conditions that restricted, fractured, and normalized life under industrial settler capitalism. Its archives set those ecstasies off against urban and borderland locales imagined to belong only precariously to the jurisdictional frame of the United States—the transient atmospheres of New York or San Francisco's subterranean opium joints (chapter one, "On the Inertia of Appetite: Transient Relations from the Chinatown Opium Scene"), the autonomous movements of indigenous peyote meetings across the expropriative frontiers of federal territorial rule (chapter two, "Moved by Another Life: Allotted Time and Historical Poiesis in the Peyote Craze"), the nullified time of sensoria consumed by cocaine or drowned in chloral hydrate (chapter three, "Appetite for Nothingness: Pharmaconormativity and the Abandon of Reified Time"). Appetites for these sorts of altered experience were reconceived between the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth as the byproducts of and catalysts for scenes of somatic disorder.

More than just excavating the phenomenological feel of such experiences, this dissertation zeros in on aesthetic relays between the orectic and the ecstatic in order to lay out the regulatory protocols that the human sciences, public health authorities, and colonial bureaucracies developed to apprehend those who went out of their senses. In question throughout is how the settler capitalist imperatives to secure national borders, privatize landownership, and standardize time drove the formation of a split regime of biochemical governance. Or, put differently, how the forces of chronic dispossession came to invest a dispersed infrastructure of clinical knowledge and state

power that divided illicit drugs from therapeutic medicines so as to constrict the molecular flux of human bodies along interlocking strata of race, class, sex, and citizenship.

Yet, as a critique of biochemical governance, this dissertation also queries how the dispossessed people and populations it administered could bypass state and extrastate projects of somatic, fantasmatic, and spatiotemporal enclosure. No matter how totalizing the drive to secure the apparent coherence of day-to-day existence amidst the endogenous crises of settler capitalist social reproduction, I argue, the calculated volatility of these projects nonetheless left openings for ecstatic amplifications of experience to warp, decenter, or run out of sync with the common sense of collective and political life. Altered states, far from simply escaping or smoothing out the world as it is, carry the potential to assemble scenes of alternate worldmaking at the seams of what should feel seamless.

Introduction: Appetites for Ecstasy between Neural and Biochemical Governance

Appetites for ecstasy come up wherever appetitive bodies verge on and converge around an incipient exit from or passage between ordinary states of perception. Yet if the alternate paths these passages hold open may signal the onset of altered proximities to freedom, the desire to stage such a departure is prone to arise from situations of unfreedom.[1] Appetitive embodiment and the altered states it engenders remain inextricable, in this study, from the dispossessive conditions that restricted, fractured, allocated, and normalized life under industrial settler capitalism in America between the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century. Nonetheless, even as this dissertation situates its inquiry in archives originating from a specific national-historical context, it also seeks out the immanent dislocation of that provenance by the phenomena it would purport to contain. Archives of ecstasy tend to set the experiential scenarios they document off against urban and borderland locales imagined to belong only precariously to the geopolitical continuum federated under the United States: the transient atmospheres gathered in New York or San Francisco's subterranean opium joints, the peripheral kinaesthetics of a peyote craze traversing the unceded interiors of federal territorial rule, the chronic and fluid mutability of sensoria consumed by cocaine or drowned in chloral hydrate.[2] Jurisdictional enclosures of synchronic coherence in space and predestinate dominion over time were not all there – which is to say distantiated, unfinished, delayed – in these instances. Appetites for ecstasy could lead desiring bodies to protract and transfigure that not-all into a present or future

[1] Marquis Bey sees *ecstasis* as "a different kind of proximity to what is": a recursive, infinitizing movement ("a way to get outside getting outside of") or the *ad infinitum* of the outside it strays through. See Bey, "Scenes of Illegible Shadow Genders," in *Them Goon Rules: Fugitive Essays on Radical Black Feminism* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2019), 129-30.

[2] On the fictional origination of the scenario as "a copy of a lost copy," see Diana Taylor, *The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in the Americas* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 55.

horizon left open to the latent and incipient autonomies of other forms of life, not yet totalized by the dispossessive conditions from which they emerged.[3]

More than simply celebrating the liberatory effect of such appetites, though, this study lays out how settler capitalist authorities sought to constrain and channel the autonomizing potential altered experiences might carry by recasting them as the byproducts of and catalysts for somatic disorder. Aesthetic relays between the orectic and the ecstatic (some fictional; others ethnographic, journalistic, or autobiographical) focus each chapter's analysis of the regulatory protocols that the human sciences, public health authorities, and colonial bureaucracies developed to apprehend those who went out of their senses. In question throughout is how settler capitalist imperatives to securitize national borders, privatize landownership, and standardize time drove the formation of what I call *a split regime of biochemical governance*: a widely distributed infrastructure of clinical knowledge and state power that aimed to constrict the molecular flux of human bodies along interlocking strata of race, class, sex, and citizenship. My inquiry here speaks to recent theoretical work on the biopolitics of plasticity (elaborated more fully below) by tracking how the calculated intensification of volatility in and around bodies subject to biochemical governance could solidify, rather than disband, settler capitalist rule. Amy Kaplan's work on the strategically lawless and deterritorializing mobilities of US imperial expansion, Robert Nichols's work on the retroactive legalization of illegal settlement, Ken Gonzales-Day's work on the incorporation of lynch-mob vigilantism into the juridical order of state violence in the West, and studies of the instrumental logics of moral panic all underscore

[3] Amy Hollywood understands the "not all" of Georges Bataille's ecstatic mysticism, following Jacques Lacan, as a lacerating communication with a catastrophic and unresponsive "real" (or, "that which is," without representational or narrativizable content). See Hollywood, *Sensible Ecstasy: Mysticism, Sexual Difference, and the Demands of History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 35, 65-6, 81.

this point.[4] Just as the initial breakdown of law on the frontiers of settler colonization would over time serve to expand – not collapse – the reach of state power, so could the nominal forfeiture of self-governing rationality in otherwise sovereign subjects end up reinforcing their division from the irrecuperable disorder supposed to emanate from racialized, criminalized, and immiserated masses.[5] It was by externalizing the threat of biochemical instability onto these subjugated populations that industrial settler capitalism secured the apparent coherence of everyday life against the endogenous crisis tendencies of its reproduction.

Yet, no matter how intimately it spliced the calculus of state-racist power into the desire for alteration, no matter how extensively it strategized and seized control of the appetitive body through its own susceptibilities to flux, this regime of biochemical governance was not omnipotent. As a critique of that regime, this dissertation not only probes how settler capitalist rule perpetuated itself through the stratification of biochemical volatility but also insists on centering scenes where dispossessed people/s found ways to bypass state and extrastate projects of somatic, fantasmatic, and spatiotemporal enclosure. José Esteban Muñoz's negative-utopian reconception of ecstasy – for him a horizon of desire in which the aesthetic surplus of what's missing from the "straight time" of the present opens out onto the "not-yet-conscious" of another world in the making – provokes my sense of the critical potential of such scenes throughout this dissertation.[6] Kadji Amin's "deidealizing" appraisal of queer *jouissance* (masochistic or self-

[4] See Amy Kaplan, *The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002); Robert Nichols, *Theft is Property! Dispossession and Critical Theory* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2019); Ken Gonzales-Day, *Lynching in the West, 1850-1935* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); and Bruce Burgett, "Sex, Panic, Nation," *American Literary History* 21, no. 1 (2009): 67–86.

[5] On the interspersion of white fragility and white sovereignty, for instance, see Kyla Wazana Tompkins, "'You Make Me Feel Right Quare': Promiscuous Reading, Minoritarian Critique, and White Sovereign Entrepreneurial Terror" *Social Text* 35, no. 4 (December 2017): 53-86.

[6] José Esteban Muñoz, *Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of Queer Futurity* (New York: New York University Press, 2009), 25, 28. Muñoz derives the concept of the not-yet-conscious from the philosopher Ernst Bloch. See Bloch, *The Principle of Hope,* trans. Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice, and Paul Knight (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986), 1:11, 49. On negative utopianism see also Ernst Bloch and Theodor W. Adorno, "Something's Missing: A

shattering ecstasy), if not antithetical to Muñoz's utopianism, lays a contrasting stress on how the erotic atemporality sought in "ecstatic self-annihilation" may coincide with a "racist desire" for prehistoricity—a concern this study shares.[7] Nevertheless, taking up Jennifer Nash's call to read ecstasy's "racial iconography" from a black feminist stance attuned to "the paradoxes of pleasure rather than woundedness or the elisions of shared injury," this dissertation examines how scenes of ecstatic feeling could iconize the libidinal reflexes of racial domination while at the same time transcribing senses of collective and political life that might otherwise leave no trace.[8] Archives of ecstasy, if imbued with violent antagonism and fetishistic attraction to the perceived abjection of bodies in ecstasy, if intoxicated with the death-bound fatality of the appetitive disorders those bodies seemed to exhibit, could at the same time inadvertently extend the range of desires that remained irreducible to that racializing optic. In response to that ambivalence this dissertation underscores how ecstatic amplifications of experience could warp, decenter, or run out of sync with the protocols deployed to assimilate their energies to the hedonic repertoires of biochemical governance.

Altered states, far from simply exempting the sensorium from the world as it is, carry an autonomizing potential to gather scenes of alternate worldmaking at the seams of what should feel seamless. Nowhere is this potential more evident than in the transient atmospherics of opium joints (the principal scene of the first chapter, "On the Inertia of Appetite: Transient Relations

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Discussion between Ernst Bloch and Theodor Adorno on the Contradictions of Utopian Longing," in *The Utopian Function of Art and Literature: Selected Essays* trans. Jack Zipes and Frank Mecklenburg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), 1-17.

[7] Kadji Amin, "Racial Fetishism, Gay Liberation, and the Temporalities of the Erotic," in *Disturbing Attachments: Genet, Modern Pederasty, and Queer History* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017), 97, 93, 98. On self-shattering ecstasy, see Leo Bersani, *The Culture of Redemption* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 38, 72-3.

[8] Jennifer Nash, *The Black Body in Ecstasy: Reading Race, Reading Pornography* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 3. Ashon T. Crawley, in congruence with Muñoz and Nash, understands what he calls "social ecstasy" as a source of "infinite possibility." See Crawley, *Blackpentecostal Breath: The Aesthetics of Possibility* (Bronx: Fordham University Press, 2016), 100.

from the Chinatown Opium scene") and the peripheral kinaesthetics of the peyote craze (an outbreak unfolded by the second chapter, "Moved by Another Life: Allotted Time and Historical Poiesis in the Peyote Craze"). Ambient narcosis responded, in the former, not only to the aesthetic regulation of the criminalized living conditions endured by Chinese migrants but also to the estranged forms of an/aphrodisiac desire elicited by the drug itself—"the freedom born … of the peculiar unsexing influence of the joints," as one investigator put it.[9] To yield to the ecstasies of transience was, for white visitors, at once to partake in a fetishization of the Orient and to fall into the inertia of collective indifference to the bounded form of sexed embodiment. On opium the sensorium, curling up in the numb oneiric air of the joint, entered a disjunctive yet tenuously shared zone of libidinal autonomy, the sort of relative "independence from the external world" Freud saw in intoxication at large.[10] Kinaesthetic senses of disembodied and reanimated vitality created a different sort of autonomy in the peyote craze, something like the abolition of settler time schemas that Kelina Gotman calls "ecstasy-belonging" in her study of Ghost Dance choreography.[11] Yet where that scene of temporal dislocation would seem to transpire through the messianic suspension of the present, the ecstasies of the peyote craze followed a more sinuous passage alongside the privatizing fractures that had come to split indigenous lifeworlds up into what I call *allotted time*. Autonomously moving sensoria coil, here, into episodes of decentered reflexivity where the narration of individual embodiment finds itself voiced by

[9] Allen S. Williams, *The Demon of the Orient, and His Satellite Fiends of the Joints: Our Opium Smokers as They Are in Tartar Hells and American Paradises* (New York: Published by the Author, 1883), 23. On the "material radiance" of atmospheric ecstasies, see Tim Flohr Søhrenson, "More than a Feeling: Toward an Archaeology of Atmosphere," *Emotion, Space, and Society* 15 (2015): 66.
[10] On intoxication and libidinal autonomy see Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents* trans. and ed. James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2010), 46.
[11] Kelina Gotman, "Ghost Dancing: Excess, Waste, and the American West," in *Choreomania: Dance and Disorder* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 226. Gotman borrows the concept of ecstasy-belonging from Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception*, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 35.

another life—that of the "living thing," peyote.[12] Neither the ecstasies circulating through the atmosphere of the opium joint nor those amplified by the kinaesthetics of the peyote craze uniformly coagulate into the racist erotics infusing the archives that would enclose them, even if they were also indissociably routed through that enclosure. Appetitive disturbances projected through and provoked by the activity of psychotropic substances (the narcotic estrangement of opium, the vitalizing reanimacy of peyote) are, rather, what run the currents of attraction to the transmutability of the singular and collective states arranged on these scenes.

My argument for the irreducibility of that activity hinges on a theorization of psychotropic desire that insists on its divergence from the instinctual drives on which the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious is based. *Alterlife*, the anthropologist Michelle Murphy's term for a life that drives at the iterability of alternatives for the future even as it bears compulsory relation to the chronic conditions of settler capitalist rule, is an approximation of the appetites studied in this dissertation. Live embodiment cannot help but configure its survival to a scene of historical overdetermination shot through with chemical exposures and dependencies. Yet because alterlife remains not merely "already altered" but still "open to alteration" it prefigures, too, an ecstatic otherwise where the accumulated toxicity of the historical present cannot necessarily repeat itself in the reproduction of a future already under control of biochemical governance.[13] Autonomous capacitations of this sort expose how what Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari call the "specific causality" of psychoactive agencies may send the recursive motion of sexual desire off course, toward more indeterminate passages between states. In that vein, then, this dissertation scales its questions to the network of habitual and

[12] John Rave's conversion to peyotism is the source of this characterization of peyote as a "living thing," as related in Sam Blowsnake, *Crashing Thunder: The Autobiography of a Winnebago Indian* ed. Paul Radin (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 179.
[13] Michelle Murphy, "Alterlife and Decolonial Chemical Relations," *Cultural Anthropology* 32, no. 4 (2017): 497.

experimental routes that any given drug may clear for desires that "directly [invest] perception," as opposed to desires that retrace lines already striating the tissue of the unconscious.[14] My analysis of the self-nullifying appetites evoked in narratives of habitual dependency on cocaine and chloral hydrate (the readings at the center of the third chapter, "Appetite for Nothingness: Pharmaconormativity and the Abandon of Reified Time") takes this argument to its furthest conclusions. To live through the ambivalent influence of these pharmaceutical surrogates is, for the women who take them, sometimes to manage the reproduction of normative personhood and sometimes to sink out of or outpace their disposability by the advancing periodicities of time under industrial capitalism. Metamorphic potentials for accelerated and dissociated vitality edge into, involute, and empty out the generic protocols deployed to recontain what I call *appetites for nothingness*. Altered states, if no longer converging in the collective scenes of transient relationality and kinaesthetic mobility that set out the worldmaking horizons in the opium joint or the peyote craze, here still leave open counter-empirical potentials for metabolic and sensuous transmutability that the chronic equilibration of everyday life under industrial capitalism would normally absorb.

From Neural to Biochemical Governance

Appetite for ecstasy, as defined by the foregoing, describes whatever can transpose desiring bodies through the states of atmospheric, kinaesthetic, and metamorphic flux potentiated and impelled by psychotropic drugs. To historicize that concept, the remainder of this

[14] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, "1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible," in *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 283.

introduction tracks how a split regime of biochemical governance came to incite and securitize psychotropic desire in the United States from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century. One function of this regime, its deployment of what I call *pharmaceutical normativity*, was to keep the metabolic variability of re/productive bodies in equilibrium with the maintenance of the industrial-capitalist everyday. Its obverse was to project the chronic crisis of that timeframe's impending dissolution onto the illicit volatility associated with those populating the dispossessed underworlds and peripheries of settler-capitalist rule. Nexuses of governance formed by the convergence of news media, the human sciences, and state regulatory authorities would begin, around 1870, to set up apparatuses designed to conduct and constrict the transit of psychotropic desire along the biochemical channels that divide the pharmaceutical from the illicit.[15] Modern regimes of state power over the life and death of populations, as Michel Foucault understands them, operate on the grounds of a "biological-type caesura" that induces a "break between what must live and what must die" in the domain of the species subject to governance.[16] Or, in this case, a discontinuous series of chronic breaks separating those incited to take pharmaceuticals to manage their competence to diurnal cycles of capitalist social reproduction from those whose appetitive deviance sent them off track of the everyday, into altered timezones intercut by calculations of relative disposability and enclosures of transmitted disorder. The critical object of this dissertation is to sift the antagonistic mass imaginaries from which these divisions were produced.

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[15] Julie Netherland and Helena Hansen's work on the racialization of the opioid crisis (1990s – present) make it clear that what they call "biochemical stratification" has not only colluded in an enduring structure of racial dispossession (and white rehabilitation) but has been intensifying police and carceral powers over black, brown, and indigenous people since the onset of the War on Drugs (1971 – present). See Netherland and Hansen, "White Opioids: Pharmaceutical Race and the War on Drugs That Wasn't," *Biosocieties* 12, no. 2 (2016): 219. On the illicit see Angela Garcia, "The Promise: On the Morality of the Marginal and the Illicit," *ETHOS* 42, no. 1 (2014): 51-63.
[16] Michel Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended": Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-6* trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003), 255.

Normative uses of pharmaceutical drugs, exemplified in chapter 3 by a sedative called chloral hydrate, were supposed to smooth out the enmeshment of sexed bodies' energies in diurnal periodicities of labor, consumption, and biosocial reproduction. Other drugs, maligned as overpowering sources of biological damage and social disorder, drew a different response: moral panic, police suppression, medical censure, and public health intervention, culminating in and reinforced by legal prohibition. To this stratum belong substances like opium (chapter 1), peyote (chapter 2), and cocaine (chapter 3), each of which encoded the physical and moral irregularities ascribed to a given subaltern racial population: Asian, Native, and Black, respectively. Around the turn of the century all of these substances came under stricter regulatory control by state powers seeking to regulate and defuse the risks they were thought to carry. Yet only the mood-altering potencies of the latter stratum were felt to herald epidemic threats to public safety: the opium evil, the peyote craze, the curse of cocaine. Kane Race and Helen Keane, among others, have used the term *pharmacological determinism* to describe the propagandistic condensation of psychotropic effects into magical and demonized powers retroactively embedded within the chemical structure of drugs themselves.[17] With the historian Paul Gootenberg we must also insist, however, that this ideological formation arose in response to the biopolitical agendas of a "drug war pharmacology" intent on licensing and criminalizing the mobility of biochemical

[17] Kane Race, *Pleasure Consuming Medicine: The Queer Politics of Drugs* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009), 20; Richard DeGrandpre, *The Cult of Pharmacology: How America Became the World's Most Troubled Drug Culture* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 209-10; Helen Keane, *What's Wrong with Addiction?* (New York: New York University Press, 2002), 17. Keane seeks to counterbalance the critique of pharmacological determinism with a close theoretical attention to the "materiality" and "physiological microprocesses" of drug effects. Imagined threats to public safety were a keystone of the prohibitionist and reformist discourse aimed at patent medicines, as Kyla Wazana Tompkins shows in "'You Make Me Feel Right Quare.'" On the historical emergence of this notion see William F. Bynum, "Chemical Structure and Pharmacological Action: A Chapter in the History of 19th Century Molecular Pharmacology" *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 44, no. 6 (November 1970): 518-38.

agents across populations.[18] Access to the autonomizing potential of psychotropics—at once left open to the molecular indeterminacy of specific drugs and overdetermined by the structural positioning of the bodies that took them—was unequally stratified yet never exactly foreclosed by the divides of race, sex, class, and citizenship those agendas enforced.

Neural models of race-stratified sexual malleability formed the historical matrix in which this split regime of biochemical governance secured its functioning and strategized its breakdown. Joining current theoretical work on the biopolitics of organic plasticity, this dissertation orients its historiographic trajectories to moments in which sciences of human life came to invest molecular agents of biochemical mutability (drugs and hormones, namely) with autonomous capacities to normalize and interfere in biological processes of sexual development. Although often figured as a source of flexible receptivity opposed to the deterministic calculus of state-racist power over life and death, for Kyla Schuller and Jules Gill-Peterson the plastic body in fact makes up a regimented substrate for techniques of governance that stabilize "vital fluxes of energy and matter inherent in a population" by creating and utilizing "dynamic instability in the individual." Malleability, or the potential for adaptive and amorphous resilience inhering in the animate material of human flesh, not only fails to escape subdual and exploitation by state power, they argue, but, worse yet, coheres through the very race-stratified manipulations of unevenly distributed capacity and debility that the conceptual figure of vital flux is thought to undercut.[19] My sense of biochemical governance, though not averse to this critique of how

[18] Paul Gootenberg, *Andean Cocaine: The Making of a Global Drug* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 9. Gootenberg defines "drug war pharmacology" as "the fallacy that chemistry determines drug outcomes."

[19] Kyla Schuller and Jules Gill-Peterson, "Introduction: Race, State, and the Malleable Body," *Social Text* 38, no. 2 (June 2020): 3. See also Kyla Schuller, "Biopower below and before the Individual," *GLQ* 22, no. 4 (2016): 629-36. An allied approach to biopolitical plasticity may be found in Neel Ahuja's work on the "fluid materialization" of race in *Bioinsecurities: Disease Interventions, Empire, and the Government of Species* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 6. See also Arun Saldanha on the production of race through attraction and coherence (rather than

biopolitical logics may promote somatic adaptability as a vehicle of racial domination, insists nonetheless on distinguishing the material specificity of *flux* from what Schuller and Gill-Peterson call *plasticity* or *malleability*. Underwriting this distinction, leaving aside the political viability of these terms as indices of alternative modes of embodiment antagonistic to state power, is a hypothesis about their historical formation. Around the turn of the century, this dissertation posits, configurations of flux in Euro-American human sciences would begin to register the divergence between a biochemical schema of appetitive disequilibrium and a neurological schema of sensory plasticity.

Although both understood the body's appetitive life to unfold through the the development of morphological sex, they substantiated that process in different material substrates. Neural models of sexual embodiment, Schuller has shown elsewhere, situated the genesis of sexed form within a Lamarckian frame, as an innate yet plastic anatomical binary—at once the inheritance and the adaptive refinement of a progressive racial evolution toward self-possessed control over economies of nervous force and sensitivity. And, as Gill-Peterson's work on "the racial plasticity of sex" demonstrates, emergent biochemical models would likewise bind sexual difference to the racialized bifurcation of maleness and femaleness.[20] Yet here sex was no longer assumed to take form through the responsive conformation of living tissue to neural sense-energies. Morphogenesis in this instance rather consisted in the coordinated allocation of tissue by intrinsic and transient metabolic tendencies—a process dependent on how the body maintains equilibrium among the energies it takes in and uses up, or the appetites it satisfies and

division) in *Psychedelic White: Goa Trance and the Viscosity of Race* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007).

[20] Jules Gill-Peterson, "The Racial Plasticity of Gender and the Child," in *Histories of the Transgender Child* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2018), 41-4. According to Gill-Peterson, the concept of racial plasticity came as an extension and revision of an earlier theory of "natural bisexuality" (39), which held that all animals retain a latent potential for male *and* female sex characteristics regardless of their current anatomical form.

suppresses, as it passes through critical periods of developmental crisis or external toxicity. As these models diverged from one another, I argue, they disclosed a drive to install modes of governance that would rule not via the individuating subjection of malleable nervous systems to the disciplinary enforcements of population control but, rather, through variable constrictions of the biochemical pathways that convey normative interferences across and within appetitive bodies.

Neurological sciences developed in the last third of the nineteenth century held that sex is divided between two evolved physical organizations (male / female) and determines the body's appetites for sensation, its ability to retain and expend nerve force, and its overall liability to functional disorder. According to Cynthia Russett, this model premised health for both men and women on the "conservation of nerve force" within a "closed circuit" fixed by heredity. Nonetheless, because women's evolutionary duty to reproduce "the race" was thought to further wear down their already finite inheritance of nerve force, neurasthenic susceptibilities – a predisposition to hypersensitivity and nervous exhaustion – came to be identified with female sexuality as such.[21] Kyla Schuller's work on regimes of impressibility in the nineteenth-century United States contends, however, that the heightened receptivity of white women's nervous systems here embodied not energetic closure but its opposite. Nerve force designates, for Schuller, not a diminishing resource but a metamorphic relay between sensory and reproductive organs—the means by which plastic bodies conform to the environmental stimuli that excite their reflexes. In this way the affective "porosity" of white female sensoria and the "anatomical specialization" of white female bodies were folded into one another. At the same time, though, neural models posed race as an inborn limit on the nerves' ability to retain the traces of what

[21] Cynthia Russett, *Sexual Science: The Victorian Construction of Womanhood* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 118.

animated them. Nervous susceptibilities in white women, if subject to regimes of "sensorial discipline" meant to restrain a disordering overindulgence in sensation, nonetheless marked a capacity for sympathetic intensities – of suffering, especially – that were foreclosed to black women and nonwhite bodies more generally. These the nervous schema reduced to the "unimpressible" and "unsexed state of 'flesh.'" Arrested in evolutionary stasis and aggregated into masses fit only for extraction, such bodies figured a disposable yet renewable source of "energy that can be set in motion to produce for others but remains incapable of accumulating anything in return."[22] Nerve-based models of inherent binary sex difference thus consigned racialized populations to a hyperexploited class of de-skilled labor insofar as they placed white bodies at the leading evolutionary edge of sensory and sexual refinement. Or, put differently, these models diagrammed the political order of racial dispossession as an anatomical gradation of plasticity and obduracy.

At the same time that they reduced these massified bodies to insensitive appendages of the production process, though, neural models would also cast the flesh of those bodies as conduits for exorbitant appetites and amorphous energies that threatened to eat away the willpower and spoil the disciplinary self-possession of white sensoria if not contained. Nervous systems were the pliable medium through which those overexciting forces and the habits of self-control they menaced could disrupt the sensorimotor pathways, vitiate the sexual development, and hence endanger the reproductive futurity of the white race. Lapsed self-restraint was seen to result in a degenerative wasting of vital force that jeopardized the ability of developing white bodies to grow into and reproduce a predeterminate racial inheritance. As such, neural models of

[22] Kyla Schuller, *The Biopolitics of Feeling: Race, Sex, and Science in Nineteenth-Century America* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2018), 102-3, 18, 13, 14.

sexed embodiment would remain the predominant ground of clinical expertise about and corrective intervention into appetitive disorder until the end of the nineteenth century.

Another schema of sexed embodiment and appetitive de/regulation, based not on the nervous plasticity of the organism but on normative interferences in its biochemical flux, would begin to take shape around the turn of the century. Morphogenesis of the latter sort depended not on the solidification of sex from the interorganic economy of sensuous forces accumulated by and expended from nerve tissue but, instead, on the fluid equilibrium the body maintains among the molecular processes that nourish, consume, inhibit, arouse, and otherwise alter the functioning of all living tissues, nerves included. At work throughout the rise of the biochemical schema was an effort to set up a normal range of fluctuations in the equilibrium of sexed bodies' energies and appetites so that they might be perfected in the future.

Metabolic sciences attuned to the appetitive and energetic dis/equilibrium of sexed bodies initiated the formation of the biochemical schema between 1890 and 1910. A core theory in these emergent models of biochemical equilibration, influentially articulated by Patrick Geddes and J. Arthur Thomson in *The Evolution of Sex* (1889), postulated that distinct metabolic tendencies define the complementary opposition of maleness and femaleness. Male organisms, the theory goes, tend to be "more *katabolic*," while females tend to be "more *anabolic*." Katabolic (or dissimilative) tendencies consume tissue so as to release the energy deposited within it. Anabolic (or assimilative) tendencies, conversely, withhold expenditure so as to conserve the energetic tissue reproductive bodies need to sustain the life of the species.[23] Metabolic equilibrium, the dynamic stabilization of these tendencies at the scale of both the individual body and the racial-evolutionary order it was to perpetuate, was soon cast as a biochemical ground for sexed

[23] Patrick Geddes and J. Arthur Thompson, *The Evolution of Sex* (London: Walter Scott, 1889), 26.

differences in the appetitive body's nervous excitability and pathology. In 1897, the physician Theodore Kellogg would speculate that the "nutritive insufficiencies" attending the "crisis" of female puberty, coupled with the onset of sexual instincts, could destabilize adolescent girls' "metabolic equilibrium" by diverting nutrients "from the cerebral to the reproductive tissues." Kellogg goes on to caution that adult women who fail to restore equilibrium once puberty ends are liable to a lifelong prognosis of "periodic mental disturbance" and "perversion of appetite."[24] Likewise, in 1904, G. Frank Lydston conjectured that "neuropathic disturbances" have their origin in "autotoxemia [self-poisoning] from metabolic perversion." Nervous degeneration, as he understands it, may stem either from the "autogenetic" byproducts of a disordered metabolism or from "heterogenetic" toxins like cocaine or chloral hydrate. Lydston warns that neurasthenic woman who exacerbate a preexisting autotoxemia by indulging in alcohol or other intoxicants doubly pervert their metabolisms, not only risking a fall into "sexual vice" but also "fostering degeneracy for the race."[25] Nervous disturbances resolve, by this account, into deficits or deviations in the intermingling metabolic processes of nutrition, excitation, and sexual development. Lydston and Kellog's theories exhibit a regulatory concern for the viability and violability of racial populations. Only by controlling the equilibrium of appetites and energies required for normal reprosexual function in white female bodies can racial progress be secured, they suggest.

Models of appetitive dis/equilibrium that promulgated this metabolic division of the sexes reinforced the normative bind knotted into a scientific model that Jules Gill-Peterson calls "the racial plasticity of sex." Like the regimes of nervous impressibility examined by Schuller,

[24] Theodore Kellogg, *A Text-Book of Mental Diseases* (New York: Wood, 1897), 104.
[25] G. Frank Lydston, "The Chemistry of Social Diseases," in *The Diseases of Society (The Vice and Crime Problem)* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1904), 211, 203.

this model posed sex as a malleable formation that loops the normal or abnormal development of each individual organism (*ontogenesis*) into the progression or degeneration of racial populations in evolutionary time (*phylogenesis*). But in the endocrinological sciences Gill-Peterson addresses the genesis of sex was not just predicated on the impressing force of outside stimuli and the atavistic expression of hereditary traits.[26] Mature sexual morphology could only arise from the "inherent indeterminacy of sex as a biological form" according to the model of racial plasticity. Adolescent bodies would be unable to generate adult sex characteristics, that is, without passing through a "critical period of plasticity" – or, as Kellogg would say, metabolic disequilibrium – that unbinds their ontogenetic timeline from any set phylogenetic telos.[27] Neither the exact replication of inherited forms nor strict abstention from pathological influences would suffice for normal development, by this reasoning. To achieve sexual normativity was, rather, to enjoy the "biological luxury," as Georges Canguilhem puts it, of yielding to a range of impermanent conditions and at last conforming these transitional deviances to some more comprehensive norm.[28] Aligning the volatile curvatures of the present on an ideal arc toward the sequential perfectibility of the evolutionary future, the model of racial plasticity that Gill-Peterson theorizes thus deployed the local instabilities of sexual morphogenesis to reproduce a more comprehensive system of racial stratification.

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[26] On atavism see Dana Seitler, *Atavistic Tendencies: The Culture of Science in American Modernity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008).

[27] Not for long, though – the critical period is temporary and entails a "unidirectional" (if not entirely irreversible) movement toward adulthood. The success of that movement would still depend on the source of alterations to the body's plastic medium: "natural and artificial variation … could produce correspondingly normal and abnormal growth." See Gill-Peterson, *Histories*, 47. Yet the biochemical model of normativity espoused by Starling and other physiologists, I would argue, at the same time worked to suspend the distinction between the natural and the artificial (the internal secretion of hormones and the external application of drugs; "autogenic" and "heterogenic" chemicals), or at least made it difficult to stably map these modes of alteration onto a preset distinction between normal and abnormal development.

[28] Georges Canguilhem, *The Normal and the Pathological* trans. Carolyn R. Fawcett (New York: Zone Books, 1989), 182, 199.

