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Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

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Introduction

According to Plutarch, Demosthenes, when asked whether he wrote out his speeches before delivering them, gave the following response:

> ... οὐ παντάπασιν ἦν ἔξαρνος, ἀλλ' οὔτε γράψας οὔτ' ἄγραφα κομιδῇ λέγειν ὡμολόγει ...[1]

Demosthenes' speeches are neither written nor unwritten. Yunis understands the significance of this statement in a literal sense: "Demosthenes' speeches as we have them are designed for delivery; yet it is inconceivable that while addressing the Assembly he *merely* reproduced prepared texts."[2] To be neither written nor unwritten means to be a blend of improvised with written elements. While this is certainly true for Demosthenes, throughout the dissertation I will argue that the claim has a deeper significance for his self-fashioning. For tension between the oral and written can be said to characterize each level of the formal and substantive elaboration of his speeches. The style of the speeches is dense like Thucydides (but not as dense) and mellifluous like Isocrates (but not as mellifluous) but yet immediate and at times blunt. Structure seems to be non-existent while at the same time aptly addressing Isocrates' καιρός and achieving organic unity à la Plato. Finally, the forms in which the speeches are preserved as texts make it impossible for the reader to engage with them simply as writing or as a transcript of the speech he actually (may have) delivered.

Accordingly, when reading these text-speeches or speech-texts, one has to occupy a liminal space between the written and the oral. This makes for a somewhat peculiar reading experience, as is suggested by a remark of Demosthenes' contemporary Aesion:

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[1] Plut. *Dem.* 8: All translations are my own unless otherwise noted. "… He did not altogether deny it (that he wrote out his speeches beforehand), but he admitted that he delivered speeches that were neither written nor entirely unwritten."

[2] Yunis (1996), 245. He doubts the authenticity of the statement. However, I will argue at length in my fifth chapter that the sentiment if not the form in which Plutarch presents it can be attributed to Demosthenes himself.

> Αἰσίωνα δέ φησιν Ἕρμιππος ἐπερωτηθέντα περὶ τῶν πάλαι ῥητόρων καὶ τῶν καθ' αὑτὸν εἰπεῖν, ὡς ἀκούων μὲν ἄν τις ἐθαύμασεν ἐκείνους εὐκόσμως καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς τῷ δήμῳ διαλεγομένους, ἀναγινωσκόμενοι δ' οἱ Δημοσθένους λόγοι πολὺ τῇ κατασκευῇ καὶ δυνάμει διαφέρουσιν.[3]

For Aesion Demosthenes' speeches are only superior when read. This statement provokes several questions: What for Aesion distinguishes the reading experience from the original delivery of the speeches? What does he mean by εὐκόσμως καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς versus τῇ κατασκευῇ καὶ δυνάμει? And on what sort of theory or set of ideas was his assessment based?

1. Project Overview

The subject of this dissertation is the difficulty involved in reading Demosthenes' speeches, as opposed to hearing them presented in the Assembly or law courts. The speeches I examine, which all were composed during Demosthenes' "mature" or middle period (351-341 BCE),[4] are the following: the *First, Second,* and *Third Philippic*; the *Olynthiacs*; *On the Peace*; *Against Meidias*; and *On the False Embassy*. Although the periodization can be disputed, there is general agreement among scholars that Demosthenes' first speech against Philip marks a definite turning point in the development of his oratory.[5] For the purposes of my analysis this period will be treated as synchronic; as a result, I will not take into consideration any possible developments that may have occurred in Demosthenes' practice between one speech and the next.

In the first chapter I show that, by the time Demosthenes' speeches were first distributed, a variety of approaches to interpreting oratory had been developed. In order to reconstruct the 4th

[3] Plut. *Dem.* 11.4: "Hermippus says that Aesion, when asked about the speakers of old and those of his own day, said that one would have marveled when hearing the former speaking gracefully and solemnly, but that the speeches of Demosthenes when read were far superior in construction (devices?) and power."
[4] As opposed to the early deliberative speeches (*On the Symmories, For the Megalopolitans*) on the one hand and the late *On the Crown* on the other. Ronnet (1951), and Pearson (1964) use this rough periodization as a basis for understanding the development of Demosthenes' style.
[5] Pearson (1976), 122: "The purpose of the present discussion is to show how much these five speeches [*First Philippic, On Financial Organization, First, Second*, and *Third Olynthiacs*] have in common, in sentiment, literary style, and vocabulary." Cf. Wooten (2008), 11.

century reader's horizon of expectations, I examine the debates between Plato and Isocrates on the issue of literary interpretation. However, in certain cases, Isocrates' *Helen* for example, the modern reader becomes acutely aware that he is incapable of interpreting and experiencing the work in the same way as his 4th century counterpart did. I argue that authorial intention would have been a central issue for these readers and that, in the wake of Plato's criticism of writing and Isocrates' multiple responses to it, readers would have defined the process and goal of interpretation in a variety of at times conflicting ways.

In the second chapter I turn to the difficulty of interpreting the style of the speeches. I argue that across each level of grammatical elaboration Demosthenes expands and condenses constructions so as to create the *ethos* of an almost divine counselor who can see beyond the surface of things. In response to the problem of whether the style was revised for the publication of the speeches, I show how certain features seem designed to position the speeches in a liminal space between the written and oral, for example his use of hyperbaton.

In the third chapter I analyze the structure of the deliberative speeches. Using Isocrates' and Plato's ideas on the subject as a starting-off point, I examine the unity of the speeches and their relation to the political situation as presented in the text itself. I argue that, whereas previous scholars have posited a single structural principle that informs all the mature deliberative speeches, Demosthenes was actually experimenting with different methods of structuring his speeches in the *Philippics* and *Olynthiacs*.

In chapter four I look at the intertextual relationship between Demosthenes and his two greatest influences, Isocrates and Thucydides. In examining the ways in which he does not simply appropriate but rather meaningfully develops material from these authors, I demonstrate the possibility of an intertextual reading of the speeches which has to be contrasted in certain

respects with the experience of the original audience. With regard to metaphor and to imagery more generally, I argue that Demosthenes' usage represents a conscious break with Isocrates' prescriptions: whereas the latter severely restricted the use of this figure, Demosthenes radically expanded its role and used it in innovative and more versatile ways.

In my fifth chapter I examine the status of the speeches as written texts distributed to readers. The texts of the political trial speeches *Against Meidias* and *On the False Embassy* have clearly only been preserved in draft form. I argue that this would have created productive problems for the interpretation of each speech and that distributing them in this form would have had rhetorical (and aesthetic) advantages for Demosthenes himself. With regard to the deliberative speeches, I examine the issue of occasionality. The content of the texts is not as generalized as that of Isocrates' fictional deliberative speeches, but they clearly are also not simply transcripts of a speech composed for a specific occasion. This ambiguous status allows Demosthenes to negotiate the dangers of writing deliberative oratory in fourth-century Athens by destabilizing the reader's relation to the work as being neither text nor transcript.

2. Methodology

A. Reading Speeches

When interpreting Demosthenes' speeches, modern scholars have explicitly or implicitly focused almost exclusively on their reception by the Athenian *demos* when they were originally delivered in the Assembly or in court. Reading Demosthenes properly involves imagining oneself away from the text: "The modern scholar, reading Demosthenes in his study, must in imagination transport himself to the Athenian court-room … or he must imagine himself in the

crowded ecclesia on the hill Pnyx…."[6] Similarly, Pearson laments the fact that unfortunately all we have is texts and that as a result we cannot say just how accurately what has been preserved for us reflects what Demosthenes said in the moment,[7] and Yunis figures textuality as pure loss:

> … only the text survives; the acting, the gesture, the voice are gone. Like the text of an Athenian tragedy, the text of a Demosthenic political speech reveals the skeleton of a performance…[8]

If one is only interested in reconstructing the effect of the speeches on members of the Assembly or jurors, then Yunis's assessment is accurate. If, however, one focuses instead on the reception of these speeches by fourth-century readers, then their status as texts actively contributes to the production of meaning. In the wake of the hermeneutic debate between Plato and Isocrates, written texts as such were a subject of interest. Readers would have been interested not only in what is lost when a speech becomes a text but also what is gained. In the chapters that follow I will articulate the ways in which the textuality of the speeches distinguishes the reading experience from the oral and creates a new set of interpretive concerns.

With respect to style, intertextuality, and the problematic form in which the speeches have been preserved as texts (i.e. as unrevised drafts or with pieces missing), the experience of readers must be strongly contrasted with that of the original audience. However, when it comes to structure, the contrast is less marked: whereas certain qualities were associated with a written as opposed to an oral style, it is not clear that so strong a distinction was made with reference to structure. Accordingly, when dealing with interpretation of this aspect of form, I will assume that the experience of the two audiences was not as distinct as it was in other respects.

[6] Adams (1927), 91-2.
[7] For example Pearson (1976), 8: "We must be content to pass judgment on the written version that we have."
[8] Yunis (1996), 244. Cf. MacDowell (2009), 407.

B. Historicism

Pearson, whose monograph represents one of the major relatively recent attempts to understand "the art of Demosthenes," polemically adopted a non-historical approach:

> The technical vocabulary of rhetoric was highly developed in antiquity, but the existence of this ready-made apparatus of criticism does not excuse us from seeking our own criteria of artistic excellence.[9]

Pearson never identifies the sources of what he conceives of as "our own criteria"; however, based on the fact that in his analyses he places strong emphasis on the role of narrative, it seems likely that he was influenced by the advent of narratology. At the opposite end of the spectrum, there is no historicizing analysis of Demosthenes' speeches. Wooten, in his commentary on the *First Philippic* and in an article on Demosthenes' style in general, has applied elements of Hermogenes' theory and has argued that it accounts for his style remarkably well.[10] However, this theory has a very tenuous connection with that of the fourth-century, so it has no special claim to authority. Other general studies, Blass and Ronnet for example, have structured their analyses around the rhetorical figures and other formal features.[11]

In developing my own methodology, I have not opted for a purely historicist alternative to previous approaches. On the one hand I do focus on reading practices in fourth-century Athens, and I use them to orient my own interpretation. This approach, I would argue, has two advantages: first, by characterizing in detail the perspective of his original readers, I am also able to shed some light on Demosthenes' own approach to composition since I will assume that both shared a common form of rhetorical training and exposure to the same basic influences (e.g. Isocrates, Plato's *Phaedrus*, and Thucydides). Secondly, it has become clear that the reception of

[9] Pearson (1976), VI.
[10] Wooten (1989) and (2008). See in particular Wooten (2008), 15 for his practice of using Hermogenes in his commentary to elucidate aspects of Demosthenes' style.
[11] Blass (1893) III; Ronnet (1951).

Demosthenes in later antiquity does not clearly reflect what his own contemporaries thought of his oratory, with Bompaire going so far as to refer to an "apotheosis" in Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Cicero.[12] By examining how his original readers would have interpreted his speeches, I hope to contribute to a better understanding of the history of their reception. However, at the same time I also reject a purely historicist approach. While I seek to reconstruct and engage with the perspective of fourth-century readers, I do not work "…from the naive assumption of historicism, namely that we must set ourselves within the spirit of the age, and think with its ideas and its thoughts, not with our own…."[13] Rather, my interpretations of Demosthenes' speeches represent in some sense a "fusion of horizons"[14] according to which meaning is generated by a productive interaction of my own presuppositions with the (fragmentary) perspective of his original readers. But I also do not gloss over moments when the two perspectives cannot be fused. In my interpretations of the expressive function of elements of Demosthenes' style, I take a position far more skeptical than that of previous scholars about our ability to gauge the effect that figures like hyperbaton and constructions like the articular infinitive would have had on their original audience. In the case of the *Third Philippic*, the existence of two significantly different redactions and the jarring juxtaposition of the two in modern editions dispel any illusion of a fused experience. Finally, as I will show in my reading of Isocrates' *Helen*, the modern reader of Demosthenes at any given moment is probably either interpreting too much or too little.

[12] Bompaire (1984). See also Cooper (2000).
[13] Gadamer (1975), 264.
[14] This term is taken from Gadamer (1975), 273. Its meaning and methodological implications are not altogether clear; see Rosen (1999), 182-201. My understanding of it is based on Renaud (2000), 381: "The concept of the 'fusion of horizons,' understood here as contemporaneity, transcends the historical difference of two diverse horizons and hence minimizes 'the dialogical process of interpretation as translation of and exchange with tradition.' In the end, this leaves one single horizon, whereby the fusion is supposed to have already taken place."

With the New Historicism I share an interest in the text's role in a power dynamic. As my discussion of Isocrates in chapter 1 and my arguments in chapter 5 about Demosthenes' possible motives for publishing his speeches will show, written as opposed to oral speeches were viewed with suspicion and potentially with contempt, so orators who published their works had to do so in such a way as to deal with this prejudicial reception and situate the "helperless," impotent text in a position of dominance in relation to the reader.

C. Among other things Style

Stephen Usher, one of the most prominent recent scholars of Demosthenes, has repeatedly called for a new comprehensive study of his style:

> A comprehensive stylistic study of all the speeches ascribed to Demosthenes has yet to be made: the task still awaits a scholar with the time, the technical expertise, and the chalcenteric perseverance necessary for its accomplishment.[15]

This demand reflects a more general feeling among scholars of Demosthenes that Blass and Ronnet are inadequate.[16] However, leaving aside Usher's irony, his demand is problematic. What does he mean by "technical expertise"? There has been no study of Demosthenes' style since the advent of modern linguistics, and, in light of his at times idiosyncratic manipulation of elements of syntax and semantics, for example word order and the order of entities, one would want a scholar with a background in linguistics. However, an intimate familiarity with the rhetorical figures and there use by the Attic orators would also be a desired element of technical expertise. And in another era one might also have demanded taste.

This dissertation makes no claim to represent an adequate response to this call (especially to the last requirement). In my analysis of Demosthenes' style, I have sought to incorporate the

[15] Usher (1993), 19. Cf. Usher (2007), 235.
[16] Cf. Gagarin (2010), 16: "…there is much room for further work."

insights of modern linguists working on Ancient Greek, those of Helma Dik in particular. In certain cases this has allowed me to characterize with greater precision and rigor the phenomena to be analyzed. For example, instead of looking at Demosthenes' use of the at times vaguely defined figure hyperbaton, I have restricted myself to discontinuity, a specific type of linguistically defined deviation from normal word order. And, in order to characterize with greater specificity Demosthenes' usage relative to other orators in the tradition, I have taken advantage of digital corpora: my analysis of his development of a form of argument known as the pathetic paradox is based on an examination of all the instances in the Perseus corpus within certain parameters.

Although style plays an important role in the dissertation, I would argue that Usher's call for a study of Demosthenes' style in isolation is perhaps misguided. As I will demonstrate in the chapters to follow, it is preferable to examine his style in connection with other elements of his oratory; for certain distinguishing features can be better understood when viewed in relation to aspects of the structure and argumentation of his speeches. Also, the fact that the style belongs to the written text of the speech, as opposed to a transcript, must be taken into account.

3. The Elite Reader

Before characterizing their perspective, it will be necessary for me to establish that the group of elite 4th century Athenian readers to which I have referred is not merely a construct. For though one naturally assumes that, because he enjoys reading Demosthenes with visions of Plato and Isocrates dancing in his head, there must have also been an original audience who shared the same experience, he comes to find that to a degree at least the evidence for the existence of such an audience is limited.

That there was a group of educated elites at Athens and that they were reading things is of course indisputable. Aristotle, as Ober notes, lists παιδεία as one of the four defining attributes of the elites (γνώριμοι);[17] Ober further notes that "…Aristotle's list parallels the constellation of elite attributes used by modern students of elites."[18] Education, then, was and is generally considered an integral part of elite identity. However, it is not entirely clear how and when elite and common education diverged: Harris, for example, disputing Flory's claim that "almost all" adult male Athenians received some level of education,[19] asserts that parents were required to pay for schooling. Citing the passage from Plato's *Protagoras* (326c) where Protagoras says that the wealthiest provide their children with the best educations and that their children stay in school the longest, he concludes "… that everyone other than the *plousiotatoi* … is to a greater or lesser extent influenced by the cost of education."[20] Although this passage does confirm that the education of elites was distinctive even at an elementary level, it provokes as many questions as it answers, and the other primary evidence that is cited in this context suffers from a similar degree of vagueness. Demosthenes in *On the Crown* claimed that he "attended the right schools as a child,"[21] which may suggest that there were wrong schools--or perhaps he was just contrasting education with banausic activity. There is also a reference to paid tutors in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*.[22] In conclusion, it seems clear that elite primary education was distinctive in terms of length and quality even if the details are more than a bit fuzzy.

As far as secondary education is concerned, there is a much greater abundance of evidence available, although unfortunately there are still some significant gaps. Plato was training young

[17] Arist. *Pol*. 1291b14-30.
[18] Ober (1989), 11.
[19] Flory (1980), 19.
[20] Harris (1989), 101.
[21] Dem. 18.257: Ἐμοὶ … ὑπῆρξεν … παιδὶ μὲν ὄντι φοιτᾶν εἰς τὰ προσήκοντα διδασκαλεῖα ….
[22] Xen. *Mem.* 2.2.6.

men to become philosophers at the Academy, and Isocrates from his Trojan horse of oratory was producing genteel statesmen, for the curricula of both of which there is significantly more evidence available than there is for primary level education.[23] However, the number of students attending these two schools at any given time would only have represented a fraction of the eligible elite population. Unfortunately the evidence seems too meager to make any precise statements about other contemporary "institutions of higher learning." Bolgar, in an article that is devoted to assessing the nature of elite education during this period, comes to the following conclusion:

> The social influence of these various institutions is not easy to estimate: As far as numbers go, the rhetorical schools were probably the most important …. though we have no firm evidence, it is impossible to avoid the impression that there was a substantial number of rhetoricians around.[24]

Although he is certainly right that it is difficult to gauge the social influence of these institutions, the evidence for the number of rhetoricians is perhaps slightly stronger than he suggests. If we only had late testimonia such as Plutarch's account of Demosthenes' education,[25] which seems to suggest that prominent orators would work as teachers apart from any institutional framework, the evidence would indeed be quite weak. However, there is strong contemporary evidence for such a practice as well.

Aeschines' repeated claims that Demosthenes taught rhetoric, even if they are false, presuppose that there existed and was common a type of higher education in which young elites became apprenticed, so to speak, to prominent orators. One passage from his *Against Timarchus* is particularly illuminating. While attempting to implicate Demosthenes in a murder committed

[23] The literature on Isocrates' school is vast. Jaeger (1939) III, 46-84 and 132-56 is still one of the best accounts; the overview in Marrou (1956) is also useful. For more recent work, see the various essays collected in Poulakos and Depew (2013). Johnson (1959) provides a speculative reconstruction of the curriculum offered by Isocrates.
[24] Bolgar (1969), 46.
[25] Plut. *Dem.* 5.6: ἐχρήσατο δ' Ἰσαίῳ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὑφηγητῇ.

by a certain Aristarchus, who he claims was one of Demosthenes' students, he gives the following description of the manner in which Demosthenes enticed him to become his pupil:

> Κατιδὼν γὰρ οἰκίαν πλουσίαν καὶ οὐκ εὐνομουμένην, ἧς ἡγεμὼν μὲν ἦν γυνὴ μέγα φρονοῦσα καὶ νοῦν οὐκ ἔχουσα, νεανίσκος δὲ ὀρφανὸς ἡμιμανὴς διεχείριζε τὴν οὐσίαν, Ἀρίσταρχος ὁ τοῦ Μόσχου, τούτου προσποιησάμενος ἐραστὴς εἶναι τὸ μειράκιον εἰς τὴν φιλανθρωπίαν ταύτην προσκαλεσάμενος, ἐλπίδων κενῶν ἐμπλήσας, ὡς αὐτίκα δὴ μάλα τῶν μενος, ἐλπίδων κενῶν ἐμπλήσας, ὡς αὐτίκα δὴ μάλα τῶν ῥητόρων πρωτεύσοντα, κατάλογον ἀποφαίνων, τοιούτων εἰσηγητὴς αὐτῷ καὶ διδάσκαλος ἔργων ἐγένετο, ἐξ ὧν ἐκεῖνος μὲν φεύγει τὴν πατρίδα …[26]

In making these charges Aeschines must have assumed that the situation would have sounded plausible to the audience; further, the sarcasm expressed by ὡς αὐτίκα δὴ μάλα suggests that he expected the jurors to be familiar with orators making grand claims to students about their career prospects.

Further evidence for the existence of a large class of private tutors is provided by Isocrates' *Panathenaicus*:

> Καὶ τί δεῖ θαυμάζειν τῶν πρὸς ἁπάσας τὰς ὑπεροχὰς οὕτω διακεῖσθαι πεφυκότων, ὅπου καὶ τῶν οἰομένων διαφέρειν καὶ ζηλούντων ἐμὲ καὶ μιμεῖσθαι γλιχομένων τινὲς ἔτι δυσμενέστερον ἔχουσί μοι τῶν ἰδιωτῶν; Ὧν τίνας ἄν τις εὕροι πονηροτέρους, —εἰρήσεται γὰρ, εἰ καί τισιν δόξω νεώτερα καὶ βαρύτερα λέγειν τῆς ἡλικίας—, οἵτινες οὔτε φράζειν οὐδὲν μέρος ἔχοντες τοῖς μαθηταῖς τῶν εἰρημένων ὑπ' ἐμοῦ, τοῖς τε λόγοις παραδείγμασι χρώμενοι τοῖς ἐμοῖς καὶ ζῶντες ἐντεῦθεν τοσούτου δέουσι χάριν ἔχειν τούτων, ὥστ' οὐδ' ἀμελεῖν ἡμῶν ἐθέλουσιν, ἀλλ' ἀεί τι φλαῦρον περὶ ἐμοῦ λέγουσιν;[27]

Here Isocrates refers to incompetent teachers of rhetoric who admire his speeches but then have the audacity to slander the author. Although the negative aspects of his representation of these

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[26] "Aeschin. 1.171-2: "For when he spotted a household that was wealthy and not well-administered, the head of which was a proud and foolish woman, and the property of which a half-mad fatherless young man was administering, Aristarchus the son of Moschus, and when he claimed to be this young man's lover, after he filled him with vain hopes, as though of course he would quickly become the best of orators, showing him a list of names, he introduced him to and taught him such acts…" For discussion of this passage, see Fisher (2001) *ad loc.* Adams (1919) *ad loc*., following the scholia, argues that the κατάλογος referred to here was "Doubtless a list of young men who had studied oratory with Demosthenes and become successful public men." cf. Aeschin. 1.117: ὁ τὰς τῶν λόγων τέχνας κατεπαγγελλόμενος τοὺς νέους διδάσκειν.

[27] Isoc. 12.16: "And what reason is there to wonder at those so disposed to all forms of superiority when even some of those who consider me superior and who emulate and desire to imitate me are still more hostilely disposed toward me than the average citizen? What men baser than these could one find anywhere—for the truth will be said, even if I will seem to some to say things more audacious and harsh than is appropriate for a man of my age—men who, though they cannot properly explain to their students any part of my speeches, and although they use my speeches as paradigms and make their living from them, nevertheless are so far from having gratitude for them that they are not even willing to leave me alone, but rather are always talking nonsense about me." For speculation about the identities of the teachers in question, see Roth (2003) *ad loc.*

teachers are of course unreliable, his reference to a general class of teachers offering lessons in rhetoric from paradigmatic works strongly suggests that such a class did exist at least in some form. The evidence, then, for the existence a large class of rhetoricians in fourth-century Athens is substantial enough.

In the dissertation I will be focusing on this class of educated readers, as opposed to the literate public more generally. Although the extent of literacy in fourth-century Athens is not clear, it is at least possible that a more general class of readers existed,[28] and Usher argues that some of these readers would have been reading orators like Lysias for pleasure.[29] However, the issues I examine, for example intertextuality and engagement with rhetorical theory, presuppose a reader who had read and studied Athenian oratory extensively and who had also become familiar with the fourth-century discourse on the subject.

4. Hermeneutics

A. The Fifth Century

There is very little discussion of interpretation by fifth-century authors, and Eden has gone so far as to say, "So far as I know, we have no substantial evidence for the theoretical discussions of either rhetorical or interpretive strategies before the fourth century."[30] This seems for the most part accurate: There is evidence that suggests that Theagenes of Rhegium initiated the tradition of allegorical interpretation of Homer in the sixth century, but there are only a handful of testimonia that refer to him, and none of them provides us with much detail.[31] In the fifth and

[28] For the problem of literacy in fourth-century Athens, see Usener (1994), 2 with bibliography.
[29] Usher (2004). On pgs. 114-15 he claims that it would have been "a natural recreation" for Athenians who had served on juries or attended a trial to read the text of the speech after the trial.
[30] Eden (1987), 59.
[31] For references see D-K I, 8, esp. 8.2.

fourth century allegorical interpretation remained popular,[32] and beginning in the fifth Aristophanes and Thucydides provide us with evidence for the interpretation of oratory in particular. Although there are of course no theoretical discussions of the subject in Aristophanes, a few passages provide evidence for fifth-century views on genre and on the relationship between author and audience. However, the degree to which one can talk of well-articulated views is not entirely clear. Usher argues that the reason Isocrates must distinguish his works from forensic oratory in the *Panegyricus* (generally dated to 380 BC) is because this genre would have provided the generic reference point for a general audience:

> Isocrates is advertising the style he has chosen for the training of his class of elite, high-paying pupils. He has himself turned away from forensic speech-writing and writes with the zeal and the venom of the convert. The more surprising, then, that he even recognizes a readership for the inferior genre. But it may seem that he has to, because it is popular. Isocrates is complaining that forensic oratory provides most of the reading public with the point of literary reference from which to judge other prose writing.[33]

According to Usher, then, most of the reading public did not have a very clear set of generic expectations in 380. Assuming for the moment the validity of Aristotle's system of classification, readers were indiscriminately judging epideictic and deliberative speeches according to what they had heard in the courts. He bases this claim on his reading of the following passage from the *Panegyricus*:

> Καίτοι τινὲς ἐπιτιμῶσι τῶν λόγων τοῖς ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἔχουσι καὶ λίαν ἀπηκριβωμένοις, καὶ τοσοῦτον διημαρτήκασιν ὥστε τοὺς πρὸς ὑπερβολὴν πεποιημένους πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας τοὺς περὶ τῶν ἰδίων συμβολαίων σκοποῦσιν, ὥσπερ ὁμοίως δέον ἀμφοτέρους ἔχειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοὺς μὲν ἀφελῶς, τοὺς δ' ἐπιδεικτικῶς, ἢ σφᾶς μὲν διορῶντας τὰς μετριότητας, τὸν δ' ἀκριβῶς ἐπιστάμενον λέγειν ἁπλῶς οὐκ ἂν δυνάμενον εἰπεῖν.[34]

[32] See Yunis (2011), 92 for discussion of the pertinent passage in Plato's *Phaedrus* with bibliography.
[33] Usher (2004), 115.
[34] Isoc. 4.11: "And yet some find fault with those speeches that are beyond the ability of ordinary citizens and which are perfectly polished, and they have made so great an error as to view speeches composed with an eye toward perfection in relation to petty trials dealing with civil disputes, as though it were it necessary for both to be similar rather than for the ones to be written in a simple style, the others epideictically, or as if they themselves were perceiving the mean [for this translation and the significance of the plural, see Sandys *ad loc*.], while the one who knows how to speak with precision would not be also able to speak in a plain style."

Isocrates' designation of his critics as "some men", however, makes Usher's argument problematic: if he were intending to refer to the general public, one would have expected οἱ πολλοί. Furthermore, this passage says more about the problems with Isocrates' own literary project than about audience expectations: because his speeches are fictional and blend epideictic with practical oratory, it became necessary not so much to distinguish his works from forensic speeches as to distinguish the actual, workaday forms of both forensic and deliberative oratory from his literary elaborations thereof. Finally, it seems likely enough that the same people who were reading Lysias' *On the Murder of Eratosthenes* were also reading his *Defense Against the Charge of Having Supported the Thirty*, a fact which problematizes any simple characterization of "forensic oratory" as a reference point. I would argue, then, that this passage from Isocrates does not provide evidence for the claim that up until 380 at least audiences did not have a set of more or less clear generic expectations for different types of oratory.

The evidence from the 5th century for the positive claim that audiences did indeed clearly differentiate between rhetorical genres is substantial. In the *Wasps* and *Knights* Aristophanes' lampooning of rhetorical strategies used in the law courts and the Assembly, respectively, presuppose that his audience would have associated certain strategies with each type of oratory. In the *agon* of the of the former Philocleon catalogues the following "endearments" (θώπευμα) that speakers were accustomed to using in the courts:

> φέρ' ἴδω, τί γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀκοῦσαι θώπευμ' ἐνταῦθα δικαστῇ;
> οἱ μέν γ' ἀποκλάονται πενίαν αὑτῶν, καὶ προστιθέασιν
> κακὰ πρὸς τοῖς οὖσι <κακοῖσιν>, ἕως ἂν ἰσωθῇ τοῖσιν ἐμοῖσιν·
> οἱ δὲ λέγουσιν μύθους ἡμῖν, οἱ δ' Αἰσώπου τι γέλοιον·
> οἱ δὲ σκώπτουσ', ἵν' ἐγὼ γελάσω καὶ τὸν θυμὸν καταθῶμαι.
> κἂν μὴ τούτοις ἀναπειθώμεσθα, τὰ παιδάρι' εὐθὺς ἀνέλκει
> τὰς θηλείας καὶ τοὺς υἱεῖς τῆς χειρός, …[35]

[35] Ar. *Vesp.* 563-69: "Come, let me see: What endearment is not possible for a juror to hear in court? Some bewail their poverty and pile ills one on top of another until they equal my own; others tell us stories, others something funny from Aesop; and others tell a joke so that I will laugh and cool my anger. And if we are not persuaded by these tactics, without delay he drags in his poor little children, both his daughters and sons, by the hand …."

Contained in this list are the appeal to poverty and to generally unfortunate circumstances; the use of entertaining narrative; humor including Aesop's fables; and, finally, the introduction of family members to arouse pity. Each of these elements represents a distinctive characteristic of forensic oratory in particular,[36] and the fact that Aristophanes satirizes them here strongly suggests that his audience would have been very familiar with and would have associated them with speeches they had heard in the courts as jurors. For forensic oratory, then, it seems clear that Athenians had developed at least a rudimentary set of generic expectations.

The evidence for interpretation of deliberative oratory in the fifth century is of a similar nature. In the *agon* of the *Knights* the Sausage-Seller and the Paphlagonian compete with one another for the affection of Demos. In his evaluation of the Paphlagonian's speech, Demos says that he envies his eloquence (ζηλῶ σε τῆς εὐγλωττίας).[37] Since the speeches of both characters essentially consist of a series of outlandish and absurd promises, they don't tell us as much about deliberative oratory as the *Wasps* does about forensic; however, they do at least indicate that Athenian audiences were accustomed to speakers in the Assembly relating to their audience in a certain way.

The proem to Pericles' Funeral Oration provides evidence for the existence of a set of generic expectations for epideictic oratory—or at least for the funeral oration. At the beginning of his speech, Pericles says, "Οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε ἤδη εἰρηκότων ἐπαινοῦσι τὸν προσθέντα τῷ νόμῳ τὸν λόγον τόνδε."[38] By referring to what "the majority of those who have spoken here" have said, he clearly expects his audience to have some more or less clear idea of the content of

[36] See Pearson (1976), 64 for the association of narrative with forensic oratory.
[37] Ar. *Eq.* 837.
[38] Thuc. 2.35: "The majority of those who have spoken here praise the man who added this speech to our ancestral custom."

previous funeral orations, including his own. For at least one type of epideictic oratory, then, the Athenians had developed during the course of the fifth century a very clear set of generic expectations. Indeed, Loraux in her reading of Gorgias' funeral oration argues that reading the work as an example of the genre is critical to our understanding of it:

> However,--and this is the essential point—in order to elucidate this text we must always proceed by comparison: whether we see it as a mere application of the topoi of the funeral oration or find in it ideas already developed elsewhere by the Sophist [Gorgias], we must refer to other works in the same series. *Qua* epitaphios, the oration acquires its full meaning as an example of a genre; *qua* epitaphios written by Gorgias, it is the application of ideas worked out in other texts…[39]

One final piece of evidence from the fifth century perhaps sheds the most light on how audiences were interpreting oratory during this period. In the course of the speech he delivers during the Mytilene Debate (427 B.C.), Cleon makes the following criticisms of the Athenian people and of their obsession with inane rhetorical novelties :

> καὶ μετὰ καινότητος μὲν λόγου ἀπατᾶσθαι ἄριστοι, μετὰ δεδοκιμασμένου δὲ μὴ ξυνέπεσθαι ἐθέλειν, δοῦλοι ὄντες τῶν αἰεὶ ἀτόπων, ὑπερόπται δὲ τῶν εἰωθότων, καὶ μάλιστα μὲν αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν ἕκαστος βουλόμενος δύνασθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνταγωνιζόμενοι τοῖς τοιαῦτα λέγουσι μὴ ὕστεροι ἀκολουθῆσαι δοκεῖν τῇ γνώμῃ, ὀξέως δέ τι λέγοντος προεπαινέσαι, καὶ προαισθέσθαι τε πρόθυμοι εἶναι τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ προνοῆσαι βραδεῖς τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀποβησόμενα, ζητοῦντές τε ἄλλο τι ὡς εἰπεῖν ἢ ἐν οἷς ζῶμεν, φρονοῦντες δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν παρόντων ἱκανῶς• ἁπλῶς τε ἀκοῆς ἡδονῇ ἡσσώμενοι καὶ σοφιστῶν θεαταῖς ἐοικότες καθημένοις μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ πόλεως βουλευομένοις.[40]

This passage demonstrates that by this time it was at least possible to represent an audience who exhibited a strong interest in interpretation and who had actually broached if only intuitively some of the issues that were to become central to discourse on the subject. First, there is a clear

[39] Loraux (1986), 228.

[40] Thuc. 3.38: "And you are best at being deceived by the novelty of a speech, and at not being willing to follow along with what has proven itself, since you are slaves to what is unusual at any given time and are despisers of things that are customary, and, since each man desires most of all to be able to speak (well) himself, but if this is not possible, in vying with those saying such things you desire to seem not to follow behind them in judgment but rather to praise something clever before the speaker says it, and (you desire to seem) to be eager to foresee the things being said and yet you are slow to foreknow what will result from them, and seeking, so to speak, something different from the world we are living in, while not even thinking about present circumstances sufficiently; and simply being a prey to pleasure in hearing speeches and the audiences of sophists that sit idly by rather than men deliberating about the city."

distinction between what is commonplace and presumably characteristic of deliberative oratory (τῶν αἰεὶ ἀτόπων vs. τῶν εἰωθότων), which provides further evidence for the importance of genre in the fifth century. Second, Cleon claims that audience members were eager to show off their cleverness by anticipating what the speaker was going to say next (προαισθέσθαι …τὰ λεγόμενα) and by pretentiously lauding the speaker to whoever happened to be sitting next to them (προεπαινέσαι). One is reminded of the obnoxious young men Aristophanes satirizes in the *Knights*, who praise Phaeax using the technical jargon in vogue at the time.[41] Elite Athenians, then, were interested not only in interpreting oratory but also in couching their interpretations in some sort of technical language. The interest in anticipating a speaker referred to by Cleon strongly suggests that audiences were making an attempt, in Schleiermacher's terms, "to understand the utterance at first just as well and then better than its author."[42] Interestingly, the relationship is figured antagonistically: audience members are competing with (ἀνταγωνιζόμενοι) speakers to see who can think and express the sentiment first. That the "methodology" in question here involved a psychological as well a generic component seems clear: you are not going to anticipate sentiments very well by simply imagining a form of discourse abstracted from its instantiation by an individual speaker. Second, at least a few orators in the fifth century had very distinctive stylistic identities: the young men's characterization of Phaeax cited above is one example, and descriptions of Pericles' oratory are even more vivid.[43] It seems likely, then, that the audience members whom Cleon criticizes were basing their stylistic conjectures on both generic expectations and their knowledge of the individual speaker.

[41] Ar. *Eq.*1378-80: σοφός γ' ὁ Φαίαξ δεξιῶς τ' οὐκ ἀπέθανεν. / συνερτικὸς γάρ ἐστι καὶ περαντικός, /καὶ γνωμοτυπικὸς καὶ σαφὴς καὶ κρουστικός, / καταληπτικός τ' ἄριστα τοῦ θορυβητικοῦ.
[42] Schleiermacher (1998), 23.
[43] Ar. *Ach.* 529-30: ἐντεῦθεν ὀργῇ Περικλέης οὐλύμπιος / ἤστραπτ' ἐβρόντα ξυνεκύκα τὴν Ἑλλάδα…. cf. Eup. fr. 94.

B. The Fourth Century

The degree to which one can assert the existence of any explicit theories of interpretation in antiquity is somewhat disputed. Eden asserts that by Plato and Isocrates' day intellectual figures had become conscious of and concerned with issues pertaining to hermeneutics:

> Nevertheless, there is good reason to believe—and I hope to show—that the earliest critics or interpreters not only used rhetorical strategies in their exegetical exercises, but actually discussed the interpretive act in these same terms.[44]

The two texts she cites as evidence are Socrates' interpretation of the Simonides' ode in the *Protagoras* and the Spartan sympathizer's interpretation of the *Panathenaicus* within the same work, a figure whom she calls "one of our earliest interpreters and theorists of interpretation."[45] According to her these two texts actually present summary versions of theories of interpretation:

> Nevertheless, his defense of a coherent meaning in Simonides' ode, like the interpretation of Isocrates' fictitious exegete, is remarkable in the history of hermeneutics, insofar as it preserves in outline a method or *technē*—perhaps standard among the sophists—for solving literary *problemata*.[46]

Erler in an article that deals with the relationship between Plato's *Phaedrus* and Isocrates' *Panathenaicus* claims that these two works are ". . . Testimonien des ersten hermeneutischen Disputes in der Antike."[47] Yunis, too, argues for an "explicit concern with hermeneutics" at the turn of the fifth century, especially in Plato and Thucydides.[48]

Glenn Most, however, is much more skeptical about the existence of any sort of systematic hermeneutics in antiquity. One of the primary theses of his article, which explores the relationship between rhetoric and modernity, is ". . . daß es in der Antike keine Hermeneutik in

[44] Eden (1987), 60.
[45] *ibid.*, 60.
[46] *ibid.*, 66.
[47] Erler (1992), 125.
[48] Yunis (2003), 190.

unserem Sinne gab."[49] What he means by "in unserem Sinne" is clarified by a later assertion in the same article:

> und jene antiken Ansätze sind im Sand verlaufen, denn weder haben ihre eigenen Urheber sie zu systematischen Theorien entwickelt, noch haben andere antike Denker sie kritisch rezipiert und productiv weiterverarbeitet. Wenn wir unter Hermeneutik die systematische Ausarbeitung von Regeln zur erfolgreichen Deutung schriftlich fixierter Texte verstehen, dann müssen wir feststellen, daß es diese in der Antike einfach nicht gab.[50]

Certain authors, then, developed the rudiments of what might have become systematic theories of interpretation, but these never blossomed into anything more rigorous. The difference between Most's and Eden's position seems to be one merely of degree, the former arguing for a lower, the latter for a higher degree of elaboration and systematicity. In my first chapter I will give a more precise account of the status of hermeneutics when Demosthenes' career began, and I will show that on the one hand "the first hermeneutic debate" between Plato and Isocrates provided readers with some very specific interpretive strategies pertaining to fundamental hermeneutic issues such as authorial intention, the hermeneutic circle, and the role of genre; however, due to the specific form this decades-long debate took, the approaches to interpretation that emerge are somewhat eccentric and opaque and are conditioned by the fact that they were developed within literary works belonging to particular genres.

In addition to the problem of the debate itself, there is also the issue of whether fourth-century readers would have been exposed to both Isocrates' speeches and Plato's *Phaedrus*. I would argue that there is strong enough evidence for the circulation of both among the same class of reader. There is the aforementioned passage from Isocrates' *Panathenaicus* (pg. 12), which suggests that his works were widely used among teachers of rhetoric in Athens. Further,

[49] Most (1984), 65.
[50] *Ibid*. Gadamer (1976), 21 argues in more general terms that the advent of hermeneutics "… represents an effort to grasp at something vanishing and hold it up to the light of consciousness" and thus that it tends to arise "in later stages of cultural evolution" such as Alexandrian philology.

Aristotle refers far more frequently to his speeches than to those of any other orator.[51] Broad dissemination of his speeches, then, is beyond dispute. As for the distribution of the *Phaedrus*, the main evidence is the fact that both Isocrates and Alcidamas clearly read and engaged with it, as I will discuss at length in my first chapter. Also, the criticism Plato makes of Isocrates in this dialogue and the *Euthydemus* suggests that he anticipated a more general readership. In light of all these considerations, I will assume that there was a group of rhetorically educated readers who were acquainted with both Isocrates' speeches and Plato's *Phaedrus*.

5. Note on Texts and Translations

Unless otherwise noted, I have cited Dilts' *Oxford Classical Text* edition for all of Demosthenes' speeches, except the *Prooemia*, for which I have used Clavaud's *Budé* edition.[52] For all other authors, I have cited the text found in the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*. For words he considers spurious, Dilts uses curly brackets, while square brackets indicate restorations in the text of papyri. All translations are my own unless otherwise noted.

[51] For discussion of Aristotle's citation practice in the *Rhetoric*, see Trevett (1996a) and pg. 375 for Isocrates in particular.
[52] Dilts (2002); Clavaud (1974).

Chapter 1

Reading

In this chapter I will examine the horizon of expectations of the 4th century Athenian readers to whom Demosthenes' speeches would have first been distributed. The results of this examination will then be used in the following chapters to orient my approach to interpreting his speeches. In order to reconstruct the perspective of his readers, I will use a variety of primary sources, but the most significant will be Plato's *Phaedrus* and Isocrates' *Encomium of Helen, Evagoras, Antidosis,* and *Panathenaicus*. I have selected these works because they develop a spectrum of possible interpretive methodologies that would have been available to readers when Demosthenes' speeches were distributed. The chapter will be organized chronologically beginning with the earliest published work.

1. Isocrates' *Encomium of Helen*

How much and how should an oration mean? For the original audiences of deliberative and forensic oratory, it is obvious that there should be a meaning and a lucid one. Indeed, for Dionysius functionality is the constitutive element of practical oratory that distinguishes it from non-occasional prose. In his essay *On the Style of Demosthenes,* he characterizes the orator's intentions in the following way:

> ὁ δὲ ῥήτωρ τοῦ τε ἀρκοῦντος στοχάζεται καὶ τοὺς καιροὺς συμμετρεῖται οὐκ εἰς ἀνάθημα καὶ κτῆμα κα<τασκευάζων> τὴν λέξιν μόνον ὥσπερ ὁ συγγραφεύς, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς χρῆσιν. ὥστε οὔτε τὸ σαφὲς ἐκβέβηκεν, οὗ πρώτου τοῖς ἐναγωνίοις λόγοις δεῖ, τό τε δεινὸς εἶναι δοκεῖν, ἐφ' ᾧ μάλιστα φαίνεται σπουδάζων, προσείληφε.[1]

[1] D.H. *Dem.* 10: "The orator aims at what is sufficient and measures occasions properly, not only preparing his style to be an eternal dedication and possession like the writer, but also for use. And so clarity does not wander off, of which there is the utmost need in trial speeches, and the speaker has assumed an air of cleverness in addition, for which he shows the greatest degree of eagerness."

The orator, then, cannot simply write a κτῆμα ἐς αἰεί à la Thucydides but rather must orient his cleverness and eternity towards a definite purpose, be it persuading a jury or inciting members of the Assembly to action. Interpretation in such circumstances is a relatively simple affair: do I find so and so's arguments convincing? In the case of Isocrates, however, whose works straddle the line between the epideictic and the practical,[2] things become much more complicated.

It is striking how divided scholars have been on the question of what and how much some of Isocrates' major works mean. As I will discuss presently with respect to the *Encomium of Helen* (referred to hereafter as *Helen*) and as we shall see later when we come to the *Antidosis* and *Panathenaicus*, there is usually one camp which argues that one of the aforementioned works is mere epideictic in the worst sense and thus does not really mean very much at all, while the other camp asserts that, if one actually interprets said speech correctly, it proves to be a coherent and meaningful work of art or artful political propaganda depending on the scholar in question. This tension within the reception of Isocrates seems to me to reflect an inherent feature of his works. Although the nature of and rationale for it vary from work to work, Isocrates' "literary" or "political" or "philosophical" or "literary-political-philosophical" project as a whole suffers from a more fundamental form of schizophrenia. Whatever conclusion one comes to about the implications of this for his own oratory, I will demonstrate that for fourth-century readers it created a spectrum of interpretive approaches ranging from a somewhat passive to a hyperactive relation to the text.

[2] For the problem of determining the generic status of Isocrates' own speeches and for discussion of his views on genre, see Too (1995), 13-35 and Papillon (1996), 377.

Beginning with Aristotle's attempt to explain the proem in the *Rhetoric*,[3] interpreting the *Helen* has proven a vexed undertaking. Although a full overview of the literature falls outside the scope of this chapter, in brief there are political readings,[4] there are pedagogical readings,[5] there are technical readings,[6] and there are purely aesthetical readings.[7] With varying degrees of violence scholars have been able to interpret the meaning, purpose, and quality of the *Helen* in manifold ways. Rather than present a new interpretation or a response to a previous one, I want to approach the work from a different angle by asking how much and how does the work itself claim to mean and how does it want to be read.

Near the end of the *Helen*, Isocrates hymns beauty, the source of Helen's power, in almost ecstatic tones:

> κάλλους γὰρ πλεῖστον μέρος [Helen] μετέσχεν, ὃ σεμνότατον καὶ τιμιώτατον καὶ θειότατον τῶν ὄντων ἐστίν. Ῥᾴδιον δὲ γνῶναι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀνδρίας ἢ **σοφίας** ἢ δικαιοσύνης μὴ μετεχόντων πολλὰ φανήσεται τιμώμενα μᾶλλον ἢ τούτων ἕκαστον, τῶν δὲ κάλλους ἀπεστερημένων οὐδὲν εὑρήσομεν ἀγαπώμενον ἀλλὰ πάντα καταφρονούμενα, πλὴν ὅσα ταύτης τῆς ἰδέας κεκοινώνηκεν, καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν διὰ τοῦτο μάλιστ' εὐδοκιμοῦσαν, ὅτι κάλλιστον τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἐστίν. Γνοίη δ' ἄν τις κἀκεῖθεν ὅσον διαφέρει τῶν ὄντων, ἐξ ὧν αὐτοὶ διατιθέμεθα πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν. Τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων ὧν ἂν ἐν χρείᾳ γενώμεθα, τυχεῖν μόνον βουλόμεθα, περαιτέρω δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν οὐδὲν τῇ ψυχῇ προσπεπόνθαμεν· τῶν δὲ καλῶν ἔρως ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται, τοσούτῳ μείζω τοῦ βούλεσθαι ῥώμην ἔχων ὅσῳπερ καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα κρεῖττόν ἐστιν. Καὶ τοῖς μὲν **κατὰ σύνεσιν** ἢ κατ' ἄλλο τι προέχουσιν φθονοῦμεν, ἢν μὴ τῷ ποιεῖν ἡμᾶς εὖ καθ' ἑκάστην τὴν ἡμέραν προσαγάγωνται καὶ στέργειν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀναγκάσωσιν· τοῖς δὲ καλοῖς **εὐθὺς ἰδόντες** εὖνοι γιγνόμεθα καὶ μόνους αὐτοὺς ὥσπερ τοὺς θεοὺς οὐκ ἀπαγορεύομεν θεραπεύοντες, ἀλλ' ἥδιον **δουλεύομεν** τοῖς τοιούτοις ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἄρχομεν …[8]

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[3] Arist. *Rhet.* 3.14 (1414b).

[4] Kennedy (1958), 81 argues that the work represents the first version of what was to become Isocrates' hobby-horse, Panhellenism.

[5] J. Poulakos (1986), 5: "Grounded historically and textually, this interpretation will posit that the Helen argues that rhetoric, as Isocrates understands it, is the best kind of education in Athens. Reading the encomium analogically, I will show that the historical situation Isocrates describes in the proemium is responded to in the main body. In light of this reading, I will argue that the Helen exhibits unity in its structure, its purpose, and its meaning." cf. Eucken (1983), 81: "Die Aufgabe dieser Schrift ist es danach nicht nur, das in den Grundzügen von der Sophistenrede her bekannte Programm zu präzisieren, sondern auch an einem Beispiel vorzuführen, wie in Isokrates' Schule die Redekunst gehandhabt wird." cf. Dalfen (1985-6), 110-11.

[6] Livingstone (2001), 13 argues that the *Busiris* and *Helen* represent successful attempts to "nullify the paradoxical quality" from a given subject by proper technical application of the genre of encomium and that they thus pave the way for appropriation of the genre into prose. Blank (2013), 30, however, disputes this claim.

[7] For Blass (1893) II, 246 the *Helen* seems to represent a sort of formal unity peculiar to the genre where heterogeneous structural elements are aesthetically(?) combined to form a unified and cohesive whole. However, the work has no deeper meaning: "Jedenfalls wollte Isokrates ein rhetorisches Kunststück liefern, und nichts mehr als das."

[8] Isoc. 10.54-7: "For Helen had the greatest share of beauty, which is the holiest, most honored, and most divine of all things. And it is easy to know its power; for of the things that do not partake in bravery or wisdom or justice

We can honor things that do not have a share of wisdom (τῶν ... σοφίας ... μὴ μετεχόντων), but we cannot even live with those which are bereft of beauty (τῶν … κάλλους ἀπεστερημένων). Further, we resent those of above average intelligence if they are not constantly doing us a good turn. But the beautiful, to them we immediately become well-disposed. Other things we merely want (τυχεῖν μόνον βουλόμεθα) but can do without; for beauty, however, we suffer ἔρως. And thus we take more pleasure in being slaves to the beautiful than in ruling all the ugly others. The hierarchy here is clear: *Omnia vincit pulchritudo,* so to speak. It is notable, though, that beauty conquers intelligence not once but twice in this passage: we can live with the unwise but not with the ugly, and we resent the intelligent but not the beautiful. And what's more our experience of the beautiful is not figured as a rational one. For, regardless of whether these beautiful things or people are well-disposed to us, we immediately become their slaves as soon as we set eyes on them (εὐθὺς ἰδόντες).

That Isocrates, at least, believed his *Kunstprosa* was capable of having the same effect on his readers as ἔρως does on lovers is confirmed by a passage from the *Antidosis*. In that work he criticizes those who crave the ability to speak well yet slander those who actually have developed this ability:

> ἡγοῦμαι πάντας τοὺς φιλοτίμως διακειμένους, ἐπιθυμητικῶς ἔχοντας τοῦ φρονεῖν εὖ καὶ λέγειν … πρὸς δὲ τοὺς πολλὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιουμένους καὶ τυχεῖν βουλομένους, ὧν εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν αὐτοὶ καθεστᾶσιν,

many will clearly be honored more than each of these qualities, but we will find that none of the things bereft of beauty is held dear but all are despised, except as many as share in this form, and we will find that virtue is respected for this reason most of all, because it is the most beautiful of pursuits. And one could know from the following consideration as well how different it is from everything else, namely from how we are disposed to each of them. For as to everything else we are in need of, we only desire to obtain it, but beyond this we suffer nothing additional in our soul concerning them; but for beautiful things longing is produced in us, possessing a strength that is greater in proportion to the magnitude of the thing. And we are resentful of those who are superior in intelligence or any other respect, unless they reconcile us on a daily basis by treating us well and compel us to cherish them; but from the moment we lay eyes on the beautiful, we feel benevolence towards them and never become weary of serving them alone like the gods, indeed we take more pleasure in serving them than in ruling everyone else."

> δυσκόλως ἔχειν καὶ ζηλοτυπεῖν καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς τεταραγμένως διακεῖσθαι καὶ πεπονθέναι παραπλήσια τοῖς ἐρῶσιν· τίνα γὰρ ἄν τις αὐτοῖς ἐπενεγκεῖν αἰτίαν ἔχοι πρεπωδεστέραν ταύτης;[9]

Just like lovers the ineloquent suffer a feeling of longing for the ability to speak and think well. Further, just as those who see Helen and anything beautiful behave irrationally, so the lovers of eloquence paradoxically slander and reproach those who possess the very faculty they desire.

Another piece of evidence that suggests that Isocrates wanted his readers to associate the experience of his prose with that of erotic desire is a later passage from the *Helen* itself. After finishing his reverie on the human response to beauty, Isocrates moves on to the gods. Why, he says, should I keep rambling on about human opinions (τὰς ἀνθρωπίνας δόξας) when I can talk about the gods instead? Zeus, ruler of all the gods, was willing to assume the base forms of animals in his pursuit of beauty; there is one thing, however, that distinguishes him as a lover from others and from Theseus in particular: ἀεὶ δὲ μετὰ τέχνης ἀλλ' οὐ μετὰ βίας θηρώμενος [Zeus] φαίνεται τὴν φύσιν τὴν τοιαύτην.[10] The reference here to hunting after beauty with τέχνη seems to be a clear if veiled reference to Isocrates' own hunt within the *Helen* itself.

So Isocrates' *Kunstprosa* is characterized by a beauty superior to wisdom and intelligence which provokes an irrational desire in the reader as soon as he sets eyes and ears on it. The question, then, is what the implications of this are for the meaning of the *Helen* and for interpretation in general. I would argue that Isocrates views meaning and interpretation as a needless imposition on or rather harmful obstruction to the sensual pleasure that distinguishes

[9] Isoc. 12.244-245: "I believe that those who have ambition, feeling a desire for developing prudence and for being eloquent … and who show diligence and desire to obtain the things that they have developed a desire for, these men get upset and become envious and experience a disturbance in their souls and have experienced the sort of things lovers do; for what charge could one lay against them more fitting than this?"

[10] *Ibid.* 10.59. cf. the description of Theseus' abduction of Helen earlier in the speech (19): … βίᾳ λαβὼν αὐτὴν εἰς Ἄφιδναν τῆς Ἀττικῆς κατέθετο. Eucken (1983), 82-3 argues that Isocrates presents an "indirekte Kritik" of Theseus' conduct here, but that, in the end, "Die nicht ganz gebilligte Gewalttat wird doch von Theseus in seiner ganzen Person vertreten, und so kann in seiner Geschichte die beispielhafte Ausstrahlung von Helenas Gestalt aufgewiesen werden…" This argument seems dubious to me.

encomium as a genre: in lieu of meaning stands ἔρως. As weighty mythological paradigms and sexy paradoxical arguments float before the reader's consciousness, all couched in Isocrates' characteristically lush, antithetical periods, which are, in his own words, "full of many arguments and of not a few antitheses and isocola and the rest of the figures that glisten in speeches"[11] (argument=adornment), his senses are thrilled while a vague sensation of gravitas and of the majesty of grand mythological figures occupies his mind and memory.[12] If while savoring the encomium the reader happens to become anxious at some point about what it all means, the hymn to beauty advises him not to try to rationalize his experience but rather to yield to his desire for beauty.

Norden attributes our inability to derive the same sort of supreme delight (*das höchste Entzücken*] from reading Isocrates that the ancients did to a fundamental distinction in taste between modern and ancient readers.[13] Wilamowitz called susceptibility to "the charm of the Isocratean oration"(den Zauber der isokrateischen Rede) a decisive test for one's understanding of Greek art, while one's determination of whether Isocratean art has the right to exist constitutes a test for his taste in art in general. One should, he suggests, deny it this right: "denn diese Schönheit ist absolut leere Form, leer an Inhalt, leer an Seele."[14] He seems to envision some sort of formal extraction whereby while reading Isocrates one can admire the Greek aesthetic sensibility while dismissing the oration's substantive void. There is some truth to both of these

[11]Isoc.12.2: [λόγους] ….πολλῶν μὲν ἐνθυμημάτων γέμοντας, οὐκ ὀλίγων δ' ἀντιθέσεων καὶ παρισώσεων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἰδεῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς ῥητορείαις διαλαμπουσῶν …. This description of his "youthful style" occurs in Isocrates' final work, the *Panathenaicus*.
[12] Jebb (1893) II, 102-3 seemed to be getting at the purely aesthetic function of the mythological material when he characterizes its effect in the *Helen* thus: "Isocrates conceived that dignity and gravity might be added to encomia of the conventional type by connecting with mythical subject-matter some topic of practical interest, political or moral…" A pinch of Paris and several tablespoons of Theseus, and voila, a nice full-bodied encomium.
[13] Norden (1915): "Das, was ihn dem modernen Leser bei längerer Lektüre so langweilig macht, seine Leidenschaftslosigkeit und Glätte, hat im Altertum das höchste Entzücken hervorgerufen."
[14] Wilamowitz (1911), 70.

positions, but I would argue that the experience is neither wholly irrecoverable nor entirely formal. Reading the *Helen* is a no man's land experience; it is difficult to pinpoint and characterize cognitively and aesthetically: it does not produce the racing *Assoziationsablauf* that one expects of works of art, and yet amidst his static mental state the reader feels not bored but satisfyingly occupied with a vision of—well, on a substantive level the mythological grandeur of Theseus is a necessary ingredient, while the expansive periodicity plays its role on the formal side. Nietzsche's characterization of the limitations of the modern reader when approaching Isocrates points toward a solution:

> Das isocrat. Kunstwerk … steht uns fremder als etwa die Demosthen. Rede; wir hören **zu stark auf den Gedanken** [bolding mine], finden diese nicht tief, staatsmännisch, philosophisch genug; ein wenig Mittelgut!, u. wir begreifen die Wirkung nicht, die sie hatten.[15]

But how to think less without abandoning thought altogether? Perhaps Dionysius' river analogy can help: one can imagine watching, listening to, thinking the serene, majestic flow of a river as the hours pass.

2. Isocrates' *Evagoras*

Isocrates' next significant contribution to contemporary discourse on hermeneutics can be found in his *Evagoras*, an encomium composed for the late king of Cyprus of this name which is generally dated to sometime between 370 and 365 B.C.,[16] that is after the death of Evagoras in 374/3 B.C. The *prooemium*, the section of the speech on which I too will focus my attention, has received a lot of scholarly attention of late primarily due to its implications for contemporary views on the relationship between prose and poetry. In an article devoted to this issue, Graff

[15] Bornmann (1995), II.4, 382. This passage is taken from notes prepared by Nietzsche for a series of lectures he delivered in Basel in 1872-3 on the subject of "Die Geschichte der griechischen Beredsamkeit."
[16] Blass (1893) II, 285 and Alexiou (2010), 38-9 with bibliography.

discusses a section of the *prooemium* at length, and Alexiou has written an article on its indebtedness to the Athenian funeral oration.[17] The *Evagoras*'s relationship to Pindaric encomium has also received significant attention.[18] Although I will refer to these studies insofar as they pertain to the subject of this chapter, I will focus my attention on how the *prooemium* directs the reader to interpret the work. Kennedy has argued that Isocrates' *Panathenaicus* represents an antecedent to modern reader-reception,[19] and, although this claim is problematic for that speech as I will discuss later in this chapter, I will argue that the *Evagoras* does indeed gesture towards a reader-reception based model of interpretation.

In the *prooemium* Isocrates makes a strong claim to originality and innovation. After criticizing those who out of mere envy reject encomia of contemporary figures in favor of hearing the traditional praises of mythological heroes, he argues that those who are sensible should ignore these vicious critics for the following reason:

> … ἄλλως τ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰς ἐπιδόσεις ἴσμεν γιγνομένας καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων οὐ διὰ τοὺς ἐμμένοντας τοῖς καθεστῶσιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοὺς ἐπανορθοῦντας καὶ τολμῶντας ἀεί τι κινεῖν τῶν μὴ καλῶς ἐχόντων.[20]

The *Evagoras*, as he proceeds to claim, will be an attempt to "correct and disturb" the social/literary problem that he has discussed in the preceding section, namely that writers are not composing encomia for contemporary figures. For he will undertake the difficult task of being the first[21] "to write an encomium of a [contemporary] man in prose" (ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν διὰ λόγων

[17] Graff (2005) and Alexiou (2009).
[18] See Race (1987) for an extended comparison of the two and pg. 131, fn. 3 for bibliography.
[19] Kennedy (1989), 497.
[20] Isoc. 9.7: "…especially since we know that progress occurs in the arts and everything else due to the influence not of those who adhere to the established order, but of those who make improvements and are willing at any given time to alter whatever he does not find satisfactory."
[21] Since Aristotle (*Rhet*. 1368a17) claims that the first encomium was written for a man named Hippolochus, the validity of Isocrates' claim to be the first has been disputed. See Alexiou (2010), 29 for discussion. Since however, as Alexiou notes there, Isocrates may not have even been aware of the existence of this encomium and since the *Evagoras* exercised "einen prägenden Einfluß auf die Entwicklung der Gattung," the question of whether he was actually the first or not is not as critical as it may at first seem.

ἐγκωμιάζειν)[22]. This of course immediately creates an interpretive problem for any prospective audience insofar as comparison of a given work with others of the same genre constitutes an important element of literary interpretation. When interpreting the *Helen*, for example, audiences could at least compare or rather contrast it with the paradoxical encomia that Isocrates so strongly criticizes and with Gorgias's *Helen.* Should we in fact use the mythological encomia as comparanda? To some extent this is inevitable, but since Isocrates has just finished criticizing this very genre and the way in which the virtues of mythological heroes have been praised hyperbolically, one should be reluctant to lump the two types together.

And so should we compare the *Evagoras* with poetic encomia of contemporary figures? This is not suitable either, for prose is a much more restricted form of discourse than poetry:

> Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ποιηταῖς πολλοὶ δέδονται κόσμοι· καὶ γὰρ πλησιάζοντας τοὺς θεοὺς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οἷόν τ' αὐτοῖς ποιῆσαι καὶ διαλεγομένους καὶ συναγωνιζομένους οἷς ἂν βουληθῶσιν, καὶ περὶ τούτων δηλῶσαι μὴ μόνον τοῖς τεταγμένοις ὀνόμασιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ξένοις, τὰ δὲ καινοῖς, τὰ δὲ μεταφοραῖς, καὶ μηδὲν παραλιπεῖν, ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν τοῖς εἴδεσιν διαποικῖλαι τὴν ποίησιν· τοῖς δὲ περὶ τοὺς λόγους οὐδὲν ἔξεστιν τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλ' ἀποτόμως καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων τοῖς πολιτικοῖς μόνον καὶ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τοῖς περὶ αὐτὰς τὰς πράξεις ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν χρῆσθαι. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ μὲν μετὰ μέτρων καὶ ῥυθμῶν ἅπαντα ποιοῦσιν, οἱ δ' οὐδενὸς τούτων κοινωνοῦσιν·[23]

Note that the elements classified under κόσμοι include not only formal features such as meter and diction but also elements of content: poets can narrate interactions of gods with men, while this is not permitted in prose. Scholars have called attention to the fact that the description of prose Isocrates gives here conflicts with his own practice and with descriptions he gives in other works: one can easily find metaphors in any one of his works,[24] and in *Against the Sophists* (§16)

[22] Isoc. 9.8.

[23] Isoc. 9.9-10: "For many forms of ornamentation have been granted to poets: they can make the gods have dealings with men and converse with them and aid those whom they wish to in a struggle, and they can express these things using not only standard but also foreign words, neologisms, and metaphors, and they do not suffer any restriction but can adorn their poems with all manner of embellishment. To writers of prose, on the other hand, none of these things is permitted, but they are strictly forced to use common words and material that deals with the way things actually happen. And in addition poets compose in various meters and rhythms, while writers of prose have no share in any of these."

[24] For further discussion of this issue, see Chapter 5.2.B.

and the *Antidosis* (§§46-7) he claims that his prose is something more elevated than that of mere pettifoggers and that it actually does resemble poetry on a formal level.[25] Alexiou argues that the contradiction can be resolved by viewing the remarks in the *Evagoras* as a *Hindernismotiv*: by overstating the disadvantages of prose in relation to poetry, Isocrates amplifies his accomplishment in overcoming them.[26] Although this certainly must be one of the motivations for the comparison, it is nevertheless still true that prose authors cannot bring in gods, write in meter, employ daring metaphors or exotic diction, and it is also true that in general they have to adhere more closely to "the events themselves" (τοῖς περὶ αὐτὰς τὰς πράξεις). The discursive dichotomization, then, is still to some degree valid and important for the audience's interpretation of the work: we clearly should not be evaluating the *Evagoras* in the same way we would one of Pindar's epinician odes. However, since this is the first prose encomium of a contemporary figure, we are left in a state of interpretive *aporia* at this point: if there are no other examples of the genre and if one should not compare the work with poetic encomia, how should he interpret it? We perhaps expect that Isocrates, after giving us a litany of elements that prose writers do not have at their disposal, will proceed to give us positive guidance on how we should be reading this work. However, after finishing his discussion of the advantages of poetry, he concludes the *prooemium* thus:

> Ὅμως δὲ καίπερ τοσοῦτον πλεονεκτούσης τῆς ποιήσεως, οὐκ ὀκνητέον, ἀλλ' ἀποπειρατέον τῶν λόγων ἐστὶν, εἰ καὶ τοῦτο δυνήσονται, τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας εὐλογεῖν μηδὲν χεῖρον τῶν ἐν ταῖς ᾠδαῖς καὶ τοῖς μέτροις ἐγκωμιαζόντων.[27]

[25] See Alexiou (2010), 84 for discussion of the relationship of these descriptions to one another. Graff (2005), 321 mentions the problem in passing; Alexiou (2009), 48 provides much fuller discussion with bibliography.
[26] Alexiou (2010), 85.
[27] Isoc. 9.11: "But nevertheless although poetry has so great an advantage, one must not shy away, but prose must be tested to see if it too will have the ability to eulogize good men no worse than those who have composed encomia in verse."

In spite of such disadvantages, then, one must still make an attempt to see if prose can praise men as well as poetry can. But what does μηδὲν χεῖρον mean at this point? If prose lacks some of the fundamental thematic and formal elements associated with artistic eulogy, how could it possibly not be inferior?

Sykutris asks this same question and comes to the conclusion that Isocrates desired to appropriate the pedagogical function of poetry: "Dieses höhere Ziel des μεθ' ἡδονῆς παιδεύειν verfolgt auch Is.[Isocrates] mit seinem Werke, das er den dichterischen Produkten gleichzustellen wagt."[28] Since in the *Evagoras* Isocrates does tell Nicocles, Evagoras' son, that he composed the work in the belief that it would serve as an exhortation to Evagoras' posterity[29] and since pedagogy is such an important element of the Isocratic program in general, Sykutris' claim does seem plausible. However, due to the fact that Isocrates describes the intention of the speech in more general terms as an attempt at eulogizing (εὐλογεῖν) in prose in a way no worse than poetic encomia have done, it seems unnecessary to restrict the goal of the work to μεθ' ἡδονῆς παιδεύειν, especially when he has devoted so much attention to the aesthetic rather than to the pedagogical aspects of poetry in the preceding sections.

I would argue that the sections of the *prooemium* I have discussed represent Isocrates' solution to the interpretive problem he knew he was going to face when he distributed the *Evagoras*. He anticipated that audiences would attempt to compare it with either mythological or poetic encomia, both of which were unsuitable in many respects as comparanda for the *Evagoras*. In order to carve out space for his new genre of prose encomium, he does not choose in his preface to give the reader a detailed characterization of it in positive terms, and one can wonder how clearly he himself conceived of it as a distinct genre. Instead, he defines it in

[28] Sykutris (1927), 45.
[29] Isoc. 9.76.

largely negative terms in relation to existing genres and then concludes the preface by describing the work as a mere attempt (ἀποπειρατέον). The reader, then, is left to determine for himself whether the attempt is successful and thus whether prose can in fact praise men as well as poetry. Sykutris argues that Isocrates encourages the reader to compare the two because he is fully confident that his prose encomium will prove superior,[30] and in light of his conceitedness this seems likely enough. However, in spite of all the formal and structural parallels that scholars such as Race and Papillon have noted between the *Evagoras* and Pindar's epinician odes, it seems in some fundamental sense absurd even to compare the two in detail: Can the most obscure, daring, paratactic poet really be doing the same thing as the most lucid, commonplace, hypotactic orator? I would argue instead that the sort of comparison Isocrates envisions is much more fluid and eclectic than what Sykutris has in mind. The reader is implicitly asked to evaluate Isocrates' attempt on the basis of almost no positive criteria: at the same time as he is reading the *Evagoras*, he must also be developing an interpretive model according to which he will determine its quality. Since Isocrates has virtually ruled out any strict comparison with works in related genres, the manner in which any given reader will decide to evaluate the *Evagoras* will be highly individualized: *quot homines, tot rationes interpretationis*, so to speak. The genre of prose encomium is only instantiated within the individual reader on the basis of whatever criteria he chooses to identify as constitutive thereof. Inevitably he will end up using other encomia of various sorts as comparanda, but not in any systematic fashion and only very selectively (and anxiously).

This does not mean, however, that Isocrates intended to allow the reader to respond negatively to the work. All potential criticisms—it is not as imaginative as other types of

[30] Sykutris (1927), 43.

encomia, the language is not as interesting, and it seems bare without any meter—have been deflected away from the work itself to the limitations of prose as a form: any element in the *Evagoras* that the reader finds distasteful or dissatisfying must be attributed to one of the items found in the extensive catalog of prose's disadvantages in relation to poetry. The reader, then, is only free to praise the *Evagoras*, not to disparage it; Isocrates only allows for an infinite variety of positive responses. What emerges from the *Evagoras* is a very rhetorical form of proto-reader reception; it is a freedom of response and production of meaning subjected to Isocrates' ever lurking ambition and lust for praise.

3. Plato's *Phaedrus*

There are at least three sections of the *Phaedrus* that pertain to literary interpretation, and it is on these that I intend to focus my attention. The sections in question are the first interlude after Phaedrus recites Lysias' speech (234c-237a); Socrates' theory of disposition and form, presented in the form an organic metaphor (264b-c); and finally the criticism of writing (274b-278e). The literature on this dialogue is particularly vast and interdisciplinary: Griswold, writing in 1996, stated that "… in the last ten years the attention and respect accorded the *Phaedrus* and the issues it raises are nothing short of remarkable."[31] In the following section I will focus my attention on the scholarship pertaining to the following issues: the significance of Plato's characterization of Phaedrus; Socrates' interpretation not only of Lysias's speech but also of Phraedrus's reading thereof; the significance of the organic metaphor of structure for literary interpretation; and, finally, the relationship of Plato's criticism of writing to literary culture in 4th century Athens.

[31] Griswold (1996), viii. See the rest of this preface for a discussion of the various reasons the dialogue has received so much attention in recent years. This work also contains one of the most extensive bibliographies on the *Phaedrus*.

A. Phaedrus as Reader

The characterization of Phaedrus has received considerable scholarly attention: both Griswold and Ferrari devote extensive discussion to it in their monographs on the dialogue, and for Usener, whose work deals with the relationship between writing and orality in Isocrates and Plato, the characterization of Phaedrus is central to understanding his relationship to contemporary literary culture.[32] Ferrari colorfully describes him thus: "Anachronistically put, he is literary journalist, publisher, and ubiquitous *salon* presence rolled together."[33] For Griswold he represents "a disciple of texts"[34] who, when reading Lysias' speech, "…is in a world of his own, or rather, in the world of the text with which he identifies."[35] Usener's characterization is similar to Ferrari's, but she highlights the importance of Phaedrus as a paradigmatic figure: "Phaidros wird von Platon in zwei Dialogen als literaturinteressiert und –kundig charakterisiert—er kann wohl aufgrund seiner Mentalität als 'typischer' Leser angesehen werden."[36] All of these views nicely complement one another, and they will provide the basis for my argument about the function of Phaedrus in relation to Plato's view of literary interpretation. For I will argue that he serves as a vehicle for dramatizing the act of an erroneous mode of interpretation and that Socrates does not criticize Lysias' speech itself so much as the speech as interpreted by Phaedrus.

After he finishes reciting the speech to Socrates, Phaedrus asks him to evaluate it in very general terms: Τί σοι φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ λόγος; οὐχ ὑπερφυῶς τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς

[32] Griswold (1996), 18-25; Ferrari (1987), 4-9; Usener (1994) 186-7.
[33] Ferrari (1987), 5.
[34] Griswold (1996), 53.
[35] *Ibid.*, 52.
[36] Usener (1994), 187.

ὀνόμασιν εἰρῆσθαι;[37] His reference to style (τοῖς ὀνόμασιν)[38] is specific enough, but the indeterminate τά … ἄλλα makes any comprehensive response to the question of whether the speech has been spoken "extraordinarily well" (ὑπερφυῶς) virtually impossible. Consequently, when Socrates responds, he chooses to evaluate not the speech itself but rather Phaedrus's response to it:

> Δαιμονίως μὲν οὖν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ὥστε με ἐκπλαγῆναι. καὶ τοῦτο ἐγὼ ἔπαθον διὰ σέ, ὦ Φαῖδρε, πρὸς σὲ ἀποβλέπων, ὅτι ἐμοὶ ἐδόκεις γάνυσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου μεταξὺ ἀναγιγνώσκων· ἡγούμενος γὰρ σὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμὲ ἐπαΐειν περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοὶ εἰπόμην, καὶ ἑπόμενος συνεβάκχευσα μετὰ σοῦ τῆς θείας κεφαλῆς.[39]

The particle combination μὲν οὖν explicitly marks Socrates' statement as an affirmative correction of Phaedrus's assessment, while δαιμονίως suggests that Socrates is responding not to the quality of the speech but rather to its effect on Phaedrus, thus anticipating his later characterization of the latter and himself as being inspired (συνεβάκχευσα) by it. As commentators have noted, Socrates' characterization here is clearly ironical.[40] If one agrees with Usener that Phaedrus represents the typical reader, then the implicit criticism contained in Plato's reference to inspiration here can be said to be directed more generally at a contemporary way of reading oratory. Phaedrus, in losing possession of himself while reciting Lysias' speech, becomes a passive reader: rather than attempting to critique the text objectively, he identifies with its perspective completely. By depicting him in this way, Plato takes aim more generally at contemporary reading practices. As I have argued in an earlier section of this chapter, Isocrates would have expected his readers to have the same sort of reaction to his *Helen* that Phaedrus

[37] Pl. *Phdr*. 234c6-7: "How does the speech seem to you, Socrates? Doesn't it seem to have been spoken extraordinarily well, in other respects and in style?"
[38] For this interpretation of τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, see Yunis (2011), *ad loc*.
[39] Pl. *Phdr*. 234d: "Nay rather it was inspired, my friend, so that I was astounded. And I suffered this because of you, Phaedrus, as I watched you intently, because you seemed to me to derive such pleasure from the speech while reciting it; for believing that you know more about this sort of thing than I do, I followed you and in following I became inspired with you, divine head."
[40] de Vries (1969) and Yunis (2011) *ad loc*.

does to Lysias's erotic speech. However, as I demonstrated in my reading of the *prooemium* of the *Evagoras*, in that work Isocrates encourages his readers to be active and indeed to formulate consciously a method of interpretation while reading. The difference between the two is based on genre: mythological encomia should not be read in the same way as encomia of contemporary figures. Although Isocrates would have disapproved of Phaedrus's response to Lysias's speech since he was critical of works based on paradoxical propositions,[41] he nevertheless was not opposed to a passive and "inspired" mode of reading *per se* and thus would have criticized Phaedrus not for losing control of himself but rather for becoming inspired by such a base genre: one should be a bacchant in the presence of a Helen, not a conniving non-lover.

