

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

AKBARĪ HERMENEUTICS IN  
SHAMS AL-DĪN AL-FANĀRĪ'S QUR'AN COMMENTARY  
ON THE CHAPTER AL-FĀTIḤA

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## Note on Translation, Transliteration, and References

Translations of the Qur’anic passages belong to Yusuf Ali, and the translations of the sources are mine, unless indicated otherwise. The Qur’anic verses are referred to as follows: Q. 15:13. The first number refers to the chapter and the second to the verse. References to the hadiths found in the canonical hadith collections are written according to the Concordance system, as in “Bukhārī, *īmān*, 5.” The hadith sources are listed in the bibliography with their full bibliographic information.

I have amended the transliteration system of IJMES (*International Journal of Middle East Studies*) for Arabic names, titles and words in the text, footnotes and bibliography. Diacritics are added to personal names, place names, and titles of books and articles. Well-known Arabic terms, such as Qur’an, hadith, Sunnis etc. are not transliterated. *Tafsīr*, *Hadith*, and *Kalām* are capitalized if they refer to the Islamic sciences, but not if they are used in the context of interpretation, Prophetic tradition, and speech. Arabic *ibn* is shortened to *b.* in the tables. ‘Abd Allah is written as ‘Abdullāh. In most cases, death years are given according to the Gregorian calendar.

*Ḥarf al-ta’rīf* (the definite article in Arabic) preceding the *nisba* (the relative adjective) is omitted if the *nisba* is mentioned alone (e.g., Suyūṭī); it is retained if the full name is given (e.g., Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī). This rule is also applied in the footnotes and bibliography. *Ḥarf al-ta’rīf* preceding the names of a group is omitted (e.g., Mu‘tazila). It is retained in titles (e.g., al-Ma’mūn, al-Aswad, al-Mu’ayyad). *Ḥarf al-ta’rīf* preceding book titles and the names of the Qur’anic chapters is kept (e.g., *al-Burhān fī ‘ulūm al-Qur’ān* and *al-Naml*).

Transliteration of Turkish names is written in Turkish script (e.g., the names of the Ottoman sultans, Osman and Orhan). The names of Turkish scholars who authored their works in Arabic are written in Arabic transliteration (e.g., Fanārī, Ṭāshkubrīzāda, Kātīb Chalabī). The names of Turkish places are written in Turkish (e.g., Aksaray, Kayseri, and Köseadağ). However, the *nisbas* for the locations are transliterated according to Arabic script if the scholar who has the *nisba* wrote in Arabic (e.g., Aqsarāyī, Qayṣarī).

I have followed the Chicago Manual of Style in formatting for the references and bibliography.

## INTRODUCTION

Muḥammad ibn Ḥamza Shams al-Dīn al-Fanārī (A.H. 751-834 / C.E. 1350-1431) was a notable scholar who lived in Anatolia at a time when the Ottoman dynasty was on the rise, dominating Western Anatolia and constantly expanding their territories, except for a brief interregnum period of a decade after Timur defeated them in 1402. The time when Fanārī lived coincided with the extension of the Islamization and Turkization process in the region beyond Anatolia at the hands of the Ottomans. The Turkoman principalities in Anatolia, known as *Beyliks*, still existed, but it would not take them long to be swallowed by the Ottomans. Fanārī relocated, first for his education in his youth, and later, according to the changing political situation, until the Ottomans became an unchallenged power. He finally established himself as an esteemed scholar and bureaucrat in Bursa, the Ottoman capital.

Fanārī contributed to the fields of Islamic jurisprudence, logic, and Arabic grammar through his writings, but he is best remembered for his contributions to Akbarī teaching. The word *Akbariyya* (the Akbarī School or Tradition), derived from Ibn al-‘Arabī’s (d. 1240) epithet al-Shaykh al-akbar (the Greatest Master), has been used to refer to the writers who were influenced by Ibn al-‘Arabī’s Sufi doctrines. Fanārī followed Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī’s (d. 1274) interpretation of the School, which gave Ibn al-‘Arabī’s teachings a philosophical formulation, and greatly contributed to Qūnawī’s being understood as the most prominent commentator on his thinking. Fanārī also contributed to the Akbarī exegetical tradition with his Qur’anic commentary on the *al-Fātiḥa* chapter titled “‘*Ayn al-a’yān.*”

Numerous studies have been devoted to the discussion of Sufi exegetical practice and to

the role of Sufi commentaries in classical Islam.<sup>1</sup> Within the genre of Sufi exegesis, the Qur’anic commentaries produced by the Akbarī School constitute an important phase in the history of Sufi exegesis.<sup>2</sup> Modern works on Ibn al-‘Arabī and his School are legion but only a few are dedicated to the analysis of the Scriptural hermeneutics of the School. For example, Goldziher includes Ibn al-‘Arabī in his *Die Richtungen der islamischen Koranauslegung*.<sup>3</sup> He finds that Ibn al-‘Arabī reads his Sufi ideas, formed under the influence of Neo-Platonism, into the Qur’anic text. Goldziher’s discussion is useful; however, the work he analyzes as Ibn al-‘Arabī’s Qur’anic

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1 Some of them are the following: Süleyman Ateş, *İşari Tefsir Okulu* (İstanbul: Yeni Ufuklar, 1998): After discussing the religious legitimacy of Sufi interpretation, Ateş introduces many Sufi commentaries, published or in manuscript, in several phases. Kristin Zahra Sands, *Sufi Commentaries on the Qur’an in Classical Islam* (London; New York: Routledge, 2006): Sands discusses both the theoretical aspects of classical Sufi exegesis and some examples of the exegetical practices of Sufi commentators. She first focuses on the factors that helped Sufi interpretation to emerge such as some Qur’anic verses and prophetic traditions that allow the possibility of multiple layers of meaning in the Qur’an. Then she discusses the opinions of several medieval Muslim scholars in regard to Sufi interpretation and the different methods of interpretation Sufis used. Finally, through some examples, she shows how Sufi commentators interpreted the Qur’anic verses. This work is useful for seeing the general outline of the questions and the themes in classical Sufi exegesis. Hussein Ali Akash, *Die Sufische Koranauslegung: Semantik und Deutungsmechanismen der Isārī-Exegese* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, c2006): Akash touches on early Sufi commentaries, the methods of Sufi exegesis, and the arguments used by Sufis to justify their interpretations. In a large portion of his work, he picks numerous Qur’anic words and explores how Sufis interpret them. He also discusses some Sufi terms that are important in Sufi exegesis, such as *ma’rifā*, *qalb*, and *dhawq*. Mahmūd Abd al-Razzāq, *al-Mu’jam al-şūfi: Awwal dirāsa ‘amiqa fi al-uşul al-Qur’āniyya li-l-muştalah al-şūfi* (Jidda: Dār Mājid ‘asīr li-l-nashr wa-l-tawzī’, 2004). Paul Nwyia, *Exégèse Coranique et Langage Mystique: Nouvel Essai sur le Lexique Technique des Mystiques Musulmans* (Beyrouth: Dar El-Machreq Sarl Éditeurs, 1991): Nwyia attempts to show that the mystical terminology of the Sufis began to form in early Qur’anic exegesis. He reinforces his argument with examples from early commentators, such as Muqātil, al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, Ja‘far al-Şādiq etc.; Annabel Keeler and Sajjad Rizvi (ed.), *The Spirit and the Letter: Approaches to the Esoteric Interpretation of the Qur’an* (London; New York: Oxford University Press, in association with The Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2016). These are studies on Sufi exegesis in general. There are also research monographs on particular Sufi commentaries: Gerhard Böwering, *The Mystical Vision of Existence in Classical Islam, The Qur’anic Hermeneutics of the Sufi Sahl at-Tustari* (Berlin; New York: de Gruyter, 1980, c1979); Pierre Lory, *Les Commentaires ésotériques du Coran d’après ‘Abd ar-Razzaq al-Qashani* (Paris: Les Deux Oceans, 1980); Annabel Keeler, *Sufi Hermeneutics: The Qur’an Commentary of Rashīd al-Dīn Maybūdī* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press; London: In association with The Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2006).

2 Gerhard Böwering who defines four phases in the history of Sufi exegesis, places the commentaries produced by the School of Ibn al-‘Arabī in the third phase, which marks the period when the commentaries of the Sufi schools were produced (from the seventh/thirteenth to the middle of the eighth/fourteenth century). Najm al-Dīn al-Kubrā (d. 618/1221) and his followers, known as the Kubrawī School, also contributed to the genre in this period. See Gerhard Böwering, “The Qur’ān Commentary of al-Sulamī,” in *Islamic Studies Presented to Charles J. Adams*, ed. Wael B. Hallaq and Donald P. Little, (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 42-43.

3 Ignác Goldziher, *Die Richtungen der islamischen Koranauslegung: An der Universität Upsala gehaltene Olaus-Petri-Vorlesungen* (Leiden: Brill, 1920), 216-262.

commentary belongs, in fact, to ‘Abd al-Razzāq al-Qāshānī (d. 1330).<sup>4</sup>

Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Dhahabī, a contemporary scholar of Qur’anic Studies, classifies Ibn al-‘Arabī’s Qur’anic exegesis among “speculative (*naẓarī*) interpretations,” which he defines as unjustifiable attempts by the Sufīs to find support from the Qur’an for their pre-accepted philosophical ideas, such as *Waḥdat al-wujūd*. On the other hand, he approves of other Sufi commentaries that he calls “spontaneous” (*fayḍī*) or “allusive” (*ishārī*), because they may be reconciled with apparent meanings sanctioned by a consensus of “exoteric” scholars.<sup>5</sup>

In his *Falsafat al-ta’wīl*, Naṣr Ḥāmid Abū Zayd, a contemporary Egyptian scholar of Qur’anic hermeneutics, provides a more detailed analysis of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s exegetical thoughts.<sup>6</sup> After discussing Ibn al-‘Arabī’s cosmological and anthropological doctrines in the first and second parts of the work, he analyzes Ibn al-‘Arabī’s exegetical theory and his practices of interpretation in the last part, which constitutes approximately one third of the work. Abū Zayd argues that Ibn al-‘Arabī establishes a connection among three fields –existence, human being, and the Qur’an– on the basis of *ta’wīl*, an interpretative methodology. Michel Chodkiewicz, one of the most prominent scholars on Ibn al-‘Arabī, finds unfortunate Abū Zayd’s choice of the word *ta’wīl* to refer to Ibn al-‘Arabī’s exegetical method, probably under the influence of Henry

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4 Qāshānī’s commentary was mistakenly ascribed to Ibn al-‘Arabī and published in the latter’s name. See ‘Abd al-Razzāq al-Qāshānī, *Tafsīr Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn al-‘Arabī* (Miṣr: Maṭba‘at Būlāq, 1283 [1867]). Goldziher analyzes the commentary thinking it was authored by Ibn al-‘Arabī. For an analysis of Qāshānī’s commentary, see Pierre Lory, *Les Commentaires ésotériques du Coran d’après ‘Abd ar-Razzaq al-Qashani* (Paris: Les Deux Océans, 1980).

5 Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Dhahabī, *al-Tafsīr wa-l-mufasssīrūn: Baḥth tafṣīlī ‘an nash’at al-tafsīr wa-taṭawwuruh, wa-alwānuh, wa-madhāhibuh, ma’a ‘arḍ li-ashhār al-mufasssīrīn, wa-taḥlīl kāmil li-ahamm kutub al-tafsīr, min ‘aṣr al-Nabī ilā ‘aṣrinā al-ḥāḍir* ([al-Qāhira]: Dār al-Kutub al-ḥadītha, 1976-1989), 2:339-352. Dhahabī also has a monograph on Ibn al-‘Arabī’s exegetical methodology: Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Dhahabī, *Ibn al-‘Arabī wa-tafsīr al-Qur’ān* (al-Qāhira: Maṭba‘at al-Azhar, 1973).

6 Naṣr Ḥāmid Abū Zayd, *Falsafat al-ta’wīl: Dirāsa fī ta’wīl al-Qur’ān ‘inda Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn ‘Arabī* (Bayrūt, Lubnān: Dār al-Tanwīr, 1983).

Corbin, who introduces *ta'wīl* as Ibn al-‘Arabī’s method in the interpretation of the Qur’an.<sup>7</sup> Chodkiewicz emphasizes that Ibn al-‘Arabī does not favor the word *ta'wīl*, which undermines the literal meaning of the Qur’an. Instead of *ta'wīl*, Ibn al-‘Arabī prefers the word *ishārāt* (allusions) to refer to his comments on the Qur’an. Chodkiewicz also criticizes Abū Zayd for basing his arguments regarding Ibn al-‘Arabī’s exegetical principles on a work whose attribution to al-Shaykh al-akbar is debated.<sup>8</sup> Chodkiewicz believes that Abū Zayd’s work, despite its merits, has not extinguished the need for an in-depth study of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s thoughts on interpretation of the Qur’an.<sup>9</sup>

We find information on Fanārī in early sources written by his contemporaries, such as Taqīyy al-Dīn al-Maqrīzī (d. 1442), Ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī (d. 1449), Ibn Taghrībirdī (d. 1470), and ‘Alī ibn Dāwūd al-Ṣayrafī (d. 1494).<sup>10</sup> Maqrīzī and Ibn Ḥajar provide valuable, albeit brief, eyewitness accounts of Fanārī’s visit to Cairo in 1420. Ibn Ḥajar also reports that he received an *ijāza* from Fanārī in his handwriting on ‘Aḍḍ al-Dīn al-Ījī’s (d. 1355) *al-Mawāqif*, which Fanārī used to teach often.<sup>11</sup> Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūfī (d. 1505) reports on Fanārī mostly from Ibn Ḥajar, but also narrates some information from Muḥyī al-Dīn al-Kāfīyajī (d. 1474), his teacher and

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7 See Henry Corbin, *Alone With the Alone: Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn ‘Arabi* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 49-50. The emphasis Corbin puts on *ta'wīl*, William C. Chittick believes, is “to imply that Ibn al-‘Arabī leaned toward Shi‘ite beliefs.” See William C. Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-‘Arabi’s Metaphysics of Imagination* (Albany: State University of New York, 1989), 199. Chittick rejects the claim of Shi‘ite leanings in Ibn al-‘Arabī. See *ibid.*, 402, note:13.

8 It is *Kitāb Radd ma‘ānī al-āyāt al-mutashābihāt ilā ma‘ānī al-āyāt al-muḥkamāt*.

9 Michel Chodkiewicz, Review of the *Falsafat al-ta'wīl: Dirāsa fī ta'wīl al-Qur‘ān ‘inda Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn ‘Arabi*, by Naṣr Ḥāmid Abū Zayd, *Studia Islamica* 60 (1984): 177-180.

10 Aḥmad ibn ‘Alī al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk li-ma‘rifat duwal al-mulūk* (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyya, 1997), 7:8-9; Ibn Ḥajar Aḥmad ibn ‘Alī al-‘Asqalānī, *Inbā’ al-ghumr bi-anbā’ al-‘umr* (al-Qāhira: al-Majlis al-‘alā li-l-shu‘ūn al-Islāmiyya, 2009-2011), 3:216-217 and 3:464-465; Abū al-Maḥāsin Yūsuf ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Manhal al-ṣāfi wa-l-mustawfā ba‘da al-wāfi* ([al-Qāhira]: al-Hay‘a al-‘Āmma li-dār al-kutub, 1984-....), 10:40-41. al-Khaṭīb al-Jawharī ‘Alī ibn Dāwūd al-Ṣayrafī, *Nuzhat al-nufūs wa-l-abdān fī tawārīkh al-zamān* (al-Qāhira: Maṭba‘at Dār al-kutub, 1970), 2:469. Maqrīzī and Ibn Ḥajar write Shams al-Dīn’s epithet as “Ibn al-Fanārī.”

11 ‘Asqalānī, *Inbā’ al-ghumr*, 3:465.