Yet if it could reinforce the maturational and reproductive logics that enmeshed sexed bodies in the operations of state racism, the biochemical schema would also begin to isolate the autonomous potentials of the molecular agencies whereby those bodies maintain equilibrium as they pass through states of hormonal and pharmaceutical flux. 1905, the year the British physiologist E.H. Starling first conceptualized hormones as blood-borne "chemical messengers" sent to excite and correlate vital functions, marks a critical moment in the history of that autonomization.[29] As Celia Roberts reads it, the animate and animating *hormone* figures here as a "material-semiotic actor" whose message – "I excite or arouse," from the Greek *ὁρμῶν* – need not put the morphogenesis of sex in any fixed correspondence with "biological determinism."[30] In part this indeterminacy stems from the indifference of metabolic bodies to the source of the chemical messages they receive. Just as the injection of drugs like nicotine can stimulate or paralyze nerve endings, so can the extraction and reinjection of hormones secreted by the

[29] Nelly Oudshoorn, Anne Fausto-Sterling, Andreas-Holger Maehle, Chandak Sengoopta, and Elizabeth Williams have charted how the isolation of internal chemical agencies governing digestion, sex, and autonomic response motivated the departure from theories that ascribed the regulation of the appetitive/energetic body to the action of nervous stimuli. See Nelly Oudshoorn, *Beyond the Natural Body: An Archeology of Sex Hormones* (London: Routledge, 1994); Anne Fausto-Sterling, *Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality* (New York: Basic Books, 2000); Andreas Holger-Maehle, "'Receptive Substances': John Newport Langley (1852-1925) and his Path to a Receptor Theory of Drug Action" *Medical History* 48 (2004): 153-74; Chandak Sengoopta, *The Most Secret Quintessence of Life: Sex, Glands, and Hormones, 1850–1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006); Elizabeth Williams, *Appetite and Its Discontents: Science, Medicine, and the Urge to Eat, 1750-1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2020). On sex hormone research, see too Meriley Borell, "Organotherapy and the Emergence of Reproductive Endocrinology" *Journal of the History of Biology* 18:1 (Spring 1985): 1-30; Adele Clarke, *Disciplining Reproduction: Modernity, American Life Sciences and the Problems of Sex* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Celia Roberts, *Messengers of Sex: Hormones, Biomedicine, and Feminism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). On the study of drug response, see Eliot Valenstein, *The War of the Soups and the Sparks: the Discovery of Neurotransmitters and the Dispute over How Nerves Communicate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).

[30] Celia Roberts, *Messengers of Sex,* 19. Actor-network theory is the framework Roberts uses to conceptualize the mediating activity of hormones, but we may also understand that activity as a sort of animism, in keeping with Martin (see below). It is also worth noting that the action of drugs and hormones is not just semiotic but performative. More specifically, as Starling articulates it, the hormone – etymologically derived from a Greek word meaning "I excite or arouse" – performs a perlocutionary act. On the combined metaphorics of mobility, communication, and "'druglike' behavior" in Starling's description of hormonal activity, see Debra Hawhee, "From the Rhetoric of Science to the Science of Rhetoric: the Case of Endocrinology," in *Moving Bodies: Kenneth Burke at the Edges of Language* (Charleston: University of South Carolina Press, 2009).

ovaries, for example, induce the "assimilation" of energy to organ growth (*anabolism*) and inhibit the "dissimilation" of tissue as exerted force (*katabolism*). No matter how they come into circulation, and regardless of their artificiality or naturalness, the messages these chemicals carry are equal in their potential to arouse "various parts" of the body to bring their own functions into "harmonious coöperation" with some other process affecting the body as a whole. All bioactive substances, whether exogenous or glandular in origin, have the effect of "interfering with normal processes," Starling insists.[31] The normalization of biochemical equilibrium depends, in other words, not on the origin of the exciting molecule but on the receptivity of cellular substances to recalibration by the interference of another, higher-order normativity.[32] If drugs and hormones alike may alter the metabolic processes that maintain equilibrium, then there can be no set of intrinsic biological givens that exhaustively determine sexual morphologies. A pharmacological determinism thus began to dislodge the theoretical primacy of biological determinations of race and sex around the turn of the century. Autonomizing chemical agencies in this way, I venture, had the side effect of loosening the normative bind that constrained the hormonal and pharmaceutical flux of sexed bodies to the reproductive teleology of racial evolution.

A split regime of biochemical governance emerged in response to the concentration of newly autonomous powers in molecular agencies, as the regulation of psychotropic drugs makes most acutely apparent. Some of those agencies the regime targeted with preexisting security mechanisms and others it applied to incipient modes of therapeutic normalization. Around the

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[31] Ernest Henry Starling, *The Croonian Lectures on the Chemical Correlation of the Functions of the Body: Delivered before the Royal College of Physicians of London on June 20th, 22nd, 27th & 29th, 1905* (London: Women's Printing Society, Limited, 1905), 7.

[32] An extended analysis of the "metabolic equilibrium" of depression and excitation, with emphasis on how narcotics like chloral hydrate depress the metabolism, may be found in Max Verworn, *Irritability: A Physiological Analysis of the General Effect of Stimuli in Living Substance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1913). See too John Newport Langley, "On the Reaction of Cells and of Nerve-Endings to Certain Poisons, Chiefly as Regards the Reaction of Striated Muscle to Nicotine and to Curari" *Journal of Physiology* 33 (1905): 374-413. On this article and its historical context, see Maehle, "'Receptive Substances.'"

turn of the century in the United States, administrative bodies operating at the state and federal levels intensified their efforts to criminalize and regulate access to the substances working populations took to augment and repair their energies. My focus here, extending from and contextualizing the analysis given in chapter 3, is limited to two of the eleven drugs the Pure Food and Drug Act scheduled for oversight: cocaine and chloral hydrate.[33] It is no coincidence that the year the Act codified the first federal regulations on the manufacture, branding, transport, and sale of these two substances – 1906 – also witnessed an escalating alarm over transregional and intracity outbreaks of illicit cocaine use.[34] At the epicenter/s of this felt crisis was a reiterated pornotropic scenario wherein the multiplication of poor black "coke fiends," "crazed" by habitual snuffing of the stimulant, menaced white "victims" with both sociospatial mayhem and, for adolescents especially, the irresistible lure of cravings that could only end in the loss of "all racial instinct toward separation."[35] Legislation that restricted the use of cocaine not only defended the segregationist project of policing and dispersing scenes of racial/sexual intermixture, but implicitly abandoned black populations to the genocidal fantasy that they were lawlessly destroying their own evolutionary viability.[36]

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[33] James Harvey Young, *Pure Food: Securing the Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 266.

[34] Mostly in the form of over-the-counter "catarrh powders." See Samuel Hopkins Adams, *The Great American Fraud: Articles on the Nostrum Evil and Quackery Reprinted from* Collier's (Chicago: American Medical Association Press, 1912), 41. On branding see Joseph M. Gabriel, *Medical Monopoly: Intellectual Property Rights and the Origins of the Modern Pharmaceutical Industry* (University of Chicago Press, 2014). On the narrative logic of the outbreak, see Priscilla Wald, *Contagious: Cultures, Carriers, and the Outbreak Narrative* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007). On the illicit (as opposed to the illegal) as a matter of "social perceptions of activities defined as criminal," see *Illicit Flows and Criminal Things: States, Borders, and the Other Side of Globalization* ed. Willem van Schendel and Itty Abraham (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2005), 18.

[35] "Cocaine the Curse of Chicago, Claiming Victims by Tens of Thousands" *Chicago Daily Tribune*, February 25, 1906. On the racialization of cocaine see Michael C. Cohen, "Jim Crow's Drug War: Race, Coca Cola, and the Origins of Drug Prohibition," *Southern Cultures* 12.3 (Fall 2006): 55-79. On pornotroping see Hortense J. Spillers, "Mama's Baby, Papa's Maybe: An American Grammar Book," *Diacritics* 17, no. 2 (Summer 1987): 67. See also Alexander G. Weheliye, *Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 39.

[36] "Fading of Negro Race Statistics Show It Will Eventually Disappear from America" *The Anaconda Standard* Anaconda, MT November 19, 1899.

Very different modes of governance oversaw the administration of chloral hydrate. Asylums and hospitals in the US had begun employing the sedative for the "chemical restraint" of ostensibly uncontrollable patients not long after the German pharmacologist Oscar Liebrich published a study of its anesthetic and hypnotic effects in 1869.[37] Laurent de Sutter compares this disciplinary-carceral use of chloral, in which the drug served to depress the "manic excitation" that made certain bodies dangerously indocile, with its applications to "'everyday life.'" In the latter capacity chloral was still used to inhibit excitability and thereby diminish any "affective energies" that might send otherwise normal subjects out of their senses. As it circulated beyond sites of direct institutional control and over drugstore counters, though, the sedative also came to assist working people in evening out irregularities in their diurnal cycles of work and rest.[38] Unlike cocaine, which was targeted because it appeared to subvert eugenicist horizons of racial improvement, in regulating chloral hydrate federal authorities aimed to standardize the options and mitigate the risks associated with the biochemical maintenance of laboring masses.[39] Against the demonized power of the former substance to accelerate a perverse intercourse between the appetites of white and racialized populations, the restorative efficacy of the latter promised to loop the flux of sexed bodies' energies back into the interminable recurrence of the industrial-capitalist everyday.

Between a drug like cocaine and a drug like chloral hydrate we may chart the onset of a split regime of biochemical governance. If the criminalization of one relied on predictive logics

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[37] Janet Colaizzi, "Seclusion and Restraint: A Historical Perspective," *Journal of Psychosocial Nursing and Mental Health Services* 43, no. 2 (March 2005): 31-7. See also H.B. Wilbur, "'Chemical Restraint' in the Management of the Insane," *Archives of Medicine* (1881): 271-92.

[38] Laurent de Sutter, *Narcocapitalism: Life in the Age of Anesthesia* trans. Barnaby Norman (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018), 12-13, 85.

[39] On self-medication, see James Harvey Young, "Dr. Wiley's Law," in *The Toadstool Millionaires: A Social History of Patent Medicine in America before Federal Regulation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 244.

to forecast and intervene in near-futural epidemics of racial degeneracy, the normalization of the other impelled the typical white person to manage risk and maintain equilibrium within an eternalized present. Normalization refers for Nikolas Rose to a psychiatric and statistical project, developed from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, that adjudicated the "violation of norms" not in terms of occasional "irregularity of conduct" but as a global problem of "deviant personhood." In this earlier phase of pharmaceutical governance, Rose argues, normalizing strategies aimed to overrule the "autonomy" of dangerous populations and the pathological types of people they generated. Only with the twenty-first-century rise of molecular genetics would that mode of government make individuals responsible for a "constant process of adjustment" to "the circuits of everyday life," he claims.[40] As the above sketch of the cocaine/chloral split indicates, however, what Rose frames as a recent paradigm shift was in fact already materializing in the early twentieth century as a biochemical-type caesura dividing white and racialized populations. Not to say that the human sciences exempted white people's drug use from typification as the deviant behavior of an addict or criminal, nor that these kinds of people were free of the ideational "looping effect," as Ian Hacking terms it, of altering their conduct in response to such classifications.[41] Late nineteenth-century *habitués* and early twentieth-century *addicts* attest to the normative pressures clinical typification exerted on white people's ability to manage and narrate their lives.[42] But it is just as clear that these pathologizing labels, and the chronic loops of prognostic feedback they set in motion, presumed and fortified a dispossessive hierarchy of human kinds in which race remained a central axis of stratification.

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[40] Nikolas Rose, "The Neurochemical Self and Its Anomalies," in *Risk and Morality* ed. R. Ericson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 411, 431.
[41] Ian Hacking, "Degeneracy, Criminal Behavior, and Looping," in *Genetics and Criminal Behavior* ed. David Wasserman and Robert Wachbroit (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 155.
[42] Susan Zieger, *Inventing the Addict: Drugs, Race, and Sexuality in Nineteenth-Century British and American Literature* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2008), 3.

As unwilling *victims* of appetites the drug itself seemed to elicit, white addicts could still hope for the future recuperation of normal functioning, however compulsory that optimism may have been. As *fiends*, the scapegoated carriers of a multiplying appetitive perversion, racially marked bodies could not expect to be looped into the same processes of therapeutic normalization. Instead they were apprehended en masse by security mechanisms designed to halt the proliferation of deviance through habit-forming zones of interracial contact. Notwithstanding their surface equivalence as figures of abnormality, then, I maintain that victims and fiends came under distinct biopolitical configurations—one invested in capacitating white bodies within a relatively elastic range of normative conduct, the other in confining racialized populations to generally irrecuperable extremes of social disorder.

Yet if these figures were by no means isomorphic in the form of their subjection to pharmaceutical governance, if the split between them never equally distributed the somatic burdens of typification, neither did they align with fixed loci of dispossession. As detailed in the first chapter, the figure of the *opium fiend* was initially propagated in the 1870s by a wave of xenophobic panic that mobilized police, public health authorities, and mass-mediated organs of investigative vigilance to reinforce Euro-American antagonisms toward Chinese migrant laborers. Only later, in the 1890s, did white antagonisms toward black workers precipitate in the figure of the *cocaine fiend*.[43] Kathleen Auerhahn's work on the "split labor market dynamics" behind these antidrug crusades suggests that in both instances fiends were targeted as part of a strategic effort to fragment working populations into racialized class strata. Just as the

[43] See "Cocaine the Curse of Chicago." In "Dope Town," the story claims, "Negroes, Chinamen, and whites may all be found housed in one foul basement giving way to a mutual enjoyment of the ever procurable cocaine, all racial instinct toward separation killed by a few snuffs of white, flaky cocaine." In my view this constellation of "mutual enjoyment" derives from the vague racialization of the fiend, carried over from opium den scenes. This connection is made explicit in "Cocaine Habit Growing. This Drug Is Superseding Opium in Some Parts of the Country," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, May 12, 1898.

illegalization of opium smoking arose in response to the felt threat that the perverse efficiency of Chinese migrants would devalue and displace white American workforces, so too by outlawing cocaine did the Jim Crow apartheid system aim to restrict the movement of black working populations into white-dominated jobs, cities, and social environs.[44]Anti-opium campaigns deployed the figural mobility of the fiend – its slippage between a primary application to Asian bodies and subsequent transfer to all those in the habit of frequenting opium joints – to spread an atmosphere of multiplying danger. Mass-circulated images of cocaine fiends likewise incited the response of white publics and governments by at once associating the drug with an aura of racial alterity and magnifying the fear that scenes of psychotropic alteration held the power to taint or ruin the normative transparency of the white self-/mastering subject.

News coverage of the drug "menace" in both instances sought to maintain chronic structures of dispossession by amassing panic around the imagined proliferation of vicious cravings across the sex differences, class strata, and racial taxonomies whereby those structures divided up loci of productive and reproductive labor. An 1898 newspaper report from New Orleans catches this transfigural logic in the act of shifting panic from the first substance to the second. Its headline announces that cocaine is "SUPERSEDING OPIUM IN SOME PARTS OF THE COUNTRY," a development the story attributes to the drug's ease of access and the debased appetites it engenders. Not only is cocaine cheap enough to cross any "'dividing line'" that might have limited its epidemic spread among the working poor, the story proclaims, but it is potent enough to leave anyone who falls victim to the habit a "shattered [wreck] of humanity"—

[44] See Kathleen Auerhahn, "The Split Labor Market and the Origins of Antidrug Legislation in the United States," *Law & Social Inquiry* 24, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 411-440. See also Joseph M. Gabriel, "Restricting the Sale of 'Deadly Poisons': Pharmacists, Drug Regulation, and Narratives of Suffering in the Gilded Age" *The Journal of the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era* 9, no. 3 (July 2010): 313-336. And see Rosanne Currarino, "'Meat vs. Rice': The Ideal of Manly Labor and Anti-Chinese Hysteria in Nineteenth-century America," *Men and Masculinities* 9, no. 4 (April 2007): 476-90.

physically wasted, morally depraved, financially ruined. Men become "hysterical" for the drug; it disfigures women beyond any "semblance of femininity." Unsexed, declassed, "more beast than human," the fiend typifies a body that has ceased to properly belong to any recognizable kind of personhood.[45] A shard of a person. In this sense, however hyperbolic, the cocaine fiend is class fragmentation incarnate: a body shattered into the criminalized and immiserated substrata of the industrial-capitalist division of re/productive labor; a body residually entitled, if white, to some chance for medicolegal repair but otherwise confined to a summarily disposable state of toxicity.

Underlying this transfigural fracture was the unequal calculus of degradation and recuperability maintained by a split regime of biochemical governance. Across all of its chapters this study examines how that regime came to solidify and set in motion enduring structures of chronic dispossession. In the first chapter, those structures cohere through the spatial disjuncture of migrant Chinese neighborhoods—an overall process of containment that could nonetheless incite the aestheticized leakage of affect through local and dislocative scenes of contagious appetite. In the second chapter, they cohere through the spatiotemporal disintegration and forced disappearance of indigenous modes of inhabiting land that settlers claimed for the inevitability of private property relations. In the third chapter, chronic structures of dispossession operate through emergent forms of irrationalized temporality wherein the normative aspiration to managerial self-possession looped downwardly mobile women into subsisting on the pharmaceutical equilibration of appetites and energies. Yet in each of these cases we see, too, the autonomizing tendencies of psychotropic substances at play. An appetite for chemical alteration could generate autonomously zoned collectives through habitual recurrence to scenes of

[45] "Cocaine Habit Growing."

collective inertia or in the unrestrained movement of bodies across settler-capitalist property lines. Atmospheres or the more secluded embrace of pharmaceutical abandon could let sexed bodies slip into indifference to or noncompliance with the normative temporalities in which they were supposed to reproduce their personhood. Animate or companionate relations to the sensuous effects of psychotropics could at points even give the sensorium over to a sentience no longer corresponding to its own. My arguments in the chapters that follow center these sorts of appetitive interferences and the counternormative experiences they coordinated in order to ask how the biochemical flux of sexed, racialized, and class-stratified sensoria might loosen the immediacy or inevitability of chronic structures of dispossession.

Chapters in Summary

"On the Inertia of Appetite: Transient Relations from the Chinatown Opium Scene," the first chapter, begins with a picture of appetitive inertia and works backward to recompose the scenes of transient relation that formed in late nineteenth-century opium joints. By now the "fiends" seen in such pictures may look like prototypical figures of addiction. Yet the aesthetic protocols that subtend colonial drug control regimes did not initially center on the disciplinary person of "the addict." Rather, these protocols derive from attempts to regulate the contagious spread of appetites through Chinatown opium scenes. Around the time of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, I argue, white Americans came to treat opium joints as test sites for the selective criminalization of drug habits and the aesthetic regulation of migrant living conditions. Neither of these biopolitical processes took the individual user as its primary target; instead they aimed to delimit and regulate zones of habit-forming contact between racialized types of life. Various

investigative agencies cooperated in penetrating, exposing, and rechanneling the ambient narcosis that seemed to transfigure the sensoria of anyone who joined in an opium scene. At issue, here, was how the transsensory drift of the joints not only loosened the hold of capitalist work-discipline but also allowed sexed bodies – women's especially – to float out of sync with routine inducements to care for the future. I use the concept of inertia throughout the chapter to map the lines of energetic transfer whereby opium scenes looped the appetites of visitors and regulars alike into a conditionally shared indifference to the social reproduction of settler-national time.

"Moved by Another Life: Allotted Time and Historical Poiesis in the Peyote Craze," the second chapter, follows the experience of altered vitality through a historical poetics of the "peyote craze" that spread across Indian Territory (now Oklahoma) and to the Northern Plains near the end of the nineteenth century. Its primary text is the life story of a Ho-Chunk man named Sam Blowsnake (Hágaga, Big Winnebago), titled *The Autobiography of a Winnebago Indian* (192,. New senses of time and embodiment elicited by peyote rituals had been reviving currents of trans-indigenous worldmaking since the 1880s. To restrict the spread of peyotism, various agencies of the US settler state developed new ways to intercept and intervene in the biochemical flux of "intoxication" through Native bodies. The affective enclosure of intoxication by the alarm, concern, fascination, and "visceral disgust" of white investigators had long been key to colonial formations of racial indigeneity, as Alexander Dawson has argued. Underwriting that spectrum of acute sensitivities, this chapter posits, were the chronic structures of dispossession governing the day-to-day reproduction of settler capitalist rule. Allotted time worked by splitting collectively felt passages of time into a series of individuated life spans and, concomitantly, attempted to disperse the lines of transport opened by the peyote craze.

Nonetheless, throughout this chapter I also attend to how the craze enlisted somatic intensities to stall, obstruct, and expropriate the work of chronic individuation.

"Appetite for Nothingness: Pharmaconormativity and the Abandon of Reified Time," the third chapter, draws out the generic protocols that animate and bring closure to the emplotment of pharmaceuticals in Edith Wharton's novel, *The House of Mirth* (1905), and Annie Meyers's memoir, *Eight Years in Cocaine Hell* (1902). Narrative time in both texts warps around the metonymic transfers effected by the drugs each protagonist takes to live through the disintegration of her class status. In the biochemical action of pharmaceuticals Lily Bart and Annie Meyers each find a substitutive vitality that comes to both capacitate and displace their own. Lily's terminal dependence on chloral hydrate may seem to trap her in a defeated effort to self-medicate her way out of a downward spiral into poverty. And yet, for all the pathos of that emplotment, chloral also enables her to let go of the person she is supposed to be repairing and in its place feel nothing, or nothing but her own negligibility to the pockets of insensible sensuousness the sedative enfolds around the edges of her death's generic enclosure. Meyers's deviations into the illicit life of a "cocaine fiend" (an epithet typically affixed to the ungovernability of black bodies) reach a more optimistic denouement, as the before-and-after photos appended near the end of *Cocaine Hell* attest. It turns out, however, that the equipoise of Meyers's after photo still fails to purge the text of its perverse attraction to the impersonal potencies of the stimulant. Despite the lasting improvement her image projects, cocaine gets the last word. Across these two cases this chapter plots some of the lines along which the surrogate activity of pharmaceuticals could support and supplant the forms of biochemical self-governance that buffered, without resolving, the class antagonisms that fragmented daily life under American industrial capitalism.

Chapter One

On the Inertia of Appetite: Transient Relations from the Chinatown Opium Scene

THE "HOP FIEND."

As the town drunkards to an American community, so were these creeping, flabby slaves of opium to Chinatown.

Figure 1. Profile of a "fiend" reposing in the ruins of an opium joint. (Arnold Genthe, *The "Hop Fiend,"* in *Pictures of Old Chinatown* (New York: Moffat, Yard, 1908), plate 33. Widener Library, Harvard Library.)

Antidrug campaigns have now served to propagate state racist violence against dispossessed people in the United States for nearly a century and a half. Obliquely registered in

the above profile (fig. 1) are some of the aesthetic protocols of that ongoing drug war.[1] As if to proxy the eye of the state, the photograph isolates a figure of abject craving, captioned "The 'Hop Fiend,'" against a ruined void. Just a few years earlier this had been a scene of more pleasurable transience—an opium joint known as "The Devil's Kitchen," desolated by the San Francisco earthquake of 1906. Arnold Genthe and Will Irwin salvaged several views of the joint for a book-length photo essay titled *Pictures of Old Chinatown* (1908). They describe it as a "*show-place*" where Euro-American tourists could pay a quarter to "'*see the hop fiends*.'" Narcotourism had kept the place "*going for years, in spite of the Health Board*," they reminisce.[2] Municipal authorities had been tightening controls on the Chinatown opium scene since at least 1875. Legislatively, that year marks both an intensification of federal immigration restrictions, via the Page Act, and the first attempts at outlawing opium dens in San Francisco. Altered-state profiling soon became a nationwide tactic in the criminalization of migrant lives and living conditions under the regime of Chinese Exclusion (1882–1943).[3] Moral panics about opium smoking reinforced that regime by multiplying alarm over the epidemic spread of "alien" vice over borders and through the transnational enclaves of US cities. After 1882 such panics would help secure the common sense of time elapsing uniformly throughout those cities, states, and

[1] On the racialization of the long war on drugs, see Curtis Marez, *Drug Wars: The Political Economy of Narcotics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004); and Doris Marie Provine, *Unequal under the Law: Race in the War on Drugs* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).
[2] Arnold Genthe and Will Irwin, *Pictures of Old Chinatown* (New York: Moffat, Yard, 1908), 32–33, 38–39.
[3] Evelyn Nakano Glenn links the restriction of Chinese American neighborhoods to settler capitalist modes of dispossession in "Settler Colonialism as Structure: A Framework for Comparative Studies of U.S. Race and Gender Formation," *Sociology of Race and Ethnicity* 1, no. 1 (2015): 66–69. Exemplary histories of Chinese Exclusion and border security include Edna Bonacich and Lucie Cheng, *Labor Immigration under Capitalism: Asian Workers in the United States before World War II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Lucy E. Salyer, *Laws Harsh as Tigers: Chinese Immigrants and the Shaping of Modern Immigration Law* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Erika Lee, *At America's Gates: Chinese Immigration During the Exclusion Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); and Adam McKeown, *Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).

territories that the nation had yet to enclose in its totalizing co-presence.[4] Lingering on opium scenes then came to look like the unfixed languishing of a "fiend"—that is, a body too inert to keep its senses in touch and appetites in sync with the reproduction of the settler-national present.

Against that personifying logic, the object of this essay is to rejoin figures of opium addiction to the scenes of inertia they once inhabited. Inertia refers, in physics, to a body's resistance to changes in its current state of rest or constant motion. Like inertia, addiction represents a compulsive stasis. Addicted bodies, by this logic, are those that have lost normative receptivity to changes in the form, substance, and timing of satisfaction—who suffer, in short, from implasticity of appetite. Nonetheless, as theorists of habit from William James to Catherine Malabou have observed, the same automatisms that rigidify addiction also remain vital to the free exercise of self-possessed personhood. James poises habit between the plasticity and the inertia of a nervous system that must both shape its pathways to new functions and recur to those detours in the future.[5] Nervous inertia opposes plasticity in the present so that the system may persist in its modifications over time. Malabou understands habit as *hexis*, a virtual "having" or disposition whereby the body holds and reverses energetic impressions toward its own ends. But while habit may feel like a personal reserve of potential energy, it always requires more than any one person can retain. If the nervous system's reflexive operations depend on the habits of other bodies, then the inertia of that system never exactly reduces to its own implasticity.[6] As inertia,

[4] My sense of that co-presence comes from Benedict Anderson's analysis of the national "meanwhile," "a device for the presentation of simultaneity in 'homogeneous, empty time,'" in *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 2006), 25.
[5] See William James, "Habit," in *The Principles of Psychology*, vol. 1 (New York: Henry Holt, 1890), 105, 108.
[6] Malabou sees habit as the medium through which the subject affects itself and thus attains synthetic continuity. Yet habit is always already folded into forces outside itself. Addiction, for her, merely amplifies the parasitism by which the auto-affective subject of habit acquires and maintains self-presence. See her preface to *Of Habit*, by Félix Ravaisson, trans. Clare Carlisle and Mark Sinclair (New York: Continuum, 2008), ix–x, xiv, xvii. On inertia as the "entropy" or "limit" of plasticity, see Malabou, "The Equivocity of Reparation: From Elasticity to Resilience," in

habit coheres not in the substance of each individual body but in the forces that hold multiple bodies to adjoining loops of craving and replenishment. Just such an inertia structured the recurrent moment of sensory and spatiotemporal alteration sought by those who frequented opium dens. Narcosis not only enfolded the senses in anesthetic softness but could also relax, dilate, or even nullify co-presence to a space and time already bounded by the nation. Yet, far from regressing to a static dreamworld outside or beyond the settler-national present, I argue that the inertia of appetites for opium held open zones of transient relationality in the joints and disjunctures of that present.

It was the criminalization of Chinatown opium scenes, not the disciplinary production of addict identity, where state agencies first converged on the habits we now call addictions.[7] To account for that convergence, the present essay emphasizes the relationality of the opium appetite and the biopolitical logics that came to profile its transmission through groups and populations. Many genealogies of addiction reprise an individuating narrative that isolates both the force of habit and the locus of intervention in figures of volitional disorder.[8] It was the

The New Wounded: From Neurosis to Brain Damage, trans. Steven Miller (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012), 177–78.

[7] Mariana Valverde demonstrates how habit, as "a way of governing that lies in the borderland between act and identity," channels forms of power that route through neither punishable acts nor disciplinary persons in *Diseases of the Will: Alcohol and the Dilemmas of Freedom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 69, 143. Michel Foucault, too, understands the disciplinary person as just one "transfer point" within a distributed strategy of control in *An Introduction*, vol. 1 of *The History of Sexuality*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1990), 103. It significantly complicates the logic of personification if we ask why the fiend never became a "case history," like the homosexual or the habitué, but only a contagious "type of life" (43). Maybe the most obvious answer is that these figures stood on opposed sides of a "biological-type caesura" upheld by state racism. See Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended": Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–76*, ed. Arnold I. Davidson, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 1997), 255. Addiction epidemiology concerns disorders that communicate across that caesura and, as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick argues, multiply beyond the disciplinary relay between act and identity. See Sedgwick, "Epidemics of the Will," in *Tendencies* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993), 130–31.

[8] See, e.g., Helen Keane, *What's Wrong with Addiction?* (New York: New York University Press, 2002). Keane focuses on how addiction discourses incite and normalize the "regulatory ideal of rational, autonomous subjecthood" (8), though she also gives less-contained renditions of body-substance relations, like Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's "ethological description" (34) of drug cravings. On the racialization of craving as repetitious attachment, see Jennifer L. Fleissner, "Earth-Eating, Addiction, Nostalgia: Charles Chesnutt's Diasporic Regionalism," *Studies in Romanticism* 49, no. 2 (2010): 313–36. On the cultural logics of addiction, see Janet Farrell Brodie and Marc Redfield, eds., *High Anxieties: Cultural Studies in Addiction* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); and

appearance of "the addict" in case histories and other confessional genres, some would argue, that subjected drug habits to penal, clinical, and time-disciplinary governance during the nineteenth century. Michael Warner, for one, asserts that addiction first emerged in the US from the mass self-relations promoted by the temperance movement in the 1830s and 1840s. Liberal fantasies of a self integrated by its mobility across voluntary associative networks, Warner holds, thereafter framed addiction as a mode of public "self-contemplation" that lets censured pleasures leak through "an abandonment newly regarded as expressive."[9] Along similar lines, Susan Zieger claims that "the new human character of the addict" irrupted from the "incomplete medicalization" of temperance in the 1870s and 1880s. Metaphors of self-enslavement shifted to a disease model in the wake of the Civil War, Zieger finds, displacing the ruin of the slavocracy into anxieties about the exhaustion and emasculation of white male bodies.[10] Addiction discourse, when exemplified by genres in which habitués narrate the divestment and redemption of white citizen–subjecthood, would thus seem to have originally concerned those subject to a dialectic of alienated desire and disordered will. Neither version of this genealogy examines the genres of investigative vigilance and xenophobic panic that circulated around scenes of psychotropic sociability, however.[11] And, consequently, neither accounts for how protocols of

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Timothy A. Hickman, *The Secret Leprosy of Modern Days: Narcotic Addiction and Cultural Crisis in the United States, 1870–1920* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2007). See also David T. Courtwright, *Dark Paradise: A History of Opiate Addiction in America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).

[9] Michael Warner, "Whitman Drunk," in *Publics and Counterpublics* (New York: Zone Books, 2005), 272, 280–81.

[10] Susan Zieger, *Inventing the Addict: Drugs, Race, and Sexuality in Nineteenth-Century British and American Literature* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2008), 18, 22. Not until the turn of the century did the state begin to regulate "'drug undergrounds'" (234) as nodes of "social infection" (237), Zieger suggests in her afterword, "The Biopolitics of Drug Control."

[11] A classic account of moral panics surrounding sexuality may be found in Gayle S. Rubin, "Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality," in *Deviations: A Gayle Rubin Reader* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012), 137–82. See also Bruce Burgett, "Sex, Panic, Nation," *American Literary History* 21, no. 1 (2009): 67–86; Sean P. Hier, ed., *Moral Panic and the Politics of Anxiety* (New York: Routledge, 2011); and Miriam Kingsberg, *Moral Nation: Modern Japan and Narcotics in Global History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013). My sense of the term *psychotropic sociability* is akin to what Nicholas Shapiro and Eben Kirksey call "chemosociality" in "Chemo-Ethnography: An Introduction," *Cultural Anthropology* 32, no. 4 (2017): 481–93.

exposure and containment aligned state regulatory agencies, narcotourist mediascapes, and the human sciences in the profiling of those scenes.[12] I contend that this nexus of aesthetic regulation was crucial to advancing the racist governance of drug use from the first municipal opium den bans of the mid-1870s to the federal Opium Exclusion Act in 1909.