The next mistake Phaedrus makes stems from a fundamental misconception of the nature of oratory. After noticing Socrates' irony and asking him to give a serious reply, Phaedrus reformulates his question in the following way: οἴει ἄν τινα ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ἄλλον τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἕτερα τούτων μείζω καὶ πλείω περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος;[42] Socrates, somewhat surprised by this question, gives the following response:

> Τί δέ; καὶ ταύτῃ δεῖ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ τὸν λόγον ἐπαινεθῆναι, ὡς τὰ δέοντα εἰρηκότος τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνῃ μόνον, ὅτι σαφῆ καὶ στρογγύλα, καὶ ἀκριβῶς ἕκαστα τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀποτετόρνευται; εἰ γὰρ δεῖ, συγχωρητέον χάριν σήν, ἐπεὶ ἐμέ γε ἔλαθεν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐμῆς οὐδενίας·[43]

He begins by saying that he thought he would only have to evaluate the style of the speech and not the argumentation. As commentators have noted, the categories he evokes here (τὰ δέοντα, σαφῆ, στρογγύλα, ἀκριβῶς) all were or were in the process of becoming technical terms in

[41] Isoc. 10.8 and 11.9.
[42] Pl. *Phdr.* 234e: "Do you think that any Greek could say things greater and more numerous than these on the same subject?"
[43] Pl. 234e: "What do you mean? Do you and I have to praise the speech in this way as well, namely by claiming that the composer has said what is necessary, rather than restricting our praise to the claim that the material is clear and well-rounded and that each of the phrases has been shaped with precision? If we have to do this, it must be granted for your sake, since it has escaped my own notice at least due to my worthlessness."

contemporary stylistic theory.[44] By using this jargon Socrates gestures at a possible mode of criticism and conversation that never ends up taking place due to Phaedrus's insistence on evaluating the speech's arguments: he envisions or at least pretends to envision Phaedrus and himself engaging in refined salon talk about the aesthetic qualities of the speech's diction, sentence structure and rhythms à la the aristocratic young men in Aristophanes' *Knights*. Indeed, this would have been the more urbane and proper response to a paradoxical epideictic speech, or as Blass describes it, "ein Erzeugniss des blossen Scherzes und sophistischer Spielerei"[45]: Phaedrus is clearly being a bit vulgar and tasteless in insisting so heavily on the substantive value of the work.

Since, however, he has asked Socrates to comment on the speech's argumentation, he obliges him:

> τῷ γὰρ ῥητορικῷ αὐτοῦ μόνῳ τὸν νοῦν προσεῖχον, τοῦτο δὲ οὐδ' <ἂν> αὐτὸν ᾤμην Λυσίαν οἴεσθαι ἱκανὸν εἶναι. καὶ οὖν μοι ἔδοξεν, ὦ Φαῖδρε, εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις, δὶς καὶ τρὶς τὰ αὐτὰ εἰρηκέναι, ὡς οὐ πάνυ εὐπορῶν τοῦ πολλὰ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἢ ἴσως οὐδὲν αὐτῷ μέλον τοῦ τοιούτου· καὶ ἐφαίνετο δή μοι νεανιεύεσθαι ἐπιδεικνύμενος ὡς οἷός τε ὢν ταὐτὰ ἑτέρως τε καὶ ἑτέρως λέγων ἀμφοτέρως εἰπεῖν ἄριστα.[46]

Socrates claims that Lysias does not present a series of distinct arguments but rather repeats the same argument in different forms (ταὐτὰ ἑτέρως τε καὶ ἑτέρως λέγων). Plato's treatment of the

[44] See especially O'Sullivan (1992), 46. cf. Yunis (2011) and de Vries (1969) *ad loc*.
[45] Blass (1893), I, 428.
[46] Pl. *Phdr.* 235a: "For I was paying attention to the rhetorical aspect alone, but I thought that not even Lysias himself thought that that would be sufficient. And in fact he seemed to me, Phaedrus, unless you're of a different opinion, to have said the same things two and three times, as though he didn't have the resources for saying many things on the same subject—or perhaps he wasn't concerned about this sort of thing; and indeed he seemed to me to flaunt his youth by showing off in the belief that he was able, saying the same things now one way, now another, to express them best in both ways." Yunis (2011) *ad loc.* objects to the traditional understanding of this passage, according to which τῷ ῥητορικῷ refers to style and τοῦτο back to τὰ δέοντα εἰρηκότος. He bases his objection on two arguments: first, "S. would be saying that he paid exclusive attention to the style of the speech even though his criticism here focuses on the argument and (except for the irony of 234e5-6) ignores the style." Second, "it[the traditional interpretation] would force an unnatural understanding of τοῦτο as 'that other [or that first] aspect' of the speech, referring all the way back to the speaker's saying 'what he ought' (234e5)." I think the argument presented on the preceding page provides an adequate response to Yunis's first argument: Socrates is hinting at what would be the proper response to a somewhat frivolous showpiece, namely a somewhat superficial critique of style. With respect to Yunis's second argument, he seems to have overlooked the fact that 'that other [or that first] aspect of the speech' must be supplied from context with the protasis in 234e7, e.g.: εἰ γὰρ δεῖ [ταύτῃ ... τὸν λόγον ἐπαινεθῆναι, ὡς τὰ δέοντα εἰρηκότος τοῦ ποιητοῦ].

famous orator here has vexed scholars. As Hackforth says, "It has always been a puzzle that Plato should criticise as unfavorably as he does a writer whose name, both in ancient times … and in modern, stands in such high repute."[47] Indeed, Wilamowitz, who describes Plato's treatment of Lysias as "…einer so grausamen Kritik," and Robin speculate about possible political and philosophical motivations for the enmity toward the orator they see in the *Phaedrus*.[48] However, I would argue that Plato is careful to avoid personal criticism here. After claiming that the latter may simply not have been capable of producing more than one argument on the subject (οὐ πάνυ εὐπορῶν τοῦ πολλὰ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ), Socrates then suggests that it also may have been the case that he was not concerned about the repetition. The way in which he phrases his agreement with the second alternative provides the key to understanding not only Plato's relationship to Lysias but also his estimation of Lysias' speech. Socrates is careful to emphasize the subjective nature of his judgment of Lysias' motive and capacity: ἐφαίνετο is followed by δή, and the verb governs a complementary infinitive (νεανιεύεσθαι) and not a supplementary participle, which would indicate that Socrates believed that Lysias' motives in writing the speech could become manifest through a reading of the text. But of course, as Plato has said in the *Protagoras*[49] and will emphasize once again later in the *Phaedrus,* it is impossible to deduce an author's intentions from a written text. Lysias' intentions, then, are inaccessible to us either for criticism or praise.

Whether or not the second hypothetical intention corresponds to that of Lysias in writing the speech or not, it is more favorable than commentators have recognized. As de Vries notes,

[47] Hackforth (1952), 16.
[48] Wilamowitz (1920) I, 259; Robin (1961), xix-xxii.
[49] Pl. *Prt.* 347e: … ποιητῶν, οὓς οὔτε ἀνερέσθαι οἷόν τ' ἐστὶν περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν, ἐπαγόμενοί τε αὐτοὺς οἱ πολλοὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οἱ μὲν ταῦτά φασιν τὸν (ποιητὴν νοεῖν, οἱ δ' ἕτερα, περὶ πράγματος διαλεγόμενοι ὃ ἀδυνατοῦσι ἐξελέγξαι.

"Plato disliked and despised current epideictic oratory, as the *Menexenus* makes very clear."[50] His contempt for frivolous epideictic is abundantly clear from the passage under discussion as well, but though he despises the genre, he still represents Lysias' speech as an eminently effective example of it. Phaedrus, after all, has been utterly bewitched by the speech, and the fact that the divinely shrewd Socrates is not taken in does not really speak against the work's quality as an example of rhetorical prestidigitation. Further, oratory is intended to be persuasive to a particular audience, and Phaedrus was not only (a member of) the audience to whom the work was originally recited (227b) but also can be viewed, as discussed earlier, as a typical Athenian reader. One should also note that in the *Symposium* (277b1) Phaedrus indicates that he is very familiar not only with standard encomia of figures such as Heracles but also with paradoxical ones of salt and other seemingly worthless objects. Accordingly, the delight he takes in Lysias' speech is that of a reader who has a more or less clear set of generic expectations. Since, then, Plato represents Lysias' speech as not only persuading but even possessing its intended audience of connoisseurs of oratory, I would argue that he actually "praises" it as a paradigm of a fundamentally worthless genre. The ideal member of this genre would be an infinite variation on the same argument that could possess the hearer eternally. Plato of course strongly disapproves of such static, inane discourse, but nevertheless some forms of emptiness are more alluring than others.

Socrates' response to Lysias' speech also opens up a mode of interpretation more suited to the work than the one that Phaedrus insists on adopting. By dismissing the philosophical value of the speech as a valid set of arguments in favor of the proposition that the beloved should prefer the non-lover, he encourages Phaedrus to focus instead on τὸ ῥητορικόν, for a definition

[50] de Vries (1969), 15.

of which we can look to Socrates' contemptuous allusion to Gorgias and Tisias later in the dialogue:

> Τεισίαν δὲ Γοργίαν τε ἐάσομεν εὖδειν, οἳ πρὸ τῶν ἀληθῶν τὰ εἰκότα εἶδον ὡς τιμητέα μᾶλλον, τά τε αὖ σμικρὰ μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μεγάλα σμικρὰ φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦσιν διὰ ῥώμην λόγου, καινά τε ἀρχαίως τά τ' ἐναντία καινῶς, συντομίαν τε λόγων καὶ ἄπειρα μήκη περὶ πάντων ἀνηῦρον;[51]

Orators from the beginning of the rhetorical tradition had made strong claims about their ability to affect reality through language. Plato clearly harbors some doubt about the validity of these claims, but nevertheless doing and affecting things with words was the intention with which many speeches had been written. Accordingly, Socrates suggests to Phaedrus that he should not praise Lysias' speech for its philosophical content but rather should examine the ways in which the author has managed to take a single argument and variegate its presentation without his noticing it. This sort of interpretation would be in line with rhetoricians' claims about the power of the λόγος and with their intentions in writing epideictic pieces. However, Phaedrus stubbornly refuses to heed Socrates' not so subtle suggestion and persists in defending the value of the speech as philosophy:

> Οὐδὲν λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες· αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ μάλιστα ὁ λόγος ἔχει. τῶν γὰρ ἐνόντων ἀξίως ῥηθῆναι ἐν τῷ πράγματι οὐδὲν παραλέλοιπεν, ὥστε παρὰ τὰ ἐκείνῳ εἰρημένα μηδέν' <ἄν> ποτε δύνασθαι εἰπεῖν ἄλλα πλείω καὶ πλείονος ἄξια.[52]

It is odd that he is so bent on making such a strong claim. For even Lysias himself and orators in general would be more inclined merely to claim that they had given the appearance of exhausting

[51] Pl. *Phdr*.267a-b: "But we'll let Tisias and Gorgias sleep, who saw that instead of the true the probable ought to be honored, and who in turn make the small seem great and the great small due to the power of speech, and who speak on novel subjects in archaic ways and vice versa, and who discovered brevity and boundless verbiage concerning any given subject." Plato is clearly alluding here to Isocrates' characterization of the power of speech in the *Panegyricus* (4.8).

[52] Pl. *Phdr*. 235b: "You're talking nonsense, Socrates. For the speech actually has this quality to the highest degree. He has left out none of the things that are worth saying on the subject, with the result that beyond what he has said no one could ever say other things more numerous and more worthwhile."

the possible arguments in favor of their case:[53] it is seeming comprehensive that is important.[54] Ferrari describes the structural function of Phaedrus' inadequacy for the dialogue as "… a springboard for exploration of how the talk of the true philosopher is indeed appropriate just to the extent that it is good."[55] Phaedrus's obtuseness is necessary for the dialogue to proceed in the direction Plato wants it to. However, what scholars seem to have overlooked is that Socrates' response to Lysias' speech presents a viable and indeed more suitable approach to the work than the one Phaedrus chooses. It is, after all, as Socrates suggests, quite vulgar to take so seriously a paradoxical encomium which was only intended to be a "feast of words" in the house of a hedonist.[56]

B. The Organic Metaphor and the Hermeneutic Circle

Before he develops his own theory of dialectical disposition, Socrates criticizes Lysias for "…attempting to swim through the speech in the wrong direction on his back not from the beginning but from the end." [57] He then proceeds to criticize the disposition of the entire speech in the following terms:

> οὐ χύδην δοκεῖ βεβλῆσθαι τὰ τοῦ λόγου; ἢ φαίνεται τὸ δεύτερον εἰρημένον ἔκ τινος ἀνάγκης δεύτερον δεῖν τεθῆναι, ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν ῥηθέντων; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἔδοξεν, ὡς μηδὲν εἰδότι, οὐκ ἀγεννῶς τὸ ἐπιὸν εἰρῆσθαι τῷ γράφοντι·[58]

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[53] The story related in Plutarch about Lysias (Plut. *De Garr.* 5) comes to mind. There a client for whom Lysias had written a speech comes to him and complains that, whereas he found the speech to be wondrous after a first reading, after a second and third, he felt it was "dull and ineffective"(ἀμβλὺν καὶ ἄπρακτον); Lysias then replies by laughing and asking the client whether he intended to present it before the jury more than once.

[54] So Gadamer (1976), 23: "… the orator carries his listeners away with him; the convincing power of his arguments overwhelms the listener. While under the persuasive spell of speech, the listener for the moment cannot and ought not to indulge in critical examination."

[55] Ferrari (1987), 9. Cf. Griswold (1996), 18.

[56] Pl. *Phdr*. 227b.

[57] Pl. *Phdr.* 264a: ἦ πολλοῦ δεῖν ἔοικε ποιεῖν ὅδε γε [Lysias] ὃ ζητοῦμεν, ὃς οὐδὲ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τελευτῆς ἐξ ὑπτίας ἀνάπαλιν διανεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ τὸν λόγον.

[58] Pl. *Phdr*. 264b: "Don't the parts of the speech seem to have been thrown out haphazardly? Or does it seem that the second section had to be placed second by some necessity, or any of the other things said for that matter? For it seemed to me, as someone who is ignorant of these things, that the writer in a not ignoble fashion has said whatever struck his fancy." For the ironical use of οὐκ ἀγεννῶς, see Thompson (1868) and Yunis (2011) *ad loc.*

A speech should be structured in such a way that a necessary relationship is produced among the parts. Socrates explicates his meaning further in the famous organic metaphor of disposition:

> Ἀλλὰ τόδε γε οἶμαί σε φάναι ἄν, δεῖν πάντα λόγον ὥσπερ ζῷον συνεστάναι σῶμά τι ἔχοντα αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ, ὥστε μήτε ἀκέφαλον εἶναι μήτε ἄπουν, ἀλλὰ μέσα τε ἔχειν καὶ ἄκρα, πρέποντα ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ γεγραμμένα.[59]

The theory that Plato formulates here represents a watershed moment in the history of hermeneutics. For, as Gadamer notes, it introduces the concept of the hermeneutic circle.[60] To compose or understand[61] a speech, one must view it as a teleological whole each of the parts of which serves a particular function. In addition to the rhetoricians such as Theodorus that Socrates himself criticizes in the *Phaedrus*, Isocrates may serve as a comparandum for the purblindness of other contemporary ways of interpreting structure:

> (φημὶ) τὸ δὲ τούτων (ἰδεῶν)[62] ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ τῶν πραγμάτων ἃς δεῖ προελέσθαι καὶ μείξασθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλας καὶ τάξασθαι κατὰ τρόπον ... ταῦτα δὲ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας δεῖσθαι.[63]

He refers vaguely here to some sort of mixing of generic elements and to arrangement κατὰ τρόπον. In his defense, one would not expect an exhaustive technical account of his theory of disposition in a short programmatic work like *Against the Sophists*, so it very well may have

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[59] Pl. *Phdr*. 264c: "But I think you would say this, that every speech must cohere like an animal, having a body proper to itself, so that it is neither headless nor footless, but has a midsection and extremities written to agree with one another and the whole."

[60] Gadamer (2001), 112: "Heidegger took up the issue of the hermeneutic circle, which was already addressed in Plato's *Phaedrus*. If I want to understand, then I must project something, and one must return to the project again and again." For the importance of the concept in modern hermeneutics beginning, it seems, with Ast, see Palmer (1969), 76-77 and Kinneavy (1971), 2. Maraldo (1974), 13 discusses fragments of Heraclitus and Parmenides that pertain to the concept of a circle, but concludes that "….inwiefern die Vorsokratiker den Zirkel, d.h. das, was Anfang und Ende gemeinsam hat, als Problem gestellt haben, muß offen bleiben."

[61] Plato only presents the organic metaphor from a rhetorical perspective, that is he presents a model of how speeches should be composed, not necessarily of how they should be interpreted. However, I follow Gadamer (1976), 20 in viewing rhetoric and hermeneutics as necessarily complementary: "In rhetoric, linguisticality is attested in a truly universal form, one that is essentially prior to the hermeneutical and almost represents something like the 'positive' as over against the 'negative' of linguistic interpretation."

[62] For Isocrates' use of the term ἰδέα, see below. The term is problematic: Wilamowitz (1920), 111 calls it a "so schwer fassbare Wort." See further the discussion in Wersdörfer (1940), 43-5, who calls it "überaus vieldeutig," and in Too (1995), 20.

[63] Isoc. 13.16-17: "But I say that the selection of the forms necessary for each subject and the proper mixing and arranging of them with one another ... these things demand much care."

been the case that he had much more definite and well-reasoned ideas on the subject than can be deduced from this passage. However, as it stands it seems that at this point in his career he merely had some sort of intuitive idea of how to arrange the parts of any given speech. As we will see, under the influence of the *Phaedrus* his ideas changed dramatically by the time he wrote the *Antidosis*.

C. Psychology, *kairos,* and the production of meaning

After he has finished criticizing and dismissing all non-philosophical forms of rhetoric, Socrates in a single grand, sweeping sentence characterizes the consummation of the art thus:

> ὅταν δὲ εἰπεῖν τε ἱκανῶς ἔχῃ οἷος ὑφ' οἵων πείθεται, παραγιγνόμενόν τε δυνατὸς ᾖ διαισθανόμενος ἑαυτῷ ἐνδείκνυσθαι ὅτι οὗτός ἐστι καὶ αὕτη ἡ φύσις περὶ ἧς τότε ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι, νῦν ἔργῳ παροῦσά οἱ, ᾖ προσοιστέον τούσδε ὧδε τοὺς λόγους ἐπὶ τὴν τῶνδε πειθώ, ταῦτα δ' ἤδη πάντα ἔχοντι, προσλαβόντι καιροὺς τοῦ πότε λεκτέον καὶ ἐπισχετέον, βραχυλογίας τε αὖ καὶ ἐλεινολογίας καὶ δεινώσεως ἑκάστων τε ὅσα ἂν εἴδῃ μάθῃ λόγων, τούτων τὴν εὐκαιρίαν τε καὶ ἀκαιρίαν διαγνόντι, καλῶς τε καὶ τελέως ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη ἀπειργασμένη, πρότερον δ' οὔ·[64]

Using this and the surrounding context, one can formulate the stages of the process thus: first, one must learn how many types of souls there are, then determine the character of each; second, one must do the same for the types of speeches; next, he must be able to correlate a given soul with a given type of speech; after this, he must be able to observe and correctly identify these things in practice; finally, he must be able to determine in a more general way the proper καιρός for when and what to speak. If one applies these prescriptions to the interpretation of any given speech, then the method would be something like the following: identification of the class to

[64] Pl. *Phdr.* 271e-272a: "And when he can sufficiently identify what sort of person is persuaded by what sort of speeches and can, distinguishing the person in his presence, demonstrate to himself that this is the man and this the nature which the speeches dealt with at that time, and which now is in fact in his presence, to which these words in this way must be applied to persuade him of these things; having now all these things in his possession, and having acquired in addition the ability to discriminate between when he should speak and when he should keep silent, and having distinguished the appropriateness and inappropriateness of short speeches, pitiful speeches and of aggrandizement and of each of the types of speech he learns, he has brought the art to a beautiful and complete perfection, but not before."

which speech X belongs; identification of a type of soul or audience to which speech X corresponds; accommodation of speech X to a *kairos* or external circumstances more generally.

The theory that Plato presents here represents an epochal moment in the history of rhetoric. As several scholars have noted, it presents in outline form the basis for Aristotle's *Rhetoric*,[65] and Cole forcefully argues that Plato and Aristotle together effected a "revolution" in the historical development of the discipline.[66] Asmis, in turn, argues convincingly that the theory of rhetoric contained in the *Phaedrus* is a direct "counterproposal" to that which Isocrates presents in *Against the Sophists*: first, Plato introduces a psychological component to rhetoric; second, he changes the epistemological basis of the art from opinion to knowledge obtained through dialectic.[67] Insofar as rhetoric and hermeneutics "completely interpenetrate one another,"[68] the implications of Plato's theory for interpretation are just as significant. However, I will argue that, whereas his theory, as scholars have noted, had a salutary effect on rhetoric inasmuch as it grounded it on a more scientific basis, nevertheless its influence on the actual composition and interpretation of oratory is more problematic.

Despite some disagreement on the precise nature of early *technai* on rhetoric, it is now generally agreed that they were not analytical works like Arisotle's *Rhetoric* but rather consisted of paradigmatic speeches or of exemplary speech components.[69] Accordingly, rhetorical pedagogy occurred on the level of the particular: for example, if one wanted to insert a passage in a speech intended to arouse pity, he did not refer to some abstract, clearly defined category of the pitiful to guide him; rather, he had particular instances of the affect culled from

[65] Romilly (1975), 59; Cole (1991), 12; Gadamer (1976), 21.
[66] Cole (1991), 28. Cf. Yunis (2009), 84-5.
[67] Asmis (1986), 169-170. Cf. Balla (2004), 65-66; Yunis (2009), 84.
[68] Gadamer (1976), 25.
[69] Cole (1991), 83ff.; Schiappa (1999), 45: "The 'Arts' attributed to Gorgias, Thrasymachus, and Antiphon are probably the result of the publication of exemplary speeches."

Thrasymachus' *Eleoi* swimming around in his head which he could adapt to suit his own purposes. As Papillon argues, it is in fact Plato's abstraction of rhetoric that Isocrates was attempting to combat:

> It was Plato, and after him Aristotle, who would try to find systems of definition and division to analyze and compartmentalize ideas about communication, about rhetoric and philosophy. Schiappa … points out that Isocrates does not use the term *rhêtorikê* even after Plato has coined it. This being the case, it is a piece of evidence that Isocrates was trying desperately to avoid the abstraction of the field that Plato offered.[70]

Isocrates, then, rejected Plato's innovations; however, he was also critical of more traditional rhetoricians, as *Against the Sophists* illustrates. There he criticizes those who believe they can provide their students with a set *techne* for a creative activity (ποιητικοῦ πράγματος τεταγμένην τέχνην παράδειγμα), as if teaching rhetoric were the same thing as teaching the alphabet. But the two are completely different, for, whereas letters and the words formed from them remain constant, each speech must be unique and must address a particular situation. [71] He then proceeds to present his own model of rhetoric:

> Φημὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ τῶν μὲν ἰδεῶν, ἐξ ὧν τοὺς λόγους ἅπαντας καὶ λέγομεν καὶ συντίθεμεν, λαβεῖν τὴν ἐπιστήμην οὐκ εἶναι τῶν πάνυ χαλεπῶν, ἥν τις αὐτὸν παραδιδῷ μὴ τοῖς ῥᾳδίως ὑπισχνουμένοις ἀλλὰ τοῖς εἰδόσιν τι περὶ αὐτῶν· τὸ δὲ τούτων[ἰδεῶν] ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ τῶν πραγμάτων ἃς δεῖ προελέσθαι καὶ μείξασθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλας καὶ τάξασθαι κατὰ τρόπον, ἔτι δὲ τῶν καιρῶν μὴ διαμαρτεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασι πρεπόντως ὅλον τὸν λόγον καταποικῖλαι καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν εὐρύθμως καὶ μουσικῶς εἰπεῖν, ταῦτα δὲ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας δεῖσθαι καὶ ψυχῆς ἀνδρικῆς καὶ δοξαστικῆς ἔργον εἶναι …[72]

At first glance one might be inclined to think that Isocrates' ἰδέαι are comparable to the abstract classes of speeches (εἴδη) that the aspiring orator must learn in the *Phaedrus.* Gercke noted the possible connection but also expressed the difficulty involved in establishing any precise correlation due to Isocrates' seemingly protean use of the term:

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[70] Papillon (1995), 153.
[71] Isoc. 13.12.
[72] Isoc. 13.16-17: "For I say that it is not altogether difficult to gain knowledge of the forms from which we speak and compose all speeches, if that is one hands himself over not to those making glib promises but rather to those who know something about these things. But (I do claim that) the selection of the forms necessary for each subject and the proper mixing and arranging of them with one another, and in addition not straying from occasions but fittingly adorning the whole speech with material and speaking in rhythmical and musical phrases, these things, I say, demand much diligence and are the work of a manly and keen soul …"

> Von Platons λόγων καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς γένη oder εἴδη … hat Isokrates wenigstens einen Teil, die εἴδη oder ἰδέαι τῶν λόγων… aber während die Begriffe dort durchsichtig sind, weiß niemand genau zu sagen, was sie hier bedeuten sollen, zumal Isokrates sie in verschiedenen Reden verschieden anwendet.[73]

Wersdörfer, who provides exhaustive discussion of the various uses of the term in Isocrates, comes to a similar conclusion:

> …volle Klarheit und Sicherheit ist dabei nicht immer zu erzielen, wie die verschiedenen, voneinander abweichenden Deutungsversuche der Kommentatoren und Übersetzer beweisen: Isokrates war nicht der Mann begrifflicher Klarheit und scharf geprägter Termini.[74]

Isocrates' use of the term ἰδέα, then, suffers from a lack of conceptual clarity. This may very well be true, but, if one looks at the various uses that Wersdörfer catalogues, what at first appears as a deficiency may in part be a different, non-Platonic mode of conceptualization.

Among the various uses classified, two in particular seem worthy of attention for the purposes of the present discussion. Citing *To Nicocles* 48, where Isocrates refers to tragedy and epic as ἰδέαι, and *Antidosis* 46, where he refers to all the ἰδέαι of speeches before mentioning particular genres, Wersdörfer concludes that the term can be used simply in the sense of "genre" (*Gattung*).[75] Then he proceeds to discuss the use of the term at *Antidosis* 74, which he claims is "schwieriger … zu fassen."[76] In this passage Isocrates describes the citations from his earlier speeches that he is going to incorporate in the present work thus: οὐ μόνον μικροῖς μέρεσιν, ἀλλ' ὅλοις εἴδεσιν προειλόμην χρῆσθαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς.[77] Here he uses the term εἴδεσιν not to refer to genres in the abstract but rather to particular examples of them; Wersdörfer translates "in sich abgeschlossene Proben aus verschiedenen Redegattungen."[78] It is clear from these passages that Isocrates makes no terminological distinction between "genre" and "example of a genre."

[73] Gercke (1897), 377. cf. Wilamowitz (1920), 111.
[74] Wersdörfer (1940), 53.
[75] *Ibid.*, 47.
[76] *Ibid.*
[77] "I chose to use not only small pieces but whole forms (?) in my speech to you."
[78] *Ibid.*, 48.

It is also noteworthy that he uses the term to refer to both the formal and substantive elements of an oration. Wersdörfer defines the more technical uses thus:

> In einem engeren Sinne sind ἰδέαι Gesichtspunkte, welche die Stoffauffindung bestimmen und erleichtern, **sowie** [bolding mine] die Formelelemente, die für die sprachliche Gestaltung maßgebend sind.[79]

As he proceeds to demonstrate, in certain passages the term refers to *topoi*, while in others it refers to the Gorgianic figures.[80] Accordingly, it seems that considerations of form and content all could fall under the heading of the term ἰδέα.

This lack of terminological distinction between the formal and substantive and between the abstract and concrete has significant implications for Isocrates' model of composition and interpretation. While the Platonic orator can produce new speeches based on his knowledge of abstract speech types, the student of Isocrates is engaged in manipulation of existing discourse *in concreto*: the former works from a definition of the patriotic and instantiates it in a particular speech, while the latter reworks suitable passages from the *Panegyricus* or funeral orations he has memorized. With respect to interpretation, a given speech for Plato signifies in relation to the abstract class to which it belongs; for Isocrates, on the other hand, meaning is produced in relation to particular forms of discourse: How does this passage from Demosthenes relate to the class of the patriotic vs. how does it relate to section x from my *Panegyricus.* Thus intertextuality plays a much more fundamental role in Isocrates' system than it does in Plato's. For the latter form like the spirit of God upon the face of the waters seems to supervene at the last minute on content (βραχυλογίας τε αὖ καὶ ἐλεινολογίας καὶ δεινώσεως ἑκάστων τε ὅσα ἂν εἴδη μάθῃ λόγων, τούτων τὴν εὐκαιρίαν τε καὶ ἀκαιρίαν διαγνόντι); for the former, by contrast,

[79] *Ibid.*
[80] *Ibid.*, 49-50.

matter never exists without form, and speeches arise from the mixing and moving of formal and substantive elements (μείξασθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλας καὶ τάξασθαι κατὰ τρόπον).

Turning to the psychological component of the theory of rhetoric that Plato presents in the *Phaedrus* and to the question of how this relates to that of Isocrates, one can see that the two theories differ just as widely on this point as they do on the subject of composition. Both Asmis and Balla argue persuasively that Plato's emphasis on individual psychology represents an innovation in rhetorical theory; the latter describes the status of psychology in sophistic and Platonic rhetoric thus:

> Furthermore, Plato's preoccupation with the varieties of human soul decidedly undermines the model of rhetoric that an Athenian of the fifth or fourth century would find familiar. We can find a plausible account at least of the scope of 'traditional' rhetoric in Gorgias' claim that rhetoric gives you the power to 'convince by your words the judges in court, the senators in Council, the people in the Assembly, or in any other gathering of a citizen body' (452E – trans. D. Woodhead). This function of rhetoric, however, seems either to ignore psychology altogether, or to treat the citizen body as homogeneous. It is certainly no accident that the definition of rhetoric in the *Phaedrus* shifts the emphasis from the art of speaking addressing crowds to the art of speaking addressing *individuals*.[81]

Asmis, in turn, as discussed earlier, views the psychological component of the *Phaedrus* as a direct response and counterproposal to Isocrates' *Against the Sophists*.[82] Both are certainly correct in arguing that there was no distinct psychological component to earlier rhetorical theory; however, the sophistic concepts τὸ πρέπον and καιρός,[83] which were much more robust than their trivialization in the *Phaedrus* would suggest, did include considerations of something like mass psychology. John Poulakos defines *to prepon* as the prescription that "…what is said must conform to both audience and occasion."[84] As an example he cites a passage from Gorgias' *Defense of Palamedes* (§33) in which the defendant states that one must adopt a different type of defense depending on whether he is being judged by the mob or by noble and wise judges.

[81] Balla (2004), 66.
[82] Asmis (1986), 149.
[83] The two concepts are interrelated in Isocrates. See Wersdörfer (1940), 22.
[84] J. Poulakos (1983), 36.

Audience psychology has also been included in definitions of *kairos*: Untersteiner quoting Funaioli defines the concept thus:

> Thus καιρός, when resolved into that rhetorical skill of which an example is now given, can be defined as 'that which is fitting in time, place and circumstance', which means the adaptation of the speech to the manifold variety of life, to the psychology of speaker and hearer: variegated, not absolute unity of tone'.[85]

The sophists and Isocrates did, then, take into consideration the nature of their audiences. While it seems unlikely that this ever amounted to anything more than a crude psychologization of character and class types, and thus that Balla and Asmis are right to describe Plato's focus on the individual soul in the *Phaedrus* as an innovation, nevertheless, for composing and interpreting deliberative and forensic speeches, both of which were intended for mass audiences, one should not be too quick to dismiss the value of the sophistic model.

Once again what at first seems like a failure to distinguish between categories that should be distinguished turns out upon further analysis to be a productive categorical interdependence. Werner in his assessment of the theory of rhetoric presented in the *Phaedrus* draws attention to its impracticability:

> Moreover, the *ad hominem* requirement—the requirement that an orator know the soul-types of his audience and fit his speeches to those soul-types accordingly—would be impossible to meet in any context in which an orator would typically find himself. For, in addressing a mass audience such as the Assembly or a pool of jurymen, how could an orator possibly fit his speech to the hundreds (or thousands) of soul-types who would be represented within that audience?[86]

The would-be orator, then, cannot hope either to be able to identify each soul-type within his audience or to accommodate his speech to conflicting psychological demands. One could argue in response that this means that for deliberative and forensic oratory one should focus on accommodating a given speech to the ideology of one's audience. However, as Ober notes,

[85] Untersteiner (1954), 197. Freeman seems mistakenly to have omitted an end quote in her translation. The quotation is from Funaioli, *Studi*, p. 176.
[86] Werner (2010), 37. See his footnote for further bibliography and for a response to possible objections.

fourth-century Athens was "… a relatively stable ideological and social environment,"[87] so, to the degree that one can speak of a collective soul, it would be characterized as a constant and not a variable. Accordingly, as far as political oratory is concerned, Plato's theory makes unreasonable demands and puts the emphasis in the wrong place: while composing or interpreting a speech, one is either left hopelessly attempting identify hundreds or thousands of souls and produce or imagine a speech that somehow manages to address conflicting soul-types, or he ends up fretting too much about the precise nature of the relatively stable collective soul.

The procedure suggested by the Isocratean concepts of *kairos* and *to prepon*, by contrast, is much better suited to the task. One begins by referencing an approximating *idea*, for example a passage from the *Panegyricus* for a projected section praising Athens or a passage from the *Evagoras* for a section praising an individual. Viewing the psychology of the audience for a particular genre as a constant, one proceeds to affect the *idea* as dictated by the *kairos* or circumstances broadly defined: Isocrates addressed audience V when it was affected by W with *idea* X, so how do I fine-tune *idea* X to address audience V when it is affected by Z? Thus speeches are put into relation not with variable souls but rather with a psychological constant modified by identifiable variables. As a method of composition and interpretation of political oratory, this proves much more productive than Plato's: when reading the *Third Philippic*, I posit the same audience as I did for the *First*, and I interpret the text in relation to a set of circumstances I reconstruct from it and its relation to other deliberative speeches. This is one way in which Wooten accounts for the differences between the first and the second and third speeches:

> But more than anything, I think, the change in approach [between the *First Philippic* and the next two] probably reflects a change in D's political position in Athens…. Orators tend to resort to highly emotional speeches when they have a difficult case that is being argued before a hostile audience. That seems to have

[87] Ober (1989), 104.

> been the situation in which D found himself when he delivered *Philippic* II and, even more so, *Philippic* III.[88]

Wooten in his analyses of Demosthenes' *Philippics* adopts Blitzer's theory of the "rhetorical situation," which he defined as "a complex of persons, events, objects and relations presenting an actual or potential exigence which can be completely or partially removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision or action as to bring about the significant modification of the exigence."[89] In his elaboration of this theory, Blitzer characterizes audience as a "constituent" of the rhetorical situation.[90] Although he does not mention it in his article, his theory sounds very much like Isocrates' idea of *kairos* clothed in more abstract and technical language: the situation at hand is viewed by both as a nexus of factors that must determine the form a speech takes. However, with regard to the ontology of a speech and its relation to discourse and reality, Isocrates' *kairos*-theory is distinct from Blitzer's rhetorical situation. The latter describes discourse as being "introduced into the situation"; Isocrates, by contrast, describes speeches (λόγοι) as "partaking in situations and in being suitable and novel" ([λόγοι] τῶν καιρῶν καὶ τοῦ πρεπόντως καὶ τοῦ καινῶς ἔχειν μετάσχωσιν).[91] The particularity in which speeches are said to partake here complements Isocrates' other description of them in the same work as consisting of *ideai* (see pg. 46). For him, speeches are begotten from the union of previous discourse with the particular; their essence thus "partakes" in both. A speech, then, is not introduced into a rhetorical situation but rather grows out of it and thus shares in the same relation to the universal. This view of the relationship between the particular and the universal

[88] Wooten (2008), 126.
[89] Blitzer (1968), 6.
[90] *Ibid.*, 7-8.
[91] Isoc. 13.13.

will become important when we come to discussing Demosthenes' *Prooemia* and their relationship to the deliberative speeches in chapter 5.

D. The Criticism of Writing

Plato's criticism of writing at the end of the *Phaedrus* (274b-278e), as Szlezák notes, now belongs "zu den bekanntesten philosophischen Texten der Antike."[92] Consequently, the scholarship on this section of the dialogue alone is vast; indeed, no less than five papers from the second Platonic Symposium are devoted to the issue. Much of the debate has centered on the implications of the passage for interpretation of the dialogues and for evaluating the degree to which they can be regarded as sufficient explications of Plato's philosophy; for this aspect of the reception Szlezák's article provides an excellent review and discussion of the *communis opinio*.[93] There is of course also Derrida's reading of the dialogue, which focuses on the broader philosophical implications of the concept of writing and its relationship to speech.[94] However, in the sections that follow I will focus exclusively on the way in which Plato's criticism problematizes the ability of an author to convey his intentions through the medium of writing and on the implications of this for interpreting texts in general.

4. Isocrates' *Philip* and *Letter to Dionysius*

At the beginning of his *Letter to Dionysius*, tyrant of Syracuse, Isocrates alludes to Plato's criticism of writing in the *Phaedrus* when explaining to Dionysius the deficiencies of written texts:

[92] Szlezák (1992), 93.
[93] Szlezák (1992).
[94] Derrida (1972). For responses to his reading see Griswold (1996), 230-41 and Rinon (1992).

> Οἶδα μὲν οὖν ὅτι τοῖς συμβουλεύειν ἐπιχειροῦσιν πολὺ διαφέρει μὴ διὰ γραμμάτων ποιεῖσθαι τὴν συνουσίαν ἀλλ' αὐτοὺς πλησιάσαντας, οὐ μόνον ὅτι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων ῥᾷον ἄν τις παρὼν πρὸς παρόντα φράσειεν ἢ δι' ἐπιστολῆς δηλώσειεν, οὐδ' ὅτι πάντες τοῖς λεγομένοις μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς γεγραμμένοις πιστεύουσιν, καὶ τῶν μὲν ὡς εἰσηγημάτων, τῶν δ' ὡς ποιημάτων ποιοῦνται τὴν ἀκρόασιν· ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις ἐν μὲν ταῖς συνουσίαις, ἢν ἀγνοηθῇ τι τῶν λεγομένων ἢ μὴ πιστευθῇ, παρὼν ὁ τὸν λόγον διεξιὼν ἀμφοτέροις τούτοις ἐπήμυνεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιστελλομένοις καὶ γεγραμμένοις, ἤν τι συμβῇ τοιοῦτον, οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ διορθώσων· ἀπόντος γὰρ τοῦ γράψαντος ἔρημα τοῦ βοηθήσοντός ἐστιν.[95]

Written texts cannot communicate as well; are less readily believed; are regarded as mere showpieces; and, finally, as in Plato, cannot defend themselves against misinterpretation without the author's aid. However, Isocrates seems to provide a response to these difficulties:

> Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ σὺ μέλλεις αὐτῶν ἔσεσθαι κριτὴς, πολλὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχω φανήσεσθαι λέγοντας ἡμᾶς τι τῶν δεόντων· ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ ἁπάσας ἀφέντα <σε> τὰς δυσχερείας τὰς προειρημένας αὐταῖς ταῖς πράξεσιν προσέξειν τὸν νοῦν. [96]

Because Dionysius (who as tyrant of a powerful city must naturally be exceedingly intelligent and perspicacious) is going to be the one reading the letter, Isocrates is confident that he can overcome the deficiencies of the written text and apply his mind to the matters themselves (αὐταῖς ταῖς πράξεσιν). These words have universally been regarded as one of Isocrates' attempts to respond to Plato's criticism of writing. So Erler concludes that Isocrates believed that, if the addressee of a written text is competent, the deficiencies of writing could be overcome: "Vor allem aber ist der Unterschied wesentlich, daß für Isokrates die Qualität des Adressaten Nachteile ausgleichen kann, die durch die Abwesenheit des Autors entstehen."[97] Eucken and Usener come to the same conclusion.[98] This interpretation, however, does not take into account

[95] Isoc. *Ep.* 1.2-3: "I know that for those attempting to give counsel it is far preferable to do so not in writing but rather by being present in person, not only because concerning the same matters one could more easily point something out face to face than he could show it through a letter, and not only because all trust what is said more than what is written down and listen to the former as proposals, the latter as artistic compositions; and what's more in actual gatherings, if something said is not understood, the one going through the speech, being present in person, can provide aid to both these situations, but in things sent by letter and in anything written more generally, if anything of this sort happens, there is not someone present who might correct the error; for, when the author is absent, the material is bereft of one who could come to its aid."

[96] Isoc. *Ep.* 1.3: "However, because you are going to be the judge of them, I am quite confident that it will be clear that we are saying something worthwhile. For I think that you, having put aside the aforementioned difficulties, will pay attention to the matters themselves."

[97] Erler (1987), 41.

[98] Eucken (1983), 138 and Usener (1994), 118.

the element of flattery involved. After identifying a written text's inability to respond to a reader's confusion or disbelief as a seemingly insurmountable limitation, Isocrates then implicitly characterizes Dionysius as a quasi-divine, omniscient reader for whom no passage from the text is unknowable, who can with a mere wave of the hand simply dismiss the difficulties involved in reading (ἀφέντα <σε> τὰς δυσχερείας τὰς προειρημένας) and who can apply his mind directly to reality without discursive mediation (αὐταῖς ταῖς πράξεσιν προσέξειν τὸν νοῦν). By characterizing Dionysius in this way, Isocrates both obtains his goodwill and positions him in an idealized relationship to the text, that is as a perspicacious interpreter who can cut through the surface to the things themselves. But does he actually believe that this sort of reader exists? Insofar as he is expected never to have questions about the author's intentions that would require his presence, this seems unlikely. One should rather imagine Isocrates presenting this passage to his students not as a valid response to Plato's criticism of writing but rather as a practical means of obviating such criticism. Everyone, after all, would like to believe that he can view events themselves with his mind's eye and that he has the power to divine an author's intentions. The *Letter to Dionysius*, then, indicates Isocrates' awareness of Plato's criticism of writing without presenting any attempt to provide an adequate response to it. The problem lingers, and, for someone like Isocrates who was completely dependent upon the written word for influence, it must have been a source of great anxiety. It is natural, then, that, as we will see, attempts to deal with it dominate two of his most important later works, the *Antidosis* and the *Panathenaicus*.

5. Isocrates' *Antidosis*

It was in the face of Plato's criticism of writing that Isocrates had to invent the genre of autobiography, in which an author attempts through a written text to communicate to posterity something about himself and his life. Judging by the reception of the *Antidosis*, the work has failed to overcome this criticism, for it is in sore need of a helper to ward off the general disregard and contempt it has suffered. Misch's criticism is perhaps the harshest:

> Isocrates had no dramatic self-portrayal to offer, but applied the technique of the *enkomion* to his autobiography and tried to make it plausible by means of a fiction that was a pilfered reality. For the technique of autobiography this stagecraft had only the secondary effect of plastering the whole work with a network of polemic and self-justification and of outbursts of injured vanity against rivals and opponents and the envious …[99]

Blass is actually more favorable than most when he memorably compares it "…mit einem ungeheuern Haufen Spreu, in welchem indes, wenn man ordentlich nachsucht, sich eine grosse Fülle guter Körner findet."[100] Due to the work's many allusions to Plato's *Apology*,[101] many scholars have viewed it as an utterly unsuccessful attempt to rival that work.[102] It is hard to dispute these criticisms, but, as is the case with several of Isocrates' works, the preface in which he frames and theoretically grounds the work proves more interesting than the speech itself, and I will argue that this preface presents an intriguing if in the end dissatisfying response to Plato's discussion of oratory in the *Phaedrus.* De Vries, who argued that "One should peruse the *Antidosis* to find Isocrates' reaction to the *Phaedrus*,"[103] already investigated some of the points

[99] Misch (1950), 167.
[100] Blass (1893) II, 313. Ober (2004), 22, who characterizes the work as "… an especially skillful and complex intervention into the intellectual debates that flourished in mid-fourth century Athens," represents an exception.
[101] For a list of parallels see Norlin (1928) I, xvii fn. c. and Ober (2004), 35.
[102] The remarks by Orelli (1814), 451 on the relationship between the two well exemplify this position: Ein auch no so geringer ästhetischer Sinn sieht gleich ein, welches Kopie, und welches Original ist; in jener[the *Antidosis*] gehn die feinern Züge verloren, die kräftigern werden matter, das Ideale wird beengt und prosaisch nüchtern, wie alles was Isokrates aus Platon entlehnt. Cf. Misch (1950), 167. Havet (1862), CVII seems to concur, although he is able to find more of value in the *Antidosis*.
[103] de Vries (1953), 40.

of contention between the two, but his article does not deal with Isocrates' reaction with respect to interpretation of oratory.

In the opening of the preface Isocrates explains why he felt the need to characterize the nature of the work before presenting it: because of its novelty (διὰ καινότητα), it might seem strange if it were not prefaced with a justification of its innovative form.[104] The preface, then, is going to show us how to interpret the work properly. He then proceeds to relate how he discovered during a trial on an exchange of liturgies (*antidosis*) that many people did not have the opinion of him that he thought they did. As a result, he began thinking about how he might reveal both to his contemporaries and to posterity the truth about his character, the life he has been leading, and his ideal of culture (τὸν τρόπον... τὸν βίον... τὴν παιδείαν). [105] Upon reflection he decides that the only means of accomplishing this would be to compose a speech to serve as an image of his mind and of his actions throughout his life (ὥσπερ εἰκὼν τῆς ἐμῆς διανοίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν [ἐμοὶ] βεβιωμένων). He then expresses his expectation that the speech will prove to be a memorial much more beautiful than bronze statues.[106] Accordingly, in contrast to Plato, who in the *Phaedrus* is suspicious of writing's capacity to immortalize (257d) and who thus at least seems to reduce all writing to a form of play or at best to an aide-mémoire (276d), Isocrates makes a strong claim about the capacity of an autobiographical text to preserve for posterity a clear image of the author's mind. However, he does not yet address the problem of the helperless text, which he himself had previously mentioned but not resolved in his *Letter to Dionysius*, so the reader expects him to explain just how he is going to produce such an image.

[104] Isoc. 15.1.
[105] Isoc. 15.6.
[106] Isoc. 15.7.

The prescriptions he proceeds to give on how the work should be performed do seem to represent an attempt on his part to respond to Plato's criticism of writing. He begins by giving a general description of the work's contents: some parts are suitable for a forensic oration, others are intended to be a candid account of his φιλοσοφία, others are written for the benefit of motivated young gentlemen who are dedicated to a life of the mind and to high culture, and finally others are excerpts from previous works that have been carefully integrated into the structure of the current speech.[107] The work is thus, as he describes it in the following section, a mixed speech (μικτοῦ λόγου). At this point the influence of Plato's organic metaphor of disposition becomes apparent, for Isocrates stresses to the reader with a series of συν- compounds that, in spite of its varied contents, the work represents a cohesive whole:

> Τοσοῦτον οὖν μῆκος λόγου συνιδεῖν καὶ τοσαύτας ἰδέας καὶ τοσοῦτον ἀλλήλων ἀφεστώσας συναρμόσαι καὶ συναγαγεῖν καὶ τὰς ἐπιφερομένας οἰκειῶσαι ταῖς προειρημέναις καὶ πάσας ποιῆσαι σφίσιν αὐταῖς ὁμολογουμένας οὐ πάνυ μικρὸν ἦν ἔργον.[108]

The whole which is produced by the synthesis of all these elements is, as Isocrates has told us, an image of his mind and life. Using Plato's model, then, he gives us a way to interpret his autobiography: as we are reading a given passage, we should be actively engaged in relating it to what precedes and what follows so as to produce a cohesive image. This is admittedly a *petitio principii* that wrongly assumes that the reader has a clear expectation of what an image of the mind and life looks like, but perhaps in the end it is not too problematic: life and mind, after all, seem to have a clear enough shape. But regardless Isocrates still has not addressed the lingering problem of the helperless text: how will a mute text answer any lingering questions we have about his life and philosophy?

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[107] Isoc. 15.10.

[108] Isoc. 15.11: "It was no small task, then, to get a full view of such a long speech and to fit together forms so numerous and so different from one another and to bring them together and to adapt those that follow to those that precede and to make them all harmonious with one another."

After describing the contents and the structure of the work, Isocrates then gives the following instructions on how to perform it:

> Χρὴ δὲ τοὺς διεξιόντας αὐτὸν πρῶτον μὲν ὡς ὄντος μικτοῦ τοῦ λόγου καὶ πρὸς ἁπάσας τὰς ὑποθέσεις ταύτας γεγραμμένου ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀκρόασιν, ἔπειτα προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν ἔτι μᾶλλον τοῖς λέγεσθαι μέλλουσιν ἢ τοῖς ἤδη προειρημένοις, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις μὴ ζητεῖν εὐθὺς ἐπελθόντας ὅλον αὐτὸν διελθεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μέρος ὅσον μὴ λυπήσει τοὺς παρόντας. Ἢν γὰρ ἐμμείνητε τούτοις, μᾶλλον δυνήσεσθε κατιδεῖν εἴ τι τυγχάνομεν λέγοντες ἄξιον ἡμῶν αὐτῶν.[109]

In contrast to Phaedrus, who becomes ecstatic while reading Lysias' speech and thus loses control of himself, the performer of the *Antidosis* must recite the work very deliberately and always keep the genre of the contents he is performing in mind. Hudson-Williams, comparing this passage with Isocrates' description in the *Philip* of how a bad recitation can spoil a good speech,[110] persuasively argues that he gives these instructions so that performers will not recite the work monotonously but will adjust their tone and gestures to the ὑπόθεσις they are performing.[111] In preparing for such a performance the reciter will have to envision a mode of representation in terms of tone of voice and gesture that will be suitable for each passage. For an autobiographical work like the *Antidosis*, this means that he will have to construct a persona that can pass for Isocrates himself. This inevitably would entail projecting a motivation or at least the outward form of one for each passage. The reader performing the text in front of an audience becomes responsible to a degree not only for writing Isocrates' autobiography but for writing it persuasively. The choices and selections he makes in terms of both content and delivery are

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[109] Isoc. 15.12: "And those reading through it[the *Antidosis*] should first of all recite it while keeping in mind that the speech is mixed and has been composed with a view to addressing all these subjects; secondly, they should pay attention still more to the things that are going to be said than to those previously said, and in addition should not seek to read through the whole work at a single sitting, but rather only as great a part as will not irritate those present in the audience. For if you abide by these prescriptions, you will be able to get a better impression of whether we have in fact said anything worthy of ourselves." For the translation of the difficult phrase ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀκρόασιν, see Hudson-Williams (1949), 66 fn.4.

[110] Isoc. 5.26-7: ἐπειδὰν γὰρ ὁ λόγος ἀποστερηθῇ τῆς τε δόξης τῆς τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ τῆς φωνῆς καὶ τῶν μεταβολῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς ῥητορείαις γιγνομένων … ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν προειρημένων ἁπάντων ἔρημος γένηται καὶ γυμνὸς, ἀναγιγνώσκῃ δέ τις αὐτὸν ἀπιθάνως καὶ μηδὲν ἦθος ἐνσημαινόμενος ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἀπαριθμῶν, εἰκότως, οἶμαι, φαῦλος εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν.

[111] Hudson-Williams (1949), 66.

determined by his own self and what he feels will appeal to an audience, and thus only performing, for example, the Timotheus passage and/or performing it with such a delivery as to provoke a particular response in the audience says more about the performer than about Isocrates himself. Any performance of the text, then, is as much a biography of the performer as it is an autobiography of Isocrates. The author has inscribed his own autobiography into that of his readers. The distinction between biography and autobiography thus becomes blurred. This attempt to create a symbiosis between author and reader will be important for understanding readers' possible reactions to the distribution of Demosthenes' *Against Meidias* in draft form(see pgs. 237 ff.).

It is only through persuasive recitation of the text that it can be properly evaluated (Ἢν γὰρ ἐμμείνητε τούτοις, μᾶλλον δυνήσεσθε κατιδεῖν εἴ τι τυγχάνομεν λέγοντες ἄξιον ἡμῶν αὐτῶν). These words are at first surprising: we expect Isocrates to say something like, "If you adhere to these guidelines, you will better allow your audience to determine whether we actually are saying anything worthy of ourselves." It seems more intuitive, after all, to consider the performance's effect on the audience than on the performer himself. I would argue that these words represent Isocrates' attempt to deal with the muteness of the text. He expects his readers in envisioning a proper recitation of the text to supply a voice for it; this involves formulating potential justifications, motivations, and suitable representations of mental states for each passage; the text is thus helped and defended by the reader/reciter. The validity of the defense he provides can only be determined by its effect on an audience: if the reader has interpreted the text correctly, then his performance will produce a convincing representation of Isocrates himself that will prove pleasing to an audience. It is thus in successful performance and resurrection of the author that an interpretation is validated: a correct interpretation is a quickening one.

There is of course a significant problem here, for it is surely possible to interpret and perform a text successfully in ways that wildly deviate from the author's intentions. Isocrates, however, does not address this, and it may at first seem that he naively assumes that by providing a preface that explains the nature of the work and which gives general instructions on how to perform it, he can enable the reader to perform and interpret it in the way he intended. However, it probably did not matter so much to him precisely how the text was read and performed—so long as it *kept* being read and performed. One suspects that Isocrates was perfectly content to sacrifice himself for his name's sake and to allow the *Antidosis,* provided that it continued to serve as a lasting memorial, to be the image of an Isocrates and his mind.

6. Isocrates' *Panathenaicus*

In Isocrates' final work, the *Panathenaicus*, we get what seems to be a final attempt to respond to Plato's criticism of writing in the *Phaedrus*.[112] Erler as cited in the Introduction argues that the two works are "…Testimonien des ersten hermeneutischen Disputes in der Antike,"[113] and Roth, commenting on the recurrence of the metaphor of the abandoned text in the Spartan sympathizer's speech, concludes,

> Ihre [die Metapher von der Verlassenheit des λόγος] Wiederverwendung im 'Panathenaikos' reiht auch Isokrates' letzte Rede in die Geschichte dieser Kontroverse ein und bezeugt, wie ihn das Problem des richtigen, d.h. adressatenbezogenen Verfassens von Texten weiter beschäftigen hat.[114]

[112] We also get a host of other things. Blass (1893) II, 326, adopting a harsher form of the same analogy he used to describe the *Antidosis* (see pg. 56), compares the *Panathenaicus* to "… ein wüster Haufe, in dem die Körner recht selten sind."
[113] Erler (1992), 125.
[114] Roth (2003), 256.

It seems clear, then, that Isocrates was at least trying to say something in his swan song about interpretation. However, this part of the work has proven even more difficult to interpret than the rest.[115]

Before discussing the work's reception, I will give a brief outline of the speech's content. It is usually divided into at least five sections: the proem, the body of the speech, two dialogue scenes, and an epilogue.[116] In the body of the work (§§39-198), Isocrates presents a comparison of Athens and Sparta which *prima facie* seems to be an encomium of the former and a criticism of the latter. In the first dialogue scene (§§199-228), a Spartan sympathizer whom Isocrates has invited to critique the work presents objections to the criticisms he has made of Sparta and claims that, if for no other reason, the Greeks should at least be grateful to the Spartans for discovering, using, and demonstrating "the most noble pursuits" (τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων).[117] After Isocrates replies to this objection by arguing that Spartan pursuits are not the most noble but rather are quite depraved, the sympathizer proceeds to specify what he meant by this ambiguous phrase: he was not referring to piety, justice or intelligence but to physical training, exercise in courage, civil concord, and their concern for martial diligence in general (§217). Isocrates then presents a second reply to the sympathizer's objection, and the audience unanimously agrees that he has won the debate (§229). He himself, however, becomes concerned that the speech's criticism of Sparta may be too harsh, so he calls together a larger group of students and the same Spartan sympathizer to get their advice on whether the work should be destroyed or published; this begins the second dialogue scene (§§234-265). All of his students once again praise the work very highly, but the sympathizer, whose interpretation will

[115] For a comprehensive overview of the reception of the work, see Roth (2003), 9-18.
[116] For a more detailed outline of the structure, see Roth (2003), 69-70.
[117] Isoc. 12.202.

be discussed in detail below, changes his mind about the work and argues that Isocrates delivered it to his students in order to test them. For it contains a hidden meaning: those who do not read it carefully enough will interpret it simply as an encomium of Athens and as a criticism of Sparta; those, on the other hand, who do take the time to study it will come to see that it actually contains veiled praise of Sparta and thus that Isocrates manages to praise both cities simultaneously (§§232-263). Isocrates' students then enthusiastically praise the sympathizer's interpretation, while Isocrates himself, though he praises his nature and diligence (τήν τε φύσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν), refuses to utter a syllable about whether his interpretation corresponds to his own intentions (περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ἐφθεγξάμην ὧν εἶπεν, οὔθ' ὡς ἔτυχεν ταῖς ὑπονοίαις τῆς ἐμῆς διανοίας, οὔθ' ὡς διήμαρτεν).[118]

Scholars who have dealt with the significance of the dialogue between Isocrates and the Spartan sympathizer can be divided into three camps: those who argue that he views the sympathizer's method of interpretation as valid and thus does not respond in order to preserve the polyvalence of the text;[119] those who argue that by various means he rejects the sympathizer's interpretation of and approach to the speech and that he expects the reader to arrive at this conclusion on his own;[120] and, finally, those that argue that Isocrates' silence

[118] Isoc. 12.264-5.
[119] Kennedy (1989), 497, Too (1995), 71-2 and Roth (2003), 252-6 and 260. Roth provides much more supporting evidence than the other two and better contextualization of the Spartan sympathizer's speech.
[120] Kröner (1969), 324 argues that Isocrates has made the sympathizer's reading so weak that the reader by carefully thinking through the text will see that it is incorrect. Schäublin (1982), 173 ff. argues that for Isocrates clarity (σαφήνεια) was of the utmost importance and thus that he could never endorse the sympathizer's reading; rather, the latter represents a sophistic mode of interpretation similar to the one Plato lampoons in the *Protagoras*. Similarly, Erler (1992), 129 argues that Isocrates believed that texts needed no interpretation but could attain to clarity independently of their author's voice. Finally Gray (1994), 228 in a polemical article argues that Isocrates in presenting the dialogue scene employs what would have been recognized by his audience as a conventional rhetorical device, namely the use of the reaction of an internal audience as a negative paradigm for proper interpretation. The dialogue scene, then, dramatizes a mode of reading that Isocrates encourages us not to adopt.

represents a true feeling of ambivalence about the meaning of the work.[121] I find the position of scholars from the first camp most persuasive,[122] so I will analyze the sympathizer's method of reading under the assumption that Isocrates presents it as valid. Roth in his commentary provides a detailed analysis of the passage in question to support his interpretation; however, he does not fully explore its implications for the debate between Plato and Isocrates, nor can he in the confines of a commentary put his interpretation into as broad a perspective as the chronological analysis of the development of their views that I have performed in the preceding sections will allow me to do.

The *Encomium of Helen* and the *Panathenaicus* were composed at roughly the beginning and at the very end respectively of Isocrates' literary output, and there is a chasm between the interpretive methodology he develops for each work. While he expected readers of the former to be overcome with erotic desire for the beauty of his style and sentiments and thus merely to bask in the sensual delight of the text, readers of the latter, by contrast, are told that they must ever be on their guard if they hope to unearth the surplus of meaning the text contains: surface reading vs. interpretive mining. The sympathizer asserts twice (§239,§249) that Isocrates made a conscious effort to conceal his intentions when composing the work; he also claims (§§236-7) that Isocrates intended to test his students' hermeneutic acumen by presenting them with a polyvalent text. The work exists, then, to be wrestled with, to be outwitted.

[121] Tigerstedt (1965), 200 and Eucken (1982), 66. The former argues that one can detect in the *Panathenaicus* "a secret love of Sparta's highly praised εὐνομία," while the latter claims it was Sparta's *Machtpolitik* that appealed to Isocrates.

[122] In favor of this position, I would add the following arguments: first, during (§201) and after the first dialogue scene, Isocrates describes the sympathizer in quite positive terms (§229). Second, if Isocrates did object to his interpretation, then it seems odd that he does not correct all of his students who unanimously praise it. Finally, the sympathizer's interpretation is advantageous to Isocrates: it demands a careful reading of the text, and it allows the work to receive approval in both Sparta and Athens.

The preface to the *Evagoras* does anticipate the relationship between text and reader that Isocrates will elaborate further in the *Panathenaicus*. In the former, Isocrates characterizes the work as innovative and (somewhat disingenuously) as an experiment that needs to be evaluated by the reader. Having subtly framed the speech in such terms as to preclude a negative response, he is content to allow the reader to develop his own method of interpretation. Thus the meaning of the *Evagoras* like that of the *Panathenaicus* will vary depending on the perspective of the individual. However, there are also some key differences between the methodology developed in each work. In the *Evagoras* Isocrates does not provide the reader with any positive rubric for how he should be reading: after listing the criteria according to which one should not evaluate the text, he is content to let the reader to develop his own approach to the text. Accordingly, one could read it like the *Helen* in a purely sensual way or burrow into the text in an attempt to ferret out all its hidden meaning, depending on what suits his fancy. In the *Panathenaicus*, by contrast, Isocrates provides us with a very detailed paradigm: we must constantly keep our eye on the author, work through the text very carefully, and be sensitive to all the interpretive possibilities of the language. Although the reader must still determine the meaning of the text for himself and although these prescriptions give him plenty of wiggle room, Isocrates gives him a much more definite idea of what he should be doing when reading the work.

The significance of the *Antidosis* for the development of Isocrates' views on interpretation is difficult to assess. On the one hand, he takes pains to communicate his intentions clearly and to encourage the reader to take them into consideration when reciting and interpreting the work; on the other hand, by incorporating performance of the text into the act of interpretation, he seems to be willing to allow the reciter's perspective to influence meaning when he is forced in preparing for a performance to supply his own motivations and

justifications for a given passage. I would argue that this tension stems from the exceptional status of the *Antidosis* within Isocrates' oeuvre: as an autobiography and an apologetic one at that, the work is much more personal and has much greater significance for Isocrates and his reputation than any of his others. Consequently, it would have been surprising if he had left it completely open to interpretation even if he were receptive to polyvalence in other cases. However, as the preface shows, he was also acutely aware of how necessary performance was for a proper interpretation and successful reception of a work, and he foresaw the inevitable influence of the reciter's perspective on his interpretation. In the end the relationship between Isocrates' intentions and the reader's interpretation remains ambiguous: he slowly oozes his way into our reading until intentionalities become blended.

In the *Panathenaicus* a sea change occurs in the relationship between text and reader. In the *Helen* we lusted after the beauty of the text; in the *Evagoras* we collaborated with Isocrates in defining the new genre of prose encomium; in the *Antidosis* through performance of the text we became surrogates for Isocrates himself; in the *Panathenaicus*, however, the text becomes an adversary. This can be seen most clearly through comparison with the relationship between the two that is laid out in the *Phaedrus* (275d), to which the sympathizer alludes at one point. There the communicative situation is quite clear: the reader questions a text about an aspect of its content in order to learn what it means, but, without the aid of the author, it can only repeat the same answer; the text is figured metaphorically as a helpless child in need of its father for protection. The defense that the latter would provide would be a clarification of the meaning of the passage in question. Contrast this view of the relationship between text and author with that of the sympathizer, who characterizes it in the following way when speculating about how Isocrates is going to respond to his interpretation:

> ὧν οὐδὲν ἐάσαντά με φήσεις τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἔχειν, ὡς ἐβουλεύσω σὺ περὶ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τήν τε δύναμιν τῶν λεγομένων διδάσκοντα καὶ τὴν σὴν διάνοιαν ἐξηγούμενον οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι τοσούτῳ τὸν λόγον ἀδοξότερον δι' ἐμὲ γιγνόμενον, ὅσῳπερ αὐτὸν φανερώτερον ἐποίουν καὶ γνωριμώτερον τοῖς ἀναγιγνώσκουσιν·ἐπιστήμην γὰρ τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόσιν ἐνεργαζόμενον ἔρημον τὸν λόγον με ποιεῖν καὶ τῆς τιμῆς ἀποστερεῖν τῆς γιγνομένης ἂν αὐτῷ διὰ τοὺς πονοῦντας καὶ πράγματα σφίσιν αὐτοῖς παρέχοντας.[123]

For the sympathizer clarification of the text has precisely the opposite effect from the one it has in Plato: whereas explanation by the author was figured by the latter as a defense of the text, for the former it serves to disarm it and make it vulnerable. For communicating a single, authoritative message is what the text is defending itself against. The ideal situation is one in which the text can remain to some degree inscrutable. In Plato, reader and author have the same (unattainable) goal: a meeting of minds through the mediation of the text. In Isocrates, by contrast the two are at war with one another: if the reader wins, he disarms, that is deciphers the text; if the text wins, it preserves its own polysemy. Reading is thus figured as an agonistic activity in which the author is constantly making covert attacks against the reader while he defends himself with hermeneutic fortification; it is a zero sum game in which either the reader outwits the author or vice versa.

In the pedagogical context of the *Panathenaicus*, such conflict is innocent and intended to be educational. The sympathizer characterizes the text as a sort of oral exam (πεῖραν) by means of which Isocrates desires to test whether his students can philosophize and whether they remember everything they have learned in their previous lessons (… εἰ φιλοσοφοῦμεν καὶ μεμνήμεθα τῶν ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς λεγομένων).[124] Then in the epilogue Isocrates himself

[123] Isoc. 12.247: "You will say that, after having let none of these things be, I am so disposed as you intended in regard to them [the parts of the speech as interpreted by the sympathizer], but that I do not perceive that the speech becomes worthy of less esteem through my explanation of the force of the things said and through my explication of your intention inasmuch as I made it clearer and more easily comprehensible to readers; for you will say that by producing knowledge in the ignorant I disarm the speech and rob it of the honor it would receive due to those who work through it and make an effort at understanding it."
[124] Isoc. 12.236.

describes the work as educational and technical (διδασκαλικοὺς καὶ τεχνικοὺς).[125] Thus on one level the speech is like a stumper and Isocrates like that supposedly benevolent teacher that tortures students for their own good,[126] and the reader like the sympathizer must constantly be on his guard against the ways in which Isocrates might be trying to slip one past him. Under this constant threat, the student is forced to develop a hyper-sensitivity to the tricks of the trade and in the process of doing so to interpret each aspect of the work exhaustively, projecting now one possible meaning, now another. Upon (an ideal) successful reading, the work would emerge as a carefully constructed object the manifold capacities of which for influencing or victimizing an audience have carefully been charted and contained.

From the pedagogical context it is easy to transition to a less innocent, more threatening one, and it is then that the value of this method of interpreting oratory becomes evident. Philosophical texts want to tell us something, potentially something eternal; we assume that the author is benevolent and at least believes his truth will benefit us somehow. For oratory this is usually not the case: this speech I'm reading may very well have been written by a pettifogger, sycophant, or traitor in an attempt to hoodwink me as a potential member of its prospective audience. And now it has been distributed in written form, so it must have been eminently successful. I'm reading it, then, not to learn from it but against it. The speech is armed to affect me in its own interest; reading it properly involves disarming it through a careful analysis that produces levels of meaning that correspond with projected audiences: the *Panathenaicus* can mean one thing to the *hoi polloi*, another to those in the know, and yet another to Spartans. The meanings themselves in the case of deliberative or forensic oratory are irrelevant; all that matters

[125] Isoc. 12.271. For this interpretation of τεχνικοὺς, according to which the adjective does not distinguish the work generically but rather refers to its pedagogical value, see Roth (2003), 267.
[126] I am reminded of one of my calculus teachers in high school, who regularly assigned problems before lecturing on the material needed to solve them.

is the network of correlations. In lieu of a meeting of two minds at the point of an eternal truth, reading oratory produces the appropriation, absorption of one mind by another: by interpreting the *Panathenaicus* properly I disarm the text and take it captive to serve as a slave for my own purposes. By training his students in this method of interpretation, Isocrates prepared them to deal with and use to their advantage texts from the paradigmatic tradition, for example Lysias or Isaeus.

7. Conclusion: Toward a Hermeneutic for Demosthenes

When Demosthenes' speeches were first published, his original readers would have had a variety of approaches at their disposal for interpreting them. Following Isocrates' *Helen* or Socrates' reference to τὸ ῥητορικόν, they could have placed themselves in that no man's land between thought and sensation by "not listening too closely to the thoughts." For those who find the ubiquity of *topoi* or the dearth of poetic imagery off-putting, this sort of surface reading might be said to represent the ideal perspective. As a sort of anti-hermeneutic, it will have to remain unexplored in the chapters that follow.

On the other hand, following Plato's organic metaphor and Isocrates' reformulation of it in the *Antidosis*, fourth-century readers could have consciously engaged in analysis of the speech's form and content in an attempt to determine whether it constitutes an organic body or harmony of parts. Existing side by side with this what could be called literary interest would be a technical one: how can I learn from Demosthenes' speeches to make myself a better orator? It is hard to imagine that these speeches were or could be read exclusively for pleasure. In the issue of authorial intention, which after Plato and Isocrates must have haunted every conscientious reader, the literary and technical interests can be said to interpenetrate one another. The

relationship between the textual voice of Demosthenes and his reader would have been collaborative, antagonistic, and estranged all at once. Just by existing in textual form the speeches take their place alongside those of Isocrates and Thucydides as potential paradigms for addressing the Assembly, indeed as potentially ideal paradigms. This issue of the paradigmatic status of the speeches will become particularly acute when we come to looking at their relationship to the collection of *Prooemia* in chapter 5.

Following the Spartan sympathizer, in turn, the reader must view the author as hostile and be on his guard against ways in which the speech is unconsciously affecting him. This is especially true when he himself is reciting it, as the preface to the *Antidosis* demonstrates: the author threatens to possess or at least latch on to the reader like a parasite. Finally, the author, Demosthenes, is simply inaccessible through the text of his speeches; the reader queries them, but they cannot respond.

In the chapters that follow, I will be examining the experience of reading Demosthenes' speeches on a more concrete level. I will argue that the texts themselves respond in compelling ways to the hermeneutic situation outlined in this chapter. With respect to each level of formal and substantive elaboration (style, structure, content), I will demonstrate that the speeches have been composed and preserved in such a way as to address the challenges facing any 4th century Athenian author who wished to communicate with an audience through the medium of writing and who had the ambition to make his texts speak to posterity.

CHAPTER 2

Style

Even if Demosthenes' syntax is sometimes difficult to understand, his style never should be. At least that is what Fénelon tells us: "c'est la nature qui parle elle-même dans les transports[of Demosthenes]; l'art est si achevé, qu'il n'y paraît point."[1] Ronnet makes a similar claim in her criticism of German scholarship on his style:

> Au rebours l'érudition germanique apporte dans cette étude une minutie, un souci du détail, qui, à force de relever et de codifier les figures, risquent de donner une apparence artificielle à cette éloquence toute de vie et de naturel.[2]

When reading Demosthenes, then, one should be able to grasp the effect of a given element of his style intuitively, even if he cannot give a technical account of it, for it gives the impression of being completely natural and spontaneous. Indeed, Ronnet, following Marouzeau and Buffon, saw herself as writing an account of Demosthenes' psychological development by studying the development of his style.[3] In readers from all periods,[4] his style has provoked this sort of strong impulse to identify closely with him, with the result that there has been a focus on elements that encourage a feeling of immediacy and arouse the passions to the exclusion of others that create a sense of distance between speaker and audience.

Such claims about "naturalness," however, conflict with what Demosthenes' own contemporaries had to say about his style. Pytheas, one of the men who prosecuted him in the Harpalus trials, is said to have mocked his arguments (ἐνθυμήματα) as smelling of lamp wicks.[5] Then there is the somewhat enigmatic remark by Aesion which I mentioned in the Introduction:

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[1] Fénelon (1983), 9.
[2] Ronnet (1951), 7.
[3] Ronnet, (1951), "Voici donc quel est notre objet … chercher, grâce à cette connaissance, à mieux découvrir Démosthène lui-même et son évolution intérieure, en un mot, par l'histoire du style, faire l'histoire de l'homme."
[4] Dion. *Dem*. 22; Weil (1873), IX; Dobson (1919), 240; Yunis (2001) 19.
[5] Plut. *Dem.* 8.

> Αἰσίωνα δέ φησιν Ἕρμιππος ἐπερωτηθέντα περὶ τῶν πάλαι ῥητόρων καὶ τῶν καθ' αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν, ὡς ἀκούων μὲν ἄν τις ἐθαύμασεν ἐκείνους εὐκόσμως καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς τῷ δήμῳ διαλεγομένους, ἀναγινωσκόμενοι δ' οἱ Δημοσθένους λόγοι πολὺ τῇ κατασκευῇ καὶ δυνάμει διαφέρουσιν.[6]

Whatever Aesion meant by saying this, the contrast he makes between hearing and reading and his reference to Demosthenes' superiority when it comes to κατασκευή suggests that he did not feel his style to be as natural as Fénelon and Ronnet did. Finally, there is Aeschines' reference to his insidious and base antitheses (τοῖς ἐπιβεβουλευμένοις καὶ κακοήθεσι τούτοις ἀντιθέτοις[7]). Although it is not very clear what he had in mind here, it is possible that he was referring in some way to a stylistic idiosyncrasy that he felt was (notoriously) distinctive.

