User Welfare Optimization in Recommender Systems with Competing Content Creators

Driven by the new economic opportunities created by the creator economy, an increasing number of content creators rely on and compete for revenue generated from online content recommendation platforms. This burgeoning competition reshapes the dynamics of content distribution and profoundly impacts long-term user welfare on the platform. However, the absence of a comprehensive picture of global user preference distribution often traps the competition, especially the creators, in states that yield sub-optimal user welfare. To encourage creators to best serve a broad user population with relevant content, it becomes the platform's responsibility to leverage its information advantage regarding user preference distribution to accurately signal creators.

In this study, we perform system-side user welfare optimization under a competitive game setting among content creators. We propose an algorithmic solution for the platform, which dynamically computes a sequence of weights for each user based on their satisfaction of the recommended content. These weights are then utilized to design mechanisms that adjust the recommendation policy or the post-recommendation rewards, thereby influencing creators' content production strategies. To validate the effectiveness of our proposed method, we report our findings from a series of experiments, including: 1. a proof-of-concept negative example illustrating how creators' strategies converge towards sub-optimal states without platform intervention; 2. offline experiments employing our proposed intervention mechanisms on diverse datasets; and 3. results from a three-week online experiment conducted on Instagram Reels short-video recommendation platform.