My argument unfolds in three parts. Its overarching aim is to decenter those personifying logics that would identify addiction with the repetitive collapse of a freely willing citizen-subject. To that end, the first part of this essay tracks a shift from physiological to neurological models of habit between 1868 and 1890. If the former sorted the opium habit between the racialized figures of the habitué and the fiend, the latter traced it to the inertia that loops nervous systems into circuits of energetic uptake and discharge. As the second part demonstrates, physiological models of habit shaped the profiling of opium scenes from the 1870s on. Narcotourist mediascapes and state agencies further racialized those models, however, by stressing the contagious toxicity of smoked opium. Anti-opium panic coordinated informal and official investigations in the drive to control the boundaries of Chinatown by exposing and recontaining transsensory drift. But the aesthetic regulation of opium scenes did not only rely on the terrorizing work of sociospatial apartheid. With the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, a new sense of temporal disjuncture began to split opium scenes. In the final part of this essay, I turn to three exposés from that period to elaborate how opium joints arranged scenes of appetitive and sensorial inertia. Opium smoking would seem, in these inquiries, to unfasten

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Chemosociality refers for them to "the longstanding relationships and emergent social forms that arise from chemical exposures and dependencies" (484).

[12] *Mediascapes*, as Arjun Appadurai defines the term, script national and translocal fantasies of others' worlds by extrapolating "prologemena to the desire for acquisition and movement" from "image-centered, narrative-based accounts of strips of reality" (*Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996], 35).

attachments to conscious sociality. Yet transient relations could also float on the looseness of association this very indifference sustained.

Habitués, Fiends, and the Inertia of Appetite

Addiction has never been a unified diagnostic. Nor can its emergence be ascribed solely to the medicalization of willpower in an abstract citizen-subject. Medical theory in the US did not consolidate the diagnostic type of the addict until the early twentieth century. Late nineteenth-century treatises on appetitive disorder occasionally refer to addiction, but more often they classify the disorder either as a mania (for opium, cocaine, morphia, chloral, etc.) or under the more general category "morbid craving."[13] No matter the nosology, though, almost every study sorted the opium habit between two physiological profiles: there was the disease suffered by the white *habitué*, who ate opium, and the vice indulged by racialized *fiends*, who smoked it. Between the two there operated a dynamic "logic of personification," as Timothy Hickman has observed.[14] Lapses of self-possessed personhood pushed the habitué to the brink of racial abjection, but also measured the distance between curable illness and constitutional depravity. Iyko Day's work on Asian racialization, though not directly concerned with opium fiends, allows us to relink their figural constitution to the chronobiopolitical formations they encode. With the completion of the US transcontinental railroad in 1869, Day contends, Chinese bodies came to

[13] Alonzo Calkins popularized the term *morbid craving*, which had been in circulation since at least the 1830s, in *Opium and the Opium-Appetite: with Notices of Alcoholic Beverages, Cannabis Indica, Tobacco and Coca, and Tea and Coffee, in their Hygienic Aspects and Pathologic Relations* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1871), 20. The term attained its widest circulation after 1878, with the English translation of Edward Levinstein, *Morbid Craving for Morphia (Die Morphiumsucht): A Monograph Founded on Personal Observation*, trans. Charles Harrer (London: Smith, Elder, 1878).

[14] Hickman, *Secret Leprosy*, 60. See also Joseph M. Gabriel on the bifurcation of consumer drug regulations in "Restricting the Sale of 'Deadly Poisons': Pharmacists, Drug Regulation, and Narratives of Suffering in the Gilded Age," *Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era* 9, no. 3 (2010): 328–34.

personify the abstract movements of "*labor time*" through settler capitalist circuits of accumulation. More specifically, these bodies stood for the inhuman mobility of capital insofar as their "mode of efficiency" indicated a "perverse temporality of domestic and social reproduction."[15] If habitués narrated cases of toxic accumulation in the insoluble time of prognosis, then fiends typified the unfeeling endurance of degraded living conditions previously associated with the Chinese "coolie."[16] Later theories of the opium habit complicate this personifying logic, however. Neurological models of the habit, exemplified here by the work of William James, locate it not in a degeneration of personal substance but in the inertia of appetite as it courses through impersonal circuits of accumulation and expenditure.

Among the earliest US-based studies to racialize the physiology of the habitué was a therapeutic treatise titled *The Opium Habit* (1868). Race determines susceptibility to the effects of the drug, here. Opium "seldom, perhaps never, intoxicates the European," the volume asserts, though "it seems habitually to intoxicate the Oriental" and to thereby "distort the person." Initially the pleasureless compulsiveness of opium eating would seem to exempt Euro-Americans from the sensual excess that disfigures their Chinese counterparts. Nonetheless, the prognoses given by *The Opium Habit* warn that even opium eaters must eventually suffer distortions of white personhood. Addressing a "hopeless" case in the second person, a hypothetical physician explains that, as "'your very personal substance'" continues to amass foreign toxins, metabolic processes will begin to shut down from "'fatal conservation of the

[15] Iyko Day, *Alien Capital: Asian Racialization and the Logic of Settler Colonial Capitalism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016), 16.
[16] On hope and hopelessness in prognosis, see Jasbir Puar, "Prognosis Time: Towards a Geopolitics of Affect, Debility, and Capacity" *Women & Performance: A Journal of Feminist Theory* 19, no. 2 (2009): 161–72. On the sensory constitution of the coolie in US race sciences, see Eric Hayot, "Chinese Bodies, Chinese Futures," *Representations* 99, no. 1 (2007): 99–129. Hayot argues that the coolie figured a "biologically impossible body" whose inability to "*experience* monotony" portended the triumph of "mass production over unalienated, organic labor" (103).

tissues.'" Over time, deposits of "inert" or "'effete'" matter will block off every excretory outlet but the skin, staining the entire body gradually "'yellower.'" As body and toxin merge ever more intimately, the effeteness of opium progressively exhausts, unmans, and discolors the habitué. Soon he must keep to a precise dosing schedule just to avoid the "languor and impotence one feels from abstaining."[17] Cycling between abstention and relapse at some point causes multiple body systems to collapse entirely. By physicalizing the disorder, *The Opium Habit* thus promises a degree of biosocial immunity to those who would identify their habits as diseases.[18] At the same time, though, it premises that immunity on the diseased person's captivation by a fatal spiral toward chronic energy loss, body-substance degendering, and racial degradation.

Quite the contrary for fiends: opium smoking configured their bodies as sites not of enervation but of perverse efficiency. Rather than induce a visceral decline in energetic capacities, that is, the habit of smoking opium indexed the abstracted drives and debased social reproduction of Chinese laborers. Kathleen Auerhahn has shown how the Workingmen's Party of California promulgated this racist ideology throughout the 1870s. Anti-opium propaganda, impelled by the fantasy that opium inured Chinese bodies to living conditions too "degraded" for whites, was one means by which the WPC leveraged state racism to restrict and expel "labor market competition."[19] That ideology spread with particular virulence in the buildup to the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act. In 1882, for instance, the physician H. H. Kane claimed that Chinese opium smokers are by no means "incapacitated for work" but indeed outperform

[17] Horace B. Day, *The Opium Habit, with Suggestions as to the Remedy* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1868), 8, 47, 219, 258, 281–82.
[18] On biosocial immunity, see Priscilla Wald, *Contagious: Cultures, Carriers, and the Outbreak Narrative* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 57. Also see Neel Ahuja on the "fluid materialization" of race across different scales and species in *Bioinsecurities: Disease Interventions, Empire, and the Government of Species* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016), 6.
[19] Kathleen Auerhahn, "The Split Labor Market and the Origins of Antidrug Legislation in the United States," *Law & Social Inquiry* 24, no. 2 (1999): 413. See also Alexander Saxton, *The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement in California* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).

Euro-Americans in the most strenuous mining operations.[20] Likening migrant laborers to a "wage-reducing machine," Roswell P. Flower drew on the same racist physiology to voice his opposition to the "cooly system" in the congressional hearings that would pass the Exclusion Act that same year. Against the political autonomy enjoyed by a naturalized white citizenry, Flower counterposes the machinic subsistence of "cooly" labor. "The freedom of an eating, drinking, opium-smoking, working automaton," he declares, "is not the freedom which our citizens enjoy."[21] Not only does this image reduce migrant bodies to their physiological functions, but it also equates the survival of that functioning with a machinic indifference to unfreedom. As a hyperbolic incarnation of the perverse social reproductivity already personified in the "coolie," the opium fiend thus both screened and magnified the racist antagonisms segmenting the nation's industrializing labor force.

Less-stereotyped renderings of habit, derived from nervous systems rather than already racialized personae, started to displace the habitué–fiend dyad toward the end of the nineteenth century.[22] In 1890 William James reconceived habit as a form of inertia that stores and expends energy through the body's recurrence to sensorimotor pathways. Inertia sets a constitutive limit to what James calls plasticity. Matter enjoys plasticity when its structure is "weak enough to yield to an influence, but strong enough not to yield all at once." Not yielding all at once defines the work of inertia. James sees this same dynamic at work in the habitual pathways that structure the nervous system. Nerve tissues conduct incoming stimuli to outgoing discharges along a

[20] Harry Hubbell Kane, *Opium-Smoking in China and America: A Study of Its Prevalence, and Effects, Immediate and Remote, on the Individual and the Nation* (New York: G. P. Putnam's and Sons, 1882), 75.
[21] Roswell P. Flower, "Chinese Immigration," in *Remarks of Hon. Roswell P. Flower, in the House of Representatives, Forty-seventh Congress* (Washington, DC, 1883), 11. This racist imagery was by no means idiosyncratic to Flower. Lucy Salyer cites California Senator John Miller's argument that Chinese laborers were hereditarily trained to become "'automatic engines of flesh and blood.'" See Salyer, *Laws Harsh as Tigers*, 15.
[22] On the racialization and subsequent "biological universalism" of the opium habit, see Alan Baumler, "The International Campaign against Opium," in *The Chinese and Opium under the Republic: Worse Than Floods and Wild Beasts* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), 62–64.

"reflex arc." At first the system resists, but with each recurrence the reflex yields more readily to its corresponding influence. Once habit takes hold, action becomes automatic. A willed or perceived "command to *start*" is all it takes for the system to start down a pathway: discharged energy (A), returning as stimulus (a), in turn yields discharge (B) and consequent stimulus (b) in a chain of reflexes that ends in the "idea" (G'**)** of a completed effect. Living creatures comprise the total "system of paths" to which their nerve tissues have yielded in the past or may yield in the future. Nervous inertia maintains those reflexes by resisting the conduction of stimuli to other paths. Yet inertia also makes the system prone to relapse, as when one falls back into an "opium-indulgence."[23] To wean oneself off such a habit, one must break unconscious automatisms down to the conscious sequences of action from which they derive. It becomes clear from this prescriptive moment that James seeks to enclose the inertia of opium craving between an executive act of will and the recognition of that act's efficacy. Because it enmeshes any given exercise of the will in a maze of automatisms, however, this inertia may always escape or oppose the subject it automatizes.

Modeling the habit-forming body as a system of nervous inertia allows James to diverge from a physiology that would substantiate disorder in racialized types. But it also leads him to recast social and geopolitical hierarchies as universal physical laws that bind everyone equally. Habit constitutes, for James, "the enormous fly-wheel of society." A fly-wheel is a mechanism that uses rotational inertia to concentrate and regulate intermittent energy sources.[24] Nervous

[23] William James, "Habit," in *The Principles of Psychology*, vol. 1 (New York: Henry Holt, 1890), 105, 109, 116, 108, 106, 124. Kyla Schuller's arguments about the role of inertia in nineteenth-century race sciences are instructive here. As Schuller points out, evolutionary ontologies of race rest on an "animacy teleology" that opposes the pastness of "inert matter" to the futurity of "vital materiality" (*The Biopolitics of Feeling: Race, Sex, and Science in the Nineteenth Century* [Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2018], 26). James sees inertia differently—not as a primitive state from which living processes evolve but as their ongoing structural condition of possibility.
[24] James, "Habit," 121. "A fly-wheel serves to store up work, or to give it out when required, just as a mill-pond fed by a stream of variable discharge serves to store up water for the mill-wheel," William Dennis Marks explains in *The Relative Proportions of the Steam-Engine: Being a Rational and Practical Discussion of the Dimensions of*

inertia, following this metaphor, ensures the smooth functioning of power relations by looping energy into closed circuits of accumulation and expenditure. Multiple scales of relation come under this segregatory order: habit "keeps different social strata from mixing," "saves the children of fortune from the envious uprisings of the poor," "holds the miner in his darkness," and "protects us from invasion by the natives of the desert and the frozen zone."[25] Just as it encases socioeconomic inequalities in a sense of immediacy and inevitability, so does habit naturalize the imperial violence that orders the planetary zoning and dislocation of subaltern peoples. Yet if habit may seem to hold up a sociophysical defense against "invasion," it also holds together somatic repertoires for reproducing lifeworlds in transit. Migration, as Arjun Appadurai understands it, carries the "social inertia of bodily techniques" out of predisposing social structures and compels the body to adapt, instead, to scripts circulated through deterritorialized mediascapes.[26] While opium habituation marked Chinese migrants out for regulatory control, then, the inertia of that appetite also served as a base on which their bodies could improvise more ephemeral forms of relation. Archival work attuned to sensorial and appetitive inertia, I propose, allows us to draw out temporalities resistant to the governance of habit: not only the dilated transience of time on opium but also the chronic maintenance of places where the appetite for opium could loop all sorts of bodies into the social reproduction of migrant lifeworlds.[27]

Every Detail of the Steam-Engine (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1884), 120. On inertia, see also Jennifer Fleissner, *Women, Compulsion, Modernity: The Moment of American Naturalism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 2–4.

[25] James, "Habit," 121.

[26] On "social inertia," see Appadurai, *Modernity at Large*, 67.

[27] More specifically, the inertia of opium scenes resisted capture by a chronobiopolitics premised, as Dana Luciano puts it, on the "sexual arrangement of the time of life." See *Arranging Grief: Sacred Time and the Body in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York: New York University Press, 2007), 9. Opium appetites reroute the "exceptional loop" (74) that, Luciano argues, threads "timeless" affective rhythms of social reproduction through the progressive drive of capital accumulation.

Opium Law and the Aesthetic Regulation of Chinatown

Around 1875 a new nexus of aesthetic regulations began to script Chinatown opium dens as scenes of contagion. Narcotourist mediascapes, state agencies, and the human sciences initiated a convergent effort, at this moment, to expose and recontain the transsensory drift of the dens. Most accounts of those scenes oscillate between prying curiosity about and violent revulsion at the orientalized sensuality of opium fiends. Narcotourists and other investigators plotted routes through the dens that typically featured tableaux of bodies of every age, race, sex, and class "scattered promiscuously" on bunks and couches, numb to any impropriety.[28] Mary Ting Yi Lui retraces how guidebooks to New York City's opium joints used this "disheveled image" to arouse a sense of reprosexual crisis around the intermingling of white women and Chinese men.[29] Likewise, in his work on opium dens in San Francisco, Nayan Shah finds that moral panics seized on scenes of "indiscriminate intimacy" because they hosted "cross-racial sexual liaisons" and excited pleasures that were too contagious, too enervating, or too queer to enter into the bioenergetic calculus of reproduction investing the white nuclear family.[30] Mel Chen, drawing on Shah, examines how the white domestic imaginary at once concentrated the felt menace of opium dens in oral vectors of disease (the pipe) and dispersed it across the "transitivity" of racialized toxins.[31] Rather than localize disorder in persons, investigations of the

[28] Because they generally arise in the context of anti-Chinese propaganda, such images come freighted with racist antipathies. This quote is from Atwell Whitney, *Almond-Eyed; A Story of the Day* (San Francisco: A. L. Bancroft, 1878), 129.
[29] Mary Ting Yi Lui, *The Chinatown Trunk Mystery: Murder, Miscegenation, and Other Dangerous Encounters in Turn-of-the-Century New York City* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 30. I define the term *reprosexual*, following Luciano, as the domain of sexuality assessed by racialized norms of heterosexual reproduction. See *Arranging Grief*, 11, 136.
[30] Nayan Shah, *Contagious Divides: Epidemics and Race in San Francisco's Chinatown* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 97, 93. See also Marez on the opium den's "queer intimacy" in *Drug Wars*, 71, no.
[31] Mel Chen, *Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012), 170. If opium figured as the toxic object of racial panic, Chen speculates elsewhere, it also carried the

dens profiled the zones of habitual alteration that spread between depersonified sensoria. Although they could never fully withdraw from that nexus of aesthetic regulation, opium scenes could nonetheless loosen the aesthetic protocols used to restrict the transit of addicted appetites.

A model of habit keyed less to the prognostic arc of any one case than to the projected multiplication of disorder across cases guided investigations of Chinatown opium scenes. If in theory the Euro-American habitué and the "oriental" fiend embodied discrete types of physiological susceptibility, in regulatory practice the techniques, speeds, and loci of exposure were what racialized opium smoking. A "Report on Chinese Immigration" (1871) for the California State Board of Health exemplifies that investigative protocol. More than any other intoxicant, the report warns, smoked opium risks a deregulated assimilation of "our excitable [white] community" to the "depraving habits" of Chinese migrants. It goes on to explain that opium smoking is "more readily communicated" than opium eating because the effects of inhalation are "almost instantaneous" compared with digestion.[32] Within a few years of the report, in 1875, the city of San Francisco would attempt to outlaw any assembly "for the purposes of smoking opium, or inhaling the fumes of opium."[33] Not coincidentally, that same year the US government implemented the Page Act, which authorized settler states to deport any "obnoxious person" whom the courts might assign to one of three classes: "cooly" laborers, "alien convict[s]," and women "imported for the purposes of prostitution" from "China, Japan, or any Oriental country."[34] Noxiousness, though ascribed to moral and physical contaminants rather

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biochemical efficacy of "involuting human temporalities and percepts." See Chen, "Unpacking Intoxication, Racialising Disability" *Medical Humanities* 41, no. 1 (2015): 28.

[32] Arthur B. Stout and Thomas Logan, "Report on Chinese Immigration," in *First Biennial Report of the State Board of Health of California for the years 1870 and 1871* (Sacramento: D. W. Gelwicks, State Printer, 1871), 55–56.

[33] The text of the proposed ordinance may be found in "The Opium Dens. Action of the Board of Supervisors on the Evil—a Disgusting Recital of Facts," *San Francisco Chronicle*, November 16, 1875.

[34] U.S. Congress, "An Act Supplementary to the Acts in Relation to Immigration," sess. II, chap. 141, *U.S. Statutes at Large* 18 (March 3, 1875), 477. The Page Act was "the first federal legislation that enumerated specific types of

than persons, thus tied investigations of opium dens to national structures of xenophobic recoil. Just as immigration restrictions sought to preempt infiltrations of national territory, so too did anti-opium panic presuppose that ambient flows of sensation had already escaped aesthetic containment. But if the reciprocal amplification of these crises solicited a sense of acute threat, it could only do so by evoking an established interimperial imaginary. It will thus be necessary, before returning to the incipient logics of anti-opium panic in the US, to chart some shifts in opium's dispensations under British imperial rule.

To maintain work-discipline in its subjugated peripheries, the British Empire depended, for much of the nineteenth century, on the cultivation and administration of opium. Lisa Lowe and Curtis Marez have shown how the empire used opium to instill docility in colonized populations in India and entrap "coolie" laborers in predatory debt systems across the Asia-Pacific.[35] Indian plantation workers in Benaras and Patna processed opium for export by the East India Company to British and American merchants, who then smuggled the drug into Qing China throughout the early nineteenth century.[36] After the first Opium War (1839–42), the British used opium as a sort of chemical weapon to secure commercial–imperial control over Hong Kong and the ports seized by the Treaty of Nanking.[37] Likewise, around half a century later in South Africa, British colonizers occupying the Transvaal (1902–10) would provision opium for Chinese migrants indentured to work in the Witwatersrand gold mines. According to Thembisa Waetjen, the colonial administration deployed the opium den as a "'special

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people who were excluded from entry into the United States," Siobhan Somerville observes in "Notes toward a Queer History of Naturalization," *American Quarterly* 57, no. 3 (2005): 666.

[35] Lisa Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015), 133; and Marez, *Drug Wars*, 71.

[36] See R. K. Newman, "Opium Smoking in Late Imperial China: A Reconsideration," *Modern Asian Studies* 29, no. 4 (1995): 765–94; and Amar Farooqui, "Colonialism and Competing Addictions: Morphine Content as Historical Factor" *Social Scientist* 32.5–6 (2004): 21–31.

[37] On the treaty, see Carl Trocki, *Opium, Empire, and the Global Political Economy: A Study of the Asian Opium Trade, 1750–1950* (London: Routledge, 1999), 99–102.

biochemical zone'" where "medical and penal machineries" could manipulate worker vitality. But the empire phased out that managerial logic to join an emerging system of international drug control in the early twentieth century.[38] Medical and penal apparatuses had been reorganizing around a logic of criminalization since the 1890s, partly due to pressure from reform lobbies like the Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade. In 1895 the Royal Commission on Opium issued an investigative report that upheld the Indo-Chinese trade against the anti-opium campaigns. London's County Council did not regulate opium smoking until 1909, in keeping with the International Opium Commission convened in Shanghai that same year.[39] A global drug control system only began to take shape in 1912, when the UK, along with nine other signatory nations, ratified the Hague Opium Convention.[40]

Metropolitan imaginaries had begun anxiously probing mainland dens some twenty years before the Royal Commission on Opium, however. Journalistic and fictional accounts of the dens in London's East End shaped the ideological shift underwriting reform movements from the 1870s on—namely, a shift from what Virginia Berridge calls an "air of realism" to an atmospherics that at once dilated curiosity around the den's exoticism and shrouded it in hallucinatory menace.[41] Ashley Wright proposes that, amid this panicked curiosity, opium dens composed scenes of "bodily irregularity" where "Chinese, Indian and British consumers mingled outside of imperial hierarchy, and where British consumers could come under the thrall of a

[38] Thembisa Waetjen, "Poppies and Gold: Opium and Lawmaking on the Witwatersrand, 1904–10," *Journal of African History* 57, no. 3 (2016): 394, 415.
[39] See Howard Padwa, *Social Poison: The Culture and Politics of Opiate Control in Britain and France, 1821–1926* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2012), 66.
[40] See William B. McAllister, *Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History* (New York: Routledge, 2000), 33–35.
[41] Virginia Berridge, *Opium and the People: Opium Use and Drug Control Policy in Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century England* (London: Free Association Books, 1999), 196.

foreign substance."[42] What made these scenes especially disturbing were the sexual opportunities they offered to white women and Asian men. Moral–physical contagion was, by the 1890s, the primary register in which anti-opium propaganda imagined the dens as nexuses of somatic disorder and reprosexual subversion. If opium dens abroad promised to contain and regenerate bodies laboring under imperial control, in the UK they raised the specter of those same bodies invading the metropole to degenerate the appetites and deregulate the self-rule of its white citizenry. Most broadly, then, the opium den emplotted a zone of xenophobic reversal in the British imperial imaginary. Although the empire relied on opium to subdue and extract productivity from peripheral laborers, the drug's very potency as a tool of biochemical governance also seemed to risk the dissolution of racial–sexual apartheids.

A similar trajectory organized opium scenes under US settler society. Moral panics originating in western settlements like San Francisco and Virginia City, Nevada, started to attract regulatory oversight to the dens in the mid-1870s, mostly through public health policing. Laws banning opium dens soon followed. Their purpose was to reinforce the already virulent network of work restrictions, anti-miscegenation laws, discriminatory taxes, health codes, and "anti-coolie" terrorism that built up to the Chinese Exclusion Act.[43] Nowhere was that network applied more visibly than in San Francisco, the port of entry for most Chinese migrants and a center of Chinese American life since the 1850s. As early as 1854, the San Francisco Board of Health had designated Chinatown a source of miasma, a term used to indicate how sensations (smells especially) could transmit disease.[44] City legislators made that association a jailable offense with

[42] Ashley Wright, "Not Just a 'Place for the Smoking of Opium': The Indian Opium Den and Imperial Anxieties in the 1890s," *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 18, no. 2 (2017), muse.jhu.edu/.
[43] See Saxton, *Indispensable Enemy*; and Lee, *At America's Gates*.
[44] On the difference between miasma, contagion, and infection in multifactorial models of disease causality, see Margaret Pelling "The Meaning of Contagion: Reproduction, Medicine and Metaphor," in *Contagion: Historical and Cultural Studies*, ed. Alison Bashford and Claire Hooker (New York: Routledge, 2001), 18–19.

the Cubic Air Ordinance of 1870. Police targeted residents of Chinese lodging houses for arrest and incarceration when enforcement began in 1873.[45] Not long after, opium dens came under more direct attack. According to the historian Diana Ahmad, Virginia City passed the nation's first ordinance against opium dens in 1876. San Francisco succeeded in passing its own ban in 1878.[46] Legislation in Utah Territory prohibited the keeping of opium dens in 1880. Montana Territory, the state of California, and the city of Chicago prohibited both keeping and frequenting in 1881. After 1882, laws against opium dens spread to cities in the East, South, and Midwest, and national security apparatuses rapidly expanded border controls on opium smuggling.[47] The administration of opium dens would extend to the Philippines once the US established its colonial government there in 1902.[48] By the time of the Shanghai Opium Commission and the Smoking Opium Exclusion Act seven years later, drug control had become a matter of international hegemony.

As the law expanded, so did strategies of aesthetic containment. Lurid exposés of opium dens not only impelled the law's eastward spread but also fed curiosity about the illicit sensations the dens might hold. If anti-opium panic targeted US Chinatowns for intensified boundary policing, it also incited traffic in spectacles of ethnic peculiarity.[49] These aims were not antithetical but coextensive. Opium dens composed scenes of constraint where white citizens could go to thrill in their own free mobility. It was precisely the sociolegal marginalization of Chinatown, Raymond Rast argues, that promoted it as a "picturesque" reserve of premodern

[45] Joshua S. Yang, "The Anti-Chinese Cubic Air Ordinance," *American Journal of Public Health* 99, no. 3 (2009): 440.
[46] Diana Ahmad, *The Opium Debate and Chinese Exclusion Laws in the Nineteenth-Century American West* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 2007), 57–58, 60.
[47] See Courtwright, *Dark Paradise*, 77–79. See also Gabriel, "'Deadly Poisons,'" 331–32.
[48] See James A. Leroy, "The Opium Question in the Philippines," *Medical News*, February 18, 1905.
[49] On Exclusion-era "containment fields," see James S. Moy, *Marginal Sights: Staging the Chinese in America* (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1993), 65. See also David Palumbo-Liu, *Asian/American: Historical Crossings of a Racial Frontier* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 17–42.

exotica. Nowhere did the fantasy of the enclave's backwardness operate more powerfully than in the opium den. Marketing the dens as "backstage areas," guides sold tourists on their proximity to the phantasmic core behind Chinatown's show-places.[50] Like Rast, Carrie Tirado Bramen finds picturesque formulae at work throughout the genre she terms the "intra-urban walking tour." More than recycling images of backwardness, though, she argues that those formulae worked to recontain the "hermetic otherness" of Chinatown in a response that "transforms shock into mild surprise." An 1888 article by the journalist and activist Wong Chin Foo, titled "The Chinese in New York," exemplifies efforts to rescript the "racial sublime" as "charming curiosity." Wong turns away from the conventional topos of the opium den to explore a more "innocent" interest in food, Bramen suggests, because the latter could be publicly enjoyed, unlike opium.[51] Not only does the opium den here insinuate a scene of guilty indulgence, but it also marks the threshold beyond which picturesque formulae cease to work their domesticating charm and start to relapse into an exoticizing sublimity. Apprehended as a site of both obscene surplus pleasure and cryptic self-enclosure, the atmosphere of the opium den would thus seem to reduce to the static object of the tour's scopophilic drive.

Aesthetic containment was rarely that successful, however. Nor did it need to be. Moral panics generated alarm precisely from the failure to grasp the transsensory drift of opium scenes

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[50] Raymond Rast, "The Cultural Politics of Tourism in San Francisco's Chinatown, 1882–1917," *Pacific Historical Review* 76, no. 1 (2007): 38, 41–42. Xiaojing Zhou argues that the "controlling gaze of the *flâneur*" reinforced the ethnological profiling and aesthetic containment of Chinatown in San Francisco. See "'The Woman about Town': Transgressing Raced and Gendered Boundaries in Sui Sin Far's Writings," in *Cities of Others: Reimagining Urban Spaces in Asian American Literature* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2015), 31. Moving through opium dens under police escort, white guides sought out the "odor of abject social reality," as was typical of what Scott Herring calls "slumming literatures" in *Queering the Underworld: Slumming, Literature, and the Undoing of Lesbian and Gay History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 7.

[51] Carrie Tirado Bramen, "The Urban Picturesque and the Spectacle of Americanization," *American Quarterly* 52.3 (2000): 451, 468. Wong himself does not morally oppose the pleasures of opium to those of food. Opium smoking for him constitutes an "insidious social evil," but also a rather ordinary social lubricant. Under the influence people "become cheerful and communicative with those around them," he reports, and only sometimes lapse into the abandon seen in "'opium fiends.'" See Wong Chin Foo, "The Chinese in New York" *Cosmopolitan*, June 1888, 311.

on a sublime-picturesque spectrum. One of the earliest opium den tour stories in the US, Benjamin Lloyd's "A Night Stroll through Chinatown" (1875) set the protocol for this kind of tactical infelicity. Before he descends into the opium den, the white guide pauses to catalog a series of hypersensitive recoils. Just walking through the streets, he complains, left him "shocked" by "savage noises," "pestilential odors," and sights "which may have awakened symptoms of the most dreadful diseases." None of these miasmatic accesses compare, however, to the sight of opium smokers "sprawled out in all manner of pose, and in all stages of stupor or idiocy." At first the guide tries to seal their "ecstatic stage of somnolence" into a kind of solipsistic insensibility: seen from above the influence, the den's "blissful clime" collapses into the mute vacancy of each smoker's "limp and lifeless" body. Yet, by the end of the episode, there remains an undifferentiated tangle of bodies—"a number of young men and women," emphatically "*not Chinese*," strung out in the "miscellaneous confusion" of an all-too-Chinese setting. Most "startling," here, is the ambient communicability of the sensation to which the smokers seem to have fallen victim: as pleasurable as it is toxic, their "experiment" easily "glides into the habit" for which "death is the only cure."[52] Neither end of the spectrum presented above succeeds in circumscribing the slippage of habit through the social field arranged by the smokers' promiscuous sleep. Just as their miscellany throws any picturesque domestication into disarray, so too do their ecstasies splay out of sublime self-enclosure. To the extent that the scene solicits panic, the logic of that panic requires the breakdown of scopic pleasure in a safely delimited spectacle.

On this scene there emerges a contagion model of habit that redistributes the personifying logics discussed in the first part of this essay. Narcotourist mediascapes, state regulatory

[52] Benjamin E. Lloyd, "A Night Stroll through Chinatown," in *Lights and Shades in San Francisco* (San Francisco: A. L. Bancroft, 1875), 261–62.

agencies, and medical theory used that model to intensify the profiling of opium scenes throughout the 1880s. One scene from 1883, for instance, imagines the den as a place where any number of bodies may "breathe each other's emanations" and thereby succumb to "the effects of foul air, strongly saturated with intoxicating opium."[53] Reporting on "The Condition of Chinatown" in San Francisco two years later, a supervisory committee led by Willard Farwell describes the "poisonous atmosphere" of opium dens as a medium of habitual toxicity.[54] Likewise, an 1886 *Medical Bulletin* article stresses the danger of contracting the opium habit from the "moral contagia which float about . . . in the social atmosphere of cities and towns."[55] By 1887 a medical article on "The Opium Habit" could track the contagion from the "forced debasement of China" by the Opium Wars, through Chinese immigration to California and Nevada, and from there across America "along the route of the railroads."[56] Not even James's diagrams of nervous inertia, though just as attentive to the variable scale of habit, could adequately render the sensory transfers envisioned by the contagion model. Atmospheric sensation, instead of enclosing bodies in stratified circuits of energetic uptake and discharge, here envelops them in a common inertia. Yet, to track the communicability of this inertia, the aesthetic regulation of opium scenes required more than a strategy of spatial restriction. It would also come to articulate time-sensitive profiles of how those scenes staged and reproduced transient relations.