Critics from later antiquity also felt that Demosthenes' style was not always entirely natural. When discussing the contexts in which the distinctive Demosthenic style occurs, Dionysius says,

> καὶ σχεδὸν ἔν τε τούτοις, καὶ ταῖς δημηγορίαις, Ὥπερ ἔφην ἂν διαγνοίης σημείῳ προχειροτάτῳ τὸν Δημοσθένους χαρακτῆρα. Τῷ δὲ ἧττον ἢ μᾶλλον αὐτοῖς κεχρῆσθαι τὸν ἄνδρα πρὸς τὰς φύσεις ἀποβλέποντα τῶν ὑποθέσεων, καὶ τὰς ἀξιώσεις τῶν προσώπων, πλανηθήσεταί τις· ὅπερ ἴσως οὐκ ἄλογον.[8]

There is not, he claims, always a direct relationship between style and the nature of the subject matter (τὰς φύσεις…τῶν ὑποθέσεων). Cicero perhaps makes the strongest claim when he says "… et vero nullus fere ab eo[Demosthenes] locus sine quadam conformatione sententiae dicitur."[9]

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[6] Hermipp. fr. 74: "Hermippus says that Aesion, when asked about the speakers of old and those of his own day, said that one would have marveled when hearing the former speaking gracefully and solemnly, but that the speeches of Demosthenes when read were far superior in construction (devices?) and power."
[7] Aeschin. 2.4.
[8] D.H. *Dem.* 9: "It is also found extensively in those of his speeches that were delivered in public actions. Broadly speaking, these and his political speeches provide the readiest illustration, in the manner I have described, of the style that is characteristically Demosthenic. But anyone who thinks that he adapted it, giving prominence to some aspects and suppressing others according to the nature of the subject and the requirements of the characters involved, will be in error; which is perhaps not unreasonable." (tr. Usher)
[9] Cic. *Orat.* 136: "… and indeed almost no passage is spoken by him without there being a certain form to the sentiment."

With regard to more recent scholarship on the issue, Yunis's statement of the "principles" of Demosthenes' style is enlightening, so it is worth quoting the first one at length:

> D.'s art is agonistic rather than epideictic; that is, form serves strictly the purpose at hand, which is to defend himself and destroy his opponent, and is not elaborated for its own sake or for any other reason. In regard to that purpose, D. presents arguments that are concrete and coherent, however misleading, erroneous, or irrelevant they may be in other respects. Even though his verbal artifice is always palpable and sometimes conspicuous, the primary commitment to the content of his message conveys the impression that he uses artistic expression to make his points clearly and effectively, not to deceive or manipulate the audience. The result is an apparent transparency between what he says and his own mind, which gives the effect of honesty and integrity.[10]

It is difficult to accept Yunis's claim that Demosthenes never elaborates the form of his political trial speeches except to defend himself and destroy his opponent. As Habinek and Ober have argued, oratory played a significant role in Athens' identity formation and in influencing its ideology,[11] and Demosthenes himself was keenly aware of this.[12] What Yunis calls elaboration of form, then, is not so easy to account for, as I will demonstrate later in this chapter in my discussion of Demosthenes' encomium of Athens. Another problem with his characterization is his insistence on excluding the epideictic.[13] His presupposition that every stylistic element must be referred to some practical agonistic or deliberative aim is anachronistic, as Cleon's criticisms of the Athenian people clearly demonstrate.[14] For he claimed that the Athenians prioritize novelty (καινότης) over what is tried and true (δεδοκιμασμένον), and they are keen to spot what sort of tricks the speaker has up his sleeve. In general, they get wrapped up in aesthetic appreciation of a speech when they should be deliberating about the welfare of the state (ἁπλῶς τε ἀκοῆς ἡδονῇ ἡσσώμενοι καὶ σοφιστῶν θεαταῖς ἐοικότες καθημένοις μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ πόλεως βουλευομένοις).

[10] Yunis (2001), 18.
[11] Habinek (2005), 49-50; Ober (1989), 338-9.
[12] Dem. 19.184. For discussion see Goldhill (2002), 45.
[13] This squeamishness about the epideictic is characteristic of many interpreters of Demosthenes' style. Cf. Kennedy (1994), 80; Jebb (1893), 309.
[14] For discussion see pg. 17.

Cleon reveals his wonderment at and confusion about this perverseness of the Athenians when he says that it is almost as though they are seeking a different world from the one in which they live. Yunis's heavy-handed insistence on the purely practical aim of style does not do justice to this aspect of the Athenian character. Blass, however, was sensitive to it when he said of the Athenian people: "...das athenische Volk war ...gewohnt, in den Versammlungen nicht bloss zu denken und zu berathen, sondern auch sich in Kunstgenuss zu weiden."[15] The Athenians, even (or especially) when the fate of their city was at stake, had their eyes on something higher, so one should be wary of saying categorically that "form serves strictly the purpose at hand."

A potentially more satisfying way to account for moments when the style seems artificial is to say that the speeches were revised for publication to an audience of readers (connoisseurs). This was the argument of Wilamowitz, who did not believe an elaborate periodic style was suitable for addressing a large crowd.[16] More recently Tuplin has contended that "… the selection, **recreation**[bolding mine] and arrangement of items in the Demosthenic demegoric *corpus* is consciously informed by considerations of a literary and paradeigmatic nature."[17] Wooten, in turn, when analyzing a difficult periodic sentence from the *First Philippic*, says that "… it is tempting to speculate... that the delivered version of the speech, at least in these sections of it, would have been simplified."[18] Perhaps one should not, then, argue that the stylistic elements in question had any rhetorical function for their original audience but rather were added to the speeches when they were revised. However, even for fourth-century readers distinguishing "written" elements from "unwritten" ones was no easy task. After an exhaustive review of the

[15] Blass (1893), III.1, 72-3.
[16] Wilamowitz (1911), 75: "Wohlgerundete Perioden und die peinlichst temperierte Wortwahl sind nicht geeignet, eine tausendköpfige Menge zu bewegen." For him this is evidence that Demosthenes' speeches were actually political pamphlets. I will discuss this so-called pamphlet theory at some length in my fifth chapter (pgs. 253 ff.).
[17] Tuplin (1998), 319. Cf. Milns (2000), 207-9.
[18] Wooten (2008), 74.

evidence,[19] O'Sullivan establishes that a basic but fluid division between written and unwritten styles was common to fourth-century theorists (Plato, Isocrates, Alcidamas, and Aristotle).[20] The unwritten, though, "… is characterized chiefly by negatives; it is the style without τέχνη, the style of the ἰδιώτης."[21] In characterizing a style, then, one talked of it as being more or less written without there being a clear boundary between the two.

In this chapter I will look at elements of Demosthenes' style that would have been conspicuous to contemporary readers and which would have created a sense of distance between them and the voice of the text. I will demonstrate that at each level of syntactical organization there are structural features that make it difficult for the reader to identify with the author. This manipulation of syntax has the effect of creating a particular *ethos*. Mader in a well-argued article has explored some of the key elements of Demosthenes' self-fashioning in the *Philippic* cycle. He characterizes the development of his self-representation thus:

> Between his earliest intervention on the Macedonian question and the retrospective in the Crown speech, a grand projection of the consummate adviser gradually takes shape, with foresight as a key point of reference.[22]

To demonstrate this, he looks at various ways in which Demosthenes crafts this image by exploiting *topoi* and presenting his own analyses of situations in hindsight. However, he does not discuss the contribution of style to this aspect of his self-fashioning. I would argue that it is in fact on the level of style that he manages to resolve a fundamental tension inherent in democratic ideology, namely that speakers had to make claims to superior foresight while acknowledging what Ober calls "the wisdom of the masses"[23] and "… the generalized faith the Athenians had in

[19] O'Sullivan (1992) 42-62.
[20] *Ibid.*, 43.
[21] *Ibid.*, 62. The positive elements of the written are not much more substantive. One has to elaborate on vague descriptors like precision (ἀκρίβεια) and clarity (σαφήνεια).
[22] Mader (2007), 341.
[23] Ober (1989), 163.

the collective knowledge, experiences, and judgment of the citizen body as a whole."[24] An adviser needs to have insight that the advisee lacks, but of course at the same time the latter does not want to be made to feel stupid or inferior. Demosthenes deals with this delicate situation in part on the level of style. Since he cannot risk making outright claims to superior intelligence and insight, he instead makes them implicitly through the way he structures his sentences. In my interpretations of various structural features of his prose, I will explore the ways in which he manipulates phrasal, clausal, and sentence structure to mold an image of a quasi-divine intellect that seems to transcend the limits of ordinary human cognition. However, it is at these moments that the style is most markedly "written," so one may doubt whether he actually spoke this way when addressing the Assembly or jury. Accordingly, in addition to the meaning of the style, the problem of its intended audience will also have to be addressed.

On the level of the phrase, I will examine Demosthenes' distinctive habit of what I will call overweighting. This analysis will focus on the articular infinitive in particular. On the level of the clause, I will look at discontinuity, a particular type of hyperbaton, and various ways of interpreting its expressive function(s). With regard to the sentence, I will analyze how Demosthenes structures a frequently occurring stereotyped form of argument, the pathetic paradox, and I will also discuss sentences that through their content call attention to their own structural expansiveness. For each aspect of style treated, I will provide evidence that the element in question would have been conspicuous to contemporary audiences; the nature of this evidence ranges from statistical frequency to the stylistic habits of Demosthenes' imitators like Dinarchus. In an attempt to understand the combined effect of all these various elements, I will place the interpretations presented throughout the chapter in relation to Demosthenes' own

[24] *Ibid.,* 163.

representation of his oratory and will address the problem of possible revision of the style for the publication of the speeches.

To return to Demosthenes' imitators, it is in fact the struggle of orators like Dinarchus that the readings presented will work towards recreating. Gildersleeve in one of his articles on the articular infinitive makes the following observation on Aristides' use of the construction:

> À propos of the whole question of apery, I have had the curiosity to examine the usage of Aristeides [of the articular infinitive] in his speech against Leptines, which is nearly as long as the corresponding speech of Demosthenes (96 per cent.). Aristeides seems to be fully aware of Demosthenes' fondness for the construction, but he overdoes it, as was to be expected, and he has some 106 articular inf.'s to Demosthenes' 71, thus carrying up the average into the neighborhood of Demosthenes' extreme, which is found in the First Olynthiac, whereas Demosthenes' Leptinea is in the neighborhood of the mean, although above it. Nor do we find anywhere in Demosthenes' Leptinea such a cumulation of art. inf.'s as we find in Aristeides. This excess of the articular infinitive, unrelieved by any of the charms that have made the Leptinea of Demosthenes one of the favorite orations in modern times as in antiquity, contributes unquestionably to the cumbrousness and unreadableness of Aristeides' fabrication, which, in spite of all the evident pains he has taken betrays to the grammatical eye the syntactical weaknesses of the age in which it was manufactured.[25]

Gildersleeve shows little sympathy for Aristides here, but his criticism undermines itself to a degree: the frequency of the articular infinitive in the latter's imitation does not exceed Demosthenes' usage at its most extreme, and the frequency in the *Leptines* itself does not precisely correspond with the overall average in his public speeches. Should Aristides have been expected to calculate the general average and to compose his imitation accordingly? And why does the *Leptines* have fewer articular infinitives than the *First Olynthiac* anyway? As Aristides' failure suggests, this is not an easy question to answer; one has to approach it feelingly and without any expectation of "understanding the author better than he understood himself."

[25] Gildersleeve (1887), 336 fn. 4.

1. The Phrase

A. The Articular Infinitive

Sigg was the first scholar to note both the exceptional frequency with which Demosthenes used the articular infinitive and the daring ways in which he did so; however, he devotes less than a page to the issue and makes his claims in general terms ("mehr als alle andern redner" and "keiner aber handhabt denselben so kühn und so meisterhaft").[26] Stix then provided an extensive catalogue of the various ways in which the articular infinitive is employed by Demosthenes.[27] It was Gildersleeve, Wagner, and Birklein, however, who first clearly demonstrated just how anomalous Demosthenes' usage was in relation to that of previous orators.[28] The table below is taken from the last of Gildersleeve's three articles on the articular infinitive.[29] In this article he compares his statistics with those of Wagner, whose results match his own very closely.

	No. of Occurrences.	§§.	*Average.*	*Per §.*	*Per Teubner p.*
Demosthenes	832	2672	1 : 3	.31 +	1.25[1]
Thukydides	134	676	1 : 5	.20 —	[1.]
Deinarchos	33 [34]	162	1 : 5	.21 —	.80[2]
Lykurgos	26	150	1 : 6	.17 +	.60
Isokrates	288	2064	1 : 7–8	.14 —	.60[3]
Antiphon	38	295	1 : 8	.13 —	.50[2]
Aischines	61	640	1 : 10	.09 +	.30
Andokides	16	219	1 : 13	.07 +	.20[2]
Isaios	37	521	1 : 14	.07 +	.25
Lysias	38	970	1 : 25	.04 —	.12[3]

Table 1. Gildersleeve's and Wagner's statistics for the articular infinitive

[26] Sigg (1873), 429.
[27] Stix (1881).
[28] Birklein (1888).
[29] Gildersleeve (1887), 332.

The statistics for the number of occurrences per section and per Teubner page were tallied by Wagner and Gildersleeve, respectively. The statistic for Demosthenes represents the frequency in his public speeches; for private speeches the average according to Gildersleeve is .80 occurrences per page. Birklein, in turn, tracked in detail not only frequency of occurrence but also the diachronic development of the use of the articular infinitive in different grammatical cases and functions. Thucydides, as he shows, played a significant role in the flowering of the articular infinitive in Attic prose: he uses it approximately nine times as often as Herodotus and in a much greater variety of ways.[30] It is also worthy of note that it occurs much more frequently in speeches than in narrative. In Lysias, however, there is an extreme drop-off: fifteen of the twenty seven authentic[31] speeches from the Lysianic corpus offer not a single example of the articular infinitive, while the remaining twelve only contain thirty six instances. When comparing Thucydides' usage with that of Demosthenes, Birklein notes that in the former a third of the instances have no modifiers at all, while this is only the case for a seventh of the instances in the latter, and Heiny has provided more precise statistics for Thucydides, calculating that the average number of words intervening between article and noun is a mere 1.85.[32] In summarizing Demosthenes' usage, Birklein states,

> Demosthenes steht, was die Frequenz des Inf mit Art. anlangt, unter allen Rednern bei weitem oben an; auch finden wir bei ihm mit ganz gerinfügigen Ausnahmen alle Formen vertreten, in denen überhaupt der Inf. mit Art. erscheinen kann.[33]

He also notes in passing the boldness of Demosthenes' constructions ("Bei den kühn gebauten complicierten Infinitivsätzen…"[34]). Since Lysias, then, a more or less perceptible rise in the

[30] Birklein (1888), 50-51.
[31] This number is that of Birklein (1888), 59. Determining the authenticity of speeches within the Lysianic corpus is notoriously difficult. Dover (1968), 193, for instance, concludes that XII is the only speech that can be attributed to Lysias and to him alone.
[32] Heiny (1973), 181.
[33] *Ibid.*, 65.
[34] *Ibid.*, 66.

frequency of the articular infinitive had occurred among the orators, and Demosthenes' usage represents an extreme development of this general trend, both with regard to frequency and plasticity. The high number for Dinarchus is, as Gildersleeve suggests, due in part at least to the influence of Demosthenes.[35]

My discussion in this section will serve as a complement the work of these scholars. While their studies focused on variety of usage (e.g. occurrences in various cases and after prepositions) and on frequency, I want to take a closer look at the structure of some of the more extreme instances in Demosthenes. As I will show, he not only uses the articular infinitive more frequently and more dynamically than other orators but also with a proportional increase in density.

The motivation for this density is not always readily apparent. For example, in *Against Meidias*, Demosthenes presents a characteristic argument of guilty defendants and the proper response in the following way:

> φεύγοντος μὲν γάρ, οἶμαι, καὶ ἠδικηκότος ἐστὶν τὸ τὸν παρόντα τρόπον τοῦ μὴ δοῦναι δίκην διακρουόμενον τὸν οὐκ ὄνθ' ὡς ἔδει γενέσθαι λέγειν, δικαστῶν δέ γε σωφρόνων τούτοις τε μὴ προσέχειν καὶ ὃν ἂν λάβωσιν ἀσελγαίνοντα κολάζειν.[36]

Nested within the articular infinitive are both a complex circumstantial participial phrase and an indirect statement. It would have been easy enough to restructure this ponderous phrase so as to make it more readily comprehensible: Demosthenes could have divided the infinitive clause into two separate articular infinitives (διακρούεσθαι καὶ ... λέγειν), or he could have placed the ὡς-clause after the infinitive. It is even more surprising that he did not choose one of these alternatives in light of the way that he structures the second part of the antithesis (why not τὸ

[35] Gildersleeve (1887), 334 fn. 1.
[36] Dem. 21.27: "For it is characteristic of a defendant, I suppose, and of one who has committed a crime to say that the mode of punishment that was not adopted should have been in an attempt to evade the one that actually has been pursued, but it belongs to sober-minded jurors not to pay attention to these things and to punish whomever they catch committing an outrage."

τούτοις μὴ προσέχοντα ὃν ἂν λάβωσιν ἀσελγαίνοντα κολάζειν?). One could perhaps argue that the needless complexity suggests to the audience's minds the shiftiness of these wrongdoers who are always making excuses based on technicalities, but this is admittedly a stretch.

There are, by contrast, instances where some sort of rhetorical effect is clearly intended. In *On the False Embassy* Demosthenes reveals Philip's greatest good fortune thus:

> Πολλὰ τοίνυν ἄν τις, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, Φίλιππον εὐδαιμονίσας τῆς τύχης εἰκότως, τοῦτο μάλιστ' ἂν εὐδαιμονίσειεν ἁπάντων, ὃ μὰ τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τὰς θεὰς οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν ἔγωγε ἄλλον ὅστις εὐτύχηκεν ἐφ' ἡμῶν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πόλεις μεγάλας εἰληφέναι καὶ χώραν πολλὴν ὑφ' ἑαυτῷ πεποιῆσθαι καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ζηλωτὰ μέν ἐστιν, οἶμαι, καὶ λαμπρά· πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ἔχοι δ' ἄν τις εἰπεῖν πεπραγμένα καὶ ἑτέροις πολλοῖς. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ἴδιον καὶ οὐδενὶ τῶν πάντων ἄλλῳ γεγονὸς εὐτύχημα. τὸ ποῖον; τὸ ἐπειδὴ πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰς τὰ πράγματ' αὐτῷ ἐδέησεν, πονηροτέρους εὑρεῖν ἢ ἐβούλετο.[37]

This passage is carefully constructed to build up a feeling of suspense in the audience: what is this gift that fortune has bestowed on Philip alone? Demosthenes vaguely refers to it twice with neuter pronouns (τοῦτο, ἐκεῖνο) and then creates a climax with the question τὸ ποῖον; The reader is thereby led to expect an answer in the form of an easily conceptualizable thing comparable to one of the items in the preceding list of Philip's good fortunes: sacking of cities, subjugation of land, etc. What he gets instead is a complex articular infinitive in which a subordinate clause has been nested (τὸ ἐπειδὴ πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰς τὰ πράγματ' αὐτῷ ἐδέησεν, πονηροτέρους εὑρεῖν ἢ ἐβούλετο). What is the significance of his choice of such a dense articular infinitive here? On the one hand due to its onerousness it is redolent of Thucydides. And yet at the last moment it grants us an unexpected release by lightening the load and placing ἢ ἐβούλετο after the infinitive.

[37] Dem. 19.67-8: "And so although one has many good reasons for calling Philip happy due to his good fortune, he would make this claim most of all with respect to this, a good fortune which by the gods and goddesses no one else whom I can name has obtained in our time. For capturing great cities, making vast tracts of land subject to himself, and all the things of this sort are certainly enviable, I think, and distinguished. How could one deny it? However, one could say that these things have been accomplished by many others. But that windfall is unique and has happened to no one else. Which one do I mean? The fact that, when he had need of base men for his activities, he found them baser than he desired." The desire to avoid the elided form ἐβούλετ' could provide justification for the ordering on the grounds of euphony, but the form occurs often enough in Demosthenes. (11 instances in a Perseus search)

It thus inflicts on the reader a momentary Thucydidean mind cramp only to swerve at the very end and give him a sense of release. The cognitive difficulty, however, abides: sacking of cities, subjugation of lands, and … the … when one is in need of them finding base men baser than he expected? It cannot easily be reduced to a verbal substantive like the gifts of fortune, even though Demosthenes has strongly encouraged us to view it synoptically with them; rather, it seems to recreate in the reader that moment of horror upon discovering that men are actually more wicked than he thought they were, for the grammatical nesting of the content of the expectation within the discovery binds them together into a single cohesive experience. Or maybe I am overthinking it and Demosthenes' only intention was to infuse his *ethos* with a touch of Thucydidean austerity?

It does seem to be the case, after all, that at times the articular infinitive is chosen merely to contribute to the construction of a particular *ethos*. This is of course a difficult argument to make, since it is hard to gauge the register of the construction. As Birklein's study shows, it appealed most to authors who adopted a more austere style, that is to Thucydides and Demosthenes. Further, in the former it occurs much more frequently in the fiendishly difficult speeches. Finally, by Lysias, the paradigm of the "simple" style, it is used quite sparingly. Even if it had become more fashionable by the mid-fourth century, it seems safe to assume that the use of it, especially when daring or involved, signified something to audiences. In the *Fourth Philippic* Demosthenes tells the Assembly why those who ally themselves with Philip have been successful:

> … καὶ κεκρατήκασιν οἱ δι' ἐκείνου τὰς πολιτείας ποιούμενοι πᾶσιν ὅσοις πράγματα πράττεται, πρώτῳ μὲν πάντων καὶ πλείστῳ τῷ τοῖς βουλομένοις χρήματα λαμβάνειν ἔχειν τὸν δώσονθ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν, δευτέρῳ δὲ καὶ οὐδὲν ἐλάττονι τούτου τῷ δύναμιν τὴν καταστρεψομένην τοὺς ἐναντιουμένους αὐτοῖς ἐν οἷς ἂν αἰτήσωσι χρόνοις παρεῖναι.[38]

[38] Dem. 10.5: "… and those who make their policies through Philip's influence have been dominant by every means by which things are done, the first and foremost of which being the fact that they have someone who will give

Here there does not seem to be any attempt to affect the audience emotionally. In regard to *ethos*, though, perhaps one wants a political adviser who is perspicacious enough to view and comprehend complicated states of affairs as though they were simple entities, who, when I need to boil down the cause to vague corruption, can see more broadly "the having one who will give money to those who want to take it," who can think of such a situation as a simple dative of means.

Finally, there are instances where the articular infinitive interacts with the structure of the rest of the sentence in such a way as to problematize a direct response to the text with respect to *ethos* or *pathos*. In *On the False Embassy*, when Demosthenes is reminding the audience of the events that took place after his and Aeschines' return from the second embassy, he tells them how he knew that the latter was trying to deceive them and how he responded:

> Ἀκούων τοίνυν ἐγὼ τηλικαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἐπαγγελλομένου τούτου, καὶ ἀκριβῶς εἰδὼς ὅτι ψεύδεται,--καὶ ὅθεν, φράσω πρὸς ὑμᾶς, πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ τοῦ, ὅτε τοὺς ὅρκους ἔμελλε Φίλιππος ὀμνύναι τοὺς περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης, ἐκσπόνδους ἀποφανθῆναι τοὺς Φωκέας ὑπὸ τούτων[Aeschines and Philocrates], ὃ σιωπᾶν καὶ ἐᾶν εἰκὸς ἦν, εἴπερ ἤμελλον σῴζεσθαι· ἔπειτα ἐκ τοῦ μὴ τοὺς παρὰ τοῦ Φιλίππου πρέσβεις ταῦτα λέγειν μηδὲ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν τὴν Φιλίππου, ἀλλὰ τοῦτον-- ἐκ τούτων οὖν τεκμαιρόμενος, ἀναστὰς, καὶ παρελθὼν ἐπειρώμην μὲν ἀντιλέγειν, ὡς δ' ἀκούειν οὐκ ἠθέλετε, ἡσυχίαν ἔσχον ...[39]

On the one hand, it seems easy enough to provide a plausible interpretation of the expressive function of this sentence in broad strokes: due to the virtual destruction of Phocis that followed the events Demosthenes narrates here, his valiant effort to persuade the Athenians to heed his wise counsel and their failure to listen make for a moving tragic effect. This if any seems to be a

money on their behalf to those who want to receive it. A second resource that is no less significant is having at their disposal a force to subdue their opponents at any time they require it."

[39] Dem. 19.44-5: "And so, as I was listening to that man making such astounding promises, and knowing precisely that he was lying—and from what source, I will point out to you, first from the fact that, when Philip was just about to swear the oaths about the peace, the Phocians were revealed to be outside its terms by those men, which it was reasonable to keep quiet about and to let pass, if they were actually going to be saved; next, from the fact that the ambassadors from Philip were not saying these things nor the letter of Philip, but that man—judging, then, from these facts, after I had stood up and come forward, I kept trying to oppose him, but since you were unwilling to hear me, I held my peace…."

passage where, to use Milns' phrase, "the passion leaps out from the printed page." But there is a tension in the structure of the sentence that is not so easy to deal with. The participles leading up to ἐπειρώμην (Ἀκούων, εἰδὼς, τεκμαιρόμενος, ἀναστὰς, παρελθὼν) present Demosthenes' thoughts and actions in a comprehensible sequence and vividly focalize the situation from his perspective at the time: because the first three, which all are stative or present and refer to acts of perception or of the intellect, are simultaneous with and provide the motivation both for the two aorist participles that follow and for the main verb, they encompass the three different stages of events related in the sentence (I stood up, then I came forward, then I tried to respond, all the while hearing, knowing, judging). The entire narrative, then is framed by Demosthenes' experience of it. However, within this vivid focalization he inserts a conspicuously artificial construction, namely the two elaborately extended articular infinitives that relate his reasons for coming forward to speak (τοῦ … ἀποφανθῆναι and τοῦ …λέγειν). Note further that the first of these is characterized by extreme separation of the article from the infinitive by an entire temporal subordinate clause. The focalization, then, occurs in conjunction with conscious and conspicuous stylization of only a part of the experience focalized. This complicates the reader's response to the text: one feels drawn into Demosthenes' thoughts and perceptions at this moment only to encounter suddenly something that does not feel spontaneous or natural at all. Further, he is forced to try to use his mind's eye to make deductions (εἰδὼς …ἐκ … and ἐκ τούτων … τεκμαιρόμενος) from circumstances presented synoptically in the form of articular infinitives which, due to their complexity, cannot simply be paraphrased as verbal nouns. The passion of the sentence, then, flows from the tragically unsuccessful emotional response of a godlike intellect to his timeless, synoptic view of a complex situation which is inaccessible to the reader. In the end,

one is not so much taking pleasure in Demosthenes' passionate language as wondering what sort of passion knowing from articular infinitives provokes.

There also lingers the issue of the interpretability of such a difficult sentence for the members of the jury; it is difficult enough just to read, after all. One solution would be to place a stop after the parenthesis and so treat the participles that begin the sentence as an anacoluthon. The explanation for the interruption of the syntax would be the inordinate length of the parenthesis. However, if the structure is the result of revision for publication,[40] then it would provide significant insight on the function of and motivation for such revision. The extended parenthesis and the participial phrase referring back to it (ἐκ τούτων οὖν τεκμαιρόμενος) could easily have been added to a much simpler and more easily digestible sentence. Becoming written would involve interposing a sequence of deductions (τεκμαιρόμενος) between perception (Ἀκούων) and reaction (ἀναστὰς). In one respect this makes the written Demosthenes more real than the hypothetical spoken one insofar as the text represents a psychologically plausible synthesis: the actions he takes are motivated by his hearing of Aeschines' claims and his intellectual response to them (I know he is lying based on …). The whole sequence of events, then, can be seen as linked. But it is hard to imagine that his thoughts actually occurred to him in anything like the form in which they are presented in the text. Thus the written Demosthenes is a paradox: the reader simultaneously feels closer to but yet farther from the sublime orator than his original audience did. Assuming, of course, that he did revise the style.

[40] For discussion of this possibility, see pgs. 246-47.

B. Orders of Entities

The preceding discussion focused on the ways in which Demosthenes structured his articular infinitives and on understanding the expressive function of the construction in context. In this section I want to draw attention to another distinctive aspect of his usage which, though noted in some form by previous scholars, has not been fully understood. Denniston in his survey of Greek prose style identifies a characteristic of it that has long been recognized: "In most Greek prose-writers *abstract substantives are seldom made the subject of verbs*: the normal agents are human beings."[41] There is a confusion here between syntactic and semantic categories (subject and agent), but the most significant limitation of Denniston's discussion is the vagueness of his conceptualization of "abstraction." For instance, he discusses the articular infinitive separately from "abstract substantives" and calls the former "less abstract" than the latter.[42] Radford in his study of the use of abstracts in Thucydides and the Attic orators does present a system of classifying abstract nouns, but it is not hierarchical, and articular infinitives are not included.[43] This lack of clarity obscures an important aspect of Demosthenes' usage, for he not only uses abstracts in general as subject more frequently than orators of the plain style as Radford notes,[44] but he is also more daring in the kinds of abstracts he is willing to use as subject. By applying a more rigorous and explicit system of classification of nouns, I will demonstrate that Demosthenes creates cognitive strain by making articular infinitives as well as other abstract entities the subjects of verbs that ordinarily would require an agent or an experiencer.

[41] Denniston (1952), 28. Cf. Sidgwick (1908), 51.
[42] Denniston (1952), 37.
[43] Radford (1901), 3-4 and 7.
[44] *Ibid.*, 6-7.

Simon Dik, expanding on Lyons' distinction between three types of entities,[45] formulates a typology that comprises four orders : zero-order, a property or relation, for example Peter's intelligence, Peter's sense of humor; first-order, a spatial entity, for example Peter, dog, stone, etc.; second-order, a state of affairs, an event, occurrence, for example, sunset, arrival; third-order, a possible fact, for example John believed that Peter had opened the safe; fourth-order, a speech act, for example John tried to answer Peter's question why he had not called earlier.[46] I have used Dik's classification instead of Lyons because distinguishing zero-order entities or properties will be important for the discussion that follows.

With regard to second-order entities or states of affairs, the gamut of instances is quite broad. On the one end, there is the following example from the *First Olynthiac*:

> τὸ γὰρ εἶναι πάντων ἐκεῖνον ἕνα ὄντα κύριον καὶ ῥητῶν καὶ ἀπορρήτων καὶ ἅμα στρατηγὸν καὶ δεσπότην καὶ ταμίαν, καὶ πανταχοῦ αὐτὸν παρεῖναι τῷ στρατεύματι, πρὸς μὲν τὸ τὰ τοῦ πολέμου ταχὺ καὶ κατὰ καιρὸν πράττεσθαι πολλῷ προέχει, πρὸς δὲ τὰς καταλλαγάς, ἃς ἂν ἐκεῖνος ποιήσαιτο ἅσμενος πρὸς Ὀλυνθίους, ἐναντίως ἔχει. [47]

Because the verbs in this sentence do not refer to activity, the use of the second-order abstract here is not very striking. Somewhat more marked are the following instances:

> (a) καίτοι θεάσασθε ὅσας συμφορὰς παρασκευάζει τὸ τῶν τοιούτων ἐθέλειν ἀκροᾶσθαι.[48]
>
> (b) ἀλλ', οἶμαι, νῦν μὲν ἐπισκοτεῖ τούτοις τὸ κατορθοῦν·[49]

The first argument of παρασκευάζω can be filled by a noun having the semantic function agent or cause,[50] and for ἐπισκοτέω cause is the only function attested. For both verbs, however, the

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[45] Lyons (1977) II, 443.
[46] Some of the examples and the classification have been taken from Dik (1997), 137.
[47] Dem. 1.4: "For the fact that, though being only one man, he is in control of all things open and secret and is at the same time a general, master and administrator, and the fact that in every place he is present in person with his military force, this all is greatly advantageous for swift and timely accomplishment of the affairs of the war, but the opposite is true when it comes to the reconciliation he would gladly make with the Olynthians."
[48] Dem. 9.55: "And yet observe how many misfortunes willingness to listen to such men furnishes."
[49] Dem. 2.20: "But success, I suppose, currently overshadows these things."
[50] Instances of the latter are Isoc. 1.38 (δικαιοσύνη ... παρασκευάζει) and Lys. 2.2 (παρεσκεύασεν ἡ τούτων ἀρετὴ).

cause is usually something more concrete: as the other examples of παρασκευάζω cited show, it is often a property, and of the other two instances of ἐπισκοτέω in Demosthenes, one (11.13) is almost identical to the one cited here, with τὸ κατορθοῦν functioning as subject, while in the other a physical entity, Meidias' mansion, is literally overshadowing all the neighboring houses (21.158). Accordingly, one state of affairs furnishing another or overshadowing things would probably have been felt to be mildly marked. Finally, at the other end of the spectrum is the following instance in which a second-order entity functions as first argument of a verb that normally requires an experiencer:

> νῦν δ' ἤδη περιερχόμεθ' ἡμεῖς τί δέδοκται τοῖς ἄλλοις σκοποῦντες, καὶ ὠτακουστοῦντες τί τὰ τῶν Ἀρκάδων, τί τὰ τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων, ποῖ πάρεισι Φίλιππος, ζῇ ἢ τέθνηκεν. οὐ τοιαῦτα ποιοῦμεν; ἐγὼ δ' οὐ δέδοικα εἰ Φίλιππος ζῇ, ἀλλ' εἰ τῆς πόλεως τέθνηκεν τὸ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας μισεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι.[51]

The choice of τέθνηκεν is clearly motivated here by a desire for contrast with Φίλιππος ζῇ, but it is striking nonetheless. Classifying the articular infinitive is somewhat difficult: on the one hand, due to the dependent possessive genitive it could be classified as a zero order entity, that is as a property of the city; on the other, Demosthenes also has legal process in mind. The sentence, then, is doubly challenging: one has to imagine a dying of... hatred and vengeance or of hating and avenging?

There is also at least one instance where Demosthenes uses a fourth-order entity, that is a speech act, as subject of a verb that normally takes a personal subject in the role agent:

> Ταῦτα τοίνυν καὶ πόλλ' ἕτερ' ἐνῆν παραχρῆμα τότ' εὐθὺς ἐξελέγχειν καὶ διδάσκειν ὑμᾶς καὶ μὴ προέσθαι τὰ πράγματ' ἐᾶν, εἰ μὴ Θεσπιαὶ καὶ Πλαταιαὶ καὶ τὸ Θηβαίους αὐτίκα δὴ μάλα δώσειν δίκην ἀφείλετο τὴν ἀλήθειαν.[52]

[51] Dem. 19.288-9: "And now we are going around focusing on what everyone else has decided and eavesdropping to hear 'what news of the Arcadians, of the Amphictyony, where is Philip headed, is he alive or dead?' Do we not do such things? And I am not afraid if Philp is alive, but rather if the city's hatred for and exacting vengeance on those who commit injustice is dead."

[52] Dem. 19.42: "And so these and many other things it would have been possible to refute right then, and it would have been possible to inform you and not to allow you to abandon the situation, if Thespeae and Plataeae and Thebes about to pay the price without delay had not stolen away the truth."

The subjects of the clause in question Θεσπιαὶ καὶ Πλαταιαὶ καὶ τὸ Θηβαίους αὐτίκα δὴ μάλα δώσειν δίκην refer to claims made by Aeschines, as is made clear by Vince's translation: "if you had not been cheated out of the truth by that **story of** [bolding mine] Thespiae and Plataea and the imminent punishment of the Thebans."[53] Aeschines' claims, then, stole away the truth. A more typical way of expressing the same sentiment would be something like "If Aeschines had not deceived you in saying that ..." (εἰ Αἰσχίνης μὴ ἐξηπάτησεν ὑμᾶς, φάσκων ...). A further complication is the form of the subjects: there is no explicit indicator that Demosthenes is referring to claims about Thespiae and Plataeae or to what Aeschines said about Thebes paying the penalty. This compression makes it ambiguous as to whether the subjects refer to the hopes instilled by Aeschines' lies or the lies themselves. Thespiae and Plataeae are just there in the nominative, as if one could simply reach out and grab them, and similarly one sees directly the prospect of Thebes getting her due; the allure is palpable. Whichever way one interprets the subjects, it is still hard to personify a prospect or a promise as stealing away the truth.

C. Noun Phrases

With regard to the noun phrase, there seems to have been a conscious attempt on Demosthenes' part to weigh it down to its load bearing limit. A paradigmatic example of this is the following phrase from *Against Aristocrates*:

> διὰ τὴν τῶν καταράτων καὶ θεοῖς ἐχθρῶν ῥητόρων, τῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα γραφόντων ἑτοίμως, πονηρίαν[54]

The space between τὴν and πονηρίαν is immense, and what's more there seems to be a pause and subsequent development not only mid-phrase but even mid-midphrase: "due to the baseness of the public speakers, accursed and enemies to the gods, that is the ones who propose such things,

[53] Vince (1926) *ad loc*.
[54] Dem. 23.201.

and willingly at that." All of this happens between the article and the head of the phrase. Because Demosthenes is talking about how the value of gifts bestowed by the city has diminished in recent years and because this prepositional phrase is going to tell us the cause, we should be able to anticipate that something like πονηρία is coming. One could compare the following from *Against Meidias*:

> Τίς οὖν ὑπερβολή, τίς ὁμοία τῇ τούτου γέγον' ἢ γένοιτ' ἂν πονηρία;[55]

Here ὑπερβολή suggests that something bad is coming in the next part of the rhetorical question, so perhaps this makes the hyperbaton τίς … πονηρία easier for the audience to handle. A similar explanation might be offered for the following difficult phrase that opens one of the *Prooemia*: **Ἡ μὲν εἰωθυῖα πάντα τὸν χρόνον βλάπτειν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὴν πόλιν λοιδορία** καὶ ταραχὴ καὶ νυνὶ γέγονε παρὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ὥνπερ ἀεί.[56] The vocative intervenes between article and noun and also separates the infinitive from its direct object; however, after εἰωθυῖα … βλάπτειν one can anticipate that something like λοιδορία is coming. But even so what is the effect of these disjointed phrases? One is reminded of Cleon's criticisms in Thucydides to the effect that the Athenians treat deliberative assemblies like epideictic performances and that they delight in trying to anticipate the sort of rhetorical tricks that the speaker is going to use. Perhaps there is an anticipatory pleasure in these phrases: by the time we actually get to the head of the phrase, we should already have predicted it and thus derived satisfaction from saying it to ourselves before the speaker does.

In the *Second Olynthiac,* Demosthenes expresses somewhat ambivalent praise of Philip's character:

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[55] Dem. 21.122: "What excess, what baseness has or even could be comparable to that of this man?"
[56] Dem. *Ex.* 53.1: "The abuse and disturbance, men of Athens, which have always been accustomed to harm the city have come about from the same men as they always have."

> ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν δόξης ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ τοῦτ' ἐζήλωκεν, καὶ προῄρηται πράττων καὶ κινδυνεύων, ἂν συμβῇ τι, παθεῖν, τὴν τοῦ διαπράξασθαι ταῦτα ἃ μηδεὶς πώποτε ἄλλος Μακεδόνων βασιλεὺς δόξαν ἀντὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἀσφαλῶς ἠρημένος·[57]

Between the article and head noun (τὴν ... δόξαν) there is sandwiched not only an articular infinitive but also a relative clause. One might have expected Demosthenes to lighten the load a bit by placing the head first and then repeating the article (τὴν δόξαν τὴν τοῦ ... Μακεδόνων), as Isocrates does when expressing a similar sentiment about Theseus.[58] Why, then, does he choose the more ponderous and strained phrasal structure? The content of the phrase represents an ambivalent assessment of Philip's achievements: he certainly deserves praise for not being cowardly and indolent, but he is also somewhat hubristic for thinking he can dare to do more than any of his predecessors have; further, this sentence occurs in the midst of Demosthenes' attempt to demonstrate to the Athenians that Philip's power is not as secure as they might think, so it can hardly serve to magnify or substantiate Philip's reputation. Perhaps the unnaturalness of the phrase reflects the unnaturalness of its content: the phrase is too big, too grand, hard to understand, and so is Philip's success. As we will see in chapter 4, the problem of verbalizing Philip will also be reflected in the metaphors Demosthenes uses in the same speech to characterize his eventual downfall (see pgs. 215 ff.).

The phrase might also remind the reader of Thucydides. Rusten distinguishes a penchant for "lengthy attributive phrases" as characteristic of his style. The instances he cites,[59] however, are at the same time more and less dense than the aforementioned ones from Demosthenes: while in at least one example (τῇ τε οὖν ἐπὶ πολὺ κατὰ τὴν χώραν αὐτονόμῳ οἰκήσει) three attributes

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[57] Dem. 2.15: "But he desires fame and has eagerly pursued it, and he has chosen to suffer whatever befalls him while doing things and taking risks, because he has preferred the glory of accomplishing what no other king of the Macedonians ever has accomplished to living securely."

[58] Isoc. 12.128: καὶ μᾶλλον [Theseus]εἵλετο τὴν δόξαν τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν πόνων καὶ τῶν ἀγώνων εἰς ἅπαντα τὸν χρόνον μνημονευθησομένην ἢ τὴν ῥᾳθυμίαν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τὴν διὰ τὴν βασιλείαν ἐν τῷ παρόντι γιγνομένην.

[59] Rusten (1989), 23. Thuc. 2.37.2: τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὑποψίαν; 2.39.1: τῷ ἀφ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐς τὰ ἔργα εὐψύχῳ; 2.16.1: τῇ τε οὖν ἐπὶ πολὺ κατὰ τὴν χώραν αὐτονόμῳ οἰκήσει; 2.39.3: τὴν ἐν τῇ γῇ ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπίπεμψιν.

are sandwiched between article and noun, more than occur in the examples from Demosthenes,[60] Thucydides does not seem to interpose entire (finite[61]) subordinate clauses, nor does he interpose attributes that are themselves structurally difficult like τῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα γραφόντων ἑτοίμως. More precisely, one can say that Thucydides modifies the meaning of the head by building up chains of attributes, while Demosthenes prefers to add nuance to the attributive material by elaborating on a single attribute at length.

The precise poetic/rhetorical effect of the phrases discussed above is hard to gauge. It is perhaps significant that in each case the head noun is relatively colorless. Πονηρία is ubiquitous in the orators (in the Perseus corpus, the five authors who use it most frequently are in descending order: Dinarchus, Theophrastus, the Old Oligarch, Lysias, and Isocrates.) Perhaps the structuring in one of the examples discussed above (τὴν τῶν καταράτων καὶ θεοῖς ἐχθρῶν ῥητόρων, τῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα γραφόντων ἑτοίμως, πονηρίαν) represents a way of reinvigorating a desiccated element of the oratorical repertoire: if one just hears πονηρία, he might be inclined to start ignoring whatever you have to say as mere rhetorical trumpery before you even get to the attribute; if, however, you infuse the term with meticulously precise coloring first--not just baseness, but "the belonging to slippery rhetoricians, accursed and enemies to the gods, those who propose such things, and willingly, baseness," then what was empty bombast becomes a vivid representation of a particular sort of vice. As for the second example (τὴν τοῦ διαπράξασθαι ταῦθ' ἃ μηδεὶς πώποτ' ἄλλος Μακεδόνων βασιλεὺς δόξαν), the delay might reinforce the ambivalence that Demosthenes seems to feel toward Philip. Should δόξα be

[60] Three occur at Dem. 20.76 (τῆς ἐν ἑκάστῳ νῦν περὶ αὐτοῦ **δόξης** ὑπαρχούσης), but they are much easier to digest.
[61] There is at least one example of a nested genitive absolute: Thuc. 2.39.1.

translated as “notoriety” or “glory”? the relative clause seems to provoke a productive ambiguity when one comes to the head noun.

I have argued above that the noun phrases I have examined are carefully constructed so as to allow the audience to anticipate the delayed head. However, this does not change the fact that the phrases in question are still highly artificial: a speaker of ancient Greek presumably would not interpose direct address between article and noun. In line with my general argument about the function of the style, this artificiality can be explained with reference to the original audience as contributing to a particular *ethos*: it presents Demosthenes’ thinking as if it had a superhuman breadth and comprehensiveness to it. Further, if any members of the audience were familiar with Thucydides, they might have associated these phrases with the peculiar intellectual concentration of his prose. For readers, in turn, such phrases have a distinctive writtenness to them. Whether Demosthenes thought this way spontaneously or carefully crafted these phrases, the style at these moments reflects a written mind, that is one that has been meticulously crafted with the aid of writing or simply informed by literary influences like Thucydides (whom, it was said, Demosthenes knew by heart[62]). Apart from its rhetorical function in context, the capacity of the phrases represents writing’s potential for informing thought. Simple nouns like δόξα or λοιδορία can be expanded and colored in ways that would be difficult to conceive of for an unwritten style.

2. The Clause

When it comes to hyperbaton, one begins reading Demosthenes with a rather confused set of presuppositions. Scholars have attempted to account for the figure on the level of aesthetics,

[62] Zosimus (Biogr. Gr. W. 299, 47ss.) claimed that Demosthenes could recite the whole of Thucydides’ *Historiae* from memory.

affect, and cognition. Pervasive in all accounts is the problematic term "emphasis."[63] For Blass one of the important functions of the figure is to keep the audience on its toes:

> In jedem Falle aber wird durch das Hyperbaton das Verständniss erschwert, und nicht nur der Leser, sondern auch der Hörer, dem der ausdrucksvolle Vortrag zu Hülfe kam, hatte den Geist stets rege und angespannt zu erhalten. [64]

Ronnet, in turn, referring to instances with "descending emphasis," argues that the figure is intended to reflect a disturbance in the speaker and to bind him to the audience on an emotional level:

> dans l'autre [descendant] au contraire, orateur et auditoire éprouvent ensemble les mêmes impressions, le second est intimement associé aux émotions du premier dans l'ordre même où elles se produisent.[65]

With regard to those who explain the figure as having a particular aesthetic effect, Lausberg sees in hyperbaton a way of creating on the level of the clause what periodic structuring does for the sentence:

> It is the accomplishment of hyperbaton to lend even to the simple sentence the cyclic tension between those referential elements that are in need of resolution, and those that can provide the resolution … and thus to make the sentence appear of equal value to the period.[66]

Denniston, in addition to citing this periodic effect, also argues that "...alternating rise and fall of emphasis produce a pleasing effect."[67] Taking all of these explanations into account, when I encounter a given instance, I could tell myself: the isolated words are merely accentuated; or I should be empathizing with the emotional disturbance and strong passion that Demosthenes is feeling here; or I should be savoring a pure aesthetic delight in the cyclicity of the thing. The first two motivations differ merely in degree, but the second and the third are mutually exclusive insofar as periodic structuring is a deliberate and conscious attempt to create a feeling of cyclicity or return and thus precludes the idea of emotional disturbance.

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[63] See Dover (1960), 32-3 for discussion of this problem.
[64] Blass (1893) III.1, 145.
[65] Ronnet (1951), 45.
[66] Lausberg (1998), sec. 716.
[67] Denniston (1952), 59.

Another problem with accounting for the figure is the fact that in Demosthenes its correspondence with a difference in meaning has been weakened. Because Thucydides seems only to have been concerned with the meaning and not with the rhythm of his prose, it is a safe assumption in his case that a given instance of hyperbaton has some expressive function. In Demosthenes, however, there are cases where normal word order is disturbed at least in part to avoid a tribrach or hiatus, as exemplified by the following instance from one of the *Prooemia*: τὴν μὲν οὖν τούτων σπουδὴν οὐδ' ὑμῶν ἴσως ἀγνοοῦσιν οἱ πολλοί·[68] The word order here is odd, but the irregularity was presumably motivated by the fact that there is no position before the verb where οἱ πολλοί could have been placed without creating hiatus. In light of instances like this, hyperbaton had potentially less expressive significance for Demosthenes than it did for Thucydides.

On the other hand, concomitant with this potential loss in meaning is an increase in another respect. Lausberg and Denniston speak of the periodic effect as though it is a natural and inevitable function of the figure; they do not discuss its relation to the normal structure of the clause in Greek, nor do they put this in relation to the historical development of periodicity. This of course is a difficult subject in and of itself, but I will side with Grube and Usher in assigning a later date to the advent of periodicity than is traditional, that is I will reject the position of those who make Thrasymachus the discoverer and will attribute the advent of the period to Isocrates instead.[69] Now the clause in Greek according to the model put forward by Helma Dik is only naturally periodic when it is very short, that is when it only consists of a topic, focus, and verb and possibly some setting elements; otherwise, remaining, non-salient elements are placed to the

[68] Dem. *Ex.* 49.3: "And so perhaps neither are the majority of you unaware of the aim of these men."
[69] Grube (1952); Usher (1973), 41.

right of the verb thus making the clause non-periodic.[70] One should assume that when authors such as Isocrates and Demosthenes started capping clauses with the verb and striving for periodicity in other ways, for example by interrupting one clause with another,[71] that this might have had broader ramifications for its expressive potential. Once one began to expect a sense of finality at the end of the clause, it became possible to play with this expectation in other ways; hence, hyperbaton, which before the advent of periodicity may have served simply to highlight a given element or ease information distribution, now became another way of creating a sense of cyclicity. Thus one can say that the figure is both more and less meaningful in Demosthenes than it is in Thucydides. Accordingly, taking into account the various proposed interpretations of the figure, its relationship to rhythm and to the historical development of periodicity, one has to deal not only with the question of what hyperbaton means but also with the problem of how much it means.

In order to get a better sense of Demosthenes' usage, I have examined all of the instances of a particular type of hyperbaton called discontinuity in the *Olynthiacs*, *Philippics*, the *Prooemia*, and selections from *On the False Embassy* and *Against Meidias*. Discontinuity occurs when an element of a noun phrase is separated from the rest of the phrase by one or more words. For example, in ἀπὸ τῶν ὑμετέρων ὑμῖν πολεμεῖ συμμάχων, the head of the noun phrase συμμάχων is separated from the article and possessive adjective τῶν ὑμετέρων by ὑμῖν πολεμεῖ. As comparanda for Demosthenes' speeches I selected works by several other authors of Attic prose. In the table below, I have included the following types of discontinuity: instances where an attribute is separated from its head and preposed, what Devine and Stephens call Y_1

[70] H. Dik (1995) 12 ff.
[71] See Dionysius's analysis of the Demosthenic style (D.H. *Dem*. 9).

hyperbaton; instances in which the head is separated from its attribute and preposed, Devine and Stephens' Y_2 hyperbaton;[72] and separation of a dependent genitive from the noun on which it depends. Cases in which the only word(s) separating the two elements were post-positives or quasi-postpositives have been excluded.

Speech	Instances per page
First Olynthiac	1.800
Second Olynthiac	1.810
Third Olynthiac	2.455
First Philippic	1.375
Second Philippic	0.889
Third Philippic	1.571
Aeschines: *False Embassy* (§§1-29)(Teubner)	1.143
§§97-118	1.100
§§144-161	0.400
Demosthenes: *False Embassy* §§1-40(Teubner)	2.357
Demosthenes: *Meidias* (§§1-34)	2.1667
Demosthenes: *Prooemia* (OCT)	1.149
Isocrates: *Archidamus*	1.480
Isocrates: *Areopagiticus*	1.889
Lysias 12	0.333
Nicias' First Speech(Thuc. 6.9-14, app. 3.6 pgs.)	0.000
Alcibiades' Speech (Thuc. 6.16-18, app. 2.8 pgs.)	0.714

Table 2. Frequency of Discontinuity

[72] Devine and Stephens (2000).

As can be seen from this table, discontinuity occurs much more frequently in Demosthenes than it does in Lysias or Aeschines. However, one should not be too quick to attribute any particular significance to this statistic since Isocrates too employs the figure much more frequently than the latter two orators. This problematizes any simple association of hyperbaton with emotional disturbance or passion. The higher frequency in Demosthenes and Isocrates can perhaps in part be attributed to the stricter rhythmical standards of these two, though according to Blass Aeschines was quite fastidious about avoiding hiatus in *On the False Embassy* at least.[73] However, if one assumes that rhythmical considerations can only partially account for the disparity, and probably for only a very small part, then the significance of the higher frequency in Demosthenes still has to be dealt with. In an attempt to do so, I will examine various instances in his speeches, and, using the interpretations proposed by Blass, Ronnet, and Lausberg among others along with my own, I will attempt to integrate the function of the figure into the dynamic of his style more generally.

As mentioned above, Blass and others have argued that hyperbaton increases the cognitive difficulty of the clause and thus forces the audience to pay closer attention to what's being said. This can be seen most clearly in two types of instances: first, those that require re-analysis to be understood properly; second, those without any context to aid the audience's understanding. Examples of the first type are (a)-(d) below:

(a) ... ἅπαντα μὲν ἡμῶν προείληφε τὰ χωρία ἄνθρωπος[Philip] ... [74]

(b) νῦν δ' ἅπανθ' ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀγορᾶς ἐκπέπραται ταῦτα ... [75]

[73] Blass (1893) III.2, 232.
[74] Dem. 3.16: "...The man has anticipated us in seizing all the strategic locations...."
[75] Dem. 9.39: "But now as if from the market all these things have been sold off."

(c) εἰ μὲν γάρ τις ἀνήρ ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς οἷος ἔμπειρος πολέμου καὶ ἀγώνων, τούτους μὲν φιλοτιμίᾳ πάντας ἀπωθεῖν αὐτὸν ἔφη, βουλόμενον πάντα αὑτοῦ δοκεῖν εἶναι τἄργα.[76]

(d) καὶ ἔτι πρὸς τούτῳ πρῶτον μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸν μέγιστον τῶν ἐκείνου πόρων ἀφαιρήσεσθε. ἔστι δ' οὗτος τίς; ἀπὸ τῶν ὑμετέρων ὑμῖν πολεμεῖ συμμάχων, ἄγων καὶ φέρων τοὺς πλέοντας τὴν θάλατταν.[77]

In all of these examples, what first could be construed as a substantival neuter plural has to be re-analyzed later as an adjective modifying a discontinuous head noun. The frequency of passages requiring re-analysis to be understood correctly has recently been used by Vatri as a means of determining the difficulty of a given text[78] and as an indicator of whether it was intended for private circulation.[79] Such instances, then, presumably would have demanded increased attention from the audience. In addition to this, though, I would argue that the re-analysis in each of these examples has an expressive function. In ex. (a), ἅπαντα does not necessarily anticipate a head; indeed, Demosthenes elsewhere imagines the unthinkable possibility of Athens abandoning "all things".[80] For a moment the audience sees Philip seizing first not only territory but everything collectively; the delayed head then gives the claim a more specific reference. By using this type of hyperbaton here, Demosthenes first instills in his audience a more general sense of shame at the thought that Philip has anticipated them at every turn, then he makes a more concrete criticism in concluding the clause which will be continued in the second part of the antithesis. The postponement of ταῦτα in (b) has a similar effect: the situation is first presented in hyperbolically dire terms (*everything* has been sold like mere merchandise), then there is a return to the particular things that have been put up for sale at the end of the clause. Ex. (c) is somewhat

[76] Dem. 2.18: "He said that, if any man among them is experienced in war and conflict, all such men he drives away because of his ambition, desiring as he does for all accomplishments to seem to be his own."
[77] Dem. 4.34: "And what's more in addition to this, men of Athens, first you will take away the greatest of his resources. What's this? That it is with your own allies that he wages war with you, plundering and pillaging the ones that sail the sea."
[78] Vatri (2013), 140 ff.
[79] *Ibid.*, 176ff.
[80] Dem. 8.49: οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' εἴ τις ἄλλος λέγει καὶ ὑμᾶς πείθει, ἔστω, μὴ ἀμύνεσθε, **ἅπαντα πρόεσθε**. Cf. also 9.36 and 18.101.

more difficult since τἄργα doesn't really contribute much to the meaning of the sentence. Here the discontinuity seems motivated by a desire to accentuate Philip's megalomania as much as possible by juxtaposing "all" with "belonging to himself." Due to the context, (d) is a particularly illuminating example. Demosthenes creates a feeling of suspense by employing his characteristic *anthypophora*: what is this greatest source of revenue? Shockingly, it turns out to be Athens' own resources—or rather allies. In order to maximize the paradoxical sting of the claim, Demosthenes juxtaposes τῶν ὑμετέρων with ὑμῖν even though this creates a rather harsh hyperbaton since συμμάχων is not at all inferable; further, since he often uses τὰ ὑμέτερα without a head to refer generally to what belongs to the Athenians,[81] the audience would first construe the claim as a general one about Philip's exploitation of their own resources only to have to reanalyze it as a more specific claim about their allies. The significance of the hyperbaton here could be interpreted in several ways. Due to the need for reanalysis, it forces the reader to focus his attention on the claim Demosthenes is making. With respect to *ethos*, it gives him the sense that Demosthenes' mind is always working on two planes: on the hand he is dealing with particular actions of Philip like his use of Athens' allies against her; on the other he is also viewing such actions in relation to their broader significance. The effect of this could be compared to certain uses of the articular infinitive at the level of the phrase (see pgs. 83 ff) and to overabundant growth at the level of the sentence (see pg. 111). Finally, because of the buildup and the nature of the sentiment, Ronnet's emotional disturbance is certainly not out of the question: Demosthenes gives the impression of becoming fixated for a moment on the outrageousness of τῶν ὑμετέρων and forgets about συμμάχων.

[81] E.g. 7.35, 17.24. For the genitive in this sense, see Dem. *Ex*. 53.2 & 3 and 9.6.

The second type of hyperbaton that could create cognitive difficulty for an audience occurs when there is no context to make the head of the phrase at all inferable, that is in the opening clause of a speech:

> (a) Περὶ μὲν τῶν παρόντων, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πραγμάτων τῇ πόλει, καίπερ οὐκ ἐχόντων ὡς δεῖ, οὐ πάνυ μοὶ δοκεῖ τῶν χαλεπῶν εἶναι ζητῆσαι τί ἄν τις πράξας βελτίω ποιήσειεν.[82]
>
> (b) Ὅσην μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πεποίηνται σπουδὴν οἱ πρέσβεις κατηγορῆσαι τῆς πόλεως ἡμῶν, ἅπαντες ἑοράκατε·[83]
>
> (c) Ἦν μὲν [οὖν] δίκαιον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὴν ἴσην παρ' ὑμῶν ὑπάρχειν ὀργὴν τοῖς ἐπιχειροῦσιν ὅσηνπερ τοῖς δυνηθεῖσιν ἐξαπατῆσαι.[84]
>
> (d) Ἀντὶ πολλῶν ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, χρημάτων ὑμᾶς ἐλέσθαι νομίζω, εἰ φανερὸν γένοιτο τὸ μέλλον συνοίσειν τῇ πόλει περὶ ὧν νυνὶ σκοπεῖτε.[85]
>
> (e) Πολλῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, λόγων γιγνομένων ὀλίγου δεῖν καθ' ἑκάστην ἐκκλησίαν περὶ ὧν Φίλιππος, ἀφ' οὗ τὴν εἰρήνην ἐποιήσατο, οὐ μόνον ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀδικεῖ, καὶ πάντων οἶδ' ὅτι φησάντων γ' ἄν, εἰ καὶ μὴ ποιοῦσι τοῦτο, καὶ λέγειν δεῖν καὶ πράττειν ὅπως ἐκεῖνος παύσεται τῆς ὕβρεως καὶ δίκην δώσει, εἰς τοῦθ' ὑπηγμένα πάντα τὰ πράγματα καὶ προειμένα ὁρῶ, ὥστε δέδοικα μὴ βλάσφημον μὲν εἰπεῖν, ἀληθὲς δ' ᾖ· εἰ καὶ λέγειν ἅπαντες ἐβούλοντο οἱ παριόντες καὶ χειροτονεῖν ὑμεῖς ἐξ ὧν ὡς φαυλότατα ἔμελλε τὰ πράγμαθ' ἕξειν, οὐκ ἂν ἡγοῦμαι δύνασθαι χεῖρον ἢ νῦν διατεθῆναι.[86]

Each of these examples is the first sentence of the speech to which it belongs. This would be a natural place for hyperbaton to occur if one of its functions is to get the audience to pay attention. In (a) the emphasis placed on τῶν παρόντων by the discontinuity is very light: one does not deliberate about irrelevant or distant matters, and πραγμάτων could easily be excised without affecting the sense.[87] Besides grabbing the audience's attention, perhaps it lends a sense of "getting down to business" to the opening. In (b), by contrast, the head is necessary and not at

[82] Dem. *Ex.* 15.1: "In regard to the matters that the city is facing, men of Athens, although they are not as they should be, it does not seem to me to be altogether difficult to seek out what one could do to improve the situation."
[83] Dem. *Ex.* 46.1: "How earnest, men of Athens, the ambassadors have been in accusing our city, you all have seen."
[84] Dem. *Ex.* 52.1: "It would be just, men of Athens, for you to feel the same degree of anger towards those attempting as you do towards those actually able to deceive you."
[85] Dem. 1.1: "A great price, men of Athens, I think you would choose to pay, if, in regard to the matters you are now considering, that which is going to benefit the city would become clear."
[86] Dem. 9.1: "Although many speeches, men of Athens, are made well nigh every assembly meeting concerning the offenses Philip has committed from the time he made peace not only against you but also against everyone else, and although everyone, I well know, would say, even if they do not do this, that it is necessary to say and bring it about that he stop his outrageous conduct and pay the penalty, nevertheless I see that the situation has been neglected and brought to the point that I am afraid it is slanderous but true to say: even if all those who come forward to speak desired to say and you desired to vote for the proposals from which affairs would turn out as bad as possible, I don't think they could be disposed worse than they are now."
[87] E.g. Dem. *Ex.* 10.1, *Ex.* 11.1, *Ex.* 18.1.

all inferable. Leaving an adjective expressing magnitude hanging in such a contextual void for a moment inevitably would lend to it a sort of starkness. The same can be said for ex. (c), although here τὴν ἴσην is somewhat less emphatic. In ex. (d), in turn, on the one hand the head could easily be excised, but πολλῶν is much more emphatic than τῶν παρόντων in (a). Finally, in ex. (e) the discontinuity gives the paradox structural distinctness: lots of deliberating should lead to lots of action and lots of progress, but for some reason this has not been the case. Πολλῶν is separated from λόγων to create a quasi-antithesis. Ronnet's emotional disturbance is also in play, a brief pause of exasperation before the vocative. And in all these examples due to the absence of contextual aid one can make a strong case for increased cognitive difficulty.

Instances of hyperbaton that require reanalysis or pose serious cognitive difficulty are not very common, so the preceding discussion cannot account for most occurrences. Examples (a)-(f) illustrate the more common types:

> (a) ... εἰ δὲ μή, προσδεῖ, μᾶλλον δ' ἅπαντος ἐνδεῖ τοῦ πόρου.[88]
>
> (b) εἰ δ' ὁ μὲν ὡς ἀεί τι μεῖζον τῶν ὑπαρχόντων δεῖ πράττειν ἐγνωκὼς ἔσται, ἡμεῖς δ' ὡς οὐδενὸς ἀντιληπτέον ἐρρωμένως τῶν πραγμάτων ...[89]
>
> (c) τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ Ὀλυνθίοις, τετταράκοντ' ἀπέχων τῆς πόλεως στάδια, εἶπεν ...[90]
>
> (d) καὶ γάρ τοι ταύτῃ χρησάμενος τῇ γνώμῃ πάντα κατέστραπται καὶ ἔχει ….[91]
>
> (e)... εἰς τοῦθ' ἥκει τὰ πράγματ' αἰσχύνης...[92]
>
> (f) τὸ γὰρ τοὺς πολεμήσοντας Φιλίππῳ γεγενῆσθαι καὶ χώραν ὅμορον καὶ δύναμίν τινα κεκτημένους, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἁπάντων, τὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ πολέμου γνώμην τοιαύτην ἔχοντας ὥστε τὰς πρὸς ἐκεῖνον διαλλαγὰς πρῶτον μὲν ἀπίστους, εἶτα τῆς ἑαυτῶν πατρίδος νομίζειν ἀνάστασιν, δαιμονίᾳ τινὶ καὶ θείᾳ παντάπασιν ἔοικεν εὐεργεσίᾳ.[93]

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[88] Dem. 1.19: "Otherwise, you will be in need of additional, or rather every resource."
[89] Dem. 1.14: "But if he [Philip] will have judged that he must always be engaged in something greater than what belongs to him, but we that we do not have to engage in any affair with our full strength ...."
[90] Dem. 9.11: "For, when he was forty stades away from the city, he[Philip] said this to the Olynthians ..."
[91] Dem. 4.6: "For in fact by using this judgment he[Philip] has subdued and holds all things in his possession …."
[92] Dem. 4.47: "...matters have reached such a point of shame ...."
[93] Dem. 2.1: "For the fact that those who will wage war with Philip have arisen, being in possession of bordering territory and a significant military force, and, what is greatest of all, having such a judgement about the war as to consider reconciliation with him first to be untrustworthy, then an annihilation of their own country, this fact resembles in every respect some sort of divine and god-given boon."

In (a) an adjective of quantity is preposed; in (b), a neuter pronoun indicating quantity is preposed with a partitive genitive postponed; in (c), a cardinal numeral is preposed; in (d), a demonstrative adjective; in (e), a neuter demonstrative pronoun with a genitive of measure postponed; in (f) qualitative adjectives. Overall, instances of hyperbaton involving an adjective or pronoun of quantity/magnitude occur quite frequently, while attributes denoting a quality, as represented by (f), are rarer. As discussed above, modern scholars have been inclined to assign *a* function to a given type of hyperbaton, for example emphasis, passion, attention-grabbing, periodization. The idea that the figure could be polyvalent has not, as far as I know, been entertained. Further, two seemingly pervasive presuppositions about the function of the figure are problematic: first, that the effect hyperbaton would have had on an audience is fixed, stable, and ahistorical; second, that the effect of the figure is not conditioned by the dynamic of the style in which it occurs. In my approach to understanding the figure, I would like to dispute these presuppositions. I will argue that within the stylistic dynamic of Demosthenes' prose the figure occupies a liminal space between the written and oral and impassioned and artificial. Because Isocrates consciously avoids giving the impression that he is trying to practice any sort of ψυχαγωγία on his audience and because his style in other respects flows smooth without a hiatal hiccough, the effect of the figure in his prose is fundamentally different from how it functions in that of Demosthenes: along with considerations of rhythm and weighting, it contributes to the periodicity that he was so instrumental in developing. In Demosthenes, however, the impassioned orator *par excellence* but also Aeschines' τεχνίτης, the man who consists of nothing but words, who spends a bit too much time lucubrating over his prose, the figure participates in this dividedness. When encountering any given instance, the reader is inclined to assign two mutually exclusive interpretations to it: à la Ronnet Demosthenes is so full of vim and vigor that

he can't help but dislocate his syntax; à la Lausberg and Denniston, he is consciously and carefully constructing his clauses in such a way as to produce in his audience a feeling of cyclicity and finality. Viewed from the perspective of cognitive difficulty, in turn, the same duality arises: it gives us the feeling of having to work with the prose, a milder form of the Thucydidean striving for laboriousness, while at the same time, on an intuitive level the meaning, the conviction blazes forth all the more clearly. The prominence of hyperbaton in Demosthenes in conjunction with its status within the dynamic of his style destabilizes the *ethos* of his prose in a positive way: he is immediate yet distant, impassioned yet cool and calculating, focused yet panoptic.

So the reader encounters a passage like the following:

> εἰ δέ τις ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δυσπολέμητον οἴεται τὸν Φίλιππον εἶναι, σκοπῶν τό τε πλῆθος τῆς ὑπαρχούσης αὐτῷ δυνάμεως καὶ τὸ τὰ χωρία πάντ' ἀπολωλέναι τῇ πόλει, ὀρθῶς μὲν οἴεται, λογισάσθω μέντοι τοῦτο, ὅτι εἴχομέν ποτε ἡμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, Πύδναν καὶ Ποτείδαιαν καὶ Μεθώνην καὶ πάντα τὸν τόπον τοῦτον οἰκεῖον κύκλῳ, καὶ πολλὰ τῶν μετ' ἐκείνου νῦν ὄντων ἐθνῶν αὐτονομούμενα καὶ ἐλεύθερ' ὑπῆρχε, καὶ μᾶλλον ἡμῖν ἐβούλετ' ἔχειν οἰκείως ἢ 'κείνῳ. εἰ τοίνυν ὁ Φίλιππος τότε ταύτην ἔσχε τὴν γνώμην, ὡς χαλεπὸν πολεμεῖν ἐστιν Ἀθηναίοις ἔχουσι τοσαῦτα ἐπιτειχίσματα τῆς αὐτοῦ χώρας ἔρημον ὄντα συμμάχων, οὐδὲν ἂν ὧν νυνὶ πεποίηκεν ἔπραξεν οὐδὲ τοσαύτην ἐκτήσατο δύναμιν.[94]

To begin with, on some level he is aware that he has been encountering the figure significantly more frequently than he would in Lysias or Aeschines. In this particular sentence, there are two instances (ταύτην ... τὴν γνώμην and τοσαύτην ... δύναμιν). In an attempt to interpret Demosthenes' usage, he considers various possibilities. Passion makes sense here: the speech begins on a defensive, polemical note with Demosthenes saying that, if the matter under deliberation were new and had not already been discussed many times, he would have waited to

[94] Dem. 4.5: "If any of you, men of Athens, think that Philip is a formidable opponent in war when considering the size of the force that belongs to him and the fact that all the strategic locations have been lost for the city, he thinks rightly; nevertheless, let him take into consideration the fact that at one time, men of Athens, we had as our own Pydna and Poteidaia and Methone and this whole region in a circle , and many of the tribes that now belong to him used to be self-governed and free and were desiring to be friendly to us rather than to him. And so if Philip at that time had judged that it is difficult for someone lacking allies to wage war with the Athenians when they possess so many fortifications of their land, he would not have done any of those things he's doing now, nor would he have acquired such great power."

speak until he had heard what others had to say; however, since no one has said what needs to be said, he feels compelled to speak first. Further, in the first sentence of the passage cited above, he says that, if anyone in the audience thinks that Philip is a formidable enemy (δυσπολέμητον), he is right. The word order in this sentence is already somewhat disjointed, with the direct address separating the verb from its objects; this adds a touch of regret and longing to the sentiment: We had them, once. In light of this, the moment of fixation on τοσαύτην created by the hyperbaton could be intended following Ronnet to unite speaker and audience in a feeling of somewhat fearful respect for the magnitude of Philip's power: it needs to be dealt with--now. But striving for periodicity also makes sense, especially since the preceding instance of discontinuity, in which a mere cataphoric element is fronted (ταύτην), is hard to explain as due to emotional disturbance. And of course in a passage where Demosthenes is explaining to the Athenians the mistakes they have made in the past, he wants them to pay attention, so increased cognitive difficulty is not out of the question either. Finally, the discontinuity could mean nothing: The alternative (τοσαύτην δύναμιν ἐκτήσατο) would create a tribrach. One presumes that Demosthenes would have found all of the readings, with the exception of the last, appealing in some way. I would argue that this polyvalence may account for the high frequency of the figure in his prose, for it allows him to go beyond Dionysius' comparison of him with Proteus: he assumes multiple forms simultaneously, all the while maintaining his Thucydidean austerity.

In the preceding discussion I made an attempt to understand the general function of hyperbaton as an element of Demosthenes' style. I argued that the figure achieves a distinctive polyvalence: besides adding emphasis to or narrowing focus on a given element within a clause, it also contributes more generally to the creation of the characteristic Demosthenic *ethos*, impassioned, insistent, full of conviction. However, there are a few passages in which one gets in

addition to the standard types a cluster of more exceptional ones, and in these cases one can argue that the discontinuity has a more context-specific function. One of these passages is the celebrated eulogy of the Athenians of old in the *Third Olynthiac*. Dionysius in his essay *On Demosthenes* compares this passage with a similar eulogy composed by Isocrates in order to highlight the differences in their styles and to demonstrate the ways in which Demosthenes is superior.[95] He does not, however, note that whereas there is only one or maybe no instances of discontinuity in Isocrates' eulogy,[96] in Demosthenes there are no less than three, each of which is distinctive in some way:

> ἐκεῖνοι(the Athenians of old) τοίνυν, οἷς οὐκ ἐχαρίζονθ'οἱ λέγοντες οὐδ' ἐφίλουν αὐτοὺς ὥσπερ ὑμᾶς οὗτοι νῦν, πέντε μὲν καὶ τετταράκοντα ἔτη τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἦρξαν ἑκόντων, πλείω δ' ἢ μύρια τάλαντ' εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν ἀνήγαγον, ὑπήκουε δ' ὁ ταύτην τὴν χώραν ἔχων αὐτοῖς βασιλεύς, ὥσπερ ἐστὶ προσῆκον βάρβαρον Ἕλλησι,[1] πολλὰ δὲ καὶ καλὰ καὶ πεζῇ καὶ ναυμαχοῦντες ἔστησαν τρόπαια αὐτοὶ στρατευόμενοι, μόνοι δὲ ἀνθρώπων κρείττω τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔργοις δόξαν τῶν φθονούντων κατέλιπον. ἐπὶ μὲν δὴ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν ἦσαν τοιοῦτοι· ἐν δὲ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν αὐτὴν θεάσασθ' ὁποῖοι, ἔν τε τοῖς κοινοῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις. δημοσίᾳ μὲν τοίνυν οἰκοδομήματα καὶ [2]κάλλη τοιαῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα κατεσκεύασαν ἡμῖν ἱερῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν τούτοις ἀναθημάτων, ὥστε μηδενὶ τῶν ἐπιγιγνομένων ὑπερβολὴν λελεῖφθαι· ἰδίᾳ δ' οὕτω σώφρονες ἦσαν καὶ σφόδρα ἐν τῷ τῆς πολιτείας ἤθει μένοντες, ὥστε τὴν Ἀριστείδου καὶ τὴν Μιλτιάδου καὶ τῶν τότε λαμπρῶν οἰκίαν εἴ τις ἄρα οἶδεν ὑμῶν ὁποία ποτ' ἐστίν, ὁρᾷ τῆς τοῦ γείτονος οὐδὲν σεμνοτέραν οὖσαν· οὐ γὰρ εἰς περιουσίαν ἐπράττετ' αὐτοῖς τὰ τῆς πόλεως, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινὸν αὔξειν ἕκαστος ᾤετο δεῖν. ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τὰ μὲν Ἑλληνικὰ πιστῶς, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εὐσεβῶς, τὰ δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ἴσως διοικεῖν [3]μεγάλην εἰκότως ἐκτήσαντο εὐδαιμονίαν.[97]

[95] D.H. *Dem.* 21 ff.

[96] The text of the passage in question (8.46) is disputed: Mathieu (1928) reads… ἵνα τοῖς ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων κοινοῖς ἐχθροῖς τὸν μισθὸν ἐκπορίζωμεν, while Mandilaras (2003) opts for ἵνα τοῖς ἁπάντων κοινοῖς ἀνθρώπων ἐχθροῖς.