Fanārī's pupil.<sup>12</sup> Suyūṭī states that Kāfiyājī used to talk about Fanārī with extreme praise (*kāna yubālighu fī al-thanā 'alayh jiddan*).<sup>13</sup> Aḥmad ibn Muṣṭafā Ṭāshkubrīzāda (d. 1561), who is the most important source for the early Ottoman scholars, provides biographical data on Fanārī's life that contains some inaccurate information.<sup>14</sup> Later historians, biographers, and bibliographers also gave a place to Fanārī in their works.<sup>15</sup>

A detailed biography of Fanārī in Turkish, written by Hüseyin Hüsameddin (d. 1939), a contemporary Turkish historian, contains valuable information not found in the previous sources, but the reader is cautioned not to rely on speculations he makes with no evidence.<sup>16</sup> In English, Richard Cooper Repp has written the most extensive biography of Fanārī; however, since he is primarily interested in the history of the Ottoman institution of *Shaykh al-Islam* and Fanārī's relationship with it, Repp provides no information about the scholar's works or thoughts.<sup>17</sup> In

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12 Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, *Bughyat al-wu'āh fī ṭabaqāt al-lughawīyyīn wa-l-nuḥah* (al-Qāhira: Maṭba'at al-Sa'āda, 1326 [1908]), 39.

13 Ibid.

14 Aḥmad ibn Muṣṭafā Ṭāshkubrīzāda, *al-Shaqā'iq al-nu'māniyya fī 'ulamā' al-Dawlat al-'Uthmāniyya* (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kitāb al-'Arabī, 1975), 17-21; Aḥmad ibn Muṣṭafā Ṭāshkubrīzāda, *Miftāḥ al-sa'āda wa-miṣbāḥ al-siyāda fī mawḍū'āt al-'ulūm* (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-'ilmiyya, 2002), 2:109-111. I will point out inaccurate information narrated by Ṭāshkubrīzāda in chapter 1.

15 For example, see Mehmed Mecdī, *Hadāiku'ş-Şekāik: Tercüme-i Şekāik-i Nu'māniyye* (İstanbul: 1854), 47-53; 'Abd al-Ḥayy ibn Aḥmad ibn al-'Imād, *Shadharāt al-dhahab fī akhbār man dhahab* (Bayrūt, Lubnān: Dār al-Kutub al-'ilmiyya, 1998), 7:341; Muḥammad ibn 'Alī al-Shawkānī, *al-Badr al-ṭālī ' bi-maḥāsin man ba'da al-qarn al-sābi'* (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-'ilmiyya, 1998), 2:140-142; Muḥammad 'Abd al-Ḥayy al-Laknawī, *Kitāb al-Fawā'id al-bahiyya fī tarājim al-Hanafiyya* ([al-Qāhira]: Aḥmad Nājī al-Jamālī wa-Muḥammad Amīn al-Khānjī, [1906]), 166-167; İsmail Belig, *Güldeste-i riyāz-i irfān ve vefeyāt-ı dānişverān-ı nādiredān* (Bursa: Hüdavendigar Vilayeti Matbaası [1884]), 239-244; Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmānī yāhud Tezkire-i meşāhī-i Osmāniye* ([İstanbul]: Matbaa-i Amire, 1308-1315 [1891-97]), 3:159; 'Umar Riḍā Kaḥḥāla, *Mu'jam al-mu'allifin: Tarājim muşanniḥ al-kutub al-'Arabiyya* (Bayrūt: Mu'assasat al-Risāla, 1993), 3:269-270; Mehmed Tahir, *Osmanlı Müellifleri* (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, [1914-1928]), 1:390-392.

16 Hüseyin Hüsameddin, "Molla Fenârî," *Türk Tarih Encümeni Mecmuası* 18 (1926): 368-383 and "Molla Fenârî," *Türk Tarih Encümeni Mecmuası* 19 (1928): 148-158. Richard Cooper Repp states, "...[M]uch of what he [Hüseyin Hüsameddin] says is ... based on little genuine historical evidence... and appears so speculative that it must be treated with some caution." See Richard Cooper Repp, *The Müfti of Istanbul: A Study in the Development of the Ottoman Learned Hierarchy* (London: Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Published by Ithaca Press London for the Board of the Faculty of Oriental Studies, Oxford University, 1986), 75.

17 Repp, *The Müfti of Istanbul*, 73-98.

addition, an article written by J. R. Walsh about Fenārī-zāda, the prominent family of scholars and jurists, contains some brief information about Shams al-Dīn al-Fanārī, the founder of the family.<sup>18</sup>

There are also numerous modern studies on Fanārī in the Turkish language some of which deal with Fanārī's thoughts concerning Qur'anic exegesis.<sup>19</sup> Most of the Turkish studies repeat the assertions that Fanārī represented the Rāzīan School of thought, he attempted to synthesize Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's (d. 1209) metaphysics with Ibn al-'Arabī's, and he aimed at a synthesis among Islamic theology, Islamic philosophy, and Islamic mysticism.<sup>20</sup> These assertions are partly based on Fanārī's pupilage under 'Alā al-Dīn 'Alī al-Aswad (d. 1397), and Jamāl al-Dīn al-Aqşarāyī (d.1370's), who are said to have represented the Rāzīan School in Anatolia. İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı (d. 1977), a contemporary Turkish historian, seems to be the first to have emphasized Fanārī's affiliation with the Rāzīan School by pointing out that Fanārī's scholarly lineage traces back to Rāzī through Aqşarāyī.<sup>21</sup> However, Fanārī's attendance at the lectures of al-Aswad and Aqşarāyī, and even his teaching of the theological works of the Rāzīan

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18 J.R. Walsh, "Fenārī-Zāde," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. 2nd ed. Brill Online [www.brillonline.com].

19 Hakkı Aydın analyzes Fanārī's work on Islamic jurisprudence that is entitled *Fuṣūl al-badā'i' fī uṣūl al-sharā'i'* in his *İslam Hukuku ve Molla Fenârî* (İstanbul: İşaret Yayınları, 1991). Recep Şehidoğlu discusses Fanārī's thoughts concerning the exegesis of the Qur'an and analyzes Fanārī's exegetical methods in an unpublished dissertation, "Molla Fenârî ve Tefsir Metodu" (PhD diss., Ankara University, 1992). Mustafâ Aşkar discusses Fanārī's approach to the *Waḥdat al-wujūd* in his *Molla Fenârî ve Vahdet-i Vücut Anlayışı* (Ankara: Muradiye Kültür Yayınları, 1993). Mehmet Çiçek compares Fanārī's thoughts on the Qur'an to Fazlur Rahman's in his work entitled *Geçmiş ve Günümüz Algısında Kur'an: Molla Fenârî ve Fazlur Rahman Örneği* (İstanbul: Yedirenk, 2012). Betül Güler discusses Fanārī's thoughts regarding ontology and epistemology in *Molla Fenârî'nin Varlık ve Bilgi Anlayışı* (İstanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 2016).

In addition, a multi-language international symposium on Fanārī was held in Turkey in 2009. For the proceedings, see Tefik Yucedođru et al. (ed.), *Uluslararası Molla Fenârî Sempozyumu: International Symposium on Molla Fanârî (Bursa: 2009)* (Bursa: Bursa Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2010).

20 For example, Tahsin Görgün states these claims in the entry he writes for Fanārī's thoughts in *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi*, an encyclopedia influential in research in Islamic Studies conducted in the Turkish language. Tahsin Görgün, "Molla Fenârî (Düşüncesi)" in *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi* [www.islamansiklopedisi.info].

21 İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin İlmîye Teşkilatı* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi: 1988), 76.

School, which was usual in Ottoman madrasas until the 17<sup>th</sup> century, do not necessarily mean that he was following this school in his theology. There is no study demonstrating that Fanārī adopted Rāzī's theological and philosophical points of view and sought a synthesis of Rāzī's and Ibn al-‘Arabī's teachings. Apart from anything else, *Kalām* is not a field to which Fanārī directed his scholarly attention. The only theological work attributed to him is a super-commentary on ‘Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī's (d. 1355) theological treatise titled *al-Mawāqif*, but it is not extant; therefore, the most proper work where we can trace Fanārī's position in relation to Rāzī's theology would be his Qur’anic commentary, *‘Ayn al-a’yān*, in which he engages in long theological discussions. In chapter 6, I elaborate on Fanārī's approach to some theological subjects, in order to shed light on the question of his alleged attempt at synthesis between Rāzī and Ibn al-‘Arabī.

This study examines Fanārī's Qur’an commentary with an aim to demonstrate how he skillfully expresses Akbarī ideas (mostly Qūnawī's) regarding Scriptural hermeneutics by employing the terminology of the classical Islamic scholarly tradition. I argue that the appropriation of Qūnawī's hermeneutics led Fanārī to question the nature and the authority of *Tafsīr* and eventually to develop an exegetical theory that emphasizes the multilayering of Qur’anic meanings, including their esoteric sense, and the openness of the Qur’anic text to endless attempts at interpretation, not just those interpretations based on traditional narrations. He considers the multiple layers of Qur’anic meaning in connection with the hierarchical structure of existence. At the level of esoteric sense, according to Fanārī, the text encodes the secrets of existence. To unveil these secrets, the task of the commentator involves not only intellectual, but also spiritual, experience. In this regard, in Fanārī's commentary, the Qur’an functions as an epistemological medium that connects Akbarīan ontology to spirituality.

Regarding Fanārī's theological position, I argue that Akbarī ideas play a major role in forming his theological conclusions, especially those concerning divine speech (*kalām*).

The study consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 is dedicated to Fanārī's biography and a discussion of his works. Here, closely examining all of the material written on him in both the primary and secondary literature, I try to paint an accurate portrait of the scholar. Chapter 2 contains a detailed description of Fanārī's commentary, *'Ayn al-a'yān*, which forms the backbone of my analysis. This chapter also discusses Fanārī's contribution to the debates on the nature and the sources of Qur'anic exegesis as an Islamic discipline. Chapter 3 provides a detailed analysis of the famous Prophetic tradition (hadith) that describes the Qur'an as having four aspects. The evolution of the comments on this particular hadith through the centuries epitomizes, in a sense, the historical stages of Sufī Qur'anic exegesis. Chapter 4 deals with the theological traditions regarding the nature of Qur'anic revelation and attempts to contextualize Fanārī's thinking in this respect. This chapter points to the theological roots of the differences between the Akbarīs and other traditions, in terms of their approach to the Qur'an and its exegesis. Chapter 5 examines the Sufī theory of multilayered Qur'anic meaning and how Fanārī perceives and expands on it. This chapter also focuses on Fanārī's discussion of *Tafsīr* as an Islamic discipline. Chapter 6 discusses the outstanding characteristics of Fanārī's practice of exegesis through examples from his *'Ayn*. In addition, a large portion of the Prologue (*Muqaddima*) of the *'Ayn* in Arabic, which contains the important parts of the text to which I frequently refer in this study, is appended at the end. I have constructed this edition from several manuscripts, which I will introduce in chapter 2. The text is in a plain format, from which references to the variant readings and citations are omitted; the page numbers of the published version of the *'Ayn* are given between parentheses.

## CHAPTER I

*(Fanārī) was a man of good character and extreme generosity, but he was being criticized because of his affiliation with Ibn al-‘Arabī and that he used to teach Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam and lecture on it.*

Ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī

### SHAMS AL-DĪN AL-FANĀRĪ: LIFE AND WORKS

Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ḥamza (A.H. 751-834 / C.E. 1350-1431), better known as Mullā Fanārī (Molla Fenārī in Turkish transliteration) lived in Anatolia during the rise of the Ottoman Empire. After receiving his education from the madrasas of Anatolia and Egypt, he started his career as a *mudarris* and then a *qāḍī* and eventually reached the highest rank in Ottoman religious bureaucracy as a notable scholar. In this chapter, first I will provide a brief outline of what happened in Anatolia before and during Fanārī’s lifetime. Then I will attempt to depict the biography of the scholar by examining the primary and secondary material written on him. While discussing Fanārī’s biography, I will place a special emphasis on two phenomena, the *riḥla* (travel for the sake of knowledge) and the madrasa, which played important roles in shaping the learned class of the medieval ages, in order to shed some light on the context in which Fanārī lived. I will also give information about Fanārī’s works.

## **Brief Outline of the Historical Developments<sup>1</sup>**

Fanārī spent most of his life in Anatolia. The region witnessed an enormous mobility of the human population in the centuries preceding Fanārī's time. The westward migration of the Muslims from Central Asia to Anatolia from the late 11<sup>th</sup> century on was one of the most remarkable phenomena in the history of the region. Historians have regarded the defeat of the Byzantine army in 1071 by Alparslan (r. 1063-1072), the sultan of the Great Seljuk Empire, at the Battle of Manzikert, located in eastern Anatolia, as a historic moment for the Islamization and Turkization of Anatolia. After this battle, there remained no obstacle in the path of endless Turkoman migrations into Asia Minor.

After the Great Seljuk Empire collapsed, the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum, also known as the Anatolian Seljukids, continued to rule Anatolia until 1243, when the Mongols defeated them at the Battle of Kösedağ. The Anatolian Seljukid dynasty survived another half century as a weak subordinate state of the Mongol Ilkhānids and eventually was replaced by many Turkoman principalities (*beylik*). The Mongol invasion of eastern and central Anatolia forced Turkish tribes to migrate to western Anatolia. During the 14<sup>th</sup> century, the Ottomans, one of the Turkish *beyliks* that had established themselves in western Anatolia, gradually expanded their territories at the expense of the Byzantine Empire and the other rival *beyliks*, as the Ilkhānids lost their power and disappeared in the first half of the 14<sup>th</sup> century. Fanārī's life span coincided with the rise of the Ottomans under the rule of five sultans: Orhan Gāzī (r. 1326-1362), Murād I (r. 1362-1389), Bāyezīd I (the Thunderbolt) (r. 1389-1402), Mehmed I (r. 1413-1421), and Murād II (r. 1421-

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<sup>1</sup> This section is based on Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600* (New York: Praeger Publishers, [1973]).

1444 and 1446-1451). This period was also the time when the early Ottoman madrasas expanded rapidly in Anatolia and Rumeli and the region witnessed an intense mobility of the learned class.

During the reign of the first three Ottoman sultans, Osman, Orhan, and Murād I, northwestern Anatolia, with some large Byzantine cities such as Bursa and Iznik, fell to the dynasty. The Ottoman army that passed to the European side and captured another big Byzantine city, Edirne (Adrianople), began to conquer the Balkans. The Christian Balkan states assembled Crusader armies to stop the Ottomans, but they failed. As all of these events were happening, we see Fanārī wandering in Anatolia and Egypt for the sake of his education and pursuing his early career as a *mudarris* and a *qāḍī*.

Only the advance of Timur (r. 1370-1405), the powerful Mongol-Turkish sultan who invaded a large territory that included Central Asia, Persia, and Eastern Anatolia, was able to stop the expansion of the Ottoman dynasty in Anatolia and the Balkans. Timur's decisive victory against the Ottoman sultan Bāyezīd I the Thunderbolt at the Battle of Ankara in 1402 sent the region into a decade-long chaos. As Bāyezīd's sons were busy with the struggle for the throne, the Turkish principalities that had been suppressed by the Ottomans reappeared. Bāyezīd's youngest son, Mehmed I, known as Çelebi Mehmed, was finally able to put an end to the civil war and reconsolidate the dynasty's power after he defeated all of his rival brothers. During the interregnum period (1402-1413) for the Ottomans, Fanārī took refuge with the Karamanid dynasty, another powerful principality that ruled central Anatolia. He returned to the Ottomans again when Mehmed I restored stability in his realm.

After this brief interruption caused by Timur, the Ottomans regained power and resumed their expansion under the rule of Sultan Murād II, who ascended the throne after Mehmed I.

Murād II focused on suppressing revolts, securing the Balkan front, and eliminating threats in Central and East Anatolia. Fanārī died in 1431 when Murād II was still on the throne; therefore, he did not witness the momentous events that occurred during the following decades. Murād II's son, Mehmed II the Conqueror (r. 1444-1446 and 1451-1481), completed the conquest of the Balkans. His major achievement was the conquest of Constantinople, which marked the end of the Byzantine Empire and the transition of the Ottoman dynasty into an empire. Mehmed II also accomplished the unity of Anatolia by conquering the Empire of Trebizond, located on the eastern coast of the Black Sea, and the Karamanid territory in Central Anatolia, and by defeating Uzun Hasan (r. 1453-1478), the ruler of the Akkoyunlu Turkoman State, which occupied present-day Eastern Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Azerbaijan.