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[53] James W. Buel, "Chinese Prostitution and Opium Smoking," in *Mysteries and Miseries of America's Great Cities* (San Francisco: A. L. Bancroft, 1883), 280–81.
[54] J. L. Meares, "Condition of the Chinese Quarter," in *San Francisco Municipal Reports for the Fiscal Year 1884–5, Ending June 30, 1885* (San Francisco: W. M. Hinton, 1885), 180.
[55] Edward C. Mann, "On the Nervous and Mental Deterioration Produced by the Opium Habit in the Higher Classes," *Medical Bulletin* 8, no. 1 (1886): 12.
[56] W. S. Whitwell, "The Opium Habit," *Pacific Medical and Surgical Journal and Western Lancet* 30, no. 6 (June 1887): 323, 329.

Transience in the Joints, circa 1882

Opium scenes underwent a curious lexical split around the time of the Chinese Exclusion Act. Throughout the 1870s, investigators had almost uniformly referred to these spaces as *opium dens*. But in the succeeding decade they would also begin to call them *opium joints* and, later, *hop joints*. The mass-cultural emergence of the slang form traces back most directly to three inquiries from the years surrounding the act: two medical treatises, *The Morphine Eater* in 1881 (Leslie Keeley) and *Opium-Smoking in America and China* in 1882 (H. H. Kane), followed by a journalistic exposé, *The Demon of the Orient, and His Satellite Fiends of the Joints*, in 1883 (Allen Williams). As the instruments of an epidemic mediascape, these texts both registered and reinforced the criminalization of Chinese neighborhoods. Moral panic logics drive these investigations to amplify a sense of crisis around anesthetic departures from conscious sociality. Lapses of propriety in the joints signaled disorder for individual bodies and dissolution for the white bourgeois home's nucleus of private property, patriarchal kinship, and possessive heteroerotics.[57] With each rotation of the opium pipe, smokers might drift farther out of industrial time disciplines and the segregatory forms of social reproduction they compelled. Yet if exposure to opium habits could loop people into a common inertia, the allure of that inertia consisted in its ability to decelerate, break simultaneity with, or estrange the sense of inhabiting a shared present. New forms of asynchronous feeling, momentary affinity, and "unsexing" conviviality came to repose on these loci of temporal distortion. If they never fully dissolved capitalist circuits of accumulation or the chronic dispossessions on which they rest, opium joints

[57] Shah, *Contagious Divides*, 93–97.

could nonetheless shelter the transient uncoiling of appetite from cycles of settler-national reproductivity.

Keeley was among the first medical theorists to frame the opium joint as a scene set apart from public temporality. Juxtaposing the "prostrate, silent human forms" assembled there with "the hurrying rush and roar of traffic along the streets without," *The Morphine Eater* exhibits the joint in a kind of cutaway view. Adjacent to but a world away from street-level commerce, this scene would seem to unveil a zone of exemption from the everyday punctualities and aspirational business of city life. Underground and under the influence, even "'respectable' ladies, and actresses of note, may be found mingled with outcasts of their own, and with all classes of the other sex in this unlively, silent fellowship." Loss of voice and vivacity in this tableau of downward immobility accents the women's simultaneous exteriority to domestic space and reclusion from public time. Insofar as their common repose defamiliarizes habits of class stratification, it also figures dissociation: "The opium smoker," Keeley proclaims, "drops out of real life." As he understands it, real life entails the partitioning of "dreams" from consensus reality, but also the proper integration of downtime into cycles of domestic social reproduction. Dreamily gathering in the interstices of a bustling public world, the women's "silent fellowship" slips out of that loop, however temporarily. Much of this slippage Keeley attributes to the suppression of sexual appetites. On opium, "all dangerous passions are dulled and absorbed in the one over-mastering appetite for the narcotic intoxication."[58] If collective inertia comes to look like pathological stasis, here, it is not only because the joint drifts out of sync with domestic time disciplines but also because it attenuates reprosexual vitality.

[58] Leslie E. Keeley, *The Morphine Eater: or, From Bondage to Freedom. The Opium, Morphine, and Kindred Habits; Their Origin, Nature and Extent, Together with the Proper Method of Treatment to Be Adopted* (Dwight: C. L. Palmer, 1881), 175–77.

Kane uses the term *opium joint* much the way Keeley does: as shorthand for a scene of distorted temporality and the perverse forms of social reproduction it engenders. Yet where the latter had traced the sense of crisis to the impassivity of opium narcosis, the former would focus panic on the specter of sexual transgression. Visitors to the opium joints in New York City's Chinatown were generally not there to sleep, Kane observes in an 1881 *Harper's Weekly* article. Most of the people he saw in the joints formed "parties of two or three . . . either listlessly thinking, cooking, and smoking, or chatting quietly and indolently with each other."[59] Instead of sinking into abyssal self-enclosure, the scene's gradient of insensibility reaches idly outward, toward a languid sort of sociability. Ambient feeling emplots the joint as an epicenter of reprosexual precarity, racial degradation, and "national decay" in *Opium-Smoking in America and China*. Keeping pace with the eastward migration of Chinese migrants, the joints assemble smokers into a "standing army" that "take[s] a morbid delight in converting others," Kane imagines. Most vulnerable to this strange evangelism are young white women, on whom opium was supposed to act as a virtue-ruining aphrodisiac.[60] If the drug arouses novices, however, in habitués it inevitably depletes reprosexual capacity. Linking up these contradictory effects, opium joints thus come to bear an overdetermined nexus of social pathology—at once "a fertile cause of crime," "a sunderer of family ties," and "a breeder of sensuality" terminating in "impotence."[61] National vitality degenerates in the joints, for Kane, because their strange overfertility both inhibits and outstrips the reproduction of white domestic space.

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[59] Harry Hubbell Kane, "American Opium-Smokers II," *Harper's Weekly*, October 8, 1881, 683.
[60] Kane, *Opium-Smoking*, 8. "Many females are so much excited sexually by the smoking of opium during the first few weeks," Kane writes, "that old smokers with the sole object of ruining them have taught them to smoke." Victor Jew gives historical context on moral panic about relations between Chinese men and white girls in "'Chinese Demons': The Violent Articulation of Chinese Otherness and Interracial Sexuality in the U.S. Midwest, 1885–1889," *Journal of Social History* 37, no. 2 (2003): 389–410. On opium's aphrodisiac capacities in a Chinese context, see Yangwen Zheng, "The Volume of Smoke and Powder," in *The Social Life of Opium in China* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 116–30.
[61] Kane, *Opium-Smoking*, 147, 4, 8, 153.

More explicitly than its precursors, *The Demon of the Orient* trains its gaze on the impassionate attractions that distort time in opium joints. Lured through the streets of Lower Manhattan by a young "fiend" named Frank, Williams lays out an occult social field, or "fiendish society," circulating between the Chinese joint run by "Tun Gee" and an American-run "palace joint." In the former, Williams skims a frisson from the "uncanny scene" of Frank and Tun Gee's "latent fierce desire" to transmute "twining gold threads" of boiling opium into "the anticipated elysium." As the exposé cruises from the alchemical homoerotics of Tun Gee's place to the fetishistic pleasures of the American "opium palace," it reorganizes its gaze around one Viola Hardinge, the "'Queen of the Joint.'" When she first appears on the scene, assisted by a "Chinese attendant," Williams cannot tell whether Viola is a "girl" or a "woman." In her indeterminacy she could easily instance the moral ruin invoked at the end of the chapter, where Williams poses opium as a "most powerful aphrodisiac" used to "entice virtuous women and girls." But for now Viola embodies "the freedom born . . . of the peculiar unsexing influence of the joints." As a "centre of attraction," she focalizes the "weird social intercourse" engendered by the joint's ability to satisfy any number of appetites in a single neutralizing pleasure. Much of the attraction would seem to lie, for Williams, in how her cosmopolitan "freedom" mediates the American joint's co-optation of its Chinese counterpart. Viola magnetizes desire for a whitewashed "Oriental luxury" when, for example, she "pass[es] some fragrant cigarettes of Turkish tobacco around the circle."[62] Her freedom here depends on the reification of the Orient and the social marginalization of Chinese people (i.e., the inhabitants of Tun Gee's place, the attendant). Yet the aura of "unsexing influence," even when routed through this segregatory

[62] Allen S. Williams, *The Demon of the Orient, and His Satellite Fiends of the Joints: Our Opium Smokers as They Are in Tartar Hells and American Paradises* (New York: Published by the Author, 1883), 8, 46, 18, 21–22, 30, 23, 25, 24.

xenophilia, at the same time indicates how the joints could diffuse appetites for sex into a polymorphous sensuality.

Loosening sociability around an appetite that was thought to subsume every other "vicious impulse" under one pathological cycle, the opium joint would seem, for Williams, to cocoon smokers in a "perfect harmony," even as it slowly engulfs them in "Circean enthrallment." All-night joints stretch that synchronizing bind towards a kind of void horizon, at once wasting time and decelerating sensation by shutting out the punctual rhythms of public life. "To one under the God *Opien's* influence," Williams asserts, "time is *nil*. So long as his money holds out, he will 'hang out.'" Notwithstanding its ephemeral regressions into "perfect harmony," however, this null time fails to reduce to a picturesque scene of premodern timelessness. Suspended between the transcendence and the dissipation of habitual drives, the joints unloop from the linear time of capital accumulation.[63] But the distorting effects of that dissociation do not only hinge on the suspension of futurity. Multiplying across populations, opium joints also harbor a looming overproximity to the present. As if to confirm Kane's epidemic forecasts, Williams claims that "there can scarcely be a town of above ten thousand inhabitants in the United States where a sociable smoke of opium may not be had." It was the expansion of rail infrastructure across North America, on this account, that allowed the vice to "[sow] its seed" so rapidly and "[strike] its roots" so widely.[64] One of the nation's primary means of synchronizing territory, the transcontinental railroad, is here seen to propagate cravings that void national simultaneity. Latent in yet splitting off from that simultaneity, the joint's inert downtime paradoxically accelerates into the near-futural immediacy of contagion.

[63] On "linear-accumulative" time, see Luciano, *Arranging Grief*, 74.
[64] Williams, *Demon*, 48, 56–57.

Across these inquiries, opium joints come to figure the dissolution of national reproductivity insofar as they slow down sociability in the present and thereby block out incitements to live for the future. Kane's crisis report summons a pornotropic scenario to provoke racially menaced curiosity about the opium joint's contagious pleasures.[65] Joints are dangerous for Keeley, by contrast, not because they host passional excesses but because they let declassed bodies slip into indifference to anything but the appetite for opium. A curious ambivalence shapes the convergence of these positions in Williams's investigations of the opium scene's "peculiar social character." Warning that the vice "will, if not legally crushed out, or stringently restricted, rapidly ensnare Young America," the preface to *The Demon of the Orient* aligns itself with the paranoid biopolitics codified by Kane.[66] Yet the observations logged in the body of the text reveal just the opposite: rather than exciting sexual vice, the opium joint licenses new forms of unsexed sociability. Much like Keeley's theory that opium appetites soak up "all dangerous passions" in one perverse drive, here the "unsexing" pleasure in opium opens an interval between anesthetic stasis and transsensory contagion. As urgently as *The Demon of the Orient* pursues a prohibitionist agenda against the seductive conviviality spread by opium joints, then, it just as fervently invests in the fantasy of their strange exemption from normative circuits of accumulation and expenditure.

Only in the early twentieth century would profiles of drug peril decisively attach these contradictions to the lapsed self-control of a type known as "the addict." More than the disciplinary medicalization of the will was needed to consolidate that type. Not individual disorder but, above all, the chronic disjuncture of collective scenes moved state agencies and

[65] On pornotroping in the context of black chattel slavery, see Hortense J. Spillers, "Mama's Baby, Papa's Maybe: An American Grammar Book," *Diacritics* 17, no. 2 (1987): 67.
[66] Williams, *Demon*, 8.

narcotourist mediascapes to intervene in opium habits after 1882. Often these interventions equated temporal estrangement with regression to a racialized premodernity. "To the non-Chinese," Anthony W. Lee observes, the opium den held out a fantasy of "collective withdrawal to a dream space seemingly outside of time."[67] But if opium joints screened fantasies of exception from the linear progression of capitalist time, their asynchrony never seamlessly folded into Western dreams of a space anterior to industrial time-discipline. Mass-cultural exercises in "aesthetic ethnography," Thomas Kim argues, did not simply project encounters with "the Orient" into an archaic past. To produce its "frisson," the orientalizing encounter could not freeze its subjects "out of time" but had to contact them through "disjunctive temporalities," however tenuous and distantiated.[68] Just such a disjuncture held open the sensations of latent danger and repulsed fascination that profiles of opium joints sought to incite. If the joints appeared to subvert settler capitalist timeframes, it is because their inertia offered to overtake the habits binding appetitive bodies to chrononormative forms of life.[69] Yet even as the texts discussed above apprehend opium joints as sites of xenophobic panic, they also register how transient forms of relationality sink out of public co-presence and split off from privileged routes to national kinship. In their collective indifference to simultaneity, these scenes of appetitive inertia not only recede from the present but also interfere with the reproduction of the settler-national future.

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[67] Anthony W. Lee, "Photography and Opium in a Nineteenth-Century Port City," in *A Companion to American Art*, ed. John Davis, Jennifer A. Greenhill, and Jason D. LaFountain (Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell, 2015), 590.
[68] Thomas Kim, "Being Modern: The Circulation of Oriental Objects," *American Quarterly* 58, no. 2 (2006): 388, 401, 398, 395.
[69] Elizabeth Freeman defines "chrononormativity" as "the use of time to organize individual human bodies toward maximum productivity" in *Time Binds: Queer Temporalities, Queer Histories* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 3.

Chapter Two

Moved by Another Life: Allotted Time and Historical Poiesis in the Peyote Craze

Near the end of *The Autobiography of a Winnebago Indian* (1920), the life story of a Ho-Chunk man named Sam Blowsnake (Hágaga, also called Big Winnebago), the narrator has a strange experience. Under the influence of peyote, a psychotropic cactus, he dies and feels his body "moved by another life." His body begins "to move about; to move about and make signs." "(My) body spoke of many things and it spoke of what was true," or so it (the body) says. Whatever moves the body to speak at the same time takes the sensorium out of itself. Alongside the speaking body there unfolds a sensuous periphery that dispossesses Blowsnake of his pronominal claim on what the body says and edges him out of diachronic continuity with what the body does. Yet, in articulating this ecstatic time outside of time, not even the confessional voice remains his own. Narration cannot simply continue, but must instead warp around the convolutions of the other life it bodies forth: "I would be confessing myself a fool if I were to think that I had said all this, it (my body) told me." With this the episode of oblique embodiment comes to a close. Ecstatic temporality would seem to fold back into a temporary state. Only once he resumes his "normal human condition"—only once the confessional *I* recovers its perspectival equation with the bodily *it*—does Blowsnake realize that some of his companions had feared he'd "gone crazy." "Others had liked it," though; they believed "the 'shaking' state" could transmit spiritual teachings. Alternately dreaded as a pathological index of lost self-possession and exalted as a revivifying locus of contact with the sacred powers of Earthmaker, the tremor at once elicits and eludes the apprehension of an individual condition. By this same alternation it traces out the seismic passage of a moment in the process of overtaking any number of bodies in

collective ecstasy.[1]

As it fluctuates between a sort of craziness and something one might like, the episodic condition of ecstasy amplifies its historical condition of possibility—a moment known as the "peyote craze." Newspapers had first taken notice of the rise of the craze on the Winnebago Reservation in Nebraska around 1906, about a year before Blowsnake first took peyote and seven years before he drafted the manuscript that would become the *Autobiography*. Lines of spiritual and bodily transport associated with the "peyote road" had reached Nebraska as early as 1889, however. A Ho-Chunk peyotist named John Rave brought the ritual to his relatives in Wisconsin around the turn of the century.[2] Moving by rail or by post from peyote gardens on the Mexico-Texas border, through Indian Territory (now the state of Oklahoma), and from there across the Northern Plains, the peyote road turned the infrastructure of national territorial settlement inside out. Although designed to expedite the long-range incorporation of indigenous spaces and subjects under federal sovereignty, as a medium for the circulation of peyotism this infrastructure could also carry the deterritorializing energies of what Gerald Vizenor (Anishinaabe) terms "native transmotion."[3] To restrict the spread of the craze, various agencies of the US settler state would in turn develop new ways to intercept and intervene in the

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[1] Sam Blowsnake, *The Autobiography of a Winnebago Indian,* published as part of *University of California Publications in Archaeology and Ethnology* 16, no. 7 (April 1920): 447. In some ways the shaking body becomes a "stylus" recording the passage of a multilayered wave of historical determination—the craze. See Georges Didi-Huberman, *The Surviving Image: Phantoms of Time and Time of Phantoms: Aby Warburg's History of Art* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2017).

[2] Weston La Barre, *The Peyote Cult,* 5th ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989), 121. Also see Omer Stewart, "The Spread of Peyotism Beyond Oklahoma" in *Peyote Religion: A History* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), 148-62. A more institutionally oriented history may be found in Thomas Maroukis, *The Peyote Road: Religious Freedom and the Native American Church* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2010).

[3] Gerald Vizenor, *Fugitive Poses: Native American Scenes of Absence and Presence* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 15. Also see Guillermo Giucci, "Mystical Mobilities and Entheogenic Latin America," *The Journal of Transport History* 38, no. 2 (2017): 260-71. After buying supplies from the Laredo peyote gardens, roadmen would load them onto the Texas-Mexican Railroad, and then trans-ship them on the International and Great Northern line to Indian Territory. They often also sent peyote through the mail. On rail transport see Stewart, *Peyote Religion*, 139-40, 61 and Frederick E. Hoxie, "Exploring a Cultural Borderland: Native American Journeys of Self-Discovery in the Early Twentieth Century" *Journal of American History* 79, no. 3 (December 1992): 987.

biochemical flux of "intoxication" through Native bodies. The affective enclosure of intoxication by the alarm, concern, fascination, and "visceral disgust" of white investigators had long been key to colonial formations of racial indigeneity, as the historian Alexander Dawson has recently argued.[4] Underwriting that spectrum of acute sensitivities, this chapter posits, were the chronic structures of dispossession governing the day-to-day reproduction of settler capitalist rule. Yet insofar as the episodic transports of peyote's ecstasies defied emplotment in that everyday, they could also unfold other worlds alongside and beyond the expropriative processes of territorial enclosure. As a collective practice of what Chadwick Allen might call "trans-indigenous" world creation, that is, the peyote craze enacted neither a compensatory fantasy of some more perfect world nor solely a means of repairing this one.[5] Its tendency was, rather, to enliven altered capacities for historical poiesis—a sense of history in the making, not yet overdetermined by the horizon of chronic dispossession.[6]

Before retracing the movements of the craze it will first be necessary to clarify the nexus of dispossession from which it emerged. To that end this chapter begins with an analysis of what I call allotted time. Allotment in severalty most literally refers to an expropriative program of land privatization that the United States government imposed on Native peoples between 1887 and 1934. My argument in the first part of this chapter is that the maintenance of that regime was a *schizochronic* project, (a term I borrow from Johannes Fabian), aiming not just to turn tribal

[4] Alexander S. Dawson, *The Peyote Effect: From the Inquisition to the War on Drugs* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2018), 6.
[5] Allen uses the term *trans-indigenous* to discuss affinities and exchanges between indigenous peoples. See Chadwick Allen, *Trans-Indigenous: Methodologies for Global Native Literary Studies* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012).
[6] Mikhail Bakhtin's work offers a compelling point of departure for a historical poetics of the peyote road. A historical poetics, as Bakhtin understands it, does not approach the chronotopic structures of narrative discourse and those of everyday life as ontologically impermeable to one another, but rather as interrelated through dialogic transfers. See Mikhail Bakhtin, "Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel: Notes Toward a Historical Poetics," in *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays* trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 244, 250.

lands into private property but to break down the everyday life conducted on those premises.[7] Assimilation to property-bearing citizenship depended, that is, on the fracture and reabsorption of collectively lived passages of time into a series of individual habits, comportments, and circuits of appetite. New rituals of admission to ordinary citizenship orchestrated by settler bureaucratic "competency commissions" in the early twentieth century compressed these schizochronic processes into an event of transformative incorporation. In the second part of this chapter, I demonstrate how the assessment of competency came to organize the apprehension of peyotism as a "craze" by state regulatory agencies and in the wider settler national imaginary. My archival research here takes its cue from the ethnographic work of Audra Simpson (Kahnawà:ke Mohawk), who examines how the "gift" of citizenship envelops its recipients in "theaters of apprehension" along the borders of the United States, Canada, and the Mohawk nation. Apprehension of those held in "biopolitical states of care" entails, for Simpson, two tenses: the arresting grasp of the authorities that detain bodies in transit and the anticipatory reach of regulatory agencies as they predict the movement of populations.[8] If theaters of apprehension govern through forced contortions of physical and spatial copresence, however, they also disperse their effects over an array of scenarios that may reproduce settler rule through the withdrawal of state controls. Just such a mixed strategy of intervention and abandonment directed attempts to regulate the spread of peyotism. To apprehend bodies in ecstasy as intoxicated, crazed, or otherwise divested of a rational habitus was to reinforce subjection to state care by entrapping those bodies in a supposed lapse of competence for the daily life of

[7] Johannes Fabian introduces the term *schizochronic*, a synonym of *allochronic*, to designate the split tense anthropological texts use to dislocate the present of their enunciation from the archaic or timeless status of the peoples those texts represent. See his *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 38.
[8] Audra Simpson, *Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life Across the Borders of Settler States* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 24, 10. On the scene of recognition see too Glen Sean Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014).

propriative citizenship. Yet the mobility of the craze also opened detours out of allotted time insofar as it incited an altered sense of the creation of a historical moment.

Just this sort of alteration animates *The Autobiography of a Winnebago Indian*, the focus of the final part of this chapter. My contention here is that the episodic structure of ecstasy carries out a dilation of the present alongside and beyond the timeframes of the allotted everyday. Often the critical work on Blowsnake's life story bends this structural expansiveness back into the emplotment of a confessional subject in an arc of conversion. More historically pressing, though, is the question of how the iterated passage of ecstasy may, by decentering the stance of first-person reflexivity, convolute the perspectival alignment of a confessional *I* with the animacy of the bodily *it*. Against the work of chronic individuation enforced by allotment, peyotism initiated indigenous peoples into new techniques of sensory intensification that could stretch the amplitude of a passing state out into a collectively embodied condition. Insofar as they evaded the constrictions of time by the labor of maintaining self-possessed personhood, these transports composed a historical moment in resistance to the schizochronic project of allotment.

Allotted Time: Civilized Life and Schizochronism

In 1916, the US Department of the Interior began issuing a one-page form titled "Ritual on Admission of Indians to Full American Citizenship." Its purpose was to supply so-called competency commissions with an iterable script for the conversion of Indian "wards" into "free American citizens."[9] Some thirty years of bureaucratic statecraft went into the staging of this

[9] Department of the Interior, "Ritual on Admission of Indians to Full American Citizenship." Copies of the original document are held by the State Historical Society of North Dakota and in the Records of the Office of the Secretary

metamorphic scenario. Land tenure policy in the US had, since the passage of the Dawes Act in 1887, pursued the assimilation of American Indian populations through the systematic enclosure of tribal reservations – a policy known as "allotment in severalty." Although mystified by reformers as a kind of laissez-faire tutelage in the white agrarian ethos of self-improvement, allotment would in fact only cut Native peoples loose for another phase of invasion and expropriation.[10] Many studies have already documented the policy's role in the broader mission of subduing, "detribalizing," and domesticating indigenous people/s under settler capitalist rule. Usually this work conceives allotment as a means to control and rationalize the allocation of space.[11] Only a few touch on the chronic conditions bound up in the "gift" of propriative citizenship. Yet emplotment in private property relations forced a series of basic shifts in the social reproduction of indigenous lifeworlds. Not the least of these shifts followed from tighter

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of the Interior. A transcription may be found in Committee on Indian Affairs, *Survey of Conditions of the Indians in the United States: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Indian Affairs...* vol. 7, part 15, *Oklahoma* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1931), 7013-4. On competency commissions see Janet McDonnell, "Competency Commissions and Indian Land Policy, 1913-20" *South Dakota History* 11 (Winter 1980): 21-34; Frederick Hoxie, *A Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 1880-1920* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 176-87; and Russel Lawrence Barsh, "An American Heart of Darkness: The 1913 Expedition for American Indian Citizenship" *Great Plains Quarterly* 13, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 91-115. On the racialization of competency, see David L. Beaulieu "Curly Hair and Big Feet: Physical Anthropology and the Implementation of Land Allotment on the White Earth Chippewa Reservation" *American Indian Quarterly* 8, no. 4 (Autumn 1984): 287-291.

[10] On racial tutelage see John M. Gonzalez, "The Warp of Whiteness: Domesticity and Empire in Helen Hunt Jackson's *Ramona*" *American Literary History* 16, no. 3 (2004): 437-65. On laissez-faire subjection see Thomas Biolsi, "The Birth of the Reservation: Making the Modern Individual among the Lakota" *American Ethnologist* 22.1 (February 1995): 31 and Robert Berkhofer, *The White Man's Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to the Present* (New York: Vintage, 1978), 172-3. Also see Victor Turner on Weber on the Calvinist work ethic in *From Ritual to Theatre: The Human Seriousness of Play* (New York: PAJ Publications, 1982), 37-9.

[11] Nicole Tonkovich, for instance, describes how surveys of the Nez Perce Reservation in Idaho abstracted Nimiipuu locales to fit a rectilinear grid of administrative units and economic resources. See *The Allotment Plot: Alice C. Fletcher, Jane E. Gay, and Nez Perce Survivance* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2012), 103-4. Naomi Greyser goes even further, suggesting that "allotment was embedded in a systematic, expansive reorganization of relations among animate and purportedly inanimate matter" in *On Sympathetic Grounds: Race, Gender, and Affective Geographies in Nineteenth-Century America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 130. Allotment in this sense could be seen as an extension of what Kyla Schuller calls the "'geological machine," which positions indigenous bodies as "animate fossils" in a world "[carved] up … into varying gradations of liveness and fluctuating calibrations of death." See "The Fossil and the Photograph: Red Cloud, Prehistoric Media, and Dispossession in Perpetuity" *Configurations* 24, no. 2 (Spring 2016): 238, 230, 232. Frederick Hoxie renders the complexity and range of competing race-scientific positions in "Frozen in Time and Space," in *A Final Promise*, 115-45.

entanglement in the circuits of the money economy and more exhaustive conscription by capitalist work disciplines. The object of the pages that follow is, most immediately, to retrace how the "Ritual" encoded those orders of chronic dispossession in the processual form of an initiation.[12] As conduits for what Michael Taussig calls the magic of the state, these theaters of competency compressed ordinarily diffuse coercions into a synoptic and seemingly consensual event of transformation.[13] More than simply compartmentalizing land, the allotment program here articulates its designs on the comportment of appetitive bodies in and toward the time schemas of settler capitalist rule.

The inaugural Ritual took place in May 1916 at the Yankton Sioux Reservation in South Dakota. Several more ceremonies would be held that summer. Reading down the blank form, a Representative of the Department would lead participants through one of two scripts—one "FOR MEN" and another "FOR WOMEN." The former script involves five fetish objects, each activated by a specific gesture: first the allottee shoots the "last arrow," then he takes up the handles of a plow, receives a purse, and makes a promise to the American flag, before finally donning the "badge of honor." Just before he takes hold of the plow, the man is given the "last arrow" to keep as a relic of his ancestors, whom the script rebrands "the first of all Americans." As if to etch this act of retrospective colonization onto the person of the allottee, the Representative then replaces the "*Indian name*" with a "*white name*." Living the "life of the white man," the Representative declares, means working that living out of the earth, for "[o]nly by work do we gain a right to the earth or to the enjoyment of life." Between the arrow and the plow the ritual thus marks a cross-

[12] On processual form, see Victor Turner, "Social Dramas and Ritual Metaphors," in *Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974). See also Mircea Eliade on the initiatory in *Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy* trans. Willard R. Trask (London: Arkan
[13] On rites of passage, see Michael Taussig, *The Magic of the State* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 148. See also Arnold van Gennep, "Initiation Rites," in *The Rites of Passage* trans. Monika B. Vizedom and Gabrielle L. Caffee (London: Routledge, 2004), 81.

temporal threshold. To renounce the former for the latter is to move from subsistence in the past to responsibility for the future. Although significantly abbreviated, the women's ritual similarly confers citizenship through the handling of the habitual fetishes of white life. Not the plow but the purse holds the magic touch, here. If the plow reifies the injunction to enjoy the right to life through labor, the purse bespeaks the duty to reserve that enjoyment for domestic affections, like "the white woman [who] loves her home." "The purse will always say to you that the money you gain from your labor must be wisely kept," the Representative tells the new citizen. Only by saving up wages may she save the lives of her children, now "the future of our Nation," from the perennial struggle to "not starve." Neither commemorating nor renouncing the Indian past, and indeed addressing her solely by a "*white name*," the women's script casts its subject as an already futural, because historyless, site of accumulation. Over both forms of the Ritual there looms, finally, the shadow of "a hundred million free men and women," all bound by the amnestic and insoluble jealousy of the American flag—from then on "the only flag you have ever had or will have."

Nothing short of totalizing copresence with the anterior future of the settler nation suffices, by this logic, to transform the reservation-bound Indian into a property-bearing citizen. Yet even as the Ritual monumentalizes the drama of national allegiance, at base it seeks to enclose the everyday periodicities of living bodies in new cycles of work, rest, sustenance, and saving. Repeatedly echoing section six of the Dawes Act, the Ritual grounds its assimilationist ends in the severance of tribal affiliations and adoption of "the habits of civilized life."[14] Among these habits, perhaps the most ideologically freighted was the self-reliant work ethic that mere

[14] "An Act to Provide for the Allotment of Lands in Severalty to Indians on the Various Reservations (General Allotment Act or Dawes Act)," *Statutes of the United States of America Passed at the Second Session of the Fourty-Ninth Congress, 1886-1887* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1887), 388.

proximity to white neighbors was supposed to instill in novice allottees. Merrill Gates, a reformer associated with the Friends of the Indian, declared in 1885, for instance, that allotment would let "life-giving currents of civilized life" pass through the "sticky layers" of vice that had until then insulated reservations from the good exemplarity of neighboring white settlements.[15] Gates called for new regulatory instruments that would not only privatize landownership, but also cut off rations and annuity payments, pry apart extended kin groups to make heteronuclear families, criminalize Native religions, and summon people to punitive equality before the law—all in order to break Indians out of their "savage communism."[16] Reformers like Gates put forward a "redemptive vision of the law" that hinged, Eric Olund argues, on the metonymic linkage of Indian Country to "lawlessness" in need of a "law that would individuate its inhabitants."[17] Allotment's "money-property-government complex," as Jessica Cattelino terms it, answered that need in part because it furnished economic and legal subjects who had no choice but to "extend the temporality of their desires" into a precarious future.[18] Whether with some aspiration to belonging or, as foreshadowed above, simply in dread of starving, allottees would have to conform their appetites to the abstract self-continuity needed to improve their lot, in and

[15] Merrill E. Gates, "Land and Law as Agents in Educating Indians" *Journal of Social Science* 21 (1886):141-2.
[16] Merrill E. Gates, "Address of President Merrill E. Gates," in *Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Lake Mohonk Conference of Friends of the Indian* (New York: Lake Mohonk Conference, 1897), 9. On the attempt to privatize and straighten kinship, see Mark Rifkin, *When Did Indians Become Straight? Kinship, the History of Sexuality, and Native Sovereignty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Andrea Smith, "Queer Theory and Native Studies: The Heteronormativity of Settler Colonialism" *GLQ* 16, no. 1-2 (2010): 42-68; and Richard Phillips, "Settler Colonialism and the Nuclear Family" *The Canadian Geographer* 53, no. 2 (2009): 239-53. On the criminalization of Native religions, see Lee Irwin, "Freedom, Law, and Prophecy: A Brief History of Native American Religious Resistance" *American Indian Quarterly* 21, no. 1 (Winter 1997): 35-55; Steve Talbot, "Spiritual Genocide: The Denial of American Indian Religious Freedom, from Conquest to 1934" *Wicazo Sa Review* 21, no. 2 (Autumn 2006): 7-39; and Tisa Wenger, "Indian Dances and the Politics of Religious Freedom, 1870–1930" *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 79, no. 4 (December 2011): 850-78.
[17] Eric E. Olund, "From Savage Space to Governable Space: the Extension of United States Judicial Sovereignty over Indian Country in the Nineteenth Century," *Cultural Geographies* 9, no. 2 (2002): 142.
[18] Jessica Cattelino, "From Locke to Slots: Money and the Politics of Indigeneity," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 60, no. 2 (2018): 280-1. Also see Cheryl Harris on the utilitarian view of property as expectation in "Whiteness as Property" *Harvard Law Review* 106, no. 8 (June 1993): 1729 and Margaret Radin on Lockean self-continuity in "Property and Personhood" *Stanford Law Review* 34, no. 5 (May 1982): 963. Training in an extended temporality of desire was at the same time training in the possessive investment in whiteness.

after life. Landownership promised to produce that desiring subject from the regularities of the labor it compelled, the horizons of accumulation and expenditure it projected, and the ordinary exposures to white civil society it obligated. Over time, reformers hoped, such associations would fade Native bodies into a rational habitus that could aspire to live into the settler national future and would deserve to live on in the Christian eternity.