[97] Dem. 3.24-6: "And so those men, whom speakers were not indulging or coddling as these men are doing to you now, led the Greeks fully willing for forty-five years, and they brought more than ten thousand talents up to the acropolis, and the king in possession of this land was obedient to them, as it befits a foreigner to obey Greeks, and, fighting by land and sea, they erected many beautiful trophies, going on the expeditions themselves, and they alone of men left behind a glory greater than those who envied them. With respect to the affairs of the Greeks, then, such was their character; and, when it came to the affairs of the city itself, observe what sort of men they were, both in public and private matters. Publicly they furnished us with buildings and so many beauties of temples and the dedications housed within that no possibility of surpassing them has been left behind to anyone; and privately they were so temperate and they so firmly adhered to the character of the constitution that, if anyone knows what kind house belonged to Aristides or Miltiades, the most distinguished men at that time, he sees that it is not at all grander than that of his neighbor. For the affairs of the city were not being handled by them for their own advantage, but each thought that he must make the commonwealth grow. And from their honest administration of the affairs of the Greeks and their piety towards the gods and their fair dealings with one another they naturally acquired great happiness."

In instance 1, the separation of τρόπαια from the adjectives modifying it might at first seem unusual since it is not easily inferable, but this same ordering is found in Lysias and in another speech of Demosthenes.[98] However, in neither of those cases does a weighty participial phrase intervene. Perhaps, then, this creates a particularly strong periodic effect: the audience is made to feel a sense of accomplishment in a sentence about their forebears' achievements. In instance 2, the phrase in question is enormous: κάλλη τοιαῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα … ἱερῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν τούτοις ἀναθημάτων. Clearly distribution of this weight was necessary, and after all the quality and grandeur of the beautiful things in question is the important thing. However, the nature of this beauty has already been particularized to a degree by the preceding reference to public buildings (οἰκοδομήματα), so the expansion of the phrase by the discontinuous genitive is not absolutely necessary. Further, a concrete object is coordinated with an abstract one; more typical would be a reference simply to (beautiful) buildings and temples. Perhaps all these aspects of the phrase, the discontinuity, the weightiness of the phrase, and the variation with the concrete would combine to give the impression that Demosthenes for a moment gets lost in admiration of the grandeur of Athens. Instance 3 might at first seem like the standard use of discontinuity to accentuate an adjective of degree, and indeed this type regularly occurs with the verb κτάομαι.

(a) …τέλειόν τι καὶ μέγα κτήσαισθε ἀγαθὸν…[99]

(b) … οὐδὲν ἂν ὧν νυνὶ πεποίηκεν ἔπραξεν οὐδὲ τοσαύτην ἐκτήσατο δύναμιν.[100]

Note, however, that in the two instances cited the verb form is the only word that separates the adjective from its head, whereas in the passage under discussion an adverb intervenes as well. In

[98] Lys. 18.3: στρατηγῶν γὰρ πολλὰς μὲν πόλεις εἶλε, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ καλὰ κατὰ τῶν πολεμίων ἔστησε τρόπαια…; Dem. 21.169: οἱ δὲ πόλεις εἰληφότες, οἱ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως στήσαντες τρόπαια.
[99] Dem. 3.33: "... you would acquire a consummate and great good...."
[100] Dem. 4.5: "... he would have done none of the things he has now done, nor would he have acquired so great a force."

addition, this is the very end of Demosthenes' encomium before he turns to criticism of contemporary Athens, and from the beginning the sentence starts building toward a climax: the series of articular infinitives describing the forefathers' virtuous conduct leads us to expect that they will be rewarded in some way or receive some sort of benefit; μεγάλην then partially confirms this expectation, and increases our desire for it to be fulfilled. Finally, that little bit of extra space between adjective and noun adds the proper force to the idealized happiness with which praise of the past should conclude.

3. The Sentence

Atypical phrases and clauses stick out like a sore thumb. However, when it comes to the sentence and in particular the period,[101] things are not so easy. The problem can be viewed as a cognitive, contextual, or physiological one. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Wilamowitz, arguing that Demosthenes revised his speeches before having them distributed, claimed that "Wohlgerundete Perioden und die peinlichst temperierte Wortwahl sind nicht geeignet, eine tausendköpfige Menge zu bewegen."[102] Nietzsche, basing his idea of the period on what he considered the classical conception of it, describes it as "ein physiologisches Ganzes, insofern sie [eine Periode] von Einem Athem zusammengefasst wird."[103] Finally, as Worthington points out, in addition to the cognitive and physiological dimensions, we also must take the volume level of the Assembly into account.[104] When composing a period, then, a speaker had to

[101] I follow the definition of Usher (1973), 41: "The essential characteristic of the period is its finiteness. It is so constructed that the reader, like a runner on a circular race-course (περίοδος) can see the end ahead, and experiences the same pleasure in attaining a definite goal. The thought should be similarly comprehended: a period should embrace a single idea, the essence of which is incomplete until the end is reached." Cf. Grube (1952), fn. 5. For a good overview of the debate as to whether the period should be defined rhythmically or syntactically, see Fowler (1982).
[102] Wilamowitz (1920), 75.
[103] Nietzsche, *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*, 247 in Colli and Montinari (1967). Pearson (1975) argues that the development of Demosthenes' periodic style corresponded with the development of greater breath control.
[104] Worthington (1992), 25, fn. 34.

determine whether a given sentence structure was able to be breathed, comprehended, and heard. The last mentioned factor, though it surely must have affected the stylistic choices of an orator, is almost impossible to gauge, so I will not deal with it further. With regard to breath control, Pearson in his article on the subject provides sensitive readings and analyses of sentences where he argues this would have been an issue;[105] accordingly, I will only touch upon the subject when a sentence potentially presents both syntactic and performative difficulties. It remains, then, to explore the cognitive boundaries of the period.

In light of the fact that Demosthenes, as I have demonstrated, experimented with the capacities of the phrase and clause, one would naturally expect him to do the same with the sentence. There are various ways of gauging the difficulty of a given sentence; one is sentence length. However, it is of course not easy to say just how long a sentence *can* be (the second sentence of Milton's *Of Reformation* stretches to an astounding 375 words), and Usher notes that none of the early theorists gave prescriptions for the proper length of a period.[106] In addition, length does not necessarily correspond to difficulty, as I will demonstrate in my discussion of various instances of the pathetic paradox.

Examining degrees of subordination represents a more productive approach that can yield more clear-cut results: whereas maximum sentence-length is somewhat indeterminate, as soon as one goes beyond say the third degree of subordination, the risk of confusing one's audience becomes manifestly higher. Accordingly, in the analyses that follow, this factor will be used as the primary means of articulation. In the sentence diagrams presented in this section, degrees of subordination are represented by the number of indentations.

[105] Pearson (1975).
[106] Usher (1973), 41.

After determining the criteria for analysis, one has to go about finding examples of difficult sentences. One way of doing this is to look at those characterized by a stereotyped structure and content, for example the pathetic paradox in which a simple predicate consisting of δεινόν or something comparable is followed by an εἰ-clause that functions as the subject of the sentence and which is formulated as a paradoxical antithesis in some way. Because sentences of this type are quite common among Attic prose authors, especially the orators, one can get a clear sense of relative complexity and can argue that this complexity would have been perceived as such by contemporary audiences. Another possibility is antitheses involving a contrast between the character of two different states. The following sentence from *Against Aristocrates* represents this form of antithesis at its simplest: ὑμεῖς μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδένα προὐδώκατε πώποτε τῶν φίλων, Θετταλοὶ δ' οὐδένα πώποθ' ὅντιν' οὔ.[107] One could also compare the structure of several antitheses from Herodotus in his famous comparison of Greek and Egyptian customs.[108] Contrast with these the following example from the *Second Philippic*:

> εὑρίσκει[Philip] γάρ, οἶμαι, καὶ ἀκούει τοὺς μὲν ὑμετέρους προγόνους, ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς τῶν λοιπῶν ἄρχειν Ἑλλήνων ὥστε αὐτοὺς ὑπακούειν βασιλεῖ, οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἀνασχομένους τὸν λόγον τοῦτον, ἡνίκ' ἦλθεν Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ τούτων πρόγονος περὶ τούτων κῆρυξ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν χώραν ἐκλιπεῖν προελομένους καὶ παθεῖν ὁτιοῦν ὑπομείναντας, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα πράξαντας **ταῦθ' ἃ πάντες ἀεὶ γλίχονται λέγειν, ἀξίως δ' οὐδεὶς εἰπεῖν δεδύνηται, διόπερ κἀγὼ παραλείψω, δικαίως (ἔστι γὰρ μείζω τἀκείνων ἔργα ἢ ὡς τῷ λόγῳ τις ἂν εἴποι),** τοὺς δὲ Θηβαίων καὶ Ἀργείων προγόνους τοὺς μὲν συστρατεύσαντας τῷ βαρβάρῳ, τοὺς δ' οὐκ ἐναντιωθέντας.[109]

[107] Dem. 23.112: "You, men of Athens, have never abandoned any of your friends, while the Thessalians have never not abandoned theirs."
[108] Her. 2.35ff.
[109] Dem. 6.11: "For he discovers, I suppose, and hears that your forebears, when it was possible for them to rule the rest of the Greeks on condition that they themselves obey the Persian king, not only did not suffer this proposal when Alexander, the ancestor of these men, came as herald regarding these matters, but that they even chose to abandon their land and submitted to suffer anything whatsoever, and that after this they accomplished those things that all men always desire to speak of, but which no one has been able to do justice to, for which reason I too will pass over them, and I am right in doing so (for the deeds of those men are greater than one could express in words), but as for the ancestors of the Thebans and Argives, he hears that some marched together with the barbarian, while others did not oppose him." For the extended parenthesis cf. Dem. 9.3: ὑμεῖς τὴν παρρησίαν ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων οὕτω κοινὴν οἴεσθε δεῖν εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὥστε καὶ τοῖς ξένοις καὶ τοῖς δούλοις αὐτῆς μεταδεδώκατε, **καὶ πολλοὺς ἄν τις οἰκέτας ἴδοι παρ' ἡμῖν μετὰ πλείονος ἐξουσίας ὅ τι βούλονται λέγοντας ἢ πολίτας ἐν ἐνίαις τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων**, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ συμβουλεύειν παντάπασιν ἐξεληλάκατε.

Everything moves along swimmingly[110] until we hit the relative clause beginning ἃ πάντες. What at first appears to be a simple amplification of Athens' glory develops into an extended *recusatio*, after which we get the second element of the antithesis, still governed by εὑρίσκει ...καὶ ἀκούει, as though it had never been interrupted. It would be demanding a lot from the audience to expect them to keep the grammatical construction in mind throughout such a long digression. Further, while the dilation on the ineffability of Athens' achievements could be said to magnify their grandeur, the parenthesis almost seems to devolve into Demosthenes' justifying himself to himself: "for which reason I too will omit them—and I'm right in doing so (for no one...). Finally, does Demosthenes really need to apologize for not presenting an extended encomium here? Who after all would be expecting one in this context? On the other hand, as I have argued in my interpretation of certain articular infinitives and phrases, grammatical overweighting contributes to the creation of a particular *ethos* and presents the Demosthenic mind as almost superhuman in the breadth of its conception. By exhibiting his superior control over language, Demosthenes persuades his audience that the content of his counsel too is worthy of respect. Comprehensibility, however, remains an issue, and the reader is left wondering who this sentence is for, Demosthenes (as preparation), the audience at the Assembly, his readers (as revision), or all of the above.

Another type of difficulty on the level of the sentence occurs when the content of the thought expands beyond the boundary that the speaker himself has prescribed. The following sentence from the *First Philippic* will serve as an example:

> ἂν τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐπὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐθελήσητε γενέσθαι γνώμης νῦν, ἐπειδήπερ οὐ πρότερον, καὶ ἕκαστος ὑμῶν, οὗ δεῖ καὶ δύναιτ' ἂν παρασχεῖν αὐτὸν χρήσιμον τῇ πόλει, πᾶσαν ἀφεὶς τὴν εἰρωνείαν ἕτοιμος πράττειν ὑπάρξῃ, ὁ μὲν χρήματα ἔχων εἰσφέρειν, ὁ δ' ἐν ἡλικίᾳ στρατεύεσθαι, συνελόντι δ' ἁπλῶς ἂν ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐθελήσητε γενέσθαι, καὶ παύσησθε αὐτὸς μὲν οὐδὲν ἕκαστος ποιήσειν ἐλπίζων,

[110] Since the logical subject of the accusative absolute (αὐτοῖς) that interrupts the indirect statement is co-referential with the subject of the indirect statement, it does not pose a serious impediment to comprehension.

τὸν δὲ πλησίον πάνθ' ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ πράξειν, καὶ τὰ ὑμέτερα αὐτῶν κομιεῖσθε, ἂν θεὸς θέλῃ, καὶ τὰ κατερρᾳθυμημένα πάλιν ἀναλήψεσθε, κἀκεῖνον τιμωρήσεσθε.[111]

ἂν τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐπὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐθελήσητε γενέσθαι γνώμης νῦν,
ἐπειδήπερ οὐ πρότερον,
καὶ ἕκαστος ὑμῶν,
οὗ δεῖ καὶ δύναιτ' ἂν παρασχεῖν αὐτὸν χρήσιμον τῇ πόλει,
πᾶσαν ἀφεὶς τὴν εἰρωνείαν
ἕτοιμος πράττειν ὑπάρξῃ, ὁ μὲν χρήματα ἔχων εἰσφέρειν, ὁ δ' ἐν ἡλικίᾳ στρατεύεσθαι, — **<u>συνελόντι δ' ἁπλῶς ἂν ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐθελήσητε γενέσθαι,</u>** καὶ παύσησθε αὐτὸς μὲν οὐδὲν ἕκαστος ποιήσειν ἐλπίζων, τὸν δὲ πλησίον πάνθ' ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ πράξειν,
καὶ τὰ ὑμέτερα αὐτῶν κομιεῖσθε,
ἂν θεὸς θέλῃ,
καὶ τὰ κατερρᾳθυμημένα πάλιν ἀναλήψεσθε, κἀκεῖνον τιμωρήσεσθε.

Length: 86 Words Maximum subordination: 2nd degree

In his commentary on this speech Wooten discusses the significance of the form of this sentence at length. He calls it "a good example of how form often reflects content in D.", describes the protasis as "quite complicated," identifies the source of this complicatedness as the amount of subordination, then comes to the following conclusion about the overall meaning of the structure:

> The protasis of this sentence describes the demands that will be made on the Athenians if they decide to defend themselves against Philip. These demands will be extensive, complicated, and drawn out, as is the structure of this part of the sentence. The conclusion, however, is simple and straightforward, and this indicates that the gains will be clear-cut if the Athenians will only act. There is thus a contrast between the complexity of the demands made on the Athenians and the clarity of the results that will follow.[112]

Wooten's use of the word "complicated" here is vague and problematic. It is not exactly clear to me how Demosthenes' demands are "complicated": each man should do, not just say, his part. Further, although Wooten is right that there are a number of subordinate clauses within the protasis, none of them is particularly long or complex, with the possible exception of the relative

[111] Dem. 4.7: "And so, men of Athens, if you too are willing to adopt such an opinion now—since not before—and if each of you, where there is need and where he could make himself useful to the city, having let go of all dissimulation, is prepared to act, the wealthy man to pay taxes, the young man to campaign—and in short, to put it simply, if you are willing to get control of yourselves and if each of you stops expecting that he won't do anything himself, while his neighbor will do everything on his behalf, you will bring home what's yours, God willing, and you will recover what has been lost through indolence, and you will take vengeance on that man."
[112] Wooten (2008), *ad loc.*

clause οὗ δεῖ …. That said, I would certainly agree with him about the effect of the distribution of protasis and apodosis: it could certainly reflect the difficulty of what he's asking the Athenians to do.

However, a more precise analysis is needed. With respect to certain features, the sentence is actually quite simple: it never goes beyond the 2nd degree of subordination, and the main clause is not divided up at all; further, as mentioned above the 2nd degree subordinate clauses are for the most part relatively simple. However, the sentence is quite long, and the fact that most of it consists of buildup to the conclusion creates a sense of suspense and gravity. The overweighting is explicitly marked here by the way in which the sentence develops after συνελόντι: after telling us that he is going to give us a simple summary of the condition and after proceeding to do so (ἂν ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐθελήσητε γενέσθαι), he nevertheless expands the protasis further with a somewhat involved elaboration that includes a μὲν ... δὲ antithesis. I would argue that this represents the same stylistic idiosyncrasy on the level of the sentence that I have discussed above in reference to the phrase. Things do not end quite when they should, and thinking occurs within thinking within thinking. Here we might start out with the impression that Demosthenes is going to give us a simple "if-then" scenario, but the if keeps going, and going, and going, even after he tells us it is about to conclude. But ifs are dangerous things if you get them wrong, so Demosthenes makes sure to think his through, exhaustively, even after they have started and ended.

Similar are instances in which a recapitulation that gives the impression that the main clause is about start debouches instead into further subordinate material:

> ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀπωλώλεσαν οἱ Φωκεῖς ὕστερον ἡμέραις πέντε ἢ ἕξ, καὶ τέλος εἶχε τὸ μίσθωμα ὥσπερ ἂν ἄλλο τι τούτῳ, καὶ ὁ Δερκύλος ἐκ τῆς Χαλκίδος ἦκεν ἀναστρέψας καὶ ἀπήγγειλεν ὑμῖν ἐκκλησιάζουσιν ἐν Πειραιεῖ ὅτι Φωκεῖς ἀπολώλασι, καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταῦτ' ἀκούσαντες εἰκότως κἀκείνοις συνήχθεσθε καὶ

αὐτοὶ ἐξεπέπληχθε, καὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν κατακομίζειν ἐψηφίζεσθε καὶ τὰ φρούρια ἐπισκευάζειν καὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ τειχίζειν καὶ τὰ Ἡράκλεια ἐν ἄστει θύειν, —**ἐπειδὴ ταῦτ' ἦν καὶ τοιαύτη ταραχὴ καὶ τοιοῦτος θόρυβος περιειστήκει τὴν πόλιν**, τηνικαῦτα ὁ σοφὸς καὶ δεινὸς οὗτος καὶ εὔφωνος**, οὔτε βουλῆς οὔτε δήμου χειροτονήσαντος αὐτόν,** ᾤχετο πρεσβεύων ὡς τὸν ταῦτα πεποιηκότα, οὔτε τὴν ἀρρωστίαν ἐφ' ᾗ τότ' ἐξωμόσαθ' ὑπολογισάμενος, οὔθ' ὅτι πρεσβευτὴς ἄλλος ἤρητο ἀνθ' αὐτοῦ, οὔθ' ὅτι τῶν τοιούτων ὁ νόμος θάνατον τὴν ζημίαν εἶναι κελεύει, οὔθ' ὅτι πάνδεινόν ἐστιν ἀπηγγελκότα ὡς ἐπικεκήρυκται χρήματ' αὐτῷ ἐν Θήβαις, ἐπειδὴ Θηβαῖοι πρὸς τῷ τὴν Βοιωτίαν ἅπασαν ἔχειν καὶ τῆς Φωκέων χώρας ἐγκρατεῖς γεγόνασιν, τηνικαῦτα εἰς μέσας τὰς Θήβας καὶ τὸ τῶν Θηβαίων στρατόπεδον βαδίζειν·[113]

ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀπωλώλεσαν οἱ Φωκεῖς ὕστερον ἡμέραις πέντε ἢ ἕξ, καὶ τέλος εἶχε τὸ μίσθωμ' ὥσπερ ἂν ἄλλο τι τούτῳ,
καὶ ὁ Δερκύλος ἐκ τῆς Χαλκίδος ἦκεν ἀναστρέψας καὶ ἀπήγγειλεν ὑμῖν ἐκκλησιάζουσιν ἐν Πειραιεῖ
ὅτι Φωκεῖς ἀπολώλασι,
καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,
ταῦτ' ἀκούσαντες
εἰκότως κἀκείνοις συνήχθεσθε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐξεπέπληχθε,
καὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν κατακομίζειν
ἐψηφίζεσθε
καὶ τὰ φρούρι' ἐπισκευάζειν καὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ τειχίζειν καὶ τὰ Ἡράκλει' ἐν ἄστει θύειν, —
ἐπειδὴ ταῦτ' ἦν καὶ τοιαύτη ταραχὴ καὶ τοιοῦτος θόρυβος περιειστήκει τὴν πόλιν,
τηνικαῦτα ὁ σοφὸς καὶ δεινὸς οὗτος καὶ εὔφωνος,

οὔτε βουλῆς οὔτε δήμου χειροτονήσαντος αὐτόν,
ᾤχετο πρεσβεύων ὡς τὸν ταῦτα πεποιηκότα,
οὔτε τὴν ἀρρωστίαν
ἐφ' ᾗ τότ' ἐξωμόσαθ'
ὑπολογισάμενος, οὔθ'
ὅτι πρεσβευτὴς ἄλλος ἤρητο ἀνθ' αὐτοῦ, οὔθ' ὅτι τῶν τοιούτων ὁ νόμος θάνατον τὴν ζημίαν εἶναι κελεύει, οὔθ' ὅτι πάνδεινόν ἐστιν
ἀπηγγελκότα
ὡς ἐπικεκήρυκται χρήματ' αὐτῷ ἐν Θήβαις,
ἐπειδὴ Θηβαῖοι πρὸς τῷ τὴν Βοιωτίαν ἅπασαν ἔχειν καὶ τῆς Φωκέων χώρας ἐγκρατεῖς γεγόνασιν,
τηνικαῦτ' εἰς μέσας τὰς Θήβας καὶ τὸ τῶν Θηβαίων στρατόπεδον βαδίζειν•

[113] Dem. 19.125-7: "And after the Phocians had perished five or six days later, and the contract for that man[Aeschines] had come to an end like any other, and Derkylos had returned from Chalcis and informed you while you were holding assembly in the Peiraeus that the Phocians were gone, and when you, men of Athens, upon hearing these things were with good reason grieving with them and were yourselves shocked, and you were voting to bring the women and children in from the countryside and to set up watches and to fortify the Peiraeus and to celebrate Herakles' festival in town—when this was the situation and such a disturbance and such commotion had surrounded the city, it was at this point that that wise and clever and mellifluous man went off to serve as ambassador to the man who had done these things, even though neither the council nor the people had elected him, and he did not even take into consideration either the claim of ill health based on which he had at that time refused the office, nor the fact that another ambassador had been chosen in place of him, nor that it is unspeakable for one who had announced that a price had been put on his head at Thebes to walk into the middle of that city and the encampment of the Thebans when they in addition to being in possession of Boeotia had also gained control of the territory of the Phocians."

Length: 170 Maximum subordination: 5th degree

Up to the recapitulation the period moves along easily enough (although the expansion after ἐψηφίζεσθε has to be accounted for): each clause is relatively simple, and there is no interlacing and no parentheses. As we have seen, it is characteristic of Demosthenes to add further detail where one would from a grammatical perspective least expect it. A possible motive for it here can be supplied easily enough: he wants to give the impression of momentarily being so possessed by the terror involved in the events he is describing that he cannot help but get carried away and add further detail. But to return to the recapitulation, after the very lengthy temporal clause introduced by ἐπειδὴ at the beginning of the sentence, the summary ἐπειδὴ ταῦτ' ἦν leads us to expect that we are finally going to get to the main clause; instead, the recapitulation is expanded to include a general characterization of the chaos in Athens at the time. Then, delaying gratification yet further, Demosthenes places a genitive absolute before the main clause. As in the previous example, he encourages a particular syntactical expectation only to defy it. Because the temporal clause that begins this period is so lengthy, one expects the sentence to conclude after the short main clause ᾤχετο πρεσβεύων ὡς τὸν ταῦτα πεποιηκότα, but instead Demosthenes decides to elaborate on just how impudent Aeschines' crime was. This elaboration is complex: it begins with *variatio* (τὴν ἀρρωστιαν ... ὅτι) and contains indirect statement that attains to the 5th degree of subordination. Note further that this 5th degree does not just consist of some short and simple subordinate clause but contains a lengthy temporal clause which provides an unexpected and unnecessary expansion of the enormity of Aeschines' crime. Finally, note that after πάνδεινόν ἐστιν, one would expect an infinitive relatively soon. However, Demosthenes does not give us our due until the very end of the sentence—after a circumstantial participle, and indirect statement, and a lengthy temporal clause, and an adverbial modifier, and an (unnecessarily

expanded) prepositional phrase. I would argue that this period belongs to the category of what Pearson calls Demosthenes' "virtuoso passages." Looking at the analysis above, one can see that many of the cola are relatively long; in addition, the cadence would have been quite demanding: I'm exhausted by the time I get to the main clause, only to find out that I still have five degrees of subordination to go. Aeschines' villainy thereby acquires a feeling of infinitude through our physiological reaction to the sentence: I am gasping for air, but there's still no end in sight of Aeschines' crimes, so deep is their account.

4. The Pathetic Paradox

The term 'pathetic paradox' was coined by Stephen Usher as a sort of corrective: Gebauer, according to him, classified the form of argument in question under *argumenta ex contrario*, but this term does not take account of the emotional element involved.[114] He defines his new term thus:

> The term used, in this book for the first time, to describe a form of argument which combines emotion with logic. The emotion comes in the opening formula: 'Is it not (would it not be) shocking (shameful, terrible, absurd) if, when X, which is undesirable, is not allowed to happen, Y, which is far more undesirable, is allowed to happen'. The comparative element provides the logical backbone to an argument which can have many variants.[115]

In the process of charting various developments within the Greek rhetorical tradition, Usher on several occasions makes note of the ways in which a given orator incorporates such an argument into his speech. However, he makes no attempt to undertake a detailed analysis of the diachronic development of the structure of this form of argument, and he only sporadically and even then only vaguely indicates when and how an orator innovates in his deployment of the argument.

[114] Usher (1999), 25 fn. 68.
[115] *Ibid.*, 367.

As I will demonstrate in the discussion that follows, Demosthenes, heir to a rich tradition of various elaborations of the basic form of the argument, expanded its structural possibilities so audaciously that once again in certain cases its comprehensibility for the original audience becomes an issue. In such cases the possibility of revision or lack thereof must be considered.

The following survey of the development of the argument is based on an examination of instances found in the Perseus database within certain parameters. I performed a proximity search for the words δεινόν ... εἰ (for all three degrees of comparison) allowing for separation of up to three words; then I used the same parameters for the less common introductory words σχέτλιον and αἰσχρόν (only in the positive degree).

The form of the paradox at its most basic can be seen from an early example from Aristophanes' *Plutus*:

> δεινὸν γὰρ εἰ τριωβόλου μὲν οὕνεκα
> ὠστιζόμεσθ' ἑκάστοτ' ἐν τἠκκλησίᾳ,
> αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν Πλοῦτον παρείην τῳ λαβεῖν.[116]

Here there is only one degree of subordination, and each element of the antithesis is relatively short and simple. However, even at this early stage of development further elaboration was possible, as can be seen in the following example from Euripides' *Hecuba* (424 B.C.):

> οὔκουν δεινόν, εἰ γῆ μὲν κακὴ
> τυχοῦσα καιροῦ θεόθεν εὖ στάχυν φέρει,
> χρηστὴ δ' ἁμαρτοῦσ' ὧν χρεὼν αὐτὴν τυχεῖν
> κακὸν δίδωσι καρπόν.[117]

[116] Ar. *Plut.*329-31: "For it would be terrible if for the sake of a three-obol piece we knock each other about on each occasion at the Assembly, while I let someone take Wealth himself."
[117] Eur. *Hec*. 592-5: "It is terrible if bad land, when it has met with favorable conditions from God bears a good crop, while good land, when it does not meet with what it needs bears a bad one."

Here, if one takes the circumstantial participle (ἁμαρτοῦσ') as representing a degree, there are three degrees in all. Even so, each element is still quite short and simple, and the entire argument is expressed in twenty words (as compared with 114 in the example from Demosthenes below).

Thucydides, in turn, makes significant innovations as one would expect, simultaneously expanding and condensing the form.[118] The most complex example from his *Histories* seems to be the following, which is found in the speech of the Corinthian delegates in book I:

> ἢ δεινὸν ἂν εἴη εἰ οἱ μὲν ἐκείνων ξύμμαχοι ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ τῇ αὐτῶν φέροντες οὐκ ἀπεροῦσιν, ἡμεῖς δ' ἐπὶ τῷ τιμωρούμενοι τοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ αὐτοὶ ἅμα σῴζεσθαι οὐκ ἄρα δαπανήσομεν καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ ὑπ' ἐκείνων αὐτὰ ἀφαιρεθέντες αὐτοῖς τούτοις κακῶς πάσχειν.[119]

The form of this argument is characterized by the crabbed density typical of Thucydidean speeches: the two articular infinitives are used as objects of the preposition ἐπί, and within each is nested not only a circumstantial participle with modifier(s) but also modifiers of the infinitive. If we count the articular infinitives and circumstantial participles within them as each adding a further degree of subordination, then there are three degrees in this example. However, at 38 words its length at least is not exceptional.

At the hands of Lysias the pathetic paradox becomes more expansive, more supple than it was in previous authors and yet much more easily digestible than it was in Thucydides. Although most of his paradoxes fall somewhere comfortably in-between, there are instances as simple as: σχέτλιον δ' ἂν εἴη, εἰ οὗτος μὲν ἅπαντας τοὺς πολίτας περὶ οὐδενὸς ἡγήσατο, ὑμεῖς δὲ τοῦτον ἕνα ὄντα μὴ ἀποδοκιμάσαιτε.[120] However, there is also the following exceptionally complex instance from an impassioned outburst in *Against Eratosthenes*:

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[118] The one example from Antiphon is not particularly noteworthy: καίτοι δεινὸν εἰ οἱ αὐτοὶ μάρτυρες τούτοις μὲν ἂν μαρτυροῦντες πιστοὶ ἦσαν, ἐμοὶ δὲ μαρτυροῦντες ἄπιστοι ἔσονται. (4.6.29)

[119] Thuc. 1.121.5: "It would be terrible if their allies will not tire of bearing the burden for their slavery, while we, it seems, will not spend anything on vengeance and our own salvation and on not suffering badly by means of the very things which have been stolen away from us by them." Cf. 6.79.2.

[120] Lys. 31.31.

οὐκ οὖν δεινὸν εἰ τοὺς μὲν στρατηγούς, οἳ ἐνίκων ναυμαχοῦντες, ὅτε διὰ χειμῶνα οὐχ οἷοί τ' ἔφασαν εἶναι τοὺς ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης ἀνελέσθαι, θανάτῳ ἐζημιώσατε, ἡγούμενοι χρῆναι τῇ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἀρετῇ παρ' ἐκείνων δίκην λαβεῖν, τούτους δέ, οἳ ἰδιῶται μὲν ὄντες καθ' ὅσον ἐδύναντο ἐποίησαν ἡττηθῆναι ναυμαχοῦντας, ἐπειδὴ δὲ εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν κατέστησαν, ὁμολογοῦσιν ἑκόντες πολλοὺς τῶν πολιτῶν ἀκρίτους ἀποκτιννύναι, οὐκ ἄρα χρὴ αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς παῖδας ὑφ' ὑμῶν ταῖς ἐσχάταις ζημίαις κολάζεσθαι;[121]

οὐκ οὖν δεινὸν
εἰ τοὺς μὲν στρατηγούς,
οἳ ἐνίκων ναυμαχοῦντες,
ὅτε
διὰ χειμῶνα οὐχ οἷοί τ'
ἔφασαν εἶναι τοὺς ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης ἀνελέσθαι,
θανάτῳ ἐζημιώσατε,
ἡγούμενοι
χρῆναι τῇ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἀρετῇ παρ' ἐκείνων δίκην λαβεῖν,
τούτους δέ,
οἳ ἰδιῶται μὲν ὄντες
καθ' ὅσον ἐδύναντο
ἐποίησαν ἡττηθῆναι ναυμαχοῦντας,
ἐπειδὴ δὲ εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν κατέστησαν,
ὁμολογοῦσιν
ἑκόντες πολλοὺς τῶν πολιτῶν ἀκρίτους ἀποκτιννύναι,
οὐκ ἄρα χρὴ αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς παῖδας ὑφ' ὑμῶν ταῖς ἐσχάταις ζημίαις κολάζεσθαι;

As can be seen from the analysis above, this example reaches the third degree of subordination several times, and what's more it contains 69 words. It is thus more complex and expansive by far than anything from previous authors. One can easily see what motivated the complexity: each element of the argument pertains to highly sensitive events in Athens' recent past with the result that one is practically bursting with outraged expectation by the time he reaches what he thinks is going to be the second element of the paradox (οὐ κολάσεσθε, as Adams suggests *ad loc*.). In place of this expected climax he gets an anacoluthic question that expects the audience simultaneously to supply the second part of the paradox mentally, assent to its validity, and conclude that these men must not only be punished but punished capitally. Adams suggests that the motivation for the anacoluthon is twofold: οὐκ οὖν δεινὸν is "too remote," and οὐκ ἄρα χρὴ

[121] Lys. 12.36: "Is it not terrible, then, if on the one hand you executed the generals who were victorious in a naval battle when they said they were unable due to a storm to recover the dead from the sea, because you believed that you had to exact a penalty from them for the valor of the dead, while on the other hand those men, who as private citizens caused us to be defeated in a naval battle as much as they were able, and who admit that, when they came into power, they willingly executed many citizens without trial—Don't they themselves and their children have to be punished by you to the fullest extent of the law?"

... κολάζεσθαι is a "stronger, more passionate form" of the thought."[122] The former part of his argument will receive support when we come to an example from Isaeus, and the latter is patently true. The complexity of this example, then, was presumably still felt to be somewhat problematic: perhaps at some point along the way some members of the audience had forgotten how the sentence started. Demosthenes, as we will see, showed no such concern for his audience (assuming the style was not revised).

Of the three examples in Isaeus, two are unexceptional,[123] but the third is somewhat involved, and understanding its structure is critical for a proper appraisal of Demosthenes' innovations:

> νυνὶ δὲ δεινὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι τῇδε νομίζω, εἰ ἡνίκα μὲν ὁ Μενεκλῆς εἶχέ τι, τότε μὲν ἔδωκα ἐμαυτὸν ὑὸν αὐτῷ ποιήσασθαι, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσίας τῆς ἐκείνου, πρὶν πραθῆναι τὸ χωρίον, ἐγυμνασιάρχουν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ ἐφιλοτιμήθην ὡς ὑὸς ὢν ἐκείνου, καὶ τὰς στρατείας, ὅσαι ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ, ἐστράτευμαι ἐν τῇ φυλῇ τῇ ἐκείνου καὶ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκεῖνος ἐτελεύτησεν, εἰ προδώσω καὶ ἐξερημώσας αὐτοῦ τὸν οἶκον ἀπιὼν οἰχήσομαι, πῶς οὐκ ἂν δεινὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα εἶναι καὶ καταγέλαστον δοκοίη, καὶ τοῖς βουλομένοις περὶ ἐμοῦ βλασφημεῖν πολλὴν ἐξουσίαν παράσχοι;[124]

νυνὶ δὲ δεινὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι τῇδε νομίζω,
εἰ
ἡνίκα μὲν ὁ Μενεκλῆς εἶχέ τι,
τότε μὲν ἔδωκα ἐμαυτὸν ὑὸν αὐτῷ ποιήσασθαι, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσίας τῆς ἐκείνου,
πρὶν πραθῆναι τὸ χωρίον,
ἐγυμνασιάρχουν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ ἐφιλοτιμήθην
ὡς ὑὸς ὢν ἐκείνου,
καὶ τὰς στρατείας,
ὅσαι ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ,
ἐστράτευμαι ἐν τῇ φυλῇ τῇ ἐκείνου καὶ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ•
ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκεῖνος ἐτελεύτησεν,
<u>εἰ προδώσω καὶ</u>
<u>ἐξερημώσας αὐτοῦ τὸν οἶκον</u>
<u>ἀπιὼν οἰχήσομαι</u>,

[122] Adams (1970) *ad loc*.
[123] Is. 1.38 and 1.51.
[124] Is. 2.42: "I think that now the matter is terrible and shameful if, when Menecles had some means, then I gave myself to him so that he could adopt me as his son, and if out of his estate, before the place was sold, I was serving as *gymnasiarch* among the people and was ambitious as being his son, and I have marched in as many expeditions as occurred at that time in his tribe and among the people; but, after he has died, if I will betray him and rush off after having picked his house dry, how could the matter not seem terrible and ridiculous, and how could it not give opportunity to those who want to slander me?" Usher (1999), 159 cites this as "… a good example of how Isaeus elaborated and refined existing rhetorical devices." In light of this passage, it is tempting to believe the report that Demosthenes was a student of Isaeus and thus to regard his experimentation with this form of argument as having been influenced by his teacher.

> **πῶς οὐκ ἂν δεινὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα εἶναι καὶ καταγέλαστον δοκοίη**,καὶ τοῖς βουλομένοις περὶ ἐμοῦ βλασφημεῖν πολλὴν ἐξουσίαν παράσχοι ;

Although this example is quite long (90 words), it never exceeds the second degree of subordination, and it seems to flow with ease and perspicuity (Isocrates would approve): the clauses are short and simple, and there is no interlacing. Nevertheless, presumably due to its length Isaeus felt the need to restate the paradox in slightly altered form at its conclusion. It seems likely that like Lysias he felt some doubt about his audience's ability to get a synoptic view of the argument without some form of recapitulation. The two are also similar in that the re-statement of the paradox adds further emotional coloring to the argument.

Before we proceed to Demosthenes, it is necessary to note in passing that, amongst the less conspicuous examples from the authors discussed up to this point, there is significant variation in how the antithesis within the paradox is constructed. In all of the examples mentioned so far, the two members are antithetically opposed to one another by means of the particles μὲν ... δὲ, the clearest and most pronounced way of articulating the paradox. However, there were a variety of other ways in which the antithesis could be structured: one element could be incorporated into a noun phrase, which is then set in opposition to the main verb;[125] or the content of a relative clause could be antithetical to the main clause;[126] or one element could even be dependent on a circumstantial participle;[127] finally, one element could be supplied by a genitive absolute.[128] Orators before Demosthenes, then, had experimented with the form and developed a variety of ways of juxtaposing two seemingly incompatible states of affairs.

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[125] Isoc. 7.64: δεινὸν ἡγουμένους εἴ τις ὄψεται **τὴν πόλιν τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἄρξασαν**, ταύτην ὑφ' ἑτέροις οὖσαν

[126] Lys. 26.9: ἡγούμενος δεινὸν εἶναι, εἰ **δι' οὓς ἡ δημοκρατία κατελύετο**, οὗτοι ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πολιτείᾳ πάλιν ἄρξουσι, καὶ κύριοι γενήσονται τῶν νόμων …

[127] Isoc. 6.83: πάντων δ' ἂν δεινότατον ποιήσαιμεν, εἰ συνειδότες **Ἀθηναίοις ἐκλιποῦσι τὴν αὑτῶν χώραν ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας,** ἡμεῖς μηδ' ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡμετέρας αὐτῶν σωτηρίας ἀφέσθαι τῆς πόλεως τολμήσαιμεν,

[128] Isoc. 16.11: πάντων δ' ἂν εἴη δεινότατον, εἰ **τοῦ πατρὸς μετὰ τὴν φυγὴν δωρεὰν λαβόντος** ἐγὼ διὰ τὴν ἐκείνου φυγὴν ζημιωθείην.

It is Demosthenes, though, who pushed the capacities of the form to (or beyond) its limits. Whereas both Lysias and Isaeus felt the need to remind their audience of the form of the argument when they felt it had grown exceptionally long, in Demosthenes one gets:

> νῦν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ πάντων ἄν μοι δεινότατον συμβαίη, εἰ παρ' αὐτὰ τἀδικήμαθ' οὕτως ὀργίλως καὶ πικρῶς καὶ χαλεπῶς ἅπαντες ἔχοντες [ἐφαίνεσθε], ὥστε Νεοπτολέμου καὶ Μνησαρχίδου καὶ Φιλιππίδου καί τινος τῶν σφόδρα τούτων πλουσίων δεομένων καὶ ἐμοῦ καὶ ὑμῶν, ἐβοᾶτε μὴ ἀφεῖναι,καὶ προσελθόντος μοι Βλεπαίου τοῦ τραπεζίτου, τηλικοῦτ' ἀνεκράγετε, ὡς, τοῦτ' ἐκεῖνο, χρήματά μου ληψομένου, ὥστε μ', ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, φοβηθέντα τὸν ὑμέτερον θόρυβον θοἰμάτιον προέσθαι καὶ μικροῦ γυμνὸν ἐν τῷ χιτωνίσκῳ γενέσθαι, φεύγοντ' ἐκεῖνον ἕλκοντά με, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτ' ἀπαντῶντες "ὅπως ἐπέξει τῷ μιαρῷ καὶ μὴ διαλύσει· θεάσονταί σε τί ποιήσεις Ἀθηναῖοι" τοιαῦτα λέγοντες· ἐπειδὴ κεχειροτόνηται μὲν ὕβρις τὸ πρᾶγμ' εἶναι, ἐν ἱερῷ δ' οἱ ταῦτα κρίνοντες καθεζόμενοι διέγνωσαν, διέμεινα δ' ἐγὼ καὶ οὐ προὔδωκ' οὔθ'ὑμᾶς οὔτ' ἐμαυτόν, τηνικαῦτ' ἀποψηφιεῖσθ' ὑμεῖς.[129]

νῦν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ πάντων ἄν μοι δεινότατον συμβαίη,

εἰ
παρ' αὐτὰ τἀδικήμαθ' οὕτως ὀργίλως καὶ πικρῶς καὶ χαλεπῶς ἅπαντες ἔχοντες
[ἐφαίνεσθε],
ὥστε
Νεοπτολέμου καὶ Μνησαρχίδου καὶ Φιλιππίδου καί τινος τῶν σφόδρα
τούτων πλουσίων δεομένων καὶ ἐμοῦ καὶ ὑμῶν,
ἐβοᾶτε
μὴ ἀφεῖναι,
καὶ προσελθόντος μοι Βλεπαίου τοῦ τραπεζίτου,
τηλικοῦτ' ἀνεκράγετε,
ὡς, τοῦτ' ἐκεῖνο, χρήματά μου ληψομένου,
ὥστε μ', ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,
φοβηθέντα τὸν ὑμέτερον θόρυβον
θοἰμάτιον προέσθαι καὶ μικροῦ γυμνὸν ἐν τῷ χιτωνίσκῳ γενέσθαι,

[129] Dem. 21.215: "Now this would be the most terrible of all things that could befall me, if at the time of the crimes themselves you all were so angry and harsh and upset that, when Neoptolemus and Mnesarchides and Philippides and someone else of those wealthy men were begging you and me, you were crying out not to let him go, and, when Blepaeus the banker approached me, you let loose such a great shout, as though it was the same old story and I was about to take money, that I in my fear of your uproar abandoned my cloak and was nearly naked in my frock as I fled him trying to drag me along, and if after this upon meeting me you said "Make sure that you prosecute the vile fellow and that you don't reconcile with him. The Athenians will be watching to see what you do."; if, when the matter has been voted to be ὕβρις, and those making the judgment came to their decision while sitting in the temple, and when I stayed the course and did not abandon either your or myself, at *this* point you will acquit him." I follow Weil here in bracketing ἐφαίνεσθε. Butcher, and Goodwin adopted this reading in their editions as well. More recent editors (MacDowell and Dilts), however have retained it and also opted for the reading of the poorer manuscripts by adding μὲν after αὐτὰ and δὲ after ἐπειδὴ. The choice of recent editors is somewhat puzzling. When Weil originally bracketed ἐφαίνεσθε in his edition, he justified this reading grammatically by arguing that it allows one to construe λέγοντες. MacDowell, as mentioned, retains ἐφαίνεσθε and somewhat confusedly tries to explain λέγοντες thus: "**λέγοντες:** participle with ἐφαίνεσθε. Since speech is not primarily a matter of appearances, the combination is not particularly appropriate, and Gebauer *De hypotacticis* 192 proposes the emendation τοιαῦτ'ἐλέγετε. If emendation is really needed, I should prefer to postulate the loss of an indicative earlier in the sentence …. But probably no change is necessary." So the reading he gives doesn't *really* make much sense, but we shouldn't try to fix it anyway. Since Weil's solution does the least violence to the reading of the manuscripts and actually produces a text that makes sense, even if the structure is strained, I have retained his reading.

φεύγοντ’ ἐκεῖνον ἕλκοντά με,
καὶ μετὰ ταῦτ’ ἀπαντῶντες
“ὅπως ἐπέξει τῷ μιαρῷ καὶ μὴ διαλύσει· θεάσονταί σε τί ποιήσεις Ἀθηναῖοι”
τοιαῦτα λέγοντες·
ἐπειδὴ κεχειροτόνηται μὲν
ὕβρις τὸ πρᾶγμ’ εἶναι,
ἐν ἱερῷ δ’ οἱ ταῦτα κρίνοντες καθεζόμενοι διέγνωσαν, διέμεινα δ’ ἐγὼ καὶ οὐ
προὔδωκ’ οὔθ’ὑμᾶς οὔτ’ ἐμαυτόν,
τηνικαῦτ’ ἀποψηφιεῖσθ’ ὑμεῖς.[130]

This argument consists of a staggering 117 words; further, the sentence twice attains to the fifth degree of subordination. Goodwin, commenting on the aforementioned textual problem (see fn. 130), argues that this sentence provides evidence that the *Meidias* never received a final revision: “These changes show an early attempt to reconstruct this cumbrous sentence, which the orator could never have intended to leave as it now stands or ever stood.”[131] MacDowell, however, (though he adopts different readings) argues that there is a rhetorical point to the structure: “The accumulation of vivid incidents, including the humorous picture of D. losing his cloak, effectively gives the impression that there is an overwhelming number of reasons to expect Meidias to be condemned.” MacDowell’s argument is compelling. In addition to the vividness of the incidents, I would note their specificity: rather than referring generally to certain rich men

[130] I have chosen along with the majority of editors to punctuate this sentence with a period; however, a strong case can be made for punctuating it as a question. In a TLG search, out of the 19 cases in the Demosthenic corpus where the end of a sentence is followed by a clause that consists only of the word μηδαμῶς, the sentence preceding μηδαμῶς is punctuated as a question fifteen times, as a statement 4 times. The former is more intuitive: Demosthenes asks an impassioned question then answers himself with an emphatic “by no means”, e.g. εἰ δέ τις πένης μηδὲν ἠδικηκὼς ταῖς ἐσχάταις συμφοραῖς ἀδίκως ὑπὸ τούτου[Meidias] περιπέπτωκε, τούτῳ δ’ οὐδὲ συνοργισθήσεσθε; μηδαμῶς. However, in the following example, which is very similar to the passage from the *Meidias* under discussion, it makes more sense to punctuate as a statement: Καίτοι καὶ περὶ τῆς φωνῆς ἴσως εἰπεῖν ἀνάγκη· πάνυ γὰρ μέγα καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ φρονεῖν αὐτὸν ἀκούω, ὡς καθυποκρινούμενον ὑμᾶς. ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖτ’ ἀτοπώτατον ἁπάντων ἂν ποιῆσαι, εἰ, ὅτε μὲν τὰ Θυέστου καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ Τροίᾳ κάκ’ ἠγωνίζετο, ἐξεβάλλετ’ αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξεσυρίττετ’ ἐκ τῶν θεάτρων καὶ μόνον οὐ κατελεύεθ’ οὕτως ὥστε τελευτῶντα τοῦ τριταγωνιστεῖν ἀποστῆναι, ἐπειδὴ δ’ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς, ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς καὶ μεγίστοις τῆς πόλεως πράγμασι μυρί’ εἴργασται κακά, τηνικαῦθ’ ὡς καλὸν φθεγγομένῳ προσέχοιτε. μηδαμῶς· If this were an anacoluthon in which Demosthenes breaks off his original thought to ask a question, then it seems odd that he would retain the mood determined by the conditional form. With all this said, the pathetic paradox by nature deals with shocking, seemingly unimaginable thoughts, and it is very easy for a statement of disbelief to transition seamlessly into a rhetorical question. Without any solid information on intonation, it is hard to say how much that would have determined the audience’s construal of the thought.

[131] Goodwin (1906), *ad loc.*

who tried to bribe him (e.g. δεομένων πλουσίων τινών), he provides a list of names, all within a genitive absolute within a result clause that is dependent on a circumstantial participle. This sort of expansiveness where one would least expect it can be seen as parallel to Demosthenes' penchant for developing a thought within a phrase or even within an attribute of a phrase or for expanding a period beyond self-prescribed limits. Indeed, the Demosthenic sentence seems capacious of interruption and expansion on every level, as though he could potentially think an oration within the bounds of a single sentence.

I would also argue that the role of narrative in the argument is significant. Pearson has argued that Demosthenes consciously innovated in his use of narrative in his political speeches,[132] so his use of it to inform the structure of the pathetic paradox is arguably part of a larger trend. In the more standard form of the argument as defined by Usher above, there is an antithesis between two incongruent elements or situations which is more or less clearly articulated, most frequently by the particle combination μὲν ... δὲ. In the argument under discussion, by contrast, there is a seamless transition from one element to the next within the structure of a climactic narrative. We begin at the moment of the incident (παρ' αὐτὰ τἀδικήματα) when the Athenian people are still outraged and seething at Meidias' impious and violent crime; then we move to subsequent interactions between Demosthenes and the people (μετὰ ταῦτ') in which they exhort him to persevere in his prosecution after showing him their support in the *probole*;[133] after that we get a tricolon (ἐπειδὴ ...) which serves as the temporal contrast to παρ' αὐτὰ τἀδικήματα and which through its structure (second and third elements longer than the first) and its content (I have stayed the course, I have not betrayed you) greatly

[132] Pearson (1976), 64.
[133] In the legal procedure Demosthenes adopted to prosecute Meidias, he first had to get the Assembly to vote against him in a meeting the day after the festival. Then the case could go to trial before a jury if he was still willing to pursue it. For detailed discussion of this procedure, see MacDowell (1990), 13-23.

intensifies the passion of the claim; finally, in the second to last word of the sentence, when we are all but crying out καταψηφιοῦμεν, we get instead the absurd ἀποψηφιεῖσθ'. In place of a clean division between neatly opposed incongruent elements, Demosthenes uses a single narrative which only becomes incongruous through its surprise ending. With the elements of the narrative being so vivid and dramatic (direct speech, Demosthenes tearing off his cloak), a desire is created within the reader for his expectation of the conclusion to be fulfilled. When the very opposite of this expectation is proposed, the absurdity engenders a sense of horror, thus affectively confirming the very opening of the argument: … δεινότατον συμβαίη, εἰ.

It is necessary to recall at this point that we are dealing with a single sentence which spans 117 words and twice attains to the fifth degree of subordination. Even if the interpretation I presented above is plausible, the question remains whether Demosthenes could actually have expected his audience to be able to digest such a sentence, or whether Goodwin is right that he would have restructured this passage when he went to revise the speech. Although it can be difficult at times to gauge the relative complexity even of two examples of the same type of argument, there is a comparably complex pathetic paradox in *On the False Embassy*:

> οὐκοῦν δεινόν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ σχέτλιον τοῖς μὲν τὰ Φιλίππου πράγμαθ' ᾑρημένοις θεραπεύειν οὕτως ἀκριβῆ τὴν παρ' ἐκείνου πρὸς ἑκάτερ' αἴσθησιν ὑπάρχειν, ὥσθ' ἕκαστον, ὥσπερ ἂν παρεστηκότος αὐτοῦ, μηδ' ὧν ἂν ἐνθαδὶ πράξῃ μηδὲν ἡγεῖσθαι λήσειν, ἀλλὰ φίλους τε νομίζειν οὓς ἂν ἐκείνῳ δοκῇ καὶ μὴ φίλους ὡσαύτως, τοῖς δὲ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ζῶσι καὶ τῆς παρ' ὑμῶν τιμῆς γλιχομένοις καὶ μὴ προδεδωκόσι ταύτην τοσαύτην κωφότητα καὶ τοσοῦτο σκότος παρ' ὑμῶν ἁπαντᾶν, ὥστε τοῖς ἀλειτηρίοις τούτοις ἐξ ἴσου νῦν ἔμ' ἀγωνίζεσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα παρ' ὑμῖν τοῖς ἅπαντ' εἰδόσιν.[134]

οὐκοῦν δεινόν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ σχέτλιον
τοῖς μὲν τὰ Φιλίππου πράγμαθ'ᾑρημένοις θεραπεύειν οὕτως ἀκριβῆ τὴν παρ' ἐκείνου πρὸς ἑκάτερ' αἴσθησιν ὑπάρχειν,
ὥσθ' ἕκαστον,
ὥσπερ ἂν παρεστηκότος αὐτοῦ,μηδ'

[134] Dem. 19.226: "And so it is terrible, men of Athens, and wretched that on the one hand those who have chosen to promote the affairs of Philip have such keen perception from him in each direction that each one of them believes that none of the things he does here will escape Philip's notice, as if he were standing right beside them, and as a result they regard as friends and enemies whoever he decides, while on the other hand those who live with respect for you and crave honor from you and who have not betrayed this honor, they meet with deafness from you and darkness which is so great that now I am contending with these accursed men on an equal level, and that among you who know all these things."

ὧν ἂν ἐνθαδὶ πράξῃ
μηδὲν ἡγεῖσθαι
λήσειν,
ἀλλὰ φίλους τε νομίζειν
οὓς ἂν ἐκείνῳ δοκῇ καὶ μὴ φίλους ὡσαύτως,
τοῖς δὲ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ζῶσι καὶ τῆς παρ' ὑμῶν τιμῆς γλιχομένοις καὶ μὴ προδεδωκόσι ταύτην τοσαύτην κωφότητα καὶ τοσοῦτο σκότος παρ' ὑμῶν ἁπαντᾶν,
ὥστε τοῖς ἀλειτηρίοις τούτοις ἐξ ἴσου νῦν ἔμ' ἀγωνίζεσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα παρ' ὑμῖν τοῖς ἅπαντ' εἰδόσιν.

Although this example is not as complex (only four degrees of subordination) or lengthy (it totals ninety words), it comes close. The complexity within the result clause is particularly difficult to deal with, but once again it does seem to have a striking effect: Demosthenes presents the traitors' anxiety (ὥσπερ ἂν παρεστηκότος αὐτοῦ) from their own perspective, which accentuates even further the contrast between Philip's all-seeing eye and the Athenian people's blindness. However, this comparandum is problematic since, as I will discuss at length in a later chapter,[135] it is likely that this speech too is a draft or has been revised. The two most conspicuous instances, then, both occur in texts that in some sense may not reflect what Demosthenes actually said in court. Further, as I will argue in chapter 5, readers would have been able to recognize that both *Against Meidias* and *On the False Embassy* could not have been delivered in court in their preserved form. What, then, are the implications of the state of these works for understanding Demosthenes' use of the pathetic paradox and his methods of composition more generally? On the one hand the sentences are, as I have argued, carefully crafted, and their structure can be said to have an expressive function. Perhaps, then, Demosthenes would not have altered them at all, and audience members would have had no trouble understanding them. On the other hand due to their complexity this seems difficult to imagine. But why would Demosthenes go to the trouble of carefully crafting such involved arguments in the first place if he knew he was going to have to alter them when delivering the speech? The form of the argument in *Against Meidias* could be

[135] See chapter 5.1.B.

said to represent a possible ideal of the pathetic paradox: if my hearers were readers, then the argument would have this formal potential. Revision would involve negotiating between this ideal and whatever Demosthenes thought the jury could handle. The reader can only speculate, but, as we will see in chapter 5, provoking such speculation may in fact have been Demosthenes' motive for distributing these speeches in draft form.

5. Conclusion: μέγα καὶ νεανικὸν φρόνημα

Jaeger says of the *Third Philippic*,

> Thus we may validly hold, as others have done, that in this speech Demosthenes' power as a politician reaches its peak. Like his earlier speeches against Philip, the oration is primarily a spiritual and moral achievement. In Demosthenes' soul *ethos* and *pathos* now join in a mighty alliance, marking the onset of a new era of spiritual and artistic expression in the history of the Greek spirit, an era that culminates, symbolically speaking, in the style of the Pergamene altar. The powerful and highly passionate expression that we find there bears the stamp of the violent struggle. It is in the sculptures of Scopas and simultaneously, in the *Philippics* of Demosthenes that its deep shadows first appear.[136]

Passionate expression and violent struggle, like Scopas's *Maenad*. But is the passion the same and similarly accessible? One is drawn into ecstasy as he gazes at the maenad flinging her delicate neck toward the aether, but Demosthenes, behind his passion there is projected a deep νοῦς; he is always in control of language and so, it seems, of reality, manipulating its elements, gazing beyond its confines. In this chapter I have examined various ways in which his style at times feels distinctly unnatural and thus creates a sense of distance between speaker and reader. The question arises why he would ever want to distance himself from his audience. One explanation would be that he revised the style for distribution to an audience of readers. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, Wilamowitz argued that one does not write in an

[136] Jaeger (1938), 174.

involved periodic style when addressing a large crowd in the Assembly,[137] and Nietzsche made an even more radical distinction between the written and oral styles:

> Schreibstil und Sprechstil. — Die Kunst, zu schreiben, verlangt vor Allem Ersatzmittel für die Ausdrucksarten, welche nur der Redende hat: also für Gebärden, Accente, Töne, Blicke. Desshalb ist der Schreibstil ein ganz anderer, als der Sprechstil, und etwas viel Schwierigeres: — er will mit Wenigerem sich ebenso verständlich machen wie jener. Demosthenes hielt seine Reden anders, als wir sie lesen; er hat sie zum Gelesenwerden erst überarbeitet. — Cicero's Reden sollten, zum gleichen Zwecke, erst demosthenisirt werden: jetzt ist viel mehr römisches Forum in ihnen, als der Leser vertragen kann.[138]

The title of this aphorism assumes an antithesis between the written and oral: the latter has all the elements of delivery at its disposal, the former has something else that is (intentionally) left vague. However, as I have demonstrated in this chapter, the style of Demosthenes' speeches does not represent a becoming written (*Gelesenwerden*) so much as it occupies a nebulous interstitial space between written and oral. As Demosthenes himself is said to have claimed, his speeches are neither written nor unwritten. This liminal nature, as we will see in each of the following chapters, affects not only the style but also the structure and content of his speeches. In a sense, it makes the issue of revision moot: there was not a written Demosthenes on the one hand and a hypothetical oral one on the other. Rather, the two interpenetrate one another, and, as Aeschines' criticism suggests, Demosthenes presumably talked like a book in the same way as he wrote like a speaker.

If we assume, then, that the style of the speeches as preserved is not altogether different from that of the speeches as delivered and that as a consequence the sense of distance between speaker and audience which the style creates is intentional, what did Demosthenes hope to achieve by distancing himself from his audience? One possibility is that one wants the person giving him counsel to be perceptibly more intelligent than he himself is, and the Demosthenic style with its difficult reifications of actions and states of affairs and its long, complex phrases

[137] Wilamowitz (1911), 75.
[138] Nietzsche, *Menschliches allzu Menschliches* 110 in Colli and Montinari (1967) II, 238.

and sentences certainly presents his mind as though it were almost divine. He seems to see beyond the surface of things, beyond the physical sphere where animate beings and concrete objects interact with one another, to an eternal realm where it is not people and things but states of affairs that act and are acted upon. But by focusing too exclusively on the vatic side of his *ethos* one risks losing sight of the fact that at times he is also the most immediate, colloquial orator, for example in his use of diction and question and answer. One could simply adopt the dominant metaphor for understanding such variation in Demosthenes and say that he is a Protean figure who adapts himself to any given situation without maintaining much of a consistent identity. But I would argue that there is actually a profound dialectic between the immediate and the distant in Demosthenes' prose.

Toward the end of the *Third Olynthiac* Demosthenes tells the Athenians that they have been too complacent and too willing to play the part of slaves so long as they get their share of the Theoric fund. He concludes his scathing criticism with a striking metaphor followed by a general observation on human nature:

> οἱ δ' ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει καθείρξαντες ὑμᾶς ἐπάγουσιν ἐπὶ ταῦτα καὶ τιθασεύουσι χειροήθεις αὑτοῖς ποιοῦντες. ἔστι δ' οὐδέποτ', οἶμαι, μέγα καὶ νεανικὸν φρόνημα λαβεῖν μικρὰ καὶ φαῦλα πράττοντας· ὁποῖ' ἄττα γὰρ ἂν τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ᾖ, τοιοῦτον ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ φρόνημα ἔχειν.[139]

Likening your audience to animals being tamed is a sure way to get their attention, and Demosthenes capitalizes on the ears he has pricked with a memorable gnomic statement. He exhorts the Athenians to change their behavior so that they can attain to some grand and vigorous thought. What is this thought? On a formal, linguistic level, I would argue, it is Demosthenes' prose style. After having gained the audience's sympathy with its "impure" diction, its question

[139] Dem. 3.31-2: "Those who have locked you up in the city itself lead you on toward these things [the Theoric Fund and festival processions] and tame you, making you submissive to them. But it is never, I think, possible for men engaged in paltry and base affairs to seize a great and vigorous thought; for men necessarily have the same sort of mentality as their pursuits."

and answer, its *anadiplosis,* its representation of direct speech, the style then rapidly ascends to the aether of some sublime *Gedankenwelt* with its fathomlessly capacious phrases and periods (and its Thucydidean patina). This shift from immediacy to Olympian thunderbolts can be seen most clearly in the passage from *On the False Embassy* I analyzed on pgs. 111 ff. However, characterizing the effect of the style as a sort of oscillation does not adequately account for all of its features, as I demonstrated in my discussion of Demosthenes' use of hyperbaton; for the figure, insofar as it simultaneously suggests emotional disturbance and the periodic *telos,* allows him to be two places at once. Thus he can embody the paradoxical adviser that democratic ideology demanded: a man of yet superior to the people.

Demosthenes gives the impression of already having grabbed hold of the μέγα καὶ νεανικὸν φρόνημα, and he wants the Athenians to seize it too. The features of his style that I have examined in this chapter can be seen as the mechanisms of an intellectual/moral/spiritual/political ascent: the prose comes down to our level and tries to lead us up to a new plane of intellection. To think like Demosthenes speaks! To have so great a mastery over one's language (and reality) as to be able to develop thoughts within thoughts within thoughts. Reading Demosthenes is like stretching one's neck in an attempt to become a giraffe: he compels his audience to strive to reach unattainable heights of cognition, but there is still a pleasure in the stretching and straining. Does the thought actually exist, though? Or are we merely reaching for an empty form.

CHAPTER 3

Structure

Although the chronology of the development of rhetorical theory on structure is not entirely clear,[1] the state of the art in Demosthenes' day is at least somewhat more perspicuous. As I discussed in Chapter 1 (pg. 42), Plato had prescribed that the structure of speeches should evince some sort of necessity and that they should have clearly identifiable members and articulations just like an animal. Isocrates seems to have been receptive to this idea and to have incorporated it into his own ideas about disposition. However, for both Plato and Isocrates the precise nature of the unifying principle remained somewhat ambiguous. For the former this is inevitable insofar as the structure of any given speech must be determined in large part by the nature of the soul(s) to which it is addressed.[2] This allows for variation in the nature of the principle: there will be one principle for structuring a speech addressed to a philosopher, another for one addressed to a poet.

For Isocrates, in turn, the determining factor is the all-important καιρός. This of course makes it difficult to formulate any abstract, universally applicable principles of disposition. However, one can say that he too allowed for variation in the nature of the unifying principle of any given speech. In characterizing the structure of the *Antidosis*, he says,

> Καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ (λόγος) ῥᾴδιος ἦν οὐδ' ἁπλοῦς, ἀλλὰ πολλὴν ἔχων πραγματείαν. Ἔστιν γὰρ τῶν γεγραμμένων ἔνια μὲν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ πρέποντα ῥηθῆναι, τὰ δὲ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς τοιούτους ἀγῶνας οὐχ ἁρμόττοντα, περὶ δὲ φιλοσοφίας πεπαρρησιασμένα καὶ δεδηλωκότα τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς· ἔστιν δέ τι καὶ τοιοῦτον, ὃ τῶν νεωτέρων τοῖς ἐπὶ τὰ μαθήματα καὶ τὴν παιδείαν ὁρμῶσιν ἀκούσασιν ἂν συνενέγκοι, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τῶν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ πάλαι γεγραμμένων ἐγκαταμεμιγμένα τοῖς νῦν λεγομένοις, οὐκ ἀλόγως οὐδ' ἀκαίρως, ἀλλὰ προσηκόντως τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις. Τοσοῦτον οὖν μῆκος λόγου συνιδεῖν καὶ τοσαύτας ἰδέας

[1] See Cole (1991) 130-135 and Schiappa (1999) 105-110 for persuasive challenges to the standard view that Tisias and Corax were responsible for formulating explicit theories of disposition and for dividing the forensic speech into a set number of parts.
[2] Pl. *Phdr*. 271d.

> καὶ τοσοῦτον ἀλλήλων ἀφεστώσας συναρμόσαι καὶ συναγαγεῖν καὶ τὰς ἐπιφερομένας οἰκειῶσαι ταῖς προειρημέναις καὶ πάσας ποιῆσαι σφίσιν αὐταῖς ὁμολογουμένας οὐ πάνυ μικρὸν ἦν ἔργον.[3]

The speech is complex and consists of diverse elements from various genres; however, some sort of deliberate principle of unification has been applied. Although the nature of this principle is left ambiguous, nevertheless, judging by his earlier claim in the same preface that the speech is novel and dissimilar from the rest of his works, and judging by the nature of the components that have to be unified, one must assume that he too allowed for variation in structural principles.

Fourth-century readers, then, would have been looking for some sort of unifying principle in Demosthenes' speeches, even if they did not have firm ideas about what this principle would be. However, when we turn to these readers' expectations when it came to the parts of a deliberative speech and their arrangement, the role of rhetorical theory becomes much more problematic. Perhaps as early as the fifth century[4] but definitely during the course of the fourth, rhetorical handbooks began to be organized around the canonical division of a speech into four parts (proem, narrative, proof, epilogue): this is how Anaximenes structured his handbook, and apparently Theodectes did the same.[5] If the author of such a handbook did not intend to restrict himself to forensic oratory—and Anaximenes did not do so—, then he would have had to have assumed that the same structural scheme was valid for both trial and Assembly speeches. However, as has been noted,[6] the scheme describes forensic speeches in the first instance, and

[3] Isoc. 15.9-11: "For indeed the speech was not easy nor was it simple, but it required a lot of work. For some parts of what I have written are suitable for being delivered in a courtroom, while others are not fitting for such trials but rather have been freely spoken concerning my philosophy and have demonstrated its power. There is also an element that would benefit young men pursuing education and culture when they hear it. Further, many excerpts from my previous works have been mixed with what is being said now, not in a haphazard or unsuitable manner, but in a way that befits the subject at hand. To envision, then, such a lengthy speech and to harmonize forms so numerous and so disparate from one another and to bring them together and make those that follow fit with those that precede and put all of them in agreement with one another was by no means a small task."
[4] For a brief overview of the *status quaestionis,* see de Brauw (2007), 187-191.
[5] For discussion of Theodectes' theory, see Grube (1965), 140.
[6] de Brauw (2007), 187.

more or less drastic alterations have to be made to account for deliberative oratory. Aristotle recognized this problem and so reduced the essential components of any given speech to two: proposition (πρόθεσις) and proof (πίστις).[7] Further, because, he argues, deliberative oratory deals with the future and not the past, narrative does not properly belong to it.[8] Although Aristotle's criticisms of contemporary theory on disposition are legitimate, his alternative fails to account adequately for deliberative oratory. For insofar as they were primarily interested not in a proposition about a particular course of action but rather in reformation of their audience's character, Demosthenes, Isocrates, and certain speakers in Thucydides (e.g. Cleon) were presenting propositions not just about the future but also about the present, and the expedient was viewed merely as an inevitable consequence of reformed character and right thinking. As we will see below, in one speech Demosthenes tells his audience that they already understand the situation well enough to make the right decision; they just do not have the will to follow through. Proof, then, is not enough, and based on the nature of the propositions involved one has to increase the number of essential parts of a deliberative speech.

The structure of deliberative speeches, then, with regard to both the nature of the parts in question and their arrangement, would have represented an unresolved theoretical problem for fourth-century readers.[9] They would have been looking for some sort of unity, and under the influence of Plato and Isocrates audience psychology and the nature of the situation for which the speech was composed would have served as general reference points for understanding the significance of the structure of a speech. However, it is doubtful that the average reader had any

[7] Arist. *Rhet.* 3.13.4.
[8] Arist. *Rhet.* 3.13.16.
[9] Cf. Kennedy (1963), 88.

detailed schema or catalog of components in mind with which to account for a given structure. One had to develop his own analytical tools in the process of reading.

In the previous chapter I argued that in their interpretation of Demosthenes' style fourth-century readers would have been working with a basic distinction between the written and the oral. Worthington argues that such a distinction was also made on the level of structure. He claims that speechwriters used a "two-stage process of composition"[10] according to which first a functional form of the speech was prepared for delivery in court, then this version was revised for an audience of readers. The latter version would be characterized by "more sophisticated composition,"[11] that is by more elaborate ring composition among other things. MacDowell, however, expresses his doubt:

> His [Worthington's] main argument is that they display ring composition … and this is too intricate and elaborate to have been included in a speech to an unsophisticated and inattentive audience …. In my opinion, he places more weight on this argument than it will bear.[12]

Although he disagrees with Worthington's analysis of a speech by Dinarchus, he does not present his own counter-analysis but is content to "…make the rather dogmatic statement that I do not find ring composition to be as prominent in this and other texts as Worthington does."[13] He goes on to argue that, if it is present, it may have been a feature of the original speech as delivered.[14] I agree with MacDowell on both points: because symmetrical structuring does not affect the comprehensibility of the speech in the same way that manipulation of syntax does, there is no reason why an orator would have refrained from using it in the delivered version. With regard to the presence of elaborate ring structures in the first place, I will examine in detail

[10] Worthington (1991), 62.
[11] *Ibid.*, 63.
[12] MacDowell (2009), 8. Cf. Kremmydas (2012), 54: "I disagree with Worthington on the extent of its [ring composition's] use by the Attic orators."
[13] Macdowell (2009), 8.
[14] *Ibid*.

Wooten's claims that Demosthenes used them to structure his deliberative speeches, and I will demonstrate that MacDowell's general objection is accurate. For the structural analyses on which the claim is based can often be disputed.

Although the claims about ring composition in particular must be rejected, the question remains whether readers were applying a more general written/oral distinction to structure as well as style. Because it is hard to identify concrete structural features that could be said to be distinctly written as opposed to oral, and because the structure of Demosthenes' speeches does not potentially obscure comprehensibility in the way syntax does, I will assume that for readers the written/oral distinction was not as much of an issue when it came to understanding structure.

Fourth-century rhetorical theory, as discussed above, had difficulty accounting for deliberative oratory as a genre. In addition, Demosthenes' speeches in particular pose their own set of problems. For there is a general consensus among modern scholars that the disposition of certain of his speeches is difficult to schematize and that it does not adhere to any "logical" pattern. M. Delaunois well characterizes the current *status quaestionis*:

> On éprouve, quand on lit du Démosthène au sommet de sa carrière, devant des discours mystérieusement enchaînés et pourtant si prenants, une immense difficulté à faire le plan. On est saisi par la trame du discours, conduit par la main, comme séduit, mais il est inutile d'essayer de faire ce que nous appelons un "plan logique"; on est comme étourdi par un feu d'artifice de répétitions, et finalement on reste pris par quelques idées nettes, mais tout à fait incapable de retrouver le fil conducteur, de retrace la route parcourue. Alors? Faut-il en arriver à reconnaître le désordre? Ou au contraire forcer le texte pour le faire entrer, bon gré, mal gré, dans un cadre rigoureux?[15]

Like Delaunois, Blass cautions against formulating any abstract rules of disposition and recommends focusing instead on the structure of individual speeches. He says of the range of dispositional possibilities one encounters in Demosthenes' œuvre that "… die Ordnung ist nicht einmal immer logisch begründet, sondern manchmal auch, wie in der Leptinea, ausserordentlich

[15] Delaunois (1958), 77.

zwanglos und frei ….”[16]; he lists as general principles of the structuring of his speeches beauty, relevance, freedom, and variety.[17] More recently, MacDowell has stressed that Demosthenes’ speeches “… do not easily submit to logical dissection” and that “Often they flow on from one topic to another in no obvious systematic order and without marked divisions.”[18] Finally, Wooten has argued that, at least with respect to the deliberative speeches, a clear development can be seen over the course of Demosthenes’ political career: while his early speeches before the Assembly present long chains of complex arguments, the *Philippics* and *Olynthiacs* are characterized by ring composition in which a few key arguments are presented repeatedly.[19] However, this diachronic view of the issue is problematized by the fact that, as Wooten notes, we have to allow for a reversion to account for the structure of *On the Freedom of the Rhodians*.[20]

Blass prescribed that “… in Bezug auf Bau und Anordnung der Reden die besondere Betrachtung eines jeden Werkes an Stelle einer allgemeinen Zusammenfassung zu treten hat.”[21] However, the scholarship past and present on the disposition of Demosthenes’ speeches has tended to posit a general structural principle and then has used it to analyze the disposition of a given speech. For Sampaix, “le ‘liant’ du discours, ce n’est pas une proposition générale de laquelle découlent toutes les considerations, c’est le mouvement oratoire qui consiste à accentuer sans cesse une même impulsion sur les volontés.”[22] For Delaunois, it was *le plan psychologique*; for Pearson, it was the incorporation of narrative; For Wooten it is ring composition.[23] Scholars

[16] Blass (1893) III.1, 215. Cf. Butcher (1881), 156; Tuplin (1998), 280.
[17] Blass (1893) III.1, 215.
[18] MacDowell (1990), 28. Cf. Adams (1927), 49-50.
[19] Wooten (2010). Tuplin (1998), 282 argues for the presence of ring composition in the *Olynthiacs*. Worthington (1991), 64 claims that ring composition is common in the Attic orators more generally.
[20] *Ibid.* 7-8.
[21] Blass (1893) III.1, 215.
[22] Sampaix (1937), 26.
[23] Wooten (2008), 52; Wooten (2010).

seem to assume that the emphasis which 4th century rhetorical theorists placed on making the speech suit the occasion (τὸ πρέπον and καιρός) did not extend to the logic of the disposition but rather only applied to the particular instantiation of given structural principles, that is ring composition, for example, is a given regardless of the needs of the moment, and one just needs to understand how it was implemented. This touches on another problem with the most influential and detailed studies of the disposition of Demosthenes' deliberative speeches: they are diachronic and assume an evolutionary development. For Pearson, the *telos* of this development is the *Philippics* as a cycle; for Wooten, it is the *Third Philippic* in particular.[24] As a result, earlier speeches are viewed in relation to the posited *telos* as embryonic manifestations of structural features that have yet to come to maturity rather than as equally adequate attempts to address a different rhetorical situation.