### **Fanārī's Life Story**

Biographical sources point to the year A.H. 751 / C.E. 1350 as the year of Fanārī's birth. If we follow two specific notes put down in two different manuscripts of Fanārī's *'Ayn al-a'yān*, we get approximately the same year: One note registers the day he started writing the commentary as the last day of his sixty-second year (Murad Molla, 136: 55-A.)<sup>2</sup>; the other note is the colophon at the end of another manuscript, which indicates A.H. 814 / C.E. 1411 or 1412 (Atif Efendi, 193: 255-A.)<sup>3</sup>

Where Fanārī was born is not clear. Some sources mention a village named Fanār as his place of origin, accepting his epithet *fanārī* as a *nisba* to a place.<sup>4</sup> However, where this Fanār was

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2 See Appendix- A, Figure- 3.

3 See Appendix- A, Figure- 4.

4 Ṭāshkubrīzāda, *al-Shaqā'iq al-nu'māniyya*, 17; Ṭāshkubrīzāda, *Miftāḥ al-sa'āda*, 2:109.

located is not certain in the sources; some point to Transoxania, while some locate it in Anatolia.<sup>5</sup>

The epithet *fanārī* has other possible meanings. Suyūṭī narrates that he heard from Kāfīyajī that *fanārī* indicates an occupation because it denotes “lantern maker” or “lantern seller” in old Turkish, whose speakers acquired the word *fanar* or *fanār*, which means “lantern,” from the Greeks.<sup>6</sup> According to another story, when Shams al-Dīn’s grandfather came to Anatolia, he was given a lantern as a gift, and then the family came to be known by the epithet “ibn al-Fanārī.”<sup>7</sup> Another story has it that Shams al-Dīn was given this name after he gave an ornamented lantern as a gift to Emir Sultan, a Sufi saint who settled in Bursa and became an advisor and son-in-law of the Ottoman sultan, Bāyezīd I.<sup>8</sup>

Fanārī’s father, Nūr al-Dīn Ḥamza ibn Muḥammad, a Sufi allegedly affiliated with the School of Ibn al-‘Arabī, was anachronistically identified as a disciple of Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī (d. 1274) by Ṭāshkubrīzāda.<sup>9</sup> Although this information is historically inaccurate, we may assume that Fanārī was introduced to Ibn al-‘Arabī’s *taṣawwuf* by his father, from whom Fanārī received his early education. It is told that Fanārī first studied Qūnawī’s famous treatise *Miftāḥ al-ghayb* with his father during his early education.<sup>10</sup> If this is true, we may assume that Fanārī

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5 Süleyman Sa’deddin Müstakimzade, *Mecelletü’n-nisâb fi’n-niseb ve’l-künâ ve’l-elkâb* (facsim.), (Ankara: T.C. Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2000), 241; Belig, *Güldeste*, 239; Tahir, *Osmanlı Müellifleri*, 1:391; İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin İlimiye Teşkilatı* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi: 1988), 228.

6 Suyūṭī, *Bughyat al-wu’âh*, 39. This should be Shams al-Dīn’s ancestor’s job, not his own occupation, because he was a silk merchant. See Ṭāshkubrīzāda, *al-Shaqā’iq al-nu’māniyya*, 19.

7 Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Sakhāwī, *al-Ḍaw’ al-lāmi’ li-aḥl al-qarn al-tāsi’* (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyya, 2003), 3: 115.

8 Tahir, *Osmanlı Müellifleri*, 1:391.

9 Ṭāshkubrīzāda, *al-Shaqā’iq al-nu’māniyya*, 18.

10 Ibid. Fanārī later wrote a commentary on this work with the title of *Miṣbāḥ al-‘uns*, on which detailed information will be given later in this chapter.

spent his childhood in a place of advanced religious education where a complicated text of philosophical Sufism like the *Miftāh* would be studied at an early age.

### *Fanārī's madrasa education*

Other than his studying under his father's tutelage, we know little about Fanārī's early education. The sources indicate that he attended several madrasas in Anatolia and Egypt for the sake of knowledge. To well understand the context in which Fanārī received his formal education, it would be appropriate here to look at one of the most important Islamic institutions, the madrasa, which has played a central role in Islamic education and scholarship, up to the recent past.<sup>11</sup>

The madrasa was developed from the *masjid*, which provided religious education to students, who could reside at the *khans* that later came to be adjacent to the *masjid*. Both the *masjid* and the madrasa were established on the *waqf*, a trust set up in perpetuity for philanthropic purposes. The expenses of the madrasa, including the salaries of teachers and staff and the stipends of students, were drawn from the revenues of the endowed properties. In principle, the rules of the *waqf* granted the institution total independence from its founder, as observed in the example of the *masjid*. However, the madrasas remained under the control of their founders and their descendants.<sup>12</sup>

We see a rapid increase in the number of the madrasas in the Islamic world from the eleventh century on. Although some older madrasas existed before,<sup>13</sup> Nizām al-Mulk (d. 1092),

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11 For an overview of the institutions of learning in Islam with a special emphasis on the Islamic madrasa, see George Makdisi, *The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981). Emphasizing the centrality of madrasas in Islamic education, Makdisi divides the other institutions of learning into pre- and post-madrasa periods.

12 Makdisi, *The Rise of Colleges*, 27-28.

13 Mehmed Dağ and Hıfzırrahman R. Öymen, *İslam Eğitimi Tarihi* (Ankara: Milli Eğitim Basımevi: 1974), 120-121.

the grand vizier of the Great Seljuks, who founded the famous Nizāmiyya madrasa network in the cities controlled by the Seljuk Turks, has been recognized as the foremost name associated with the madrasa. In Baghdad, the sultans, their relatives, and high officials established at least 24 madrasas for Shafī‘ī, Ḥanafī, and Ḥanbalī schools during the period of the late eleventh and twelfth centuries.<sup>14</sup> In foregoing centuries, rulers embraced the custom of founding madrasas in their realms. Nūr al-Dīn al-Zangī (r. 1146-1174) and Salāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī (r. 1174-1193) and his successors built many madrasas in Syria and Egypt in the twelfth century, on the model of the famous Nizāmiyya madrasa in Baghdad.<sup>15</sup> By the time of the Mongol invasion in the mid-thirteenth century, there were 90 active madrasas in Damascus alone, founded during the reign of Salāḥ al-Dīn and his successors.<sup>16</sup> By the end of the fifteenth century, 128 madrasas had been established for the service of the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence in Damascus.<sup>17</sup> In Anatolia also, the Anatolian Seljuks and Turkish principalities who ruled parts of Anatolia until the advance of the Ottomans opened many madrasas in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.<sup>18</sup>

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14 Daphna Ephrat, *A Learned Society in a Period of Transition: The Sunni “Ulama” of Eleventh Century Baghdad* (Albany: State University of New York Press, c2000), 25-29.

15 For an overview of the history of Muslim education from the seventh century to the thirteenth century, see Ahmad Shalaby, *History of Muslim Education* (Karachi: Indus Publications, 1979). Shalaby provides a list of the madrasas founded by Nizām al-Mulk, Nūr al-Dīn al-Zangī, and the Ayyūbids (r. 1171-1341). pp. 58-64.

16 Dominique Sourdel, “Réflexions sur la diffusion de la madrasa en Orient du xi au xiii siècle,” *Revue des études islamiques* 44 (1976): 175.

17 Makdisi, *The Rise of Colleges*, 312.

18 For the madrasas established in the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries in Anatolia by the Danishmend dynasty (r. 1071-1178), the Artukid dynasty (r. 11th century-12th century), the Anatolian Seljukids (r. 1077-1307), and the Ilkhanid dynasty (r. 1256-1335), see Aptullah Kuran, *Anadolu Medreseleri* (Ankara: Ortadoğu Teknik Üniversitesi, 1969). Kuran provides architectural analyses of forty-five surviving madrasa structures along with historical information. The architectural features of the buildings give us valuable clues about social life in these madrasas. For a general survey of madrasas built by Turkish principalities in Anatolia, see Metin Sözen, *Anadolu Medreseleri: Selçuklu ve Beylikler Devri* (İstanbul: İstanbul Teknik Üniversitesi, Mimarlık Tarihi ve Rölöve Kürsüsü, 1970). For the architectural structures erected by the Karamanids (r. 1250-1487), one of the most powerful Turkish principalities that ruled south central Anatolia, see Osman Nuri Dülgerler, *Karamanoğulları Dönemi Mimarisi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2006). In a chapter reserved for institutions of education, the author discusses the history and architectural features of the Karamanid madrasas (pp.104-140).

What would be the possible motives behind the emergence of the madrasa? Early scholars underlined the role of sectarian opposition in the creation of the madrasa.<sup>19</sup> They had a tendency to see the madrasa as an instrument of a Sunni alliance between the Seljuk sultanate and the Abbasid caliphate against the Shi‘ite and/or the Mu‘tazilite doctrines. Others thought that the madrasa was influenced by and transformed from, a Shi‘ite institution of learning, the *dār al-‘ilm*, in order to replace it.<sup>20</sup> In opposition to the idea of the madrasa’s being a public institution set up for imposing Ash‘arism as an official ideology, George Makdisi emphasizes the political factors that played a role in the establishment of thousands of *masjid-khan* complexes by Badr ibn Hasanawayh (d. 1014), a Buwayhid governor, and of the madrasa network by Nizām al-Mulk. Brilliant statesmen, Badr and Nizām generously supported the scholars and their schools of law in return for the use of their scholarly influence on the masses for their political success.<sup>21</sup> Montgomery Watt also sees a political motive behind the establishment of Nizāmiyya madrasas. The Seljuks aimed to increase their power through the ideological support of the Sunni ‘*ulamā*’ and founding many madrasas in the chief cities was an important step to this end. The Sunni ‘*ulamā*’ thus achieved the creation of an orthodox bureaucracy in the administration.<sup>22</sup> According to Richard Bulliet, who objects to those who explain the advance of the madrasas in light of the Sunni revival,<sup>23</sup> Nizām al-Mulk used the Nizāmiyya madrasa as the primary instrument to control the patricians. In other words, Nizām al-Mulk made the patricians dependent upon the state by providing them with “patronage through the building of madrasas”

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19 For a review and critique of the theories by Max van Berchem, Ignác Goldziher, and Youssef Eche, see Makdisi, *Rise of the Colleges*, 292-311.

20 Makdisi, *Rise of the Colleges*, 305-311.

21 Ibid., 32.

22 Montgomery W. Watt, *Islamic Political Thought* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), 74-75.

23 Richard W. Bulliet, *Islam: The View from the Edge* (New York: Columbia University Press, c1994), 148.

in order to control them.<sup>24</sup> There are also scholars such as Ahmad Shalaby who point out factors other than political ones in the emergence of madrasas. In Shalaby's view, madrasas developed naturally from the *masjids*. When the *masjids* became inadequate for education, the madrasas came to be built.<sup>25</sup>

There is another scholarly debate on the question of what was taught in the early madrasas. Goldziher emphasizes the significance of the Ash'arī theology in the curriculum of the madrasas founded by Nizām al-Mulk. He even associates the victory of Ash'arism over the doctrines of the Mu'tazila and Hanbalism with the Nizāmiyya madrasas in which famous Ash'arī representatives were appointed to teaching positions, he alleges, to teach Ash'arī theology publicly.<sup>26</sup> Makdisi objects to Goldziher, saying that the only position in the Nizāmiyya was that of Islamic Law, because the madrasa was an institution established exclusively for the purpose of teaching *fiqh*.<sup>27</sup> Therefore, the primary Islamic discipline studied at the madrasa was *fiqh*, and the other Islamic sciences were ancillaries.<sup>28</sup> Ash'arī theology, which was opposed by the traditionalists, was not taught officially in the Nizāmiyya.<sup>29</sup> After all, the term *madrassa* itself implies its function, since the root of the term (*d-r-s*) and all its derivatives were used in terms

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24 Richard W. Bulliet, *The Patricians of Nishapur: A Study in Medieval Islamic Social History* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), 73. In the introduction, Bulliet explains who the "patricians" are. They are a social class which the words "notables," "dignitaries," and "'ulamā'" do not define properly. The word "patrician" denotes "high social rank combined with local identification and loyalty." (ix-x).

25 Shalaby, *History of Muslim Education*, 55. However, Ahmad Shalaby also asserts that the Seljuks mounted a campaign to establish many madrasas in the Islamic world as "counter-propaganda" against "Shi'ite heresy." See *ibid.*, 57.

26 Ignác Goldziher, *Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law (Vorlesungen über den Islam)*, trans. Andras and Ruth Hamori (Princeton: 1981), 104.

27 George Makdisi, "Muslim Institutions of Learning in Eleventh-Century Baghdad," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 24 (01) (1961): 15. Also see Makdisi, *The Rise of Colleges*, 302-304.

28 Makdisi, *The Rise of Colleges*, 9.

29 Makdisi, "Muslim Institutions of Learning," 47.

related to *fiqh*.<sup>30</sup> Therefore, in his opinion, the madrasa should be rendered as the “college of law.” According to Tibawi, we do not exactly know the curriculum of the Nizāmiyya and other similar institutions; therefore, we cannot conclude that the teachers were prevented from teaching other Islamic disciplines besides *fiqh*. However, the writings of madrasa teachers such as Ghazzālī can give us a hint about the variety of Islamic disciplines they might have taught in the early madrasas.<sup>31</sup> Tibawi disagrees with Makdisi on depicting the *masjid*, the precursor of the madrasa in the latter’s theory, as an institution where *fiqh* was exclusively taught.<sup>32</sup> He points out the fact that not only *fiqh*, but also the other sciences, and even arithmetic, were taught in early educational institutions preceding the madrasa, such as the *maktab* and the *majlis*.<sup>33</sup> He also disagrees with the restriction of the term *madrasa* and its cognates to *fiqh*, pointing out their other usages associated with different meanings.<sup>34</sup>

Early Ottoman madrasas<sup>35</sup> are believed to have been built on the model of Seljuk madrasas.<sup>36</sup> The first phase of the state before it became an empire was very productive in terms of the establishment of new madrasas. During the rise of the Ottomans, except Osman I (r. 1299-1326), the first ruler of the dynasty, the sultans were committed to founding madrasas in the

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30 Ibid., 10-11.

31 A. L. Tibawi, “Origin and Character of al-madrasah,” *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 25 (1962): 227-229.

32 Ibid., 229.

33 Ibid., 226.

34 Ibid., 229, (Note: 4).

35 The term “early Ottoman” is used to connote the period from 1299, which is regarded as the birth year of the Ottoman state, until the conquest of Istanbul by Sultan Mehmed II the Conqueror (r. 1444-1446 and 1451-1481) in 1453.