But if it offered to absorb individual lives into these plenary abstractions, the metamorphic work of the Ritual would require the disintegration of indigenous lifeworlds in exchange.[19] Allotment policy, as Theodore Roosevelt envisioned it in 1901, contrived to "recognize the Indian as an individual"—even if being an individual really meant becoming the byproduct of the "mighty pulverizing engine" the law set in motion "to break up the tribal mass."[20] The central mechanism of that engine was to divide reservations into a series of privately owned estates: 160 acres for male family heads, 80 for single adults and orphans under the age of eighteen, and 40 for all other minors.[21] Originally the federal government was to hold the land in trust for twenty-five years. Upon the expiration of the trust period, the allotting agent would then issue a fee simple patent, enabling taxation, encumbrance, and alienation of the plot. By granting full possession of the land the government at the same time conferred citizenship on the allottee. Any land left over once all allotments had been made – often amounting to hundreds of thousands of acres – the state designated "surplus" and appropriated "for the sole purpose of securing homes to actual settlers," though also for resource extraction or development by

[19] On the absorptive, sacralizing futurity held out by scenes of "general admission" to citizenship, see Lauren Berlant, "*Uncle Sam Needs a Wife*: Citizenship and Denegation," in *The Female Complaint: The Unfinished Business of Sentimentality in American Culture* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 16

[20] Theodore Roosevelt, *Message of the President of the United States Communicated to the Two Houses of Congress at the Beginning of the First Session of the Fifty-Seventh Congress* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901), 39.

[21] Janet McDonnell, *The Dispossession of the American Indian* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1991), 14.

capitalist industries.[22] Modifications to allotment policy in the early twentieth century, especially those stemming from *Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock* in 1903 and the Burke Act of 1906, expanded the scope of federal powers over Indian Country. With the latter Act Congress authorized the Secretary of the Interior to issue fee patents before the end of the trust period if the allottee met certain standards of "competency" for citizenship. By 1910, the Bureau of Indian Affairs would implement a system of competency commissions to assess and impose fitness for citizenship on Native people living on reservations.[23] As a consequence, the issuing of land grants accelerated. More and more reservation lands were broken up into alienable estates, and settler capitalist enterprises rushed to exploit the ensuing "surplus." The results were catastrophic. Indigenous peoples across North America would lose some 90 million acres of their homelands to state-backed white settlers between 1887 and 1934.[24]

Land privatization under the Dawes Act represented an attempt to rationalize and thereby prolong the chronic crisis of settler capitalist property relations. As a strategy of racial expropriation, allotment held out an external "fix" for the endogenous antagonisms of the industrializing nation.[25] But this fix was anything but exceptional. Rather, it formed a repeating precondition for a centuries-long process of territorializing violence, capitalist development, and state formation. Juridical constructions of Native land title under the European "doctrine of

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[22] *An Act to Provide for the Allotment of Lands in Severalty to Indians on the Various Reservations (General Allotment Act or Dawes Act)*, U.S. Statutes at Large 24, no. Main Section (1887): 390.
[23] Phillip J. Deloria, *Indians in Unexpected Places* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 150.
[24] McDonnell, *Dispossession*, 121.
[25] In Nancy Fraser's account, expropriation generally takes the form of the conscription of unfree labor, but the analysis extends to land theft, too. Both defer or absorb the impact of capitalism's structurally necessary crises. See Fraser, "Expropriation and Exploitation in Racialized Capitalism: A Reply to Michael Dawson" *Critical Historical Studies* 3, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 168. On the "chronic crisis" of racial projects in capitalist class formation, see Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 9. A chronic crisis is a situation where "the exception is the rule" – see Taussig, *The Magic of the State*, 141. On externalization see Scott Lauria Morgensen, "The Biopolitics of Settler Colonialism: Right Here, Right Now" *Settler Colonial Studies* 1, no. 1 (2011): 60.

discovery," Joanne Barker (Lenape) reminds us, had sought to dilute or nullify indigenous sovereignty since the beginnings of colonization in the Americas.[26] It was by downgrading that sovereignty to a set of occupancy rights that this same doctrine would serve the US government's efforts to remove, contain, and eliminate Indians throughout the nineteenth century, Patrick Wolfe holds.[27] Vine Deloria Jr. (Standing Rock Sioux) traces a similar continuum from the Discovery doctrine to the Dawes Act. Just as the former had left indigenous peoples with the "right only to sell," Deloria suggests, so would the latter "encourage the sale of Indian lands," often by fraud and "for a mere fraction of its value."[28] Such breakages of the law were looped into, not in breach of, what Robert Nichols calls the "recursive process" of expropriation. Nichols contends that land theft in North America advanced westward on the expectation that at some point a national legal system would recode acts of plunder as legitimate transfers of ownership. Yet if for settlers this dynamic opened up a "*waiting period* between initial trespass and retrospective redemption through purchase," the loop moved in reverse for those they displaced.[29] If illegal homesteads rested assured on a future anterior moment when the land will have been seized legally, it was because they could rely on the law to entrap prior inhabitants in an anterior future, as if indigenous homelands were always going to be lost at the moment they came into legal possession. Allotment forced private property rights on Native

[26] Joanne Barker, "For Whom Sovereignty Matters," in *Sovereignty Matters: Locations of Contestation and Possibility in Indigenous Struggles for Self-Determination* ed. Joanne Barker (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), 1-32.
[27] Patrick Wolfe, *Traces of History: Elementary Structures of Race* (London: Verso, 2016), 141-2. Barker notes in "For Whom Sovereignty Matters" (14) that the Discovery doctrine was itself less an extant consensus than a retroactive construct advanced by US Supreme Court Justice John Marshall in his decision on *Johnson v. M'Intosh* in 1823. Known collectively as the Marshall Trilogy, *Johnson v. M'Intosh* together with *Cherokee Nation v. Georgia* (1831) and *Worcester v. Georgia* (1832) installed indigenous sovereigns in the anomalous position of "domestic dependent nations" in US foreign policy.
[28] Vine Deloria Jr., *Custer Died for Your Sins* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988), 30, 47. Robert Nichols cites "right only to sell" in "Theft is Property! The Recursive Logic of Dispossession" *Political Theory* 46, no. 1 (April 2017): 15.
[29] Robert Nichols, "Theft is Property!" 20.

peoples so as to invest each person with the inescapable capacity – and, if they were in debt, the obligation – to alienate the lands they now held as property. The conferral of propriative citizenship thus itself intensified the process of dispossession.

Allotment in severalty was, in this sense, a schizochronic project. By enclosing land in individual lots it aimed to fracture the timeframes by which indigenous people anticipated and lived out the making of worlds in common. Narrowly construed, in keeping with Johannes Fabian's sense of the term, *schizochronism* refers to the tendency of anthropological discourses to generate an "aporetic split" between two tenses: (1) the time-sensitive exigencies of fieldwork and (2) the timelessness of the ethnographic archive. To parse the actions of others in the "ethnographic present" is to abstract from what they are doing now (tense 1) to what they do as such, as a people, for all time (tense 2). At the very moment it claims them as a "necessary condition for communication," that is, the anthropological text cuts its Native informants out of "shared, intersubjective Time."[30] Mutual subjectivation in a synchronous present would thus seem to constitute, for Fabian, the disavowed ground and ideal end of any ethnographic scenario. Like the related device of anachronism, schizochronism can sometimes work to consign indigenous people and places to static points of primitivity, waste, or backwardness on the unilinear arc of history.[31] Native lifeworlds are destined to vanish, on this view, not because of

[30] Fabian, *Time and the Other*, 42. Allochronism, perhaps the better known concept, refers for Fabian to the tense effects of the effort to turn once live relations with other peoples into fixed objects of inquiry. My preference for the schizochronic stems from its sensitivity to contradictions (what Fabian calls "aporia") in the emergence of another mode of production, but also from its ability to track pre-emergent structures of time feeling that may both anticipate and disrupt the shift in property relations / relations of production. Mark Rifkin calls this time feeling "temporal affect," an anticipatory sense of "affective *vagueness*" produced on the amorphous outside of time in *Beyond Settler Time: Temporal Sovereignty and Indigenous Self-Determination* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017), 105-6. My understanding of the pre-emergent is drawn from Raymond Williams, *Marxism and Literature* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 127-8.

[31] See Anne McClintock on "anachronistic space" in *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 30. On waste spaces see Cattelino, "From Locke to Slots," 284; and Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad, 1876-1917* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2001), 109-21.

genocidal policy but owing to their own failure to live up to the settler-national present and its developmentalist telos.[32] As Mark Rifkin maintains, however, the logic of allotment did not simply freeze indigenous peoples in anachronism or "temporal anomaly."[33] Quite the opposite: as a program of assimilation, it incited their progressive adequation to another ordinary—that is, a life reordered around "the inevitability of the transition to settler social norms and the realization of the state's jurisdictional imaginary." Acknowledging intersubjective time can help revise and perhaps even dispel the lethal fantasy of Native anachronism, as Fabian suggests. But, with Rifkin, we should also ask how this sort of individuating recognition may redirect indigenous modes of historical becoming into a social evolutionary arc toward the "shared, unified 'now'" of the settler nation.[34] My working sense of the schizochronic lays stress, therefore, on the temporal breaks whereby scenes of intersubjective and national copresence emplot live relations in an expropriative regime of private property.[35]

Just such a dynamic of breakage and reincorporation structures the Department of the Interior's rites of competency. Although not exemplary of the ethnographic scenario per se, the Ritual discussed above nonetheless appropriates and formalizes refractions of that scenario in the

[32] On uneven development in Marx see Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 30. See too the critique of "developmentalist ontology" in Glenn Sean Coulthard, *Red Skin White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 9-10. And see Joy Porter, "Progressivism and Native American Self-Expression in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century," in *Native Diasporas: Indigenous Identities and Settler Colonialism in the Americas* ed. Gregory D. Smithers (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2014), 279-80.

[33] On competency and anomaly in the allotment era, see Philip Deloria, *Indians in Unexpected Places,* 150-55. Also see Hoxie on social evolutionary thinking in *A Final Promise*, 115-45. On the fossilization of indigenous bodies and Lamarckian race science, see Schuller, "The Fossil and the Photograph." Joshua David Bellin discusses precursors to this temporal stasis specifically in the production of an Indian "mind" in the ethnographic work of Henry Rowe Schoolcraft in "Mind Out of Time," in *Demon of the Continent: Indians and the Shaping of American Literature* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 131-53. Rifkin, *Beyond Settler Time*, 98.

[34] Rifkin, *Beyond Settler Time*, 1.

[35] Liveness cannot sustain itself by pure spontaneity: it needs a repertoire. Nor does it simply disappear. Repertoires move through archives. On liveness and the reiterative performativity of the colonial scenario, see Diana Taylor, "Acts of Transfer" in *The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in the Americas* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 20-27.

broader settler-bureaucratic imaginary. Perhaps that is why it draws on the same repertoire of temporal devices. To the extent that it collapses the vanishing Native lifeworld into a now merely symbolic artifact (the "last arrow"), the Ritual anachronizes its Indian subject. Crucially, however, the initiation processes that loss not as a point of stasis but, rather, as the first link in a chain of worldbreaking semiotic relays. The most global caesura is that which divides the script "For Men" from that For Women. Men and women come into possession of their citizenship through two unequal but convergent series: from arrow to plow to purse to flag to badge; or, from bag and purse to flag to badge. Letting go of the "last arrow" in order to take up the monotonous turn of the plow, the men cross over a rift between two modes of production, hunting and farming. Other passages—from the *Indian name* to the *white name*, wardship to citizenship, control to freedom, ancestry to futurity—reiterate that split. Absent this initial breakage, women allottees are relegated to forms of domestic work that sustain, from a newly marginalized position, the cumulative but precarious chronicity of either saving or starving. Where these two series converge, the purse, holds the coerced aspiration to feed every appetite through a time-disciplinary circuit of labor, accumulation, and reproduction. Through that same circuitry the state could in turn abandon its former "wards" to the supposedly civilizing predations of the open market. Yet if the Ritual carried out the administrative task of formally cutting off access to the paternalistic care of the state, it also sought to intimately enfold the allottee in the jurisdictional and demographic omnipresence of the settler nation. Admission to the full, self-governing body of a majority white citizenry ("a hundred million free men and women, of whom you are now one") came to depend, here, on the enclosure of common worlds

by the ordinary attachments, comportments, and proprieties of a "civilized life."[36] It is this incitement to habitually break worldmaking capacities down to an abstract set of self-possessed lives that defines the schizochronic logic of allotment.

Unfit for Daily Life: Regulating the Peyote Craze

Just as one arm of the settler state was officiating the abandonment of Native peoples to the compulsory autonomies of civilized life, another was extending regulatory controls on the biochemical habitus that makes up that life.[37] 1916, the year the Department of the Interior staged its first citizenship Ritual in South Dakota, also saw the Representative of that state, Harry Gandy, introduce H.R. 10699 to Congress. If made into law, this bill would authorize the government to fine or imprison anyone convicted of transporting, selling, or using peyote.[38] Later that same year the Supreme Court reaffirmed federal guardianship over allottees in *United States v. Nice*. Though designed to "free" Native peoples from tribal relations, allotment policy did not itself produce a *sui juris* citizen in the opinion of the Court. For this reason the federal government would retain undiminished the "power to regulate or prohibit traffic in intoxicating liquor with tribal Indians within a State, on or off an Indian reservation," whether they had

[36] My use of the term *comportment* goes back to a classic critique of the genetic determinism that deforms thinking about indigenous alcohol use—Craig MacAndrew and Robert Edgerton, *Drunken Comportment: A Social Explanation* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), 100-64.
[37] Marcel Mauss includes "chemical aim" in the taxonomy of adjustments the body habitually makes as it goes through everyday life. This serves as my working definition of habitus: "The constant adaptation to a physical, mechanical or chemical aim (e.g. when we drink) is pursued in a series of assembled actions, and assembled for the individual not by himself alone but by all his education, by the whole society to which he belongs, in the place he occupies in it." See Marcel Mauss, "Techniques of the Body," *Economy and Society* 2.1 (1973): 76.
[38] *Congressional Record: Containing Proceedings and Debates of the First Session of the Sixty-Fourth Congress of the United States of America*, vol. 53, part 2 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1916), 2037.

received an allotment or not.[39] Alcohol had lubricated the recursive process of expropriation as a chemical aid to fraudulent treaty-making and a test site for defining jurisdiction over "Indian country."[40] Now it could also serve as a fluid pretext for policing the movements of indigenous citizen populations.

By intervening in the use of peyote, likewise, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) advanced its program of assimilating Native sovereignties to the regulatory space and time of the settler nation. Known to Anglophone authorities as "mescal buttons" or *Anhalonium lewinii* (now *Lophophora williamsii*), peyote, from the Nahuatl *peyotl*, is a psychoactive cactus whose involvement in the curative, magical, and shamanic arts of indigenous North America reaches back to pre-Columbian times.[41] Like alcohol, the settler state construed peyote as a source of acute intoxication, chronic physical injury, moral degradation, and social disorder. If drinking freely could look like the sort of bodily autonomy befitting full American citizenship, however, the peyote craze traversed a more anomalous plane of ecstatic sensation, spreading out from and forking off into a multiplicity of "peyote cults." As they divested the body of its day-to-day proprieties and rationalities, these transports could at once cut across and lose track of allotted time, and perhaps even assemble something approaching a trans-indigenous commons in the process.

Reports of a "mescal craze" began spilling out of Indian Territory around the turn of the century. To describe the spread of peyotism as a craze was to constrain its worldmaking potentials by, at best, reducing them to an "artificial paradise" or, at worst, equating them with

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[39] "United States v. Nice. Statement of the Case," *United States Reports*, vol. 24, *Cases Adjudged in the Supreme Court at October Term, 1915* (New York: Banks Law Publishing Co., 1916), 591. Hoxie, *A Final Promise,* 224.
[40] See William E. Unrau, *White Man's Wicked Water: The Alcohol Trade and Prohibition in Indian Country, 1802-1892* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996). Also see Thomas Hill, "Peyotism and the Control of Heavy Drinking: The Nebraska Winnebago in the Early 1900s" *Human Organization* 49, no. 3 (Fall 1990): 255-65.
[41] Martin Nesvig, "Sandcastles of the Mind: Hallucinogens and Cultural Memory," in *Substance and Seduction: Ingested Commodities in Early Mesoamerica* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2018), 27-54.

the mental instability of aspiring citizen-subjects.[42] Newspapers cited the reports of white experimenters like S. Weir Mitchell and Havelock Ellis in an effort to pathologize the altered comportments and ecstatic structures of feeling peyote meetings were known to generate. One of the first stories to profile the craze, headlined "Color Visions in Mescal Bean" (fig. 2), claims, for example, that peyote "gives the Indians strong hallucinations that influence their daily conduct, frequently toward violence, and on this account white settlers living in their vicinity are alarmed for their own safety."[43]



Figure 2. Map of the "mescal craze" in "Color Visions in Mescal Bean," *Chicago Daily Tribune* October 15th, 1899.

Merely living in the vicinity of white settlements was, according to the ideology of allotment, supposed to reform the "lawless" reservations by environing them with good examples of the life of propriative citizenship. Accesses of ecstasy registered as alarm for white

[42] "Artificial paradise" is a trope popularized by Henry Havelock Ellis in "Mescal: A New Artificial Paradise" *The Contemporary Review* 74 (1898): 130-41.
[43] Mitchell in some ways touched off the wave of concern about the "craze" with the publication of his experience in the *Philadelphia Inquirer* in 1897 – see "The Mescal Button: New Vice Is at Hand" *The Philadelphia Inquirer* Jan. 10, 1897.

sensoria because they opened lines of transport that cut across the privatizing allocation of somatic proximities and territorial boundaries. Not only that, but these transports could disturb the "daily conduct" that made settler rule feel like a routine occupation. Yielding to the craze, on this view, meant going crazy—not just for the moment, but permanently disabling the possessive investment of desire in habits of rational self-continuity across space and time.

After years of relative latency, the craze resurfaced in January 1906. Now the revulsive alarm of newspaper publics and state agencies closed in on the upsurge of "Mescal Society" at the Winnebago Reservation in Thurston County, Nebraska. As far west as Los Angeles, catastrophic scenarios of drug-crazed violence rescripted the mescal rite as a "gateway to lunacy" that might lead to "armed rebellion" if not shut down by federal authorities.[44] Not many stories were quite so paranoid. Most framed the craze as a source of "demoralizing" superstitions and incapacitating excitements, not a hotbed of anticolonial insurrection. A *Sioux City Tribune* story circulating under the title "Insidious Mescal Fatal to Indians" claimed in June 1906, for example, that the "outraged bodies" of mescal eaters usually took days to recover from the aftereffects of the "horrible orgy." Insofar as they detached vital energies from a habitus that measured every expenditure in the present against what it allotted for the future, these "wild orgies" seemed to endanger the day-to-day reproduction of settler capitalist forms of life. Linking "religious ecstasy" to "the horrors of insanity," "racial extinction," "inevitable physical decline," and "more crime, more licentiousness, and more devil-may-care wildness," the story ends by blaming "mescal buds" for "destroying the Indians who own 100,000 acres of the finest and most fertile lands on which the sun has ever shone."[45] To some extent this final note of

[44] "Indians Mad on Mescal Bean" *Los Angeles Times* January 11th, 1906.
[45] "Insidious Mescal Fatal to Indians" *Forest City Press* June 20th, 1906. An article titled "Drug That Kills" that same year similarly claimed that "the wild orgies … are rapidly depopulating the tribe." "Drug That Kills" echoes the concern for Winnebago landholdings: "The Winnebagoes occupy 15,000 acres of as fine land as the sun ever

pathos simply rehearses the genocidal fantasy that Winnebago self-destruction would clear new land for white settlement. But in calling for state intervention the story also preoccupies itself with the impairment and recuperation of competence for individual landownership. News coverage of the peyote craze sought, in other words, to delimit and reincorporate a plane of collective sensuousness that allowed indigenous people to escape or abandon the schizochronic work of allotment.

Affidavits on Ho-Chunk peyotism submitted to the BIA in late 1911 appeared to verify the public intuition that the craze had been interfering in the allotment process. Medical commentary given by the mission doctor Rev. Walter Clark Roe, physiological tests conducted by the government chemist E.B. Putt, and tribal data tabulated by Albert H. Kneale, Superintendent of the Winnebago and Omaha Agency, are interspersed in the BIA file with depositions from John Semans, Harry Rave, and other Ho-Chunk people. All try to assess the extent to which the passions of "mescal worship" sexually debase, mentally debilitate, or otherwise delay progress toward a civilized life. Not surprisingly, Roe stresses how the "all-night character of their worship unfits the peyote eaters for active service the following day." Something besides the "industrial efficiency" of the body is at issue, however. Because peyote "excites the imagination and relaxes the will," Roe deduces, it must be an aphrodisiac, leading to "sexual immorality" and "scenes of unbridled libertinism."[46] Semans corroborates these speculations. Nocturnal meetings, on his account, lend cover of darkness to intimacies that stray outside or decenter the reprosexual enclosure of the married couple. More than simply

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shone on, just across the river from Sioux City." Mescal eating indicates in these articles a delay on the allotment process (in the same year as the Burke Act) and hence on a legal mechanism for "throwing open" the supposedly wasted acres of Ho-Chunk land. See "Drug That Kills," *The Gateway: A Magazine of the Great Lake States and Canada* 7, no. 1 (August 1906): 39.

[46] Walter C. Roe, "Mescal, Peyote, or Anhalonium Lewinii," reproduced in *Indian Appropriation Bill, 1919. Hearings Before the Committee on Indian Affairs United States Senate Sixty-Fifth Congress Second Session on H.R. 8696* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1918), 32-3.

accommodating extramarital sex, though, the meetings generate a promiscuous surplus of feeling that "makes [the young men] very crazy after the girls" and "affects the girls the same way," Semans attests.[47] According to Rave, too, eating peyote lets people "think more or want more about what they are thinking," and thus risks giving those who think "bad things" license to "lose all their ashamed," like the two women he says "tore off their clothes right in the meeting" and "pulled out their hair."[48] Loss of shame divests the body of self-possession, here, not by freeing it from the hold of the will or of thought but by amplifying thinking along with desire for the thinking the body does on its own. As the settler bureaucracy saw it, these acute intensifications of feeling produced an excitement so draining that it threatened to wear out the peyote eaters' nervous systems both in everyday life and in the progressive evolutionary time of racial assimilation. Yet, far from leaving indigenous bodies paralyzed by excess, the craze could instead give those bodies occasions to rethink the affects habitually binding them to settler norms of social and sexual propriety.

Nevertheless, if the pathologization of peyote rituals depended on the charge of improper conduct, that charge engaged mechanisms of state care whose more general aim was to rehabilitate, or at least recontain, bodies that had lost the shame that once kept them self-continuous. Towards that end Rave closes his statement by naming a number of friends and family members whom he claims the craze had driven insane. One woman known only as "Taylor Houghton's wife" was even committed to the Norfolk Asylum after she "got crazy" from eating mescal—a case of "intoxication psychosis," as her file might have put it.[49] Kneale's tables (fig. 3) suggest that the settler bureaucracy would have apprehended this sort of reaction

[47] *Indian Appropriation Bill*, 35.
[48] *Indian Appropriation Bill*, 37.
[49] *Indian Appropriation Bill,* 37.

less as a moral failing or lapse of disciplinary order than as a class of irregularity in the total record of each tribe member's "degree of competency." Or perhaps less than that, given that the tables seem to only list men.

Name.	Age.	Degree of competency.	Religion.	Name.	Age.	Degree of competency.	Religion.
John Carramony	45	A-2	Med.	Thomas M. Bear	21	A-3	Mesc.
William Hensley	64	N	Mesc.	Henry Bear	27	A-2	Ch.
Albert Hensley	39	A-1	Mesc.	James Peterson	54	N	Ch.
Frank Lewis	61	N	Med.	Geo. Four Cloud	37	A-2	Mesc.
Young Blackfish	48	A-2	Med.	Robert Henry	33	A-2	Mesc.
George Long	37	A-3	Med.(?)	Charles Walking Day	53	A-2	Med.
George Brown No. 2	57	N	Mesc.	Joseph White	50	A-3	Med.
George Brown, jr	26	A-2	Ch.(?)	George Monegar	33	A-3	Med.
Richard Logan	35	A-2	Med.	Joseph John	38	A-2	Med.
George White Bear	26	A-2	Med.	Roy Young Elk	23	A-2	Ch.(?)
Walking Soldier	83	N	Med.	Rufus A. Twin	37	A-2	Mesc.
Chas. Bonaparte	48	A-2	Mesc.	James Priest	23	A-3	Mesc.

A-1 signifies that the Indian is self-supporting by his own efforts.
A-2 signifies that the Indian is partially self-supporting.
A-3 signifies that the Indian is making no effort at self-support.
N signifies that the Indian is nonablebodied.
Mesc. signifies mescal.
Med. signifies Medicine Lodge.
Ch. signifies Christian.

DECEMBER 2, 1911.

Figure 3. Part of a list tabulating name, age, competency status, and religion among the Ho-Chunk people of Nebraska, compiled by Superintendent Albert H. Kneale and confirmed by Henry Roe Cloud (Ho-Chunk) in late 1911. The full list may be found in *Indian Appropriation Bill, 1919. Hearings Before the Committee on Indian Affairs United States Senate Sixty-Fifth Congress Second Session on H.R. 8696* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1918), 44-6.

After first separating out the "nonablebodied," the classificatory matrix at work here assigns one of three grades to those who remain: "A-1 signifies that the Indian is self-supporting by his own efforts"; "A-2 signifies that the Indian is partially self-supporting"; "A-3 signifies that the Indian is making no effort at self-support." Women are implicitly subsumed under male heads of household. Not unlike the citizenship Ritual discussed in the first section, then, this tabulation of the Winnebago peyote craze assimilates women to a position of economic dependence. At other points in the report, though, the sexual overexposure of women's bodies marks a breakdown in their ability to sustain the affective and material reproduction of heteronuclear forms of home

life. In this dialectic of invisibility and hypervisibility women's bodies screen the gendered divisions of time, labor, and comportment that were to prop up the appearance of self-sufficiency in those the state deemed competent. Wherever the craze disheveled settler norms of feminine propriety, then, it also signaled a failure of conjugal and maternal care severe enough to necessitate the intervention of the care of the state.

Journalists, missionaries, and reformers lobbying for a federal peyote ban would feed excerpts from the BIA file through the propaganda machine they built in preparation for the Congressional hearings held on peyote in 1918. Acting as secretary of the Society of American Indians (SAI) in its campaign to illegalize peyote, the Yankton Sioux writer and activist Zitkála-Šá (also known as Gertrude Simmons Bonnin) submitted a copy of the file as evidence to the US Committee on Indian Affairs during the first part of the hearings in January 1918.[50] Much of the force of this act of documentation was drawn from a longer campaign to install peyote as a focus of crisis in the antinarcotic imaginary. Anonymous passages from Semans' and Rave's affidavits had come into public circulation as early as 1914, in an address titled "Liquor and Peyote a Menace to the Indian" given at the Thirty-Second Annual Lake Mohonk Conference on the Indian and Other Dependent Peoples.[51] A year later, an article in the *Missionary Review of the World* would couple these materials with the data tabulated by Kneale to draw out a "disturbing comparison" of competency status between "Christ-worshippers" (50% self-supporting) and "Peyote-worshippers" (20% self-supporting).[52] In early 1916, lobbyists introduced the Gandy Bill to Congress. Later that same year, a widely reprinted article titled "Peyote Worship—An

[50] See Thomas C. Maroukis, "The Peyote Controversy and the Demise of the Society of American Indians" *The American Indian Quarterly* 37, no. 3 (Summer 2013): 159-80.
[51] F.H. Daiker, "Liquor and Peyote a Menace to the Indian," in *Report of the Thirty-second Annual Lake Mohonk Conference* (Mohonk Lake, NY: Lake Mohonk Conference on the Indian an Other Dependent Peoples, 1914), 62-8.
[52] Delavan L. Pierson, "American Indian Peyote Worship" *The Missionary Review of the World* 28, no. 3 (March 1915): 206.

Indian Cult and a Powerful Drug" used the BIA statistics to claim that the "secondary effect" of peyote use, "weariness and depression," produces "permanent economic degradation." Quoting from Rave, the article builds panic around the image of indigenous women overtaken by "animal passions," losing "'all their ashamedness,' sometimes tearing their clothes and pulling out their hair."[53] Kneale allegedly re-encountered this scene when, in 1914, he transferred from the Winnebago Agency to a new post at the Ute Agency in Fort Duchesne, Utah. In June 1916, a *Salt Lake Telegram* story on the "Great God Peyote" cited Kneale's retelling of an unnamed Indian's reason for beating his wife: "'having taken some of the Peyote [she] became crazed, tore the clothing from her body and danced about almost naked in the presence of all the others present.'"[54] By the time Congress commenced hearings on a second anti-peyote bill (H.R. 2614) in 1918, a statement endorsed by Bonnin and the Utah State Board of Pharmacy, among others, could use this same image of crazed naked dancing to figure "total abandonment of virtue" and the "waste [of] time, strength, and money" in "nocturnal debaucheries."[55]

No scene recurred more persistently in the antipeyote campaigns than that which used the bestialized shamelessness of indigenous women's bodies to choreograph drug-crazed abandon. Across every one of its iterations, this scene tends to precipitate the same overdeterminations, implicate the same figures, and anticipate the same ends. It is most immediately determined by the moralizing reflexes of early twentieth-century assimilationist discourse. Assimilationism, as Tisa Wenger has shown in her work on the BIA's attempt to suppress Pueblo dances in the 1920s, displaced biological theories of permanent racial inferiority in favor of a cultural racism

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[53] Gertrude Seymour, "Peyote Worship—An Indian Cult and a Powerful Drug" *The Survey* May 13th, 1916, 182-3.
[54] F.G. Matson, "Great God Peyote Draws Indians of Utah to His Lair of Dreams; Civilization Crumples Under Clinging Claws of New Destroyer" *Salt Lake Telegram* June 25, 1916.
[55] U.S. Congress, House Committee on Indian Affairs, *Peyote: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Indian Affairs of the House of Representatives on H.R. 2614 to Amend Sections 2139 and 2140 of the Revised Statutes and the Acts Amendatory Thereof, and for Other Purposes* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1918), 20-1.

whose goal was to suppress the "degrading" continuation of indigenous religious practices.[56] Layered into this reform discourse, despite its posture of virtuous concern, is a strain of prurience that derives from and reiterates inaugural acts of scopic colonization. An imperial pornotropics, as Anne McClintock terms it, structures the imagined scene of orgiastic dance insofar as that scene oscillates between the total sexual vulnerability and the boundary-dissolving voracity of indigenous bodies.[57] What joins the assimilationist script to this pornotropic undercurrent is a shared attraction to and revulsion at the perceived loss of rational self-continuity on the scene of ecstasy. Where they diverge is in the use of that dynamic. Antipeyote campaigns circulated and recirculated the scene of crazed naked dancing as if it were intuitive evidence for the urgency and generality of the vague causal nexus they posited between peyote worship, promiscuous sex, injurious expenditure, and statistical reversion to a state of incompetency. Each iteration of the scene would seem to reinforce and further extend the imaginary coherence of a moment of crisis in need of intervention. Lapses of propriety slide, in the lurid redundancy of that scenario, toward an impending collapse of the indigenous body's present and future viability for the daily life of propriative citizenship.