In this chapter I will analyze the structure of each of the *Olynthiacs* and *Philippics* separately. My analyses will be based on the assumption that no evolutionary development occurred during the period in which these speeches were composed and thus that each speech represents an equally adequate response to a unique rhetorical situation. For each speech the nature of this situation will be deduced from the text of the speech itself. I do not make any attempt to formulate any general principles of disposition; rather, I assume that the rationale for the organization of material in each case is determined by the situation and by the disposition of the audience. Reading and analyzing structure, then, involves in each case description of the situation as represented in the speech itself and characterization of the attitude of the audience, again as Demosthenes himself presents it in the text. Because unity was an important but only vaguely articulated factor for both Plato and Isocrates, the readings that follow will also take into

[24] Pearson (1976), 122. Wooten (2010), 22.

consideration in what sense the structure of a given speech can be said to form something like an organic whole. It should also be noted that, despite the fact that this chapter is devoted primarily to structure, I have consciously avoided undertaking a hermetic treatment of this element of rhetorical form with the result that in my readings discussion of other elements such as style and diction has been included when they can be seen to respond to the same rhetorical goal as the aspect of structure under discussion.

1. *The First Philippic*

Some scholars have argued that there is very little structure to the *First Philippic*. So Pearson, who claims that "The *First Philippic* does not present a series of logical arguments or conform to any regular rhetorical pattern. Its primary argument lies in its appeal to the feelings of the Athenians."[25] For most scholars since Delaunois, however, the importance of repetition as a structural feature has been central to understanding the disposition of the speech. For him and Rowe, Demosthenes uses theme and variation in a way analogous to the composer of a symphony; their conception of the structure is thus to some degree impressionistic, Rowe's being somewhat more determinate insofar as he argues that this theme and variation has a definite function, namely to represent events in what he terms the "satiric mode."[26] However, he is also quick to recognize the impracticability of any rigid schematization even if based on repetition.[27] Wooten, in turn, argues that on a macro-level Demosthenes employs ring composition to structure the speech; however, he never presents the full ring in diagram form as he does in other cases.[28]

[25] Pearson (1976), 127. Cf. Sampaix (1937), 24-5.
[26] Delaunois (1951), Rowe (1968), 362. Cf. MacDowell (2009), 217-18.
[27] Rowe (1968), 362. Cf. Delaunois (1958), 77.
[28] Wooten (2010), 7. Cf. Karvounis (2002), 234.

In their analysis of the structure of the speech, the aforementioned scholars have not adequately taken into account how it responds to the particular situation Demosthenes faced when delivering the speech. I will argue that its distinctive structural features, most notably the exceptionally frequent use of question and answer, represent an attempt on his part to distinguish the counsel he gives from that of other politicians.

At the conclusion of the proem, Demosthenes sets himself apart from everyone else who has given counsel on the subject of Philip's aggression: εἰ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου τὰ δέοντα οὗτοι συνεβούλευσαν, οὐδὲν ἂν ὑμᾶς νῦν ἔδει βουλεύεσθαι.[29] Differentiation on the level of content is reinforced by differentiation on the level of form. As Hermogenes noted, the proem is a reworking of the opening of Isocrates' *Archidamus*;[30] however, the style and length have been dramatically altered. Whereas Isocrates in his characteristically smooth periods luxuriates at some length in his apology for audaciously coming forward to speak as a young man, Demosthenes condenses the whole *captatio benevolentiae* into a single complex sentence. Through the formal allusion, the audience is encouraged negatively to associate all of the idle talk of the men who have not counseled what is necessary with the inflated prose of Isocrates or someone of his ilk. Demosthenes, on the other hand, is set on getting down to business; he is not going to deliver some embellished set speech, he is just going to say what needs to be said. As we will see, this sets the tone for the entire speech, which structurally gives the impression of not being a speech at all.

One element of the situation, then, is the fact that many men have already given counsel, but bad counsel. Another is that in the past the Athenians, even when they make the right

[29] Dem. 4.1: "For if in the past they had given you the right counsel, there would be no need to deliberate now."
[30] Hermog. *Id.* 2.384.

decrees, do not follow through with their decisions: Empty triremes (§43), an empty decree (§45), mere forces on paper (§19:τὰς ἐπιστολιμαίους ταύτας δυνάμεις), and waging war with Philip by letter and decree (§30: ἐν τοῖς ψηφίσμασι καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς πολεμῆτε Φιλίππῳ). Demosthenes finds the root of all this empty talk in the Athenians' sluggishness and indolence (βραδύτης and ῥᾳθυμία). Accordingly, he who would give counsel under current circumstances faces two problems: first, to distinguish himself from all the others who have not given good counsel; second, to present his proposals in such a way as actually to stir the Athenians to action.

The distinctive style of the speech of course makes its contribution, but the structure is just as important. One of the key aspects in this connection is the frequency with which rhetorical questions and hypothetical objections occur. Wooten noted this frequency and argued that the function of these devices is to create an emotional tone:

> This emotional tone is created to a great extent by the third factor that distinguishes the *First Philippic* from the other two speeches: language that is much more highly patterned, relying particularly on those figures of speech and thought that create emphasis and that convey and evoke emotion. In *For the Megalopolitans,* for example, there are, on average, .70 rhetorical questions and .35 direct addresses to the audience per page.... In the *First Philippic* there is an average of 1.6 rhetorical questions per page of text and 1.8 direct addresses to the audience...[31]

I agree with his interpretation here, but I would argue that all these addresses to the audience have in addition an important structural function. Rehdantz seems to have come to the same conclusion when in his interpretation of a rhetorical question in §2, after following Hermogenes' explanation of the function of the device (to produce clarity and understanding), he adds the following:

> Um sie [die rhetorische Frage] aber richtig anzuwenden, muss der Redner in jedem Augenblick der Gedanken und Stimmung seiner Hörer sich bewusst sein, so dass er überall nur die Frage dem Hörer von der Lippe zu nehmen scheint. Dadurch und durch die Antwort seinerseits entsteht zwischen Hörer und Redner e.[ine] lebendige Wechselwirkung, von welcher wir wenig kennen.[32]

[31] Wooten (2008), 13.
[32] Rehdantz and Blass (1886) on Dem. 4.2.

Even if one is not entirely convinced of his somewhat wistful reference to a lost reciprocal influence between speaker and hearer, nevertheless it can be demonstrated that the Athenians themselves desired such a sensation. They wanted speeches that seemed directly to address the situation at hand in all its specificity.[33] This is evident not only in Alcidamas' "On those who write written speeches," where he claims that writers who cultivate an extemporaneous style write the best speeches and where he later proceeds to make the famous analogy between written speeches and sculpture and painting;[34] but one can also see it in Isocrates' *Against the Sophists*, where the καιρός has to be defined somewhat differently. In the contrast he develops between learning to read and compose speeches, he cites the following as the greatest difference between them:

> Μέγιστον δὲ σημεῖον τῆς ἀνομοιότητος αὐτῶν· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ λόγους οὐχ οἷόν τε καλῶς ἔχειν ἢν μὴ τῶν καιρῶν καὶ τοῦ πρεπόντως καὶ τοῦ καινῶς ἔχειν μετάσχωσιν, τοῖς δὲ γράμμασιν οὐδενὸς τούτων προσεδέησεν.[35]

The highly abstract language he uses here to describe the difference is noteworthy: speeches participate in situations, suitability, and being novel. It is almost as if a given situation and an apt speech are two puzzle pieces that fit together. There is something almost mystical to the emergence of a beautiful speech; it comes to be out of the ooze of the particular.

In addition to this passage from *Against the Sophists*, one should note Isocrates' concern with giving a dialogical character to his writings. Usener devotes a chapter to discussing the various devices he adopts to achieve this: frequent use of the verb διαλέγεσθαι, use of the inclusive first-person plural, and, most pertinent to this chapter, "der Einschub von Dialogelementen und die Wiedergabe der – zum Teil hypothetischen – Rede anderer

[33] For audience psychology as an element of καιρός according to certain theories, see pgs. 49-50.
[34] Alcid. line 75 and line 162, respectively.
[35] Isoc. 13.13: "And the greatest sign of their dissimilarity is the following: while it is impossible for speeches to be well disposed if they do not participate in their occasions and in being suitable and novel, for letters none of these things is needed in addition.

Personen."[36] Audiences wanted to feel as though a written speech directly addressed their own specific concerns and objections. From the works of Isocrates and Alcidamas discussed above, one can see how concerned orators were with giving their speeches an air of particularity and spontaneity and with engaging audiences in the illusion of a dialogue.

With regard to the *First Philippic*, I would argue that the preponderance of rhetorical questions and hypothetical objections serves both to distinguish Demosthenes' counsel from that of other *rhetors* and to meet the audience's expectation of particularity. In a certain sense the speech *qua* speech at times seems to cease to exist entirely on a structural level; it becomes more like a conversation. In the paragraphs that follow, I will examine how Demosthenes utilizes the rhetorical question and hypothetical objection to mask the formal nature of the speech so that he can give the impression that his ideas are developing in contact with his audience's expectations and desires.

The most important points in the *First Philippic* are repeatedly made in response to a rhetorical question. At the beginning of the speech Demosthenes tells the Athenians to take heart since what has been worst for them in the past holds the greatest hope for the future. Then he implicitly recognizes the riddle he has posed, asks just what this thing is, and then answers: ὅτι οὐδέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῶν δεόντων ποιούντων ὑμῶν κακῶς τὰ πράγματα ἔχει·[37] The question and answer here does several things: the riddling form piques the audience's curiosity; the break in the discourse lends further emphasis to the point he is trying to make; and, on a structural level, the speech stops and seems to progress in response to the audience's need for clarification, thus creating a sense of give and take. Demosthenes adopts the same device again

[36] Usener (1994), 126.
[37] Dem. 4.2: "That things are going badly, men of Athens, while you do none of the things that need doing."

later in the speech when he tells the Athenians that, if they follow his counsel, they will take away the greatest of Philip's resources. ἔστι δ' οὗτος (πόρος) τίς; he asks. Ἀπὸ τῶν ὑμετέρων ὑμῖν πολεμεῖ συμμάχων, ἄγων καὶ φέρων τοὺς πλέοντας τὴν θάλατταν.[38] As discussed in the previous chapter (pgs. 98-100), the effect of the hyperbaton and polyptoton here is impossible to capture in translation: Philip is waging war with the Athenians with their own resources generally and with their own allies in particular.

Besides using questions to mark critical points, Demosthenes also uses them to provide necessary supplementary information about his proposals. So in section 19 he proposes that the Athenians assemble a military force of a reasonable size that will include a substantial number of citizens. He then bids them to furnish it with adequate supplies. After presenting these proposals, he asks: ἔσται δ' αὕτη τίς ἡ δύναμις καὶ πόση, καὶ πόθεν τὴν τροφὴν ἕξει, καὶ πῶς ταῦτ' ἐθελήσει ποιεῖν[39]; then, in preface to his answer, he says: ἐγὼ φράσω, καθ' ἕκαστον τούτων διεξιὼν χωρίς.[40] The question form would suggest to the audience that Demosthenes is sensitive to their concerns and their desire for further detail, and the preface to his response, when delivered properly, would indicate his responsiveness to his audience's concern that he is making outlandish general proposals with the possible result that he might not give them any concrete details or logistical information. Structurally speaking, the whole section of the speech in which the details of the proposal are spelled out would seem to an audience to have been added because they wanted and needed to hear it, not because it absolutely needed to be there. Within the proposal itself, he continues to use question and answer. In the midst of presenting the numbers of the various types of troops he feels are necessary to oppose Philip, he pauses and says: εἶεν·

[38] Dem. 4.34: "From your own allies he wages war with you, plundering those sailing the sea."
[39] Dem. 4.20: "What sort of force will this be and how numerous, and where will it get its supplies, and how will it be willing to do these things?"
[40] Dem. 4.20: "I will point all these things out, going through each of them separately one by one."

τί πρὸς τούτοις ἔτι; ταχείας τριήρεις δέκα.[41] He gives the impression of carefully dividing up the proposal so that his audience can digest each piece, and the question form makes it seem as though the transition to the final part of the proposal is determined to some degree by the audience. Later in the speech, when the issue of how the Athenians are going to pay for this military force comes up, he begins: πόθεν οὖν ὁ πόρος τῶν χρημάτων, ἃ παρ' ὑμῶν κελεύω γενέσθαι; τοῦτ' ἤδη λέξω.[42] Once again Demosthenes gives the appearance of responding to the concerns of his audience; the whole ΠΟΡΟΥ ΑΠΟΔΕΙΞΙΣ is inserted only because they want more information.

There is also an instance where Demosthenes responds to his own question in the voice of a hypothetical objector. He seems to ask the Athenians generally, πότε ἃ χρὴ πράξετε; ἐπειδὰν τί γένηται.[43] He then somewhat unexpectedly presents a vehement response: ἐπειδὰν νὴ Δία ἀνάγκη τις ᾖ.[44] The oath makes the response quite aggressive, and it does not seem likely that Demosthenes conceived of it as an objection his audience would fully agree with. Rather, formally it pits him against an opponent who does in a sense raise a valid concern: perhaps things are not as dire as you say. The tone of the scene is antagonistic, and this, as we will see, foreshadows the simile of the barbarian boxer that will occur later in the speech. Here Demosthenes of course is prepared for the punch and convincingly demonstrates that necessity is upon them. One should also note the structural importance of the antagonism. In a soberly composed set speech, one might structure such a passage by first making the claim that it is necessary for the Athenians to act now, not later; he would then proceed to demonstrate that the

[41] Dem. 4.22: "All right. What in addition to these things? Ten swift triremes."
[42] Dem. 4.29: "From what source, then, will the provision of funds come which I propose to be made by you? I will now tell you."
[43] Dem. 4.10: "When will you do what's necessary? When what happens?"
[44] Dem. 4.10: "When there is some demand, by God."

necessity is real, presumably with a passage introduced by γάρ. However, by presenting the claim in question form and its demonstration in response to a challenge, Demosthenes is able to mask the structure. The whole demonstration of necessity comes about because, it seems, at that moment he happens to have thought of what an opponent might say to him.

In the passage discussed above, Demosthenes asked the question, then a possible objection was presented in someone else's voice. Later in the speech, the converse occurs. Demosthenes delivers a series of impassioned questions, for which he expects positive answers: οὐκ ἐμβησόμεθα; οὐκ ἔξιμεν αὐτοὶ μέρει γέ τινι στρατιωτῶν οἰκείων νῦν, εἰ καὶ μὴ πρότερον; οὐκ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκείνου πλευσόμεθα; A question is then suddenly addressed to him without any notice: ποῖ οὖν προσορμιούμεθ'; ἤρετό τις.[45] This time he himself is put on the defensive, and the pugilistic give and take is even more pronounced: question after question, punch after punch he delivers when all of a sudden a counter. He is of course prepared and easily parries it: εὑρήσει τὰ σαθρά, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῶν ἐκείνου πραγμάτων αὐτὸς ὁ πόλεμος--ἂν ἐπιχειρῶμεν·[46] The response has a Thucydidean ring to it with the personification of πόλεμος and the abstract phrase τὰ σαθρά τῶν ἐκείνου πραγμάτων: Demosthenes too knows the nature of war. As for the protasis, I have changed Dilts' comma to a dash because it seems to suit the passage better: Demosthenes defends himself against the objector, then goes back on the offensive with a biting, unexpected condition: war will find the weak points—*if* we're willing to make any sort of effort, that is. Note also that the same structural masking discussed above is in play here: rather than present the objection about places to moor and his response, he puts the challenge into the mouth

[45] Dem. 4.44: "Will we not go forth ourselves now with some allotment at least of our own soldiers, even if we have not done so before? Will we not sail against his [Philip's] territory? 'Where, then, will we anchor?' Someone asked."
[46] Dem. 4.44: "The war itself will find the weak points of his state-affairs (LSJ III.2)—if we make an attempt."

of one of his audience members, thus once again seemingly constructing the speech in response to their demands.

The keen focus of the *prooemium* and the quick and agile responses to potential objections both anticipate on a structural level one of the central images of the speech. After telling the Athenians that they need to show more foresight and that they have sufficient material resources to resist Philip, Demosthenes famously compares their current way of waging war to the way a barbarian boxer fights:

> οὐδὲν δ' ἀπολείπετε, ὥσπερ οἱ βάρβαροι πυκτεύουσιν, οὕτω πολεμεῖν Φιλίππῳ. καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων ὁ πληγεὶς ἀεὶ τῆς πληγῆς ἔχεται, κἂν ἑτέρωσε πατάξῃ τις, ἐκεῖσε εἰσὶν αἱ χεῖρες· προβάλλεσθαι δ' ἢ βλέπειν ἐναντίον οὔτ' οἶδεν οὔτ' ἐθέλει.[47]

Wooten is right to note the cultural significance of the image, and he does see a limited sort of structural significance in the comparison, claiming that Demosthenes has a "…tendency to cap a section of argument with an image that sums it up…"; however, I would argue that the image has greater significance for the structure of the speech as a whole. As I have argued, the speech is structured agonistically at certain key moments. Demosthenes implicitly presents himself as engaged in combat with potential objections to his proposals. Note again the aggressive oath that occurs in the response of the hypothetical objector in section 10 and the fact that twice a voice seemingly comes out of nowhere to challenge him. Naturally he is always prepared, though, and thus implicitly sets himself up as a model for how the audience should act in opposition to Philip. The positive counterpart to the barbarian boxer is, as Wooten suggests, established by the audience's pride in their athletic training as Athenians and their use of a combination of skill and intelligence to defeat opponents; but it is also reinforced, I would argue, on another level by the

[47] Dem. 4.40: "There is no difference between the way barbarians box and the way you wage war with Philip. For one of their boxers who is struck also clings to the punch, and if someone strikes him on the other side, his hands move in that direction, but he is neither willing nor does he know how to anticipate a punch or look his opponent in the eye."

ethos Demosthenes presents throughout the speech: on a very visceral, literal level the image would resonate with them, and Demosthenes complements this by transferring the pugilism to debate and deliberation.

2. *The First Olynthiac*

Scholars have generally praised the disposition of the *First Olynthiac*.[48] The form of the speech is usually interpreted in relation to the other two speeches in the series. So Pearson argues that "The special interest of the *Olynthiacs* is that the same arguments are used in all three speeches, but they are manipulated differently and with variation in emphasis."[49] Similarly, MacDowell speaks of the *Olynthiacs* as "...dodging to and fro among the various considerations of the three texts,"[50] and Tuplin has speculated that Demosthenes himself may have ordered the speeches for publication in such a way as to create "a consistently rising tone of alarm."[51] Although I too will compare the speeches, I will analyze the structure of each one separately. In chapter 4, I will return to the relationship between the speeches when I examine Demosthenes' use of imagery in the series (see pgs. 208 ff.).

Wooten has argued for the presence of ring composition both on a macro and micro level; however, his arguments are not always persuasive. In sections 2-9, he argues for the existence of a ring of the form ABB'A': A (ὁ μὲν οὖν παρὼν καιρός); B (καὶ μὴ πάθητε ταὐτὸν

[48] Tuplin (1998), 282; Wooten (2010), 9-10. Blass (1893) III.1, 321 says generally of the speech, "die erste Rede ist zum Theil ernster und mächtiger …." By contrast, Yunis (1996), 260 is somewhat critical: "the exposition of the pragmatic argument falls short of the clarity and concentrated analysis of which Thucydides is capable." However, he does not present any analysis to support his position.
[49] Pearson (1976), 130.
[50] MacDowell (2009), 230.
[51] Tuplin (1998), 291.

ὅπερ καὶ πρότερον); B’ (οὐδὲ παθεῖν ταὐτὸν ὅπερ ἤδη πολλάκις πρότερον πεπόνθατε); A’ (νυνὶ δὴ καιρὸς ἥκει τις).[52] However, there is another occurrence of καιρός directly before B’:

> οὐ δεῖ δὴ τοιοῦτον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, παραπεπτωκότα καιρὸν ἀφεῖναι, οὐδὲ παθεῖν ταὐτὸ ὅπερ ἤδη πολλάκις πρότερον πεπόνθατε.[53]

The reference to καιρός here, in fact, complements that in A much better: The present crisis practically cries out; accordingly, we must not waste it. In light of this earlier mention of καιρός, it is better in the present case to talk of general repetition or of theme and variation.[54]

In the very first sentence of the speech Demosthenes tantalizes the audience with the possibility of predicting the course of events: Ἀντὶ πολλῶν ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, χρημάτων ὑμᾶς ἑλέσθαι νομίζω, εἰ φανερὸν γένοιτο τὸ μέλλον συνοίσειν τῇ πόλει περὶ ὧν νυνὶ σκοπεῖτε.[55] As we will see, the possibility of seeing the shape of things to come will subtly be reinforced throughout the speech. Demosthenes uses this desire for learning what will be beneficial to the city as a justification for allowing anyone who wishes to give advice to speak:

> ὅτε τοίνυν τοῦθ’ οὕτως ἔχει, προσήκει προθύμως ἐθέλειν ἀκούειν τῶν βουλομένων συμβουλεύειν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον εἴ τι χρήσιμον ἐσκεμμένος ἥκει τις, τοῦτ’ ἂν ἀκούσαντες λάβοιτε, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ὑμετέρας τύχης ὑπολαμβάνω πολλὰ τῶν δεόντων ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα ἐνίοις ἂν ἐπελθεῖν εἰπεῖν, ὥστ’ ἐξ ἁπάντων ῥᾳδίαν τὴν τοῦ συμφέροντος ὑμῖν αἵρεσιν γενέσθαι.[56]

Because of Athens’ τύχη, even those who have not deliberated on a given issue can, it seems, experience a spontaneous revelation and thus provide good counsel. Demosthenes here very vaguely posits the existence of some tutelary force which works toward the good of Athens not

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[52] Wooten (2010), 9.
[53] Dem. 1.8: “You must not, then, men of Athens, let slip the opportunity that has arisen, and you must not suffer the same thing that we have already suffered so often in the past.”
[54] Wooten (2010), 10 also argues that, by following the same pattern of argument in 2-9 as he does at the end of the speech in 21-27, Demosthenes “… conveys an idea of circularity.” This is certainly possible, though one might question how perceptible the effect would have been.
[55] Dem. 1.1: “In exchange for many things, men of Athens, I think you would choose the possibility of that which is going to be expedient for the city becoming clear concerning the things about which you are now deliberating.”
[56] Dem. 1.1: “And so when this is the case, it is fitting to be willing to listen eagerly to those who want to give counsel. For not only could you receive something useful by listening to those who have come forward after long deliberation, but I also consider it to belong to your good fortune that it could suddenly occur to some men to say much of what is necessary, with the result that from all the proposals the choice of what is expedient for you would be easy.”

only in deed but also in word. One way of explaining this choice of proem has been to speculate that the orator who spoke before Demosthenes must have made mention of his long deliberation on the issue at hand, so Demosthenes responded by saying that such deliberation was not always necessary.[57] This very well may have been the case, but the proem is more than a simple *captatio benevolentiae*. What is curious is that Demosthenes' claim that he is delivering the speech *ex tempore* is never conspicuously reinforced throughout the course of the speech by some simple device such as "I almost forgot to mention" or "But I digress." Without the proem, one would never even be tempted to regard the speech as improvisatory. One possible conclusion the audience could come to, one that is encouraged by Demosthenes' reference to Athens' τύχη in the proem, is that some providential force is guiding his tongue. As we will see, the claim to inspiration will be reinforced later in the speech when he comes to discussing recent events.

Demosthenes makes two proposals in the speech, one explicit and one implicit: the explicit proposal is to aid the Olynthians by attacking Philip on two fronts (§17); the implicit one is to use the Theoric Fund to pay for the expedition (§§19-20).[58] The argument for divine benevolence is subtly used to support both proposals. In order to get the Athenians to become active in resisting Philip by supporting Olynthus, Demosthenes juxtaposes his assessment of the present situation with an attempt to make the Athenians ashamed at their inactivity and carelessness. Twice in about the space of a page he says that the opportunity at Olynthus has come about spontaneously (§7:γέγονεν αὐτόματον; §9: νυνὶ δὴ καιρὸς ἥκει τις, οὗτος ὁ τῶν Ὀλυνθίων, αὐτόματος). He then attributes this opportunity to make an alliance with the Olynthians to the goodwill of the gods (§10: τὸ ...πεφηνέναι τέ τινα ἡμῖν συμμαχίαν τούτων

[57] See Weil (1873) and Sandys (1936) *ad loc*.
[58] See MacDowell (2009) 234-5. Cf. Weil (1873), 169.

ἀντίρροπον ... τῆς παρ' ἐκείνων εὐνοίας εὐεργέτημ' ἂν ἔγωγε θείην). Due to the gods' benevolent influence, then, things have been shaping up in the Athenians' favor even without any activity on their part. Demosthenes' repeated reference to events happening spontaneously and his mocking characterization of the Athenians as thinking that everything will just work itself out somehow (§9: τὰ δὲ μέλλοντα αὐτόματα οἰόμενοι σχήσειν καλῶς) make the audience keenly aware of its passivity: it is as though events are going on around them while they merely sit and watch. The feeling of shame thereby provoked is reinforced by the analogy Demosthenes uses in the next section:

> ἀλλ', οἶμαι, παρόμοιόν ἐστιν ὅπερ καὶ περὶ τῆς τῶν χρημάτων κτήσεως· ἂν μὲν γάρ, ὅσ' ἄν τις λάβῃ, καὶ σῴσῃ, μεγάλην ἔχει τῇ τύχῃ τὴν χάριν, ἂν δ' ἀναλώσας λάθῃ, συνανήλωσε καὶ τὸ μεμνῆσθαι {τὴν χάριν}. καὶ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων οὕτως οἱ μὴ χρησάμενοι τοῖς καιροῖς ὀρθῶς, οὐδ' εἰ συνέβη τι παρὰ τῶν θεῶν χρηστὸν μνημονεύουσι.[59]

Not only are the Athenians lazy and careless, but they are also spendthrifts and ingrates.[60] All of this combines to form an unflattering picture which contains multiple inducements finally to resist Philip actively: as a man, one does not want to be passive and lethargic, and squandering favors and not showing reciprocity incur moral opprobrium, so within his discussion of the Athenians' relationship with the gods Demosthenes manages to insert several goads to follow his proposal and take action.

He prefaces his two proposals with another analogy from the financial sphere:

> ἀλλὰ μήν, εἰ τοῦτο γενήσεται[if the war will come to Athens], δέδοικα, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὥσπερ οἱ δανειζόμενοι ῥᾳδίως ἐπὶ τοῖς τόκοις μεγάλοις μικρὸν εὐπορήσαντες χρόνον ὕστερον καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἀπέστησαν, οὕτω καὶ ἡμεῖς {ἂν} ἐπὶ πολλῷ φανῶμεν ἐρρᾳθυμηκότες, καὶ ἅπαντα πρὸς

[59] Dem. 1.11: "But the situation resembles what happens with the possession of money. For if a person preserves as much as he receives, he is very grateful to his fortune. However, if he squanders it without realizing it, he squanders at the same time the remembrance of it. And it's the same way when it comes to events: those who have not exploited opportunities correctly do not even remember if anything good came about from the gods."
[60] Martin (2009) 231 notes how Demosthenes innovates on the *topos* of divine favor: in previous instances there is no sense of reciprocity or obligation involved.

> ἡδονὴν ζητοῦντες πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ ὧν οὐκ ἠβουλόμεθα ὕστερον εἰς ἀνάγκην ἔλθωμεν ποιεῖν, καὶ κινδυνεύσωμεν περὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ χώρᾳ.[61]

The characterization of the Athenians here as reckless borrowers recalls the previous analogy insofar as in both the idea of squandering resources is involved. Also, it is presumably the gods in some sense who have been willing to keep loaning the Athenians their money. The analogy, then, reiterates the negative character portrait Demosthenes drew earlier in which the Athenians are represented as lazy, carefree spendthrifts. His reference to the Athenians' reckless hedonism here (ἅπαντα πρὸς ἡδονὴν ζητοῦντες) will become important when he makes his implicit proposal of disturbing the Theoric Fund.

After this analogy, Demosthenes makes his explicit proposal: attack Philip on two fronts, in Macedon and at Olynthus. Then he addresses the question of how to fund this expedition:

> περὶ δὲ χρημάτων πόρου, ἔστιν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, χρήματα ὑμῖν, ἔστιν ὅσα οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων {στρατιωτικά}· ταῦτα δ' ὑμεῖς οὕτως ὡς βούλεσθε λαμβάνετε.[62]

The language here is exceedingly vague, but MacDowell shrewdly notes that Demosthenes only gives them the absurd alternative of reorganizing the *eisphora* system so that everyone, not just the wealthy, would have to pay a tax.[63] The reasons for his reluctance to make his proposal to use the Theoric Fund to pay for the proposed expedition are not entirely clear. Later sources claim that there was a law that prescribed death to anyone who proposed transferring money from the Theoric to the military fund.[64] If this actually was the case, then the strategy Demosthenes adopts in the *First Olynthiac* makes even more sense. To address the feeling of sanctity associated with

[61] Dem. 1.15: "But indeed if this happens, I fear, men of Athens, that, in the same way as those who carelessly take out loans at a high rate of interest, after being rich for a short time, lose even the principal later, just so it will become clear that we too have been lax at a high price [see Weil (1873) *ad loc.*], and I fear that in seeking all things with a view to pleasure we will later be constrained to do many hard things that we don't want to, and we will put at risk things in our very own land."
[62] Dem. 1.19: "Concerning the provision of resources, there are, men of Athens, resources at your disposal, indeed you have more than anyone else. But take these as you see fit."
[63] MacDowell (2009), 234-5.
[64] See MacDowell (2009), 234 fn. 89.

the Theoric Fund, he had to substantiate the *topos* of divine favor and in addition he had to demonstrate that it was the gods' will not that the Athenians keep sitting around enjoying festivals but rather that they use the resources, which they owed to the gods, to pay them back by resisting Philip. Further, the reference to pursuit of pleasure in the analogy that precedes the proposal could be construed as suggesting that the Athenians' motives in protecting the Fund were not pure and holy but rather self-serving. By the time, then, that Demosthenes utters the words ταῦτα δ' ὑμεῖς οὕτως ὡς βούλεσθε λαμβάνετε, the audience is not only willing to entertain the idea of using the Fund, but they even feel an ethical obligation to do so and shame at the thought of wasting the tremendous resources the gods have given them. If Demosthenes is successful, a paradigm shift will have been effected that will make an explicit proposal to use the Fund possible in future speeches.[65]

Viewed from the perspective of what Plato would call logographic necessity (ἀνάγκην λογογραφικήν[66]), the disposition of the *First Olynthiac* can be seen as a paradigm of efficiency and unity. With a single argument, that the gods actively favor Athens and expect reciprocation for this favor, Demosthenes manages to respond to a previous speaker who laid claim to extensive deliberation; to provide a source of inspiration for the form and content of the speech; to lend support to his explicit proposal; and, finally, to make his audience amenable to his implicit proposal. One could envision an alternative way of composing the speech in which separate lines of argument could have been pursued to achieve each of these goals, but the

[65] This argument lends support to the positon of Eucken (1984), 205 that one can detect a unified development through the *Three Olynthiacs*, starting with vague mentions of funding in the first speech and concluding with an explicit proposal about the Theoric Fund in the third speech.
[66] Pl. *Phdr*. 264b. See also Yunis (2001) *ad loc*.

advantages of a single unifying argument are obvious. And what better source for such an argument than the divine?

3. *The Second Olynthiac*

Blass argued that the *Second Olynthiac* can be divided into four symmetrical parts: demonstration of Philip's weakness with respect to his allies, then objection, answer, exhortation; demonstration of internal weakness, then objection, answer, exhortation.[67] On this analysis, the speech is fundamentally divided. Also, there is no connection drawn or distinction made between exhortations one and two in spite of the fact that the first exhortation is a specific proposal while the second is more general and even though the second exhortation responds to the first as well as the second demonstration. Finally, the symmetry is problematic: Blass neglects the objection that occurs before the demonstration of the weakness of Philip's relationship to his allies.[68] Tuplin, in turn, argued that the speech "…essentially consists of a doubly bipartite structure (two main sections, each with two parts)."[69] Although I agree with his division of the speech into two main sections, his subsections are too inclusive for the first main section, and somewhat arbitrary for the second.[70] Further, he makes no attempt to connect the structure of the speech with the content of the *prooemium*.

Demosthenes opens the speech by presenting evidence for the belief that the gods favor Athens:

> Ἐπὶ πολλῶν μὲν ἄν τις ἰδεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δοκεῖ μοι τὴν παρὰ τῶν θεῶν εὔνοιαν φανερὰν γιγνομένην τῇ πόλει, οὐχ ἥκιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς παροῦσι πράγμασι· τὸ γὰρ τοὺς πολεμήσοντας Φιλίππῳ γεγενῆσθαι καὶ χώραν ὅμορον καὶ δύναμίν τινα κεκτημένους, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἁπάντων, τὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ

[67] Blass (1893) III.1, 313.
[68] Dem. 2.5.
[69] Tuplin (1998), 282.
[70] See Tuplin (1998), 280-281. I.A is made to include both discussion of Philip's relations with his allies and the specific proposal. II.A is supposed to be devoted to the past, II.B to the present/future, even though the line between the two is not at all clear.

> πολέμου γνώμην τοιαύτην ἔχοντας ὥστε τὰς πρὸς ἐκεῖνον διαλλαγὰς πρῶτον μὲν ἀπίστους, εἶτα τῆς ἑαυτῶν πατρίδος νομίζειν ἀνάστασιν, δαιμονίᾳ τινὶ καὶ θείᾳ παντάπασιν ἔοικεν εὐεργεσίᾳ.[71]

I would argue that this argument performs a pivotal structural function for the speech as a whole insofar as it serves as a springboard for its two main topics. First, it provokes a question for the audience: assuming that the hostility of the Olynthians towards Philip does represent an opportunity, what makes you so sure that Philip can be defeated? The concern that people felt about the power of Philip is explicitly noted and addressed at the beginning of the first section of the speech.[72] Indeed, Demosthenes claims that Philip's successes have made him a universal object of wonderment: ὁ (Philip) μὲν γὰρ ὅσῳ πλείον' ὑπὲρ τὴν ἀξίαν πεποίηκε τὴν αὑτοῦ, , τοσούτῳ θαυμαστότερος παρὰ πᾶσι νομίζεται.[73] As I will demonstrate, Demosthenes recognized that this wonderment consisted of elements of both attraction and terror: although Philip was now threatening their own safety and security, the Athenians were still awed by the sheer magnitude of what he had accomplished, especially since he was just a barbaric Macedonian.

The second major topic of the speech, which is related to the preceding argument as a consequence (τοίνυν), is the need for the Athenians to take advantage of the favor the gods have shown them:

> δεῖ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτ' ἤδη σκοπεῖν αὐτούς, ὅπως μὴ χείρους περὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς εἶναι δόξομεν τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, ὡς ἔστι τῶν αἰσχρῶν, μᾶλλον δὲ τῶν αἰσχίστων, μὴ μόνον πόλεων καὶ τόπων ὧν ἦμέν ποτε κύριοι φαίνεσθαι προϊεμένους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης παρασκευασθέντων συμμάχων καὶ καιρῶν.[74]

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[71] Dem. 2.1: "In light of many things, men of Athens, I think one could see the benevolence of the gods becoming manifest for the city, and not least of all in the present circumstances; for the fact that those who will wage war with Philip have appeared being in possession of both bordering territory and a substantial force, and what is greatest of all, judging the war in such a way that they regard reconciliations with Philip untrustworthy and even an annihilation of their own fatherland, this circumstance seems in every respect like a divine benefaction from the gods."
[72] Dem. 2.5: … τοὺς ὑπερεκπεπληγμένους ὡς ἄμαχόν τινα τὸν Φίλιππον….
[73] Dem. 2.3: "For insofar as he has accomplished things beyond his station, to this extent he is regarded as a greater object of wonder among all men."
[74] Dem. 2.2: "And so, men of Athens, we must now see to it that we not appear worse regarding our own affairs than the opportunities granted us, seeing as it is characteristic of those who are shameful, indeed most shameful, to openly abandon not only the cities and places that we controlled at one time, but also the allies and opportunities furnished by fortune.

I would posit a general division in the structure of the speech into two parts, with the first (§§5-21) devoted to refuting the claim that Philip is invincible and the second (§§23-31) exhorting the Athenians to take action; a transition from the first to the second is effected between the two (§22) by a repetition of the opening argument in altered form. The first section can further be divided into discussion of Philip's relationship with his allies (§§5-10) and discussion of internal Macedonian affairs (§§14-21), with the specific proposal being presented in-between these two subsections. However, the structure is more organic than this outline would suggest. For the presentation of the specific proposal in section 11 leads to a warning in 12 that the Athenians should not just talk but actually act and to an exhortation in 13 that they must change their behavior and actively participate in the war. The two sections, then, are not completely distinct. Nevertheless, section 22, as I will show, represents a clear turning point, so the analysis that follows will assume the general validity of this basic division.

In the first section Demosthenes' broad claim is that Philip's success is due to good fortune and deception, not to any innate worth. This claim is elaborated in a bold and difficult series of images which will be discussed at length in chapter 4. In brief these images depict Philip as an object liable to collapse at any given moment. After the conclusion of §10 in which the images are presented, Demosthenes transitions to the specific proposal: first, bring aid to the Olynthians, and as quickly and effectively as possible; second, send an embassy to the Thessalians to encourage them to abandon Philip.[75] This is followed, as I noted above, by an exhortation to act, not just talk. Then we move to the second major part of the first section, namely analysis of Philip's internal affairs:

[75] Dem. 2.11.

> κἂν ταῦτ' ἐθελήσηθ' ὡς προσήκει καὶ δὴ περαίνειν, οὐ μόνον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὰ συμμαχικὰ ἀσθενῶς καὶ ἀπίστως ἔχοντα φανήσεται Φιλίππῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς καὶ δυνάμεως κακῶς ἔχοντ' ἐξελεγχθήσεται. Ὅλως μὲν γὰρ …[76]

The content referred to by οὐ μόνον … represents the first part of the first section, and ἀλλὰ καὶ ... introduces the subsection that is to follow. The bracketing of the specific proposal by these two subsections raises the question of why Demosthenes did not juxtapose discussion of external with that of internal affairs and present the proposal before or afterwards. If he had placed it before the first major section, the proposal would have lacked any justification or context, so this would of course have been rhetorically unsuitable. If, on the other hand, he had placed it after the first section, this could have potentially strengthened his position since he would have shown that Philip's power was unstable both domestically and abroad before advocating resistance. However, this ordering would have disrupted the transition from the first to the second section of the speech. As I noted above, the first section is devoted to refuting the claim that Philip is invincible, the second to exhorting the Athenians to take action. By the conclusion of the first, Demosthenes has shown that Philip is vulnerable abroad and domestically. However, this still leaves one source of strength unaddressed, Philip's good fortune (τύχη):

> Εἰ δέ τις ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸν Φίλιππον εὐτυχοῦνθ' ὁρῶν ταύτῃ φοβερὸν προσπολεμῆσαι νομίζει, σώφρονος μὲν ἀνθρώπου λογισμῷ χρῆται· μεγάλη γὰρ ῥοπή, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ ὅλον ἡ τύχη παρὰ πάντ' ἐστὶ τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράγματα· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἔγωγε, εἴ τις αἵρεσίν μοι δοίη, τὴν τῆς ἡμετέρας πόλεως τύχην ἂν ἑλοίμην, ἐθελόντων ἃ προσήκει ποιεῖν ὑμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ κατὰ μικρόν, ἢ τὴν ἐκείνου· πολὺ γὰρ πλείους ἀφορμὰς εἰς τὸ τὴν παρὰ τῶν θεῶν εὔνοιαν ἔχειν ὁρῶ ὑμῖν ἐνούσας ἢ 'κείνῳ. ἀλλ', οἶμαι, καθήμεθ' οὐδὲν ποιοῦντες·[77]

[76] Dem. 2.13-14: "And if you are willing to do these things right now as is fitting, not only, men of Athens, will Philip's alliances be shown to be weak and untrustworthy, but also his domestic affairs and power will be proved to be in a bad state. For overall …

[77] Dem.2.22-3: "But if when seeing Philip faring well any one of you, men of Athens, thinks that for this reason he would be a terrifying adversary in war, he calculates as a prudent man would; for fortune is a great weight in the scales, or rather the whole determinant in all human affairs; nevertheless, if someone should give me the choice, I would choose the fortune of our city, provided you are willing to do what's necessary even in a small degree, before I would choose Philip's; for I see many more points of access to the goodwill of the gods belonging to you than to him. But, I think, we sit around doing nothing."

Some people may think that, in spite of all his weaknesses, Philip still has fortune on his side. However, this belief was already pre-emptively refuted at the very opening of the speech when, as I discussed above, Demosthenes argues that the gods favor Athens and that this can be demonstrated by reference to recent events. The similarities and differences in the wording and structure of the two passages are noteworthy. In the *prooemium* Demosthenes says that the favor of the gods (τὴν παρὰ τῶν θεῶν εὔνοιαν) is becoming manifest (φανερὰν γιγνομένην). The Athenians, then, must (δεῖ τοίνυν) see to it that they not appear worse than the advantages given to them. In the transitional section cited above, The Athenians do not have full possession of the gods' favor but rather starting-points or beginnings or bases of metaphorical operations from which to attain such favor, and this favorable position of possibilities is abruptly juxtaposed with the Athenians sitting around doing nothing, which leads to the absurd thought that the Athenians, while doing absolutely nothing themselves, might order the gods to act on their behalf.[78] These subtle alterations to the opening argument serve as a springboard for the sections that follow, in which Demosthenes vehemently exhorts the Athenians to take action against Philip; for by this point in the speech, with Philip having been shown to be vulnerable on several fronts and with the favor of the gods there for the taking, the audience is compelled to feel as though every circumstance is working in their favor—if only they would stand up and take some initiative.

With regard to the *First Olynthiac*, I argued in the preceding section that a single argument was used to unify several different aspects of the speech's structure. The same can be said of the *Second Olynthiac*. The first argument provokes a certain response in the audience that leads to the elaboration of the first section, and its recurrence in-between the two sections serves as a springboard for the exhortation Demosthenes gives in the second. The recurrence itself, I

[78] Dem. 2.23: οὐκ ἔνι δ' αὐτὸν ἀργοῦντα οὐδὲ τοῖς φίλοις ἐπιτάττειν ὑπὲρ αὑτοῦ τι ποιεῖν, μή τί γε δὴ τοῖς θεοῖς.

would argue, makes the audience conscious of and aesthetically satisfied by the speech's unity, for by repeating the argument (in notably altered form) Demosthenes intimately ties each major section to the genesis of the speech as a whole.

4. *The Third Olynthiac*

Although the ordering of the three *Olynthiacs* has been hotly disputed, there has developed a general consensus that the *Third Olynthiac* was the last of the three speeches.[79] Furthermore, several scholars have posited a more or less strong tonal break between the first two speeches and the third, the latter being characterized, as Tuplin says, by "an especially grave tone."[80] Indeed, the speech itself presents the καιρός it is addressing as an aporetic one:

> ἐγὼ δὲ οὐχ ὅ τι χρὴ περὶ τῶν παρόντων συμβουλεῦσαι χαλεπώτατον ἡγοῦμαι, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ἀπορῶ, τίνα χρὴ τρόπον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς ὑμᾶς περὶ αὐτῶν εἰπεῖν. πέπεισμαι γὰρ ἐξ ὧν παρὼν καὶ ἀκούων σύνοιδα, τὰ πλείω τῶν πραγμάτων ἡμᾶς ἐκπεφευγέναι τῷ μὴ βούλεσθαι τὰ δέοντα ποιεῖν ἢ τῷ μὴ συνιέναι.[81]

The Athenians already know what needs to be done; they just are not willing to do it. How, then, does one speak in such a way as to affect the will? This part of the second proem complements the first, where Demosthenes, adopting the traditional λόγος/ἔργον antithesis, expresses his

[79] For an excellent review of the scholarship on the question of the order of the three speeches, see Karvounis (2002), 304-5 n. 71. For the consensus on the third speech, see Eucken (1984), 193 and Tuplin (1998), 276 ff. The latter is actually skeptical and so presents his own counter-arguments along with his summary of scholarship on the question. More recently, however, both Karvounis and MacDowell (2009), 238 have concluded that the traditional ordering is indeed the correct one.

[80] Tuplin (1998), 276; cf. Blass (1893) III.1, 321 and Wooten (2010), 18. Eucken (1984) claims that the relationship between the three speeches is more organic, citing, for example, the development of Demosthenes' proposals on financial reform: in the *First Olynthiac* one gets a vague mention of such reform, while in the *Third Olynthiac* explicit measures about the Theoric Fund are proposed. This, according to Eucken, is part of a deliberate strategy on Demosthenes' part which in conjunction with other aspects of the speeches evinces a unified strategy for and conception behind the series. Although there is definitely a development in the argumentation from speech to speech, Eucken does not address one aspect of the *Third Olynthiac* which, as Tuplin (1998), 276 notes, suggests a strong break, namely the prominence of divine favor and τύχη in the first two speeches and its complete absence from the *Third*. As I have argued, this argument plays a central role in the first speech, and it links the first and second together by way of the proem of the latter, which opens with the repeated claim that the gods favor Athens and this is observable. In light of the significance of this argument for the first two speeches, its absence from the third is notable.

[81] Dem. 3.3: "I believe it is not too difficult too give counsel concerning what should be done about the current situation, but rather I am at a loss about how, men of Athens, I should speak to you about it. For I am persuaded by what I know from personal experience and from what I've heard that more of your affairs have eluded your grasp through your unwillingness to do what's necessary than through lack of comprehension."

surprise at the disconnect between what the Athenians are saying about Philip and what they are doing. Words and understanding are present, action and will are not. This is the situation of the speech.

In what follows I will explore how Demosthenes attempted to use elements of style, content, and disposition to produce a will to self-assertion in his audience. On the level of style, word order is manipulated at key moments to goad a desire for self-assertion on a subconscious level; further, the intensive adjective is frequently repeated at times so as to provoke a desire for presence in opposition to past absences. With regard to content, there is a heavy use of forms of argumentation which could be said to influence the audience's emotions more than their reason, namely imagery. Finally, the speech is structured in such a way as gradually to build up an irresistible urge to do something, to be active, to assert the self so that, when the crisis is presented at the end of the speech in its starkest, most terrifying form, the audience is ready to will the possibility of its own destruction.

The first section of the speech proper is a narrative of how the Athenians recently had failed to respond properly when presented with an opportunity to oppose Philip while he was besieging Heraion Teichos. This narrative concludes with the following contrafactual condition: εἰ γὰρ τότε ἐκεῖσε ἐβοηθήσαμεν, ὥσπερ ἐψηφισάμεθα, **προθύμως**, οὐκ ἂν ἠνώχλει νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ Φίλιππος σωθείς.[82] The protasis could have ended with ἐβοηθήσαμεν (if we had actually brought support), or alternatively προθύμως could have been placed in the standard preverbal focal position. Its separation from the verb, as commentators have noted, and the fact that it comes somewhat as a surprise greatly strengthen its impact.

[82] Dem. 3.5: "For if we had brought support there, and wholeheartedly, as we decreed, Philip would not be troubling us now, having been saved."

After a few further arguments/threatening prognostications in the following section, Demosthenes proceeds to present his proposal (§§10-11), namely that the Assembly should vote to create a board of lawmakers to annul the laws concerning the Theoric Fund. Then, after explaining why these laws should be annulled, he transitions to discussion of why decrees are useless when not backed up by action:

> Οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἐκεῖνό γ' ὑμᾶς ἀγνοεῖν δεῖ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅτι ψήφισμα οὐδενὸς ἄξιόν ἐστιν, ἂν μὴ προσγένηται τὸ ποιεῖν ἐθέλειν τά γε δόξαντα **προθύμως** ὑμᾶς.[83]

Once again προθύμως could be excised, and once again it is separated from its verb. The subconscious urge aroused by these displaced adverbs is strongly reinforced a few sections later. Due to the opening of the section cited directly above, I cannot agree with Wooten that the tone of sections 14-15 is "fairly calm" and that he switches to a different mode in "the emotional outburst" that occurs in 16-17.[84] Rather, I would describe the progression as a gradual bubbling up of frustration until it bursts in 16-17: you never back up your decrees; you persist in decreeing things without actually doing anything; just when are you going to act? The series of questions in 16 is indeed as Wooten describes it an outburst. As I noted in my chapter on style (pgs. 98-99), the discontinuity that occurs in one of the questions (οὐχ **ἅπαντα** μὲν ἡμῶν προείληφε **τὰ χωρί'** ἄνθρωπος) presents Philip's (shameful) success against the Athenians in its starkest form. Also the series concludes with a series of very clipped, broken questions: οὐκ ἐχθρός; οὐκ ἔχων τὰ ἡμέτερα; οὐ βάρβαρος; οὐχ ὅ τι ἂν εἴποι τις;[85] What began as subtle instigation has now become an impassioned outburst. If successful, the audience should be on the verge of jumping out their seats to go attack Philip at this point.

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[83] Dem. 3.14: "But of that, men of Athens, you must not be ignorant, namely that a decree is worth nothing, if there is not present in addition your willingness to do the things decided upon at least, and wholeheartedly." I have added 'and' to my translation in an attempt to capture the force of the word order here.
[84] Wooten (2010), 12.
[85] Dem. 3.16: "Is he not hostile? Not in possession of what is ours? Is he not a barbarian? Not whatever anyone could say?"

This outburst concludes with a very harsh comparison of the audience with soldiers who have fled from battle. Having sarcastically asked if they (though he uses the first person plural of course) are going to look for who is responsible when they themselves have all but made Philip's preparations for him (§17), he explains his question thus: οὐ γὰρ αὐτοί γ' αἴτιοι φήσομεν εἶναι, σαφῶς οἶδα τοῦτ' ἐγώ. This leads to a comparison with the situation after a defeat in battle when all the soldiers who fled blame everyone but themselves: if each and every man who fled had stood his ground, they would have achieved victory. This comparison has a function in its immediate context insofar as Demosthenes uses it to encourage the audience to give counsel themselves rather than accusing others. However, due to the strong aversion associated with the image it also has a broader function within the speech, for it instills in the audience the willingness to hold their ground and face destruction which will be needed when they get to the final simile of the speech.

Discussion of the possible counsel that could be given in the current situation leads to the possibility that someone might give advice that is unpleasant (§18: ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡδέα ταῦτα). This leads to Demosthenes' own unpleasant proposal, namely that they should disturb the Theoric Fund (§19). He introduces a hypothetical objector who claims that there are other resources available so that the Fund can remain untouched. In response, he advises his audience not to allow their desires to influence their thinking:

> ἀλλ', οἶμαι, μέγα τοῖς τοιούτοις ὑπάρχει λόγοις ἡ παρ' ἑκάστου βούλησις, διόπερ ῥᾷστον ἁπάντων ἐστὶν αὐτὸν ἐξαπατῆσαι· ὃ γὰρ βούλεται, τοῦθ' ἕκαστος καὶ οἴεται, τὰ δὲ πράγματα πολλάκις οὐχ οὕτω πέφυκεν.[86]

[86] Dem. 3.19: "But to a great degree, I think, each man's desire adheres to such words, for which reason it is the easiest of all things to deceive oneself. For what a person wants, that he also thinks is the case, but affairs often are not so disposed."

Each member of the audience is encouraged here to reflect on how he has been evaluating the situation and to see how his own desires have distorted his thinking. With regard to structure, this passage marks a turning point in the speech. Up to this point, Demosthenes has been attempting to convey the need for action and to instill the will and desire to follow through. From this point on, however, the speech will shift from Olynthus to focusing on addressing an internal crisis, namely the degradation of the Athenian character. The words of warning Demosthenes gives here about the dangers of allowing desire to influence thinking is a necessary preparation for the very ugly and altogether undesirable thinking that constitutes the second half of the speech, namely that we are not the men our fathers were, we are tantamount to tamed beasts feeding on crumbs, and finally we are chronically ill patients being kept alive at a subsistence level. The audience of course will be instinctively inclined to reject these characterizations of themselves, but they will only be able to do so by ignoring Demosthenes' words here.

After briefly contrasting present-day with Golden Age Athens, Demosthenes explains the reason for the decline:

> Τί δὴ τὸ πάντων αἴτιον τούτων, καὶ τί δή ποθ' ἅπαντ' εἶχε καλῶς τότε, καὶ νῦν οὐκ ὀρθῶς; ὅτι τότε μὲν πράττειν καὶ στρατεύεσθαι τολμῶν **αὐτὸς** ὁ δῆμος δεσπότης τῶν πολιτευομένων ἦν καὶ κύριος **αὐτὸς** ἁπάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν …[87]

The reference to the *demos* being willing to act and go on expeditions itself alludes to the praise of fifth-century Athens which immediately preceded(§24:αὐτοὶ στρατευόμενοι), and the intensive adjective is emphatically repeated in the next clause. The context also contributes to the weight of the sentiment, following as it does one of Demosthenes' characteristic rhetorical questions. The passage can be seen as further provoking the urge to self-assertion incited earlier

[87] Dem. 3.30: "What, then is responsible for all this, and why were things good then, while now they are askew? Because then the people itself, daring to act and go on expedition in person, was lord of its politicians, and it itself was in control of all benefits ..."

in the speech by the repeated displacement of the adverb προθύμως. Here the *demos* is figured as hamstrung, robbed and finally reduced to nothing but a mere appendage (§31: ὑμεῖς δ' ὁ δῆμος, ἐκνενευρισμένοι καὶ περιῃρημένοι χρήματα, συμμάχους, ἐν ὑπηρέτου καὶ προσθήκης μέρει γεγένησθε). This ultimate degradation creates a palpable tension with the incitements to action and self-assertion made throughout the speech: προθύμως προθύμως προθύμως αὐτός αὐτός; but you are disabled and nothing but a useless appendage. It is important that the exhortation is developed first, for it gives the audience a positive means of resisting Demosthenes' vilification, that is the very means he is proposing: no, we are not hamstrung and useless; we like our fathers shall take the field ourselves, shall act ourselves, shall resist Philip προθύμως.

Demosthenes' characterization of the Athenians as mere appendages would seem to represent the ultimate debasement. Why, then, do we get another metaphor immediately following this in which they are likened to tamed animals? Commentators have not been sensitive enough to the structural problem here, for Demosthenes seems to risk mixing his metaphors. The sentence in question reads: οἱ δ' ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει καθείρξαντες ὑμᾶς ἐπάγουσιν ἐπὶ ταῦτα καὶ τιθασεύουσι χειροήθεις αὑτοῖς ποιοῦντες.[88] In the previous sentence the Athenians were hamstrung slaves and nothing but an appendage; now they are tamed animals being penned up in the city. One might be inclined to say that Demosthenes is laying on the abuse a bit thick. However, it could also be argued that the metaphor here contributes a particular coloring to the provocation. By saying that the audience is being tamed like animals, Demosthenes also brings to mind the violent resistance involved in such a process. Perhaps, then, this serves simply to intensify the urge to resist and assert oneself provoked by the previous images.

[88] Dem. 3.31: "Having penned you up in the city, they lead you to these things[the Theoric fund and festivals] and tame you, making you submissive."

After having expressed his concern about the possible consequences of speaking so candidly, Demosthenes then tells his audience what they can hope to achieve should they follow his advice:

> Ἐὰν οὖν ἀλλὰ νῦν γ' ἔτι ἀπαλλαγέντες τούτων τῶν ἐθῶν ἐθελήσητε στρατεύεσθαί τε καὶ πράττειν ἀξίως ὑμῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ ταῖς περιουσίαις ταῖς οἴκοι ταύταις ἀφορμαῖς ἐπὶ τὰ ἔξω τῶν ἀγαθῶν χρήσησθε, ἴσως ἄν, ἴσως, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τέλειόν τι καὶ μέγα κτήσαισθε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τῶν τοιούτων λημμάτων ἀπαλλαγείητε, ἃ τοῖς {ἀσθενοῦσι} παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν σιτίοις διδομένοις ἔοικε. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνα οὔτε ἰσχὺν ἐντίθησιν οὔτ' ἀποθνήσκειν ἐᾷ· καὶ ταῦτα ἃ νέμεσθε νῦν ὑμεῖς, οὔτε τοσαῦτα ἐστὶν ὥστε ὠφέλειαν ἔχειν τινὰ διαρκῆ, οὔτ' ἀπογνόντας ἄλλο τι πράττειν ἐᾷ …[89]

There is an important difference between this simile and the imagery in the immediately preceding sections: having never been slaves or animals themselves, the audience has to imagine their way into the image. Sickness, however, or rather that miserable state between sick and healthy is visceral and one of the most traumatic and universal experiences. It provokes immediate partial assent: yes, let me die rather than subsist in ill health. The comparison with the situation facing Athens would of course have been terrifying, but that is why Demosthenes has carefully prepared for it and reserved it for the end of the speech. At this point he has repeatedly incited them to do something, anything and to assert themselves against corrupt politicians' attempts to domesticate them and reduce them to slavery; further, he has explicitly advised them not to allow what they desire to affect their judgment. In order to be able to conclude with this simile of the doctor and patient, to face which the audience has to be honest with itself and has to be willing to live vigorously or allow itself to die, he had to create a strong enough urge to self-assertion and he had to ensure that at the critical moment they could not easily reject the simile by telling themselves the situation is not actually that dire.

[89] Dem. 3.33: "Accordingly, If now at least, having freed yourselves from these habits, you are willing to march and act in a manner worthy of yourselves, and if you use these advantages at home as starting points for external benefits, perhaps, perhaps, men of Athens, you might gain some consummate and great good and be freed from such gains, which resemble the food given by doctors. For that too neither gives strength nor allows one to die; and these things you are distributing to yourselves are neither so great as to have any sufficient benefit nor do they allow you to reject them and fare otherwise ..."

At the beginning of the speech (§3) Demosthenes says that the problem is not that the Athenians do not understand what they need to do; rather, it is that they are not willing to do it. As I have attempted to demonstrate, he attempts to address this problem of the will by exploiting forms of persuasion that do not rely on logical argumentation. The audience is influenced subconsciously by repetition and artful displacement of a key word (προθύμως); the example of their forefathers provides an idealized model for them to aspire to in reaction to the aversion they feel to the way Demosthenes characterizes them; and, finally, all of these effects are channeled to a single point, the simile of the doctor and patient, where the will to assert oneself becomes most pronounced. The Athenians either will live in victory over Philip, or will perish in resisting him.

5. *The Second Philippic*

Several aspects of the structure of the *Second Philippic* have presented problems for scholars. Blass asserts that the *prooemium,* which as he notes is very general, is not actually suitable to the rest of the speech since the criticism that Philip needs to be resisted in deed, not just in word does not prepare for the main argument of the speech.[90] One should also note that this section of the speech is very similar to that of the *Third Olynthiac,* in which Demosthenes also criticized the Athenians for always talking about resisting Philip while never actually doing so. With regard to the body of the speech, Wooten is critical of the disposition; he argues that the speech "… is composed of what are in effect three short speeches stitched together."[91] Later in the article he elucidates what he means by this:

> These two "speeches," therefore, illustrate two different approaches that will also be seen in *Philippic* III: a calm, orderly, fairly repetitive presentation, infused with mild emotion and a very harsh, strongly emotional attack on Philip. These two approaches, however, are discrete. They exist side by side rather than being

[90] Blass (1893) III.1, 347.
[91] Wooten (2010), 20.

> melded into a coherent whole, with appropriate modulations from one tone to another, as will be the case in the *Third Philippic*.[92]

As is clear from his language, Wooten views this discretization of emotion from logic as a structural deficiency. Another problem for him is that what he calls the third "speech" "... is aimed more at Demosthenes' political opponents; it is a prelude to his prosecution of Aeschines ..."[93] In addition, then, to the lack of integration of the first two parts, there is a third part that really has nothing to do with the first two. Although I do agree with Wooten's analysis in part as the following discussion will show, nevertheless I would argue that the second section, that is the inset speech, is not completely discrete from the first and third but rather provides support to both of these. Further, with regard to the first and second sections at least, Demosthenes does attempt to unify what Wooten regards as two separate speeches. He does so tonally. Blass cites the praise of Athens' past and present in relation to other Greek states as one of the more conspicuous characteristics of the speech.[94] This praise is found primarily in two sections. The first occurs in the midst of Demosthenes' λογισμός of why Philip chose to ally himself with Thebes instead of Athens. Philip knew, he says, that, while the Athenians would not sacrifice the welfare of the Greeks for their own advantage, the Thebans would only be concerned about what was expedient for themselves (§§8-9). Athens' greatness, then, is supported by the cool, calculating part of the speech. The second section in which Demosthenes praises Athens by contrasting her with other states occurs immediately after what Wooten calls the second "speech," which contains "a very harsh, strongly emotional attack on Philip." This section (§§20-25) is an extended quotation of a speech he delivered as an ambassador before the Messenians and Argives. After he finishes quoting it, Demosthenes says that the audience applauded him and

[92] *Ibid.*, 21.
[93] *Ibid.*, 20.
[94] Blass (1893) III.1, 350.

agreed with the arguments he had presented; nevertheless, it would not be surprising if Messenians and Peloponnesians acted against what they had agreed were their best interests. It would be surprising, however, if Athenians did so (§26-7). Flattery and national pride, then, conclude both the logical and the emotional "speeches." I would argue that this problematizes Wooten's claim that the two sections are discrete.

Although there is some sort of connection between these two sections, Wooten is right that there is a more or less strong discretization between the logical and the emotional, between λόγος and πάθος. This is especially conspicuous in a speech by Demosthenes, who has traditionally been praised for his ability to blend reasoning with emotional appeal.[95] However, I would argue that the first section should not be characterized negatively as lacking emotion; rather, in place of affect is a strong positive emphasis on calculation. The body of the speech begins with a reference to Demosthenes' own calculations:

> Πρῶτον μέν, εἴ τις, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, θαρρεῖ, ὁρῶν ἡλίκος ἤδη καὶ ὅσων κύριός ἐστι Φίλιππος, καὶ μηδένα οἴεται κίνδυνον φέρειν τοῦτο τῇ πόλει μηδ' ἐφ' ὑμᾶς πάντα παρασκευάζεσθαι, θαυμάζω, καὶ δεηθῆναι πάντων ὁμοίως ὑμῶν βούλομαι **τοὺς λογισμοὺς** ἀκοῦσαί **μου** διὰ βραχέων, δι' οὓς τἀναντί' ἐμοὶ παρέστηκε προσδοκᾶν ...[96]

Demosthenes asks the audience to listen to his calculations. Then, in the next sentence, he introduces these calculations by saying: ἐγὼ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, λογίζομαι. Twice, then, in two consecutive sentences he characterizes the arguments he is going to present as calculations. This strongly encourages the audience to think through them in a cool and collected manner, and Demosthenes reinforces the effect by presenting the arguments themselves in

[95] This quality of Demosthenes' oratory was best characterized by Butcher (1881), 159: "It is not possible with Demosthenes, as it is with lesser orators, to map out a speech into parts and say: here is an appeal to feeling; here is pure reasoning; for thought is everywhere interpenetrated with feeling, reason is itself passionate."
[96] Dem. 6.6: "First if anyone, men of Athens, takes courage seeing how great Philip now is and of how many things he is in control, and if he thinks that this poses no threat to the city and that this all is not being prepared against you, I am surprised, and I want to ask all of you alike to listen briefly to my calculations, because of which it has occurred to me to expect precisely the opposite ..."

question and answer form, for example: τίνων ὁ Φίλιππος κύριος πρῶτον μετὰ τὴν εἰρήνην κατέστη; Πυλῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν Φωκεῦσι πραγμάτων.[97] It is as though he is presenting to us his thought process, and we are supposed to follow along with him. There is not, then, simply a hole where passion would typically be but rather a stronger focus on engaging the audience's minds with the argumentation.

This focus on calculation, however, makes for a rather dry speech. But a sober speech, according to Blass, is what the situation called for:

> Der Charakter der zweiten Philippika entspricht genau den Umständen, unter welchen sie gehalten ist. Noch war nicht irgendwelche Aussicht, dass mit Thaten und mit Krieg dem Philipp entgegengetreten wurde .... So tritt Demosthenes wieder getrost gegen Philipp auf and und führt den Athenern mit allem Ernst und Nachdruck ihre Gefahr vor Augen, um sie wach zu erhalten und ihnen das von der Friedenspartei genährte Vertrauen zu nehmen; aber leidenschaftliche Mahnungen fehlen hier noch, da sie die Hörer nur befremdet hätten, bevor dieselben nicht durch ruhige und nüchterne Darlegung der wirklichen Lage vorbereitet waren.[98]

It was a time for keeping the Athenians alert, not for rousing them to action. Still, if this was Demosthenes' motive for composing the speech the way he did, there was a danger that due to the absence of his characteristic passionate appeals and outbursts it might fail to make an impact on the audience, and all those very reasonable calculations might soon be forgotten. Perhaps, then, one could account for the second section of the speech or what Wooten calls the second "speech" in this way. Both he and Blass note the contrast between the two sections,[99] that is that the first is somewhat cold and rational, while the second is full of vim and vigor and of figures expressing passion, for example anaphora and Demosthenes' distinctive[100] way of using suspense to infuse the key idea with maximal emphasis, in this case that Philip should not be trusted (§24: τί οὖν ἐστι τοῦτο; ἀπιστία.). If Blass was right that direct, impassioned warnings

[97] Dem. 6.7: "Of what did Philip first gain control after the Peace? Of Thermopylae and of affairs among the Phocians."
[98] Blass (1893) III.1 350.
[99] *Ibid.*; Wooten (2010), 20.
[100] See pg. 81, pgs. 99-100, and pg. 113 in my chapter on style.

would have been out of place given the situation, then an indirect exhortation to distrust Philip was one solution for arousing the audience while not alienating them. It has the proper affective distance; the passionate appeal is felt at a situational remove.

I would argue that the inset speech also plays an important role in relation to the third part. Here Demosthenes criticizes rival politicians who undermined his warnings about Philip after the second embassy:

> καὶ πάλιν γ' (ἦν δίκαιον) ἑτέρους καλεῖν. τίνας; τοὺς ὅτ' ἐγὼ γεγονυίας ἤδη τῆς εἰρήνης ἀπὸ τῆς ὑστέρας ἥκων πρεσβείας τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς ὅρκους, αἰσθόμενος φενακιζομένην τὴν πόλιν, προὔλεγον καὶ διεμαρτυρόμην καὶ οὐκ εἴων προέσθαι Πύλας οὐδὲ Φωκέας, λέγοντας ὡς ἐγὼ μὲν ὕδωρ πίνων εἰκότως δύστροπος καὶ δύσκολός εἰμί τις ἄνθρωπος, Φίλιππος δ', ἅπερ εὔξαισθ' ἂν ὑμεῖς, ἐὰν παρέλθῃ, πράξει ...[101]

These unnamed speakers, then, mocked Demosthenes and his character after the second embassy when he tried to warn them. In the sections that follow, he makes no attempt to respond to this slander. I would argue that the inset speech that precedes this section makes an implicit rebuttal for him, for in it he projects the *ethos* of the ideal ambassador, that is one who passionately and effectively represents his state's interests. As a result, when we get to these remarks about him being a water drinker and ill-tempered, we are already inclined from the outset to reject them and side with Demosthenes. The inset speech, then, plays an important preparatory function for the third part of the speech.

6. *The Third Philippic*

Dionysius called the *Third Philippic* the greatest of Demosthenes' orations against Philip.[102] Several modern scholars hold the speech in even higher esteem: Wooten regards it as

[101] Dem. 6.29-30: "And again it would be just to call forward others. Whom? Those who when I arrived from the Second Embassy for the oaths after peace had already been made and declared and bore witness and forbade us from abandoning Thermopylae and the Phocians, those, I say, who said that of course I as a water-drinker was an altogether ill-tempered and discontented man, but that Philip, if he advances, will do just the things you would pray for ..."

[102] D.H. *Thuc.*, 54.

"the finest deliberative speech from the ancient world,"[103] and Blass in agreement with Rehdantz suggested that it might in fact be the greatest of all deliberative speeches.[104] For Wooten the speech represents the culmination of an aesthetic/rhetorical development that can be traced throughout Demosthenes' deliberative oratory:

> In *For the Megalopolitans* he had used a calm, orderly, cerebral approach and had been unsuccessful. In *Philippic* I he devised an approach that was much more energetic and emotional and also failed. In *Philippic* III he would **learn to** [bolding mine] blend these two extremes to create what is probably the finest deliberative speech from the ancient world.[105]

By both Wooten and Pearson, the disposition of the speech is singled out for praise. The latter asserts that "The special interest of the *Third Philippic* lies not so much in its conclusions or its emotional appeals, as in the skill with which the various arguments are manipulated."[106] Wooten, in turn, claims that the structure of the speech represents a significant development in Demosthenes' use of ring composition:

> Although both *Philippic* I and *Philippic* III employ ring composition, it is in different respects. In the *First Philippic* ring composition tends to be an organizing principle for the whole speech rather than of smaller sections of it. As a result, the recurring arguments are separated by long intervals and create less obvious repetitions, with less emphasis, than in the *Third Philippic*, where they are repeated in closer succession.

Although I concur with the scholarly consensus about the overall greatness and significance of the speech, I would argue that the disposition, at least, is much more problematic than has been maintained. As I will show, the significance of ring composition needs to be re-evaluated, and more generally the skillfulness with which Demosthenes structures, measures, and "manipulates" his arguments can at times be disputed, particularly in the section of the speech where the *paradeigmata* of foreign states are presented.

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[103] Wooten (2010), 22.
[104] Blass (1893) III.1, 381: "So ist diese Rede die pathetischste und gewaltigste von allen, und, wie Rehdantz sagt, nicht den Demosthenischen allein, sondern vielleicht von allen, die jemals auf Erden gesprochen sind." See further fn. 1 for a survey of other nineteenth-century scholars' views on the speech.
[105] Wooten (2008), 16. Cf. Pearson (1976), 74 for the development that the *Philippics* as a series represent in relation to Demosthenes' previous deliberative speeches.
[106] Pearson (1976), 155.

As one of the more prominent instances of ring composition in the *Third Philippic*, Wooten cites the structure of sections 47-75. I reproduce his analysis below:

A.External affairs: advice about the war (47–52).
B.The dangers of traitors (53–55).
C.The examples of Olynthus, Eretria, and Oreus (56–62).
D.Internal affairs: beware of politicians who mislead (63–65.21).
C.The examples of Oreus, Eretria, and Olynthus (65.21–66).
B.The dangers of traitors (67–68).
A.External affairs: advice about the war (69–75).[107]

Figure 1. Wooten's analysis of the structure of Dem. 9.47-75

There are some significant problems with this analysis. First of all, it suggests that the passage moves from one section to the next with each one being discrete and covering a different topic. However, this conceals the fact that significant interlacing occurs. In section 49, which should according to Wooten be devoted to external affairs, traitors receive prominent attention (νυνὶ δ' ὁρᾶτε μὲν δήπου τὰ πλεῖστα τοὺς προδότας ἀπολωλεκότας). Then, in 68, which is supposed to be devoted to the dangers of traitors, the examples of Olynthus, Eretria, and Oreus come up again. Also, it is not clear to me how Wooten's section D refers to something other than "the dangers of traitors": Demosthenes explicitly says that these "politicians who mislead" do so because they are in the service of Philip (63: οἱ δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς οἷς χαρίζονται Φιλίππῳ συμπράττουσιν). Consequently, D covers the same topic as B, with the result that it is difficult to view the structure as a ring. It should also be noted that the subject of the examples of the aforementioned cities is how they were undermined by following the advice of traitors rather than that of politicians like Demosthenes who were committed to the welfare of their state.

Another problem with what Wooten calls a ring is the conspicuous asymmetry involved: C1 in his analysis covers six sections, while C2 does not even cover two. Finally, B2, which is supposed to refer back to the dangers of traitors, is much broader in scope:

[107] Wooten (2010), 4.

> μωρία καὶ κακία τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐλπίζειν, καὶ κακῶς βουλευομένους καὶ μηδὲν ὧν προσήκει ποιεῖν ἐθέλοντας, ἀλλὰ τῶν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐχθρῶν λεγόντων ἀκροωμένους, τηλικαύτην ἡγεῖσθαι πόλιν οἰκεῖν τὸ μέγεθος ὥστε μηδ' ἂν ὁτιοῦν ᾖ, δεινὸν πείσεσθαι. καὶ μὴν κἀκεῖνό γε αἰσχρόν, ὕστερόν ποτ' εἰπεῖν "τίς γὰρ ἂν ᾠήθη ταῦτα γενέσθαι; νὴ τὸν Δία, ἔδει γὰρ τὸ καὶ τὸ ποιῆσαι καὶ τὸ μὴ ποιῆσαι."[108]

Demosthenes is talking here not just about listening to traitors, but also more generally about arrogance, false and shameful regret, and about not being willing to do what is necessary. Accordingly, labelling it "the dangers of traitors" is problematic.

Pearson as mentioned praises the disposition of the speech for its economy and its dynamism:

> Demosthenes never remains in one position of attack for long, but moves around his various positions, strengthening each one in turn as he comes to it .... He uses the evidence of events with careful economy, not wasting time with unnecessary complexities or piling up one detail after another ...[109]

Unfortunately he does not proceed to tell us which passages in particular he has in mind. However, I would argue that his emphasis on the economy and constant movement of the speech is problematic. Indeed, Blass interprets the effect the disposition in the exact opposite way:

> Ueberhaupt weilt der Redner lange bei *einem* Gedanken oder bei einer Folge von Gedanken, während er in Reden wie der ersten Philippika mit raschen Uebergängen jeden Augenblick bei einem neuen Gedanken ist.[110]

He even criticizes the length of the passage in which Demosthenes discusses the decree of Arthmios, speculating that he might have shortened it before he actually delivered the speech.[111] I would also cite the sections in which he presents the examples of Olynthus, Eretria, and Oreos (§§56-62). Each city represents an instance of the same problem: When given the choice of following the counsel of those in the service of Philip or those devoted to the city's welfare, the people of each city made the wrong choice by following the former, and the consequences were

[108] Dem. 9.67-8: "It is foolishness and cowardice to hope for such things and (it is foolishness and cowardice) for people, when they deliberate badly and are unwilling to do the least part of what it behooves them to do, and when instead they listen to those who speak on behalf of their enemies, to believe that they live in a city so great in magnitude that they will not suffer anything terrible, not even if anything whatsoever happens."
[109] Pearson (1976), 155.
[110] Blass (1893) III.1 381-2.
[111] *Ibid.*, 381.

disastrous. Why, then, do we need all three, and each presented at some length at that? Rather than elaborating on the details of each city's situation and ultimate fate, Demosthenes could have analyzed them collectively; this would have been more economical. When it comes, then, to this passage and the decree of Arthmios at least, Pearson's analysis is problematic.