36 A. Adnan Adıvar, *La Science chez les Turcs Ottomans* (Paris: G.P. Maisonneuve, 1939), 8; A. Adnan Adıvar, *Osmanlı Türklerinde İlim* (İstanbul: Maarif matbaası, 1943), 2.

cities they conquered in both Anatolia and Rumeli.<sup>37</sup> Not only the sultans, but also high officials and wealthy individuals, made generous donations to start new madrasas. As a result, eighty-four madrasas were established in Ottoman-controlled territories after Osman Gazi, during the reign of the next five Ottoman sultans (Orhan, Murād I, Bāyezīd I, Mehmed I, and Murād II). Fifty-three of these madrasas were built in Anatolia, twenty-nine in Rumeli, and two in Jerusalem.<sup>38</sup>

When Orhan Gazi (r. 1326-1362) established the first Ottoman madrasa in the town of Iznik (Nicaea), he appointed Dāwūd al-Qayṣarī (d. 1350 or 1351) as the first *mudarris*.<sup>39</sup> Qayṣarī, who received his education in Anatolia and Egypt, was a disciple of ‘Abd al-Razzāq al-Qāshānī (d. 1329). Becoming a follower of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s teaching through Qāshānī, Qayṣarī produced several important works on Sufism, including a commentary on the *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*.<sup>40</sup> Qayṣarī, who taught at the first madrasa, and Fanārī, who afterwards established himself in the Ottoman religious bureaucracy, are considered two prominent names among those who were primary

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37 There are numerous works on the Ottoman madrasa. For a study of the history of the Ottoman madrasa, see İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin İlmîye Teşkilatı* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi: 1988). Uzunçarşılı discusses not only the madrasa but also some important institutions such as the offices of *qaḍā* and *shaykh al-Islām* in his work. For an overview of the Ottoman madrasa in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, see Cahit Baltacı, *XV. XVI. Asırlarda Osmanlı Medreseleri: Teşkilat-Tarih* (İstanbul: 1976). Utilizing extensive materials, Baltacı provides details about the madrasas that were in operation in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. For an overview on the madrasas from the beginning of the Ottomans to the conquest of Istanbul, see Mustafa Bilge, *İlk Osmanlı Medreseleri* (İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1984). Drawing on deeds of trust (*waqfiyya*) and other historical documents found in the Ottoman archives, Bilge provides detailed information about the administration, curriculum, and teachers of the madrasas. For an architectural analysis of the early madrasas, see Yekta Demiralp, *Erken Dönem Osmanlı Medreseleri (1300-1500)* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1999). Demiralp discusses 36 madrasas that were built between 1300 and 1500 and have survived. He also points out the differences from an architectural perspective between them and pre-Ottoman madrasas. In addition, H. Gül provides a chronological list of madrasas, ranging from the Anatolian Seljuks to Sultan Süleyman the Lawgiver and brief information for each in his work entitled *Osmanlı Medreselerinde Eğitim ve Bunların Arasında Darul Hadislerin Yeri* (Ankara: 1997). He dedicates one part of his work to a special type of Ottoman madrasa, the *Dār al-Ḥadīth*.

38 Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, “Osmanlı Medrese Geleneğinin Doğuşu,” *Belleten* LXVI: 247 (2002): 849-903.

39 Tāshkubrīzāda, *al-Shaqā’iq al-nu’māniyya*, 8.

40 For Qayṣarī, see Tāshkubrīzāda, *al-Shaqā’iq al-nu’māniyya*, 8; Tahir, *Osmanlı Müellifleri*, 1:67-69; Kaḥḥāla, *Mu’jam al-mu’allifin*, 1:702.

contributors to the spread of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s teachings in the Ottoman territories,<sup>41</sup> but no satisfactory study has been presented to show whether or how Akbarī teaching impacted the Ottoman madrasa education.

As is the case with the curriculum of the Nizāmiyya madrasas, it is not clear what courses were taught and what books were studied in the early Ottoman madrasas.<sup>42</sup> Adıvar, a contemporary scholar who wrote on scientific developments in the Ottomans, assumes that Arabic and ancillary studies related to it held an important place in the early Ottoman madrasa, considering that the Ottomans followed the example of previous madrasas. He assumes that logic and mathematics were studied, in addition to religious sciences such as *Fiqh* and *Kalām*.<sup>43</sup> In contrast to the ambiguity about the curriculum of the early Ottoman madrasa, the sources provide detailed information about the curriculum in the later Ottoman madrasas, from the 16<sup>th</sup> century on, which covered both the classical Islamic sciences, such as *Tafsīr*, Hadith, *Fiqh* and *Kalām*, and ancillary disciplines, including linguistics and logic.<sup>44</sup> The scholars whose books were most studied were al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d. 1413), Sa‘d al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 1390) and Ibn al-Ḥājib (d. 1249).<sup>45</sup>

Back to Fanārī, the sources indicate that he studied under Kamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Ma‘arrī (d. ?), ‘Alā al-Dīn ‘Alī al-Aswad (d. 1397), and Jamāl al-Dīn al-Aqṣarāyī (d. 1370s).<sup>46</sup> Hüseyin Hüsameddin states that Kamāl al-Dīn al-Ma‘arrī was *mudarris* at Bursa.<sup>47</sup>

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41 Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin İlmîye Teşkilatı*, 228-229.

42 Adıvar, *Osmanlı Türklerinde İlim*, 2-3; Demiralp, *Erken Dönem Osmanlı Medreseleri*, 7.

43 Adıvar, *Osmanlı Türklerinde İlim*, 3.

44 Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin İlmîye Teşkilatı*, 20-31; Demiralp, *Erken Dönem Osmanlı Medreseleri*, 8; Bilge, *İlk Osmanlı Medreseleri*, 40-63.

45 Bilge, *İlk Osmanlı Medreseleri*, 43.

46 ‘Asqalānī, *Inbā’ al-ghumr*, 3: 464.

47 Hüseyin Hüsameddin, “Molla Fenârî,” *Türk Tarih Encümeni Mecmuası* 18 (1926): 370.

Since al-Aswad was the *mudarris* of the Iznik madrasa established by Sultan Orhan, which is known as the first madrasa of the Ottoman dynasty,<sup>48</sup> it means that Fanārī changed his location from Bursa to Iznik to attend al-Aswad’s lessons. As we understand from his works, al-Aswad invested his scholarly interest mostly in the field of *fiqh*.<sup>49</sup> Having fallen into disagreement with al-Aswad, Fanārī left the Iznik madrasa and went to attend the lectures of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Aqṣarāyī.<sup>50</sup> According to Ṭāshkubrīzāda, Aqṣarāyī was teaching at the Zincirli Madrasa located at Aksaray ruled by Karamanids.<sup>51</sup> However, Hüsameddin asserts that Aqṣarāyī was in Amasya, located in mid-north Anatolia, by the time Fanārī heard from him.<sup>52</sup> Neither Aksaray nor Amasya fell under the control of the Ottomans until the 1390s. In 1392, its local ruler peacefully surrendered Amasya to Bāyezīd I. In 1397, the same Bāyezīd conquered the Karamanid lands. This means Fanārī left Ottoman territory to meet Aqṣarāyī.

When Fanārī attended Aqṣarāyī’s lectures is not clear. Ibn Ḥajar states that Fanārī was twenty when he traveled to Egypt after listening to Aqṣarāyī.<sup>53</sup> According to Ṭāshkubrīzāda, Fanārī went to Egypt in company with al-Sayyīd al-Sharīf (‘Alī ibn Muḥammad) al-Jurjānī (d. 1413), the famous scholar who later established himself in Timur’s court.<sup>54</sup> When we read

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48 Ṭāshkubrīzāda, *al-Shaqā’iq al-nu‘māniyya*, 9.

49 For the biography of ‘Alā al-Dīn al-Aswad, see Ṭāshkubrīzāda, *al-Shaqā’iq al-nu‘māniyya*, 9; Laknawī, *al-Fawā’id al-bahiyya*, 116-117; Tahir, *Osmanlı Müellifleri*, 1:351, 352; Kaḥḥāla, *Mu‘jam al-mu‘allifin*, 2:383.

50 Ṭāshkubrīzāda, *al-Shaqā’iq al-nu‘māniyya*, 9. For Aqṣarāyī, see Ṭāshkubrīzāda, *al-Shaqā’iq al-nu‘māniyya*, 14-15; Tahir, *Osmanlı Müellifleri*, 1:265-266; Kaḥḥāla, *Mu‘jam al-mu‘allifin*, 3:627; Irène Mélikoff, “Djamāl al-Dīn Aqṣarāyī,” in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. 2nd ed. Brill Online [www.brillonline.com].

51 Ṭāshkubrīzāda, *al-Shaqā’iq al-nu‘māniyya*, 15.

52 Hüsameddin, “Molla Fenārī,” (18:1926), 370. Mélikoff, the writer of the entry for Aqṣarāyī, says that Hüsameddin derives this information from an unreliable source. Repp agrees with Mélikoff. See Repp, *The Müfti of Istanbul*, 76-77.

53 ‘Asqalānī, *Inbā’ al-ghumr*, 3:465.

54 Ṭāshkubrīzāda, *al-Shaqā’iq al-nu‘māniyya*, 15. For Jurjānī, see Sakhāwī, *al-Daw’ al-lāmi’*, 5:292; Shawkanī, *al-Badr al-ṭāli’*, 1:333-334; Laknawī, *al-Fawā’id al-bahiyya*, 125-137; Kaḥḥāla, *Mu‘jam al-mu‘allifin*, 2:515-516; Arthur S. Tritton, “al-Ḍjurḍjānī,” in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. 2nd ed. Brill Online [www.brillonline.com].

Ṭāshkubrīzāda’s account along with Jurjānī’s biography, we have the following story: Jurjānī set out from Herat in 1368 for Egypt to hear from Muḥammad ibn Mubārakshāh (d. ca. 1380s), upon the advice of the old Qutb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥṭānī (d. 1364). On his way to Egypt, he spent some time in Anatolia; he wanted to meet Aqṣarāyī, but the latter died just before Jurjānī’s arrival. Instead of Aqṣarāyī, Jurjānī met Fanārī in Karaman.<sup>55</sup> Then the two went to Egypt together and studied under Akmal al-Dīn al-Bābartī (d. 1384). Jurjānī stayed at least four years in Egypt, visited Constantinople in 1374, and upon his return from his travels to Egypt in 1377, was appointed *mudarris* in Shiraz. According to this scenario, Aqṣarāyī should have died before 1370. However, the existence of evidence that Aqṣarāyī was alive after 1372,<sup>56</sup> and the fact that the association of Jurjānī with Fanārī was mentioned by only Ṭāshkubrīzāda, casts doubt upon the story. After carefully investigating all the information about Fanārī’s travel to Egypt, Repp concludes,

...one cannot then determine with any certainty the date of his journey to Egypt since it is impossible to assert confidently which of the seemingly contradictory facts or sets of facts – Ibn Ḥajar’s statement that he made the journey in 778 [1377], Taṣkōprüzade’s statement that he went in company with Seyyid Şerif [Jurjānī], Taṣkōprüzade’s association of Seyyid Şerif’s arrival in Karaman with Cemaleddin Aksarayi’s death, and so on – deserves most weight, though perhaps the specific nature of Ibn Ḥajar’s date argues in its favour while, equally, the slight suspicion which always attaches to attempts to associate great figures of the past argues against the association of Molla Fenari and Seyyid Şerif.<sup>57</sup>

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55 Tritton, who states that Jurjānī studied under Fanārī when he came to Karaman, is obviously mistaken. See Tritton, “al-Djurdjānī.”

56 Repp, *The Müfti of Istanbul*, 79.

57 Ibid.

Aqşarāyī was a prominent Turkish scholar in Anatolia who was known as the great-grandson of the famous Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. According to the sources, Aqşarāyī was admitted to the position of *tadrīs* at the Zincirli Madrasa at Aksaray after memorizing Abū Naşr Ismā‘īl ibn Ḥammād al-Jawharī’s (d. ca. 1003) lexicographical work in Arabic entitled *al-Şihāh*. The sources also report that he classified his students according to their grade levels. He taught those in the first class while walking from his house to the madrasa. He gave a lecture to those in the second class at the courtyard of the madrasa. He finally met those in the third class in the hall of the madrasa.<sup>58</sup> Fanārī, since he was young, was one of those in the second class.<sup>59</sup> Aqşarāyī’s works consist of a moral treatise and commentaries on theological, jurisprudential, and grammatical works.

Aqşarāyī, like al-Aswad, is said to have represented the Rāzīan School of thought in Anatolia.<sup>60</sup> It seems that Fanārī’s so-called affiliation with the Rāzīan School is based on his pupilage under Aqşarāyī and al-Aswad. The Rāzīan School is believed to have achieved a reconciliation of philosophy and theology. After Rāzī, theological problems came to be discussed with the terminology and worldview of Islamic philosophy influenced by the ancient Greek philosophy.

#### *Fanārī’s first journey to Egypt for education*

Whether he went with Jurjānī or not is unclear, but Fanārī certainly made a journey to Egypt, one of the most important centers of learning of the time. He studied under Akmal al-Dīn al-Bābartī,

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58 Ƨāshkubrīzāda, *al-Şhaqā’iq al-nu‘māniyya*, 15.

59 Ibid.

60 Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin İlmiye Teşkilatı*, 76.

a scholar who migrated from abroad and taught in Egypt.<sup>61</sup> Bābartī is said to have been at that time a prominent scholar of Ḥanafī jurisprudence and Māturīdī theology. Ibn Ḥajar recounts from Ibn Khaldūn (d. 1406) that Bābartī used to believe in the *Waḥdat al-wujūd* (*madhhab al-waḥda*).<sup>62</sup> Although no work among Bābartī’s writings is about *Waḥdat al-wujūd* or Ibn al-‘Arabī’s teachings, we should consider the testimony of Ibn Khaldūn, who knew Bābartī personally and exchanged ideas with him,<sup>63</sup> as strong evidence of Bābartī’s sympathy for Ibn al-‘Arabī’s thoughts. If it is true that Bābartī was influenced by Ibn al-‘Arabī, Fanārī’s study under him would be more meaningful. We may assume, in this case, that the intellectual interests of the two perfectly overlapped, as being both Ḥanafī and Akbarī, and that Fanārī found favorable ground for cultivating Sufi ideas at his young age under the tutelage of such an eminent figure as Bābartī. Along with Fanārī, some other well-known names from Anatolia, such as Shaykh Badr al-Dīn ibn Qāḍī Simawna (ex. 1420), the celebrated poet Tāj al-Dīn Ibrāhīm, known as Aḥmadī (d. 1413), and the famous physician Ḥājī Pāsha (d. 1424(?)) were also part of Bābartī’s circle. Indeed, it was common among young Muslim scholars from all over the world, including Anatolia, to come to study at the prestigious madrasas of Egypt under Mamluk rule.<sup>64</sup>

Fanārī’s travels among the Muslim cities for education and for pursuing his career reflect a common custom widely practiced at the time, as the *riḥla*, a journey undertaken by the seeker

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61 For Bābartī, see Ibn Ḥajar Aḥmad ibn ‘Alī al-‘Asqalānī, *al-Durar al-kāmina fī a’yān al-mi’a al-thāmina* (Ḥaydarābād: Maṭba‘at Majlis Dā’irat al-Ma‘ārif, 1929-1931), 4:250-251; ‘Asqalānī, *Inbā’ al-ghumr*, 1:298; al-Qāsim ibn ‘Abdullāh Ibn Quṭlūbughā, *Tāj al-tarājim fī ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanafīyya* (Baghdād: Maktabat al-Mathannā, 1962), 66; Suyūṭī, *Bughyat al-wu‘āh*, 103; Tāshkubrīzāda, *Miftāḥ al-sa‘āda*, 2:243-244; Laknawī, *al-Fawā’id al-bahīyya*, 195-199; Tahir, *Osmanlı Müellifleri*, 1: 221-222; Kaḥḥāla, *Mu‘jam al-mu’allifin*, 3:699.

62 ‘Asqalānī, *al-Durar al-kāmina*, 4: 250.

63 Ibn Khaldūn, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, trans. Franz Rosenthal (New York: Pantheon Books, c1958), 2:229.

64 For the mobility of students, scholars, mystics, merchants, pilgrims, etc. between the Ottoman and the Mamluk lands, see Cihan Yüksel Muslu, *The Ottomans and the Mamluks: The Imperial Diplomacy and Warfare in the Islamic World* (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014).

of knowledge, was an important reality in the lives of medieval Muslim scholars. Travel has perhaps been one of the most familiar notions to Muslims since the beginning of Islam. The Prophet himself and many of his townsmen were merchants who traveled to trade centers. The first travels and emigrations (*hijra*) for religious purposes to Abyssinia and Medina came after the oppression the early Muslims encountered in Mecca. When forced emigration ended with Islam's final victory in Arabia, travel lost no importance in Muslims' life because the obligation of pilgrimage (*hajj*) as one of the pillars of Islam made journeying a religious duty for every economically capable male and female. But when the term *riḥla* is mentioned, what first comes to mind is neither *hijra* nor *hajj*, but "travel in search of knowledge" (*al-riḥla fī ṭalab al-ʿilm*), a concept associated with the Islamic science of Hadith that refers to the journey undertaken by the hadith compilers to obtain or to authenticate prophetic traditions.<sup>65</sup> The alleged hadith that urged Muslims to seek knowledge, even if it were to be found in China, has been taken as a motto that encouraged widespread travel for the collection of traditions throughout the first centuries of Islam.