Yet if this antinarcotic imaginary scripted the craze as a degrading regression from the civilizing work of allotment, the apprehension of crisis was more than a reaction to a perceived reversal on the timeline of cultural and economic development. To frame the spread of peyotism as a craze was, rather, to anticipate both its contagious volatility as an event *in* and its tendency

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[56] Tisa Wenger, "Dance Is (Not) Religion: The Struggle for Authority in Indian Affairs," in *We Have a Religion: The 1920s Pueblo Indian Dance Controversy and American Religious Freedom* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014), 135-81.

[57] McClintock, *Imperial Leather,* 26-7. McClintock is talking about scenes of cannibalism in the earliest European colonial exploration, so neither the thematic nor the historical content of her argument maps onto mine. But her analysis is also generalizable to the extent that it concerns the psychic dynamics of colonial scopophilic domination. It is especially relevant here, though, because this dynamic is used to mark indigenous women's bodies as "boundary figures" in a "liminal scene" of cultural estrangement. Aspirations to mastery and the dread of losing boundaries revolve on this scene.

to disorder the rational periodization *of* historical time.[58] Most abstractly, as an instance of what Jennifer Fleissner calls "fad culture," a craze designates an inflation of the ideally "self-determining individual" by the all-consuming caprice of mass activities at a given moment in history. The exemplary subject of this kind of historical determination, for Fleissner, is the New Woman around the turn of the century; the closest analogue to peyotism in that case would be the "bicycle craze" of the 1890s.[59] A more salient parallel, however, is the "messiah craze" of the late 1880s, better known as the Ghost Dance. Like this earlier craze, the proliferation of peyote rites owed less to the ephemeral periodicity of mass consumerism than to a recurrent departure from the governing consensus that colonial subjugation would soon reach its supposedly inevitable endpoint.[60] Altered states of consciousness, embodied in collective scenes of trance and ecstasy, exposed altered senses of historical agency for both movements. In their diffusion across the Northern Plains from the 1890s forward, these lines of transport carried enduring affinities with the same wave of "cultural resistance" to US assimilationism that, Scott Richard Lyons (Ojibwe/Dakota) argues, coalesced in the Ghost Dance.[61] Lyons elsewhere interprets

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[58] Georg Lukàcs, *The Historical Novel* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), 28.

[59] Jennifer Fleissner, "A Mania for the Moment: Fadmongering and Feminism in Henry James," in *Women, Compulsion, Modernity: The Moment of American Naturalism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 129, 124. Also see Elizabeth Hutchinson, *The Indian Craze: Primitivism, Modernism, and Transculturation in American Art, 1890-1915* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009).

[60] Sources for "messiah craze" include Mooney, *The Ghost-Dance Religion*, 828; Alice Fletcher, "The Indian Messiah," *The Journal of American Folk-Lore* 4, no. 12 (January-March 1891): 60; and "The Red Christ" *The Illustrated American* December 13th, 1890 7-13. On the term "cult": perhaps the first usage may be found in an extended version of Ellis's 1898 article, "Mescal: A Study of the Divine Plant," *Popular Science Monthly* May 1902, 53. Other popular accounts of peyotism pick up Ellis's usage. See "The New Mescal Religion. A Cult Based on an Intoxicant" *Springfield Republican* (Springfield, MA) Mar. 14, 1909. Later ethnological studies reproduce the term, e.g. Paul Radin, "A Sketch of the Peyote Cult of the Winnebago: A Study in Borrowing" *Journal of Religious Psychology* 7, no. 1 (January 1914):1-22. Amidst a dispute with James Mooney during the 1918 peyote hearings, Richard Henry Pratt, founder of the Carlisle Indian Industrial School, would tell Congress that the "peyote craze is under the same impulse" as "the ghost-dance craze" was. See House Committee on Indian Affairs, *Peyote*, 147.

[61] Lyons differentiates cultural resistance from nationalism in *X-Marks: Native Signatures of Assent* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010). If the former seeks to defend a "way of life" against the encroachments of modernity, the latter demands a modernization of the "*ethnie*" (an organic "people") via "intersubjective recognition of membership, duties, rights, and responsibilities against the backdrop of a mass public culture and a common economy" (120-1). As Lyons understands it, the Ghost Dance and other "pan-Indian" movements embody cultural resistance, not nationalism (63). On the cultural logic of the "outbreak," see Matthew Taylor,"'Contagious

peyotism as a means to generate a "new pan-Indian body" through "unmediated religious experience made in metis space"—that is, a cultural space intermixing "tribal, extratribal, and non-Indian elements." It was precisely through an experience of space that disengaged time-based agendas of racial assimilation, Lyons suggests, that peyotism was able to heal and create alternatives to the "Western mind/body split."[62] As a zone of intermixture, however, peyote meetings could also move around that split – a schizochronic split dividing the timeless from the time-bound – by remediating the promiscuous historical logic of the craze. Meeting in the metis time of the peyote ritual turned indigenous bodies toward a crossroads where live experiences of chronic dispossession converge, sensoria interlace, and collective spirits of resistance set out for other worlds. What the sentinels of settler rule apprehended as a crisis could, in short, hold openings for the onset of a structure of feeling that could envelop indigenous peoples in histories of their own making.

Another Life: Historical Poiesis in the Episode of Ecstasy

Most readings of *The Autobiography of a Winnebago Indian* sketch this moment only in passing, if at all. So far neither the iterative reverberation of scenes from the Winnebago "craze"

Emotions' and the Ghost Dance Religion: Mooney's Science, Black Elk's Fever" *ELH* 81, no. 3 (Fall 2014): 1055-1082. On diffusionism, see Henrika Kuklick, "The Savage Within," in *The Savage Within: The Social History of British Anthropology, 1885-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 122-30. *Diffusion* is an anthropological concept that's coming into salience at this moment, exemplified by Paul Radin, "A Sketch of the Peyote Cult of the Winnebago." A map of the diffusion of peyotism in Ruth Shonle, "Peyote, the Giver of Visions," *American Anthropologist* 27, no. 1 (Jan. – Mar. 1925): 53-75. Shonle bases her map on Charles Newberne and Chas. H. Burke, *Peyote: An Abridged Compilation from the Files of the Bureau of Indian Affairs* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922), 33-5.

[62] Scott Richard Lyons, "The Incorporation of the Indian Body: Peyotism and the Pan-Indian Public," in *Rhetoric, the Polis, and the Global Village: Selected Papers from the 1998 Thirtieth Anniversary Rhetoric Society of America Conference* ed. C. Jan Swearingen (Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1999), 152. Lyons cites Vine Deloria Jr.'s distinction between the time-centered worldview of Euro-American monotheism and the space-centered worldview of American Indian religions, from *God Is Red: A Native View of Religion* 3rd ed. (Golden: Fulcrum, 2003), 61-76.

in the national antinarcotic imaginary nor, conversely, the historical poetics of peyote ecstasies has received extensive study. Instead critics focus on the vexed configuration of autobiographical, ethnographic, and indigenous genres by which Blowsnake's text emplots the discursive action of its confessional subject. My own reading of the *Autobiography* argues for the perspectival and temporal convolution of that subject by the dis/possessive movement of "another life"—the life of bodies in ecstasy, overtaken and moved to speak by Earthmaker, God, or peyote itself, among other spirits. Amidst these bodies there unfold episodes of collective transport that lose the plot of an individuated life story as much as they escape the stasis of the ethnographic present. But if these ecstasies may seem to hold out a scene of sacred exception from linear time or, worse, as Ernst Bloch worries, to regress to the orgiastic frenzies of a "mescalin Dionysus," in practice they were never really sealed off from ordinary worldmaking.[63] Altered senses of time and embodiment in the peyote meeting no doubt concentrated the intensities of a sacred ritual setting (held all night, in a circle around a fire), but they also spilled over into the indefinite social horizons of the next day, the next night, the next weekend. Narratively, the *Autobiography* reenacts this ongoingness through a succession of episodes that both take the senses beyond and run them alongside allotted timeframes. Letting one day lapse into the next, peyote ecstasies stretch the amplitude of the present. In this way they could disclose the settler capitalist everyday as a discontinuous tissue of temporal breaks, rather than a natural frame for the regularity and immediacy of regimes of work and rest.

Not many analyses of the *Autobiography* examine its episodic structures in much detail.

[63] Bloch's skepticism about ecstasy comes in response to its appropriation by fascist thinkers, among whom he counts the Swiss psychoanalyst Carl Jung. See Ernst Bloch, *The Principle of Hope* vol. 1, trans. Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice, and Paul Knight (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996), 59. On exceptional temporality see Dana Luciano, *Arranging Grief: Sacred Time and the Body in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York: New York University Press, 2007), 5-12.

As a consequence, this work largely conflates the life animating the life story with the voice of a confessional subject that corresponds to a person named Sam Blowsnake. The question then becomes how the confessional voice mediates the power asymmetries Blowsnake confronted as a "native informant" for Paul Radin, the anthropologist who assembled, annotated, and arranged for the scholarly publication of the *Autobiography* in 1920. All of this editorial work, to complicate things further, was based on the translations that Radin's interpreter Oliver Lamere (Ho-Chunk) made from a manuscript in Hočąk syllabary, which Radin had induced Blowsnake to compose in 1913. It was not until 1926 that a retranslated and enlarged version of the text entered popular circulation under the title *Crashing Thunder: The Autobiography of a Winnebago Indian*. These multiple loci of composition merge, for Radin, to form an "ethnological and psychological document" of a "multiple personality" that belongs to Blowsnake alone but also stands to typify the "primitive people" he represents.[64] Against this documentary impulse, Michelle Burnham stresses how Ho-Chunk trickster mythology works in *Crashing Thunder* to deconstruct the criteria for social scientific "accuracy" that are supposed to authenticate the veridiction of the confessional *I*. If trickster discourse may tease out and undo the colonial relations of the autobiographical subject to ethnographic authority, however, Burnham does not yet situate the "irresolvable paradox" of confessed deception in the

[64] Paul Radin, "Introduction" to *Crashing Thunder: The Autobiography of a Winnebago Indian* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), xxxiii-iv. Radin refers to Blowsnake as a "native informant" in the "Preface," xx. Another source of confusion arising from the republication of the autobiography is the addition of a false eponym to the title. *Crashing Thunder* was the name of Sam Blowsnake's older brother, Jasper, whose Hočąk name, Warudjáxega, Radin translates as "terrible thunder crash" in "Personal Reminiscences of a Winnebago Indian" *The Journal of American Folklore* 26 (October-December 1913): 303. Arnold Krupat calls this genetic process "original bicultural composite composition" in *For Those Who Come After: A Study of Native American Autobiography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 31-3. This view is further explored in H. David Brumble, "Albert Hensley's Two Autobiographies and the History of American Indian Autobiography" *American Quarterly* 37, no. 5 (Winter, 1985): 702-18 and Hertha D. Wong, *Sending My Heart Back Across the Years: Tradition and Innovation in Native American Autobiography* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

contradiction it reflects.[65] As Grant Arndt contends, peyotism and the chronic dispossession it countered—a site of "indigenous experimentation and struggle" against forced removals, massive land theft, and settler encroachment via allotment—make up the necessary sociohistorical ground for the "mise-en-abyme" effect of the *Autobiography*. Arndt reads this formal device (the recursive nesting of narrated events) as the "auto-transcription" of a confessional discourse Blowsnake had already rehearsed in his conversion to peyotism, hence as a "socially distributed" mode of "representational agency."[66] Yet while this reading may allow us to follow the emergence of a confessional voice from the self-fashioning work of conversion, it does not specify how that voice maintains and loses its ability to plot episodes of ecstasy within a life story. Nor does Arndt's notion of historical context, though attuned to Ho-Chunk dispossession, account for how the moment of the craze initiated oppositional ways of living through the fragmentation of history in chronic crisis. Attending more closely to episodes of ecstasy, particularly where they skew or thin out the autobiographical plot, will help to expand our sense of the multiple agencies that animated everyday life under allotment.

If conversion seeks to fashion another self through the semiotic repertoires of prayer, reflective suffering, and confession of sin, ecstasy sweeps the body up in the motion of a life that no longer aligns with any integral self. Moved by this life, the confessional subject edges toward a sort of decentered reflexivity, in which assembled bodies may rethink live relations from somewhere outside the possessive investment in their own discrete presence. Loss or displacement of the usual contours of somatic experience can sometimes lead to a fusion with others so seamless that each constituent body comes to feel not just indistinct, but immaterial.

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[65] Michelle Burnham, "'I Lied All the Time': Trickster Discourse and Ethnographic Authority in *Crashing Thunder*" *American Indian Quarterly* 22.4 (Autumn 1998): 470.
[66] Grant Arndt, "Indigenous Autobiography en Abyme: Indigenous Reflections on Representational Agency in the Case of *Crashing Thunder*" *Ethnohistory* 59, no. 1 (Winter 2012): 42, 40, 41.

"'My corporeal affairs are over'" is indeed how Blowsnake says he felt after the apparent climax of his conversion to peyotism. Just before dawn, he and the circle of other peyotists had come to have "all together one spirit": "I instantly became the spirit and I was their spirit or soul." Once their spirits have circled into one, Blowsnake finds that he can know whatever the others think without having to speak with them. Not only that, but when he thinks "of a certain place, far away," he finds that "immediately [he is] there."[67] Thinking turns into a medium of instantaneous transfers. As they go out of their senses together, the ecstatic are not just disembodied but at the same time moved to embody the spiritual powers of the other life that passes through them. But the liminal structures of thinking and feeling that extend from this episode bear only superficial likeness to the states of intoxication with which ecstasy was so often confounded. Neither the sacralizing excitement that Émile Durkheim called "collective effervescence" nor the abandonment of individuation to some Dionysian substratum, as Bloch would have it, adequately describes the peyotists' experience.[68] Dissolution of the self in a transcendent or inchoate continuum of being is not the source of ecstasy here. It emerges, rather, from the transports of sensoria assembled on the verge of losing self-possession while retaining and even augmenting the capacity to think collectively through that condition.

Narrating ecstasy can be tricky, though—first because episodes of somatic intensification tend to stray out of autobiographical plotlines, but then too because these experiences embrace a field of actants that may overtake narratorial agency. More than deconstructing or socially redistributing the confessional subject, the episode of ecstasy convolves the first-person emplotment of that subject with the agencies that come to speak through its body. This is how

[67] Blowsnake, *Autobiography,* 442.
[68] Émile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* trans. Karen E. Fields (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 216-221. Also see Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings* ed. Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 17.

one such episode plays out in the penultimate chapter of the 1920 edition of the *Autobiography*, which Radin titles "I HAVE A STRANGE EXPERIENCE":

> I died, and my body was moved by another life. It began to move about; to move about and make signs. It was not I and I could not see it. At last it stood up. … (My) body spoke of many things and it spoke of what was true. Indeed it spoke of many things. It spoke of all the things that were being done (by the pagan Indians) and which were evil. A long time it spoke. At last it stopped. Not I, but my body standing there, had done the talking. Earthmaker (God) had done his own talking. I would be confessing myself a fool if I were to think that I had said all this, it (my body) told me.
>
> After a while I returned to my normal human condition. Some of those there had been frightened, thinking that I had gone crazy. Others had liked it. It was discussed a good deal. They called it the 'shaking' state….[69]

Another life moves the body to speak. What the speaking body says enunciates an *it* that slips out of perspectival alignment with the narrating *I*: "It was not I and I could not see it." Ownership of the body becomes a parenthetical operation. "(My) body" comes to articulate the condition in which possession and dispossession cross over one another: the ecstasy that lets another life overtake the body also takes the body out of itself.[70] Living again through the movements of this other life does not simply dissociate the narrator from his body, however. Rather, this reanimated movement wraps the narrating *I* up in the bodily *it*. Nowhere is that coil wound more tightly than in the sentence that brings the episode to an end. At this point the speaking body overtly toys with mimicking or even deposing the confessional voice, at first seeming to resuscitate the *I* only to twist back into an indirect discourse spoken by "it (my body)." Rewritten in direct discourse, the sentence reads: "'You would be confessing yourself a fool if you were to think that you had said all this,' it (my body) told me." In the original sentence, then, the *I* does not come from the

[69] Blowsnake, *Autobiography,* 447.

[70] Nahua (Aztec) shamanic practices used peyote and other intoxicating substances to bring about similar forms of dis/possession. When a supernatural being enters the body, the *tonalli* (part of the soul) journeys out of the body towards the dwellings of the gods. See Alfredo López Austin, *The Human Body and Ideology: Concepts of the Ancient Nahuas* vol. 1, trans. Thelma Ortiz de Montellano and Bernard Ortiz de Montellano (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1988), 354-60, 394.

body speaking in the first person, but instead represents the speech act with which the body addresses the narrator as *you*. Of course, the trick here is that the use of indirect discourse conceals itself until the end of the sentence, when the *it* suddenly retracts the would-be confessional voice. But even then it remains ambiguous: "it (my body)" indicates less a single discursive agent than the contiguity of "my body standing there" and "Earthmaker (God)" speaking at the same time, if not necessarily with the same voice. Moving amidst these multiple actants, each taking its own perspective on the scene, the episode of ecstasy decenters the confessional subject only to loop it back through a peripheral sense of the animacy of the speaking body.

Nonetheless, it would be misleading to conclude from the preceding instances that peyote ecstasy confined itself to climactic scenes of strange or incorporeal sensation. It was not simply the peyote experience's ability to suspend ordinary time but, too, the elasticity of its episodic structure that allowed these ecstasies to sustain lifeworlds resistant to the fractures of the settler capitalist everyday. As it unfolds over time, the episode of ecstasy conforms not to a teleological arc but instead to an open-ended process that curves along variably spanned crests, ebbs, plateaus, and gradations of intensity. Nowhere are the worldmaking dimensions of this sinuous duration better exemplified than in the account Blowsnake gives of his first experience eating peyote. When he comes to visit relatives in Nebraska, his younger sister, Hinákega (Distant Flashes Standing), convinces him to join the "peyote people" in their ceremony. Most of the night he experiences relatively little effect. Something feels different but he can see "nothing wrong about [him]self." Later, after midnight, people start crying and he begins to "see strange things" with his eyes closed, but the most pronounced effect is the lack of sleepiness, which lasts until "the light (of morning) [comes] upon [him]" and throughout the next day. Another meeting

is planned for that night, and the peyote people entice Blowsnake to come learn how "'their spirits wander over all the earth and the heavens also.'" Though skeptical, he follows:

> So we went there again. I doubted all this. I thought that what they were saying was untrue. However I went along anyhow. When we got there I had already eaten some peyote, for I had taken three during the day. Now near the peyote meeting an (Indian) feast was being given and I went there instead. When I reached the place, I saw a long lodge. The noise was terrific. They were beating an enormous drum. The sound almost raised me in the air, so (pleasurably) loud did it sound to me. Not so (pleasurable) had things appeared at those affairs (peyote meetings) that I had lately been attending. There I danced all night and I flirted with the women. About day I left and when I got back the peyote meeting was still going on. When I got back they told me to sit down at a certain place. They treated me very kindly. There I again ate peyote. I heard that they were going to have another meeting nearby on the evening of the same day. We continued eating peyote the whole day at the place where we were staying.[71] `

Central to this passage is the contrast between the solemn air of the peyote meeting and the sonic buoyancy of the nearby feast. Radin here annotates Blowsnake's pleasure in the volume of the drums as "delight at getting away from the rather ethical and puritanical atmosphere of the peyote people and again participating in the rites dear to him."[72] Much of this atmospheric divergence stems from the iconoclastic break that adherents of Ho-Chunk peyotism made with traditional feasts and religious societies like the Medicine Dance. But in practice these social and spiritual worlds could overlap with one another in a common amplification of the present. Lifted on a current of sound and the afterglow of the previous night, Blowsnake's sensorium resonates with a pleasure that carries him through the next evening, this time taken up in dancing and flirting. By the end of the sequence, he and the others have spent four nights eating peyote together. Sometimes they take it as a kind of social lubricant and sometimes they use it to elicit ceremonial suffering. Yet, throughout the sequence, their continuous recurrence to the ritual time

[71] Blowsnake, *Autobiography*, 437.
[72] Blowsnake, *Autobiography*, 437. Atmosphere is a loaded term for Radin: charged, as it is for Lukács, with the generic expectation that an average personage may stand in for an ordinary life and thereby gather snatches of the "emotional setting" of a historical moment. See Radin's introduction to the *Autobiography*, 383.

of the peyote meeting interlaces with mundane expansions of the amplitude of the present. Reified horizons of work and rest come undone in the indefinite dilation of their ecstasies, digressing into the atelic logic of an experience that no longer keeps time with the segmented reproduction of life from one day to the next. Lapsing into the episodic passage of ecstasy, out of the senses with which one ordinarily receives and acts on the world, is at the same time a way of letting another present elapse alongside the normative rhythms of everyday life.[73] New ways of living through allotted time thus gather into and unfurl from the interval of an alteration that brings another world to pass in the process of passing out of the world as it seemingly already is.

An episode of ecstasy is what happens when an amplification of the everyday puts narrative time out of place. Rather than simply standing outside of linear time, however, such episodes cross back over the plotline from an oblique angle. Narrative theory has generally defined the episode (from the Greek *epeisodion*, "coming in besides") by its supplementary opposition to emplotment. Aristotle understands episodes as those parts of a story which are extraneous to the logical development of narrative action yet necessary for the conveyance of that action across textual events.[74] Mikhail Bakhtin describes the everyday as the place where narrative time breaks down into a flurry of episodes, each of which in turn falls "at right angles" (not parallel, not interwoven) across the arc of the plot.[75] An episodic narrative may approximate the texture of the everyday because they both consist of sequences that, though merely incidental, still make up the intervals of nonnecessity through which events must pass in order to

[73] Henri Lefebvre associates eurhythmia with normed everydayness, where "[r]hythms unite with one another in the state of health," in *Rhythmanalysis*: *Space, Time, and Everyday Life* trans. Stuart Elden and Gerald Moore (New York: Continuum, 2004), 16.
[74] Aristotle, *On the Art of Poetry* trans. Ingram Bywater (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1920), 45, 62. My understanding of Aristotle is basically a paraphrase of Peter Haidu's in "The Episode as Semiotic Module in Twelfth-Century Romance" *Poetics Today* 4, no. 4 (1983): 657. Also see Matthew Garrett, *Episodic Poetics: Politics and Literary Form After the Constitution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), particularly the introduction and the chapter on Benjamin Franklin's autobiography, "The Life in Episodes," 60-85.
[75] Bakhtin, "Forms of Time," 128.

reach their necessary end. If everyday life feels episodic, on the other hand, perhaps it is because the satisfaction of daily necessities conforms to a syntax of states and passages. Narrative episodes alternate between two types, according to Tzvetan Todorov: there are "adjectives," iterative states of equilibrium or disequilibrium, and there are "verbs," singular passages between such states.[76] Where these two predications loop into one another, or where passages extend through an iterative structure, there opens an episode of ecstasy. As seen in the *Autobiography*, these episodes take shape around a state of disequilibrium—the "'shaking' state," for instance. Yet the state of ecstasy (from *ékstasis,* "displacement" or "standing aside") goes out of stasis only by unfolding an indefinitely extended movement between states.[77] Moments of passage—out of the body to faraway places, between the peyote circle and its social surround, night after night over the course of several days—are as ecstatic in their expansion of the present as moments of decentered reflexivity or collective spiritual fusion. At times the iteration of these passages may compose a historical moment; here it takes the form of a "craze." Such a moment arises, for György Lukács, when a chain of crises weave their intensifying tendencies so thickly into the everyday that they raise its ordinary plotlessness to a drama of "objective necessity." Latent poetic capacities are "called to life" by exposures to a chance to go beyond what is necessary to live through one day to the next.[78] While they may not have attained the sort of mass heroism Lukács would recognize as revolutionary, peyotists like Sam Blowsnake nonetheless joined and mounted a worldmaking struggle against chronic dispossession. Another mode of feeling out how everyday life might go on without being subsumed by the

[76] Tzvetan Todorov, *Poétique de la prose* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1978), 50.
[77] To be in ecstasy is to abandon the self-possessed body and dissociate from its privatizing timeframes. Judith Butler and Athena Athanasiou briefly touch on this in *Dispossession: The Performative in the Political* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 4.
[78] Lukács, *The Historical Novel*, 41, 51.

developmentalist arc of allotted time, and how swiftly another life may overtake the reified immediacy of the present, thus emerges from the episode of ecstasy.

Chapter Three

Appetite for Nothingness: Pharmaconormativity and the Abandon of Reified Time

Lily Bart is found dead from an overdose of chloral hydrate at the end of Edith Wharton's *The House of Mirth* (1905). Normally the drug does what she wants. It satisfies her "physical craving for sleep." It drowns out the residual stimulation of the tea she drinks to make it through the day, the exhausting surplus of energy it lends her. The debts exacted on her body, the numb multiplication of her senses, the loss of perspective, the deteriorating rationality of passing time—it all comes to nothing when she takes her "sleeping-drops." Just a few more and she can recover a "normal view of life." That is the promise chloral holds for Lily. At first her habit is utilitarian, but with each dose tolerance builds. Each night she has to take a little more of the "'queer-acting drug'" to get the same effect. And the more she takes, the more she enjoys it. On chloral it becomes "delicious to lean over and look down into the dim abysses of unconsciousness." So delicious that one night she takes too much, and it kills her. In the end she risks overdose just to dissolve the "destitution" of her unendurable present and the expanse of her "interminable" future in a "brief bath of oblivion."[1] Lily finds herself subject to an appetite that no longer adheres to the normalizing function the drug initially served. Momentarily annulling the reproduction of self-managerial personhood turns into an end unto itself.

Mrs. Annie C. Meyers, the author and protagonist of *Eight Years in Cocaine Hell* (1902), chases a less tranquil form of dissociation—not the slow, hypnotic dissolution of the senses but their frenetic acceleration toward states of psychic and somatic breakdown. Lily's sedative helps her fall asleep so she can stay afloat as her once-luxurious life unravels day by day into "a great

[1] Edith Wharton, *The House of Mirth*, ed. Martha Banta (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 313, 292, 314, 280, 314, 310, 293, 313.

waste of disoccupation."[2] Meyers's stimulant creates the inverse effect: it makes her stay awake so she can fall apart as each day she spends wandering, begging, crawling, trespassing, shoplifting, dancing, or prowling runs erratically into the next, one incident after another jettisoned from her manic stream of consciousness by the constant impulse to obtain yet another dose. On cocaine she acts out the criminalized and racialized persona of a *fiend*. But only temporarily. At one point a Dr. Faulkner, of the Chicago Detention Hospital, explains that she is not really psychotic, "'only queer through cocaine.'" In the end Meyers adopts a similarly clinical view of her submission to the drug's psychoactivity, reframing herself as the *victim* of an unregulated market.[3] Normativity, here, is not a suicidal horizon of attempted survival, like in *House*, but a condition of successfully recovered composure, the endpoint of a confessional arc from past abjection to a sympathetic present of redeemed self-possession. Yet in the last analysis these texts give voice to analogous appetites. Lily Bart and Annie Meyers alike seek to abandon the management of their personhood to the autonomies of a psychotropic surrogate.

Mass-circulated images of appetitive disorder played a vital role in consolidating the genres of therapeutic conduct and altered experience that came to direct the use of substances like chloral and cocaine around the turn of the century. In this chapter I draw out the generic protocols – the incitations of sensational interest, naturalist pathos, and sympathetic redemption – that animate and bring closure to the emplotment of those substances in *The House of Mirth* and *Eight Years in Cocaine Hell*. Narrative time in both texts warps around the metonymic transfers effected by the drugs each protagonist takes to live through the disintegration of her class status. To survive, for them, is to synthesize "more life" out of next to nothing, as Jason Pine writes of

[2] Wharton, *House*, 294.
[3] Annie C. Meyers, *Eight Years in Cocaine Hell* (Chicago: Press of the St. Luke Society, 1902), 57, 31, 74. Meyers never calls herself a victim. More often she identifies as a fiend. Nonetheless, the generic operation of the 'after' photo attempts (unsuccessfully) to close off the narrative with the visual language of victimage.

present-day meth use, while at the same time keeping a vicarious distance from that extra liveness, like it belongs to a "supplementary organ," as Helen Keane notes of addiction more broadly.[4] In the biochemical action of pharmaceuticals Lily Bart and Annie Meyers each find a substitutive vitality that comes to both capacitate and displace their own. Lily's terminal dependence on chloral hydrate may seem to trap her in a defeated effort to self-medicate her way out of a downward spiral into poverty. And yet, for all the pathos of that emplotment, chloral also enables her to let go of the person she is supposed to be repairing and in its place feel nothing, or nothing but her own negligibility to the pockets of insensible sensuousness the sedative enfolds around the edges of her death's generic enclosure.[5] Meyers's deviations into the illicit life of a "cocaine fiend" (an epithet typically affixed to the ungovernability of black bodies) reach a more optimistic denouement, as the before-and-after photos (figs. 2 and 3) appended near the end of *Cocaine Hell* attest. At first glance the third of the set – "Mrs. Annie C. Meyers To-Day," two years out of jail, post-detox, sane again – certifies the full reclamation of middle-class white womanhood. It turns out, however, that the equipoise of the after photo still fails to purge the text of its perverse attraction to the impersonal potencies of the stimulant. Despite the lasting improvement her image projects, cocaine gets the last word.[6] Across these two cases, I submit, we can plot some of the lines along which the surrogate activity of pharmaceuticals could support and supplant the modes of biochemical self-governance

[4] Jason Pine, "Last Chance Incorporated," *Cultural Anthropology* 31, no. 2 (2016): 306; Helen Keane, *What's Wrong with Addiction?* (New York: New York University Press, 2002), 31. On "chemical prosthesis," see Avital Ronell, *Crack Wars: Literature, Addiction, Mania* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 50. Paul B. Preciado gives a more precise elaboration of this concept in a text published under the name Beatriz Preciado, *Testo Junkie: Sex, Drugs, and Biopolitics in the Pharmacopornographic Era*, trans. Bruce Benderson (New York: The Feminist Press, 2013), 359.
[5] I refer here to the seam between the thirteenth and fourteenth chapter of Wharton, *House*, 315.
[6] Quite literally: the final sentence concludes with the word "cocaine." See Meyers, *Cocaine Hell*, 75.

developed to buffer, without resolving, the class antagonisms that fragmented daily life under American industrial capitalism.

At play throughout this chapter is the intuition that the normative utility of pharmaceuticals crystallized in response to a historical dynamic we may call *temporal reification*. I mean this term to embrace the cooperation of two processes. Around 1870 industrial-capitalist class society in the United States had already begun to assemble the instruments of calculative abstraction and functional automation needed to convert laboring bodies' energies to units of labor time on a mass scale. The philosopher Antonio Gramsci called this first process the "rationalisation of work." Maintaining workers in a condition of "psycho-physical equilibrium" stable enough to run the machinery of mass production would require more than the implementation of time-disciplinary methods on the factory floor, however. According to Gramsci, the advent of rationalization also relied on state regulatory devices (the federal prohibition of alcohol from 1920 to 1933, for instance) to enforce norms of consumption outside of work.[7] Nonetheless, as the cases portrayed in *House* and *Cocaine Hell* imply, the normalized and normalizing use of pharmaceuticals, among other habitually consumed means of social reproduction, was not always overdetermined by the coercive intervention of medical and legal authorities. Alongside the advancing rationalization of labor time there emerged a second process – the irrationalization of free time – in which market forces compelled working people to feed ostensibly impulsive desires through circuits of mass consumption. Marxian theorists have used the concept of *reification* to uncover how this dialectic of ir/rationalization came to enmesh subjective experience in the substitutive logics of commodity exchange. Under reified conditions

[7] Prohibition is Gramsci's example. My interest lies in the moment preceding national legislation outlawing the sale and consumption of alcohol. See Antonio Gramsci, "Americanism and Fordism," in *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 302-3.

the flux of live embodiment is fragmented and commensurated to an abstract "standard of living," a statistical model increasingly deployed around the turn of the century to gauge the appetites and adjust the energies of laboring masses for maximal exploitation.[8] Any future projected by this rationality would have to presume the continuation of an interminably recurrent everyday; the irrationalized pleasures of commodity consumption offered relief from that routine only to reinforce its hold on the future. Yet if reification works to immure the potentialities of the historical present in the suffocating air of the preordinate, for someone like Lily Bart or Annie Meyers the pursuit of biochemical equilibration yields effects that pull their sensoria out of continuity with the omnipresence of the reified everyday. Loosening the seemingly unending loop of that timeframe, the maintenance of pharmaceutical normativity here lapses into states of ecstatic self-abandonment that sink out of or outpace the diurnal regularities whereby the reproduction of industrial-capitalist temporality is made to feel like common sense.