There are also other structural problems that do not relate to previous scholars' analyses of the speech's disposition. One involves the content of the *prooemium* and the *prothesis.* The *Third Philippic* has been praised for its Panhellenic character and its noble call for the unification of the Greeks to resist Philip.[112] In this respect it is much broader in scope than the other speeches in the Philippic cycle, which restrict themselves to what the Athenians as opposed to the Greeks collectively should do. However, there is no preparation for this broader scope at the beginning of the speech. Indeed, as MacDowell notes, it opens with much the same argumentation phrased in much the same way as the *First Philippic*: our situation is dire, but the fact that we have been neglecting to do what is necessary should be viewed as a source of hope, for, if things had gotten so bad when we were doing everything in our power to prevent this, there would be no hope of improving the situation. One could also cite the recurrence of the λόγος/ἔργον antithesis as another similarity between the *Third Philippic* and several other speeches in the cycle. Judging by the proem, then, one gets the impression that the speech is going to cover the same ground as the rest of the *Philippics* and *Olynthiacs*.

Blass summarizes the *prothesis* thus: da nämlich noch nicht alle Athener einsehen, dass Philipp thatsächlich gegen die Stadt Krieg führt, so muss dies zuerst festgestellt werden."[113] This proposition, that Philip is violating the Peace even if he denies it, constitutes the first section of the body of the speech; Demosthenes goes through particular violations and also relates how

[112] Blass (1893) III.1, 381; Jaeger (1938), 174-5.
[113] Blass (1893) III.1, 376.

Philip used similar ploys in his dealings with other cities. Up through this section, then, we have no inkling that he has more ambitious aims than he did in the preceding speeches. He just wants Athenians to recognize Philip's violations and resist him accordingly. In the statement of the proposition, it perhaps would have been preferable to prepare the audience for the entire scope of it, that is to present Philip's crimes from the perspective of the Greeks as a whole rather than in relation to the Athenians in particular. In sections 19-20 he warns,

> καὶ τοσοῦτόν γε ἀφέστηκα τῶν ἄλλων, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῶν συμβουλευόντων, ὥστ' οὐδὲ δοκεῖ μοι περὶ Χερρονήσου νῦν σκοπεῖν οὐδὲ Βυζαντίου, ἀλλ' ἐπαμῦναι μὲν τούτοις, καὶ διατηρῆσαι μή τι πάθωσι, βουλεύεσθαι μέντοι περὶ πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὡς ἐν κινδύνῳ μεγάλῳ καθεστώτων.[114]

Why not place such a dire warning at the beginning of the speech so as to create a sense of the utmost urgency as soon as possible?

One final problem with the disposition of the speech also pertains to its Panhellenic character. In sections 19-47, Demosthenes develops his argument for unifying the Greeks in resistance to the barbarian Philip: he is an interloper and an illegitimate child who has disturbed the closed system of reciprocity that previously existed among the Greeks, who used to be concerned with the welfare of other city-states. This part of the speech brilliantly crafts an idea of Panhellenic unity that effectively provokes a strong feeling of patriotism toward Greece as a whole and just as strong a hatred for Philip the barbarian intruder. One would like the text to move from the development of this idea of Greek unity to a stirring call to action—let us send out ambassadors to other city-states to form an alliance against Philip— followed by an emotional conclusion. However, this desired movement is interrupted by a five page interlude (§§53-68) on the threat posed by traitors. We have heard this warning before, indeed it has

[114] Dem. 9.19-20: "And so much, men of Athens, do I disagree with the rest of those giving counsel that I do not think we should be deliberating now about the Chersonese or Byzantium, but it seems to me that, while we should defend these places and see to it that they not suffer harm, we should nevertheless be deliberating about all the Greeks, seeing as they are in grave danger."

recurred time after time, speech after speech, the most prominent instance being the extended comparison of treachery to a disease in *On the False Embassy* (see pgs. 221 ff.). So why devote so much space to it now, and right in the middle of your revolutionary new conception of Greece as a nation? One presumes that the audience was already well aware that Demosthenes was firmly convinced that there were traitors in the service of Philip and that he believed that they posed an imminent threat to Athens. Further, an explicit proposal about these traitors is unnecessary: just don't listen to anyone who says anything that would further Philip's interests. Why in the world, then, do we need five pages about traitors? After concluding his warning, Demosthenes transitions to his proposal thus:

> τί ποιῶμεν; πάλαι τις ἡδέως ἂν ἴσως ἐρωτήσας κάθηται. ἐγὼ νὴ Δί' ἐρῶ, καὶ γράψω δέ, ὥστε ἂν βούλησθε χειροτονήσετε. αὐτοὶ πρῶτον ἀμυνόμενοι καὶ παρασκευαζόμενοι, τριήρεσι καὶ χρήμασι καὶ στρατιώταις λέγω· καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἅπαντες δήπου δουλεύειν συγχωρήσωσιν οἱ ἄλλοι, ἡμῖν γ' ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἀγωνιστέον· ταῦτα δὴ πάντ' αὐτοὶ παρεσκευασμένοι καὶ ποιήσαντες φανερὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ἤδη παρακαλῶμεν, καὶ τοὺς ταῦτα διδάξοντας ἐκπέμπωμεν πρέσβεις πανταχοῖ ...[115]

Having been warned for five pages, now we are back to the formation of a Panhellenic alliance. This extended interruption is difficult to account for, and moving directly from the idea of Greek unity to a call to send out ambassadors would potentially have been much more rhetorically effective.

In conclusion, as Demosthenes himself says, criticizing without offering a positive alternative is easy.[116] In this section I have perhaps only performed a simple task. However, I would argue that, contrary to scholars' confident analyses of the brilliance of the speech as a specimen of ring composition or economy, the contribution of its structure to the effect it has had

[115] Dem. 9.70: " 'What should we do?' someone sitting there has perhaps long been wanting to ask. By Zeus I will tell you, and I will also make a proposal, so that you can vote for it if you so desire. We ourselves, first defending ourselves and making preparations, I mean with triremes and resources and soldiers (for even if all the rest in fact allow themselves to be enslaved, by us, at least, a battle must be fought on behalf of freedom), when, then, we ourselves have prepared all these things and have made them manifest, let us summon the rest, and let us send out ambassadors everywhere who will demonstrate these things ..."

[116] Dem. 1.16: τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐπιτιμᾶν ἴσως φήσαι τις ἂν ῥᾴδιον καὶ παντὸς εἶναι, τὸ δ' ὑπὲρ τῶν παρόντων ὅ τι δεῖ πράττειν ἀποφαίνεσθαι, τοῦτ' εἶναι συμβούλου.

on audiences, if indeed it does make a positive contribution, remains a problem. The style, vigorous and impassioned as always; the imagery, striking and distinctive as always; the argumentation and sentiments, compelling, noble, and patriotic as always; but the disposition, well, is it an animal, and if so what type?

7. Conclusion

Twice Demosthenes devotes an extensive portion of a speech's proem to expressing the difficulty involved not in determining the best course of action but rather in presenting it in such a way as to persuade one's audience. One of these occurs in the collection of *Prooemia*:

> Περὶ μὲν τῶν παρόντων, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πραγμάτων τῇ πόλει, καίπερ οὐκ ἐχόντων ὡς δεῖ, οὐ πάνυ μοὶ δοκεῖ τῶν χαλεπῶν εἶναι ζητῆσαι τί ἄν τις πράξας βελτίω ποιήσειεν. ὅντινα μέντοι χρὴ τρόπον πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν, τοῦτο παμπόλλην δυσκολίαν ἔχειν νομίζω, οὐχ ὡς οὐ συνησόντων ὅ τι ἄν τις λέγῃ, ἀλλ' οὕτω πολλὰ καὶ ψευδῆ καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ βέλτιστα τοῖς πράγμασιν συνειθίσθαι μοι δοκεῖτ' ἀκούειν, ὥστε δέδοικα μὴ τῷ νῦν τὰ βέλτιστ' εἰπόντι, ἣν τοῖς τότε ἐξηπατηκόσιν προσῆκεν ἀπέχθειαν ὑπάρχειν παρ' ὑμῶν, ταύτην ἀπενέγκασθαι συμβῇ.[117]

How to give unpleasant counsel without incurring your audience's hostility? Here the focus is on the risk to the speaker, and there is no analysis of the psychological root of the problem of why the audience insists on listening to those who deceive them even when they can identify and comprehend which counsel is the right one. In the *Third Olynthiac*, by contrast, Demosthenes goes on to tell us why this has been the case:

> ἐγὼ δ' οὐχ ὅ τι χρὴ περὶ τῶν παρόντων συμβουλεῦσαι χαλεπώτατον ἡγοῦμαι, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ἀπορῶ, τίνα χρὴ τρόπον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς ὑμᾶς περὶ αὐτῶν εἰπεῖν. πέπεισμαι γὰρ ἐξ ὧν παρὼν καὶ ἀκούων σύνοιδα, τὰ πλείω τῶν πραγμάτων ἡμᾶς ἐκπεφευγέναι τῷ μὴ βούλεσθαι τὰ δέοντα ποιεῖν ἢ τῷ μὴ συνιέναι.[118]

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[117] Dem. *Ex.* 15.1: "With regard to the situation facing the city, men of Athens, although things are not as they should be, I do not think it to be altogether difficult to seek out what one should do to make it better. However, the question of how to speak to you about it, this, I think, is very difficult, not because you are not going to understand whatever someone says, but rather you seem to me so accustomed to listening to numerous lies and indeed all things rather than what is best for affairs that I fear that it will turn out that the one who has said what is best will receive the enmity which should belong to those who have deceived you."

[118] Dem. 3.3: "I believe it is not to difficult to give counsel concerning what should be done about the current situation, but rather I am at a loss about how, men of Athens, I should speak to you about them. For I am convinced based on what I know from what I've heard and been present for that more events have escaped your grasp due to your unwillingness to do what's necessary than out of a lack of understanding."

Here the concern is not so much with how to give counsel without incurring enmity as it is how to give counsel at all when one has to address the will instead of the understanding. Also note that the *aporia* is left unresolved. Although both of these passages have rhetorical functions in their own right, nevertheless I would argue that they do indicate that when composing his deliberative speeches Demosthenes was struggling to deal with the nature of language and how it influences thinking and volition. As we will see in the next chapter, his attempts to deal with this problem on the level of form are complemented by elements of content, namely his characterizations of the Athenian mentality and his development of the λόγος/ἔργον antithesis.

Because Demosthenes himself identifies difficulties concerning the nature of discourse and its relationship to action and audience psychology, in this chapter I have worked from the assumption that the speeches represent attempts to resolve them on a formal level. I have taken his expressions of *aporia* seriously to the extent that they suggest that the dramatic variation in structure from speech to speech within the *Olynthiacs* and *Philippics* stems at least in part from a struggle to understand and exploit the relationship between structure and persuasiveness when confronted by a specific situation and an audience with an identifiable disposition.

As I argued in the introduction to this chapter, rhetorical theory on the disposition of deliberative speeches was deficient, and after Plato and Aristotle it was basically in a negative state: proem, narrative and peroration are optional; all you need is a proposition and a proof. Isocrates in whatever his esoteric teaching on the "forms" (ἰδέαι) was may have given more detailed prescriptions, but based on his rejection of abstract, immutable *technai* in *Against the Sophists,* it seems unlikely that these would have taken the form of an analytical schema. In addition to this deficiency in theory, virtually no actual Assembly speeches had been published

before those of Demosthenes.[119] As a result, the genre up to this point essentially consisted of Isocrates' meticulously crafted and cold compositions, the notoriously crabbed and dense speeches in Thucydides, and the speeches in Xenophon's *Hellenica*. In brief, those interested in the structure of deliberative speeches lacked any sort of robust theoretical model with which to study them, and they did not have any texts to study anyway. Accordingly, the initial distribution of Demosthenes' speeches represented a tremendous opportunity for readers: finally some actual speeches to read and study, and by the premiere statesman himself no less. Having shared in Demosthenes' *aporia* about how to address the Assembly persuasively, they now had the key to doing so. But how does one go about reading and interpreting the structure of the divine *Philippics*, especially when they are so different from one another? In this chapter I have attempted to engage with this audience's process of reading, analysis, discovery and frustration. Scholars have repeatedly noted the impossibility of schematizing the structure of his speeches, but, instead of recognizing the limits of interpretation, they have sought some sort of underlying principle that can explain away this difficulty, whether it be "le mouvement oratoire" or "le plan psychologique." Instead of searching for alternative first principles, I have chosen to approach the problem from the perspective of his original readers who had to struggle to find a way to interpret and analyze the speeches as they went along. The results are at times dissatisfying and inadequate, but necessarily so: the wine-bibber can only hope to understand so much about the water-drinker.

[119] Usher (2007), 220-21.

CHAPTER 4

Inter- and Contra-Text: Reading alongside Thucydides and Isocrates

In the preface to the *Panathenaicus*, Isocrates criticizes the way in which rival teachers of oratory abuse his speeches and present them in the worst possible light to their students:

> Ἕως μὲν οὖν τοὺς λόγους ἡμῶν ἐλυμαίνοντο, παραναγιγνώσκοντες ὡς δυνατὸν κάκιστα τοῖς αὑτῶν καὶ διαιροῦντες οὐκ ὀρθῶς καὶ κατακνίζοντες καὶ πάντα τρόπον διαφθείροντες ...[1]

He describes his rivals here as reading his speeches alongside their own to their students. Although he presents the comparison as being completely biased, this account of contemporary teaching methods suggests that rhetoricians would instruct their students by reading out two speeches and then comparing them. Another reference to intertextual reading occurs in Speusippus' *Letter to Philip* when he instructs Philip to have Antipater read his history alongside Theopompus's so that the latter can see just how worthless his work is by comparison.[2]

Another important piece of evidence for intertextual reading in the fourth century is the way in which Isocrates situates his speeches in relation to those of other orators. In the preface to the *Helen*, he mentions the author of an encomium of Helen who should be praised for choosing the right subject matter but criticized for handling it badly.[3] His own speech will demonstrate how to praise her properly.[4] Similarly, he addresses the *Busiris* to a certain Polycrates who had previously written an apology for the same figure, and he rebukes him for botching the speech. His own speech will demonstrate how Polycrates ought to have defended and praised Busiris.[5]

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[1] Isoc. 12.17: "And so while they were abusing our speeches, reading them alongside their own in the worst possible way and dividing them improperly and chopping them up and spoiling their effect in every way..." For extended discussion of this passage see Roth (2003) *ad loc.*

[2] Speus. *Ep. ad. Phil.* 12: ἵν' οὖν Θεόπομπος παύσηται τραχὺς ὤν, κέλευσον Ἀντίπατρον παραναγνῶναι τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν πράξεων αὐτῷ καὶ γνώσεται Θεόπομπος δικαίως μὲν ὑπὸ πάντων ἐξαλειφόμενος ... For the interpretation of παραναγνῶναι here, see Roth (2003), 88 fn. 122.

[3] Isoc. 10.14-5.

[4] *Ibid.* 10.15.

[5] Isoc. 11.1-6.

Both speeches, then, explicitly engage with a work by another author and expect their audience to be familiar with the other work and to compare it with Isocrates' own speech. With regard to Isocrates' school, it is easy to imagine that he used a pedagogical method somewhat similar to the one he mentions in the *Panathenaicus*: he would read his *Helen* alongside that of Gorgias and demonstrate the ways in which his speech was superior.

Based on this evidence, it is clear that for fourth-century readers intertextual comparison played an important role in their interpretation of texts. In the aforementioned passages, the comparison is always biased. However, in each case this was clearly rhetorically motivated, so it is likely that in practice two texts were often compared in a more unbiased way, especially when the author himself was not present to (mis)guide the reader. Accordingly, when Demosthenes' deliberative speeches were first distributed, readers would have read them alongside the works of the authors agreed by common consensus to be his two greatest influences: Thucydides and Isocrates. With regard to the latter, such comparison would have proved problematic in one important respect: his deliberative speeches are fictional, and this is reflected on the level of content by their lack of specificity and concreteness. This issue will be addressed in the following chapter in my discussion of the occasionality of Demosthenes' speeches.

In this chapter I will perform an intertextual reading of Demosthenes' speeches in relation to Thucydides and Isocrates. This reading will focus on his relationship to these two authors on the level of argumentation and content more generally. With regard to Thucydides, I will argue that Demosthenes does not merely appropriate elements of content from his *Histories* but rather engages with and develops his characterization of the Athenians in a dynamic way. With respect to Isocrates, in the first subsection I will examine in detail Demosthenes' repeated engagement with a single speech, the *Archidamus*. By looking at the ways in which he used

arguments from this speech throughout his political career, I will be able to establish the nature of Isocrates' influence in a more concrete way than has been done up to this point. In the second subsection, I will look at a point of rupture between the two: while Isocrates prescribed that use of imagery be largely excluded from oratory, Demosthenes not only greatly expanded its role but also boldly innovated on the structure and intertextual function of his images.

1. Thucydides and the Athenian Character

Thucydides' profound influence on Demosthenes, with respect to both style and content, was already recognized in antiquity.[6] Modern scholars as well have devoted a significant amount of attention to understanding the relationship between the two.[7] With regard to content in particular, Pearson compares arguments used by Archidamus in response to the Corinthians (Thuc. 1.82) with passages from *On the Symmories*,[8] and he notes how Thucydides' use of the *logos*/*ergon* antithesis influenced Demosthenes.[9] Yunis, in turn, is interested in the ways in which Demosthenes models his deliberative *ethos* on that of Thucydides' Pericles.[10] Finally, Mader, developing Rowe's interpretation of the *First Philippic* as a satirical representation of a *mundus perversus,*[11] argues that the characterization of Philip and the Athenians in that speech is closely based on passages from Thucydides.[12] Although all of these readings illuminate important aspects of his influence on Demosthenes, nevertheless in each case the nature of the

[6] There is the famous story told by Zosimus (Biogr. Gr. W. 299, 47ss.) that Demosthenes could recite the whole of Thucydides' *Historiae* from memory, and Lucian (*adv. ind.* 4) claims that he copied out the whole text several times. Cf. also D. H. *Thuc.* 53. For a brief appraisal of the understanding of the relationship between the two in antiquity, see Egermann (1972), 601-2.
[7] Pearson (1976), 24-31; Yunis (1996), 240 ff.; Mader (2003)
[8] Pearson (1976), 26-27.
[9] *Ibid.*, 114-15.
[10] Yunis (1996), 268 ff. He focuses on the prooemia and *On the Crown*; Mader (2007) defends and buttresses Yunis's argument by showing how passages from the deliberative speeches can also be said to represent a Periclean *ethos*.
[11] Rowe (1968).
[12] Mader (2007).

interaction is taken to be more or less appropriative: Demosthenes found something he liked in Thucydides and used it for his own purposes. There is no suggestion that he was a very sensitive reader of his *Histories*, at least when it comes to content,[13] or that he developed his ideas in any significant way. The *ethos* of Pericles, according to Yunis, appealed to him, so he adopted it, and similarly Thucydides' various characterizations of Athens, according to Mader, were suitable for depicting a perverse world in which Philip is more like the Athenians of yore than the Athenians themselves. Other scholars have been even more dismissive of the content of Demosthenes' speeches. Wilamowitz in comparing him with Thucydides concluded,

> Thukydideische Gedankentiefe fehlt; ein Menschenkenner war er[Demosthenes] nicht, und voll von all den Vorurteilen, die einem attischen Advokaten anhaften mußten, der von Wissenschaft keine entfernte Ahnung je empfangen hatte.[14]

Parry, discussing the "Decline of the λόγος/ἔργον Distinction," claims that this distinction dropped out of use during the course of the 4th century after "Lysias reduces it to a mere device of style."[15] A distinction, then, that was fundamental to Thucydides' thought becomes by Demosthenes' day a mere *façon de parler*.

I would argue, however, that Demosthenes' response to Athens' crisis in the *Philippics* and *Olynthiacs* represents not only an appropriation of but also a deeper intellectual engagement and grappling with Thucydides' Athens. Adopting the *ethos* of the Thucydidean diagnostician, Demosthenes identifies the cause of its "disease" as a pathological development of a mental/voluntative capacity that was an essential characteristic of Athens in its golden age, namely its longing for invisible things and its ability to conceptualize and realize the attainment

[13] The relationship of his style, on the other hand, to that of Thucydides has since antiquity been assumed to be more dynamic. See for example D.H. *Dem.* 10.
[14] Wilamowitz (1911), 76.
[15] Parry (1981), 57.

of such things through language.[16] This becomes explicit in the *Third Olynthiac* when Demosthenes identifies and diagnoses the deterioration of this intellectual capacity.

Pericles in his eulogy of the Athenian character gives the following defense of their leisurely lifestyle:

> καίτοι εἰ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ πόνων μελέτῃ καὶ μὴ μετὰ νόμων τὸ πλέον ἢ τρόπων ἀνδρείας ἐθέλομεν κινδυνεύειν, περιγίγνεται ἡμῖν τοῖς τε μέλλουσιν ἀλγεινοῖς μὴ προκάμνειν, καὶ ἐς αὐτὰ ἐλθοῦσι μὴ ἀτολμοτέρους τῶν αἰεὶ μοχθούντων φαίνεσθαι, καὶ ἔν τε τούτοις τὴν πόλιν ἀξίαν εἶναι θαυμάζεσθαι καὶ ἔτι ἐν ἄλλοις.[17]

In spite of living a life of ease without strict regulation, the Athenians display their bravery no less when it counts, and this among other things should be a cause for wonderment. As Classen-Steup note, this is a bold claim:

> Die im Üebermass und bei verkehrter Anwendung bedenkliche ῥᾳθυμία (von Demosthenes so oft an den Athenern beklagt) ist hier, wie l. 8 ἀνειμένως, in dem Selbstgefühl der damit verbundenen tüchtigen Leistungen absichtlich als eine starke Bezeichnung des der spartanischen Engherzigkeit entgegenstehenden leichten Sinnes kühn gewählt.[18]

Pericles, by presenting the character trait as something deserving of wonder, indicates his consciousness of the strength but also of the latent danger of the claim. Ease remained an important part of the Athenian identity in the 4th century, as is suggested by Isocrates' somewhat awkward attempt to transvalue the trait:

> ὁρῶν[Evagoras] γὰρ τοὺς ἄριστα τῶν ὄντων ἐπιμελουμένους ἐλάχιστα λυπουμένους, καὶ τὰς ἀληθινὰς τῶν ῥᾳθυμιῶν οὐκ ἐν ταῖς ἀργίαις, ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς εὐπραγίαις καὶ καρτερίαις ἐνούσας, οὐδὲν ἀνεξέταστον παρέλειπεν.[19]

[16] In a recent dissertation which he shared with me through personal correspondence, Tobias Joho (2015) examined at length Thucydides' characterization of the Athenians' curious relation to the absent and the speculative. He focuses on the lead up to the Sicilian Expedition in particular.

[17] Thuc. 2.39: "And yet if with ease rather than with exercise in toils and not with laws more than with the character of bravery we want to make ventures, it remains for us not to be weary beforehand for the pains to come, and, when we have encountered the same situations, not to seem more cowardly than those who toil continually, and in this as well as in other respects the city is worthy of wonder."

[18] Classen-Steup (1889) *ad loc.*

[19] Isoc. 9.42: "For seeing that those who best manage their property suffer the least vexation, and that true ease lies not in absence of labor but in success and perseverance, he left nothing uninvestigated." Cf. [Dem.] 61.37: … ἐνθυμούμενον ὅτι διὰ μὲν ἀργίας καὶ ῥᾳθυμίας καὶ τὰ παντελῶς ἐπιπολῆς δυσχείρωτ' ἐστί, διὰ δὲ καρτερίας καὶ φιλοπονίας οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων ἀγαθῶν ἀνάλωτον πέφυκεν…

True ease lies in success and perseverance, not in inactivity. Pericles' bold claim to ease plain and simple and to a relaxed lifestyle has become a sort of peace of mind that results from successful and patient activity. The paradoxical quality of the characterization has been lost, but a claim to ease of some sort remains.

Demosthenes, by contrast, in his criticism of the ῥαθυμία the Athenians displayed in the war with Philip does not attempt a transvaluation, nor does he simply reject or negate the ideal. Instead, he substitutes something like a negative image, although, insofar as the trait is characterized as something interstitial whereby the Athenians exist somewhere between reality and fantasy, image is perhaps not the right term.

In the *First Olynthiac* he expresses his fear that the war with Philip will reach Athens itself:

> ἀλλὰ μήν, εἰ τοῦτο γενήσεται[the war will come to Attica], δέδοικα, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὥσπερ οἱ δανειζόμενοι ῥᾳδίως ἐπὶ τοῖς τόκοις μεγάλοις μικρὸν εὐπορήσαντες χρόνον ὕστερον καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἀπέστησαν, οὕτω καὶ ἡμεῖς {ἂν} ἐπὶ πολλῷ φανῶμεν ἐρρᾳθυμηκότες, καὶ ἅπαντα πρὸς ἡδονὴν ζητοῦντες πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ ὧν οὐκ ἠβουλόμεθα ὕστερον εἰς ἀνάγκην ἔλθωμεν ποιεῖν, καὶ κινδυνεύσωμεν περὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ χώρᾳ.[20]

Like men who recklessly take out high-interest loans and live on credit, the Athenians continue to squander resources on a life of leisure even though a large debt of "interest" is accruing from the war with Philip. But it is not as though they are completely unaware of this or in denial of it; for they toss around grand ideas of massive mercenary forces (μυρίους … δισμυρίους ξένους[21]), and they send out forces on paper(τὰς ἐπιστολιμαίους ταύτας δυνάμεις[22]). Further, they play war with their clay soldiers:

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[20] Dem. 1.15: "But indeed, if this happens, I am afraid, men of Athens, that, in the same way as those who recklessly take out loans at high interest, after they they've thrived for a little while, lose afterwards even their original property, so we too would clearly prove to have been at ease at a great price, and (I'm afraid that), in seeking all things with a view to pleasure, later we may be compelled to do many of the hard things we don't wish to, and that we may risk things in our own land."

[21] Dem. 4.19.

[22] Dem. 4.19. Cf. 4.45: ὅποι δ' ἂν στρατηγὸν καὶ ψήφισμα κενὸν καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος ἐλπίδας ἐκπέμψητε …

> οἱ λοιποὶ τὰς πομπὰς πέμπουσιν ὑμῖν μετὰ τῶν ἱεροποιῶν· ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ πλάττοντες τοὺς πηλίνους, εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν χειροτονεῖτε τοὺς ταξιάρχους καὶ τοὺς φυλάρχους, οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸν πόλεμον.[23]

But it is not enough to say that the Athenians have simply become lazy; for they are actively engaged in a war—an imaginary one. They literally parade their power before themselves and send out expeditions that contain no citizens. This represents a complete inversion of Thucydides' Athenians, who considered "nothing a festival besides doing what is necessary."[24]

In an attempt to explain this odd behavior, Demosthenes refers to a way of conceptualizing present versus absent things that was distinctive of the Athenians in Thucydides. According to the Athenian ambassador who speaks in Book One, the Athenians regard any projected acquisition as already belonging to themselves, and the things they anticipate for the future are always immense in relation to what is present:

> καὶ ἃ μὲν ἂν ἐπινοήσαντες μὴ ἐπεξέλθωσιν, οἰκείων στέρεσθαι ἡγοῦνται, ἃ δ' ἂν ἐπελθόντες κτήσωνται, ὀλίγα πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα τυχεῖν πράξαντες.[25]

The city of Athens itself is rarely present for them, and as an idea it is always in need of further expansion: ἀποδημηταὶ [the Athenians] πρὸς ἐνδημοτάτους [the Spartans]· οἴονται γὰρ οἱ μὲν τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ ἄν τι κτᾶσθαι …[26] Demosthenes' Athenians too do not live in the present, but they also do not live in the future:

> νῦν δὲ τὸ μὲν παρὸν ἀεὶ προϊέμενοι, τὰ δὲ μέλλοντα αὐτόματα οἰόμενοι σχήσειν καλῶς, ηὐξήσαμεν, ᾧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, Φίλιππον ἡμεῖς …[27]

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[23] Dem. 4.26: "The rest (of the officials) conduct processions for you together with the overseers of sacred rites; for just like those who fashion clay soldiers you assign your *taxiarchs* and *phylarchs* by vote to the market place, not to the war."
[24] Thuc. 1.70.8: τὸ... μήτε ἑορτὴν ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ τὰ δέοντα πρᾶξαι ...
[25] Thuc. 1.70.7: "And whatever they fail to accomplish after having set their minds on it they believe they are robbed of, and with respect to whatever they obtain through pursuit, they think they have actually done little with respect to the things to come."
[26] Thuc. 1.70.4.
[27] Dem. 1.9: "But now, abandoning in every case what is present, and thinking that the things to come will turn out well of their own accord, we, men of Athens, have caused Philip's power to grow."

The substantivized singular neuter participle, especially in contrast with the plural used in the second part of the antithesis (τὰ ... μέλλοντα), makes the expression salient.[28] The Athenians neglect present opportunities, and they expect that everything will just work itself out. Just what then are they doing? Instead of dealing with critical matters of foreign policy and attempting to expand their influence, they devote themselves to urban renewal:

> ἢ φρασάτω τις ἐμοὶ παρελθών, πόθεν ἄλλοθεν ἰσχυρὸς γέγονεν ἢ παρ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν Φίλιππος. ἀλλ', ὦ τᾶν, εἰ ταῦτα φαύλως, τά γ' ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει νῦν ἄμεινον ἔχει. καὶ τί ἂν εἰπεῖν τις ἔχοι; τὰς ἐπάλξεις ἃς κονιῶμεν, καὶ τὰς ὁδοὺς ἃς ἐπισκευάζομεν, καὶ κρήνας, καὶ λήρους;[29]

Whereas Thucydides' Athenians were always abroad expanding their empire, Demosthenes' spend all their time in the city adding frivolous new amenities. The mentality implied by the picture here is reminiscent of the man living on credit from the *First Olynthiac*: the life the Athenians are living, the building projects in which they are engaged are detached from the reality threatening them. Thucydides' Athenians too detached themselves from reality, but it was in an effort to produce a new one in which ever more absent things become present. This visionary capacity has in Demosthenes devolved from engagement with the future through imaginative anticipation into child's play with toy soldiers and buildings.

Parallel with this intellectual decadence is the change in relationship between λόγος and ἔργον in Demosthenes' Athenians. Mader, following Parry's reading of Thucydides, according to which Periclean Athens was distinguished by "a dynamic harmony of λόγος and ἔργον,"[30] argues that in the *First Philippic* the Athenians are characterized by a "*disjunction* of deliberation and

[28] There are only three instances of substantive τὸ παρόν not being governed by a prepositional phrase among the orators (Aeschin. 3.223, Dem. 8.13, Dem. 18.192). The use of the neuter singular of participles as abstract substantives is associated with Thucydides in particular. See Pritchett (1975), 92 for discussion and bibliography.
[29] Dem.3.28-9: "Or let someone come forward and point out to me from what other source Philip has become strong than from us. 'But, good sir, if these matters aren't in a good way, those in the city itself at least have improved." And what could one say? The battlements we're plastering and the roads we're building, and the springs, and trash?"
[30] Parry (1981), 131.

action"[31] in which "Words have become for a substitute for action."[32] While Mader's argument well accounts for some of Demosthenes' characterizations of the relationship between the two among contemporary Athenians, there is more to the situation and its potential resolution than disjunction and substitution. The dynamic harmony that Thucydides asserts existed in Pericles' day is difficult to conceptualize, and accordingly its becoming discordant is equally difficult and complex.

As Mader claims, sometimes it is a matter of simple substitution of word for action. In the *First Philippic* Demosthenes tells the Assembly that they will vote for his proposal in order to wage war with Philip "not only in decrees and letters but also in deed,"[33] and in the preamble of the *Second* this criticism is elaborated upon at length and brought to a point in the sardonic claim that the Athenians and Philip each prosper in their respective pursuits, the Athenians in words, Philip in deeds.[34] At other times, however, it is not that the Athenians are formulating a proper course of action but then not following through with it; rather, their deliberation itself is askew. In the opening words of the *Third Olynthiac*, Demosthenes criticizes the sort of wild proposals about getting vengeance on Philip that were being bandied about:

> Οὐχὶ ταὐτὰ παρίσταταί μοι γιγνώσκειν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅταν τε εἰς τὰ πράγματα ἀποβλέψω καὶ ὅταν πρὸς τοὺς λόγους οὓς ἀκούω· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ λόγους περὶ τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι Φίλιππον ὁρῶ γιγνομένους, τὰ δὲ πράγματα εἰς τοῦτο προήκοντα, ὥστε ὅπως μὴ πεισόμεθα αὐτοὶ πρότερον κακῶς σκέψασθαι δέον. οὐδὲν οὖν ἄλλο μοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγοντες ἢ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, περὶ ἧς βουλεύεσθε, οὐχὶ τὴν οὖσαν παριστάντες ὑμῖν ἁμαρτάνειν.[35]

[31] Mader (2003), 66.
[32] *Ibid.* fn. 34.
[33] Dem. 4.30: ἵνα μὴ μόνον ἐν τοῖς ψηφίσμασι καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς πολεμῆτε Φιλίππῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις.
[34] Dem. 6.4.
[35] Dem. 3.1: "I don't come to the same conclusions, men of Athens, when I look at our affairs and when (I consider) the speeches that I hear; for I see the speeches being made about avenging Philip, but that matters have reached the point that we must take care that we ourselves not suffer first. Accordingly, those who say such things seem to me to do nothing other than miss the mark in putting before you a subject for deliberation that does not exist."

Counsel is formulated without any regard for political reality, and speakers are presenting proposals on situations that do not even exist. Similarly, in the *First Philippic* Demosthenes criticizes the Athenians for always making resolutions that are far too ambitious and costly and then as a result never following through on them. The hypothetical proposal he rejects is a force of a ten or twenty thousand mercenaries; his own proposal is for a mere two thousand.[36] The disparity highlights just how outlandish deliberations had become. Later in the same speech, twice in quick succession he mocks the Athenians for sending out mere hopes (…τὰς παρὰ τοῦ δεῖνος ἐλπίδας ἂν ἀποστείλητε… and …τὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος ἐλπίδας ἐκπέμψητε…).[37] Instead of actual forces they send out words and ideas and somehow expect them to become reality. This confidence in the performative power of language represents a pathological development of a distinctive ability of Thucydides' Athenians. Whereas for the latter hoping and speculating could not be divorced from attaining (μόνοι γὰρ ἔχουσί τε ὁμοίως καὶ ἐλπίζουσιν ἃ ἂν ἐπινοήσωσι[38]), for the former there is no possibility of attainment, and expectation has no relationship whatsoever with reality.

One cause of this change is the Athenians' refusal to participate actively in their military campaigns. A distinguishing character trait of Pericles' Athenians is that the same men carry out their plans as formulate them.[39] Presumably one of the major reasons for the parity between their anticipations and actualizations is the fact that the former are conditioned by their hands-on involvement in battles and military affairs. Demosthenes' Athenians, by contrast, are distinguished by their persistent refusal to go on campaign, indeed, as he twice exclaims, by their

[36] Dem. 4.19-20.
[37] Dem. 4.43 and 45, respectively.
[38] Thuc. 1.70.7.
[39] Thuc. 2.40.3: διαφερόντως γὰρ δὴ καὶ τόδε ἔχομεν ὥστε τολμᾶν τε οἱ αὐτοὶ μάλιστα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἐπιχειρήσομεν ἐκλογίζεσθαι.

refusal even to get moving.[40] Instead, they insist on deploying mercenary forces.[41] As a result, their deliberations are not conditioned by any direct contact with the war at all, and so they talk of ten thousand soldiers when they should be sending out a quarter of that number, and they make wild claims about avenging Philip when they should be deliberating about how to not get annihilated themselves.

Another cause concerns the interstitial mentality of the Athenians. It has been argued that the *ethos* Demosthenes adopts in his deliberative speeches was strongly influenced by that of Pericles as portrayed by Thucydides.[42] I would argue that another ethical mode he takes from him is that of the diagnostician. His proposals are presented as "cures" for what is ailing the Athenians, and in *On the False Embassy* he presents an extended "pathology" of the prevalence of traitors throughout Greece.[43] His diagnosis of the Athenians is that they are stuck in some sort of in-between state which is figured in different ways. In the *First Olynthiac* they are men living on credit; in the *Third* they are patients existing in a physiological state between sickness and health.[44] The λήμματα referred to in that passage are the Theoric Fund and processions at the Boedromia. Between the two poles of vigorous good health, which presumably consists in actually participating in foreign affairs in some capacity, and complete annihilation, the Athenians are content to play life and play war. Similarly, in the *Fourth Philippic* Demosthenes compares them to men in a drug-induced sleep: ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἀνεγερθῆναι δυνάμεθα, ἀλλὰ μανδραγόραν πεπωκόσιν ἤ τι φάρμακον ἄλλο τοιοῦτον ἐοίκαμεν ἀνθρώποις.[45] In more general

[40] Dem. 8.37, 9.5.
[41] Dem. 3.35, 4.19. cf.10.20.
[42] Yunis (1996), 268 ff. Mader (2007a).
[43] See pgs. 221-2 for further discussion.
[44] Dem. 3.33: Ἐὰν οὖν ἀλλὰ νῦν γ' ἔτι ἀπαλλαγέντες τούτων τῶν ἐθῶν ἐθελήσητε στρατεύεσθαί τε καὶ πράττειν ἀξίως ὑμῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ ταῖς περιουσίαις ταῖς οἴκοι ταύταις ἀφορμαῖς ἐπὶ τὰ ἔξω τῶν ἀγαθῶν χρῆσθαι, ἴσως ἄν, ἴσως, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τέλειόν τι καὶ μέγα κτήσαισθ' ἀγαθὸν καὶ τῶν τοιούτων λημμάτων ἀπαλλαγείητε, ἃ τοῖς [ἀσθενοῦσι] παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν σιτίοις [διδομένοις] ἔοικε. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖν' οὔτ' ἰσχὺν ἐντίθησιν οὔτ' ἀποθνῄσκειν ἐᾷ·
[45] Dem. 10.6: "But we cannot even get up, but we are like men who have drunk mandragora or some such drug."

terms, he twice describes them as having become separated from affairs in their judgements (… ἀπηρτημένοι … ταῖς γνώμαις…[46]/ ταῖς γνώμαις ὑμεῖς ἀφεστήκατε τῶν πραγμάτων[47]). The Athenians, then, are physically separated from events by mercenaries, and psychologically by festivals and entertainment. The latter, as Demosthenes asserts, is actually a consequence of the former:

> ἔστι δ' οὐδέποτ', οἶμαι, μέγα καὶ νεανικὸν φρόνημα λαβεῖν μικρὰ καὶ φαῦλα πράττοντας· ὁποῖ' ἄττα γὰρ ἂν τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ᾖ, τοιοῦτον ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ φρόνημα ἔχειν.[48]

This passage, I would argue, is critical for understanding Demosthenes' relationship to Thucydides and his political thought more generally. In combining νεανικόν, which refers to vigor and here young and impetuous thought, with φρόνημα, the activity of the intellect, he highlights precisely what he has been saying is now lacking in the Athenians: activity and will. The phrase he uses here may be an allusion to the following lines from Euripides' *Antiope* in which Zethos, advocate of the practical life, censures his brother Amphion for pursuing the contemplative life:[49]

> ... ἀμελεῖς ὦν <σε φροντίζειν ἐχρῆν·>
> ψυχῆς φύσιν <γὰρ> ὦδε γενναίαν <λαχὼν>
> γυναικομίμῳ διαπρέπεις μορφώματι
> ..... κοὔτ' ἂν ἀσπίδος κύτει
> <καλῶς> ὁμιλήσειας οὔτ' ἄλλων ὕπερ
> νεανικὸν βούλευμα βουλεύσαιό <τι>.[50]

[46] Dem. 4.12.
[47] Dem. 10.1.
[48] Dem. 3.32: "It is never, I think, possible for men doing small and paltry things to seize a great and youthful thought; for by necessity of whatever sort men's pursuits are, so also is their thought." A similar sentiment can be found in La Rochefoucauld's *Maxime* 41: "Ceux qui s'appliquent trop aux petites choses deviennent ordinairement incapables des grandes."
[49] For this reconstruction see Dodds (1959) on Pl. Grg. 485e.
[50] Eur. fr. 185: "You do not care about what you should; for, having received a soul of so noble a nature, you resemble the form of a woman.... and neither would you nobly join ranks in the hollow of a shield, nor would you on behalf of others give any young and vigorous counsel."

These lines had already been repurposed by Plato in the *Gorgias*,[51] which suggests that the play may have been well-known. Further, the context is similar to the situation Demosthenes presents in the *Third Olynthiac*: the Athenians are wrapped up in aesthetic pleasures and are not paying heed to the things they should. However, his use of φρόνημα as opposed to βούλευμα is significant. The latter refers more to the will than to a mindset. Demosthenes, however, is concerned not only with the Athenians' lack of will but with the degradation of the mental capacities exemplified by Thucydides' Athenians. They are not engaged in great actions and so are not thinking great thoughts. The disturbance that has arisen in the λόγος/ἔργον relationship is traced back to ἔργον. A harmony of sorts still obtains between the two, but it is an unpleasant one. The antithesis is refigured as a continuum determined by the nature of the ἔργα in question: Poor ἔργον leads to poor λόγος leads to poor ἔργον and so on. Correcting the situation is not merely a matter of backing up words with actions; rather, the actions themselves have to be altered first before proper words and thoughts can be formulated. Thucydides' Athenians were always abroad expanding their empire (καὶ μὴν καὶ ἄοκνοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς μελλητὰς καὶ ἀποδημηταὶ πρὸς ἐνδημοτάτους), and accordingly their thoughts were restlessly expansionist. Demosthenes' Athenians still participate in the war by sending out mercenary forces, but they do so while they themselves sit at home watching plays and festival processions. Accordingly, their thoughts, their λόγοι occupy an awkward interstitial space that has no firm connection with reality.

[51] Pl. *Grg*. 485e-486a.

2. Isocrates

A. The *Archidamus*

Attempts to gauge Isocrates' influence on Demosthenes have typically been made on a very general level. Beginning in antiquity with the story recorded by Plutarch that Demosthenes secretly obtained the *techne* of Isocrates,[52] a consensus has developed that, despite their vast political and literary differences, Isocrates exerted a great influence on Demosthenes, though there is disagreement as to whether it was as great as that of Thucydides: while Blass claimed that Isocrates had more influence than either Isaeus or Thucydides, Usher considers Thucydides more significant, especially for the public speeches.[53] There are some scholars, however, who would deny any real influence to Isocrates. Easterling and Knox make the following contrast between the two:

> The contrast between Isocrates and Demosthenes in thought is as great as in style. Indeed, they share little but a love for Athens and some of her traditions. Isocrates is a closet orator; Demosthenes a fighter in the courts and the assembly. Isocrates' works tend to respond to long-term trends; he had witnessed much of Greek history. Demosthenes reacts to the needs of the hour.[54]

Although the two are polar opposites in many ways, there are several problems with this assessment. First, it is based on a reductive, monolithic reading of Isocrates which views all of his speeches under the light of his most epideictic ones: while the thought and style of, say, the *Panegyricus* and the *Third Olynthiac* are indeed vastly different, this is much less true, as we will see, for the *Archidamus*, which is a pseudo-deliberative speech. Secondly, in characterizing Demosthenes as the rough and tumble fighter who reacts to pressing crises, it relies on a stereotypical portrait which neglects the ways in which he, too, attempts to address "long-term

[52] Plut. *Dem.* 5.
[53] Blass (1893) II, 212 ; Usher (1999), 193. For the significance of Isocrates' influence on Demosthenes, see also Pickard-Cambridge (1914), 25 and Jebb (1893) II, 68.
[54] Easterling and Knox (1985) 513.

trends." The fact that a work is occasional does not necessarily mean that it cannot also have a more general purview.

In order to get a more concrete idea of the relationship between the two, I will examine Demosthenes' use of material from one of Isocrates' speeches in particular, the *Archidamus*, a pseudo-deliberative speech written in the voice of the eponymous prince of Sparta advising his state to maintain control of Messene at all costs. Connections between this speech and certain passages from Demosthenes' oratory have been recognized since antiquity: Hermogenes noted that the proem of the *First Philippic* was a reworking of that of the *Archidamus*,[55] and Blass noted Demosthenes' reuse of a *gnome* from the speech.[56] However, the extent of the influence has not yet been realized, and Blass only mentions it in passing. Besides engaging with the argumentation of the speech, Demosthenes also, as we will see, made significant use of its ethical posture. Accordingly, I would argue that it represents an ideal locus for understanding the nature of Isocrates' influence. Further, the intertextuality has significant implications for the experience of the 4th century reader in particular. For it would have complicated his response to two of Demosthenes' most significant political positions, namely his justifications for Athens' resistance to Philip and for the policy that led to defeat at Chaeronea.

My analysis of the relationship between the *Archidamus* and Demosthenes' speeches will be organized according the structure of the former: the first argument in the *Archidamus* Demosthenes that alludes to will be discussed first, the second second, etc. In some cases the arguments I discuss are traditional *topoi,* which complicates the nature of the intertextual link. However, because it is clear that Demosthenes read and became intimately familiar with this

[55] Hermog. *Id.* 2.384.
[56] Blass (1893) II, 290 and fn. 1.

speech, his knowledge of the *topoi* in question would have at least been mediated by Isocrates' use of them. Further, as I discussed at the beginning of this chapter, readers would have been reading texts side-by-side with one another to compare each author's rhetorical approach, and in this process the ultimate origin of the *topos* would have been of less interest than the relation between the two orators' handling of it.

As I discussed in the section of my chapter on structure devoted to the *First Philippic* (pg. 139), Demosthenes' reworking of the proem of the *Archidamus* in that speech represents part of a broader structural strategy. The audience is meant to perceive the compression and abridgment as a counterpoint to the Isocratean mode and to all the speakers who have repeatedly given counsel on the issue without making any headway. This suits the argument and *ethos* of the proem, in which Demosthenes presents himself as a young man who would prefer to let older men speak first but who feels compelled to break with tradition because the issue has been discussed several times already without any resolution. In reworking this passage, then, he displays an implicit antagonism with Isocrates while at the same time embracing his ethical posture and, to some degree, his rhetorical strategy.

There are many arguments from the *Archidamus* that Demosthenes reworks in his deliberative speeches. Archidamus tells the Spartans that they should not be more lax in deliberating about their fatherland than they are about other things.[57] In the *First Olynthiac*, Demosthenes tells the Athenians that, if they had displayed the same earnestness for their own cause that they did for bringing aid to the Euboeans, they would be in possession of Amphipolis.[58] After arguing that the states that have abandoned Sparta will eventually return to

[57] Isoc. 6.52: ... χρὴ... μηδὲ ῥᾳθυμότερον ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων φανῆναι βουλευομένους.
[58] Dem. 1.8. Cf. Dem. 2.24.

aid her, Archidamus asserts that, even if the city does not receive aid from anywhere, he would rather endure all the dangers of war than agree to any of the proposed concessions.[59] In the *Third Philippic* a similar argument is expressed in hyperbolic form: τεθνάναι δὲ μυριάκις κρεῖττον ἢ κολακείᾳ τι ποιῆσαι Φιλίππου.[60] Here both Isocrates' influence and the difference between his manner and that of Demosthenes is strikingly apparent. Archidamus nobly but in a restrained way expresses his resolve even to endure the perils of war before sacrificing his principles, while Demosthenes imagines himself dying ten thousand times before sacrificing his. Later in the speech, Archidamus says that Sparta must remain true to the principles upon which the city was founded and that, while no one would criticize the Epidaureans or Corinthians or Phliasians for thinking of nothing but their survival, this is not possible for Sparta, which cannot seek salvation without maintaining its glory (εὐδοξία).[61] In the *Second Philippic*, Demosthenes claims that Philip knew, based on the actions of their ancestors, that, while the Thebans and Argives would agree to ally themselves with him against the Greeks out of self-interest, the Athenians would refuse to disgrace themselves (ἀδοξίαν ... φεύγοντες) by abandoning their traditional role as defender of Greece.[62] In Isocrates the argument is short and general: one expects these states to act basely, but for Sparta this is impossible. By Demosthenes it is expanded and made more concrete by reference to specific incidents in Thebes' history. Further, it is speculatively made part of the thought process of Philip when he went to choose an ally.

Another indicator of Demosthenes' familiarity with the *Archidamus* is, as Blass noted,[63] the recurrence of a gnomic statement from that speech in the *Second Olynthiac*. However, the

[59] Isoc. 6.70: Τοσοῦτον δ' ἀπέχω τοῦ ποιῆσαί τι τῶν προσταττομένων, ὥστ' εἰ μηδὲν γίγνοιτο τούτων μηδὲ βοηθείας μηδαμόθεν τυγχάνοιμεν, ἀλλὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων οἱ μὲν ἀδικοῖεν ἡμᾶς, οἱ δὲ περιορῷεν, οὐδ' ἂν οὕτω μεταγνοίην, ἀλλὰ πάντας ἂν τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ πολέμου κινδύνους ὑπομείναιμι πρὶν ποιήσασθαι τὰς ὁμολογίας ταύτας.
[60] Dem. 9.65: "It is better to die ten thousand times than to do anything to flatter Philip."
[61] Isoc. 6.91.
[62] Dem. 6.8-12.
[63] Blass (1893) II, 193.

significance of the changes Demosthenes makes to the gnome have not been recognized. These changes, I would argue, illuminate with particular clarity the relationship between the two. After admonishing the Spartans to remember how their ancestors nobly responded to adversity at Dipaea and Thermopylae, Archidamus says that it is in such crises that good men must distinguish themselves. To justify this claim, he makes the following gnomic statement:

> αἱ μὲν γὰρ εὐτυχίαι καὶ τοῖς φαύλοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὰς κακίας συγκρύπτουσιν, αἱ δὲ δυσπραξίαι ταχέως καταφανεῖς ποιοῦσιν ὁποῖοί τινες ἕκαστοι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες.[64]

In good Isocratean fashion, the gnome is a neat antithesis between good and bad fortune, and there is nothing jarring. Contrast with this Demosthenes' articulation of the same idea with reference to Philip's success:

> αἱ γὰρ εὐπραξίαι δειναὶ συγκρύψαι τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνείδη· εἰ δέ [Philip] τι πταίσει, τότε ἀκριβῶς αὐτοῦ ταῦτα ἐξετασθήσεται.[65]

With regard to the first part of the gnome, the unexceptional personification of good fortune in Isocrates has become insidious in Demosthenes, as if successes are actively plotting to conceal weakness. Formally it smacks more of tragedy or Thucydides than of Isocrates. With respect to the second part, there is a jolting shift from the universal back to Philip in particular.[66] This creates a strong coherence between what is generally the case and what will happen with respect to Philip in particular. Butcher characterized Demosthenes' distinctive manner of expounding principles in the following way:

> In Demosthenes the principle gradually emerges from the facts. It is not supplied as a thing ready made. The orator stimulates and provokes his hearers to reflection; they and he must reason together till the truth seems to spring from the contact of their minds. As the facts are presented first on one side then on another, the illuminating principle breaks in.[67]

[64] Isoc. 6.102: "Good fortune conceals vices even for base men, but misfortune quickly makes clear of what sort each person really is."
[65] Dem. 2.20: "For successes are good at hiding such reproaches; but if he makes a mistake, then these matters for reproach will be carefully scrutinized."
[66] To deal with this in translation, Vince (1926) puts the first part of the gnome in parentheses.
[67] Butcher (1881), 154.

In the gnome in question the principle is expounded in an even more radical way; for, by expressing the second part of the Isocratean antithesis as a prediction about Philip rather than as a statement about misfortune in general, Demosthenes elides the line between the universal and the particular.

The most significant influence the *Archidamus* had on Demosthenes can be seen in his reformulation of a paradoxical argument from the speech in *On the Crown* (§199-205). Indeed, this argument can be said to have helped shape his perspective on Athenian political identity at two of the most critical moments in his political career. Further, the "appropriative" nature of the argument has profound implications particularly for the reading experience of one of the most famous passages from *On the Crown*. Usher, following Dionysius of Halicarnassus, argues in his commentary that in composing this passage Demosthenes was strongly influenced by epideictic oratory, funeral orations in particular, and Yunis connects it with tragedy.[68] While both of these claims are certainly true, I would argue that the *Archidamus* exerted an even greater influence on the content and tone of these passages.

Archidamus criticizes those speakers who would propose any sort of peace that would involve giving up Messene and thereby incurring dishonor; for it is better to die with their reputation intact than to live in the ignominy they would incur from being subservient.[69] He then concludes this argument with the following consciously bold assertion:

> Ὅλως δ' εἰ δεῖ μηδὲν ὑποστειλάμενον εἰπεῖν, αἱρετώτερον ἡμῖν ἐστιν ἀναστάτοις γενέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ καταγελάστοις ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν. Τοὺς γὰρ ἐν ἀξιώμασιν καὶ φρονήμασιν τηλικούτοις βεβιωκότας δυοῖν δεῖ θάτερον, ἢ πρωτεύειν ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἢ παντάπασιν ἀνηρῆσθαι μηδὲν ταπεινὸν διαπραξαμένους, ἀλλὰ καλὴν τὴν τελευτὴν τοῦ βίου ποιησαμένους.[70]

[68] Usher (1993), 241 ff.; Yunis (2000).
[69] Isoc. 6.88-89.
[70] Isoc 6.89: "Altogether, if I must hold nothing back, we must choose to be destroyed rather than become a laughing-stock to our enemies. For those who have spent their lives in such dignity and in such high thoughts must choose one of two things, either to be first among the Greeks or to be annihilated completely having done nothing base, but having made the end of their lives noble."

Archidamus is not going to sugar coat anything; the Spartans should prefer annihilation to disgrace. The situation is then presented as an ultimatum: either be the best of the Greeks, or be altogether destroyed without doing anything shameful. Note that he chooses an especially strong expression for complete annihilation (παντάπασιν ἀνῃρῆσθαι). His counsel is presented not as that which will necessarily lead to success, as that which is expedient, but rather as the only possible course of action for the Spartans if they are to retain their honor, even if it leads to destruction. In his attempt in *On the Crown* to justify his policy of resistance to Philip which ultimately led to the disastrous defeat at Chaeronea, Demosthenes too begins with an apology: βούλομαί τι καὶ παράδοξον εἰπεῖν.[71] His choice of a stronger form of preface (τι ...παράδοξον vs. μηδὲν ὑποστειλάμενον) stems from the fact that he is making Archidamus' argument retro- as opposed to pro-spectively: it is one thing to say that ultimate failure is possibly necessary beforehand, but quite another after thousands are dead. Even if the city, Demosthenes proceeds to assert, had known beforehand the things to come, not even then should it have tried to avoid them (οὐδ' οὕτως ἀποστατέον τῇ πόλει τούτων ἦν[72]), if at least it was to take into account its reputation, ancestors, and posterity.

To justify his position, Archidamus proceeds to highlight the difference between Sparta and the rest of the Greek city-states:

> Περὶ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν οὐχ ὁμοίως ἅπασιν βουλευτέον, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἕκαστοι τοῦ βίου ποιήσωνται τὴν ὑπόθεσιν …. Λακεδαιμονίους δ' οὐχ οἷόν τ' ἐστὶν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου ζητεῖν τὴν σωτηρίαν, ἀλλ' ἂν μὴ προσῇ τὸ καλῶς τῷ σώζεσθαι, τὸν θάνατον ἡμῖν μετ' εὐδοξίας αἱρετέον ἐστίν.[73]

[71] Dem. 18.199: "I even want to say something paradoxical."
[72] Dem. 18.199. Yunis (2001) *ad loc.* claims that τούτων refers to Demosthenes' policy. Although I agree in part, I do not see why it cannot refer both to the policy and to its tragic consequences.
[73] Isoc. 6.90-91: "For concerning the same subjects not all men should hold the same counsel, but they must do so in accordance with the way each establish the basis for their lives in the beginning…. And it is not possible for the Spartans to seek salvation in any way whatsoever, but if noble means are not present in addition to salvation, we must choose death with glorious reputation instead."

Spartans must deliberate in accordance with their ancestral character, traditions, and principles. This means that honor and reputation must be the determining factor in any given situation: if the state cannot be saved while preserving these, death must be chosen instead. Similarly, Demosthenes says of preferring a disgraceful peace to risk on behalf of what is noble,

> ἀλλ' οὐκ ἦν ταῦθ', ὡς ἔοικε, τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις πάτρια οὐδ' ἀνεκτὰ οὐδ' ἔμφυτα, οὐδ' ἠδυνήθη πώποτε τὴν πόλιν οὐδεὶς ἐκ παντὸς τοῦ χρόνου πεῖσαι τοῖς ἰσχύουσι μέν, μὴ δίκαια δὲ πράττουσι προσθεμένην ἀσφαλῶς δουλεύειν, ἀλλ' ἀγωνιζομένη περὶ πρωτείων καὶ τιμῆς καὶ δόξης κινδυνεύουσα πάντα τὸν αἰῶνα διατετέλεκε.[74]

The founding principle Archidamus referred to had already been discussed at length previously in the speech (§59), so he does not need to repeat it. Demosthenes, by contrast, expatiates at length on what the traditional principles of Athens are, and, following the tricolon as this explanation does, it represents the climax of a much more impassioned presentation of the same basic idea.

Archidamus then adds that a state's policy decisions are actually a better indicator of its character than its success or failure in war for the following reason: Τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐκεῖ γιγνομένων τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος τῇ τύχῃ μέτεστιν, τὸ δ' ἐνθάδε γνωσθὲν αὐτῆς τῆς διανοίας σημεῖόν ἐστιν.[75] Demosthenes uses this argument relatively earlier when he contrasts the consequences of the policy Athens actually pursued with a shameful hypothetical:

> νῦν μέν γε ἀποτυχεῖν δοκεῖ τῶν πραγμάτων, ὃ πᾶσι κοινόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις ὅταν τῷ θεῷ ταῦτα δοκῇ· τότε δ' ἀξιοῦσα προεστάναι τῶν ἄλλων, εἶτ' ἀποστᾶσα τούτου Φιλίππῳ, προδεδωκέναι πάντας ἂν ἔσχεν αἰτίαν.[76]

Just as Archidamus imagines the possibility of the Spartans following the right counsel but still

[74] Dem. 18.203: "But these things were not, as it seems, men of Athens, ancestral nor endurable nor innate, nor was anyone ever able to persuade the city to be subservient securely in attaching itself to those who are strong but who do not act justly; rather, it has spent its whole history competing and running risks for the highest prestige and for honor and glory."
[75] Isoc. 6. 94.
[76] Dem. 18.200: "As things stand now, it seems that we happen to have suffered failure in our endeavors, which is common to all mankind whenever God so decrees. But the city would have incurred shame had she thought it right to lead the rest but then, yielding this to Philip, to betray everyone." For the translation of νῦν μὲν ... τότε δὲ, see Goodwin (1901) *ad loc.*

being defeated due to bad fortune in battle, so Demosthenes asserts that the Athenians have maintained their honor while suffering defeat due to an inscrutable divine will. Later in the speech, this will be connected with misfortune in battle in particular when he claims that *he* was not defeated by Philip's calculation but rather the allied generals and forces were defeated by fortune.[77]

To stress further the importance of the city's as opposed to the individual's reputation, Archidamus expresses his astonishment at those who are more concerned about the latter:

> Θαυμάζω δὲ τῶν ὑπὲρ μὲν τῆς ἰδίας δόξης ἀποθνῄσκειν ἐθελόντων, ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς κοινῆς μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν γνώμην ἐχόντων· ὑπὲρ ἧς ὁτιοῦν πάσχειν ἄξιον ὥστε μὴ καταισχῦναι τὴν πόλιν, μηδὲ περιιδεῖν τὴν τάξιν λιποῦσαν εἰς ἣν οἱ πατέρες κατέστησαν αὐτήν.[78]

In Demosthenes the contrast undergoes significant alteration, and it is presented from the perspective of an Athenian from the Golden Age before he proceeds to explain it in his own voice:

> ἡγεῖτο γὰρ αὐτῶν ἕκαστος οὐχὶ τῷ πατρὶ καὶ τῇ μητρὶ μόνον γεγενῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ πατρίδι. διαφέρει δὲ τί; ὅτι ὁ μὲν τοῖς γονεῦσι μόνον γεγενῆσθαι νομίζων τὸν τῆς εἱμαρμένης καὶ τὸν αὐτόματον θάνατον περιμένει, ὁ δὲ καὶ τῇ πατρίδι, ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ ταύτην ἐπιδεῖν δουλεύουσαν ἀποθνῄσκειν ἐθελήσει, καὶ φοβερωτέρας ἡγήσεται τὰς ὕβρεις καὶ τὰς ἀτιμίας, ἃς ἐν δουλευούσῃ τῇ πόλει φέρειν ἀνάγκη, τοῦ θανάτου.[79]

The change in perspective is due to Demosthenes' attempt here to trace his policy back to the principles of Athens' greatest heroes, as becomes explicit in the following section. On the one hand Isocrates' contrast is clearer. For Demosthenes says that the man who believes he is born just in the interest of his parents is content to wait around until he dies a natural death, but this

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[77] Dem. 18.300: οὐδέ γ' ἠττήθην ἐγὼ τοῖς λογισμοῖς Φιλίππου, πολλοῦ γε καὶ δεῖ, οὐδὲ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς, ἀλλ' οἱ τῶν συμμάχων στρατηγοὶ καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις τῇ τύχῃ.

[78] Isoc. 6.93: "I am amazed at those who are willing to die in pursuit of private fame, but who do not have the same judgement when it comes to the fame of the city; on behalf of this it is worthy to suffer anything whatsoever so as not to bring the city shame and so as not to shut one's eyes to it having abandoned the post at which our fathers placed it."

[79] Dem. 18.205: "For each of them believed that he had been born not for his father and mother alone, but also for his fatherland. What is the difference? That the man who thinks he was born for his parents alone awaits his fated and natural death, whereas the one who believes he was born for his fatherland too will be willing to die so as not to look upon it in slavery, and he will believe that the insolence and dishonor that one has to bear in an enslaved city are more terrifying than death."

neglects the importance of family honor or the possibility that the man might be willing to die for his own honor. On the other hand, Demosthenes' focus on an individual is much more vivid than Archidamus's reference to a general class; for it creates a vivid picture of some loafer waiting around with no purpose in life until death happens to strike one day. In both passages, though, the operative idea is the priority of the state before the individual and the idea that one should be willing to suffer death before allowing his state to incur shame.

Archidamus concludes his argument by highlighting the shame involved in Sparta submitting to her enemies:

> Αἰσχρὸν γὰρ τοὺς ἄρξαι τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀξιωθέντας ὀφθῆναι τὸ προσταττόμενον ποιοῦντας, καὶ τοσοῦτον ἀπολειφθῆναι τῶν προγόνων ὥστε τοὺς μὲν ὑπὲρ τοῦ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιτάττειν ἐθέλειν ἀποθνήσκειν, ἡμᾶς δ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ ποιεῖν τὸ κελευόμενον μὴ τολμᾶν διακινδυνεύειν.[80]

The argument is presented in a modified form of the pathetic paradox (see pg. 116), that is it is paradoxical for the same people to be seen ruling and serving. In Demosthenes the paradox is not presented in as pointed a way, and its expected conclusion is disrupted by a surprising shift:

> τότε δ' ἀξιοῦσα προεστάναι τῶν ἄλλων, εἶτ' ἀποστᾶσα τούτου Φιλίππῳ, προδεδωκέναι πάντας ἂν ἔσχεν αἰτίαν. εἰ γὰρ ταῦτα προεῖτο ἀκονιτί, περὶ ὧν οὐδένα κίνδυνον ὄντινα οὐχ ὑπέμειναν οἱ πρόγονοι, τίς οὐχὶ κατέπτυσεν ἂν σοῦ; μὴ γὰρ τῆς πόλεώς γε, μηδ' ἐμοῦ.[81]

The thought that the city could abandon its own character becomes unthinkable as it develops, and blame for the hypothetical is suddenly shifted to Aeschines in the form of a rhetorical question. Note also the substitution of a more violent, physical act (κατέπτυσεν) for abstract shame along with the rhetorical question. The high passion that breaks out here is sustained when Demosthenes reiterates the same idea:

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[80] Isoc. 6.94: "For it would be shameful for those who had been deemed worthy of leading the Greeks to be seen following commands, and to be so far inferior to their ancestors that, while the latter were willing to die in order to give orders to the rest of the Greeks, we are not willing to run a risk in order not to do what's commanded of us."
[81] Dem.18.200: "But the city would have incurred shame had she thought it right to lead the rest but then, yielding this to Philip, to betray everyone. For if you had given this up without a fight, a thing for the sake of which our forefathers endured every danger imaginable, who would not have spit on you; for they would not have spit on the city or me."

> τίσι δ' ὀφθαλμοῖς πρὸς Διὸς ἐωρῶμεν ἂν τοὺς εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἀνθρώπους ἀφικνουμένους, εἰ ... τὸν ... ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ γενέσθαι ταῦτ' ἀγῶνα ἕτεροι χωρὶς ἡμῶν ἦσαν πεποιημένοι, καὶ ταῦτα μηδεπώποτε τῆς πόλεως ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν χρόνοις ἀσφάλειαν ἄδοξον μᾶλλον ἢ τὸν ὑπὲρ τῶν καλῶν κίνδυνον ᾑρημένης;[82]

The basic argument here can be articulated in the same way: it would be shameful for us not to have fought against Philip when our ancestors always preferred noble dangers to ignoble security. Yunis, citing instances from Sophocles, notes that "To localize the experience of shame in the eyes ... was deeply rooted in Greek literature." [83] He also suggests that the *topos* was current among orators; however, this claim is problematic. While it is true that, as he notes, it does occur in Aeschines' speech *Against Ctesiphon* (3.121), his use of ὄμμα there, a poetic word for eye, indicates that the expression was intended to register as poetic. The *topos* is also found in Dinarchus, but this of course proves nothing, especially since the phrasing is very similar to the passage from *On the Crown* cited above.[84] Further, Yunis's reference to "Greek literature" in general is problematic. I would argue that the *topos* would have been associated with tragedy in particular, especially after the *Oedipus Tyrannus*. Note that, in the passage from the *Archidamus* cited above, the experience of shame is also localized in the eyes (Αἰσχρὸν γὰρ τοὺς ἄρξαι τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀξιωθέντας **ὀφθῆναι** τὸ προσταττόμενον ποιοῦντας); however, there the Spartans have to view themselves not with their own eyes but rather from some abstract perspective. They are not forced, as the Athenians are, to visualize the horrific situation through their own eyes (and so to turn away in shame). As in the case of other alterations that Demosthenes makes in his use of

[82] Dem. 18.201: "With what eyes, by Zeus, could we have looked at the people arriving in the city if … the rest had fought without us so that these things would not come about, and that with the city never in previous times having chosen gloryless security rather than danger on behalf of what is noble."
[83] Yunis (2001), *ad loc.*
[84] Din. 1.66: τίσιν ὀφθαλμοῖς ἕκαστος ὑμῶν τὴν πατρῴαν ἑστίαν οἴκαδ' ἀπελθὼν ἰδεῖν τολμήσει ... Wankel (1976) *ad loc.* cites as a parallel Dem. 25.98: ποίοις προσώποις ἢ τίσιν ὀφθαλμοῖς πρὸς ἕκαστον τούτων ἀντιβλέψεσθε; If this speech is spurious, then this passage would potentially represent another use independent of Demosthenes. However, MacDowell (2009), 310-311 makes a compelling case for its authenticity. Further, the passage in which this sentence occurs is a *tour de force* attempt to make the members of the jury feel shame at the outrageous thought of violating their own laws by voting the wrong way, so it resembles the passage under discussion from *On the Crown* in terms of its affective function.

material from the *Archidamus*, here he creates an immediacy and palpability that was absent from the earlier speech; further, the hypothetical situation, associated with Aeschines' policy, is presented in such a way as to achieve a tragic level of horror.

In this section I have demonstrated that at several critical moments over the course of his political career Demosthenes engaged with Isocrates' *Archidamus*. The most significant of these moments is the extended intertextual dialogue between the two speeches that occurs in his magnum opus *On the Crown*. I would argue that this culminating moment of interaction would have distinguished the reading from the oral experience of the work in a significant way, particularly with respect to the pivotal paradoxical argument beginning at section 199 of the speech (see pgs. 197 ff.). This passage has been haled by several commentators as a moment at which Demosthenes achieves a new height of rhetorical brilliance.[85] It would have had a visceral impact on those present in the court, especially on those related to men who had died at Chaeronea: Yunis says of the argument that it "… creates in the audience an emotionally resonant awareness of the rightness of the action."[86] On the original readers, too, again especially on those with a more direct connection with the battle, the argument must have had a profound impact. However, their reaction to it would have been complicated by their familiarity with Isocrates and his influence on Demosthenes. No longer does it flash out of nowhere like a lightning bolt of conviction. Rather, it has a specific source, and that in a speech of Isocrates that the reader has seen Demosthenes allude to and repurpose time and again. Indeed the passage represents, as my reading suggests, his most dynamic transformation of Isocratic material. But viewing it as such entails interpreting it as part of a tradition or at least as an intertextual

[85] Weil (1883) *ad loc.*, Goodwin (1901) *ad loc.*, Yunis (2001), 15. See also Yunis (2000) for an extended reading of this section of the speech.
[86] Yunis (2000), 109.

dialogue. One admires it not as a pure expression of conviction but as an ingenious reworking of preexistent elements. However, as an Athenian who has suffered from the epochal loss at Chaeronea, one just wants it to be true, and of course the fact that the argument is second-hand does not necessarily mean that Demosthenes did not actually believe it. The (original) reader's interpretation can thus be characterized as an interplay of political desire with rhetorical suspicion, as literary, intertextual, associative pleasure in tension with the palpable reality of tragic loss.

B. Isocrates and *Bildersprache*

Throughout the dissertation, Demosthenes' use of imagery has been a recurrent theme. In my chapter on structure, I argued that, for some of the deliberative speeches, imagery plays an important role in determining the structure: with regard to the *First Philippic*, the striking metaphor of the Athenians as barbarian boxer is placed in stark contrast with Demosthenes' subtle presentation of himself throughout the speech as a prudent advisor; with regard to the *Third Olynthiac*, the speech contains a series of carefully arranged similes along with certain stylistic idiosyncrasies that lead to the climactic image of the Athenians as sick patients who must risk death by refusing to keep living at a mere subsistence level. In addition, I argued in the first section this chapter that Demosthenes used various images involving interstitial states to present a characterization of the Athenians which represents a pathological development of Thucydides' portrayal of Periclean Athens.

It has long been recognized that metaphor and simile constitute an important element of Demosthenes' oratory.[87] As in the case of other features of his prose, his use of imagery is typically characterized as being bolder and more original than that of other orators. The two scholars who have devoted the most attention to the subject are Ronnet (27 pages of a 182 page monograph) and Krüger.[88] In accordance with her general thesis about the development of Demosthenes' style, Ronnet argues that, as his style developed, he became more and more confident in his use of metaphor until he achieved a harmony of different types in *On the Crown.*[89] Most of Krüger's dissertation on Demosthenes' *Bildersprache* consists of a thematically organized catalog of the images accompanied by brief comments. However, one section is devoted to the function of metaphorical language in its context ("Die Bildersprache im Sinnzummenhang der Reden"). There Krüger presents sensitive readings of metaphors and similes from the *First Philippic* and the *Olynthiacs* and, in certain cases, comes to conclusions similar to my own. Nevertheless, there are problems with his overall conception of the function of *Bildersprache*: he does not deal with the intratextual connections between images, and his explanation of the function of *Bildersprache* relies on vague ideas of vividness and demonstration.

With regard to Demosthenes' usage in individual speeches, much attention has been devoted to the *First Philippic* in particular: Krüger analyzed each major image individually and concluded that the abnormally high number of metaphors in the speech is an indicator of the

[87] Blass (1893) III.1, 89 ff. focuses on metaphors in the *Philippics* in particular. For a catalog of metaphors from most of the deliberative speeches, see Rehdantz (1893), 22-23. For more general treatments, see Adams (1927), 82-5; Usher (1993), 25-6; Milns (2000), 213; and MacDowell (2009), 407.
[88] Ronnet (1951), 149-176; Krüger (1959).
[89] *Ibid.,* 176.

level of Demosthenes' earnestness.[90] Rowe and Mader following him argue that Demosthenes uses metaphor satirically in this speech to depict Athens as a world turned upside down.[91]

For Demosthenes and his fourth-century readers, the status of metaphor in oratorical prose would have represented an explicit but unresolved problem. In a much-discussed passage from the *Evagoras*, Isocrates, when contrasting the resources available to writers of prose as opposed to poets, says the following about μεταφορά[92]:

> (οἷόν τ' αὐτοῖς) καὶ περὶ τούτων δηλῶσαι μὴ μόνον τοῖς τεταγμένοις ὀνόμασιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ξένοις, τὰ δὲ καινοῖς, τὰ δὲ μεταφοραῖς, καὶ μηδὲν παραλιπεῖν, ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν τοῖς εἴδεσιν διαποικῖλαι τὴν ποίησιν· τοῖς δὲ περὶ τοὺς λόγους οὐδὲν ἔξεστιν τῶν τοιούτων …[93]

As Krüger notes,[94] the fact that Isocrates does not define the term here indicates that it must have become common by around 370. The precise meaning of the term μεταφορά here is not entirely clear: does it refer to metaphor generally, or does Isocrates simply mean to exclude certain types. The former seems unlikely since he himself employed the figure in his own speeches. But, if he meant the latter, then what types did he have in mind? Kirby tentatively argues that he had something like the Homeric simile in mind but admits that it is impossible to say for sure.[95] Another issue with this passage is the classification of metaphor as a mere ornament (διαποικῖλαι) like neologism and exotic diction. This suggests that it was not viewed by Isocrates as having any sort of distinctive intellectual function.