Although the *riḥla* with the intention of collecting prophetic traditions is regarded to have ceased after the eleventh century when the major compilations of the hadiths and the madrasas became widespread,<sup>66</sup> travels of the scholars in the Islamic world never ended for several reasons. Ross E. Dunn identifies the following three purposes of travel commonly seen in the learned class of the late medieval age: to make pilgrimage, to study in the madrasas located in

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65 For a famous medieval work dedicated to *riḥla* travels for hadiths made by the companions and the later generations, see Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, *Al-Riḥla fī ṭalab al-ḥadīth* (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 1975).

66 İbrahim Hatipoğlu, "Rihle," in *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi* [www.islamansiklopedisi.info].

the Islamic centers, and to visit Sufi saints.<sup>67</sup> He further points out another social phenomenon that played a role in the mobility of the learned during the expansion of Islam in the Middle Ages, as seen in the case of Ibn Battuta: the need for “the literate frontiersman.”<sup>68</sup> As new lands were conquered and new Muslim settlements were established in the frontiers of the Muslim world, in such places as Anatolia, literate specialists were needed who could run Islamic institutions and contribute to the Islamization of the land. For the rulers of conquered lands distant from the centers of Islam, the recruitment of scholars was needed to consolidate their political power by both Islamizing non-Muslim subjects and winning political legitimacy in the eyes of Muslim subjects.<sup>69</sup> Marshall G. S. Hodgson points out this demand for literate specialists in the cosmopolitan lands of Islam, saying, “Always wherever there were numerous Muslims, there arose a demand for various sorts of Muslim specialists.”<sup>70</sup> Many learned men responded to this call, hoping to seize new opportunities.

However, Dunn also notes the mediocre quality of the scholars who travelled to the frontiers in the fourteenth century.<sup>71</sup> The insecurity of the frontiers might have been a factor that dissuaded the distinguished erudite from settling in these lands. Carl Petry, who demonstrated that very few notables located in Egypt and Syria travelled beyond the Mamlūk territories in the

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67 Ross E. Dunn, “International Migrations in the Later Middle Period: The Case of Ibn Battuta,” in *Golden Roads: Migration, Pilgrimage and Travel in Mediaeval and Modern Islam*, ed. Ian Richard Netton (Richmond [England]: Curzon Press, 1993), 76.

68 Ibid., 76.

69 Ibid., 77-78.

70 Marshall G. S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam: Volume 2, The Expansion of Islam in the Middle Periods Conscience and History in a World Civilization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 540.

71 Dunn, “International Migrations,” 82.

fifteenth century, concluded that the Mamlūk rulers provided internal security for their subjects and that the learned elite preferred this security rather than emigrating to less secure lands.<sup>72</sup>

The great Muslim traveler Ibn Battuta (d. 1377), who wandered in Anatolia and visited several Turkish principalities, including the Ottomans during the 1330s, witnessed a remarkable social dynamism in the developing cultural and commercial centers. Scholars and merchants would circulate in these centers, at the ready for any opportunity. In his *Rihla*, Ibn Battuta makes mention of the scholars and Sufis who came to this land from different parts of the Muslim world,<sup>73</sup> and he himself also took advantage of the environment in which Turkish rulers (*beys*) showed Muslim scholars great respect, and so he was able to acquire wealth. Ross Dunn describes the attitude of the *beys*, with their eagerness for “approval as legitimate and respectable Muslim rulers.”<sup>74</sup>

Like the rulers of other principalities, Ottoman rulers tried to attract scholars who would serve in their land. Among those who accepted appointments were some eminent names such as Dāwūd al-Qayṣarī (d. 1350 or 1351), Majd al-Dīn al-Fīrūzābādī (d. 1415), Abū al-Khayr Muḥammad al-Jazarī (d. 1429), Shams al-Dīn al-Fanārī (d. 1431), Fakhr al-Dīn al-‘Ajamī (d. 1460), and ‘Alā al-Dīn ‘Alī al-Ṭūsī (d. 1481).<sup>75</sup> However, not all of the scholars who served

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72 Carl F. Petry, “Travel Patterns of Medieval Notables in the Near East,” *Studia Islamica* 62 (1985): 84.

73 See Ibn Battuta, *Rihlat Ibn Baṭṭūṭa* (Bayrūt: Dār Ṣādir, 1964), 284-331.

74 Ross E. Dunn, *The Adventures of Ibn Battuta: A Muslim Traveler of the 14th Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 153. Among the Turkish *beys*, Orhan Bey of the Ottomans stands out in Ibn Battuta’s narrative; he seems to draw attention to the promising future of the Ottomans. See Ibn Battuta, *Rihlat Ibn Baṭṭūṭa*, 308.

75 Ṭāshkubrīzāda’s *al-Shaqā’iq al-nu’māniyya*, which is the most important source for the Ottoman scholars, includes biographies of these scholars.

during the reign of the early sultans were loyal to the Ottomans.<sup>76</sup> It seems that the wandering scholars were hesitant to stay permanently in the Ottoman land until the dynasty proved to be stable and powerful by eliminating their rival principalities in Anatolia and expanding their territories beyond Anatolia; this was not fully realized until the sixteenth century.

### *Fanārī's return to Anatolia*

Fanārī probably returned to the Ottoman lands when Murād I (r. 1362-1389) was still on the throne. He arrived in Bursa where he was appointed a *mudarris* at the Madrasa of Manastır, which was converted from a Christian church by Orhan (r. 1326-1362).<sup>77</sup> When Fanārī became a *mudarris* and how long he served at this position are uncertain.<sup>78</sup> He must have been found successful in his career of professorship at the madrasa, since he was promoted to the post of *qādī* (judge) in Bursa.<sup>79</sup> According to Hüsameddin, Fanārī was appointed *qādī* in 1394, when he was 44, following upon a controversy between the grand vizier and the religious officers that resulted in the dismissal of the previous judge during the rule of Bāyezīd I the Thunderbolt (r. 1389-1402).<sup>80</sup> Ibn Taghrībirdī uses the title *qādī al-quḍāt* (chief *qādī*) in Fanārī's entry. He also emphasizes that Fanārī undertook three offices, teaching at the madrasa (*tadrīs*), juristconsulting (*iftā'*), and judgeship (*qaḍā'*).<sup>81</sup> Ṭāshkubrīzāda repeats the same information.<sup>82</sup> Repp believes

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76 Fīrūzābādī, Jazarī, and Ṭūsī left the Ottoman land. Fanārī spent a part of his life in the Karamanid territory and turned again to the service of the Ottomans.

77 Ṭāshkubrīzāda, *al-Shaqā'iq al-nu'māniyya*, 18.

78 For a discussion of Fanārī's return to Anatolia, see Repp, *The Müfti of Istanbul*, 79-80.

79 'Asqalānī, *Inbā' al-ghumr*, 3:465.

80 Hüsameddin, "Molla Fenārī," (18:1926), 372-375. For a discussion of Fanārī's appointment as *qādī*, see Repp, *The Müfti of Istanbul*, 82-83.

81 Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Manhal al-ṣāfi*, 10:40.

82 Ṭāshkubrīzāda, *al-Shaqā'iq al-nu'māniyya*, 18.

that Fanārī did not take on these tasks concomitantly when he arrived in Bursa. Rather, he would have been appointed *qāḍī* and *muftī* later in his life, after he served as a *mudarris* for a while.<sup>83</sup>

The sources include stories that reveal the high esteem shown to Fanārī by the rulers during his service as a *qāḍī*. For example, Ṭāshkubrīzāda reports that Fanārī rejected Sultan Bāyezīd’s testimony in court on account of the latter’s failing to attend congregational prayers in the mosque. Bāyezīd, who suffered deep regret, built a mosque next to his palace and never quit praying in congregation.<sup>84</sup>

### *Fanārī in Konya*

Fanārī held the post of chief judge in Bursa for a while, then left the Ottomans and settled in Konya, which was ruled by the Karamanids.<sup>85</sup> According to Ṭāshkubrīzāda, the reason behind this relocation was a disagreement between him and the Ottoman Sultan, Bāyezīd I.<sup>86</sup> However, modern historians such as Hüsameddin and Uzunçarşılı insist that Fanārī’s service as a *qāḍī* extended until 1402, when the Ottomans were decisively defeated by Timur’s army at the Battle of Ankara. Fanārī was among the notables of Bursa who were captured when Timur invaded and sacked the city, and who were eventually released.<sup>87</sup> Timur restored the Anatolian principalities that had been suppressed by the Ottomans, including the Karamanids, which was one of the most powerful principalities that ruled south-central Anatolia. After Timur released Mehmed Bey, the

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83 Repp, *The Müfti of Istanbul*, 79. For a discussion of whether Fanārī united these posts at the same time, see *ibid.*, 79-82.

84 Ṭāshkubrīzāda, *al-Shaqā’iq al-nu’māniyya*, 19.

85 ‘Asqalani, *Inbā’ al-ghumr*, 3:465; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Manhal al-ṣāfi*, 10:40.

86 Ṭāshkubrīzāda, *al-Shaqā’iq al-nu’māniyya*, 19.

87 Hüsameddin, “Molla Fenārī,” (18:1926), 376-377; İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi: Kuruluşun İstanbul’un Fethine Kadar* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1947), 1: 169; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin İlmiye Teşkilatı*, 165.

ruler of the Karamanid dynasty, who was being held captive by the Ottomans in Bursa, Fanārī migrated with him to Konya, the Karamanid capital in central Anatolia.<sup>88</sup> Fanārī stayed in Konya under the patronage of Mehmed Bey during the interregnum period of the Ottomans. Mehmed Bey treated him with great respect and designated a considerable amount of money to be paid daily to Fanārī and his students.<sup>89</sup> During his stay in Konya, Fanārī was occupied in teaching and giving fatwa.<sup>90</sup> He also authored his *‘Ayn al-a’yān*, a Qur’anic commentary on the *al-Fātiḥa* chapter. In the preface of the *‘Ayn*, Fanārī includes a dedication of the work to Mehmed Bey, accompanied by remarks and poetry that contain hyperbolic praise for the latter.<sup>91</sup> It seems that Fanārī was still in the Karamanid territory in 1416.<sup>92</sup>

#### *Fanārī in Bursa again*

Mehmed I (Çelebi) (r. 1413-1421), one of Bāyezīd’s sons, ended the civil war that lasted for 11 years by defeating his rival brothers. While Çelebi Mehmed was busy fighting against his rival brother, Çelebi Mūsā, in Rumeli, the European part of the Ottoman state, Mehmed Bey the Karamanid besieged Bursa and destroyed its outskirts in 1413.<sup>93</sup> Çelebi Mehmed, who thereupon attacked and defeated the Karamanids in 1415, returned to Bursa with the sovereignty of new lands in central Anatolia surrendered by the Karamanids. Mehmed also took Fanārī to Bursa.<sup>94</sup>

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88 Hüsameddin, “Molla Fenârî,” (18:1926), 377-378.

89 Ṭāshkubrīzāda, *al-Shaqā’iq al-nu’ māniyya*, 19.

90 Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Manhal al-ṣāfi*, 10:40.

91 See Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ḥamza al-Fanārī, *‘Ayn al-a’yān: Tafsiṛ al-Fātiḥa* (İstanbul: Rıfat Bey Matbaası, 1325 [1907]), 2.

92 Repp, *The Müfti of Istanbul*, 85.

93 Halil İnalçık, “Mehmed I,” in *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi* [www.islamansiklopedisi.info].

94 Both Ibn Ḥajar and Ibn Taghrībirdī report that Fanārī returned from Konya to Bursa after the Ottomans defeated the Karamanids. See ‘Asqalānī, *Inbā’ al-ghumr*, 3:465; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Manhal al-ṣāfi*, 10:40. However, according to Ṭāshkubrīzāda, who associates Fanārī’s relocation to Konya with the disagreement between him and

Repp concludes that Fanārī “returned to the Ottoman lands some time within or shortly after Sha‘bān 820/September-October 1417,”<sup>95</sup> after deliberating upon the campaigns that occurred between the Ottomans and Karamanids and considering other historical evidence, such as official documents signed by Fanārī when he was in Konya.<sup>96</sup> Fanārī was welcomed with great respect and honor in Bursa and was appointed as *mudarris* and *qāḍī* again.<sup>97</sup> Ibn Ḥajar describes how the Ottomans received Fanārī when he came back to Bursa:

When the Karamanids were defeated by the Ottomans in the war between them, Ottoman Sultan took Shaykh Shams al-Dīn (al-Fanārī) to Bursa and entrusted him with the judgeship of his country. Henceforward, he (Fanārī) gained a great deal of prestige (*irtafa‘a qadruhū*) and reached the highest rank (*al-maḥall al-a‘lā*) in the sight of [the Sultan]. He (the Sultan) then entrusted him with managing all affairs (*al-umūr kullahā*) so that he (Fanārī) became like a vizier. His reputation further increased, as his merits became well known.<sup>98</sup>

Ibn Taghrībirdī also mentions how Fanārī enjoyed a great deal of respect when he returned to Bursa after the Ottomans defeated the Karamanids:

Having been insistently requested, (Fanārī) returned to his homeland after the Ottoman Sultan treated him with enormous gifts and excessive respect. Fanārī undertook the judgeship of Bursa again. He became the notable and even the administrator (*mudabbir*) of the (Ottoman) lands.<sup>99</sup>

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Sultan Bāyezīd I, the scholar returned to Bursa at the request of the Sultan who regretted having caused him to leave. Ṭāshkubrīzāda, *al-Shaqā‘iq al-nu‘māniyya*, 19.

95 Repp, *The Müfti of Istanbul*, 86.

96 Ibid., 85-86.

97 ‘Asqālānī, *Inbā‘ al-ghumr*, 3:465; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Manhal al-ṣāfi*, 10:40.

98 ‘Asqālānī, *Inbā‘ al-ghumr*, 3:465.

99 Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Manhal al-ṣāfi*, 10:40.

### *Fanārī's visit to Egypt*

Mehmed I dealt with revolts breaking out in Anatolia and Rumeli under his rival brothers, with Turkoman principalities, and with other ethnic elements during his entire reign. One such revolt was the well-known rebellion led by Shaykh Badr al-Dīn ibn Qādī Simawna, Fanārī's fellow pupil when he was in Egypt, which disturbed Western Anatolia. Badr al-Dīn was a prominent scholar on Islamic jurisprudence and was influenced by Ibn al-‘Arabī's teaching.<sup>100</sup> He was captured and executed in 1420 as a rebellious heretic. In the meantime, Fanārī set out on pilgrimage in 1419 through Syria.<sup>101</sup> According to Hüsameddin, in Cairo, Fanārī met Shaykh Zayn al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Khāfī (or al-Khawāfī) (d. 1435), founder of the Zayniyya order, which was based in Central Asia, and accompanied al-Khāfī in his travel on pilgrimage.<sup>102</sup> When Fanārī was in Jerusalem on his way back from Arabia, Sayf al-Dīn al-Mu'ayyad (r. 1412-1421), the Mamluk sultan of Egypt, invited him to Cairo in order to ask him for news about the Ottomans. Fanārī arrived in Cairo in 1420.<sup>103</sup> The Sultan, who treated him very hospitably, poured gifts on him.<sup>104</sup> Ibn Ḥajar describes Fanārī's reception at the Sultan's court as follows:

He (Fanārī) came on Thursday, the day when the Prophet's birthday [was celebrated], after he was invited repeatedly. He did not arrive until the evening. [When he came, Sultan al-Muayyad] let him sit below Ibn al-Dayrī, the shaykh of his Court. Then al-Mu'ayyad gestured them (the attendees) to talk on a scholarly matter and they started

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100 For Badr al-Dīn, see Ṭāshkubrīzāda, *al-Shaqā'iq al-nu'māniyya*, 33-34; Tahir, *Osmanlı Müellifleri*, 1:39-40; Hans J. Kissling, "Badr al-Dīn ibn Kādī Samāwnā," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. 2nd ed. Brill Online [www.brillonline.com].