Appetite for nothingness serves in what follows as shorthand for the felt necessity of and visceral attraction to the ecstasies of abandoning the reified everyday. Meyers loses her senses in the excitement of feeling her desire for cocaine turn and transmute itself into the all-consuming appetite the drug has for her. Lily depends on chloral to restore the energies depleted by the errands that sustain her day-to-day survival, but what makes sedation delicious is the way it provisionally fades and finally voids the monotonous distress of her "disoccupation." To her nothingness marks not the hypostatized opposite of Being but an indefinitely extended interlude of sensuous freedom enfolded, however briefly, in the attenuation of self-possessed personhood.[9]

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[8] On the use of "'standards of living' … to contain wage levels while maintaining a healthy, contented workforce," see Nick Cullather, "The Foreign Policy of the Calorie," in *American Historical Review* 112.2 (April 2007): 343. Also see Marina Moskowitz, *Standard of Living: The Measure of the Middle Class in Modern America* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2004) and Lawrence Glickman, *A Living Wage: American Workers and the Making of Consumer Society* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).

[9] On the metaphysical reification of nothingness, see Theodor Adorno, "'Nihilism,'" in *Negative Dialectics* trans. E.B. Ashton (New York: Routledge, 2004), 376-81. On "meontic nothingness," the physical apparition of nothing as

Nothingness in this sense approximates numbness—the sort of nebulous, unresponsive present Cressida Heyes calls "anaesthetic time," the ordinary experience of not experiencing anything in particular. According to Heyes, here taking her cue from Susan Buck-Morss's work on modernist theorizations of shock, the anaesthesia induced by feminized sedatives like Valium or its nineteenth-century predecessor, chloral hydrate, lets the nervous system go out of sync with its self-managerial subjection to the accelerated tempos of post-/industrial capitalism.[10] Laurent de Sutter, following Freud, describes cocaine in much the same terms. Although not tranquilizing but excitatory in effect, speeding up rather than slowing down sensorial response to the irrational pacing of rationalized time, cocaine shares with chloral the potential to distantiate the experiencing subject from the sense organs on which the impressions that make up her experience are traced.[11] By this account anaesthetizing drugs relax the routine convulsion of industrial-capitalist time by deflecting nervous reflexes through a chemical prophylactic. As effective as they are in insulating the nerves from the sensory overload of modern urban mileux, though, the pharmaceutical agencies that course through *House* and *Cocaine Hell* also redirect the pathways of metabolic exchange whereby bodily appetites and energies are to be integrated into the disintegrative continuum of the reified everyday. Appetites for nothingness here entice or urge the metabolism's potentials for energetic flux to fall out of stasis with the normative

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a void or emptiness, see Timothy Morton, "Buddhaphobia: Nothingness and the Fear of Things," in *Nothing: Three Inquiries in Buddhism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 200-1. On the black ontology of nothingness, see Calvin Warren, *Ontological Terror: Blackness, Nihilism, and Emancipation* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2018) and Fred Moten, "Blackness and Nothingness (Mysticism in the Flesh)," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 112, no. 4 (Fall 2013): 737-80.

[10] Cressida Heyes, *Anaesthetics of Existence: Essays on Experience at the Edge* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2020), 3, 106, 109. Also see Susan Buck-Morss, "Aesthetics and Anaesthetics: Walter Benjamin's Artwork Essay Reconsidered," *October* 62 (Autumn 1992): 16-17.

[11] See Laurent de Sutter, *Narcocapitalism: Life in the Age of Anesthesia* trans. Barnaby Norman (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018), 85. Also see Sigmund Freud, *Cocaine Papers*, ed. Robert Byck (New York: Stonehill, 1974) and the defensive genesis of consciousness Freud speculatively elaborates in "Beyond the Pleasure Principle," in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, trans. James Strachey, vol. 18, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Group Psychology, and Other Works* (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1955), 26-9.

periodicities that keep labor time and free time in chronic equilibrium. Not anaesthesia but ecstasy is the void these appetites seek.

My argument for this distinction, conceived in the introduction to this dissertation as a historical divergence between modes of governance based in nervous plasticity and those oriented toward biochemical volatility, proceeds in three parts. Looking back to the former mode, the first part of this chapter separates out the aesthetic formulae, prognostic models, and counter-empirical potentials that coalesced around the ecstasies of the "fasting girl" Mollie Fancher in the late 1870s. My reading of that scene serves as a prologue to this chapter's second part, which begins by expanding Marxian theories of temporal reification and ends by delineating how the libidinal dynamics of an ascendant system of mass consumption surface in the clinical picturing of *anorexia nervosa*. Appetite for nothingness may not only consist in a recession from sustenance, however, but may also route through the autonomous desire carried by psychotropic surrogates, as the final section argues through a close reading of the emplotment of pharmaceuticals in *Cocaine Hell* and *House*. Listening for the aberrant and asynchronous messages drugs send through these texts uncovers how they disordered forms of pharmaceutical conduct enabled new modes of appetitve, energetic, and sensory departure from the reified everyday.

"Nothing of Me to Die": Pathos, Hysteria, Ecstasy

Mollie Fancher's appetite for nothingness sent her into ecstasies. After a streetcar accident had left her bedridden in 1865, the so-called Brooklyn Enigma would refuse all but the tiniest morsels of the food her caretakers offered and force-fed her over the next thirteen years,

the New York *Sun* reported in 1878. More enigmatic still were the extrasensory capacities she developed in the wake of the accident. Although subject to an "entire paralysis of the senses" when seized by one of her ecstatic trances, in this state Mollie also manifested the gift of clairvoyance, or "second sight." In ecstasy her body became "immovable," "as though she were [made] of marble," while her vision effortlessly passed through sealed envelopes and reported events transpiring miles away. Onlookers remarked on the "the beauty and pathos of the scene." At its center is a woman who "longs to die, yet … tells her friends she is afraid she cannot die. 'There is nothing of me to die,' she says." Nonbeing is a condition Mollie wants but can never obtain because it is at the same time the condition she already occupies. Or the pose in which she finds her body "transfixed"—"one hand and graceful arm" suspended "at the instant of attack, perhaps pointing upward, perhaps extended to receive a visitor's salutation, perhaps folded over her breast."[12] Across the aesthetic formulae that converge on this tableau we notice a persistent impulse to run spectatorial desire through the relay of pathos. To experience something as pathetic is, for Rei Terada, to replace the affect it elicits with "a generic second-order emotion," "the reproduction of emotion out of its diminution": not the initial response but an afterimage of its undoing.[13] Mollie's wasted physique in this sense formed a conduit through which those who appraised the ecstatic as an object of pathos could proliferate the reflexive feeling of being moved. In a tragic mood they might shed tears of pity for her cruel fate; if sentimental they might

[12] Originally the quoted description appeared in a newspaper article, "Dead and Yet Alive! The Extraordinary Case of Miss Fancher of Brooklyn," *The Sun* New York, NY, November 24, 1878. It was reprinted in Abram H. Dailey, *Mollie Fancher, the Brooklyn Enigma: An Authentic Statement of Facts in the Life of Mary J. Fancher, the Psychological Marvel of the Nineteenth Century. Unimpeachable Testimony of Many Witnesses* (Brooklyn, NY: Eagle Book Printing Dept., 1894), 191-2. Mollie's dramatically arrested posture recalls a stock device in melodramatic theater – tableau, a static arrangement of the passions expressed at the moment of a scene's maximal intensity. On this point see Peter Brooks, *The Melodramatic Imagination: Balzac, Henry James, Melodrama, and the Mode of Excess* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), 65.

[13] Rei Terada, *Feeling in Theory: Emotion after the "Death of the Subject"* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 81.

bury her in an idealizing compassion for the abject status assigned to the incurable. Underlying both effects was an exchange of pathos that amplified the preternatural allure of the Enigma by petrifying her ecstasies in an image of their own disappearance.

As that image came into wider circulation, however, it not only passed through circuits of pathetic exchange but was also exposed to procedures of skeptical deflation. Medical studies of the Fancher case worked to reduce the impersonal profusion of her ecstasies to the symptomatic ploy of an individual disorder—hysteria. Among these studies, the most comprehensive attempt to make that clinical rationalization sound like a natural inevitability was the New York neurologist William Hammond's *Fasting Girls; Their Physiology and Pathology* (1879). Maintenance of vital functioning is premised, Hammond insists, on the nutritive "renovation" of bodily substance. So long as her body fails to resupply the force it expends, the fasting girl can only subsist on her own tissues, "[losing] weight with every instant of time until death finally ensues." It would seem by this reasoning that fasting girls' claims of uninterrupted food refusal at best represent a "simulation" of abstinence, if not outright deceit. Mollie's ecstatic trances, recast as "a hysterical condition in which the waste of the tissues is greatly reduced," end up explaining how she can stay alive while consuming next to nothing. On this view her emaciation verifies little more than the "inanition" one would expect to see in cases of hysterical anorexia.[14] No examination necessary – for Hammond and other medical skeptics, secondhand reports furnished evidence enough to demystify the ascetic powers fasting girls exhibited.[15] *L'anorexie hystèrique* and *anorexia nervosa*, diagnoses first promoted by the French physician Charles Lasègue and his British colleague William Gull in the mid 1870s, had by the end of the decade

[14] William Hammond, *Fasting Girls; Their Physiology and Pathology* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1879), 56, 69.
[15] Molly McGarry, *Ghosts of Futures Past: Spiritualism and the Cultural Politics of Nineteenth-Century America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 152.

rendered women's appetites newly visible to a clinical optic that assessed their absence as a sign of both psychic and somatic pathology.[16] Any body that appeared to sustain life without partaking in physiological economies of expenditure and replenishment indicated appetitive disorder to the empiricist rationality skeptics like Hammond invoked. Not only abstractly substantiating but actively enforcing the temporal norms of an ascendant industrial capitalism, this prognostic model aimed to amass *every instant of time* on an energetic continuum linking the anorexic body's present abnegation to its ongoing exhaustion and future mortality.

Yet neither the normative force of prognosis nor the generic devices of pathos could finally seal the fasting girl's appetite for nothingness into the atrophied form it was meant to embody. Molly McGarry argues that for Fancher herself, as for the Spiritualist movement at large, the experience of ecstasy did not just defy clinical rationalization but generated its own experimental methods and bodies of expertise. Out of that experience there arose an alternative empiricism, capable of dissolving or bypassing the progressive timeframes that would normally screen the material world off from the spectral returns of its past and future afterlives.[17] Arrested in the image of the pathetic, moments of ecstasy might look like a sadly futile attempt to escape the real incapacitation of the body by its physiological condition. But in isolating the ecstatic as an object of aesthetic response the exchange of pathos could also leave open channels for the transfer of disembodied affect. Audiences collected around the fasting girl not simply because she appeared pitiable but in order to witness and participate in the subtraction of her senses from the perceived stasis of invalid life. By taking leave of the body the ecstatic sensorium stages a baroque transposition of the present through the *perhaps* ("perhaps pointing … perhaps extended

[16] Joan Brumberg, *Fasting Girls: The Emergence of Anorexia Nervosa as a Modern Disease* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), 119.
[17] McGarry, *Ghosts of Futures Past*, 152, 159.

… perhaps folded") of the suspended gestures it leaves behind.[18] As much as the exchange of pathos contracts the resulting tableaux to the portraiture of a single stricken figure, at base the recirculation of feeling around the Enigma was fueled by a desire to shed the chronic strictures of personal embodiment. Moments of ecstasy allowed the bodies that experienced them to hold open a present as yet unbound by the continuous reproduction and sequestration of energy needed to keep what Dana Luciano calls the "linear-accumulative" temporality of industrial capitalism in perpetual motion.[19] Appetites for nothingness, in withdrawing or immobilizing the body's attachment to that continuum, press not into an absolute void but instead toward horizons of sensation that may unfold independently of any given object.

Appetite for Nothingness, the Not-Yet Reified

Massified systems of consumption and the forms of routine maintenance their functioning demanded were still under construction when the Fancher case first attracted public interest. By the late 1870s, however, the unconsuming body had already come under examination as a subject of clinical discipline and locus of aesthetic containment. Soon the energetic, sensuous, and appetitive life of such bodies would be intimately enmeshed in a dynamic of temporal reification, or the production of *reified time*. As theorized in the work of György Lukàcs, Fredric Jameson, Theodor Adorno, and Kevin Floyd, reification denotes the historical

[18] I say "baroque" because the ekphrasis of Fancher's ecstatic immobility echoes Gian Lorenzo Bernini's Baroque sculpture, *L'Estasi di Santa Teresa* [*The Ecstasy of Saint Teresa*] (1646-52). Jacques Lacan famously reads the sculpture as an icon of feminine jouissance in Seminar XX – see *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book XX, On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge, Encore 1972-1973*, ed. Jacques Alain-Miller, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), 76.

[19] Dana Luciano, *Arranging Grief: Sacred Time and the Body in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York: New York University Press, 2007), 74. On the accumulation and expenditure of energy, see Georges Bataille, *The Accursed Share: An Essay on General Economy. Volume 1. Consumption* trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Zone Books, 1988), 22-6.

dialectic whereby industrial-capitalist societies came to abstract bodily processes from embodied experience and in turn absorb those processes back into circuits of commodity exchange.[20] Although its trajectories are multiple and uneven, with Harry Harootunian we can track the advance of this dialectic through the increasing predominance of wage labor in Europe and the United States from the mid-nineteenth century to the "commodification of pleasure" around the turn of the twentieth.[21] Reification comprises two mutually reinforcing functions: the rationalization of labor time and the irrationalization of free time. The former was to break the laboring body's energies down to quantified sequences of activity compatible with the machinery of mass production. The latter was to annex the consuming body's appetites as seemingly organic reservoirs onto which that machinery could offload and from which it might withdraw the libidinal surpluses it needed to keep running. More than streamlining the extraction of value from bodies at work, reified time would infiltrate the needs working people felt and the pleasures they took in their off-hours. Under the influence of temporal reification even the desire for escape found an outlet in the omnipresence of commodity exchange.[22] As a fantasied outside to the scientific management of bodily energies, the mirage of spontaneity held out by the free time of mass consumption afforded the desiring subject's periodic exemption from and attendant

[20] See György Lukàcs, *History and Class Consciousness* trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1971); Fredric Jameson, *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act* (New York: Routledge Classics, 2002); Theodor Adorno, *Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life* trans. E.F.N. Jephcott (New York: Verso, 2005); and Kevin Floyd, *The Reification of Desire: Toward a Queer Marxism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009).

[21] Harry Harootunian, *Marx after Marx: History and Time in the Expansion of Capitalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 37.

[22] Herbert Marcuse would perhaps describe the infiltration of exchange logics into the satisfaction of needs and pleasures as a process of "repressive desublimation." See Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), 72-3. Adorno offers a complementary analysis of how industrial-capitalist society "cultivates art as a natural reserve for irrationalism" in *Aesthetic Theory* trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997). On escapist desire see Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, 202. Also see Theodor W. Adorno, "Free Time," in *Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords* trans. Henry W. Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 169.

recuperation for the rationalized time of wage labor. The objective of this section is to pull apart the logic of chronic ir/rationalization around which this libidinal dynamic cohered.

Yet in the course of that analysis I also want to make room for somatic practices that failed or refused to take in reified time's apparently totalizing power to adequate live embodiment to the intuitive facticity of the industrial-capitalist scheme of things. Neither the system of mass consumption nor the corrective disciplines exacted on disorders like anorexia were able to fully subsume the counter-empirical potentials secreted and acted out in appetites that shrank from every available satisfaction. Appetites for nothingness could obstruct the reification of everyday life, I argue, insofar as they defected from the lattice of social and bioenergetic reproduction on which that form of life was fabricated.

Marxian critical theory since Lukàcs has used the term reification to describe how commodity exchange breaks the sensuous experience of time and embodiment down to a set of autonomous functions, unbound by the organic rhythms of communal life. Lukàcs develops this organicist sense of the concept in *History and Class Consciousness* (1923). Reification here designates a historical shift in the "metabolism of human society"—that is, a shift in the means by which the socioeconomic order regulates the accumulation and expenditure of energy. In a society regulated by commodity fetishism, the production of exchange-value replaces that of use-value as the "dominant form of metabolic change." As rationalized production processes come to penetrate and fragment the "organic necessity" that had once unified workers with the fruits of their labor, they would also reorganize the "'natural laws'" of everyday life. Not only does the mechanical operation of these laws take over the consciously willed activity of the working body, but it also "freezes" the energetic flux of accumulation and expenditure into a "quantifiable continuum filled with quantifiable 'things.'" Modern bureaucratic states reinforce

the spatialized metrics of labor time by administering "a rational systematisation of all statutes regulating life." Lukàcs would say that this "alien system" sustains itself on the destructive objectification of the "human personality" that is "fed into" it.[23] But his concept of reification also presupposes a metabolic process in which time-rationalizing work disciplines coordinate with state regulatory systems to carve precapitalist lifeworlds up into living energy sources. It was through this nexus of reciprocal enforcements that reification assimilated energetic bodies to the normativity of what Moishe Postone calls "abstract time"—an "independent variable" that standardizes the social necessity of labor within a matrix of total exchangeability.[24] As a mechanism for the accumulation of value from expended labor, temporal reification makes it possible to convert the embodied sense of fluctuating energy into a series of metabolic functions that may then be regulated independently of the bodies from which they derive.

Yet if the point of reification is to decompose the sensorium into a range of autonomous functions, the energies thus released cannot always be appropriated for rational ends. Jameson for this reason conceives reification as a dialectical spiral that oscillates between the "autonomization" and the "recontainment" of the senses. *Autonomization* abstracts the senses from concrete activities, breaking their energetic bonds with the collective rhythms of accumulation and expenditure that Lukàcs called "organic necessity." Newly autonomized senses are vulnerable to *recontainment* whenever they can be rationalized for instrumental use or charged with the ideological power to make the "'natural laws'" of the capitalist lifeworld feel like common sense. As they split off from once-unified spheres of activity, however, the autonomized senses also generate laws of their own. An example of this process is the autonomization of sexuality initiated toward the end of the nineteenth century. Jameson argues

[23] Lukàcs, *History*, 85, 84, 89, 92, 90.
[24] Moishe Postone, *Time, Labor, and Social Domination* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 201-2.

that psychoanalysis abstracted "mechanisms of desire" from "sexual experience" so as to decipher the "symbolic dimension" those mechanisms map onto sexed bodies' "erogenous zones." Narrative genre, more than any other sociosymbolic code drafted to secure the "appropriate reception" and "proper use" of autonomized senses, is the strategy of ideological recontainment that most preoccupies Jameson. All narrative genres, from romance to case history, articulate their own devices to control receptivity to the sensations they arouse. But even from within these contracted spaces, he maintains, encounters with autonomized sensation can "restore at least a symbolic experience of libidinal gratification to a world drained of it." Jameson's initial skepticism about the tendency of "libidinal transfiguration" to revert to "merely personal ecstasy" is here counterbalanced by the hope that such ecstasies may prefigure a "perfected community." Autonomized senses, whether contained in the process of rationalization or recirculated as the inassimilable byproducts thereof, thus carry the ambivalent promise of "Utopian compensation" for the damage the appetitive body sustains from the breakdown and expropriation of its energies.[25] Maybe in the ecstatic moment between autonomization and recontainment, then, there is a chance to exchange the reified view of the present for a vision of the collective organic fulfillment we could enjoy before or beyond temporal reification.

Or maybe not. Just because the autonomized senses may disclose holes in the continuum of reified time doesn't mean they can then evade the regulation of their energies as sites of exception to rationalization. Merely symbolic restitutions of the sensuous undercut their own utopian aspirations, at any rate, to the extent that the "compensation" they prefigure casts the future in terms that remain commensurate with the commodified time of wage labor. Adorno's analysis of "stimulus-value," and his critique of the culture industry more broadly, stresses this

[25] Jameson, *Political Unconscious*, 49, 56, 93, 48, 58, 225.

further turn in the dialectic of autonomization and recontainment. Reification for Adorno constitutes a "lattice of socialization" that "assimilates equally objects and the view of them," and in this way "converts everything encountered into what always was." Not only does reification preempt any intersubjective consensus about what makes up the objective world, then, but it also seals that horizon of possible encounters into an eternalized present. Adorno locates the origins of this dehistoricizing logic in the nineteenth century, when the human sciences first attempted to divide the "specific sense-energies" of qualitative experience from the "'basic stimulus'" that makes up their quantitative substratum. Modernity's aestheticization of newness adapted that logic for the mass consumption of sensation, a term Adorno traces from the mid nineteenth-century romanticism of Poe and Baudelaire to the propaganda machines of Nazi Germany. Whatever seems new turns out, in this aesthetic, to again index the "eternal recurrence" of stimulus-value. Augmenting bodily energies only to compel a response to the stimulus, the sensation of newness itself came to act like a "stimulating and paralyzing narcotic extract boiled out of external life," at once exciting receptivity to the not-yet experienced and binding that future to the regressive pulsions of abstract time.[26] Jameson assumes that reification saps the world of libido; for Adorno this apparent depletion in fact tends to crystallize mass desire in even more overpowering and compulsive intensities of sensation. To be subject to reification, here, is to endure the potentiation of sensuous experience voided of historical potentiality. Appetitive bodies fall prey to temporal reification insofar as they conform their habits to stimuli whose energetic value, though seemingly in excess of rational ends, is always commensurable to and thus already enclosed by circuits of commodity exchange.

[26] Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, 235-8. Also see Theodor Adorno, "Detemporalization of Time," in *Negative Dialectics*, 331-3.

Autonomization can enable the sensorium to break with rationalized timeframes and anticipate other futures. But such breaks are just as often recontained in forms of consumption whose function is to maintain bodily energies for continual exploitation. Kevin Floyd's work on the reification of sexual desire in the United States underscores the historical transformations that determined that function. Late nineteenth-century efforts to isolate sexuality as a domain of scientific knowledge laid the groundwork for the Fordist regime of mass consumption that emerged from the early- to the mid-twentieth century, Floyd argues. Advances in the scientific management of labor time (a.k.a. Taylorization) had already begun, by the turn of the century, to quantify and compress the expenditure of energy during the workday. The result was that the reconstitution of laboring bodies would come to depend on the habitual consumption of commodities outside of work.[27] Key to the entrenchment of this spatiotemporal division between labor and leisure, Floyd contends, was a concurrent shift from a physiological science that substantiated sex in two incommensurable classes of body (*manhood* / *womanhood*) to a psychoanalytic science that "partitions" sexed embodiment on the basis of performed qualities (*masculinity* / *femininity*). Nineteenth-century physiology, in his telling, situated the middle-class white male body as a reserve of energies and appetites that had to be safeguarded against disordering contact with the "sexual volatility" of its feminized and racialized others. Libidinal dynamics in psychoanalysis, by contrast, no longer align with corporeal stratifications of race,

[27] Michel Aglietta, whose "regulation theory" of US capitalist development informs the historical trajectory Floyd traces, ascribes the onset of mass consumption norms to a transformation of working-class "expenditure habits." Aglietta construes this moment as a transition from an "extensive" regime of accumulation, which fixed capitalism's endogenous tendency toward crises of accumulation through the expansion of agricultural and industrial production, to an "intensive" regime, which did so through the integration of mass production with mass consumption. Living conditions organized around individual consumption of commodities and nuclear households became the norm in the transition to Fordism, Aglietta posits, because these conditions enabled "the most effective recuperation from [the] physical and nervous fatigue" created by the accelerating tempo of wage labor. See Aglietta, *A Theory of Capital Regulation: The US Experience* trans. David Fernbach (New York: Verso, 2000), 159, 80.

sex, and class.[28] Mechanisms of desire are instead traced back to a universal zone of erogenous intensification—the Oedipal triangle, daddy-mommy-me.[29] If the physiological model personified appetitive disorder in figures of energetic waste or breakdown at the limits of domestic economy, the psychoanalytic model abstracted libidinal mechanisms from sexual experience so as to decipher the "temporality of symptomatic repetition" produced within the family itself.[30] Not only did the epistemological shift between the two consolidate the nuclear household as a matrix of cisheteronormative sexual maturation, but it would also recast appetites that had once seemed pathologically wasteful as indices of personal desire.[31] It was by at once licensing the serial incitement of such unrationalized desires by consumer markets and looping those desires back into the reproduction of the normalizing space of the family, Floyd suggests, that psychoanalysis coordinated with capitalist logics of temporal reification in the early twentieth-century transition to Fordism.

Mass cultures of consumption thus assumed a regulatory function: they supported the intensive rationalization of labor time by compelling working populations to satisfy their appetites and renew their energies through circuits of commodity exchange. Overseeing that function were expert knowledges whose aim was to secure libidinal compliance to the incipient regime of mass consumption. Near the end of the nineteenth century these knowledge projects

[28] Kevin Floyd, *The Reification of Desire: Toward a Queer Marxism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 44, 59. On the incommensurability of the sexes see Thomas Laqueur, "The Discovery of the Sexes" in *Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 149-192.
[29] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, "Psychoanalysis and Familialism: The Holy Family," in *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* trans. Robert Hurley and Mark Seem (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 51.
[30] Floyd, *Reification of Desire*, 54.
[31] On the emergence of "'personal' life" as a category of working-class subjectivity, see Eli Zaretsky, *Capitalism, the Family, and Personal Life* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), 34.

intensified their efforts to incorporate the heteropatriarchal family as the normative matrix through which habits of consumption could be reproduced.

Among the most intractable parties to this arrangement were adolescent girls and young women whose appetites deviated or receded from normalization. In theorizing the reification of desire Floyd centers the dislocation of male sexuality from physiological substance to psychic abstraction. Before psychoanalysis, he supposes, the human sciences construed female sexuality as a passive reproductive support to the "spermatic economy" of male desire, rather than an object of knowledge in its own right.[32] Nineteenth-century physiology and related neurological sciences of sexed embodiment were never as univocal in their equation of sexual desire with manhood as Floyd's account suggests, however. Kyla Wazana Tompkins argues that in this "presexological" fold the sexual and the alimentary formed "*coeval* sites of erotic intensity," the pleasures and dangers associated with their assigned orifices (genitals, mouths) crossing over one another in transit along reciprocally innervating reflex arcs.[33] Nerve-based therapeutics of appetite had been organizing a disciplinary apparatus to cultivate and correct women's erotic lives decades before Freud treated his first hysteric (Anna O., c. 1893). At least since the 1870s, neural models of female appetitiveness had marked out white women's bodies as a locus of heightened susceptibility to sexual and alimentary disorder alike.[34] More diffuse, subclinical senses of appetitive disorder similarly positioned those bodies as ideological receptacles for the surpluses of desire incited by the developing system of mass consumption. As Lawrence

[32] Floyd, *Reification of Desire*, 87-8. See also G.J. Barker-Benfield, "The Spermatic Economy and Proto-Sublimation," in *Horrors of the Half-Known Life: Male Attitudes toward Women and Sexuality in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York: Routledge, 2000), 167-80.
[33] Kyla Wazana Tompkins, *Racial Indigestion: Eating Bodies in the Nineteenth Century* (New York: New York University Press, 2012), 5. See too Kyla Schuller, *The Biopolitics of Feeling: Race, Sex, and Science in the Nineteenth Century* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2018), 120.
[34] Cynthia Russett, *Sexual Science: The Victorian Construction of Womanhood* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 118.

Glickman has shown, by the 1880s working-class American women could be demeaned as figures of insatiability for indulging appetites beyond their means (i.e. their "standard of living") or in neglect of the proper ends of biosocial reproduction – deviances typically narrativized by a "fall" into prostitution.[35] Middle-class aspirations to "good taste," set off against the vicious habits of poor and racialized people, had exemplified since the Jacksonian era a feminine "civilizing" compulsion to form erotic bonds and attain political subjectivity through habits of consumption, Lori Merish contends.[36] Newly medicalized conceptions of female appetite would invest these moralistic and sentimental figurations of self-possessed liberal personhood with an authoritative semblance of empirical fact by the end of the century. More than that, they would place disciplinary controls on the subjects those figurations hailed, coaxing and coercing sexed bodies to maintain their appetites within a normative range of receptivity to the excitations of consumer desire.

Yet, against this background stimulus to keep the appetites in touch with the libidinal circuits of massified commodity exchange, the failure or refusal to consume dramatized something more recondite than a dissolution of self-control. Something almost opposite: "want of appetite" pointed to underlying "mental perversity" according to the 1874 paper in which William Gull first hypothesized the disease he called *anorexia nervosa*.[37] Around this diagnosis doctors and the families who called on their expertise would articulate clinical protocols that promised to translate the refractory body language of emaciation into the disciplinary code of

[35] Lawrence Glickman, *A Living Wage: American Workers and the Making of Consumer Society* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 48-9.
[36] Lori Merish, *Sentimental Materialism: Gender, Commodity Culture, and Nineteenth-Century American Literature* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 15. Merish traces these discourses to the "feminization of consumption" (2) initiated in the eighteenth century and the erotics of "sentimental ownership" (4) that served to consolidate the middle-class nuclear family in the nineteenth.
[37] William Gull, "*Anorexia Nervosa (Apepsia Hysterica, Anorexia Hysterica)*," *Transactions of the Clinical Society of London* 7 (1874), 25.

hysteria or neurasthenia.[38] Joan Brumberg, among others, has surveyed how these protocols transformed "fasting girls" like Mollie Fancher from icons of ascetic devotion (a condition termed *anorexia mirabilis* in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) to dysfunctional transfer points in the affectional and economic dynamics of the white bourgeois family. In their sustained refusal of sustenance fasting girls encoded a "breakdown of reciprocity"—a retraction from the relations of dependency whereby parents invested care in and acquired control over their daughters' reproductive futures.[39] Left untreated, anorexic symptoms could force the "whole household" to "[pass] under the selfish despotism of a hysterical girl," the American physician Silas Weir Mitchell warned in his rest-cure treatise, *Fat and Blood: And How to Make Them* (1877).[40] Appetites that detach themselves from the periodicities of domestic consumption signal, for Mitchell, a perverse intensification of self-restraint that could in turn collapse the circuits of reified desire that converged on the unconsuming body. In Lukàcs's terms, anorexia ciphered an aversive fixation on the "quantifiable 'things'" that began to flood domestic space near the end of the nineteenth century, a disaffection for any pretense to adequacy or intimation of repair the "alien system" of exchange relations might tender as familiar.[41] Appetites for nothingness were subjected to clinical discipline at this historical juncture, then, because they ate holes in the web of intimate transactions whereby the middle-class household was to reconfigure

[38] On the "body language" of hysteria see Elaine Showalter, *Hystories: Hysterical Epidemics and Modern Media* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 7. And see Susan Bordo on body language as a motif of "embodied *protest*—unconscious, inchoate, and counterproductive protest without an effective language, voice, or politics, but protest nonetheless"—in *Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 175. See also Anna Krugovoy Silver, *Victorian Literature and the Anorexic Body* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
[39] Joan Brumberg, *Fasting Girls*, 134. By *transfer point* I mean both a point of interpsychic transferences and a point where disciplinary power is applied with particular density, following Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, trans. Robert Hurley, vol. 1, *An Introduction* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 103.
[40] S. Weir Mitchell, *Fat and Blood: And How to Make Them* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1877), 88.
[41] The phrases "alien system" and "quantifiable 'things'" are both from Lukàcs, *History*, 90. On repulsion see Michel Delville and Andrew Norris, *The Politics and Aesthetics of Hunger and Disgust* (Routledge: New York, 2017).

itself as a training ground for and erogenous zone of mass consumption. Nullifying both the regimentations of habit and the repertoires of enjoyment that held that space together, the negative insatiability ascribed to anorexia could obstruct or invalidate the appetitive body's compulsory openness to circuits of commodity exchange.