In connection with Isocrates, a potentially significant fragment of the *techne* attributed to him should be mentioned. In this fragment the following prescription about metaphor is given:

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[90] Krüger (1959), 89-90.
[91] Rowe (1968), 363: "These images manifest the satiric traits of the incongruous, the distorted, the inane, and the paradoxical." Cf. Mader (2003), 57 and Wooten (2008), 105.
[92] For an attempt to trace the pre-history of this term, see Krüger (159), 4 ff.
[93] Isoc. 9.9.: "And they (poets) can express these things using not only standard but also foreign words, neologisms, and metaphors, and they do not suffer any restriction but can adorn their poems with all manner of embellishment. To writers of prose, on the other hand, none of these things is permitted …" For discussion see Krüger (1959), 4; O'Sullivan (1992), 50-1; Kirby (1997), Alexiou (2010) *ad loc*.
[94] Krüger (1959), 4.
[95] Kirby (1997), 526.

(δεῖ) ὀνόματι δὲ χρῆσθαι ἢ μεταφορᾷ μὴ σκληρᾷ, ἢ τῷ καλλίστῳ ἢ τῷ ἥκιστα πεποιημένῳ ἢ τῷ γνωριμωτάτῳ …[96]

One can use metaphors after all, but only ones that are not harsh or affected. As we will see, this resembles the prescription that Aristotle gives in the *Rhetoric*. However, the attribution of this precept to Isocrates is far from certain. Various speculations have been made about the origin, nature, and authenticity of Isocrates' handbook without any achieving a consensus.[97] However, if Navarre, following Pfund and Rehdantz,[98] is right that the fragments were originally written and distributed by his students, or if Kennedy is right that Aristotle collected the material from Isocrates' students,[99] then one can at least say with confidence that the problem of metaphor was being debated and discussed among a more general audience.

Kirby argues that it is very likely that Aristotle's discussion of metaphor was written at least in part in response to Isocrates.[100] If this is true, it is very well possible that Isocrates' claim had provoked discussion of the subject among rhetoricians more generally. For Aristotle, the figure had a much more profound significance than it did for Isocrates; for it is not a mere ornament but can teach us something new about a given object or phenomenon.[101] It thus has an intellectual as opposed to a purely aesthetic function. As for his prescriptions about the types of metaphor appropriate to oratorical prose, he gives the sensible but vague advice that they should not be ridiculous, too elevated, or far-fetched.[102]

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[96] Isoc. *Ars* fr. 11: "One should use the proper term(?) or a metaphor that is not harsh or the expression that is most beautiful or least affected or most well known …" The text cited here is that of Mandilaras.
[97] For discussion and bibliography see Kennedy (1963), 71 and Too (1995), 164-171.
[98] Navarre (1900), 188.
[99] Kennedy (1963), 71.
[100] Kirby (1997), 525. O'Sullivan (1992), 51 makes the more reserved claim that Aristotle borrowed Isocrates' catalog of stylistic principles.
[101] Arist. *Rh.* 1410b: ἡ δὲ μεταφορὰ ποιεῖ τοῦτο μάλιστα· ὅταν γὰρ εἴπῃ τὸ γῆρας καλάμην, ἐποίησεν μάθησιν καὶ γνῶσιν διὰ τοῦ γένους·
[102] *Ibid.* 1406b.

During the years that Demosthenes was learning and then practicing oratory, the status and function of metaphor and simile remained an unresolved issue. In the sections that follow, I will examine his use of imagery to see how it relates to Isocrates' prescriptions on the subject. In the first section I will look at the *Olynthiacs* as a series. By analyzing imagery from each of the speeches in the series and then comparing it with the others as well as with the *First Philippic*, I will demonstrate that in the *First Olynthiac* Demosthenes used simile as a means of crystallizing political thought that had been presented in more diffuse form in the *First Philippic*. In the *Third Olynthiac*, in turn, the image of the sick patients presents the same political ideas but adds a new affective dimension. With regard to the *Second Olynthiac*, I will explore the innovative way in which Demosthenes constructs a series of metaphors to characterize Philip's downfall. Although I have already discussed some of the images from the *Olynthiacs* previously in the dissertation, here I will not be looking at their role in the structure of a single speech, nor will I be deriving political ideas from them. Rather, my focus will be on how imagery creates a relationship between the speeches in the series, and, more generally, I will examine how a Demosthenic image functions as an element of content. In the second and third sections, in turn, I will examine two specific metaphors, namely the ship of state and the disease of treachery, respectively. By relating his innovation in the use of these images to my discussion of the imagery from the *Olynthiacs*, I will attempt to establish the role of imagery in his oratory more generally.

i. The *Olynthiacs*

As I discussed in my chapter on structure (pg. 158), there is some disagreement about the ordering of the three *Olynthiacs*. However, it is generally agreed that they were all delivered

(assuming they were all delivered) in the late summer or early autumn of 349/8.[103] Each speech, moreover, addresses the same situation, namely Philip's attack on Olynthus. I would argue that, in the *First Olynthiac,* the most prominent similes are used to present in a concise and vivid form the most significant political ideas Demosthenes had developed earlier in the *First Philippic*, which was delivered in 351. They thus can be said to have an intertextual function. As I demonstrated earlier in this chapter, Demosthenes characterizes the Athenians in that speech as inhabiting an imaginary world that allows them to ignore the political crisis facing them: he mocks them as playing with clay soldiers and says that they spend all their time and resources on festivals and urban renewal. Throughout the speech, he constructs piecemeal an image of the Athenian mentality without ever really bringing it all together. In the *First Olynthiac,* by contrast, the mentality underlying all the vivid imagery from the *First Philippic* is crystallized in two similes. These are the only two extended similes that occur in the speech, and, as I mentioned in my third chapter, both are taken from the same domain, that of transaction. In the first, the Athenians are likened to ingrates:

> ἀλλ', οἶμαι, παρόμοιόν ἐστιν ὅπερ καὶ περὶ τῆς τῶν χρημάτων κτήσεως· ἂν μὲν γάρ, ὅσα ἄν τις λάβῃ, καὶ σῴσῃ, μεγάλην ἔχει τῇ τύχῃ τὴν χάριν, ἂν δ' ἀναλώσας λάθῃ, συνανήλωσε καὶ τὸ μεμνῆσθαι {τὴν χάριν}. καὶ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων οὕτως οἱ μὴ χρησάμενοι τοῖς καιροῖς ὀρθῶς, οὐδ' εἰ συνέβη τι παρὰ τῶν θεῶν χρηστὸν μνημονεύουσι·[104]

Just like the spendthrift ingrate, the Athenians have used up the resources bestowed upon them by the gods and now have even forgotten that they had them to begin with. The absence of any

[103] MacDowell (2009), 238.

[104] Dem. 1.11: ""But the situation resembles what happens with the possession of money. For if a person preserves as much as he receives, he is very grateful to his fortune. However, if he squanders it without realizing it, he squanders at the same time the remembrance of gratitude. And it's the same way when it comes to events: those who have not exploited opportunities correctly do not even remember if anything good came about from the gods." For the innovative conception of χὰρις developed in this passage, see pg. 150 fn. 60.

sort of conscientiousness or prudence here recalls Demosthenes' description of them in the *First Philippic* as being "unhinged in their judgements" (ἀπηρτημένοι ... ταῖς γνώμαις).[105]

In the second simile, which I discussed at length earlier in this chapter, Demosthenes figures the Athenians as men living on high interest loans who through reckless spending end up losing the principal of their loans.[106] This simile, I would argue, functions in a dynamic way. On the one hand, it recalls all of the criticism of the Athenians Demosthenes made in the *First Philippic* (the clay soldiers, the festivals, the new buildings); however, it not only recalls but it distills and expands. In the former speech, each point of criticism was expressed separately: you are living in a dream world (clay soldiers/festivals), you are wasting resources on things that do not really matter (urban renewal), and like a barbarian boxer you never foresee what Philip is going to do next. In the figure of the men living on credit, however, all of these criticisms are made to converge: they live a luxurious life of pleasure for a short while (μικρὸν εὐπορήσαντες χρόνον) which does not actually correspond with their worth; they waste their time and money doing nothing but seeking pleasure (ἅπαντα πρὸς ἡδονὴν ζητοῦντες); and they do not foresee (ῥαδίως and εἰς ἀνάγκην) the consequences of their actions until it is too late. The simile, then, recalls all the vivid associations with the stinging criticisms from the previous speech and focuses them on a single figure. But in addition the spendthrift contributes his own effect. It is likely that Demosthenes is referring to a well-known character type. One is reminded of Theophrastus "shameless" man, who tries to get a loan from a man to whom he is already in debt.[107] Demosthenes' use of this type creates an escalation of the imagery from the *First Philippic*: the audience is made to visualize a man with a wad of cash (or rather a fistful of coins)

[105] Dem. 4.12.
[106] Dem. 1.15.
[107] Thphr. *Char*. 9.2: οἷος πρῶτον μὲν ὃν ἀποστερεῖ πρὸς τοῦτον ἀπελθὼν δανείζεσθαι …

going around wildly spending like there's no tomorrow. The simile also recalls the previous one from the same speech in which the Athenians are spendthrift ingrates who have forgotten they owe the gods χάρις. In light of all these considerations, I would argue that Demosthenes' use of simile in the *First Olynthiac* represents an attempt to employ the figure in an innovative and dynamic way. It serves as a means of subtly recalling and connecting ideas from a previous speech, and, insofar as the two major similes from the speech are taken from the same domain and refer to similar types, it creates a sense of intratextual cohesion. I would also argue that, when viewed in relation to the *First Philippic*, the second simile from the *First Olynthiac* has a sort of convergent signification. Elements articulated individually in the previous speech are all expressed simultaneously by various aspects of a single simile in the later speech. As we will see below, Demosthenes ventures an even more radical form of convergence in a series of metaphors from the *Second Olynthiac*.

One of the major rhetorical problems Demosthenes faced in the *Second Olynthiac* was that certain members of the audience were concerned that Philip might be invincible so that it would be pointless to try to resist him.[108] Indeed, he claims that Philip's successes have made him a universal object of wonderment: ὁ (Philip) μὲν γὰρ ὅσῳ πλείονα ὑπὲρ τὴν ἀξίαν πεποίηκε τὴν αὑτοῦ, τοσούτῳ θαυμαστότερος παρὰ πᾶσι νομίζεται.[109] Demosthenes recognized that this wonderment consisted of elements of both attraction and terror: although Philip was now threatening their own safety and security, the Athenians were still awed by the sheer magnitude of what he had accomplished, especially since he was just a barbaric Macedonian. As we will

[108] Dem. 2.5: … τοὺς ὑπερεκπεπληγμένους ὡς ἄμαχόν τινα τὸν Φίλιππον….
[109] Dem. 2.3: "For insofar as he has accomplished things beyond his station, to this extent he is regarded as a greater object of wonder among all men."

see, the method he adopted for combatting this sense of wonderment was to employ a bold and difficult series of metaphors to characterize Philip's success and ultimate downfall.

Demosthenes' broad claim is that Philip's success is due to good fortune and deception, not to any innate worth. The way in which this argument is developed, I would argue, represents an exquisite instance of Demosthenes' much discussed use of repetition or theme and variation,[110] with the theme being Philip's growth. Within the space of about a page, forms of the verb αὐξάνω occur four times. The first instance occurs as part of Demosthenes' justification for criticizing Philip's actions at length:

> ... δυοῖν ἕνεχ' ἡγοῦμαι συμφέρειν εἰρῆσθαι, τοῦ τ' ἐκεῖνον, ὅπερ καὶ ἀληθὲς ὑπάρχει, φαῦλον φαίνεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς ὑπερεκπεπληγμένους ὡς ἄμαχόν τινα τὸν Φίλιππον ἰδεῖν ὅτι πάντα διεξελήλυθεν οἷς πρότερον παρακρουόμενος μέγας ηὐξήθη, καὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἥκει τὴν τελευτὴν τὰ πράγματα αὐτῷ.[111]

Demosthenes' intention is to show to those who believe Philip is invincible that he has exhausted his resources. This will involve an account of how Philip "grew great." As Weil notes, Demosthenes could have used the more common copulative expression μέγας ἐγένετο, but according to him μέγας ηὐξήθη and later in the same passage ἤρθη μέγας "... sont plus pleines et plus expressives." These expressions, then, add a bit of flavor and emphasis. This general and limited interpretation of their effect is certainly valid, but it does not account for what follows. In the sentence following the one cited above, Demosthenes imagines an alternative world in which Philip had grown by acting justly (εἰ τὰ δίκαια πράττονθ' ἑώρων ηὐξημένον), then, following the catalog of the ways in which Philip has successively deceived various Greek states, he summarizes his rise to power thus: τὴν γὰρ ἑκάστων ἄνοιαν ἀεὶ τῶν ἀγνοούντων αὐτὸν

[110] For the significance of repetition in Demosthenes, see Rowe (1968), 362.
[111] Dem. 2.5: "For two reasons I think it's expedient that it has been said, first so that Philip may appear base, which is actually the truth, and second so that those who are astonished at his being invincible may see that he has exhausted all the things by which he grew great before through deceit, and so that they can see that his affairs have come to their end."

ἐξαπατῶν καὶ προσλαμβάνων οὕτως ηὐξήθη.[112] Directly following this is a comparative and a temporal clause in the first of which Philip "has been lifted to a great height" (ὥσπερ οὖν διὰ τούτων ἤρθη μέγας) and in the second of which he is "destined to be torn down once again"(ὀφείλει ... καθαιρεθῆναι). The former of these may at first just seem to be a variation on μέγας ηὐξήθη, but the phrasing has a distinct connotation. In the two other instances in which the expression occurs,[113] it has the sense of a grand exaltation: in the chorus's prayer to Zeus in Aeschylus' *Libation Bearers,* the slave women predict that, if Zeus exalts Orestes (ἐπεί νιν μέγαν ἄρας[114]) by making him victorious over his foes, he will receive ample reward. In the second instance, Aristophanes, speaking of himself through the chorus-leader in the *Wasps,* boasts …ἀρθεὶς δὲ μέγας καὶ τιμηθεὶς ὡς οὐδεὶς πώποτ' ἐν ὑμῖν.[115] The coordination with τιμηθεὶς ὡς οὐδεὶς suggests the strength of the expression. Through deceit, then, Philip has been exalted to a great height. This raising is associated with the destruction of buildings and walls by καθαιρεθῆναι, which Demosthenes almost always uses to refer to tearing down pillars, walls, buildings or fortifications.[116] Accordingly, after several general references to Philip's growth concluding in the exaltation of ἤρθη μέγας, he is figured metaphorically as a building that is destined to be torn down.

Following this account of his growth/rise to power, the hypothetical objection is presented that while Demosthenes' analysis is accurate, nevertheless Philip will be able to maintain control through force. He responds by saying that goodwill and mutual self-interest are necessary to maintain unity. He then explains what happens when these things are not present:

[112] Dem. 2.7: "For he grew in this way by always deceiving the foolishness of each of those who did not know him and receiving them as allies."
[113] According to a Perseus lemma search for the two words within three words of one another.
[114] Aesch. *Cho.* 790. Text is that of West.
[115] Ar. *Vesp.* 1023.
[116] Only two of his other eleven uses do not refer to physically tearing down a structure.

> ὅταν δ’ ἐκ πλεονεξίας καὶ πονηρίας τις ὥσπερ οὗτος ἰσχύσῃ, ἡ πρώτη πρόφασις καὶ μικρὸν πταῖσμα ἅπαντα ἀνεχαίτισεν καὶ διέλυσεν. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀδικοῦντα καὶ ἐπιορκοῦντα καὶ ψευδόμενον δύναμιν βεβαίαν κτήσασθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς μὲν ἅπαξ καὶ βραχὺν χρόνον ἀντέχει, καὶ σφόδρα γε ἤνθησεν ἐπὶ ταῖς ἐλπίσιν, ἂν τύχῃ, τῷ χρόνῳ δὲ φωρᾶται καὶ περὶ αὐτὰ καταρρεῖ. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἰκίας, οἶμαι, καὶ πλοίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων τὰ κάτωθεν ἰσχυρότατα εἶναι δεῖ, οὕτω καὶ τῶν πράξεων τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀληθεῖς καὶ δικαίας εἶναι προσήκει.[117]

Instead of a building or wall, Philip’s power is now a rider about to be thrown from his horse (ἀνεχαίτισεν). Since the Greeks did not have saddles or stirrups, this would have been a familiar enough sight.[118] The metaphor, then, would presumably have been relatable, but it also would evoke with particular force the sort of dramatic, violent, and sudden reversal that Demosthenes claims will befall Philip.

Philip is now a thing ominously growing, a building destined to collapse, and a rider about to be thrown from his horse. However, the metaphorization does not end there. In the next sentence, which marks what is to follow as significant by beginning with an *anadiplosis* (οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔστιν), Philip is figured as a flower that has briefly bloomed in the soil of hopes. Unlike the preceding characterizations, this one seems to risk turning him into a sympathetic figure. One thinks of Gorgythion from the *Iliad* (8.308-10), who in dying droops his head to one side like a poppy heavy with fruit and rain; or of Sappho’s hyacinth that is trampled to the ground by shepherds (105b). There is also the general association of flowers with fleeting youth and beauty. But perhaps Demosthenes expected these associations. With Philip having achieved such brilliant success by the time of the *Second Olynthiac*, it would have been impossible to deny to him and his conquests any appeal whatsoever. Accordingly, perhaps the metaphorization

[117] Dem. 2.9-10: “Whenever a man like this one grows strong from greed and wickedness, the first cause and a small stumble upsets and dissolves all things. For it is not, I say it is not, men of Athens, possible for someone to acquire firm power by committing injustice and breaking oaths and lying, but such things hold out once and for a short time and reach full bloom upon hopes if it so turns out, but they are found out by time and wither around themselves.”
[118] See Neil (1909) on Ar. *Eq.* 571.

as delicate flower would have channeled this attraction into an image the *telos* of which is the inevitability of immanent withering.

Philip is a thing ominously growing, a building destined to collapse, a rider being thrown, and a flower about to wither. Krüger argued that we should not attempt to analyze this series, that there is no connection between these images and that the rapid succession of unrelated metaphors indicates that Demosthenes must have been in an impassioned state when delivering this part of the speech.[119] However, I would argue that that there is in fact a very intimate connection between them and that all of the images are made to converge in the final words of the sentence περὶ αὐτὰ καταρρεῖ. The reception of this passage in antiquity is enlightening. A scholiast wanted to take the expression as a metaphor according to which Philip's successes are likened to an old wall eroded by decay: τὸ δὲ 'καταρρεῖ' ἀντὶ τοῦ διαφθείρεται, ἀπὸ μεταφορᾶς τοίχου τινὸς παλαιοῦ, ὅταν ὑπὸ τῆς παλαιότητος αὐτὸς ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ διαβιβρώσκηται καὶ ἀναλίσκηται.[120] Hermogenes, however, associates it with the image of the flower from the preceding clause, though in a strange way:

> τὸ γὰρ 'ἤνθησε' τροπικὸν μέν, οὐ μὴν αὐστηρὸν οὐδὲ σκληρόν, τὸ δὲ 'καταρρεῖ' σκληρὸν ἰσχυρῶς, οὐ μὴν τοιοῦτον ἐφάνη διὰ τὸ ἐξ ἀκολουθίας εἰρῆσθαι· ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀνθέων τῶν μαραινομένων τὸ καταρρεῖν σχεδὸν κυρίως λέγεται, ἤδη δὲ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἄγαν σκληρότητα καὶ τὸ παρακείμενον αὐτῷ ἀφεῖλε, λέγω τὸ "τῷ χρόνῳ δὲ φωρᾶται".[121]

He argues that while the image of blooming is an example of figurative language that is neither harsh nor hard, καταρρεῖ is very harsh indeed but seems less so because it follows τῷ χρόνῳ δὲ

[119] Krüger (1959), 91: Eigentlich ist es ein Fehler, dies nun langsam zu zergliedern, der Redner ist erregt, die Bilder und Metaphern strömen nur so aus ihm heraus, ohne daß man nach dem logischen Zusammenhang glaubt fragen zu dürfen, es scheint zwischen den einzelnen Metaphern gar keine Verbindung zu bestehen, sondern wir werden nur mit kurzen Augenblicksbildern überschüttet, die von einem Gebiet ins andere springen.
[120] "The word καταρρεῖ instead of διαφθείρεται, taken from the metaphor of an old wall whenever it is eaten and used up by itself due to age."
[121] Hermog. 2.5: "For ἤνθησε is figurative but not rough or harsh, but καταρρεῖ is very harsh indeed. However, it did not seem so because it has been spoken after something not harsh; for in reference to withering blooms καταρρεῖν is almost the proper word, and now its juxtaposition has removed its excessive harshness, I mean the words 'τῷ χρόνῳ δὲ φωρᾶται'."

φωρᾶται. He then seems to claim that καταρρεῖν is not so strange (σχεδὸν κυρίως) an expression for the withering of flowers. However, if this is the case, then why does the harshness need to be decreased by τῷ χρόνῳ δὲ φωρᾶται? In any case his use of σχεδὸν here suggests that he was not entirely confident in his interpretation.

In taking into consideration the explanatory sentence following περὶ αὐτὰ καταρρεῖ (note the γάρ), we might be inclined to side with the scholiast since it is the structural metaphor that Demosthenes chooses to focus on. However, I would argue that reading the passage this way unnecessarily violates the sequence of thought. In the expression περὶ αὐτὰ καταρρεῖ the scholiast saw Philip as an old, collapsing wall, while Hermogenes watched a flower wither. The verb καταρρέω can refer to a person sinking or falling down,[122] fruits or vegetables dropping to the ground,[123] and a wall collapsing.[124] The expression, then, can refer simultaneously to all three of the preceding metaphorizations of Philip: as a building, he collapses; as a rider, he is thrown; as a flower, his petals wither and fall to the ground. Finally, in light of the recognized obscurity of the expression, I would argue there is an opaque falling of the indeterminate growth, protuberance that is Demosthenes' Philip.[125] To return to the significance of repetition or theme and variation in this passage, one can see how Demosthenes begins with a general reference to growth, which could refer to anything from plant growth to increase in the abstract. This is repeated several times, as though we are supposed to be feeling Philip's devious growth. Then it gets particularized in a series of disparate metaphors, each of which is quite striking, especially for oratory. All of these then converge in Philip's spectacular collapse, in conceptualizing which

[122] Ar. *Pax* 71 and 146. Hp. *Prog.* 3.
[123] Xen. *Cyr.* 1.5.10.
[124] Antisthenes fr. 88: τεῖχος ἀσφαλέστατον φρόνησις· μήτε γὰρ καταρρεῖν μήτε προδίδοσθαι.
[125] See chapter 2 pgs. 90-1 for the problem of articulating Philip's expansion. Compare also my discussion of Meidias' *hubris* in chapter 5.

the reader has to knock him off his horse, collapse him, and watch his petals wither to the ground. At this point it is hard to imagine him not falling. The restricted reference to one of the metaphors that occurs in the following sentence could be said to cater to the needs of the audience; for it allows them to focus on a single element and move on to the next part of the speech.[126]

In the *First Olynthiac* the two major similes were taken from the same domain; in the *Third*, by contrast, imagery is drawn from several disparate domains, ranging from the abstract to the visceral. As I discussed in my examination of the structure of the speech, each of the figures to which Demosthenes likens the Athenians would have provoked an extreme feeling of aversion and resistance: they are soldiers fleeing from battle (§17), they are hamstrung men stripped naked of their resources (§31), they are a slave(§31), they are a mere appendage (§31), and they are animals being tamed (31). The final simile, however, has a distinctive function in terms of both affect and intellection:

> Ἐὰν οὖν ἀλλὰ νῦν γ' ἔτι ἀπαλλαγέντες τούτων τῶν ἐθῶν ἐθελήσητε στρατεύεσθαί τε καὶ πράττειν ἀξίως ὑμῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ ταῖς περιουσίαις ταῖς οἴκοι ταύταις ἀφορμαῖς ἐπὶ τὰ ἔξω τῶν ἀγαθῶν χρήσησθε, ἴσως ἄν, ἴσως, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τέλειόν τι καὶ μέγα κτήσαισθε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τῶν τοιούτων λημμάτων ἀπαλλαγείητε, ἃ τοῖς {ἀσθενοῦσι} παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν σιτίοις διδομένοις ἔοικε. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνα οὔτε ἰσχὺν ἐντίθησιν οὔτ' ἀποθνήσκειν ἐᾷ· καὶ ταῦτα ἃ νέμεσθε νῦν ὑμεῖς, οὔτε τοσαῦτα ἐστὶν ὥστε ὠφέλειαν ἔχειν τινὰ διαρκῆ, οὔτ' ἀπογνόντας ἄλλο τι πράττειν ἐᾷ, ἀλλ' ἔστι ταῦτα τὴν ἑκάστου ῥᾳθυμίαν ὑμῶν ἐπαυξάνοντα.[127]

The Athenians are now patients who are being kept alive by their doctors but who are not thriving and do not have the will to risk death in an attempt to recover. Already in the *Second*

[126] Krüger (1959), 92 argues that the concluding simile binds all the imagery together: "das Umkippen, das Blühem im Garten, der ertappte Dieb und das Zusammenstürzen sind alles Dinge, die man in einem Hause erleben kann." However, I do not understand what precisely he means by "in einem Hause erleben." Also, this position does not account for the image of the thrown rider.

[127] Dem. 3.33: "Accordingly, If now at least, having freed yourselves from these habits, you are willing to march and act in a manner worthy of yourselves, and if you use these advantages at home as starting points for external benefits, perhaps, perhaps, men of Athens, you might gain some consummate and great good and be freed from such gains, which resemble the food given by doctors. For that too neither gives strength nor allows one to die; and these things you are distributing to yourselves are neither so great as to have any sufficient benefit nor do they allow you to reject them and fare otherwise ..."

Olynthiac Demosthenes had figured the Athenians as sick patients who needed to regain control of themselves,[128] so the simile is consistent with a previous characterization, although in the earlier speech the metaphor is used in passing and is not elaborated upon. In addition to its connection with this previous metaphor of sickness, the simile also develops the representation of the Athenians' mentality that had been crystallized in the simile of the spendthrift in the *First Olynthiac*. Like him, the sick patients are characterized by excessive ease (ἐρραθυμηκότες and ῥᾳθυμίαν ὑμῶν ἐπαυξάνοντα, respectively), and in both cases this ease is heedless of reality. There is, however, a notable difference between the two: whereas most Athenians presumably could not personally identify with the spendthrift, sickness is a near universal. As a result, the audience would have a much more visceral reaction to the latter.[129] At the beginning of the speech (§3), Demosthenes says that he is at a loss as to how he should speak; for he is convinced that the dire situation facing the Athenians has been caused not by a lack of understanding but rather by their unwillingness to do what's necessary. In my chapter on structure I argued that various aspects of the disposition and style of the speech were intended to address this problem. Here I would argue that the shift in the type of simile employed between the *Second* and *Third Olynthiac* has the same function. Whereas in the former speech the audience could maintain a sense of distance from the figure of the spendthrift, in the latter they would react instinctively and violently to memories of being ill and neither dead nor healthy. This affective reaction occurs in conjunction with the intellection of a polyvalent image in its most concentrated form, an image that Demosthenes has been developing since the *First Philippic*. Within a single simile is distilled a complex intertext comprising all the vivid, scathing portraits of the Athenian

[128] Dem. 2.30: … ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἔτι καὶ νῦν γενομένους… Scholiast *ad loc*.: ὡς ἐπὶ νοσούντων εἶπε τὸ 'ὑμῶν αὐτῶν γενομένους'.
[129] Cf. Krüger (1959), 9: Und auf diese Erfahrung der Zuhörer kommt es Demosthenes an, es soll dem Publikum kalt den Rücken herunterlaufen. Dann merken die Leute am eigenen Leibe, wie prekär die Lage Philipps ist.

mentality from the earlier speeches, and this is made to be associated with the violent emotive element involved in recalling sickness. This was one of the Demosthenes' answers to the question he had posed at the beginning of the speech.

ii. The Fickle Waves of State

The metaphor of the ship of state dates back to Alcaeus if not earlier; it became one of the most widespread and commonly used figurations of the state. With regard to Demosthenes, there are at least two noteworthy aspects of his usage: on the one hand the metaphor is treated as a completely predictable mode of description. As a result, he felt comfortable very abruptly transitioning from literal to metaphorical reference to the state. In the *Third Philippic*, he says that various city-states like the Olynthians or the Phocians could identify many things which, had they know them before they were destroyed, would have allowed them to save themselves. However, this of course does them no good:

> ἀλλὰ τί τούτων ὄφελος αὐτοῖς; ἕως ἂν σῴζηται τὸ σκάφος, ἄν τε μεῖζον ἄν τ' ἔλαττον, τότε χρὴ καὶ ναύτην καὶ κυβερνήτην καὶ πάντα ἄνδρα ἑξῆς προθύμους εἶναι, καὶ ὅπως μήθ' ἑκὼν μήτ' ἄκων μηδεὶς ἀνατρέψει, τοῦτο σκοπεῖσθαι· ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἡ θάλαττα ὑπέρσχῃ, μάταιος ἡ σπουδή. καὶ ἡμεῖς τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἕως ἐσμὲν σῷοι …[130]

Without any means of transition, we move suddenly from the states themselves (αὐτοῖς) to their hulls (τὸ σκάφος), then back again to a literal state (καὶ ἡμεῖς) without so much as a οὕτως.[131] Such an easy back and forth between literal and metaphorical is to some degree an inevitable result of the widespread usage of the metaphor. However, it also demonstrates a sense of tact on Demosthenes' part: calling any attention at all to something so common might come off as gauche.

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[130] Dem. 9.69: "But what use is there of these things? While the hull is kept safe, whether more or less, then is the time for the sailor and the pilot and every man to be in earnest and to see to it that no one overturn it willingly or unwillingly. But whenever the sea rises too high, every effort is in vain. And so we too, men of Athens, while we are secure …"

[131] Cf. Demosthenes' use of the metaphor in his discussion of a passage from Sophocles' *Antigone* (19.250).

Demosthenes knew, then, how to employ effectively the ship of state image in its traditional sense. However, he also uses it as a springboard for developing his own original conception of the state:

> ἃ καὶ πρότερόν ποτ' εἶπον ἐγὼ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τούτων οὐδεὶς ἀντεῖπεν, ὡς ὁ μὲν δῆμός ἐστιν ἀσταθμητότατον πρᾶγμα τῶν πάντων καὶ ἀσυνθετώτατον, ὥσπερ ἐν θαλάττῃ κῦμ' ἀκατάστατον, ὡς ἂν τύχῃ κινούμενον.[132]

From a solid albeit precarious ship the state has been turned into a fickle, fluid wave. The simile operates in implicit dialogue with the traditional metaphor. One is still at sea in political life, but now he has become the sea. The content of the metaphor is reinforced by the way in which it interacts with the traditional metaphorization of the state. The people are as fickle as a wave (and even more fickle in contrastive association with the ship of state).

The nature of the metaphor discussed in the preceding paragraph should, I would argue, be used as an argument in favor of attributing the simile mentioned by Aristotle to Demosthenes the orator as opposed to the general.[133] Just as in the preceding metaphor, it is the people who are the point of reference, and the ship of state metaphor is again vividly reformulated: ὃ Δημοσθένης <εἰς> τὸν δῆμον, ὅτι ὅμοιός ἐστιν τοῖς ἐν τοῖς πλοίοις ναυτιῶσιν.[134] Instead of a wave, the people are now seasick passengers in the ship of state. Although it is impossible to say too much about this simile since we have no context, in isolation it can still be compared with that of the sick patients from the *Third Olynthiac* both in terms of domain and intertextual function. With regard to the latter, the simile seems to make visceral an image that otherwise was

[132] Dem. 19.135-6: "Which things I also said to you once before in the Assembly and which none of those men objected to, namely that the people is the most unstable thing of all and the most unsettled, like a restless wave in the sea moving about at random." The text here is problematic. I follow Fuhr in reading κῦμα instead of the manuscripts' πνεῦμα. The evidence used to support this emendation is a passage from Appian (3.20) which seems to allude to Demosthenes'' characterization of the people here. However, if one were to read πνεῦμα instead, the dialogue with the traditional ship of state metaphor would function in the same way.
[133] For discussion of this issue, see Trevett (1996a), 371.
[134] Arist. *Rh.* 1407a: "What Demosthenes said with reference to the people, that they are like seasick men aboard ships."

framed externally in terms of the state of the ship, for example the ship of state must be righted, water needs to be baled. Reference to sea-sickness, of course, provokes a much stronger response and so could have addressed the same problem Demosthenes was attempting to deal with in the *Third Olynthiac*.

iii. Treachery

In the preceding sections I examined various instances in which Demosthenes used metaphors and similes in an innovative way. In addition to these, there is one instance where the status of the expression is left unclear, perhaps intentionally. In *On the False Embassy*, Demosthenes introduces the metaphor of treachery as disease in dramatic fashion:

> νόσημα γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δεινὸν ἐμπέπτωκεν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ χαλεπὸν καὶ πολλῆς τινὸς εὐτυχίας καὶ παρ' ὑμῶν ἐπιμελείας δεόμενον.[135]

The separation of δεινὸν from the noun it modifies (νόσημα) would have strongly accentuated the severity of the disease; this effect would have been reinforced by the unexpected addition of further descriptors (χαλεπὸν … ἐπιμελείας δεόμενον) at the point when the clause seems to be coming to an end. After this we get a detailed account of the nature of the treachery. The next time the situation is referred to in general terms, the metaphor is abandoned:

> καίτοι **τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ζηλώματα** Θετταλῶν μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μέχρι μὲν χθὲς ἢ πρώην τὴν ἡγεμονίαν καὶ τὸ κοινὸν ἀξίωμ' ἀπωλωλέκει, νῦν δ' ἤδη καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν παραιρεῖται·[136]

Treachery here is no longer figured as a disease but rather is simply a state of affairs and a set of interests (τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ζηλώματα). In the next clause there is no explicit subject, but the implicit one is referred to by the circumstantial participle εἰσελθὸν. Since πρᾶγμα was one of the subjects of the previous clause, one is at first inclined to supply that as subject of

[135] Dem. 19.259: "A disease, men of Athens, and a terrible one has fallen upon Greece, and one that is hard to treat and requires much good fortune and care from you yourselves."
[136] Dem. 19.260: "And yet this state of affairs and set of interests yesterday or recently had destroyed the leadership and common dignity of the Thessalians and now is even taking away their freedom."

the following clause. However, two further considerations make this problematic: first, πρᾶγμα constitutes an element of a compound subject in that clause; second, the reference to motion better suits a plague than an abstract state of affairs.[137] Indeed, in the following clauses treachery is again said to enter a place, then "not to have stopped there" (οὐδ' ἐνταῦθ' ἔστηκεν), then the possibility of its entering (ἂν ... ἴῃ) the Peloponnese is discussed. Even though the subject is not introduced again explicitly, the references to movement give one the impression of a plague spreading from place to place. Finally, at the end of the passage, treachery is again figured as a disease: … ὡς βαδίζον γε κύκλῳ καὶ δεῦρ' ἐλήλυθεν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸ νόσημα τοῦτο.[138] This conclusion seems to suggest that Demosthenes expected his audience to maintain the figuration throughout the passage, in spite of the fact that he drops it in §260 without ever explicitly reintroducing it. It is not entirely clear what might have motivated the fluctuation. It might have been the case that he was concerned that sustaining the metaphor over such a long passage would have come off as heavy-handed. On the other hand, the categorical indeterminacy of this subject moving from place to place does perhaps reinforce the insidiousness of treachery as plague surreptitiously spreading.

3. Conclusion

After comparing Demosthenes with Thucydides and Isocrates, the reader comes to the not so surprising conclusion that he is both profoundly embedded and profoundly individual. On the one hand much of the content of his speeches can be seen as developments of ideas and arguments presented by earlier authors. His depiction of the Athenian mentality was informed by that of Thucydides, and his famous argument about the ethical necessity of the defeat at

[137] The verb εἰσέρχομαι is used by Thucydides in reference to the plague: ἐς μὲν Πελοπόννησον (ἡ νόσος οὐκ ἐσῆλθεν).
[138] Dem. 19.262: "… as if moving in a circle this disease has also arrived here, men of Athens."

Chaeronea represents a reformulation of Archidamus' exhortation to the Spartans. On the other hand, the relationship is not one of mere appropriation. In reading Demosthenes side-by-side with his two greatest influences (παραναγιγνώσκειν), the reader observes alternative possibilities of articulating arguments and ideas. Although Isocrates' and Demosthenes' gnomes about success seem to express the same general idea, in the latter the crasis between universal and particular represents a fundamentally different mode of thinking. Further, although both orators connect the experience of shame with the sense of sight, only Demosthenes feels it in his eyeballs. By juxtaposing such passages, the reader can confront questions concerning content and its relation to form in a way that would have been difficult for the original audience of the speech. In the next chapter, the same issue will be addressed in the context of interpreting the relationship between arguments from the deliberative speeches and the collection of *Prooemia*.

With regard to use of imagery, Demosthenes' role in the tradition is not entirely clear. In the wake of Isocrates' radical exclusion of *Bildersprache*, Demosthenes' decision to make such heavy use of imagery in his speeches would seem to represent a conscious break with at least one prominent prescriptive voice. As we have seen, he not only regularly used bold and involved imagery in metaphors and extended similes, but he also expanded the functional range and the significance of the figure relative to other elements of argumentation. Imagery bears the burden of communicating political ideas, unifying Demosthenes' political thought more generally, and instilling a will to action. Isocrates with his disgust for ψυχαγωγία would presumably have condemned his usage as demagoguery. For readers, then, the two figures represent paths that bifurcate on the point of the image. Reading side-by-side involves reading in different directions.

Chapter 5

Texts

When reading most of Demosthenes' forensic speeches, one can simply pretend that they more or less faithfully reflect what he or his client actually said in court.[1] In the case of *Against Meidias* (hereafter referred to as *Meidias*) and *On the False Embassy*, however, this is out of the question; for the reader becomes acutely aware that he is reading a draft and that revision would have involved more than simply crossing a few t's and dotting a few i's. Furthermore, not only are these speeches drafts, but they are the first speeches to be distributed in draft form, at least the first that have been clearly preserved for us as such.[2] This was something new, then, for fourth-century readers of oratory. After the hermeneutic debates between Plato and Isocrates, which I discussed at length in my first chapter, authorial intention had already become an issue without any satisfying resolution. Now in addition readers had to address the question of what it means to read a draft as opposed to a finished work.

In the case of the deliberative speeches, too, pretending is impossible. Some speeches are missing parts, others do not contain a specific proposal, while another exists in two drastically different redactions. In each case the reader finds himself unable to adopt a simple relationship with the text. At times the speech feels so immediate that the text seems to evanesce, at others the reader becomes utterly incapable of engaging with it at all. Further, the very existence of the

[1] For extensive discussion of the relationship between the two see Yunis (1996), 241-7.
[2] Isocrates did play with the status of the text in various ways. His speech *Against the Sophists* is a fragment that may have been intended to entice the reader without giving him satisfaction. See Too (1995), 171 for discussion and bibliography. As I discussed at length in my first chapter, both the *Evagoras* and the *Antidosis* are prefaced by sophisticated prescriptions on how the work should be read, and the *Panathenaicus* is presented within the dramatic frame of a discussion of the work between Isocrates and his pupils. However, he did not publish any drafts, nor would one expect the man who spent ten years agonizing over the periods of the *Panegyricus* to deign to do so.

text of a deliberative speech would have represented a problem: one has to explain why it exists in the first place.

In this chapter I examine the status of Demosthenes' speeches as written texts. Because the texts of the public trial speeches raise a different set of concerns from those pertaining to the deliberative speeches, the chapter will be broadly divided into two sections. In my discussion of the former, I look at the state in which the speeches have been preserved and develop an approach to reading the texts as drafts. For the deliberative speeches, in turn, I look at how the texts alternately invite and obstruct a sense of immediacy. I also examine the relationship between the collection of *Prooemia* and passages from the deliberative speeches. In cases where the collection preserves an alternative version of a passage from one of the deliberative speeches, I compare the two in detail and explore possible relations of priority and development. Although the issues that textuality raises for the two types of speech differ, central to both are the uncertainty surrounding the original distribution of the speeches and the problem of authorial intention.

1. The Public Trial Speeches

In the analyses of the *Meidias* and *On the False Embassy* that follow, I begin by applying the Platonic and Isocratic theories of structure discussed in my third chapter in an attempt to gauge the general level of completedness of each speech: does the structure match the plan outlined in the proem and elsewhere, and, if not, can this be said to be intentional; and can I find anything that unifies the speech, that makes it into a well-formed animal, that endows it with Plato's "logographic necessity." In the process of pursuing this line of inquiry, a method of reading the speech as a draft is developed in each case.

A. *Against Meidias*

i. Structure

Although technically Demosthenes was prosecuting Meidias on the charge that he violated the sanctity of the Dionysiac festival by publically striking him in the theater,[3] it is Meidias' *hubris* ("a mixture of insolence and violence")[4] that dominates the speech; indeed, I would argue that it represents something more dynamic and architectonic than a simple motif or even a structural keystone. As will become clear from the discussion that follows, the peculiar nature of Meidias' *hubris* can be said to have determined the form and substance of the speech on multiple, intertwined levels. First of all there is the sheer number of occurrences of forms of the verb ὑβρίζω and related words in the beginning of the speech. Between §1 and §21, where Demosthenes presents his outline for the speech as a whole, forms of the verb occur 12 times, of the noun ὕβρις three times, and the agent noun ὑβριστής once. In a case, then, that is not actually a prosecution on a charge of *hubris*,[5] Demosthenes still makes this aspect of Meidias' crimes the focal point from the outset.

It is not just any *hubris*, though. From the very first sentence of the speech it is characterized as having a disturbing boundlessness to it. So Demosthenes says in his opening words,

> Τὴν μὲν ἀσέλγειαν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, καὶ τὴν ὕβριν, ἣ πρὸς ἅπαντας ἀεὶ χρῆται Μειδίας, οὐδένα οὕθ' ὑμῶν οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν ἀγνοεῖν οἴομαι.[6]

[3] For discussion of the nature of the legal proceedings, see Macdowell (1990), 16.
[4] The definition of ὕβρις quoted above is taken from Cawkwell (1978), 129. The concept is notoriously difficult to define, and I have adopted various translations depending on which feature seemed to me to be most prominent in a given context. For an exhaustive account of the meaning of the word from Homer all the way through the 4th century, see Fisher (1992). For further discussion and bibliography, see MacDowell (1990), 19.
[5] See MacDowell (1990), 26-27.
[6] Dem. 21.1: "The insolence, men of the jury, and the outrage that Meidias continually commits against all men, I think no one, neither you nor the rest of the citizens, is unaware of."

Somehow Meidias manages to act insolently toward everyone in the city, and what's more continuously. Indeed, it has gotten to the point where no force can restrain him (§3). Later, Demosthenes refers to his *hubris* as though it could be quantified: "… καὶ οὐδ' ἐνταῦθ' ἔστη τῆς ὕβρεως, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον αὐτῷ περιῆν ὥστε …."[7] So great a portion remained. One thinks here of something amorphous and menacing like the Blob: Meidias' *hubris* has an identity of its own, never quite able to be conceptualized but always expanding. This characterization, as we will see, will continue to be developed throughout the speech in various ways, but already by the end of the preface its outlines or rather lack thereof have been clearly drawn and accentuated.

In proportion to the boundlessness of Meidias' *hubris*, Demosthenes allows for the possibility of boundless growth on the level of structure and style. With regard to the former, when introducing his catalog of Meidias' offenses, he repurposes a device from the *Iliad*:

> πάντα μὲν δὴ τὰ τούτῳ πεπραγμένα οὔτ' ἂν ἐγὼ δυναίμην πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰπεῖν, οὔτ' ἂν ὑμεῖς ὑπομείναιτ' ἀκούειν, οὐδ', εἰ τὸ παρ' ἀμφοτέρων ἡμῶν ὕδωρ ὑπάρξειεν πρὸς τὸ λοιπόν, πᾶν τό τ' ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ τούτου προστεθέν, οὐκ ἂν ἐξαρκέσειεν·[8]

Homer's ten tongues and mouths[9] have become the more prosaic and less hyperbolic water-clock, but nevertheless the expression still presents the subject, Meidias' offenses, as beyond the speaker's ability to list them and as potentially innumerable. The speech, then, and the section dealing with Meidias' crimes in particular, represents a selection, but one that could be expanded indefinitely. This selection is to be made by the audience: Demosthenes says (§130) he will read out the catalog and let them decide which crimes they want to hear more about.[10] The possibilities for expansion, then, are not entirely indeterminate. A given member of the jury may

[7] Dem. 21.17: "... and he did not even stop there in his hubris, but so much remained for him that …"
[8] Dem. 21.129: "I could not tell you all the crimes he has committed, nor could you stand listening to them all, nor would there be enough water (in the water-clock) if I had the use of both his and my water added together."
[9] Hom. *Il.* 2.489.
[10] Cf. Dem. 23.18-19 where the speaker Euthykles, after claiming he will prove three things, allows the audience to choose the order in which he presents his proofs.

have wanted to hear more about a certain offense while no one else did. His (and thereafter the reader's) speculation about the circumstances of the crime would keep writing Demosthenes' speech for him.

Another aspect of the speech's structure determined by Meidias' *hubris* is Demosthenes' handling of the subject of his wealth and the manipulation of class consciousness that this involves. Ober characterizes one part of his strategy in the speech thus: "Hence, the speaker puts himself at one with his listeners, average citizens jointly confronted by the egregious display of a rich man's personal wealth."[11] Although Demosthenes does do this repeatedly throughout the speech, there is one passage, as Ober notes, that problematizes his vilification of Meidias as the stereotypical arrogant rich man:

> ὃν γὰρ οὐχ ἱππεῖς, οὐ συνάρχοντες, οὐ φίλοι δύνανται φέρειν, τί τοῦτον εἴπῃ τις; ἐμοὶ μὲν νὴ τὸν Δία καὶ τὸν Ἀπόλλω καὶ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν (εἰρήσεται γάρ, εἴτ' ἄμεινον εἴτε μή,) ὅθ' οὗτος ὡς ἀπήλλαγμαι περιιὼν ἐλογοποίει, ἔνδηλοί τινες ἦσαν ἀχθόμενοι τῶν πάνυ τούτῳ λαλούντων ἡδέως. καὶ νὴ Δί' αὐτοῖς πολλὴ συγγνώμη· οὐ γάρ ἐστι φορητὸς ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ καὶ πλουτεῖ μόνος καὶ λέγειν δύναται μόνος, καὶ πάντες εἰσὶ τούτῳ καθάρματα καὶ πτωχοὶ καὶ οὐδ' ἄνθρωποι.[12]

Here Meidias is described as having alienated even other members of the wealth elite along with his friends. Ober has difficulty reconciling this with the strategy pursued elsewhere in the speech. First he tentatively suggests that "Perhaps Demosthenes inserted this passage to appeal to the sympathy of any wealthy citizens who might be sitting as jurors."[13] However, he then admits that this is unlikely since he would have presumably already alienated them by the previous anti-elitist statements made in the speech. He then concludes,

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[11] Ober (1989), 207-8.

[12] Dem. 21. 197-198: "For the man [Meidias] whom his fellow cavalrymen cannot endure, whom neither his colleagues in office nor even his friends can endure, what should one call such a man? When he was going around claiming that I had dropped the case (against him), to my eyes, by Zeus and Apollo and Athena (for it will be said for better or worse) some of those who willingly consort with him were clearly upset by this. And by Zeus they should be forgiven; for the man is insufferable, but he alone is rich and he alone can speak well, and all men to him are offscourings and beggars and not even human beings."

[13] Ober (2009), 210.

> The passage is best interpreted as an example of the familiar tactic of isolating the opponent completely from the citizen group by depicting him as a renegade whose interests are irreconcilably at odds with the interests of the rest of the citizen population.[14]

While I agree with this interpretation for the most part, it fails to explain the passage's relationship to the overall strategy of the speech. I would argue that the class dynamic is subordinate to the presentation of Meidias' *hubris* as an almost demonic force that threatens the entire city. Meidias as represented by Demosthenes is the one isolating himself even from those closest to him. The claim that he regards everyone else as subhuman is, as MacDowell notes, repeated from a previous passage of the speech (§101), so it is not just a momentary lapse into extreme hyperbole. He is a rich man, yes, and he commits all the offenses that one expects from rich men; however, in addition to this there is something more disturbing at work that threatens both itself and the city as a whole in its striving to assert itself. This comes to a head at the conclusion of the passage cited above when Demosthenes says of Meidias that "the city cannot contain him."[15] In the *Third Philippic* he will say the same thing about Philip: "Neither Greece nor the rest of the earth can contain the ambition of the man."[16] Both men represent the same type of threat, namely that of a megalomaniacal ambition. Wealth is only part of the equation, as becomes clear at the conclusion of this section: πλούσιος, θρασύς, μέγα φρονῶν, μέγα φθεγγόμενος, βίαιος, ἀναιδής, —ποῦ ληφθήσεται, νῦν ἐὰν διακρούσηται;[17] Rich, brash , arrogant.... The catalog of vices has no end and so has to be cut off arbitrarily. In the end Meidias is not just the wicked rich man or the megalomaniac; he's a noxious cloud of vices rapidly expanding in an enclosed space.

[14] Ober (2009), 210.
[15] Dem. 21.200: ἡ πόλις αὐτὸν οὐ χωρεῖ.
[16] Dem. 9.27: οὔθ' ἡ Ἑλλὰς οὔθ' ἡ βάρβαρος τὴν πλεονεξίαν χωρεῖ τἀνθρώπου.
[17] Dem. 21.201 "(Meidias is) Rich, brash, arrogant, a big talker, violent, shameless—where will he ever get caught, if he evades you now?"

Turning to style, there are at least two significant moments where, in discussing Meidias' outrageous behavior, Demosthenes violates the one-focus per clause rule.[18] In a *prokatalepsis*, he anticipates that Meidias will plead anger as an excuse for striking him; to undermine this claim, he makes the following contrast between an action committed spontaneously out of anger and a premeditated crime:

> ἀλλ' ἃ μὲν ἄν τις ἄφνω τὸν λογισμὸν φθάσας ἐξαχθῇ πρᾶξαι, κἂν ὑβριστικῶς ποιήσῃ, δι' ὀργήν γ' ἔνι φῆσαι πεποιηκέναι· ἃ δ' ἂν **ἐκ πολλοῦ συνεχῶς ἐπὶ πολλὰς ἡμέρας παρὰ τοὺς νόμους** πράττων τις φωρᾶται, οὐ μόνον δήπου τοῦ μὴ μετ' ὀργῆς ἀπέχει, ἀλλὰ καὶ βεβουλευμένως ὁ τοιοῦτος ὑβρίζων ἐστὶν ἤδη φανερός.[19]

Based on the first part of the antithesis, one would expect a simple focus in the second that refers to premeditation. Instead, the characterization of the action keeps getting expanded: he was doing it for a long time, and continually over the course of several days, and in contravention of the laws. To suggest the enormity of the crime, Demosthenes squeezes all the iniquity into a single clause rather than distributing its various aspects across several.

This same stylistic phenomenon can be observed again later in the speech. To show the severity of Meidias' offense and his own restraint in not killing him on the spot, Demosthenes cites the case of a man named Euaion, who killed a certain Boiotos for striking him at a dinner party. He makes the following contrast between Euaion's and his own case:

> ὁ[Euaion] μέν γ' ὑπὸ γνωρίμου, καὶ τούτου μεθύοντος, ἐναντίον ἓξ ἢ ἕπτα ἀνθρώπων ἐπλήγη, καὶ τούτων γνωρίμων, … καὶ ταῦτα εἰς οἰκίαν ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ δεῖπνον, οἶ μηδὲ βαδίζειν ἐξῆν αὐτῷ· ἐγὼ δ' **ὑπ' ἐχθροῦ, νήφοντος, ἕωθεν, ὕβρει καὶ οὐκ οἴνῳ τοῦτο ποιοῦντος, ἐναντίον πολλῶν καὶ ξένων καὶ πολιτῶν** ὑβριζόμην, καὶ **ταῦτ' ἐν ἱερῷ καὶ οἷ πολλὴ μοι ἦν ἀνάγκη βαδίζειν χορηγοῦντι**.[20]

[18] H. Dik (1995), 29; Spevak (2010), 44 fn. 28.
[19] Dem. 21.41: "The things that someone is provoked to do suddenly before making any calculation, even if he does them in an insolent way, he can still say that he has acted out of anger; But whatever someone is caught doing after long premeditation, continuously, over the course of many days, in violation of the laws, not only can he not plead anger as an excuse for these, but such a man is clearly at this point being intentionally insolent."
[20] Dem. 21.73-4: "Euaion was struck by an acquaintance who was drunk, and in the presence of six or seven people, who were also acquaintances… and what's more he entered a home which he could just as easily not have done; I, on the other hand, was offended by a personal enemy who was sober, it was at dawn, and he did this out of hubris, not because he was drunk, and he did it in the presence of many foreigners and citizens, and that in a sacred space and one to which I was obligated to go as chorus-leader."

Note the expansion that occurs in the second element of the antithesis: Boiotos was drunk while Meidias was sober, and his crime was committed early in the morning, so he acted out of insolence not inebriation; Boiotos struck Euaion in the presence of six or seven men, while Meidias struck Demosthenes before a large audience of people, and not just any people, but both citizens and foreigners. Finally, note the καί that has been added before the relative clause in the second element, which gives the clause the force of an added outrage. Once again the more one thinks about Meidias' crime, the more outrageous it becomes. Conceptualizing it really involves the arbitrary imposition of a cap at some point, for one could conceivably keep adding elements of iniquity indefinitely.

This brings us back to the very first sentence of the speech:

> Τὴν μὲν ἀσέλγειαν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, καὶ τὴν ὕβριν, ᾗ πρὸς ἅπαντας ἀεὶ χρῆται Μειδίας, οὐδένα οὕθ' ὑμῶν οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν ἀγνοεῖν οἴομαι.[21]

Meidias never stops committing acts of *hubris*, and what's more he manages to abuse every single citizen in the city. Without knowing anything about the rest of the speech, one would be inclined to take this as mere rhetorical trumpery. However, as have I argued, the boundlessness of Meidias' *hubris* plays an important role in determining the structure and style of the speech. We begin with a general characterization of Meidias' behavior, and the speech proceeds to substantiate it with hubristic sentence structure and disposition: Meidias' crimes keep growing on a macro and micro level beyond the bounds of the actual speech.

Toward the beginning of the speech, Demosthenes gives the following outline of its structure:

> ἐξελέγξω δὲ πρῶτον μὲν ὅσ' αὐτὸς ὑβρίσθην, ἔπειθ' ὅσα ὑμεῖς· μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, βίον αὐτοῦ πάντα ἐξετάσω, καὶ δείξω πολλῶν θανάτων, οὐχ ἑνὸς ὄντα ἄξιον.[22]

[21] Dem. 21.1.
[22] Dem. 21.21: "I will show first how many outrages I have suffered, then how many you have. After that, men of Athens, I will also examine the rest of his life, and I will demonstrate that he deserves many deaths, not just one."

MacDowell claims that the speech ends up fulfilling this plan "more or less."[23] However, I would argue that Demosthenes actually proceeds to violate the basic distinction he makes here between the crimes committed against himself and those committed against others. By doing so, he reinforces one of the major goals of the speech, which is to show that it is of no consequence in the end that Meidias offended him as an individual. For he represents a threat to all Athenian society, and the crime was committed against Demosthenes ***qua*** chorus-leader. The distinction between different categories of offense is used as a sort of scaffolding: Demosthenes begins with himself, then shows how Meidias' crimes against him actually involved abuse of others as well, until it becomes clear that in the end the distinction does not really matter.

The first offense narrated, namely Meidias striking Demosthenes at the Dionysia, does in fact only involve himself and Meidias. From there, however, we move to Meidias' involvement in the exchange of liturgies (*antidosis*) which occurred in connection with Demosthenes' prosecution of his guardians. In that incident (§§77-82) Meidias offended not only Demosthenes but also his mother and sister when, after breaking into his home, he spoke to them in an unseemly manner. In connection with the same incident, he next (§§83-101) relates how Meidias, after being prosecuted by him and convicted for slander by an arbitrator named Strato, managed to get this Strato disfranchised for ruling against him. There is an escalation here: the offense against Demosthenes' sister and mother though coarse was relatively minor, and it was still directed at his relatives. Now a random citizen has lost his rights simply for ruling against Meidias. At the beginning of the narrative, Strato is called to come forward; however, because he has been disfranchised, he is not allowed to give testimony. I would argue that by calling this silent witness Demosthenes is using a device made famous by Aeschylus, who in Aristophanes'

[23] MacDowell (1990), 25 fn.6.

Frogs[24] is criticized by Euripides for his use of silent characters like Achilles and Niobe. Bringing Strato before the audience, poor and unjustly deprived of all rights, even of the right to testify, would create a similar feeling of pathos. This feeling is immediately reinforced when he valorizes him as the ideal average citizen[25]: Στράτων Φαληρεύς, ἄνθρωπος πένης μέν τις καὶ ἀπράγμων, ἄλλως δ' οὐ πονηρός, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάνυ χρηστός.[26] This characterization is clearly intended to strike fear into the average jury member: if it could happen to Strato, it could happen to you.

There follows an incident that concerns Demosthenes alone: Meidias' attempt to get him convicted of desertion (§103). However, it is presented in the form of a *praeteritio*; when introducing the matter, he says he is going to pass over it. Then after giving a few more details he emphatically repeats his intention of omitting it (§103). The incident, then, is clearly separated from the main narrative; it supports his case and needs to be mentioned here to maintain the chronological sequence, but it is not part of the escalating series that concludes with the Aristarchus incident that follows.

When introducing this incident, Demosthenes makes it clear that it represents the nadir of Meidias' vicious behavior: ἀλλ' ὃ καὶ δεινόν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ σχέτλιον καὶ κοινὸν ἔμοιγ' ἀσέβημα, οὐκ ἀδίκημα μόνον, τούτῳ πεπρᾶχθαι δοκεῖ, τοῦτ' ἐρῶ.[27] The offense is introduced as an act of impiety that affects the entire community; however, the section of the speech devoted to offenses against others does not strictly begin until §128, and as we will see the actions in question were intended to harm Demosthenes in particular. At the outset of the narrative, then,

[24] Ar. *Frogs*, 911-12.
[25] For the significance of this characterization see Ober (2009), 211.
[26] Dem. 21.83: "Strato of Phaleron, a man poor and uninvolved in political affairs, but in other respects not base but actually altogether decent."
[27] Dem. 21.104: "But, men of Athens, what I think is terrible and wicked and sacrilege, not just a crime, this I will tell you."

Demosthenes is already starting to collapse the divisions he established at the beginning of the speech in §21. The incident concerns the murder and gruesome mutilation of a man named Nikodemos, who had been involved in the unsuccessful prosecution of Demosthenes for desertion.[28] Demosthenes claims that at first Meidias spread a rumor around the city that he had committed the murder (§104). Next, he tried to bribe Nikodemos's relatives into prosecuting him for the crime. When this failed, he started to attack Aristarchus, a mutual friend of himself and Demosthenes, by involving himself in the prosecution in order to injure Demosthenes' reputation by association (§116).[29] Here Meidias reaches a new low: the day before accusing Aristarchus before the Council, he visited him at his home and sat under the same roof with him as if he were innocent and as if they were still friends (§118). According to Demosthenes, then, he did not believe Aristarchus was guilty, but he was willing to betray a friend and make allegations against him on a capital charge just for the sake of the collateral damage it would inflict on Demosthenes. Then he had the temerity to swear to Aristarchus the next day that he had not made any allegations against him and to ask that he serve as intermediary between himself and Demosthenes (§119)! After expressing his outrage about this (§122), he tells the audience that all of them, not just him, should share in his indignation since they as poor average citizens are particularly vulnerable to such abuse from rich men.

Thus concludes the narrative about Aristarchus and the section of the speech devoted to offenses against Demosthenes. I would argue that the structure of this section does two things: First, it purports to focus on Demosthenes as an individual victim while simultaneously drawing attention away from him toward other victims like Strato and Aristarchus, the lives of whom Meidias has destroyed in his attacks on Demosthenes. There is no distinct boundary drawn

[28] For discussion of our sources of information on the murder, see Macdowell (1990), 328-31.
[29] See Macdowell (1990) *ad loc*.

between the latter and these other victims. Thus the division he established at the beginning of the speech between offenses against himself and those against the audience as representatives of the city is shown to be non-existent; there is no purely private element to the case. Thinking about offenses against Demosthenes necessarily also involves thinking about what Meidias did to Strato and Aristarchus. This claim is made explicitly at the conclusion of the section:

> οὐκ ἔστ' ἐφ' ὅτῳ τῶν πεπραγμένων ἐγὼ μόνος ἠδίκημαι, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς εἰς τὸν χορὸν γεγενημένοις ἀδικήμασιν ἡ φυλή, τὸ δέκατον μέρος ὑμῶν, συνηδίκηται, ἐπὶ δ' οἷς ἔμ' ὕβρισεν καὶ ἐπεβούλευσεν οἱ νόμοι, δι' οὓς εἷς ἕκαστος ὑμῶν σῶς ἐστιν·[30]

The removal of the private element is complemented by the implicit claim made by the structure that any given person in the city represents a potential victim. At first, only Demosthenes' relatives are affected when Meidias uses obscene language in the presence of his mother and sister. Next, Strato, who has no personal connection with him, is disfranchised for deciding an arbitration in his favor. Finally, Aristarchus, who has done nothing to help him or harm Meidias and who is, moreover, Meidias' friend, is accused of murder just to harm Demosthenes indirectly. There is thus an escalation of viciousness from attack on a victim's relatives, then on those who have aided him, then finally on one's own friend simply because he is associated with him. If Meidias is willing to attack his own friends, who's safe? There is also a connection here with the claim made twice in the speech (§101 and §198) that Meidias regards everyone else as mere offscourings and as not even human. With Meidias' demand that his friend Aristarchus not only be convicted of Nikodemos' murder but also that he be executed for it (§116), one gets the disturbing feeling that everyone, even his friends, are just so many disposable pawns.

[30] Dem. 21.126: "There is not one of Meidias' crimes in which I alone have been unjustly treated, but rather my tribe, which represents a tenth of you, was harmed by the crimes he committed against the chorus I led, and in his offenses and plots against me the laws were violated through which each one of you remains in a state of security."

ii. The State of the Text

As I have demonstrated in the preceding section, the text of the *Meidias* seems to represent an almost fully elaborated version of a speech that could have been delivered in court insofar as its structure is characterized by an overall unity (Meidias' *hubris*) and exhibits a careful articulation into parts (the organization of the charges Demosthenes brings against him). However, there are other elements of the speech's composition as well as external evidence that precludes one from regarding it as a finished work.

Much ink has been spilled on two related questions: Did this case actually go to trial, and would the text of the speech actually have been presentable as it has been preserved for us?[31] With regard to the first issue, I agree with MacDowell that, without new evidence, "the question must remain open."[32] For one of the key pieces of evidence, Aeschines' claim that Demosthenes "sold" the case for thirty minas, may either mean that he dropped the case before going to trial or that he agreed to propose a much less severe penalty than he would have otherwise. With regard to the second, there was a general consensus before Erbse that there were serious defects in the speech's disposition and thus that it represented an incomplete draft.[33] Erbse, however, contended "… daß die Midiana nicht nur zu Ende geführt, sondern wahrhaftig vollendet ist…"[34] One of the main pieces of evidence cited by previous scholars for the claim that the speech was in some sense provisional was the repetition of the extended analogy of life to an *eranos* or meal to which each guest contributed a share(§101, §§184-5). Erbse, however, asserted that this analogy was rhetorically suited to both passages and that the changes to the wording in the

[31] For surveys of the longstanding debate on the first question, see Harris (1989), 117 ff. and MacDowell (1990), 23-28.
[32] MacDowell (1990), 28.
[33] For bibliography of nineteenth century views, see Blass (1893) III.1, 339, fn. 1.
[34] Erbse (1956), 137.

second occurrence are significant; he concluded on the basis of these arguments that both analogies could have been presented in the actual speech. MacDowell, however, persuasively refutes this claim by pointing to the fact that the second time the analogy occurs, it is presented as a new idea and not as one that had been introduced earlier.[35] I would note further the degree of elaboration and the originality of the analogy as supporting arguments: a brief, trite analogy might be repeated, but a long, novel one could not, at least not without justification.

As further evidence for the claim that the speech is just a draft, two further aspects of the speech's disposition have been cited: first, in two passages where Demosthenes has a law read out (§94, §113), he does not, in contrast to his usual practice, comment on its significance; second, sections 213-18 seem to cover the same ground as 208-212, so it is unlikely that he would have included both in the final speech.[36] In light of all these arguments, I concur with MacDowell that the text of the *Meidias* that has been preserved for us represents something like a draft.

The aforementioned defects in the speech's disposition would have been just as conspicuous to fourth-century readers. By modern scholars they have universally been regarded as accidental elements that have to be read around or emended. So Weil, arguing that the speech was never delivered, claims that it must have been left behind by Demosthenes among his "papers" and that it was only posthumously published.[37] MacDowell, in turn, suggests the following as a possibility: "… if the speech had been a success and people were clamouring to read it, he may have allowed copies of the written draft to be made at once, without holding it back for further revision."[38] Both of these explanations are plausible, but they assume that the

[35] MacDowell (1990), 27.
[36] Weil (1883), 103; MacDowell (1990), 26-27.
[37] Weil (1883), 105-6.
[38] MacDowell (1990), 28.

unrevised state of the speech is simply a deficiency. I will argue, by contrast, that for fourth-century readers the incompleteness of the work would have had several positive functions. As I mentioned at the beginning of the Introduction, Demosthenes according to Plutarch claimed that his speeches were neither written nor altogether unwritten.[39] Dealing with this paradox, I would argue, is fundamental to interpreting the *Meidias*.

At one point in the speech Demosthenes anticipates that Meidias will claim that he carefully prepared the whole speech before the trial: Τάχα τοίνυν ἴσως καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτ' ἐρεῖ, ὡς ἐσκεμμένα καὶ παρεσκευασμένα πάντα λέγω νῦν.[40] He responds not by denying the claim but by partially admitting to its validity: ἐγὼ δ' ἐσκέφθαι μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, φημὶ καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀρνηθείην, καὶ μεμελετηκέναι γ' ὡς ἐνῆν μάλιστ' ἐμοί.[41] So he gave it a lot of thought, and he practiced delivering it as much as possible. But did he write the whole thing out? This question is given an evasive answer:

> (φημὶ) γεγραφέναι μέντοι μοι τὸν λόγον Μειδίαν· ὁ γὰρ τὰ ἔργα παρεσχηκὼς περὶ ὧν εἰσιν οἱ λόγοι δικαιότατ' ἂν ταύτην ἔχοι τὴν αἰτίαν, οὐχ ὁ ἐσκεμμένος οὐδ' ὁ μεριμνήσας τὰ δίκαια λέγειν νῦν.[42]

For the members of the jury, then, the issue is simply deflected by a clever shift of focus. The reader, however, has a written text right in front of him. However, as discussed above, it clearly does not represent the speech as delivered. Accordingly, Demosthenes' caginess within the speech itself about his preparation for the trial is complemented by the state in which the text has been preserved. Demosthenes, as he himself says, gave the case a lot of thought, and he must

[39] Plut. *Dem.* 8.5: ... οὔτε γράψας οὔτ' ἄγραφα κομιδῇ λέγειν ὠμολόγει.
[40] Dem. 21.191: "And so perhaps he will also claim that I am now delivering a speech that has been thought out and prepared in advance."
[41] Dem. 21.191: "I admit, men of Athens, and I would not deny that I considered what I was going to say and that I practiced delivering my speech as much as possible."
[42] Dem. 21.191: "However, I would also say that Meidias has written my speech for me; for the one who furnished the actions to which the words pertain would incur this charge most justly, not the man who thought about them and who was concerned to speak justly now."

have rehearsed what he was going to say, but the composition is still in a somewhat fluid form, and there are holes that have to be filled.

If Demosthenes were involved in teaching oratory,[43] distributing a speech in this state would have had definite advantages. Based on the fact that he thinks Meidias may criticize him for writing his speech out in advance, it is possible that he had already at this point in his career gained a reputation for doing this. This conclusion is supported by Aeschines' invective a few years later: in *Against Timarchus* he calls him a 'craftsman of speeches'(τεχνίτου λόγων),[44] and in his defense speech *On the Embassy* he contemptuously refers to a written text when relating Demosthenes' infamous performance anxiety before Philip.[45] A speech in draft form, and especially one that explicitly drew attention to the issue of writing, could have served as a rebuttal to such criticisms.

Indeed, in a certain sense a draft represents the optimal response. Alcidamas in his polemic against written speeches in favor of extempore composition had claimed that mixing improvisation with prepared elements was a bad idea since it would cause the speech to seem heterogeneous.[46] However, the text of the *Meidias* leaves room for a substantial amount of improvised material: the elaboration of the catalog of Meidias' crimes (§§128-131) would have presumably been one of the most engaging and memorable sections of the speech, and then there are the two laws for which Demosthenes would have had to improvise an apposite interpretation. The draft implicitly rejects Alcidamas' claim, and, based on its quality, it would have been

[43] For this possibility, see the passage from Aeschines discussed in the Introduction on pg. 12 fn. 26.
[44] Aeschin. 1.170.
[45] Aeschin. 2.34.
[46] Alcid. fr.1 line 84: ἀνάγκη δ' ἐστίν, ὅταν τις τὰ μὲν αὐτοσχεδιάζῃ, τὰ δὲ τυποῖ, τὸν λόγον ἀνόμοιον ὄντα ψόγον τῷ λέγοντι παρασκευάζειν, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὑποκρίσει καὶ ῥαψῳδίᾳ παραπλήσια δοκεῖν εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ταπεινὰ καὶ φαῦλα φαίνεσθαι παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνων ἀκρίβειαν.

tantalizing to aspiring young orators: the text we have is so brilliant; now we want to know how Demosthenes seamlessly integrated the improvised bits.

In his criticism of writing Plato likens written texts to paintings which seem alive but which, when questioned, remain silent and can only ever say the same thing.[47] A written speech, then, is a dead thing, a mere semblance; for it cannot move, cannot respond to stimuli. Using this analogy, what would one say about a draft? Its body has no definitive form, and one cannot determine with any certainty the amount of further metamorphosis it might undergo before being realized as the animal of the speech. And so, if its form is never finalized in writing, it retains indefinitely the potential to be born as any number of speeches; it lives as an embryo. Blass tells us that the *Meidias* is one of Demosthenes' greatest masterpieces—*if* we ignore the lack of revision: "indes hiervon und von der mangelnden Ausarbeitung abgesehen, wüsste ich kaum, worin diese Rede irgend einer der andern nachstünde."[48] For the fourth-century reader, by contrast, this lack of revision would have contributed to the effect the speech had on him. For it is not a dead thing, and Demosthenes is not dead with it. He along with the speech remains alive in the possible coming to be of the speech in delivery (and recitation), yet they always lie just beyond the reader's grasp. He can never know with any certainty whether, by rearranging some sections here, some sections there or by excising a bit there, and maybe expanding that argument a touch, he is actually reconstructing the speech as delivered (assuming it was delivered). That is of course lost forever, but through the draft, so full of vigor and high passion, it perpetually tantalizes.

[47] Pl. *Phdr.* 275d-e.
[48] Blass (1893) III.1, 341.

B. *On the False Embassy*

There has been disagreement among scholars concerning the formal qualities of the structure of Demosthenes' *On the False Embassy*. Blass admitted that he could understand why the speech's disposition had been criticized, but he himself rejected the "faults" that had been cited and attributed criticism of the speech to a misguided approach to structural analysis:

> ... das rhetorische Schema hat sich Demosthenes so wenig wie sein Lehrer Isaios zur hindernden Fessel werden lassen. Aber das ist der Irrthum auch jener Neueren, welche in der Rede Anstösse finden, dass sie dieselbe in das Schema einzwängen und nun, was überschiesst, oder sonst nicht hineinpasst, zu entfernen suchen.[49]

If one would just stop being so procrustean in his analysis, he would be able to admire how Demosthenes—who is always freer than everyone else—manages to blend various disparate structural elements together into a seamless whole.[50] Pearson, in turn, following Blass admires "... how ingeniously narrative is blended with argument, refutation with *paradeigma*, ridicule with appeals to patriotic sentiment...."[51]

In the other camp, Taylor made the general claim that "per totam enim orationem mirum in modum omnia sunt conturbata."[52] Spengel, taking issue with the manner in which the speech ends in particular, concluded that the ordering must have become confused somehow in the process of transmission, and he attempts to redress this by rearranging sections in certain cases.[53] Finally, MacDowell makes a distinction between the first half of the speech (§§1-178), which he regards as tightly structured and which he claims "... could well have been delivered almost exactly as it stands," and the second half, which "is more miscellaneous" and which lacks "an overall logical structure."[54] He speculates that Demosthenes intended to deliver the whole of the

[49] Blass (1893) III.1, 362-3. Cf. Franke (1846), 16.
[50] Cf. Adams (1927), 57.
[51] Pearson (1976), 175.
[52] Taylor's remarks are collected in Schäfer (1824), 570.
[53] Spengel (1861).
[54] MacDowell (2000), 27-28.

first half and then would have tried to include as much material from the second as he had time for.[55]

As with the *Meidias*, we are clearly dealing with a text that is in some sense a draft. Philocrates went into exile before Aeschines' trial, but in the text of Demosthenes' speech he is repeatedly referred to as still being present in Athens.[56] In addition, there are several remarks of Demosthenes referred to by Aeschines in his speech that are not found in the text we have. Finally, the text is too long to be presented in court,[57] although this could of course be the result of revisions made after the trial.

I will argue, based primarily on the relationship between the proem and the "halfway point" but also on comparative evidence, that there is a serious problem with the structure of *On the False Embassy*. Without any clear indicator in the speech itself, the reader has to decide how to deal with a conclusion that is not really a conclusion. MacDowell's suggestion that Demosthenes would have delivered the entire first half of the speech and then would have tried to fit in as much as possible from the second oversimplifies the matter.