101 Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, 7: 8.

102 Hüsameddin, "Molla Fenārī," (18:1926), 383. Hüsameddin does not cite any source for this information. For a discussion of this information, see Repp, *The Müfti of Istanbul*, 90-91. Ṭāshkubrīzāda mentions that Fanārī corresponded with 'Abd al-Laṭīf al-Maqdisī, the successor of Zayn al-Dīn al-Khāfī, and includes the complimentary poems the two exchanged. Ṭāshkubrīzāda, *al-Shaqā'iq al-nu'māniyya*, 19-20.

103 Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, 7:8; 'Asqalānī, *Inbā' al-ghumr*, 3:465; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Manhal al-ṣāfī*, 10:40.

104 Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, 7:8.

talking but Fanārī said nothing. He (Fanārī) entered the Court again after the night prayer. The story of the Prophet's birthday was recited. Then fruitful discussions took place between Fanārī [and scholars].<sup>105</sup>

Ibn Ḥajar also records an interesting anecdote about Fanārī's visit to Cairo:

He (Fanārī) was a man of good character and extreme generosity, but he was being criticized because of his affiliation with Ibn al-‘Arabī and that he used to teach *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* and lecture on it. When he came to Cairo, he displayed nothing about [his interest in Ibn al-‘Arabī's teaching]. He performed pilgrimage in the year of 822 (1419). When he came back, Sultan al-Mu'ayyad invited him, and Fanārī arrived in Cairo and met its notables. He made no remark about the above-mentioned teaching [of Ibn al-‘Arabī], which might be criticized. Some who respected him requested him to keep silent on this issue.<sup>106</sup>

Ibn Taghrībirdī also mentions how Fanārī's affiliation with Ibn al-‘Arabī's school occupied the Egyptians' agenda. He recounts that Fanārī, when he came to Cairo, did not debate with the local scholars, and this caused a rumor among the people. Some, including Ibn Taghrībirdī, interpreted Fanārī's refraining as his condescension (*taraffu'*), whereas others asserted that he wanted to avoid unfavorable situations because of his attachment to Ibn al-‘Arabī.<sup>107</sup> Ibn Ḥajar's and Ibn Taghrībirdī's words give us a hint about the Egyptian scholars' opinion regarding Ibn al-‘Arabī. In such an environment, Fanārī normally made no mention of al-Shaykh al-akbar and his school, but he had a chance, during his visit to Egypt, to teach his own works,<sup>108</sup> to give lectures on Islamic law,<sup>109</sup> and to have a debate with the Egyptian scholars on Arabic grammar.<sup>110</sup>

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105 'Asqalānī, *Inbā' al-ghumr*, 3:216.

106 Ibid., 3:465. This passage is from Fanārī's entry by Ibn Ḥajar.

107 Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Manhal al-ṣāfi*, 10:40-41.

108 Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Manhal al-ṣāfi*, 10:41.

109 Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, 7:9.

110 Muṣṭafā ibn 'Abdullāh Kātib Chalabī, *Kashf al-ẓunūn 'an asāmī al-kutub wa-l-funūn* (Bayrūt: Dār al-Fikr, 1982), 1:223.

After a two-week stay, Fanārī left Cairo in great splendor and with plenty of valuable presents both from the Sultan and the statesmen.<sup>111</sup> Ibn Ḥajar reports on Fanārī’s departure from Cairo, with the Mamlūk envoy carrying a letter from the Sultan to the Ottoman Sultan. Other than describing how the Egyptians showed respect to Fanārī when they wished him a safe journey, Ibn Ḥajar, interestingly, emphasizes again how Fanārī successfully hid his attachment to Ibn al-‘Arabī and left Cairo without causing any scandal: “He (Fanārī) concealed his fondness for Ibn al-Arabī and that he occupied people with the *Fuṣūṣ* and other writings [of Ibn al-‘Arabī] in his country. He stayed in Cairo during this time until he set out safe and sound with no enervation but respect.”<sup>112</sup> On his way to Anatolia, Fanārī visited Jerusalem.<sup>113</sup>

*Fanārī’s appointment as the muftī of Bursa and his death*

According to Hüsameddin, Fanārī returned to the Ottoman lands in 1420 after his pilgrimage and visit to Egypt, after the rebellion allegedly led by Badr al-Dīn was suppressed.<sup>114</sup> It is told in the historical sources that Fanārī was appointed as the *muftī* of Bursa in the time of Sultan Murād II (r. 1421-44 and 1446-51).<sup>115</sup> Many Ottoman historians, following Sa‘deddīn Müstakīmzāde (d. 1787), an 18<sup>th</sup> century-Ottoman biographer, took this to mean that Fanārī became the first *Shaykh al-Islām*.<sup>116</sup> Repp emphasizes that Müstakīmzāde depends on Ṭāshkubrīzāda, who writes that

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111 Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, 7:8-9. According to Ibn Ḥajar, Fanārī stayed in Cairo for one and a half months. ‘Asqalānī, *Inbā’ al-ghumr*, 3:216.

112 ‘Asqalani, *Inbā’ al-ghumr*, 3:217.

113 ‘Asqalānī, *Inbā’ al-ghumr*, 3:465; Ṭāshkubrīzāda, *Miftāḥ al-sa‘āda*, 2:125.

114 Hüsameddin, “Molla Fenârî,” (19:1928), 150.

115 Repp, *The Mufti of Istanbul*, 73-74. For a detailed analysis of the reports about Fanārī’s appointment as “*muftī*” in the historical sources, see *ibid.*, 91-92. For a discussion of the origin and the functions of the post of the *muftī* in its early phase in the Ottoman state, see *ibid.*, 111-124.

116 Repp, “Shaykh al-Islam (in the Ottoman Empire),” in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. 2nd ed. Brill Online [www.brillonline.com].

Mullā Fanārī was “*muftī* in the Ottoman lands (*al-mamlaka al-‘Uthmāniyya*).”<sup>117</sup> Not only Ṭāshkubrīzāda but also the Egyptian historians Ibn Ḥajar and Ibn Taghrībirdī use terminology that implies that Fanārī reached the highest bureaucratic rank in religious authority, without specifically associating this with his appointment as “*muftī*.” For example, Ibn Ḥajar states that the Ottoman Sultan “entrusted Fanārī with the judgeship of his lands (*qaḍā’ mamlakatih*),” then “with managing all affairs (*al-umūr kullahā*).”<sup>118</sup> Ibn Taghrībirdī says that Fanārī became “the administrator (*mudabbir*) of the [Ottoman] lands.”<sup>119</sup> In spite of the fact that neither the term *Shaykh al-Islām* was used as a bureaucratic title, nor a post equivalent to this rank was clearly defined during Fanārī’s time, it seems that he took some of the functions of this “later-to-be-established” office upon himself.<sup>120</sup> He did not even have time, as Ṭāshkubrīzāda writes, to collect his many drafts into books because he was overwhelmingly occupied with lecturing (*dars*), issuing *fatwā*, and judging (*qaḍā’*).<sup>121</sup> Regarding the question “Was Fanārī the first Ottoman *Shaykh al-Islām*?” Repp concludes that Murād II’s conscious policy to create “a religious authority alongside of the secular power” was *partly* realized in Fanārī.<sup>122</sup>

Near to his death, Fanārī suffered temporary blindness in his eyes, about which Ṭāshkubrīzāda tells some hagiographical stories:<sup>123</sup> When Fanārī learned of a tradition that states that the body of a pious person of knowledge never decays under the ground if he lives in

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117 Repp, “Shaykh al-Islam.” Ottomans used the terms “Mufti of Istanbul” (after the conquest) and “*Shaykh al-Islām*” interchangeably; the usage of the former was popular in earlier centuries whereas the latter gained popularity from the 18th century on. See Repp, “Shaykh al-Islam”; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin İlmiye Teşkilatı*, 174-175.

118 ‘Asqalānī, *Inbā’ al-ghumr*, 3:465.

119 Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Manhal al-ṣāfi*, 10:41.

120 The duties of the *Shaykh al-Islām*, although not clearly defined, included serving as head of the ‘*ulamā*’, giving religious advice to the Sultan, issuing *fatwā* etc. See Repp, “Shaykh al-Islam.”

121 Ṭāshkubrīzāda, *Miftāḥ al-sa’āda*, 2:110; Ṭāshkubrīzāda, *al-Shaqā’iq al-nu’māniyya*, 18.

122 Repp, *The Müfti of Istanbul*, 123-124.

123 Ṭāshkubrīzāda, *al-Shaqā’iq al-nu’māniyya*, 20-21.

accordance with his knowledge, he wondered about his late teacher, ‘Alā al-Dīn al-Aswad. He dug up al-Aswad’s grave and witnessed that the deceased body remained just as it had been when it was buried, despite a long passage of time. Then Fanārī lost his sight as heard a mysterious voice saying, “Did you have to see it to believe it? May your eyes go blind!” Another story tells that when Fanārī went blind, the vizier Hacı İvaz Paşa (d. 1428), one of his foes, said he hoped to lead Fanārī’s funeral prayer. When he heard what İvaz said, Fanārī wished to be cured and to lead the funeral prayer for İvaz. Then, Fanārī’s sight was recovered and İvaz, who was blinded by the Sultan as a punishment, died before Fanārī. It was Fanārī who performed İvaz’s funeral prayer.<sup>124</sup>

Ibn Hajar reports that Fanārī went on pilgrimage to express his thankfulness to God for his recovery in 1430.<sup>125</sup> A little later, after he returned to Bursa, he died in the Spring of 1431.<sup>126</sup> He was buried in Bursa in the graveyard of the mosque built by him.<sup>127</sup>

### Fanārī’s Works

As a versatile scholar, Fanārī produced works in several fields. Ibn Hajar describes Fanārī as a sage in reference to his expertise in Arabic grammar, lexicology in rhetoric (*Ma‘ānī*), style of speech in rhetoric (*Bayān*), and methods of reciting the Qur’an (*Qirā’āt*).<sup>128</sup> Many biographers also emphasize his expertise in both rational (*‘aqlī*) and religious (*naqlī*) sciences. Brockelmann

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124 Tāshkubrīzāda, *al-Shaqā’iq al-nu‘māniyya*, 20. Ibn Hajar also mentions Fanārī’s blindness without telling the details of the story. ‘Asqalānī, *Inbā’ al-ghumr*, 3:465.

125 ‘Asqalānī, *Inbā’ al-ghumr*, 3:465. Ibn Taghrībirdī also reports Fanārī’s second pilgrimage but does not refer to his blindness. See Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Manhal al-ṣāfi*, 10:41.

126 Historical and biographical sources give different dates for Fanārī’s death. For an assessment of them, see Repp, *The Müfti of Istanbul*, 93-97.

127 Tāshkubrīzāda, *al-Shaqā’iq al-nu‘māniyya*, 19; Belig, *Güldeste*, 241; Tahir, *Osmanlı Müellifleri*, 1:390.

128 ‘Asqalānī, *Inbā’ al-ghumr*, 3:465.

and Baghdādī attribute more than twenty works to him.<sup>129</sup> However, his authorship for some of these works may not be authentic. In addition, the same work is sometimes called with different titles.<sup>130</sup> Here, I will first introduce the works of Fanārī that exist in print, all of which were written in Arabic. Then I will list the works attributed to him in the sources.

### *Asās al-taṣrīf*

This is a short treatise on morphology in Arabic (*ṣarf*). Muḥammad Shāh, Fanārī’s son, wrote a commentary on it.<sup>131</sup> It was published with the title *Asās al-Ṣarf* in 2008.<sup>132</sup>

### *‘Ayn al-a’yān: Tafsīr Sūrat al-Fātiḥa*

This is Fanārī’s Qur’an commentary on the *al-Fātiḥa*. The next chapter of this study will provide a detailed description of the *‘Ayn*.

### *al-Fawā’id al-Fanāriyya: Sharḥ al-Īsāghūjī*

This is a commentary on Athīr al-Dīn al-Abḥarī’s (d. 1264) famous treatise on logic, *al-Īsāghūjī*, which is “an adaptation of the *Isagoge* of Porphyry.”<sup>133</sup> Fanārī states in the introduction that he completed his commentary between morning and sunset on the same day. Therefore, the work

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129 Carl Brockelmann, *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur: Zweite den Supplementbänden angepasste Auflage* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1943-1949), 2:303-4; Carl Brockelmann, *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur: Supplementband* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1936-1942), 2:328-9; Ismā‘īl Bāshā al-Baghdādī, *Hadiyyat al-‘arīfīn: Asmā’ al-mu’allifīn wa-āthār al-muṣannifīn* (Istanbul: Wakālat al-Ma‘ārif al-jalīla fī maṭba‘atihā, 1951-1955), 2:188-189.

130 In a recent study, Kadir Gömbeyaz attempts to identify the authentic works of Fanārī. See Kadir Gömbeyaz, “Molla Fenārī’ye Nispet Edilen Eserlerde Aidiyet Problemi ve Molla Fenārī Bibliyografyası,” in *Uluslararası Molla Fenârî Sempozyumu: International Symposium on Molla Fanârî*, ed. Tefvik Yucedogru et al. (Bursa: Bursa Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2010). Gömbeyaz concludes that Fanārī certainly authored 11 works. Eight works attributed to him are non-extant. His authorship is doubtful for 15 works and not true for 19 works. Gömbeyaz restricts his study to the libraries located in Turkey only; therefore, one should treat some of his conclusions with caution.

131 Muṣṭafā ibn ‘Abdullāh Kātib Chalabī, *Kashf al-zunūn ‘an asāmī al-kutub wa-l-funūn* (Bayrūt: Dār al-Fikr, 1982), 1:74.

132 Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ḥamza al-Fanārī, *Asās al-Ṣarf* (al-Qāhira: Dār Bayān al-‘Arabī, 2008).

133 Carl Brockelmann, “al-Abḥarī,” in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. 2nd ed. Brill Online [www.brillonline.com].

has been known as *Yak-rūzī* (diurnal) in the Indian Muslim territories.<sup>134</sup> Fanārī's commentary gained a great reputation and was taught in the Ottoman madrasas. Numerous glosses on it were written, two of which became popular: Aḥmad ibn Maḥmūd ibn Khadir's (d. 1543) *Qawl Aḥmad* and Burhān al-Dīn al-Bulghārī's *al-Farā'id al-Burhāniyya*.<sup>135</sup> *al-Fawā'id* has been published many times in Turkey.<sup>136</sup> Because of this prestigious work, Fanārī is considered "a highly influential teacher of logic."<sup>137</sup>

*al-Fawā'id*, following Abharī's *al-Īsāghūjī*, deals with subjects of classical logic, which are examined in four main sections: *mabādī* (principles) and *maqāṣid* (goals) of each one of the divisions of knowledge, namely, *taṣawwur* (conception) and *taṣdīq* (assent). It is notable that Fanārī, in this commentary and his other writings related to logic, embraces the Avicennian tradition in logic.<sup>138</sup>

*Fuṣūl al-badā'i' fi uṣūl al-sharā'i'*

Fanārī's prominence in Islamic Law was acknowledged to the extent that he was called "*al-Imām al-a'zam* of his land."<sup>139</sup> The *Fuṣūl*, which is a lengthy work on Islamic legal theory (*Uṣūl al-*

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134 Laknawī, *al-Fawā'id al-bahiyya*, 167.

135 Mehmet Yalar lists 14 glosses on *al-Fawā'id* mentioned in the bibliographical sources. See Mehmet Yalar, "Molla Fenārī'nin İsağucü Şerhi ve Şark Medrese Geleneğindeki Yeri," in *Uluslararası Molla Fenârî Sempozyumu: International Symposium on Molla Fanârî*, ed. Tevfik Yucedogru et al. (Bursa: Bursa Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2010), 566-568. This number would be much higher with the manuscripts in the libraries not listed in the sources.