Medical treatments of anorexia aimed not just to correct individual cases of food refusal but to ensure the assimilation of these obtrusive appetites to reified time. One part of that project, exemplified by Hammond's response to the Fancher case, entailed the reduction of live embodiment to a continuous exchange between energy accumulated as flesh and expended in activity. A related logic led Gull to include in his 1874 paper on anorexia three sets of before-and-after photographs (Miss A., Miss B., Miss C.) contrasting the extremity of his patients' initial emaciation with the fullness of their subsequent recovery. Take, for example, the first set (fig. 4).In the four years that elapsed between these two illustrations, the case history tells us, Miss A. underwent a regimen of regular feeding to both put on weight (46 lbs.) and quell her "restless" disposition. Miss A.'s even-tempered expression in No. 2, outlined from the shoulders up against an unshaded blank, replaces the "nervous," downcast gaze of No. 1 with a "younger look," better aligning with her true age (21) than the first picture (taken at 17 but appearing "near 30"), Gull suggests. All of the symptoms the *after* frame purports to resolve – "amenorrhea, slow pulse, slow breathing" – are negative sequelae of a "starvation-process" that "[depresses] … all the vital functions." Miss A., Miss B., and Miss C. serve as interchangeable prototypes of the same resolution: the first photo captures an infertile, exhausted, and yet perversely overactive body; the second certifies the resumption of fully functioning personhood.[42] As Erin O'Connor has pointed out, this logic of curative "photogenicity" renders any disturbance the patient once

[42] Gull, "*Anorexia Nervosa*," 23, 25.

made, any deviation in the course of her convalescence, irrelevant in view of her image's silent conformation to the moral and aesthetic "standards of [middle-class white] femininity"—standards, that is, for the production of a "sexually viable woman."[43]



Figure 4. "Miss A." from W.W. Gull, "*Anorexia Nervosa*," 22-3.

Juxtaposing the bent, careworn aspect of the defeminized *before* to the upright receptivity of the rejuvenated *after*, the before/after cut elides the transition from diseased will to healthy appetite in order to expedite the reinsertion of the prematurely aged girl into a progressive

[43] Erin O'Connor, "Pictures of Health: Medical Photography and the Emergence of Anorexia Nervosa," *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 5, no. 4 (April 1995): 560.

timeline of sexual maturation. At stake in the graphic scission of each case between past and present, then, is the dramatic rehabilitation of the desire to keep bodily processes on track with the normative horizons of social and biological reproduction. Not only did this clinical optic equate personal wellbeing with the willingness to maintain energies and appetites through increasingly standardized circuits of consumption, but it would in turn compel the women it targeted to assume responsibility for the habitual integration of those circuits into the everyday life of their present and future families.

Appetites for nothingness came under disciplinary control in the late nineteenth century because they tended to strip the veneer of consensual exchange from the dominating logic of mass consumption. In spite of all efforts at recuperation, they allowed their subjects to retain a zero degree of desire, unreceptive and incommensurable to the routine satisfactions of the reified everyday's chronic recurrence. Anorexia, as the psychoanalyst Geraldine Shipton conceptualizes it, dislocates the body in psychic space by adhering its "inner dimensionality" to the contours of an externally perfectible image. But if for Shipton that disorder reflects the now-ubiquitous commodification of femininity, in the instances considered here it could point "beyond the gravitational pull of objects," toward a "'nowhere'"—a dimension of objectless need that exchange relations had not yet subsumed and could ostensibly never satisfy.[44] Not a utopian nowhere, exactly, but perhaps still an access of the ecstatic (Mollie Fancher in states of trance) or matrix of surreptitious energies (Miss A. in states of restlessness) insinuating the onset of what Ernst Bloch would call the "Not-Yet-Conscious" of an "unknown drive."[45] Less in pursuit of an

[44] Geraldine Shipton, "Anorexic Space," *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology* 9 (1999): 442, 447, 441. Anorexic space, for Shipton, recedes toward a "'vanishing point'"—an ideal image of thinness that evades embodiment, remaining "always intangible, out of reach, and yet sought after relentlessly" (446).
[45] Ernst Bloch, *The Principle of Hope,* trans. Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice, and Paul Knight (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986), 1:11, 49. Not just anybody's appetite could take refuge in the same nowhere, though, because not everybody could take for granted the same nutritive plenitude or investments in womanly propriety as those which failed to attach the person of the anorexic to her generally white, middle-class household. See Doris Witt's critique

ideal physique than in flight from the compulsion to bind the sexed body to a future already confined to the endless reproduction of the present, the nullification of appetite could undo the habits of consumption that were to loop that body into a normative sequence of development. Appetites for nothingness might in this sense retract intervals of autonomous feeling – ecstasies that sink bodies into insatiable voids or avoidances of satiation, moments where progressive futurity slips into or stalls on the verge of oblivion – from the continual advance of reified time.

Pharmaceutical Normativity and Psychotropic Desire

It may seem from the preceding analysis that appetite for nothingness consists solely in the recalcitrance of sexed bodies singled out for medical correction, or that standardized time secured compliance to its omnipresence strictly through the intervention of therapeutic authorities in the desires of individual subjects. Yet temporal reification did not just exert its normative force on the individuating plane of clinical discipline. Appetitive bodies were also subject to more diffuse, molecular forms of chronic equilibration designed to coordinate their flux with the periodicities of the reified everyday.

My readings in this section concern how *pharmaceutical normativity* (or, abbreviated, *pharmaconormativity*), the chronic equilibration of energies and appetites through the use of mass-produced psychotropics, operates in the genres of self-managerial conduct that took shape around two drugs, cocaine and chloral hydrate. As the introduction to this dissertation argues, a split regime of biochemical governance, emerging in the United States around the turn of the century, structured the state-racist division of these substances into illicit and therapeutic

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of Brumberg in "'How Mama Started to Get Large': Eating Disorders, Fetal Rights, and Black Female Appetite," in *Black Hunger: Soul Food and America* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), 186-7.

domains of use. Logics of criminalization apprehended drugs like cocaine as dangerous agents of imagined racial degeneracy whose near-futural horizon of epidemic spread required preemptive containment by state powers. Logics of normalization, in contrast, approached drugs like chloral as optional aids to the typical (white) person's need to manage risk and maintain equilibrium within an eternalized present. My argument in the following pages concerns how this split regime configures the generic protocols that set off, intercept, and fail to recontain the chemical messages psychotropics send through *Eight Years in Cocaine Hell* and *The House of Mirth*. Narrative emplotments of managerial personhood in both texts conscript the pathos of wasted femininity (among other devices) as a means to hem in the tropic mobility of the pharmaceutical and the stray instances of ecstatic self-abandonment it leaves open along the edges of the reified everyday. Appetite for nothingness rematerializes here not just as a somatically voiced refusal of the normative coercions of reproductive futurity but also as a bundle of drives whose asynchronous flux neither originates in the body they move through nor coincides with the sensorium this movement perforates.[46] Normative investments in the surrogate potencies of the pharmaceutical – its capacity to extend the energies, carry the appetites, and bear the chronic recurrence of day-to-day life without feeling it – are here reversed or inverted, taking over the autonomy of the person who takes it and the genres of conduct that make that person up.

Narrative time and the styles of therapeutic self-management it holds together are indexed, in *Cocaine Hell*, to an interlayered series of 'befores' and 'afters.' Meyers lines up her testimonial itinerary from debased fiend to delivered victim through the graphic division of her

[46] Here I mark a distinction between ecstasy and *jouissance*, or alteration by psychotropic drives and the drive for self-shattering, laid out more fully in the introduction. On *jouissance* as it unbinds the political order of reproductive futurism, see Lee Edelman, *No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 2. *Jouissance* is one path the ecstatic modulation of pathos might take – "the *jouissance*," as Edelman understands it, "of passing beyond the Imaginary limit of the human and dissolving into the drive that insists beyond the subject's desire." See Lee Edelman, "Compassion's Compulsion," in *Compassion: The Culture and Politics of an Emotion*, ed. Lauren Berlant (New York: Routledge, 2004), 167.

life story into past and present. Before cocaine, Mrs. Annie C. Meyers is a "typical woman of society" living in Chicago. To legitimate that class status *Cocaine Hell* reproduces a formal photograph of Meyers, clipped from a group shot of the Board of Lady Managers of the World's Columbian Exposition, as well as a certificate verifying her membership on the Board. A mere three months after first trying a catarrh powder containing the drug, however, Meyers already resembles like a hardened criminal (fig. 5, *Mrs. Meyers After Using Cocaine Three Months*).[47]



Figure 5. Annie C. Meyers, 'before' photoengravings,
in *Cocaine Hell*, plate 7.

[47] My point, to be clear, is not that I personally think Meyers looks "hardened," but that a penal-archival convention generates the physiognomic appearance of callousness in the foregoing photograph. It is possible, based on her account of her multiple arrests for fraud and forgery, that this photograph is in fact a mugshot taken by the St. Louis police, "for the rogue's gallery." On the "rogue's gallery" and criminal typology, see Alan Sekula, "The Body and the Archive," *October* 39 (Winter 1986): 37.

Meyers's once-respectable womanhood further deteriorates into the base euphoria of a "cocaine fiend" in the six years that elapse between this picture and the next. On cocaine she leads a life "continually on the go"; the drug keeps her moving "night and day for weeks without sleep." Narratively erratic, her "downfall" unfolds through scattered episodes of detention and release as she flees from city to city stealing and selling whatever she can, dancing for money, "play[ing] the insane dodge," and actually going insane. Just before detectives haul her out of court to a cell in the Bridewell Prison (Cook County House of Corrections) circa 1900, she acts "as if the devil possessed [her]," "froth[ing] at the mouth and struggling with some unseen power." After thirty-seven days in the Bridewell, she resurfaces a "broken-down and pitiful wreck"—her profile (fig. #, *Mrs. Meyers on Her Release from the Bridewell*) prematurely decrepit, her body weighing "only about 80 pounds," her mind atrophied to "a state of imbecility." Yet, as if miraculously, Meyers once again embodies a picture of health (fig. 6, *Mrs. Annie C. Meyers To-Day*) by the time the text marks its deictic "to-day" in 1902. By then she weighs "about 150 pounds," her mind is "cleared," and her soul "redeemed."[48] As far as the narrational present of *Cocaine Hell* goes, the sequence this trio of photographs sets out – from the sclerotic look of "After Using," to the near-death emaciation of "Her Release," to the genial decorum of "To-Day" – fulfills a generic function similar to that which orders the before/after pictures in Gull's *anorexia nervosa* article.[49] Not anorexia but *narcomania*, the term the physician T.D. Crothers (quoted in the text's final chapter) would use to diagnose the permanently damaging "'impression'" of pleasure the cocaine habit leaves on the brain of its "'victim,'" is the diagnosis Meyers ambivalently

[48] Meyers, *Cocaine Hell*, 11, 15, 60, 9, 51, 68-70.
[49] By *narrational present* I mean what Gérard Genette would call the "narrating instance": the scene or position of enunciation from which the narrative is told. See Genette, *Narrative Discourse: An Essay on Method* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 31.

embodies.[50] As a device of clinical retrospection, the before-and-after sequence is designed to straighten out the errant psychoactivity and repair the carceral ruination of the sexed body it captures. It does this by entering the prior narration of that body's deviance into a case-historical timeline that recodes each episode, however perverse or illicit, as a pitiable symptom of disordered appetite.

MRS. ANNIE C. MEYERS TO-DAY

Figure 6. Annie C. Meyers, 'after' photoengraving,
in *Cocaine Hell*, plate 8.

[50] These are quotes from Crothers reproduced at the end of *Cocaine Hell*. Meyers refers this "dispatch" to a paper Crothers read before the New York Medical Association. The material quoted in *Cocaine Hell* is developed at greater length in T.D. Crothers, *Morphinism and Narcomanias from Other Drugs: Their Etiology, Treatment, and Medicolegal Relations* (Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders and Company, 1902), 270-286. In retrospect, the posture of full recovery staged in the final after photo may look precipitate. Newspapers will report Meyers pleading weak "'self-government,'" the fault of "'the drug,'" when she yet again shows up in court for shoplifting in 1906, six years post-detoxification. See "Rich Shoplifter Lays Her Trouble to Cocaine" *Salt Lake Telegram* February 28, 1906.

Not only does this synoptic device aspire to fix Meyers's deviant inhabitation of criminality in a superseded past, setting the carceral optics of the 'before' photos in bleak contrast with the therapeutic optimism of the 'after,' but it also allows her victimage to shed the aura of racialized mayhem that that deviance would otherwise arouse. At stake in the photographic repossession of wasted femininity is an effort to segregate the chronicity of the white victim's disorder from the anarchic historicity projected, in a newspaper clipping enclosed in the final chapter (after the 'after' photo), onto the figure of the black "'coke fiend.'" It is the "'desperado, Charles" – a folk icon of heroic black masculinity notorious, as Douglas Flowe has argued, for mounting an insurrectionary "self-defense" against police violence in the Jim Crow South – who incarnates the fiend in this excerpt.[51] At the same time that its outlaw status alludes to this singular figure of spectacular resistance, however, the fiend also stands to exemplify how the intraracial communicability of the coke "'Habit,'" here reported to be "'almost confined … to … the lowest type of the colored race,'" could spur and spill over into mass ungovernability—a "'riot … inspired by the drug,'" according to the New Orleans police.[52] Meyers, tacitly affirming the anti-black iconography this story sets forth, notes that "police officials" have decided that coke "fiends" make up "the most dangerous class of criminals." Likewise, in tracing the "'Coke Habit'" through a chain of transmission that "has not yet extended beyond the lowest strata of humanity," she echoes the excerpt's call for the preemptive containment of (white contact with) that habit's menacing blackness. Nonetheless, as part of her reiteration of the clipping's racist vigilance over biosocial hierarchy, Meyers invokes the near-futural horizon of

[51] Douglas Flowe, "Folklore, Urban Insurrection, and the Killing of the Black Hero in the Turn-of-the-Century South," *The Mississippi Quarterly* 67, no. 4 (2014): 594.
[52] The police were lying. Actually it was a white lynch mob that was rioting, not the "'lowest type'" "'running amuck.'" Again, this is quoted in Meyers, *Cocaine Hell*, 73. See also Ida B. Wells-Barnett, *Mob Rule in New Orleans: Robert Charles and His Fight to the Death* (Chicago: Privately Published, 1900).

an epidemic present in which it seems "the cocaine habit is spreading" indiscriminately. To confirm such reports she cites the medical opinion, ascribed to Crothers, that "the habit has secured [a lasting hold] upon every class in society" by ostensibly lawful means—"headache powders and catarrh cures," prescribed by doctors or pushed by commercial druggists. Access to an unregulated market in pharmaceuticals is, for Meyers, the condition of possibility for the promiscuous mobility of the cocaine habit, its ability to "[reach] the rich and the poor, the high and the low, the roustabouts on the Mississippi River, the fashionable women on Fifth Avenue."[53] Around the obscene edges of this image of socially levelling exposure to the spread of habit there returns a pornotropic scenario, explicated in this dissertation's introduction, which incited scandal at the prospect that habitual drug use might couple the appetites of racialized bodies (here black-coded "roustabouts") to those of white consumers, women especially.[54] Meyers's text partakes in that imaginary insofar as it invests the clinical synopsis of victimage with the generic function of softening and purifying her formerly debased flesh of its association with a traffic in appetitive disorder imagined to endanger the continuity of race, sex, and class stratification.

As powerfully as that device sanitizes *Cocaine Hell*'s appeals to lurid interest under the sign of sympathetic redemption, though, it still fails to exhaust the autonomous potencies or screen off the perverse communicability of psychotropic desire. Nowhere is this more apparent than in Meyers's account of the metabolic "havoc" cocaine has wrought on her body. "Even after

[53] Roustabouts were black steamboat workers perceived to be at the epicenter of an epidemic of cocaine abuse traced to New Orleans at the end of the nineteenth century. See, for instance, "Negro Cocaine Fiends. The Use of the Drug Has Now Spread to the Cotton Plantations," *Charlotte Observer*, November 9, 1902. See also Thomas Ruys Smith, "Roustabouts, Steamboats, and the Old Way to Dixie: The Mississippi River and the Southern Imaginary in the Early Twentieth Century" *Southern Quarterly* 52, no. 3 (Spring 2015): 10-29.

[54] On pornotroping see Hortense J. Spillers, "Mama's Baby, Papa's Maybe: An American Grammar Book," *Diacritics* 17, no. 2 (Summer 1987): 67. See also Alexander G. Weheliye, *Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 39.

stopping the use of it and the desire had been eliminated," she writes, "still it continued eating the flesh off in places for some time." Appetitive disorder is in her experience irreducible to the hedonic traces the cocaine habit impresses on the plastic form of her nervous system, as Crothers would suppose. Nor, consequently, can it be reduced to the regressive expression of those traces through an unconsciously enduring desire for the sensations the drug elicits.[55] Appetite is carried in this instance not by the one who chases or receives stimulation but by the stimulant that permeates and devours the contours of her body image. Its insatiability somehow keeps going even when the effect her sensorium registers no longer answers to any desire of her own. Its insatiability, not hers, somehow keeps going *even after stopping the use of it*, an asynchronous half-life inhabiting and decaying her body indefinitely. Only a treatment designed to "eliminate the cocaine from [her] system" could finally cure her of the habit, she claims, as if what had sustained her need for the drug was the circulation of its appetite through her. Assuming this scene of clinical detoxification corroborates the generic function discussed above, we might interpet it as a means to purge the metonymic corruption of Meyers's flesh by racial figurations not properly belonging to the white womanhood embodied in the 'after' photo. Yet by the final paragraph of *Cocaine Hell* it becomes clear that this procedure succeeds neither in expunging nor in foreclosing the psychotropic desire that pervades the rest of the text. Notwithstanding her insistence that the present of narration has left behind the compulsion of the 'before' it narrates, even here Meyers cannot resist proclaiming that she is "the only living person in the world to-day who ever took two hundred grains [of cocaine] in twenty four hours and survived." An unknown voice or some unseen power, not quite in the possession of the "living person" from

[55] Meyers, *Cocaine Hell,* 55-6. Kyla Schuller on impressibility is the main interlocutor of this point. An impressibility model of addiction, geared toward the return to a remembered or simply past-tense pleasure, can be seen, for example, in Michael Clune, "The Addictive Image," in *Writing Against Time* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), 57-86.

whom it surfaces, eats away at the recovered co-presence supplicated by the picture of "Mrs. Annie C. Meyers To-Day" and cuts an aberrant path through the standard measure of reified time in view of which that picture wants to rectify itself.[56] Appetite for nothingness, though configured in *Cocaine Hell* by a retrospective disavowal of their tropic contiguity with the nullified life of the black "coke fiend," at the same time exudes an unreformed drive to let the granular asynchronies of the drug's hunger traverse and corrode the normative coordination of the rationalized everyday.

Lily Bart's appetite for nothingness likewise eats a hole in the narrative genres that would delimit its form. If habitual recurrence to tea and chloral hydrate allows her to survive the seeming endlessness of reified time, it also risks and eventually ends her life. As some critics see it, the fact that Lily yields her life to such contingencies indicates her aspirational enmeshment in the same capitalist norms that are slowly killing her. Her recourse to "self-destructive" styles of consumption, Bonnie Gerard observes, exemplifies the double bind of the "social determinism" that advances *House*'s naturalist plotline: "capacities that Lily must use to succeed in her world are also the ones that cause her to be consumed."[57] Near the end of the novel, as her disoccupied everyday progressively exposes her to the empty recurrence of reified time, tea and chloral remain among the few energetic resources she has left to fuel her ability to live through that void, even if this form of survival itself seals her into predatory circuits of exchange. As instruments of what Patrick Mullen calls "self-managerial intelligence," then, Lily's drug habits aid her laboriously idle enmeshment in a "capitalized temporality" that will still end up throwing her

[56] Meyers, *Cocaine Hell*, 69, 75.
[57] Bonnie Lynn Gerard, "From Tea to Chloral: Raising the Dead Lily Bart" *Twentieth Century Literature* 44.4 (Winter 1998): 417, 415.

body out of its chronic structures of biosocial reproduction.[58] If by taking her chances with chloral she extends (not escapes) an effort to manage life through the market logic of speculative investment, as Walter Benn Michaels argues, that overdetermination is also a scene of indeterminacy. You take chloral and "[wait] to see if you've killed yourself"; you take chloral and wait to see if it kills you. It is impossible to say whether Lily is waiting to find out what she wants or if she is waiting to see what the drug will do. An "epistemological opacity," the unknowable difference between the suicidal choice and the unconscious wish for death, or an "ontological indeterminacy of the act," a zone of real indiscrimination between the action of the subject and the activity of the drug? Does she die on purpose, accidentally-on-purpose, or is it actually just an accident? This is the indeterminacy Michaels raises.[59] Lily tells herself she's taking a "slight risk" – just "one chance in a hundred" that a drop or two over the "regular dose" will kill her – with the "incalculable action of the drug." In the aftermath of that action her friend Gerty Farish, the first to discover her death, is anxious to deny any "'trouble'" medically ruling the cause of death a "'mistake.'"[60] Neither woman is in a position to separate the apparent negligibility of the risk Lily takes from her negligent receptivity to whatever happens, however. As Gerard suggests, we can trace that impasse to a double bind in which the most reliable means of maintaining life turns out to be inimical to survival. To live through reified time is in this instance to nourish the project of self-managerial personhood on processes of self-destruction. Yet, again, we must stress that this double bind cuts deeper than the overdetermination of psychic or social causes insofar as the risk may always lie in the pharmacodynamics of chloral

[58] Patrick Mullen, "The Aesthetics of Self-Management: Intelligence, Capital, and *The House of Mirth*" *Novel* 42.1 (Spring 2009): 59, 41, 60.
[59] Walter Benn Michaels, "Action and Accident: Photography and Writing," in *The Gold Standard and the Logic of Naturalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 233-4.
[60] Wharton, *House*, 313, 316-7.

itself—its fickle curve from getting some sleep to waking up dead, the fuzzy boundary beyond which neither intention, nor unconscious desire, nor even chemical analysis can tell what the drug will do.

Alongside the impulse to have the overdose distill the incalculable nexus of forces that send Lily into her downward spiral, *House* also articulates the pathos of irreversibility – the belated reflex of feeling for what might have been had the risk tilted toward a different result – as a site of sentimental closure. Naturalist protocols intercede, in the end, to subsume the superabundant causality of the overdose under the deterministic bind of "external influences," as if the activity of chloral could be absorbed without residue by "the conditions of life" that Lily's would-be lover Lawrence Selden imagines "had conspired to keep them apart."[61] Jennifer Fleissner argues that in this final scene "a conventional *tableau mort* of the woman 'too good for this world' smoothes out all complications like the sleeping drug" held responsible for her death. According to Fleissner, this scene flattens the outward spirals of "seeking" that carry Lily through her plot of decline by framing the outcome of embraced risk as a moment of stasis movingly suspended in the sacrificial drama of "'lost possibilities.'"[62] Michaels's sense of the radical opacity Lily accepts in order to stay competent to the speculative logic of the market reaches its limit, on this view, in the symbolic radiance of victimage, which revalues indeterminacy as a sadly unavoidable loss of the will or capacity for self-determination. Like Fleissner, Dana Seitler has argued that the installation of this "sentimentalizing frame" cuts short the "quests for joy" that both attach Lily to personhood and, in repeatedly nullifying self-consciousness, give relief from the "possessive individualism" underwriting that attachment. But

[61] Wharton, *House*, 320.
[62] At the end of the sentence I'm quoting Fleissner quoting *House* in "The New Woman & the Old Man," in *Women, Compulsion, Modernity: The Moment of American Naturalism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 198. A fuller version is cited in the paragraph that follows.

if for the former critic the pursuit of annihilated states enacts a fantasy of "beatific" reunion with the "recovered past," for the latter this quest to intensify the feeling of not feeling anything entails just the opposite, "a fantasy about being able to live as if you had no past."[63] Ambivalence, for Seitler, forms in response to a situation where one has to repeatedly disburden the present of its individuating attachments to the past in order to even imagine carrying the desire for individuation into an already dispossessed future. Lily's enjoyment of nonbeing images neither an infantile wish for regression nor a compensatory surplus of her self-managerial efforts at becoming a person but, rather, the best chance she has to slip the bind in which the past would have captured the now-voided present.

Nullification of personhood draws Lily's sensorium out of the disintegrative continuum of daily life and puts a hiatus on her commensuration with the exchange-valued cycles of biosocial reproduction that keep her life stuck to a diminishing range of options. At the end of the novel, however, naturalist and sentimental protocols collude to reinsert that moment into reified time by exchanging its insensible sensuousness for an external recognition of the overdetermining forces that regrettably cut short the future Lily never got to enjoy. It is by valorizing the overdose as an exemplary site of victimage that the novel moves to enclose the pharmaceutical "'mistake'" in a narrative formula that would render the agency of the drug causally imperceptible and affectively irrelevant.

Just as the corrosive grain of cocaine's voice continues to eat away at the extremities of Meyers's text even after it appears to have to been expelled from her system, however, so does

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[63] Fleissner, "New Woman," 198. Dana Seitler, "Willing to Die: Addiction and Other Ambivalences of Living," *Cultural Critique* 98 (Winter 2018): 9. Marianne Noble examines this sort of beatific moment vis-à-vis the "ecstatic interpenetration of mother and child" in "'An Ecstasy of Apprehension': The Erotics of Domination in *The Wide, Wide World*," in *The Masochistic Pleasures of Sentimental Literature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 108. On how isolated worldmaking sets up the "narcissistic fantasy of ecstatic oneness" and how "childlike neediness" undergirds "narcissistic ecstasy" in *House*, see Joan Lidoff, "Another Sleeping Beauty: Narcissism in The House of Mirth" *American Quarterly* 32.5 (Winter 1980): 522, 537.

the indeterminacy of the message Lily's overdose may send (as suicide) or not (as accident) dissolve the expected pathos of her demise into a dimensionless volume of sensation. Not long before she takes her final dose of chloral, the stream of narrative consciousness gives voice to a free indirect death wish: "If only life could end now—end on this tragic yet sweet vision of lost possibilities, which gave her a sense of kinship with all the loving and foregoing in the world!" Kinship of this sort is something Lily associates with "the blind motions of her mating-instinct," a phylogenetic sex drive that would compel her to wonder what could have been had she not succumbed to "the disintegrating influences of the life about her."[64] As such, whether suicidal or accidental, her death may in this sense dramatize the waste of life on unreproductive desire—a pathos idly expressed by the hallucination she has of holding Nettie Struther's baby just before sinking into total unconsciousness. Yet here and in the aftermath we again run up against the indeterminacy of the drug. Lily's delight in the tactility of the hallucinated baby, the "gentle penetrating thrill" it holds, not only reiterates but ultimately merges with the thrill she gets from the "touch of the packet" containing her chloral hydrate. At the moment of overdose it is no longer possible to separate the "tender pressure" of the baby from the "sensuous pleasure" of the substance that generates it—an artificial, vacant, and horizonless pleasure normatively opposed to the procreative telos of biological kinship the hallucination may symbolize. Any residue of the telepathic "word" Selden thinks he can salvage from the pathetic "silence" of Lily's deathbed is lost the moment the sedative sets in; its final effect is to dissolve whatever she wanted to say into the wordless and irreproducible feeling of wanting itself. In the end the only message it carries is

[64] I call the mating-instinct "phylogenetic" because it links the "individual existence" of the sex drive to the speciating inheritance of "slowly-accumulated past lives in the blood." Wharton, *House*, 311. Note too that this connects Lily's death to the discourses of "race suicide," a paranoiac vision of the extinction of whiteness through the degeneration or disintegration of white femininity – on this see Fleissner, "New Woman," 98, 246, 249.

"the end."[65] Just at the edge of the lost possibility her final coupling with Selden would promise to solidify into an anchoring reproductive purpose, or coursing under and soaking up through the "mating-instinct" that could have made such a solidity seem promising, is the blurred motion of an appetite that finds satisfaction neither in the extinction nor in the perpetuation of life. Only in neglect of that distinction can her appetite for nothingness get what it wants.

Nothing More

Narcomania and self-medication, the appetitive disorders that structure the two texts under study in this chapter, come undone within distinct genres of pharmaceutical conduct. In one, the sentimental posture of victimized white femininity is to rehabilitate the illicit psychoactivity of a self-styled cocaine fiend; in the other, a similar motif, less performed than imposed, is to cover up the incalculable risk to which a woman gives her senses over in overdosing on chloral hydrate. Moving between these parallel emplotments, into the chiasmus where their downward mobilities just miss one another, allows us to reassemble a sense of how sexed bodies could employ pharmaceuticals to manage and disregard their antagonistic relations to the advance of the reified everyday. Between these texts the pharmaceutical performs several functions: a catalyst of mania or nucleus of risk; a ground on which to figure deviance and victimage; a device employed to complete the sympathetic redemption or plot out the irreversible pathos of wasted life; an empty slot of sensation. Yet in the metonymic transit of these substances, their tendency to circulate through associations the generic device of sympathetic victimage can neither contain nor excise, we find a logic of surrogation capable of at once

[65] Wharton, *House*, 281, 313, 314, 320.

voiding the intentionality and repealing the fatality of the plotlines that device would lay down. Jacques Derrida might say that this supplementary potential curves the tropic mobility of the pharmaceutical in on the generic sequences that are supposed to bring each text to an end, folding that enclosure into "an internal pocket larger than the whole."[66] As if, in its aberration or retraction from narrative sequence, the drug were "involuting" narrative perception and secreting a volume of time no longer indexed to "human temporalities," as Mel Chen suggests of opium.[67] Or, following Stacy Margolis, as if the psychoactivity of the drug could stay in circulation without having any psyche feel that activity as their own.[68] Not only an exogenous carrier of the appetites, energies, and senses but also an incorporated proxy for the person who wants to make use of this extraneous liveness, the psychotropic serves in these texts to disclose autonomous paths through and zones of indifference to the ongoingness of the reified everyday.

At once actuating and suspending the animation of human protagonists, the pharmaceutical here both enhances and deteriorates the capacity to reproduce a future in calendrical time. Lily alternates between drugs with opposed effects—a stimulant, tea, to keep her going during the day, and a sedative, chloral, to put her to sleep each night—in order to manage her contradictory attachments to the desolation of her present and the interminability of her future. As they loop her appetites and energies into the diurnal reproduction of exchange relations, these drugs end up pushing her to the edge of a suicidal *anomie*: a state of disequilibrium, as Émile Durkheim defined it, which metabolic bodies exhibit in response to

[66] Jacques Derrida, "Plato's Pharmacy," in *Dissemination* trans. Barbara Johnson (London: The Athlone Press, 1981), 112, 70. And see Derrida's essay, "The Law of Genre," *Critical Inquiry* 7, no. 1 (August 1980): 59.
[67] Mel Y. Chen, "Unpacking Intoxication, Racialising Disability," *Medical Humanities* 41, no. 1 (June 2015): 28
[68] Stacy Margolis, "Addiction and the Ends of Desire," in *High Anxieties: Cultural Studies in Addiction* ed. Janet Brodie and Marc Redfield (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 22. Margolis argues that addicted desire is figured "not by the self that wants the drug, but by the drug that wants itself."

abnormalities in the system of class stratification.[69] Normativity, for Meyers, comes after and excuses deviance instead of being undone from within by the nihilistic therapeutics that maintain daily cycles of work and rest. In cocaine she seeks an unceasing flight from those who investigate and arrest her mobility—doctors, judges, prison keepers, and, shadowing her every move, the police. Medicocarceral protocols derived from the clinical imaging of anorexia and the criminal profiling of cocaine fiends configure the narrative irresolution of her ongoing restlessness, as the before/after synopsis makes visible. Yet if these protocols may seem to bring Meyers's appetitive deviance back into line, they nonetheless fail to close off the chronic recursion of the 'after' to the 'before' it would supersede—the latent and manifest potential that the future wellness her image projects may always slide back into the toxic liveness it claims to have expunged. Less graphic protocols of pharmacotherapeutic self-fashioning inform the maintenance of energy and management of risk in *House*. By the end of the novel these protocols appear to collapse the incalculability Lily courts into the fatal outcome anyone could have seen coming. And yet, despite the determinism that encases her death, around the edges of that ending the pharmaceutical toys with the possibility of turning its generic surround inside out: a drug taken to normalize the capacity to live through reified time has the perverse effect not of reconciling but of nullifying the coerced aspiration to indefinitely reproduce her personhood.

[69] Émile Durkheim, *Suicide: A Study in Sociology* trans. John A. Spaulding and George Simpson (New York: Routledge, 2002), 208.

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