When outlining the plan of the speech, Demosthenes restricts himself to questions directly pertinent to Aeschines' conduct in the Assembly and during the embassies to Philip:

> ἂν μὲν τοίνυν ἐξελέγξω καὶ δείξω σαφῶς Αἰσχίνην τουτονὶ καὶ μηδὲν ἀληθὲς ἀπηγγελκότα καὶ κεκωλυκότα ἐμοῦ τὸν δῆμον ἀκοῦσαι τἀληθῆ, καὶ πάντα τἀναντία τῶν συμφερόντων συμβεβουλευκότα, καὶ μηδὲν ὧν προσετάξατε ἐν τῇ πρεσβείᾳ πεποιηκότα, καὶ ἀνηλωκότα τοὺς χρόνους ἐν οἷς πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων πραγμάτων καιροὶ προεῖνται τῇ πόλει, καὶ πάντων τούτων δῶρα καὶ μισθοὺς εἰληφότα μετὰ Φιλοκράτους, καταψηφίσασθε αὐτοῦ καὶ δίκην ἀξίαν τῶν ἀδικημάτων λάβετε.[58]

[55] *Ibid.*, 27.
[56] E.g. §§229-231, §328.
[57] MacDowell (2000), 23.
[58] Dem. 19.8: "And so if I clearly prove and demonstrate that Aeschines here has said nothing true in his report and has prevented the people from hearing the truth from me, and that all of his counsel has been contrary to what is expedient for the city, and that he has done none of the things that you ordered him to on the embassy, and further that he has wasted the occasions on which opportunities involving many great events have been lost for the city, and finally that in exchange for all these things he has received gifts and pay along with Philocrates, then vote against him and exact a penalty worthy of his crimes."

The first half of the speech (through §178) then faithfully proceeds to attempt to substantiate these claims, and with little digression.[59] Then, at section 177, the speech seems to be coming to an end:

> Συλλογίσασθαι δὴ βούλομαι τὰ κατηγορημένα ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, ἵν' ὅσα ὑμῖν ὑπεσχόμην ἀρχόμενος τοῦ λόγου δείξω πεποιηκώς. ἐπέδειξα οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς ἀπηγγελκότα, ἀλλὰ φενακίσανθ' ὑμᾶς, μάρτυσι τοῖς γεγενημένοις αὐτοῖς, οὐ λόγοις χρώμενος. ἐπέδειξα αἴτιον γεγενημένον τοῦ μὴ 'θέλειν ὑμᾶς ἀκούειν ἐμοῦ τἀληθῆ ταῖς ὑποσχέσεσιν καὶ τοῖς ἐπαγγέλμασιν τοῖς τούτου καταληφθέντας τότε, πάντα τἀναντία συμβουλεύσαντα ἢ ἔδει, καὶ τῇ μὲν τῶν συμμάχων ἀντειπόντα εἰρήνῃ, τῇ δὲ Φιλοκράτους συναγορεύσαντα, τοὺς χρόνους κατατρίψαντα, ἵνα μηδ' εἰ βούλοισθε δύναισθε ἐξελθεῖν εἰς Φωκέας, καὶ ἄλλα ἐπὶ τῆς ἀποδημίας πολλὰ καὶ δείν' εἰργασμένον, προδεδωκότα πάντα, πεπρακότα, δῶρα ἔχοντα, οὐδὲν ἐλλελοιπότα μοχθηρίας. οὐκοῦν ταῦθ' ὑπεσχόμην ἐν ἀρχῇ, ταῦτ' ἐπέδειξα.[60]

Demosthenes emphatically refers back to the proem here and says that he wants to demonstrate that he has fulfilled all of the promises he made there; he then proceeds to claim that he has substantiated all of his charges. The passage concludes with emphatic anaphora (ταῦθ'... ταῦτ'). What more, then, is there to prove? These things Demosthenes promised, these things he has shown. It seems as though it should be time for the epilogue. Instead, the next section begins: ὁρᾶτε τοίνυν **τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα**· ἁπλοῦς γάρ ἐσθ' ὁ μέλλων λόγος οὑτοσὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἤδη.[61] There is no attempt to bind what follows with what preceded; the rest of the speech is simply "the things after these things." Further, the reference to "the account I am going to give you" can hardly refer to anything but the immediately following section or sections, unless we are to regard the

[59] Sections 67-69 are the only major digression I note. In these sections Demosthenes elaborates at length on the paradox that the treacherous men like Aeschines who have been furthering Philip's interests actually turned out to be more wicked than he could have hoped for.

[60] Dem. 19.177-78: "I desire, then, to tally up the accusations I have made from the beginning of the speech so that I can show that I have fulfilled all the promises I made to you when I began. By using the events themselves, not mere words, I have shown that he reported nothing true, but that instead he deceived you. I have shown that he was responsible for your unwillingness to hear the truth from me because you were taken in by his promises and his claims at that time, and (I have shown) that all of his counsel was contrary to what was necessary and that, while he opposed the peace proposal of the allies, he supported that of Philocrates, all the while wasting time so that you would not be able to march out in support of the Phocians even if you wanted to. (I have also shown) that he did many other terrible things in his absence from the city, that he abandoned everything, sold everything, received gifts and left no element of baseness untried. And so these things I promised in the beginning of my speech, and these things I have shown."

[61] Dem.19.179: **"**And so examine the things after these things; for the account I am going to give you now is simple."

whole (involved) second half of the speech as "simple." Accordingly, Demosthenes does not preface the second half of the speech with any sort of outline that would give the audience a general idea of its purpose; it's just what comes next. Also, as I mentioned above, the proem to the speech as a whole gave no indication that it would include anything but a demonstration of the claims made there, which all have already been fulfilled.

These structural problems become even more striking when one compares Demosthenes' practice in the *Meidias* and *On the Crown*, both of which also contain extensive sections devoted to personal attacks on his opponent. In the former, Demosthenes tells his audience toward the beginning of the speech that he intends to discuss crimes committed by Meidias that are not strictly relevant to the case at hand:

> Τὰ μὲν οὖν εἰς ἐμὲ καὶ τοὺς φυλέτας ἠσελγημένα καὶ περὶ τὴν ἑορτὴν ἀδικήματα τούτῳ πεπραγμένα, ἐφ' οἷς αὐτὸν προὐβαλόμην, ταῦτ' ἔστιν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ πόλλ' ἕτερα, ὧν ὅσ' ἂν οἷός τ' ὦ διέξειμι πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτίκα δὴ μάλα.[62]

The description of Meidias' other crimes here is vague, but at least the audience knows what to expect. A few sections later, a more detailed outline is given:

> ἐξελέγξω δὲ πρῶτον μὲν ὅσ' αὐτὸς ὑβρίσθην, ἔπειθ' ὅσ' ὑμεῖς· μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, βίον αὐτοῦ πάντ' ἐξετάσω, καὶ δείξω πολλῶν θανάτων, οὐχ ἑνὸς ὄντ' ἄξιον.[63]

The last section of the speech will cover "the rest of his life." This too is of course quite vague, but it shows that Demosthenes was willing to include the more miscellaneous elements of a speech in the outline given in a proem. He could very easily have done the same in *On the False Embassy*, but again there the outline is restricted to matters more or less directly relevant to the case.

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[62] Dem. 21.19: "And so these, men of Athens, are the offenses he committed against me and the crimes pertaining to the festival, on the basis of which I brought him to trial. There are also many others, and I will presently go through with you as many of them as I am able."

[63] Dem. 21.21: "I will show first how many outrages I have suffered, then how many you have. After that, men of Athens, I will also examine the rest of his life, and I will demonstrate that he deserves many deaths, not just one."

In the proem of *On the Crown*, the famous invective against Aeschines is included in the outline:

> τοῦτο παντελῶς εὖηθες ᾠήθης, τοὺς περὶ τῶν πεπραγμένων καὶ πεπολιτευμένων λόγους ἀφέντα με πρὸς τὰς λοιδορίας τὰς παρὰ σοῦ τρέψεσθαι. οὐ δὴ ποιήσω τοῦτο· οὐχ οὕτω τετύφωμαι· ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ μὲν τῶν πεπολιτευμένων ἃ κατεψεύδου καὶ διέβαλλες ἐξετάσω, τῆς δὲ πομπείας ταύτης τῆς ἀνέδην γεγενημένης, ὕστερον, ἂν βουλομένοις ᾖ τουτοισί, μνησθήσομαι …[64]

First come the political issues, then—and only if the jury wants to hear it— all the fun bits. Thus sections of the speech not directly relevant to the case are only included because Aeschines made personal attacks in his speech, and because the audience may want to hear them. Since *On the False Embassy* is a speech for the prosecution, Demosthenes could not of course have justified the less relevant elements in the same way; however, they could easily have been introduced by a *prokatalepsis*, for example, "I hear that Aeschines is going to make such and such a criticism of me in his speech, so, after substantiating all the charges I have made, I will make mention of these other matters—if you want to hear it."

For those who had read the *Meidias* and *On the Crown*, then, the omission of any mention of the second half of the speech in the proem would have been especially conspicuous. However, based on the internal and external evidence mentioned above, they would also have been aware that the speech was in some sense unfinished. What, then, did Demosthenes do to this draft on a structural level to produce a more cohesive speech? MacDowell does not have a problem with the proem or the way the speech seems to conclude midway through; he speculates, as I mentioned above, that Demosthenes would have delivered the first half, then would have tried to squeeze in as much as possible from the second half. However, there are two problems with this position: first, it does not address the deficiency in the proem or explain why

[64] Dem. 18.11: "… you[Aeschines] had this altogether silly idea that I would omit any words about political events and would instead address your personal abuse of me. I will not do this; I am not out of my mind. Rather, I will examine my political activities, which you kept lying about and slandering, and then, if these men of the jury are willing to hear it, I will make mention of some of your profuse ribaldry ..."

the speech gives the impression of concluding midway through; second, it overlooks a problem within the structure of the second half. At section 315, Demosthenes introduces a chronological summary of the ways in which Philip came to dominate Athens by enlisting the services of traitors like Aeschines. This summary ends apocalyptically: "all Athens' affairs have been destroyed" (§325) and "The whole business has turned out like a puzzle for Athens."[65] This would seem to represent the climax of the speech, with all of Athens being destroyed in some sense by Aeschines' treachery.[66] But then, instead of ending, the speech continues with another *prokatalepsis*, namely that someone had told Demosthenes as he was entering court that Aeschines was preparing to accuse Chares.[67] Slameczka, noting that this passage and the one that follows about Aeschines' voice are only loosely integrated within and indeed are unsuitable to their context, conjectured that they were only inserted after the trial so as to better address certain aspects of Aeschines' speech.[68] Schaefer, on the other hand, argued that the section does have an important function, for, in the course of objecting to Aeschines' supposed accusation of Chares, Demosthenes gives himself the opportunity to repeat his warning to the jury that they should not let Aeschines base his defense on events not pertinent to the accusation.[69] It might be an anticlimax, then, but at least it is one with a definite purpose.

So there might be a justification for the *prokatalepsis* on Chares. However, the passage that follows is even more difficult to explain. The *prokatalepsis* ends with the claim that, if the audience keeps an eye on Aeschines, he will not know what to say, and his beautiful voice will be useless (§336). This reference serves as a segue to an extended discussion of his voice and of

[65] Dem. 19.328 (tr. MacDowell) : γέγονεν τὰ πράγματα πάνθ' ὥσπερ αἴνιγμα τῇ πόλει.
[66] Cf. Slameczka (1885), 44: "Er gibt also hiemit indirect die Versicherung, er stehe am Schlusse und habe eigentlich nichts weiter vorzubringen."
[67] Dem. 19.332.
[68] Slameczka (1885), 43.
[69] A. Schaefer (1885) II, 400.

why the audience should not let it affect them (§§337-340). Again, after all of Athens has been destroyed, it is something of an anticlimax to move to the seductive qualities of Aeschines' voice. Because of this structural problem and because Demosthenes already warned the audience about Aeschines' voice earlier in the speech (§199), Busse speculated that these sections might have been improvised by Demosthenes on the day of the trial and then added to the text when he was preparing it for distribution.[70] However, if this was the case, one might have still expected Demosthenes to make some attempt to better integrate the new material.

In light of the aforementioned issues with the proem, the midway point, and the order of arguments at the end of the second half of the speech, I would argue that the work is more of a draft than MacDowell would claim. One should entertain the possibility that some of the material from the second half could have been moved to the first half when the speech was actually delivered. For instance, at the end of section 120 Demosthenes implicitly criticizes Aeschines for his prosecution of Timarchus and mocks him for his previous career as an actor.[71] This would be a more appropriate context for addressing the dangers of his voice. Also, one could imagine the extended warning against treachery in 258 being placed at the beginning of the speech. However, because the first half is so cogent and tightly structured, it is difficult to imagine the limit case in which all or even a significant amount of the material from the second would be incorporated into the first half. Some sort of division, then, is necessary.

Having failed to find a way to resolve this structural problem either within the speech itself or by comparing it with other works of Demosthenes, the reader is left at an impasse as to

[70] Busse (1880), 42: Neque tamen crediderim oratorem eam rem (Aeschines' voice) in commentario priore loco sane minus commodo repetivisse. Veri similius videtur Demosthenem, cum ad finem orationis pervenisset, ea verba ex tempore dicendo addidisse et postea orationi edendae ascripsisse.
[71] Dem. 19.120: ὃς γὰρ ἀγῶνας καινοὺς ὥσπερ δράματα, καὶ τούτους ἀμαρτύρους, πρὸς διαμεμετρημένην τὴν ἡμέραν αἱρεῖς διώκων, δῆλον ὅτι πάνδεινος εἶ τις.

what to do with the structure. There is also the problem of the speech's length, for, as mentioned at the beginning of this section, it is too long to have been delivered in court in its current form. As a result, it cannot serve as a paradigm for those readers who wished to model their own orations on those of Demosthenes. If in spite of this it still formed a cohesive whole, still looked like a single well-formed animal rather than conjoined twins, one could enjoy it as a sort of ideal form of the prosecution of Aeschines, but as it stands the speech's superfluous length is palpable, and amputation feels necessary.

Apparently not just amputation, though. Aeschines in his defense speech refers to two remarks made by Demosthenes that are not found in our text: one involves Aeschines covertly traveling by night in a single person canoe down the river Loedias for a secret meeting with Philip (2.124), the other a comparison of Aeschines with Dionysios, the tyrant of Sicily (2.10); the latter also included a reference to some dream the priestess of Sicily had. Aeschines' brief references alone are enough to suggest the sensational nature of the material, and the reader's curiosity is piqued without any possibility of satisfaction. Buckler suggests that Demosthenes at some point decided to substitute the canoe incident for the account of the secret meeting that occurs in our text (§175).[72] This would mean that he altered and may have improvised on not only the more miscellaneous second but even on the tightly structured first half. One should be hesitant, then, to assume that any given part of the text we have represents the final version.

In the previous section, I argued that Meidias' *hubris* could be seen as the primary structural and stylistic determinant of the work: the whole form of the speech is carefully calculated to reflect just how outrageous and boundless Meidias' insolence is. In *On the False Embassy*, by contrast, this sort of unifying structural determinant is lacking. From the proem we

[72] Buckler (2000), 150.

might expect it to be the figure of the bad ambassador, but this only holds for the first half of the speech. After that, the portrayal of Aeschines devolves into an assortment of vices that paint him as a generally vile character. Thus the second half of the speech can be seen not as paradigmatic of Demosthenes' refusal to be constrained by a rigid rhetorical schema but rather as a set of brilliant pieces still in need of a keystone.

The question, then, becomes why Demosthenes would have distributed the speech in this state. Blass may well be right that his primary goal was to respond to Aeschines' publication of his speech: even if the work does suffer from some structural problems, it nevertheless does still present a compelling accusation of Aeschines' actions as ambassador, so perhaps he was willing to have an unrevised composition distributed for the sake of political gain. However, I argued that in the case of the *Meidias* distributing the speech in an unrevised state would also have held rhetorical as well as aesthetic advantages. Is this the case for *On the False Embassy*? On the one hand, the accusation that Demosthenes is a crafty speechwriter is not broached this time, so there is nothing within the speech itself that would suggest any further need to address this criticism. However, in his famous account of Demosthenes' performance anxiety before Philip Aeschines does mock him for not being able to deviate from his written text.[73] Further, due especially to its length but also to its glaring structural problems, the text of *On the False Embassy*, if it is the final written draft of the speech, does clearly show that Demosthenes did not simply read or memorize a definitive text in preparation for delivering a speech. As a sort of ἐπάγγελμα, then, the speech is in its way quite brilliant: I for one along with all those fusty nineteenth-century scholars of oratory am dying to know what sort of alchemy he exercised on the text to turn it into a unified whole. With all this said, though, Aeschines only ridicules Demosthenes' inability to

[73] Aeschin. 2.35.

improvise in passing, so it seems unlikely that the lack of revision in this case was meant to have any positive effect on the reading experience.

In the end, reading *On the False Embassy* is a frustratingly aporetic experience. The first half of the speech is vigorous and well-formed, and the second half, though it suffers from a lack of structure, contains some of its most famous passages, for example the narrative of Aeschines' abuse of the Olynthian slave girl and the comparison of treachery to a disease afflicting all of Greece. After what seems like a conclusion at 178, one oscillates between a state of restlessness wondering why the speech keeps going and going and going and engagement with whatever bits happen to strike his fancy. Perhaps one should return to Rehdantz's idea of "eine lebendige Wechselwirkung zwischen Redner und Hörer"[74] here: when delivering any given section of the second half of the speech, Demosthenes would have gauged his audience's response and chosen the next section accordingly.

2. The Deliberative Speeches

A. The *Olynthiacs* and *Philippics*

By way of preface the status of deliberative oratory as a more or less distinct genre must be established; for, if there were no generic boundary between deliberative and forensic oratory, then the initial publication of Demosthenes' deliberative speeches would lose much of its significance. For Aristotle there is a clear set of criteria that distinguishes the two with respect to both form and content. With regard to the former, deliberative speeches do not need a proem (1414a30-b7), and narration is superfluous since the audience is already familiar with the

[74] Rehdantz (1886) commenting on Dem. *2 Ol.* 8.

situation (1414b8-9). As for content, the goal (*telos*) of deliberative oratory is what is expedient for the *polis,* while the goal of forensic is establishing whether an action was just or unjust; accordingly, the former deals with the future, the latter with the past. Anaximenes, too, distinguishes between the two on the level of both content and form: after dividing oratory into three types, he proceeds to discuss arguments proper to deliberative oratory (1.3), and, in the preface to his discussion of structure, he says that the will give prescriptions based on genre (28.5).

For Isocrates the situation is more complicated,[75] but nevertheless at the very least he creates a strong contrast between the gutter genre of private trial speeches and his own elevated "political speeches" (πολιτικοὶ λόγοι). In the *Antidosis,* he describes the class of orators to which he himself belongs in the following way:

> Εἰσὶν γάρ τινες οἳ τῶν μὲν προειρημένων οὐκ ἀπείρως ἔχουσιν, γράφειν δὲ προῄρηνται λόγους, οὐ περὶ τῶν ὑμετέρων συμβολαίων, ἀλλ' Ἑλληνικοὺς καὶ πολιτικοὺς καὶ πανηγυρικοὺς, οὓς ἅπαντες ἂν φήσειαν ὁμοιοτέρους εἶναι τοῖς μετὰ μουσικῆς καὶ ῥυθμῶν πεποιημένοις ἢ τοῖς ἐν δικαστηρίῳ λεγομένοις. Καὶ γὰρ τῇ λέξει ποιητικωτέρᾳ καὶ ποικιλωτέρᾳ τὰς πράξεις δηλοῦσιν, καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν ὀγκωδεστέροις καὶ καινοτέροις χρῆσθαι ζητοῦσιν …[76]

Isocrates' political oratory is superior to forensic formally and substantially; it employs a more ornate, poetical style, and its arguments are more weighty. Although the "genre" of political oratory referred to here clearly has to be distinguished from deliberative oratory more narrowly defined, nevertheless, when taken together with Aristotle and Anaximenes, it suggests that readers of Demosthenes at the very least would have made some basic distinction between forensic and deliberative oratory, with the latter being more elevated and broader in scope.

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[75] For the problem of determining the generic status of Isocrates' own speeches and for discussion of his views on genre, see Too (1995), 13-35 and Papillon (1996), 377.

[76] Isoc. 15.46-7: "For there are those who are not ignorant of the genres of prose mentioned above, but who have chosen to write speeches not about your petty contract disputes but rather ones that are Greek, political, and elevated, which all men would say more closely resemble pieces composed for musical accompaniment and in meter than the things that are said in court. For indeed they relate events in a style that is more poetic and ornate, and they seek to employ arguments that are weightier and more novel …"

It is also important to note that while the *raison d'être* of the written text of a forensic speech is clear, that of a deliberative speech is not. Logographers presumably distributed their speeches to attract clients,[77] and they may also have been motivated by a desire to enhance their literary reputation more generally among connoisseurs of the genre.[78] Men involved in political life, however, as Phaedrus's remark in the eponymous dialogue of Plato indicates, had strong reasons for not publishing their speeches:

> καὶ σύνοισθά που καὶ αὐτὸς ὅτι οἱ μέγιστον δυνάμενοί τε καὶ σεμνότατοι ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν αἰσχύνονται λόγους τε γράφειν καὶ καταλείπειν συγγράμματα ἑαυτῶν, δόξαν φοβούμενοι τοῦ ἔπειτα χρόνου, μὴ σοφισταὶ καλῶνται.[79]

By circulating his speeches in written form, an orator risked being remembered not as a statesman who spoke in the interest of his fatherland but rather as a self-interested sophist. The mere existence, then, of the text of a deliberative speech potentially compromised the reputation of its author. This would have been particularly true for Demosthenes who, as I have discussed at length in the preceding sections, had developed something of a reputation for writing out his speeches in advance. As Usher argues, however, we should not neglect the profound influence Isocrates exercised on the intellectual climate of Athens in the years between the *Phaedrus* and the beginning of Demosthenes' political career:

> Isocrates' school was a symptom of, and perhaps a catalyst for, the growth of interest in political discourse; and he stimulated this further by circulating his teaching in rhetorical form in works which articulate his views on politics, literature, and his own individual brand of philosophy. For present purposes the main interest is upon the effect which Isocrates' teaching and writing had on Demosthenes. They established a literary genre and opened up a stage on which he could display his talents and advance his career.[80]

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[77] Kennedy (1963), 128; Usher (1976), 38; and Worthington (1993), 192.
[78] For this possibility see Usher (1999) and Dover (1968), 170: "We must remember that when a written version of a speech was put into circulation it was not designed for compilers of law reports or for historians and scholars, but for four categories of reader: the partisan, the floating voter, the would-be politician and the connoisseur."
[79] Pl. *Phdr.* 257d: "And you yourself are also aware, I suppose, that those who have the most authority and are most respected in cities are ashamed to write speeches and to leave behind their compositions, out of concern for their legacy, fearing that they might be remembered as sophists."
[80] Usher (2007), 228. He later speculates (234) that Demosthenes' political rivalry with Isocrates may have been his motivation for publishing his deliberative speeches. For anti-Isocratean sentiments, in one of Demosthenes political trial speeches, see Rowe (2000), and conversely, for responses by Isocrates, see Rowe (2002).

Whether or not one agrees with Usher that Demosthenes published his own deliberative speeches (see below), it does seem likely enough that Isocrates removed at least some of the stigma associated with publication. However, since he seems to have suffered from physical limitations that prevented him from participating in the Assembly,[81] distribution of texts represented the only viable means of exercising political influence open to him. For Demosthenes of course this was not the case. Fourth-century readers, then, would have been confronted by a set of texts whose very existence needed to be not only explained but justified.

When Wilamowitz suggested that certain of Demosthenes' deliberative speeches were not the texts of speeches actually delivered in the Assembly but rather were originally written as political pamphlets,[82] occasionality became an issue for Demosthenic scholarship. Although a consensus has developed that the texts were not intended as pamphlets,[83] the challenges put forward by advocates of this theory still have significant implications for readers of these texts. In my chapter on style I have already looked at one aspect of this position: there I considered the difficulty of Demosthenes' style and the problem of how this would affect readers and the original audience. However, in addition to style those who challenged the texts' status as speeches also based their position on elements of content. They claimed that because the arguments of the speeches tend to be generalized and because several speeches do not present a specific proposal, they must not have been composed for a specific meeting of the Assembly.[84] Adams followed by Trevett have countered this argument by raising the possibility that speakers

[81] Isoc. 12.9.
[82] Wilamowitz (1893) II, 215 fn. 5.
[83] Trevett (1996b), 430, fn. 30; Yunis (1996), 245.
[84] Wendland (1910=Wendland 1987), 103-5.

in the Assembly were not required to present a specific proposal but could speak in a more general way about the situation at hand.[85]

In this section I will examine the occasionality of the deliberative speeches and its implications for fourth-century readers. I will look at arguments that pertain to specific situations as well as the conspicuous absence at times of such arguments. I will demonstrate that the speeches present an ambiguous occasionality, especially when placed in an intertextual relationship with the works of Isocrates, and that this would have had a profound effect on readers' interpretation of the speeches as written texts.

In the *First Philippic* Demosthenes presents his proposal in the following way:

> μή μοι μυρίους μηδὲ δισμυρίους ξένους, μηδὲ τὰς ἐπιστολιμαίους ταύτας δυνάμεις, ἀλλ' ἢ τῆς πόλεως ἔσται, κἂν ὑμεῖς ἕνα κἂν πλείους κἂν τὸν δεῖνα κἂν ὁντινοῦν χειροτονήσητε στρατηγόν, τούτῳ πείσεται καὶ ἀκολουθήσει. καὶ τροφὴν ταύτῃ πορίσαι κελεύω. ἔσται δ' αὕτη τίς ἡ δύναμις καὶ πόση, καὶ πόθεν τὴν τροφὴν ἕξει, καὶ πῶς ταῦτ' ἐθελήσει ποιεῖν; ἐγὼ φράσω, καθ' ἕκαστον τούτων διεξιὼν χωρίς. ξένους μὲν λέγω—καὶ ὅπως μὴ ποιήσεθ' ὃ πολλάκις ὑμᾶς ἔβλαψεν· πάντ' ἐλάττω νομίζοντες εἶναι τοῦ δέοντος, καὶ τὰ μέγιστ' ἐν τοῖς ψηφίσμασιν αἱρούμενοι, ἐπὶ τῷ πράττειν οὐδὲ τὰ μικρὰ ποιεῖτε· ἀλλὰ τὰ μικρὰ ποιήσαντες καὶ πορίσαντες τούτοις προστίθετε, ἂν ἐλάττω φαίνηται. λέγω δὴ τοὺς πάντας στρατιώτας δισχιλίους, τούτων δὲ Ἀθηναίους φημὶ δεῖν εἶναι πεντακοσίους …[86]

What is presumably an absurd proposal, ten or twenty thousand mercenaries, is dismissed out of hand. This leads to Demosthenes' alternative, a much smaller force that includes a significant number of citizens. What is a reader, who is not familiar with all the details of the situation, supposed to do when he encounters content like this that is specific to a particular occasion? On the one hand it represents a simple dead end. Without the means to evaluate whether the proposal would have effectively addressed the situation, it has no meaning and so creates a gap in the

[85] Adams (1927), 12; Trevett (1996b), 431.

[86] Dem. 4.19: "Don't propose to me ten or twenty thousand mercenaries, and don't give me these forces on paper, but rather a force that will belong to the city, and one which, if you elect one or more and this man or whoever as general, will obey and follow him. And I motion that you furnish this force with supplies. And what sort of force will this be and how large, and from what source will it get its provisions, and how will it be willing to do these things? I will point this out, going through each point separately. With regard to mercenaries, I propose—but don't do what has often harmed you: believing everything to be lesser in magnitude than what is needful and opting for the greatest measures in decrees, you then do not even take small measures when it comes to taking action. Instead, after providing for and taking limited actions, supplement them if they are clearly inadequate. I propose, then two thousand soldiers in all, and I say that five hundred of these must be Athenians …"

reading experience where he has to stop and jump over. On the other, when he looks at the proposal intertextually in relation to Isocrates' fictional deliberative orations, which "characteristically shun specifics and details,"[87] its mere presence absent any interpretation imbues the speech with specificity and concreteness. It thus functions as an intertextual contrastive whereby the text achieves an immediacy excluded for the Isocratean. But this demands that one not attempt to interpret the proposal too much.

In reading this proposal, then, one feels that he is in some sense encountering the speech in all the specificity of its occasion. However, complete alienation also occurs, as in the following moment from the same speech:

ΠΟΡΟΥ ΑΠΟΔΕΙΞΙΣ [88]

This title immediately follows a *hypophora* in which Demosthenes first asks what the source of funds will be with which he intends to pay for his proposal then says that he will tell the audience. Its significance has been accounted for in various ways,[89] but regardless of its origin it presents a potential stumbling block for the reader. As I argued above, the existence of specific proposals in Demosthenes' deliberative speeches serves as an intertextual contrastive with the fictions of Isocrates to create a sense of immediacy and vividness. Here, however, the reader is jerked away from the occasion by a conspicuous lacuna. The absence of content reminds him that the work is in important ways not just or fully an occasional one. Without any demonstration of the resources that Demosthenes intended to exploit to fund his proposal, its practicability

[87] Rowe (2002), 154.
[88] Dem. 4.29. Unfortunately the two papyrus fragments of this section of the speech (*P. Oxy.* LXII 4319 and *P. Gen.* 3) break off before the heading.
[89] Jaeger (1938), 121-2 speculated that Demosthenes himself edited out the section when he went to distribute the speech because he had since changed his views on the best sources of funding, while Trevett (1996b), 427 suggests two possibilities: a later editor may have regarded it as not being of any literary interest and so excised it, or, what is more likely in his view, Demosthenes never included it in the text but intended to have the clerk read out his proposals.

becomes impossible to determine, and the reader is left trying to deal with a fragment of the occasion. In interpreting the speech, he occupies a no man's land between the Isocratean pamphlet on the one hand and a transcript of an actual deliberative speech on the other. Indeed, reading a deliberative speech of Demosthenes can be said to be a constant negotiation with occasionality, where the reader oscillates between assignment of elements of content to a general referent, that is the overall political situation at Athens, or to a specific one, that is a specific meeting of the Assembly in which a proposal was presented. One does not read the works as records of actual speeches or as political pamphlets but rather continually moves between these two poles in engaging with the texts as preserved.

The *Second Philippic* may present an even more difficult instance of the same phenomenon, although the passage is disputed. At one point in the speech Demosthenes says that he will tell the Assembly the proper response to give to the Macedonian ambassadors: ἃ δὲ νῦν ἀποκρινάμενοι τὰ δέοντ' ἂν εἶητ' ἐψηφισμένοι, ταῦτ' ἤδη λέξω.[90] However, no answer is preserved, nor is there a simple heading comparable to the one from the *First Philippic*; instead, the speech simply moves on to a new subject. As a result, Abbé d'Olivet added to the text ΑΠΟΚΡΙΣΙΣ, and he was followed in this by Butcher, Dobree, and Jaeger.[91] More recent editors (Fuhr, and Dilts), however, have rejected this insertion, presumably following Hansen.[92] I agree with Trevett, though, that it is "less likely" that Demosthenes simply never suggested a reply to the ambassadors,[93] so one has to decide how to deal with the invisible gap. Jaeger's solution was to say that Demosthenes deleted the reply when preparing the speech for publication,[94] and those

[90] Dem. 6.28: "I will now tell you which answers would be the proper response."
[91] Olivet (1803), 62 (a French translation of the speech). For Jaeger's view, see Jaeger (1938), 252, fn. 27.
[92] Hansen (1984), 59.
[93] Trevett (1996b), 428. Weil (1873) along with Rehdantz, Spengel, Westermann suggests that Demosthenes presented his response at the end of the speech, but in that case even following Weil's text one would want an adverb, e.g. ταῦτα δὴ λέξω ὕστερον.
[94] Jaeger (1938), 252, fn. 27.

who subscribed to the pamphlet theory would have said that there obviously never needed to be an answer. However, both are mere speculations, and without any way of explaining the gap or even determining for sure that it exists, the reader is left at an impasse. Whereas with ΠΟΡΟΥ ΑΠΟΔΕΙΞΙΣ he could identify the hole and situate his alienation from the occasion with some certainty, here the speech is lost for a moment in a state of limbo, and the reader becomes completely detached from engagement with the text on any level.

As Adams noted, no definite proposal is presented in either the *Second* or *Third Olynthiac*.[95] This makes their connection with a specific meeting of the Assembly somewhat problematic. In certain cases, the Council could put on the agenda an open, as opposed to a specific, provisional decree or *probouleuma.* The former is defined by Hansen as "a commission that a matter be debated and decided by the people."[96] A notable instance of this procedure is referred to, as Rhodes argues,[97] in Demosthenes' speech *On the Crown*, where, in describing the course of events after Philip's invasion of Elatea in 339, he says that the people cast its vote "concerning the salvation of the city."[98] Theoretically, then, Demosthenes could have delivered the *Second* and *Third Olynthiac* in response to such an open *probouleuma.* However, Tuplin is rightly cautious about reconstructing any definite relationship between speech and occasion:

> Lack of 'control' examples of actual assembly debate becomes an acute problem here. We can theoretically define various relationships between speeches and the making of formal proposals and amendments but we do not know what the verbal and rhetorical habits of assembly speakers were in these various contexts or more generally what the conventions of debate were.[99]

[95] Adams (1912), 13.
[96] Hansen (1987), 35. For further discussion of the open *probouleuma*, see Rhodes (1972), 58-9.
[97] Rhodes (1972), 234.
[98] Dem.18.248: … περὶ σωτηρίας τῆς πόλεως τὰς ἐμὰς γνώμας ἐχειροτόνει …
[99] Tuplin (1998), 304. Hansen (1987), 93 claims that "… an open *probouleuma* might arouse a debate but not entail the moving of any proposal." In his footnote he cites his previous article (Hansen (1984)), which seems to suggest that the evidence for this claim is the fact that several of Demosthenes' deliberative speeches do not support a specific proposal. However, one would like a more reliable source of evidence.

The modern reader is at a significant disadvantage here in relation to his fourth-century counterpart. The latter would have had a more or less intimate familiarity with Assembly procedure and with the types of speeches presented there, in particular those delivered in response to an open *probouleuma*. The *Second* and *Third Olynthiac* could accordingly have been placed in association with other speeches of this type allowing the reader to develop a quasi-intertextual response. The modern reader, by contrast, is forced to engage in vague speculation and imaginative reconstruction in an attempt to situate the speeches. However, inherent in the open *probouleuma* procedure itself is a weakening of the concreteness, of the specificity of the occasion: one is dealing with aroundness, with a radius as opposed to a point, for example in the open *probouleuma* referred to above "concerning the salvation of the city." In such cases the speech necessarily seems less occasional, more Isocratean, because the occasion itself was never clearly defined to begin with. The line between political pamphlet and actual speech becomes blurred, and elements of content can simultaneously be referred to a specific debate and more general circumstances. Tuplin's continuum is apt here: reading is not a matter of situating the speech in the Assembly or in the hands of a reader but moving back and forth along a continuum.

Another instance in which the experience of the modern reader must be distinguished from that of the ancient concerns the *Third Philippic* in particular. Much ink has been spilled on the question of why two separate redactions of the speech exist in the manuscripts and the papyri, one longer, the other shorter.[100] Although there is a general consensus that the additional passages in the longer version are the work of Demosthenes' hand,[101] it is still unclear what the

[100] For detailed discussion with bibliography, see Wooten (2008), 167-73 and Trevett (1996b), 428-9. With regard to papyrological evidence, an important piece of evidence is provided by *P. Fay* 8 (2nd century CE). In this fragment words from the longer text in §39 have been added to the shorter one by a later hand. Hausmann (1978), 52 argues that this provides evidence that already during this period an edition from the vulgate tradition (i.e. the one preserving the longer redaction) was being used either to correct or interpret the shorter version.
[101] MacDowell (2009), 353 and Trevett (1996b), 428.

relationship between the two is. Regardless of the explanation one puts forward for the two versions, it is highly unlikely that the original readers would have had access to both versions, or that they would have read them side by side even if they did. Because the passages in the longer version seem for the most part to pertain to a more specific, Athenian audience, the version one reads has profound implications for his experience of the occasionality of the work. In Dilts' edition sections 41-2 are printed in the following way:

> Ὅτι δ' οὕτω ταῦτ' ἔχει τὰ μὲν νῦν ὁρᾶτε δήπου καὶ οὐδὲν ἐμοῦ προσδεῖσθε μάρτυρος· τὰ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἄνωθεν χρόνοις ὅτι τἀναντία εἶχεν ἐγὼ δηλώσω, οὐ λόγους ἐμαυτοῦ λέγων, ἀλλὰ γράμματα τῶν προγόνων τῶν ὑμετέρων ἀκεῖνοι κατέθεντο εἰς στήλην χαλκῆν γράψαντες εἰς ἀκρόπολιν, οὐχ ἵν' αὐτοῖς ᾖ χρήσιμα (καὶ γὰρ ἄνευ τούτων τῶν γραμμάτων τὰ δέοντα ἐφρόνουν), ἀλλ' ἵν' ὑμεῖς ἔχητε ὑπομνήματα καὶ παραδείγματα ὡς ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων σπουδάζειν προσήκει. τί οὖν λέγει τὰ γράμματα; "Ἄρθμιος" φησὶ …[102]

Dilts along with most editors has put the passage from the longer version in smaller print. This passage contains Demosthenes' interpretation of the intent of the proposers of a decree; it thus concerns the Athenians in particular and their understanding of the political acts of their forefathers, and it represents a significant claim about the relationship of members of the Assembly and their decisions to those of previous generations. Further, by referring to the bronze decrees set up in the Acropolis, the passage materially ties the speech to the experience of Athenians in particular and imbues it with a vivid sense of occasionality. The original reader presumably would either have had the longer or the shorter text. The former with its additional Athenian-oriented passages like this one would have come off as less abstract and more audience-specific, but, unless they were aware of the existence of two versions, occasionality would not have been an issue for them. For the modern reader, by contrast, the two versions are

[102] Dem. 9.41-2: "That these things are so you can see on your own with respect to the current state of affairs, and you do not need me as a witness; but I will show that things in previous times were just the opposite, not by speaking my own words, but by reading the writings of your ancestors which they set up on the Acropolis, having inscribed them on a bronze pillar, not so that they might be useful to them (for even without these writings they knew what was needful), but so that you might have reminders and examples of how it is fitting to be in earnest when it comes to such things. What, then, do the writings say? 'Arthmios,' they say …"

uncomfortably merged and only differentiated by font size. In the movement from the one to the other, his experience is determined by the manner in which he decides to relate the two. Following Treves,[103] he could imagine the longer version as the one actually presented before the Assembly and so would associate the abridgement with publication of the work for a general audience. Or, following MacDowell,[104] he could imagine that Demosthenes produced two drafts before delivering the speech in the Assembly and then opted for the shorter one. On this reading, the differentiation of font size allows for speculation on the process of composition: the reader repeatedly posits different possibilities for the development of the speech before delivery. With regard to the passage discussed above, for example, perhaps Demosthenes felt that the juxtaposition of the image of the gleaming bronze pillar with the wording of the decree itself was more effective than an explicit interpretation of the forefathers' motives. In this process of speculation, text and occasion become somewhat mercurial, with posited developments being placed into relation with possible occasions that would explain them. In reading the speech from this perspective, one is interested in ways of understanding a process of development as opposed to static entities like text and occasion. Finally, the typeset also provokes an aporetic reading. The paradox of two Demosthenes being in the same place at the same time is reflected visually in the harsh juxtaposition of two font sizes. The reader wants to make all the text the same size, or at least do something to it that will draw a clear boundary between what the one and the other is. But, with the nature of this boundary being unclear, there is some satisfaction in simply experiencing in graphic form what otherwise is always latent in the speeches of Demosthenes as an implicit uncertainty, an implicit distance.

[103] Treves (1940), 357.
[104] MacDowell (2009), 353-4.

In the first section of this chapter I argued that one should entertain the possibility that Demosthenes intentionally distributed the *Meidias* in draft form; for by doing so he would have been able to respond to opponents who vilified him as a rhetorician deviously manipulating his audience with speeches that had been crafted in writing before the trial. With regard to the deliberative speeches, it is interesting to note how well the corpus seems to respond to the intellectual climate of 4th century Athens. As I discussed in the introduction to this section, there was still a stigma attached to publishing one's own deliberative speeches in written form, but the influence of Isocrates had complicated things. When considering Demosthenes' deliberative speeches from this perspective, can one condemn him as a sophist for leaving behind his speeches in written form? Or can he be neatly situated in relation to Isocrates' literary activity? There is nothing in the speeches themselves to indicate that Demosthenes himself was the one responsible for circulating them; further, there is the gap in the *First* and perhaps the *Second Philippic*. Also, in certain cases specific proposals are made without any attempt to contextualize them. Accordingly, perhaps MacDowell is right in speculating that Demosthenes had simply left them in a drawer or cupboard when he died.[105] On the other hand, there are speeches like the *Second* and *Third Olynthiac* which do not present specific proposals and which one might accordingly be tempted to regard as pamphlets in the Isocratean mode—although the style is not so Isocratean. (But still it is polished, and he does avoid hiatus and tribrachs.)[106] What emerges from all these considerations is a Demosthenes who perches on a point of transition. Not written enough to be condemned as sophistry but yet not occasional enough to be confined to the Pnyx,

[105] MacDowell (2009), 8 fn. 24.
[106] It has proven difficult to characterize Demosthenes' rhythmical practice in positive terms. For a handy summary of his avoidance of tribrachs and hiatus, see Yunis (2001), 24-26. Greek prose rhythm more generally is still very poorly understood. Usher (2010) has recently argued that current approaches are misguided in the emphasis they lay on the importance of the clausula. Even the basic unit of analysis, then, cannot be agreed upon.

his deliberative oratory when viewed as an *oeuvre* represents, intentionally or not, an almost ideal legacy in relation to the conditions in which it was produced. For the fourth-century reader, still suspicious of but also attracted to the possibilities of writing, he can remain firmly rooted in the concreteness, the specificity of actual political life in the Assembly while at the same time extending his reach more broadly to general questions of political identity.

B. The *Prooemia*

Beginning as early as the 5th century, it was common practice, if the testimonia are to be believed, for orators to publish collections of preambles: Antiphon, Critias, Thrasymachus, and Cephalus are all said to have published such collections.[107] Unfortunately none of these survives, nor do the testimonia provide any description of their contents. As a result, one can only speculate about the nature of the pieces these collections contained. With regard to Antiphon, Maidment claimed that "The work [*Preambles and Epilogues*] must have consisted of a series of commonplaces compiled by Antiphon for the benefit of pupils."[108] In light of the presumably instructional purpose of Thrasymachus' collection of laments,[109] one could make the same speculation about his collection. However, beyond this it is impossible to say anything about the form and content of these preambles and, what is more relevant for this section, about their possible connection with a complete speech that was either actually delivered in the Assembly or composed à la Isocrates for an audience of readers.

[107] Antiphon: Suda s.v. μοχθηρός and αἰσθέσθαι; Critias: Hermog. περὶ Ἰδεῶν pg. 402, line 5; Cephalus: Suda s.v. Κέφαλος Ἀθηναῖος; Thrasymachus: Athenaeus .10.416a. Blass (1893) III.1, 325 fn. 1 suggests that Thrasymachus' collection may have consisted of judicial preambles.
[108] Maidment (1941), 309.
[109] Arist. *Rh.* 1404a15 says that Thrasymachus included some discussion of delivery in this collection.

There is also a collection of preambles attributed to Demosthenes. Although in the nineteenth century scholars were divided as to its authenticity,[110] a consensus has developed that Demosthenes did at least compose the individual preambles within the collection, though the subject has not received much attention in recent years.[111] As for the collection as a whole, its origin and intended function still remain unclear. No scholar entertains the idea that Demosthenes himself was responsible for publishing it; however, in light of the fact that previous orators had published such collections, this does not seem to me beyond the realm of possibility, especially if Demosthenes was involved in teaching oratory.[112] Those scholars who do argue that he was responsible for assembling the preambles together into a collection posit various motivations for his doing so. Blass speculated that he composed it so as to have a stockpile of preambles ready to hand should a given situation arise.[113] As a result, he went on to infer, Demosthenes reworked two pieces from the collection when composing his first two speeches against Philip.[114] MacDowell follows Blass, but he adds, following the tradition that Demosthenes felt uncomfortable speaking extemporaneously, that he may have composed just the first few sentences of a speech "To give himself confidence" before extemporizing the rest.[115] Clavaud, in turn, also believed that Demosthenes' purpose in writing out the preambles was to give himself confidence, but he objects to the claim that they were written as a collection in isolation from any particular political situation; each one, according to him, was composed separately and in preparation for a specific meeting of the Assembly.[116]

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[110] See Rupprecht (1927), 365-6 for an overview of 19th century scholarship on the issue. Blass and Uhle among others argued for the authenticity of the collection, while Swoboda argued against it, and Wilamowitz claimed that much of it was spurious.
[111] So Clavaud (1974); Yunis (1996), 247, ff.; Worthington (2006), 16-17; MacDowell (2009), 6-7.
[112] For this possibility see pg. 12 and fn. 26.
[113] Blass (1893) III.1, 324. Cf. Yunis (1996), 255.
[114] Blass (1893) III.1, 327-8.
[115] MacDowell (2009), 6. Cf. Worthington (2006), 58.
[116] Clavaud (1974), 43-50.

In this section I will examine cases where more or less the same preamble is found in both the collection of *Prooemia* and as the opening of an actual deliberative speech. I will argue that the collection makes possible but also problematizes a response to the composition of the speeches. Consideration of the relationship between the two also raises further questions about the occasionality of the deliberative speeches.

The relationship between the text of the first preamble and that of the *First Philippic* is perhaps the most problematic. The wording of the two versions is virtually the same through the first section with one significant exception:

> [*Preamble*] ἐπειδὴ δ' ὑπὲρ ὧν πολλάκις εἰρήκασιν οὗτοι πρότερον, περὶ τούτων νυνὶ σκοπεῖτε, ἡγοῦμαι καὶ πρῶτος ἀναστὰς **εἰκότως ἂν μετὰ τούτους δοκεῖν λέγειν**.[117]
>
> [*First Philippic*] ἐπειδὴ δ' ὑπὲρ ὧν πολλάκις εἰρήκασιν οὗτοι πρότερον συμβαίνει καὶ νυνὶ σκοπεῖν, ἡγοῦμαι καὶ πρῶτος ἀναστὰς **εἰκότως ἂν συγγνώμης τυγχάνειν**.[118]

In the version from the *Prooemia*, there is a slight paradox involved: Demosthenes is actually going to be the first speaker, but, because the issue has already been discussed so often by other speakers on previous occasions, he should be viewed as speaking after them. In the *First Philippic*, by contrast, he makes a simple request for pardon. On the one hand, one could plausibly argue that the paradox might have presented a stumbling block to the audience at the very beginning of a speech, so Demosthenes decided to replace it with something simpler in the *First Philippic*. On the other, he was fond of opening a speech with some form of contradiction or paradox, as Lounès notes,[119] so it also seems likely that he would not have viewed the difficulty as a problem. In this case, then, the priority of the one or the other cannot be determined with any degree of confidence.

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[117] Dem. *Ex.* 1.1: "But since you are now considering matters about which these men have often spoken before, I think that, even though I'm standing up first it is right for me to seem to speak after them."
[118] Dem. 4.1: "But since it happens to be the case that once again we are considering matters about which these men have often spoken on previous occasions, I think that, even though I'm standing up first, I should meet with pardon."
[119] Lounès (1986), 256-8. Cf. Clavaud (1974), 39.

In section 3 of the same preamble, an argument is presented which is found in the middle of the *First Philippic* in almost the same wording:

> [*Preamble*] καὶ γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς, εἰ μέν, ὅσ' ἂν τῷ λόγῳ τις ὑπερβῇ λυπῆσαι μὴ βουλόμενος, καὶ τὰ πράγμαθ' ὑπερβήσεται, δεῖ πρὸς ἡδονὴν δημηγορεῖν· εἰ δ' ἡ τῶν λόγων χάρις, ἂν ᾖ μὴ προσήκουσα, ἔργῳ ζημία γίγνεται, αἰσχρόν ἐστιν φενακίζειν ἑαυτοὺς καὶ μετὰ τῆς ἐσχάτης ἀνάγκης πρᾶξαι ταῦθ' ἃ πάλαι 'θελοντὰς προσῆκεν ποιεῖν.[120]

> [*First Philippic*] ἀλλ' εἰ μέν, ὅσα ἄν τις ὑπερβῇ τῷ λόγῳ, ἵνα μὴ λυπήσῃ, καὶ τὰ πράγμαθ' ὑπερβήσεται, δεῖ πρὸς ἡδονὴν δημηγορεῖν· εἰ δ' ἡ τῶν λόγων χάρις, ἂν ᾖ μὴ προσήκουσα, ἔργῳ ζημία γίγνεται, αἰσχρόν ἐστι φενακίζειν ἑαυτούς, καὶ ἅπαντ' ἀναβαλλομένους ἃ ἂν ᾖ δυσχερῆ πάντων ὑστερεῖν τῶν ἔργων, καὶ μηδὲ τοῦτο δύνασθαι μαθεῖν, ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς ὀρθῶς πολέμῳ χρωμένους οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖν τοῖς πράγμασιν, ἀλλ' αὐτοὺς ἔμπροσθεν εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὥσπερ τῶν στρατευμάτων ἀξιώσειέ τις ἂν τὸν στρατηγὸν ἡγεῖσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τοὺς βουλευομένους, ἵν' ἃ ἂν ἐκείνοις δοκῇ, ταῦτα πράττηται καὶ μὴ τὰ συμβάντα ἀναγκάζωνται διώκειν.…[121]

The text of the two passages is almost identical up through φενακίζειν ἑαυτοὺς, at which point the content of the two passages remains similar through 'θελοντὰς προσῆκεν, although it is expressed in different terms. Here the preamble from the collection ends, but in the *First Philippic* the argument is greatly expanded to include several more considerations along with a simile. In attempting to understand the method of composition suggested by the relationship between these passages, one might at first think of the mockery of orators implied by Socrates' description of Aspasia's method in Plato's *Menexenus*:

> ἔπειτα τὰ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμά μοι διῆει ... τὰ δὲ πρότερον ἐσκεμμένη, ὅτε μοι δοκεῖ συνετίθει τὸν ἐπιτάφιον λόγον ὃν Περικλῆς εἶπεν, περιλείμματ' ἄττα ἐξ ἐκείνου συγκολλῶσα.[122]

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[120] Dem *Ex.* 1.3: "For in truth if for as many things as one omits in speaking out of a desire not to offend the things themselves are also omitted, one must give counsel with an eye to pleasure; but if the pleasure of words, if it is not appropriate, becomes a punishment in deed, it is shameful for people to deceive themselves and to do out of dire necessity what they should have done willingly in the past."

[121] Dem. 4.38-9: "But if for as many things as one omits in speaking so as not to offend, the things themselves are also omitted, one must give counsel with an eye to pleasure; but if the pleasure of words, if it is not appropriate, becomes a punishment in deed, it is shameful for people to deceive themselves, and (it is shameful) in putting off all the things that are unpleasant, to fall behind every event, and not even to be able to learn this, that those who wage war properly must not follow events, but must themselves stay ahead of them, and, in the same way as one would think it right for a general to lead his expeditions, so also those deliberating should lead events, so that whatever they decide actually gets done and so that they are not compelled to chase after whatever happens to come about."

[122] Pl. *Menex.* 236b: "Next some parts she went through for me extemporaneously ... but others she had thought up in advance, when she was composing, I think, the funeral oration that Pericles delivered, gluing together some leftovers from that speech."

Aspasia is described as "gluing together" pieces from a funeral oration she had composed previously to form sections of a new speech. This would seem to describe the passage from the *First Philippic* above; however, "gluing" does not quite apply. There are subtle changes made to the wording of the parts that overlap, and, in the *First Philippic*, the passage seems to grow organically from the prefab argument. Viewed from this light, it could be seen a paradigm of the Isocratic method of composition, which, as I discussed in chapter 1 (pgs. 45 ff.), involves proper selection, blending and arrangement of rhetorical forms or ἰδέαι.[123] This is all assuming, of course, that the preamble came first. If not, then it does indeed seem more like a case of simple cut and paste, so to speak.

The preamble of *On the Symmories* contains a striking instance of discontinuity. After employing the *topos* that those who praise Athenians from the Golden Age can never do their achievements justice, Demosthenes gives an alternative, superior source of praise:

> ἐγὼ δ' ἐκείνων μὲν **ἔπαινον** τὸν χρόνον ἡγοῦμαι **μέγιστον** ...[124]

The adjective μέγιστον modifies ἔπαινον. Not only does it represent the less common form of discontinuity in which the modifier, as opposed to the head noun, is postponed, but also τὸν χρόνον intervenes, which could create confusion for the audience. When this same sentence occurs in in one of the *Prooemia*, the syntax is simple: ἐγὼ δὲ τῆς μὲν ἐκείνων ἀρετῆς μέγιστον ἔπαινον ἡγοῦμαι τὸν χρόνον.[125] However, as can be seen from my section on hyperbaton in chapter 2, Demosthenes was not afraid to deviate from standard word order; further, the *topos* belongs to the tradition of the funeral oration,[126] so perhaps a more marked, solemn style was

[123] Isoc. 13.16:(φημὶ) τὸ δὲ τούτων ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ τῶν πραγμάτωνἃς δεῖ προελέσθαι καὶ μείξασθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλας καὶ τάξασθαι κατὰ τρόπον … ταῦτα δὲ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας δεῖσθαι καὶ ψυχῆς …
[124] Dem. 14.1: "I believe time to be their greatest praise ..."
[125] Dem. *Ex.* 7.1.
[126] E.g. Lys. 2.54ff. Cf. Isoc. 4.74. In Pl. *Menex.* 239c, one cannot do the forefathers' achievements justice in prose because they have already been celebrated by poets.

called for. In light of these considerations, it is once again difficult to make a strong argument for the priority of either version.

The relationship between the opening of the *First Olynthiac* and that of the third *Preamble* presents several difficulties:

> [*First Olynthiac*] Ἀντὶ πολλῶν ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, χρημάτων **ὑμᾶς ἑλέσθαι νομίζω, εἰ φανερὸν γένοιτο τὸ μέλλον συνοίσειν τῇ πόλει περὶ ὧν νυνὶ σκοπεῖτε.** ὅτε τοίνυν τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, προσήκει **προθύμως ἐθέλειν ἀκούειν τῶν βουλομένων συμβουλεύειν**·[127]
>
> [*Preamble*] Ἀντὶ πολλῶν ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, χρημάτων **τὸ μέλλον συνοίσειν ὑμῖν περὶ ὧν νυνὶ τυγχάνετε σκοποῦντες, οἶμαι πάντας ἂν ὑμᾶς ἑλέσθαι.** ὅτε τοίνυν τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, προσήκει **παρέχειν ἐθέλοντας ἀκούειν ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς τῶν βουλομένων συμβουλεύειν**·[128]

The first bolded section of the preamble, in comparison with the corresponding section from the *First Olynthiac*, is arguably less rhetorically effective: in the version from the collection, the core idea, namely you would pay *a lot* for this, is not completed until the end of the sentence, and the intervening material is quite involved. In the *First Olynthiac*, by contrast, the whole core is fronted. The version from the *Preambles* is also more difficult to construe: as is suggested by the attempts that have been made to translate it,[129] one wants to supply something that suggests the acquisition of knowledge, that is "you would choose (to know) what will be expedient…." And indeed this is how the same idea is expressed in the *First Olynthiac*. Conversely, the second bolded section of the preamble is more difficult than that of the alternate version: while in the latter προθύμως is discontinuous with ἀκούειν and also somewhat redundant, in the former the

[127] Dem. 1.1: "**I think you would pay a lot, men of Athens, if that which is going to be expedient for the city should become clear concerning the things upon which you are now deliberating.** And so when this is the case, it is fitting **that you listen eagerly to those who want to give counsel**."

[128] Dem. *Ex.* 3.1: "**For what is going to be expedient to the city concerning the things upon which you are now deliberating, a lot I think you would pay, men of Athens.** And so when this is the case, it is fitting **that you present yourselves willing to hear those who want to give counsel."** The text cited is that of Rennie (1903). The alterations made by Clavaud in this case seem to me unjustified. However, the choice of text does not affect my argument.

[129] Worthington (2006) translates: "… I believe that you would all give a great deal of money for advice that would be of benefit…" DeWitt and DeWitt (1926): "…you would choose the plan that will pay you…" Clavaud (1974): "Je crois que vous seriez tous prêts à payer très cher, Athéniens, l'avis qui doit vous être utile …" Cf. also the interpretation of this section of the *First Olynthiac* by Schäfer (1824) I, 181: Primaria enim notio non est τὸ μέλλον συνοίσειν, sed ἡ τούτου φανέρωσις. Hic cardo totius orationis.

same section is relatively straightforward without any irregular syntax or redundancy. In light of the discussion in my third chapter of the significance of the will and in particular of adverbs signifying willingness in the *Olynthiacs*, one can argue that the seemingly odd syntax has a definite motivation, indeed that it represents an integral element of Demosthenes' rhetorical strategy in those speeches. In this case, then, it is not a matter of an insignificant stylistic discrepancy but rather of one that affects the fundamental nature of the speech and its relation to the other speeches in the series. If it was the case that Demosthenes had a collection of preambles lying around waiting to be incorporated into individual speeches, then this represents an exquisite instance of how, with one subtle alteration, he could take a generally applicable opening and transform it into a fully individualized and integrated component of an individual speech. To return to the comparison between the first bolded section of each version, perhaps in the process of incorporating the preamble Demosthenes simply determined that the wording he ultimately chose for the *First Olynthiac* was clearer.

With regard to the two versions of this same preamble, there is also a problem concerning their length. In the manuscripts, preambles 3 and 4 are not distinguished from one another, and ἔστι, the first word of what has come to be numbered 4, is followed by δέ.[130] Wolf, apparently following Feliciano, deleted the conjunction and divided the preamble into two separate pieces.[131] He was followed in this by Blass and Rennie. Clavaud, however, pointed out that there is a neat logical progression from the end of 3 to the beginning of 4;[132] accordingly, in his edition

[130] I have personally reviewed Omont's (1892) facsimile of S (the most authoritative manuscript for modern editions of Demosthenes' speeches) at this point. In that manuscript the individual preambles are distinguished from one another by a sort of dash. No such marking occurs between 3 and 4.
[131] See Blass's apparatus criticus, Schäfer (1824), which contains Wolf's and Reiske's views, and the discussion in Clavaud (1974), 11.
[132] This point was already made by Wolf, whose note on the relationship between the two can be found in Schäfer (1824) V, 665: Parum autem refert, sive novum hic exordium facias, sive cum superiore (quod quidem non inepte fieri potest) coniungas. He does not explain why, if this is the case, he chose to emend the reading of the manuscripts.

he removed the division between the two and restored the δέ of the manuscripts. I find his arguments for separating the two compelling, but in any case the original readers would not have divided them. Accordingly, when comparing the version from the *Prooemia* with that from the *First Olynthiac*, they would have been faced with a divergence:

> [*First Olynthiac*] ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ὑμετέρας τύχης ὑπολαμβάνω πολλὰ τῶν δεόντων ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα ἐνίοις ἂν ἐπελθεῖν εἰπεῖν, ὥστ' ἐξ ἁπάντων ῥᾳδίαν τὴν τοῦ συμφέροντος ὑμῖν αἵρεσιν γενέσθαι.
>
> **Ὁ μὲν οὖν παρὼν καιρός, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μόνον οὐχὶ λέγει φωνὴν ἀφιεὶς ὅτι τῶν πραγμάτων ὑμῖν ἐκείνων αὐτοῖς ἀντιληπτέον ἐστίν** …[133]
>
> [*Preamble*] … ἐνίοις ἐπελθεῖν ἂν εἰπεῖν, ὥστ' ἐξ ἁπάντων ῥᾳδίαν τὴν τοῦ συμφέροντος ὑμῖν αἵρεσιν γενέσθαι.
>
> **Ἔστι δέ , ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δίκαιον, ἐπειδὴ ἐφ' ὑμῖν ἐστιν ἑλέσθαι τῶν ῥηθέντων ὅ τι ἂν βούλησθε, ἁπάντων ἀκοῦσαι**.[134]

Commenting on the *First Olynthiac*, Sandys, citing parallels from several other speeches, notes that the function of the particle combination μὲν οὖν is to introduce the subject of the speech.[135] We have, then, an instance of a common form of transition from the preamble to the body of the speech. In the preamble version, by contrast, a connection is made with the argument that concluded the preceding section. This is followed by an exhortation to the audience to maintain their composure, and the preamble concludes with Demosthenes saying that he will not speak at length but will present what is expedient in the fewest words possible. In light of the implication of the *topos* expressed at the end of the first section, namely that he has not thought about the situation beforehand and so will have to speak extemporaneously, it would be absurd for him to use the first section in two different speeches; for employing it a second time would risk belying

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[133] Dem. 1.1: "But I suppose it belongs to your[the Athenians'] good fortune for some men to say what is needful spontaneously, so that the choice of what is expedient can easily be made from all the speakers taken together.

And so the present crisis, men of Athens, all but cries out, saying that you yourselves must grab hold of those affairs ..."

[134] Dem. *Ex.* 3.1-2: "But I suppose it belongs to your[the Athenians'] good fortune for some men to say what is needful spontaneously, so that the choice of what is expedient can easily be made from all the speakers taken together.

And it is just, men of Athens, to listen to everyone, since it is in your power to choose whichever you wish of the things said."

[135] Sandys (1936), *ad loc.*

the very position he is trying to take. Does the version from the *Prooemia*, then, represent some sort of draft after all? Or perhaps Blass was right that it was written in isolation from the rest of the speech as part of a practical repertory? It is not entirely clear what might have motivated Demosthenes to cut the second section. It is possible that he determined at some point that he was not going to have to worry about any disturbances in the Assembly and so felt that admonishing the audience on this point was superfluous. Also, with the addition of this section the preamble does feel a bit longwinded, and the remark that it often happens that the same man is sometimes right, sometimes wrong[136] seems a bit obvious, so perhaps he decided that excising it was simply more rhetorically effective, especially since the transition to the body of the speech (the crisis is all but crying out!) is so dramatic.

Finally, there is a clear connection between the conclusion of *Prooemium* 53 and one of the most crucial passages in the *Third Olynthiac*:

> [*Preamble*] νῦν δὲ δραχμῆ καὶ χοῒ καὶ τέτταρσιν ὀβολοῖς ὥσπερ ἀσθενοῦντα τὸν δῆμον διάγουσιν, ὁμοιότατα, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῖς παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν σιτίοις διδόντες ὑμῖν. **καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖν' οὔτ' ἰσχὺν ἐντίθησιν οὔτ' ἀποθνῄσκειν ἐᾷ, καὶ ταῦτ' οὔτ' ἀπογνόντας ἄλλο τι μεῖζον πράττειν ἐᾷ, οὔτ' αὖτ' ἐξαρκεῖν δύναται.**[137]

> [*Third Ol.*]… ἴσως ἄν, ἴσως, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τέλειόν τι καὶ μέγα κτήσαισθε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τῶν τοιούτων λημμάτων ἀπαλλαγείητε, ἃ τοῖς {ἀσθενοῦσι} παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν σιτίοις διδομένοις ἔοικε. **καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνα οὔτε ἰσχὺν ἐντίθησιν οὔτ' ἀποθνῄσκειν ἐᾷ· καὶ ταῦθ' ἃ νέμεσθε νῦν ὑμεῖς, οὔτε τοσαῦτα ἐστὶν ὥστε ὠφέλειαν ἔχειν τινὰ διαρκῆ, οὔτ' ἀπογνόντας ἄλλο τι πράττειν ἐᾷ …**[138]

In the version from the collection, Demosthenes swerves at the last instant: the only foreseen result of rejecting the politicians', as opposed to the doctor's, prescriptions is improvement (ἄλλο

[136] Dem. *Ex.* 4.1: καὶ γὰρ πολλάκις συμβαίνει τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον τοῦτο μὲν μὴ λέγειν ὀρθῶς, ἕτερον δέ τι·

[137] Dem. *Ex.* 53.4: "But now with a drachma and a chous and four obols they lead around the people as if they were sick, just as if, men of Athens, they were giving you the food administered by doctors. For that too neither imparts strength nor allows one to die, and these things neither allow one to reject them and fare better nor are they themselves sufficient."

[138] Dem. 3.33: "… perhaps, perhaps, men of Athens, you might gain some consummate and great good and be freed from such gains, which resemble the food given by doctors. For that too neither gives strength nor allows one to die; and these things you are distributing to yourselves are neither so great as to have any sufficient benefit nor do they allow you to reject them and fare otherwise ..."

τι μεῖζον). In the *Third Olynthiac*, by contrast, μεῖζον is absent; further, the order of the two possibilities is reversed so that the uncertainty of the outcome is made to conclude the comparison. This passage has been central to several of the arguments that I have made throughout the dissertation: in the third chapter I argued that the entire speech was structured in such a way as to prepare the audience to deal with the disturbing implications of the image (pgs. 164-5), and in the fourth I situated the passage in relation to Thucydides' political thought (pg. 189) and, in a later section, argued that it represents an innovative use of imagery (pg. 217-18). Its relation to the version from the *Prooemia*, I would argue, strengthens my claim that the passage is critical to understanding Demosthenes' oratory on a formal and substantive level. One speculates that Demosthenes, in the process of composing the *Third Olynthiac*, reworked this passage and, having realized how dire the situation had become, decided this time not to shy away from the implications of the comparison but to compel his audience to face them. Alternatively, if the proem is an adaptation of the *Third Olynthiac*, then perhaps the image was modified to suit a situation which he considered less terminal, so to speak. If so, it makes for a deleterious intertextual effect; the image feels an enervated version of itself.

As illustrated by the preceding paragraphs, the unexplained existence of the *Prooemia* creates productive problems for any interpretation of the deliberative speeches. It becomes unclear what exactly a Demosthenic speech is with respect to occasionality. Yunis seems to argue that the collection represents something like a practical realization of the theory Plato proposed in the *Phaedrus*:

> Plato's ideal *rhētōr,* having recognized what type of auditor each real auditor is, is to employ the appropriate speech for that auditor out of the universal set of speeches designed to instruct and persuade the types of auditors. Plato's purpose in creating his array of prepared speeches was to turn his rhetorical

> theory into the basis, at least, of systematic rhetorical practice. The Demosthenic collection is on a far smaller—far more realistic—scale than the improbable, gargantuan project imagined by Plato.[139]

According to Yunis, the collection is a set of possibilities that aims for universality. In composing a speech, Demosthenes would select the appropriate possibility and instantiate it in relation to a particular occasion. However, I would argue that this is too schematic. There seems to me to be a more supple relationship between universal and particular. The subtle changes to and developments of material from the *Prooemia* suggest that for Demosthenes perhaps composition was neither gluing nor invention in the original sense, that is discovery pure and simple. It seems as though there are elements that could be described as universals but that they can never simply be inserted into the particular without being fundamentally reshaped themselves. The relationship between universal and particular is thus reciprocal.

3. Conclusion

Demosthenes' speeches were neither written nor unwritten. In the *Against Meidias* this cagey negative characterization assumes a positive, concrete form: being neither written nor unwritten means being a draft. The text does not allow the reader to determine where the written Demosthenes ends and the spoken one begins. Further, in attempting to finalize a hypothetical deliverable speech, one ends up positing multiple Demosthenes. As we saw in the preface to Isocrates' autobiographical speech the *Antidosis* (see pgs. 60-61), he too seems to have allowed for multiplication of the self through writing. In response to Plato's criticism of writing, then, these orators did not abandon the text but refigured their relationship to it as being dynamically indeterminate.

With regard to the deliberative speeches, this indeterminacy is manifested in the ambiguous occasionality of the texts. Just when the reader feels as if he is being transported to

[139] Yunis (1996), 255.

the Pnyx, the demonstration of resources (ΠΟΡΟΥ ΑΠΟΔΕΙΞΙΣ) is missing, or there's no answer to the ambassadors. Just as the style at times provokes uncertainty in the reader about the relation between the written and the oral, so this alternation between immediacy and alienation on the level of content destabilizes the reading experience. Reading the *First Philippic* cannot involve merely reimagining one's way back to the actual delivery of the speech or treating it as a generalized pamphlet. Rather, one must constantly negotiate between the two without ever achieving a stable relation to the text. By occupying an interstitial space between transcript and literary embellishment, the texts preserve Demosthenes' sublime oratory while at the same time shielding him from the charge of being a self-interested sophist.

The significance of the collection of *Prooemia* in this context must remain unclear. When compared with passages from actual deliberative speeches, these preambles seem to offer the reader a window on Demosthenes' methods of composition, and, insofar as they suggest a certain relation between the universal and particular, they also have larger implications for the nature of meaning in oratory more generally. However, in each case establishing a definite relationship between the two proved impossible; the reader speculates about the rhetorical significance of disparities and about the priority of one or the other version without being able to come to any firm conclusions. Whether Demosthenes himself was the one responsible for distributing this collection or not, in combination with the deliberative speeches it represents for readers his most abiding legacy; for in perpetually attempting to relate the two the reader reenacts the activity of a (possible) Demosthenic mind.

Concluding Remarks

After vividly describing the quasi-religious ecstasy[1] he experiences when reading a speech of Demosthenes, Dionysius of Halicarnassus tries to imagine what (τί ποτε) the members of the Athenian Assembly must have felt when they heard the great orator himself address them with all the force of his legendary delivery. He concludes that the experience must have been awe-inspiring:

> εἰ δὴ τὸ διὰ τοσούτων <ἐτῶν> ἐγκαταμισγόμενον τοῖς βυβλίοις πνεῦμα τοσαύτην ἰσχὺν ἔχει καὶ οὕτως ἀγωγόν ἐστι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἦ που τότε ὑπερφυές τι καὶ δεινὸν χρῆμα ἦν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκείνου λόγων.[2]

The text has preserved in some adulterated form the breath of the speaker himself. Although it gives the reader a form of access to the original speech, it can never fully resuscitate it, especially when the reader no longer has a personal stake in the situation Demosthenes was addressing. The text is presented as an inadequate but unavoidable intermediary between reader and actual speech. One does not want to read (the text of) Demosthenes, one wants to respeak/rehear Demosthenes. In the text there is only loss.

As I have demonstrated in this dissertation, the above approach to reading or rather unreading Demosthenes blinds one to the potential of the speeches as texts. Readers in 4th century Athens were interested in written texts as such and in relating them to speech, not just in deriving speech from them. As I argued in my chapter on style, various difficulties in Demosthenes' manipulation of syntax force the reader to pause and consider the status of certain

[1] D.H. *Dem.* 22: διαφέρειν τε οὐδὲν ἐμαυτῷ δοκῶ τῶν τὰ μητρῷα καὶ τὰ κορυβαντικὰ καὶ ὅσα τούτοις παραπλήσιά ἐστι, τελουμένων …

[2] D.H. *Dem.* 22: "If, then, the breath mingled with the papyrus through so many years has such strength and leads men so well [in their recitation of the speech], there was at that time, I imagine something supernatural and awesome in his own words."

constructions with reference to a vague spectrum of written vs. unwritten style. This led to more general considerations of writing's potential for informing thought and expression.

Although understanding Demosthenes' style is critical to interpreting his speeches as texts and to understanding the *ethos* he projects, I have argued that one must incorporate discussion of the subject into a larger set of issues surrounding the writtenness of the speeches. For structure and substance need to be read too, not just respoken. The *First Philippic* is carefully structured so as to seem conspicuously unwritten at the same time as it attains to Plato's ideal of organic unity. At times, with their references to specific situations and their concrete proposals, the deliberative speeches seem to transport the reader back into the midst of the crisis they address. But then the list of resources required to instantiate the proposal is missing, which jerks him back to the text as text, as a piece of writing distributed for a reason he cannot clearly identify. Finally, in the case of *Against Meidias*, the text, inasmuch as it is clearly a draft, can only be writing and can never be imaginatively recreated as an actual speech without alteration, supplement, and deletion. Reading Demosthenes, then, involves a constant negotiation on multiple levels between speech as transcript and speech as written text.

When read in this way, his speeches emerge in an almost ideal relation to the intellectual climate in which they were produced. The text of *Against Meidias* preserves a brilliant and scintillating speech in writing; however, insofar as it is clearly a draft, it also demonstrates that Demosthenes was capable of improvising material. The actual speech as delivered in court remains a perpetual hypothetical. This allows it to escape Alcidamas's objections to writing, and it provokes continued engagement with the work. The incompleteness also defends it against hostile readers like Isocrates' Spartan sympathizer who might seek to disarm it for their own benefit; for when stripped the speech cannot show us an integral Demosthenes. With regard to

the deliberative speeches, in turn, the reader cannot identify just what it is he is reading. They are not exactly transcripts but they are also a far cry from Isocrates' pseudo-deliberative literary speeches. Thus, with their nature and the intention behind their distribution being so indeterminate, they cannot be used to criticize Demosthenes for being a sophist who only cares about his own reputation, nor do they stray so far from the particular as to become a bloodless Isocratean pamphlet. When read in this way in relation to 4th century discourse on oratory, the textuality of Demosthenes' speeches does not negate but rather produces new meaning.

If Aeschines and Pytheas are to be believed, to some degree Demosthenes spoke like a book. There are also the apocryphal stories about him being able to recite all of Thucydides' *Histories* by heart. Both in text and in person, then, he was in some sense intertextual. The way he formulated his thoughts and arguments and the substance of his political ideas had been informed by intimate engagement with Thucydides and Isocrates among others. Reading his speeches, then, represents a form of access which by allowing for intertextual comparison can grant the reader a clearer view of the genesis and relative significance of his oratorical achievement. Indeed, insofar as Demosthenes himself seems to have been intrinsically bookish, the texts might be said to be truer representations than the speeches as delivered.

Instead of figuring the text as loss, I have treated it as a source of new concerns and questions. In the wake of the debate between Plato and Isocrates, those in 4th century Athens who were interested in oratory would have been excited not just to hear speeches but to read them and to think about what reading the text of a speech means. When interpreting Demosthenes' oratory, they would have had a sometimes vague, other times clear set of questions and concerns to apply to the text as text: one looked for a substitute for the authorial voice, fought to disarm and denude the text, worked to define prose generally and each genre of oratory in particular.

Speculation about the experience of the original audience was only one element of a much broader hermeneutic.

Recent scholars of Demosthenes have lamented the current lack of interest in studying his speeches from a literary perspective. C.S. Lewis's opinion of him seems to have become the common consensus: he is a great bore.[3] In attempting to respond to this problem, one emphasizes the beauty of his language, his consummate verbal "artistry," his rhetorical legerdemain, or one argues that he is doing interesting things with tragedy or comedy, all the while still trying to get back to the originary experience of the speech thundering from Demosthenes' lips. While all of these approaches illuminate important aspects of his oratory, they do not represent a radical enough shift from the traditional understanding of what it means to interpret one of his speeches. In focusing instead on the reading experience, I hope I have gestured toward a different path. To make Demosthenes speak again, one must first silence him.

[3] Lewis (1955), 138: "Kirk did not, of course, make me read nothing but Homer. The Two Great Bores (Demosthenes and Cicero) could not be avoided."

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