136 One of the editions is Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ḥamza al-Fanārī, *Fenârî* (İstanbul: Dersaadet: [1857-1858]). The most recent edition was published along with Abharī's *al-Īsāghūjī* and Aḥmad ibn Maḥmūd's *Qawl Aḥmad*: Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ḥamza al-Fanārī, *Al-Fawā'id al-Fanâriyya* (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 2014).

137 Nicholas Rescher, *The Development of Arabic Logic* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964), 226.

138 Some modern scholars point out that Fanārī followed the Avicennian tradition in logic. See Khaled El-Rouayheb, *Relational Syllogisms and the History of Arabic Logic, 900-1900* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 82-83; Ahmet Kayacık, "İslam Mantık Geleneğinde Fenârî'nin Yeri," in *Uluslararası Molla Fenârî Sempozyumu: International Symposium on Molla Fanârî*, ed. Tevfik Yucedogru et al. (Bursa: Bursa Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2010), 329-335.

139 Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Manhal al-şāfi*, 10:41.

*fiqh*), is one of Fanārī's works that justifies this claim. It is said that Fanārī completed the *Fuṣūl* in thirty years.<sup>140</sup> There are some manuscripts in the libraries of Turkey that were copied while Fanārī was still alive.<sup>141</sup> In addition, the *Fuṣūl* was published first in 1872 in Istanbul,<sup>142</sup> then in 2006 in Beirut.<sup>143</sup> The Ottoman scholars esteemed the *Fuṣūl*, and several commentaries were written on it,<sup>144</sup> but it was not studied as a textbook in the Ottoman madrasas,<sup>145</sup> probably because of its size and complexity.

The *Fuṣūl* consists of two major sections. In the first section, whose title is *Fātiḥa*, Fanārī describes Islamic legal theory and its function, subjects, and sources. The second section, entitled *Maṭlab*, contains two prologues (*muqaddima*), two chapters (*maqṣad*), and one epilogue (*khātima*). The first prologue gives information about essential and secondary proofs (*dalīl*) of the Law. The second prologue is reserved for the explanation of logical, linguistic, and jurisprudential principles. The first chapter discusses the four fundamental indicators of Islamic law: the Qur'an, prophetic tradition, consensus, and analogy. The second chapter explains conflicts relating to the indicators and their solutions. The epilogue is about *ijtihād* (the derivation of legal opinions from the sources of the Law).

Fanārī includes many opinions from different Islamic jurisprudential and theological schools in his discussions in the *Fuṣūl*. The works to which he most frequently resorts are Ḥanafī

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140 'Asqalānī, *Inbā' al-ghumr*, 3:465; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Manhal al-ṣāfi*, 10:41.

141 Gömbeyaz, "Molla Fenârî'ye Nispet Edilen Eserlerde Aidiyet Problemi," 478.

142 Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ḥamza al-Fanārī, *Fuṣūl al-badā'i' fī uṣūl al-sharā'i'* (İstanbul: Şeyh Yahya Matbaası, 1289 [1872]). 2 volumes.

143 Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ḥamza al-Fanārī, *Fuṣūl al-badā'i' fī uṣūl al-sharā'i'* (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-'ilmīyya, 2006). 2 volumes.

144 Recep Cici, "Molla Fenârî'nin Osmanlı Hukuk Düşüncesindeki Yeri," in *Uluslararası Molla Fenârî Sempozyumu: International Symposium on Molla Fanârî*, ed. Tefik Yucedogru et al. (Bursa: Bursa Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2010), 245.

145 Ibid., 249.

Fakhr al-Islām al-Bazdawī’s (d. 1089) *al-Uṣūl*, ‘Abdullāh ibn Aḥmad al-Nasafī’s (d. 1310) *al-Manār*, Shafī‘ī Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s (d. 1209) *al-Maḥṣūl*, and Mālikī Ibn al-Ḥājjib’s (d. 1249) *al-Mukhtaṣar*. Ṭāshkubrīzāda emphasizes that Fanārī brings these sources from different schools together.<sup>146</sup> Fanārī generally defends the Ḥanafī viewpoint after citing and discussing other opinions about the debated subjects of Islamic jurisprudence.

*Miṣbāḥ al-uns bayn al-ma‘qūl wa-l-mashhūd fī sharḥ Miftāḥ ghayb al-jam‘ wa-l-wujūd li-l-Qūnawī*

This is a long commentary on Qūnawī’s *Miftāḥ al-ghayb* in Arabic.<sup>147</sup> The *Miftāḥ*, which focuses on metaphysics, is considered Qūnawī’s key work. It has been subjected to at least nine commentaries in Arabic and Persian, most of which were written in Turkey and were taught to advanced students in the madrasas of Iran, along with Fanārī’s *Miṣbāḥ*.<sup>148</sup> In addition to there being numerous manuscripts in the libraries, the *Miṣbāḥ* was published several times in Iran, together with the text of the *Miftāḥ*.<sup>149</sup> One of the editions edited by Muḥammad Khājawī also contains six super-commentaries written by Persian writers, including Ayatollah Khomeini (d.

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146 Ṭāshkubrīzāda, *Miftāḥ al-sa‘āda*, 2:110.

147 It is approximately five times as the size of the *Miftāḥ*.

148 William C. Chittick, “Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ishāq ibn Muḥammad ibn Yūnus al-Ḳūnawī,” in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. 2nd ed. Brill Online [www.brillonline.com]; William C. Chittick, “The Last Will and Testament of Ibn ‘Arabi’s Foremost Disciple and Some Notes on its Author,” *Sophia Perennis* 4:1 (1978): 48; Reşat Öngören, “Miftahu’l-gayb,” in *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi* [www.islamansiklopedisi.info].

149 Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ishāq al-Qūnawī and Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ḥamza al-Fanārī, *Miftāḥ al-ghayb and Sharḥuhū Miṣbāḥ al-uns* ([Tīhrān]: Mawlā, 1995 [1st printing], 2005 or 2006 [2nd printing] and 2009 [3rd printing]); Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ḥamza al-Fanārī, *Miṣbāḥ al-uns fī sharḥ Miftāḥ ghayb al-Jam‘ wa-l-wujūd Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ishāq Qūnawī* (Tīhrān: Intishārāt-i Fajr, 1905 or 1906 [1st printing], 1985 [2nd printing]).

1989).<sup>150</sup> Khājawī has also translated the *Miṣbāḥ* into Persian.<sup>151</sup> There are some other studies on the *Miṣbāḥ* in English and Turkish.<sup>152</sup>

The *Miṣbāḥ* roughly deals with Qūnawīan epistemology, ontology, and metaphysical anthropology. Fanārī arranges his commentary in seven chapters. In the introduction (*Fātiḥa*), he discusses the categories and the nature of knowledge and the status of spiritual knowledge among the rational and religious sciences. The preliminary section (*tamhīd*) is an explanation of the Creator’s relationship with Creation, despite His absolute unity in His essence. The first main section (*al-faṣl al-awwal*) discusses the connection between the divine essence and the divine attributes. The second section (*al-faṣl al-thānī*) explains the relationship between the divine names and the realities of things (*a’yān*). The epilogue (*khātima*) contains a very long and detailed discussion of the ontological levels and God’s manifestations. Another section, entitled *al-Bāb*, discusses general principles for understanding God’s relationship with the levels of Creation. The last section of the book (*khātimat al-kitāb*) is reserved for an explanation of the reality of the human being, the purpose of his existence and the attributes of the Perfect Man (*al-Insān al-kāmil*).

When commenting on the *Miftāḥ*, Fanārī cites and quotes philosophers, theological schools, and Sufi and non-Sufi writers, especially Ibn al-‘Arabī and his followers, such as Sa‘īd

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150 Khomeini’s super-commentary was published separately: Ruhollah Khomeini, *Ta’liqāt ‘alā Sharḥ Fuṣuṣ al-ḥikam wa-Miṣbāḥ al-uns* (Qum: 1989-1990).

151 Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ḥamza al-Fanārī, *Tarjuma-yi Miṣbāḥ al-uns-i Ḥamza Fanārī yā paymand-i istidlāl wa-shuhūd dar kashf-i asrār-i wujūd* (Translated by Muḥammad Khājawī. [Tihārān]: Mawlā, 1995).

152 Alan Godlas, “Molla Fanārī and the *Miṣbāḥ al-uns*: The Commentator and the Perfect Man,” in *Uluslararası Molla Fenârî Sempozyumu: International Symposium on Molla Fanârî*, ed. Tefik Yucedogru et al. (Bursa: Bursa Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2010). In this paper, Godlas discusses how Fanārī approaches the concept of *al-Insān al-kāmil* (the Perfect Man) in his commentary. Muammer İskenderoğlu, *Molla Fenârî’de Tasavvuf Metafiziği: Misbahu’l-Üns Üzerine Bir İnceleme* (İstanbul: Değişim Yayınları, 2016). In this work, the writer analyzes Fanārī’s thoughts on the metaphysics of Sufism in the *Miṣbāḥ*.

al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Farghānī (d. ca. 1300), Muayyid al-Dīn al-Jandī (d. ca. 1300), and ‘Abd al-Razzāq al-Qāshānī (d. 1330). He also makes frequent references to Qūnawī’s other works.

*Risāla fī al-Taṣawwuf*

In this short treatise, Fanārī explains and comments on a famous quatrain, which reads as follows: “We were lofty letters not yet pronounced, latent in the highest peaks of the hills. I was you in Him, and we were you and you were He and the whole is He in Him—ask those who have attained.”<sup>153</sup> The quatrain has been attributed to Ibn al-‘Arabī.<sup>154</sup> The libraries of Turkey have numerous manuscripts of the *Risāla*. In addition, Muḥammad Khājawī published this work in Iran along with its Persian translation.<sup>155</sup>

Although this is a very short booklet,<sup>156</sup> it contains a concise explanation of the basics of Akbarī ontology. Fanārī offers ten preliminaries in order to understand the poem. He provides short passages on the realities of things in divine knowledge (*a’yān thābita*), on the relationship between things and their realities, on multiplicity out of unity, on ontological levels (*ḥaḍarāt*), on

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153 “*Kunnā ḥurūfan ‘āliyāt lam nuqal, muta‘alliqātin fī dhurā a’lā al-qulal. Ana anta fīh, wa-naḥnu anta, wa-anta hū, wa-l-kull fī huwa hū, fa-sal ‘an man waṣal.*” Translation is Annemarie Schimmel’s. See Annemarie Schimmel, “Calligraphy and Sufism in Ottoman Turkey,” in *The Dervish Lodge: Architecture, Art, and Sufism in Ottoman Turkey*, ed. Raymond Lifchez (California: University of California Press, 1992), 244.

154 It is attributed to Shaykh al-akbar in the title of the published version of Fanārī’s treatise (See the following note). I have found the poem nowhere in any of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s works but it was attributed to him by some other eminent names, such as ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Jīlī (d. 1365 or 1366), al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d. 1413), and ‘Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī (d. 1731). See ‘Abd al-Karīm ibn Ibrāhīm al-Jīlī, *al-Insān al-Kāmil fī ma‘rifat al-awākhir wa-l-awā’il* (al-Qāhira: Maktabat al-Thaqāfat al-dīniyya, 2004), 1:161 (Jīlī records only the first verse); ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī, *al-Ta‘rīfāt* (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyya, 1983), 86 (Jurjānī records the first half); ‘Abd al-Ghanī ibn Ismā‘īl al-Nābulusī, *Taḥrīk al-iqlīd fī fath bāb al-tawḥīd* (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyya, 2012), 80. In addition, the quatrain is found in ‘Abd al-Razzāq al-Qāshānī’s *al-Iṣṭilāḥāt al-Ṣūfiyya* (Calcutta: [publisher not identified], 1845). Qāshānī attributes it to the “Shaykh” without identifying him (p. 36).

155 Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ḥamza al-Fanārī, *Tarjuma wa-matn-i sharḥ-i rubā‘ī-i Shaykh-i Akbar Muḥī al-Dīn A‘rabī*, trans. Muḥammad Khājawī (Tihiran: Mawla, 1991 [1st printing] and 2007 [2nd printing]).

156 The text has only 12 pages in Khājawī’s edition.

absolute and specific divine manifestations, on the meaning of Creation, etc. After presenting these principles in most of the work, he does not need to say much to comment on the quatrain.

*Works attributed to Fanārī*<sup>157</sup>

1. *Asāmī al-funūn*: A list of the sciences written in verse. Muḥammad Shāh, Fanārī's son, commented on it.<sup>158</sup>
2. *As'ilat al-'allāma*: A riddle poem that consists of 20 stanzas on Islamic sciences. It is told that Fanārī completed the poem in one day. Muḥammad Shāh wrote his answers to his father's riddles in 20 stanzas.<sup>159</sup>
3. *Ta'līqa 'alā Iṣṭilāḥāt al-Ṣūfiyya*: Annotations to 'Abd al-Razzāq al-Qāshānī's (d. 1330) *Iṣṭilāḥāt al-Ṣūfiyya*, an important work on Sufi terminology.<sup>160</sup>
4. *Sharḥ al-Uṣūl*: A commentary on Fakhr al-Islām al-Bazdawī's (d. 1089) work on theoretical jurisprudence titled *al-Uṣūl*. Fanārī commented only on the prologue.<sup>161</sup>
5. *Nuzhat al-naẓar bayna al-inshā' wa-l-khabar*: This is a treatise written by 'Alā al-Dīn al-Bukhārī on a debate Fanārī had with Egyptian scholars when he visited Egypt. The debate was about whether the phrase *al-ḥamdu li-llāh* ("Praise is due to Allah") was *ikhbārī* (declarative) or *inshā'ī* (imperative). Fanārī defended the second opinion, on which some Egyptian scholars, including Kamāl al-Dīn Ibn al-Humām (d. 1457), agreed

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157 This section is based on Muṣṭafā ibn 'Abdullāh Kātib Chalabī, *Kashf al-zunūn 'an asāmī al-kutub wa-l-funūn* (Bayrūt: Dār al-Fikr, 1982).

158 Kātib Chalabī, *Kashf al-zunūn*, 1:75.

159 Ibid., 1:92.

160 Ibid., 1:107.

161 Ibid., 1:113.

with him. Some others, including ‘Alā al-Dīn al-Bukhārī, the writer of the *Nuzhat*, opposed Fanārī.<sup>162</sup>

6. *Risāla ‘alā ta’wīl al-aḥādīth*: A commentary on Prophetic traditions.<sup>163</sup> Qūnawī also commented on selected traditions from his Sufi perspective under the title *Sharḥ al-arba ‘īn ḥadīthan*.<sup>164</sup>
7. *Sharḥ Talkhīṣ Jāmi‘ al-kabīr fī al-Furū‘*: A commentary on Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Khilāṭī’s (d. 1254) *Talkhīṣ*, an abridgment of *Jāmi‘ al-kabīr*.<sup>165</sup> *Jāmi‘ al-kabīr* is an important work on Ḥanafī jurisprudence written by Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Shaybānī (d. 805), a prominent disciple of Abū Ḥanīfa.
8. *Ḥāshiya ‘alā Kanz al-ma‘ānī*: A super-commentary on Burhān al-Dīn al-Ja‘barī’s (d. 1332) *Kanz al-ma‘ānī*, which is a commentary on *Ḥirz al-‘amānī wa-wajh al-tahānī*, Abū Muḥammad Qāsim al-Shāṭibī’s (d. 1194) famous ode on seven methods of recitation, which is also known as *al-Shāṭibiyya*.<sup>166</sup>
9. *Risāla fī Rijāl al-ghayb*.<sup>167</sup>
10. *al-Risāla al-qudsiyya*.<sup>168</sup>

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162 Ibid., 1:223.

163 Ibid., 1:335.

164 Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ishāq al-Qūnawī, *Sharḥ al-arba ‘īn ḥadīthan: Kashf asrār al-mushtamila ‘alā naḥwī is al-ḥukm al-Ṣūfiyya* (Bayrūt: Kitāb Nāshirūn, 2013).

165 Ibid., 1:472.

166 Ibid., 1:646.

167 Ibid., 1:867.

168 Ibid., 1:882.

11. *Ḥāshiyā ‘alā Sharḥ al-Shamsiyya*: A super-commentary on Qutb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥṭānī’s (d. 1364) commentary on *al-Shamsiyya*, a famous treatise on logic by Najm al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī, who was also known as al-Kātibī (d. 1276).<sup>169</sup>
12. *‘Awīṣāt al-afkār fī ikhtiyār ulī al-abṣār*: A small work that contains questions about the metaphysical sciences to test students.<sup>170</sup>
13. *Sharḥ al-Farā‘id*: A commentary on *al-Farā‘id al-Sirājiyya*, a standard jurisprudential text on the law of inheritance written by Sirāj al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Sajāwandī (d. 1023), a Ḥanafī jurist.<sup>171</sup>
14. *Sharḥ al-Fawā‘id al-Ghiyāthiyya*: A commentary on ‘Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī’s (d. 1355) abridgment of a part of *Miftāḥ al-‘ulūm* addressed to the rhetorical sciences, prepared by Sirāj al-Dīn al-Sakkākī (1229) with the title *al-Fawā‘id*.<sup>172</sup>
15. *Murshid al-muṣallī*: A treatise encouraging people to perform special prayers on Islamic feast nights.<sup>173</sup>
16. *Ḥāshiyā ‘alā al-Ḍaw’*: A super-commentary on Tāj al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Isfarāyīnī’s (d. 1285) *al-Ḍaw’*. *al-Ḍaw’* is an abridgement of *al-Miftāḥ* by Isfarāyīnī, which is a commentary on Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Muṭarrizī’s (d. 1213) *al-Miṣbāḥ*, a treatise on Arabic grammar (*naḥw*).<sup>174</sup>

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169 Ibid., 2:1063.

170 Ibid., 2:1180.

171 Ibid., 2:1249.

172 Ibid., 2:1299.

173 Ibid., 2:1655.

174 Ibid., 2:1709.

17. *Muqaddimat al-ṣalāh*: An introductory treatise on ritual prayers. According to Ṭāshkubrīzāda, who commented on the treatise, Fanārī wrote it but Kātīb Chalabī states that it has also been attributed to other writers.<sup>175</sup>

18. *Sharḥ Jawāhir al-Kalām*: A commentary on ‘Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī’s *Jawāhir al-Kalām*, which is an abridgement of *al-Mawāqif* by the same author, one of the most famous works on Islamic theology.<sup>176</sup>

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175 Ibid., 2:1802.

176 Ibid., 2:1894.

## CHAPTER II

[In the ‘Ayn al-a‘yān, *Fanārī*] integrated the  
religious sciences with the Sufi teachings.<sup>1</sup>

Ṭāshkubrīzāda

### ‘AYN AL-A‘YĀN: TAFSĪR AL-FĀTIḤA

‘*Ayn al-a‘yān*<sup>2</sup> is Fanārī’s commentary on the first chapter of the Qur’an: the *al-Fātiḥa*. Fanārī’s exposition can be seen as part of a popular Sufi tradition, similar to an Akbarī commentary on the *al-Fātiḥa* authored by Qūnawī.<sup>3</sup> This tradition was perhaps rooted in the belief that the whole Qur’an was summarized in the *al-Fātiḥa*. Fanārī quotes a statement attributed to Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī (d. 670) that expresses this belief. According to Ḥasan, God has placed the knowledge of all the Scriptures in the Qur’an, then the knowledge of the whole Qur’an in the *al-Fātiḥa*. Therefore, “whoever knows the interpretation of the *al-Fātiḥa* knows the interpretation of all the Holy Scriptures.”<sup>4</sup> This chapter will describe the outstanding manuscripts of the ‘*Ayn* and its content, and discuss Fanārī’s impact on the Qur’anic Studies.

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1 Ṭāshkubrīzāda, *Miftāḥ al-sa‘āda*, 2:109.

2 This title may mean many things. The most appropriate translation would be “the water spring of the notables.”

3 Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ishāq al-Qūnawī, *I‘jāz al-bayān fī ta’wīl Umm al-Qur’ān*, ed. ‘Atā, ‘Abd al-Qādir Aḥmad, ([al-Qāhira]: Dār al-Kutub al-ḥadītha [1969]).

4 Fanārī, ‘*Ayn*, 8.

## Manuscripts and Published Version

Numerous manuscripts of the *'Ayn* are found in the libraries of Turkey and abroad.<sup>5</sup> It is believed that two of them (Murad Molla: 136 and Mahmud Paşa: 9), which can be found in the Süleymaniye Library, are an autographed copy and a draft copy by Fanārī. On the title page of the Mahmud Paşa manuscript, a note written with a different script states that Fanārī himself wrote it. This text really looks like a draft copy with many corrections, scratched out lines, and additions in the margins.<sup>6</sup> The text is neither pointed nor vowelized. At the end, there is no information concerning the date or the scribe. This copy is composed of 149 leaves.

The Murad Molla manuscript was written by two different scribes. A note found on the first page states that Fanārī wrote the second part, which is the commentary after the prologue. The script of this second part is the same as that in the Mahmud Paşa manuscript.<sup>7</sup> According to a note in the margin of page 51, where the transition occurs, Fanārī started writing the commentary section on his 63<sup>rd</sup> birthday.<sup>8</sup> The text with no pointing or vowelization also has corrections and additions, but not as heavy as those in the Mahmud Paşa manuscript. A couple of pages at the end, under the title “*Khātimat al-khātima*” (final remarks of the epilogue), are missing. On the last page, neither the date nor the name of the scribe is given. This version has 218 pages.

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5 For its manuscripts in Turkish libraries, see [www.yazmalar.gov.tr](http://www.yazmalar.gov.tr). For other manuscripts, see Brockelmann, *GAL*, 2:303 and Brockelmann, *Supp.*, 2:328.

6 See Appendix- A, Figure- 5.

7 See Appendix- A, Figure- 6.

8 See Appendix- A, Figure- 3.

Another manuscript worth mentioning is found in the Atıf Efendi Library with the catalogue number 193. This copy was written in an outstandingly beautiful handwriting.<sup>9</sup> Black and red ink were used. Significant parts of the text, such as the headings and Qur’anic verses, are written in red ink. The beginnings of passages and important statements are also highlighted with red. The text is composed of 255 leaves, and it is fully pointed and often vowelized. On the title page, there is a statement in Ottoman that Fanārī himself wrote the text, but the script differs so much from the previous ones discussed here that we cannot consider these two styles of handwriting to belong to the same person. As a matter of fact, we find no name of the scribe at the end. In addition, the fact that some hadiths and statements quoted from Suyūfī (d.1505) were recorded on the cover page in the same handwriting indicates that the text was written well after Fanārī’s time. The text ends with a colophonic poem, where the year of A.H. 814 / C.E. 1411 or 1412 is hinted at with the word “*dayd*,” whose numerical value is 814, and the numeral is also written under the word.<sup>10</sup> This must have been the date when the *‘Ayn* was authored, not when this specific text was copied.

After closely investigating these three manuscripts, I propose the following as the most plausible conclusion: Fanārī produced the Mahmud Paşa manuscript as a draft copy when he was in Konya under Karamanid patronage. As we know that Fanārī wrote the *‘Ayn* when he was in Konya and dedicated it to Karamanid Mehmed Bey,<sup>11</sup> the date A.H. 814 / C.E. 1411 or 1412 seems valid. The Murad Molla manuscript looks like an attempt to produce a fair copy of the Mahmud Paşa manuscript, because crossed-out passages in the latter were omitted in the former.

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9 See Appendix- A, Figure- 7.

10 See Appendix- A, Figure- 4.

11 Fanārī, *‘Ayn*, 3.

Fanārī must have had the first 51 pages written by a scribe. Occasional additions in the margins indicate that Fanārī reviewed the text and dictated the additions. From the fiftieth page on, Fanārī himself continued to edit the text. What attracts attention is that the size of the additions in the margins strikingly increases in the part written by Fanārī. This clearly shows that he still meditated and worked on the text. For an unknown reason, Fanārī stopped writing a couple of pages before the end. Later, an unknown scribe wrote the Atıf Efendi manuscript. This is a studied and very carefully written text, with minimal errors. The copyist's effort to make the text as correct and readable as possible is noticeable. Important parts of the text such as Qur'anic verses, hadiths, poems, and proper names, as well as infrequent words and grammatically critical components of the sentences, are vowelized. The copyist probably constructed this manuscript based on the draft and on other copies.

*'Ayn al-a'yān* was also published in Istanbul in 1907,<sup>12</sup> in an edition consisting of 376 densely typeset pages. However, it contains a lot of errors, poor punctuation, and misleading subdivisions. Some parts are misprinted so badly that they are undecipherable and impossible to understand. The manuscripts that formed the basis of this edition are not identified.<sup>13</sup>

## **Dedication**

Fanārī dedicated the *'Ayn* to the Karamanid ruler Mehmed Bey (r. 1402-1419 and 1421-1423), who was the son of 'Alāaddīn Bey (r. 1361-1398), one of the most successful Karamanid sultans, who enlarged his territories in Central Anatolia. However, his relentless struggle against the Ottomans cost him his life when he was executed in 1398. The Ottoman sultan Bāyezīd the

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12 Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ḥamza al-Fanārī, *'Ayn al-a'yān: Tafsīr al-Fātiḥa* (Istanbul: Rıfāt Bey Matbaası, 1325 [1907]).

13 See Appendix- A, Figure- 8. I am working to construct a reliable text of the *'Ayn* based on the above-mentioned three manuscripts, and I hope to publish its critical edition soon.

Thunderbolt, who invaded all the Karamanid territories, imprisoned Mehmed and his brother after their father's execution. When Timur defeated the Ottomans, he reinstated the Karamanid sovereignty and made Mehmed the ruler. Mehmed Bey enjoyed rulership in central Anatolia for a while, but he, like his father, did not give up fighting against Ottomans, who regained their power. Finally, he lost his life in a battle in 1423.<sup>14</sup>

In his preface to the *'Ayn*, Fanārī bestows an excessive amount of praise on Mehmed Bey. In a poem, he introduces Mehmed Bey as follows:

A king who is of so lofty rank that you consider even the bright stars worthless...

A matchless lion among his opponents when the kings call to battle...

He has an inherent eloquence thanks to which the religion of the Powerful Exalted One becomes sublime.

[O Sultan!] There is nobody loving (you) like me, you have no alike in terms of beauty; thus, both of us have become the epitome [of love and beauty].

As if only for your love do I exist. As if your love exists only for me.

Sultan, the son of the Sultan, Muḥammad ibn sa'īd al-shahīd 'Alā al-Dīn Beg ibn Karaman.<sup>15</sup>

It is very interesting that Fanārī identifies Mehmed Bey's father, 'Alāaddīn, executed by the Ottomans, as a martyr (*shahīd*) deserving of heaven (*sa'īd*). It seems Fanārī did not have to retract his dedication when he returned to Ottoman patronage, nor were the expressions of praise for an enemy of the Ottomans censored in the manuscripts afterwards.

## Content

Considering that the *al-Fātiḥa* is only seven short verses, *'Ayn al-a'yān* amounts to a fairly large partial commentary of 376 pages in its published version. It consists of two parts, a prologue and

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14 For a brief history of the Karamanids, see Faruk Sümer, "Karaman-Oghullari," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. 2nd ed. Brill Online [www.brillonline.com].

15 Fanārī, *'Ayn*, 3.

a commentary on the *al-Fātiḥa*. The first part makes up 90 pages of the work and is divided into four chapters. The commentary that follows in the second half of the work contains standard hermeneutic discussions of language, ritual practices, narratives, theology, and so forth, as well as Sufi exegesis grounded in allusion (*ishāra*).

### *The Prologue*

Fanārī presents a very long prologue before starting to interpret the Qur'an. This prologue, as a matter of fact, can be considered an independent study of the methodology of Qur'anic exegesis, in which he explains what he thinks of what *Tafsīr* should be. According to Fanārī, it is important to establish a paradigm before engaging in exegesis. He states:

It is essential on the one who wants to have a good grasp of the truths of *Tafsīr* through a careful examination to give precedence to the knowledge of its comprehensive definition (*ḥadduh*), then to the knowledge of the need for it (*al- ḥāja ilayh*) through being aware of its exalted virtues (*faḍluh*), then to the knowledge of its subject (*mawḍū'uh*) [i.e. the Qur'an] on whose specific features (*aḥwālul al-khāṣṣa*) comprehensive discussions are made, then to the knowledge of its dependence (*istimdāduh*) on any other indispensable science.<sup>16</sup>

The first chapter of the Prologue (*al-bāb al-awwal*) consists of seven sections (*fuṣūl*).<sup>17</sup> In the first section (*al-faṣl al-awwal*), reserved for a discussion of the definition of *Tafsīr*, Fanārī discusses the meaning and value of Qur'anic exegesis, as well as its status among the Islamic sciences. This discussion is noteworthy given the context of the *'Ayn al-a'yān*. It was written in the period when several important works on *'ulūm al-Qur'an* were completed, including Zarkashī's (d. 1392) *al-Burhān fī 'ulūm al-Qur'ān* and Suyūṭī's (d. 1505) *al-Itqān fī 'ulūm al-*

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 4-16.

*Qur'ān*. Although not as comprehensive as either of these, the *'Ayn* distinguishes itself as a work that questions the nature and the authority of Qur'anic exegesis. Here, Fanārī, after criticizing previous definitions made by Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥṭānī (d. 1364) and Mas'ūd ibn 'Umar Sa'd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 1390), proposes his own definition: “*Tafsīr* is the knowledge of the states of God’s speech in terms of its Qur’anness and in terms of its indication to God’s intention that is known or assumed according to the human capacity.”<sup>18</sup> When explaining his definition, he argues that *Tafsīr* lacks universal principles and should not be considered a science (*'ilm*) like, for example, *Uṣūl al-fiqh* (theoretical jurisprudence). Another point he wants to emphasize is that most comments produced in *Tafsīr* are inconclusive (*ẓannī*). A detailed analysis of Fanārī’s argument and his criticism of the other definitions will be provided in the fifth chapter of this study.

The second and the third sections of the first chapter of the Prologue are on the classical debates over the distinction between *tafsīr* and *ta'wīl*, two methods of Qur'anic exegesis. Fanārī takes the former as a method of interpretation based on narration (*riwāya*) and the latter as one based on rational investigation (*dirāya*), including esoteric cognition.<sup>19</sup> The differences between *ta'wīl* and *tafsīr*, permissibility of *ta'wīl*, the scriptural factors necessitating the use of this method, and the level of certainty of the exegetical outcomes acquired by *ta'wīl* are the subjects Fanārī deals with. Fanārī’s understanding of *ta'wīl* is important because he bases the legitimacy of the Sufi esoteric interpretation on the indispensability of *ta'wīl* as an exegetical method. I will discuss in detail, in chapter 5, Fanārī’s arguments and the motives that led him to his conclusions on this subject.

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18 Ibid., 5.

19 Ibid., 5 and 89.

In the fourth section (*al-faṣl al-rābi‘*) of the first chapter of the Prologue, Fanārī introduces the readers to the fourfold exegetical theory on which he bases the interpretational practice he displays in the *‘Ayn*. The starting point of this fourfold theory is the famous prophetic tradition that announces four aspects of the Qur’anic message (see chapter 3 for a detailed analysis). Besides discussing the interpretations of the tradition by Baghawī (d. 1117) and Qūnawī (d. 1274), Fanārī also shows how to put the theory in practice using as an example the *basmala*, the first verse of the Qur’an.

The *al-bāb al-awwal* ends with an epilogue (*khātimat al-bāb*) after relatively short fifth and sixth sections that briefly mention the obligatory status (*farḍ kifāya*: a religious obligation which, when done by some, absolves the rest) of undertaking interpretation of the Qur’an, and the most prominent names among the companions (*ṣaḥāba*) and followers (*tābi‘īn*) who stand out in Qur’anic exegesis. The epilogue of the chapter explores various aspects of comprehension (*idrāk*) in the light of Avicenna’s ideas. After a brief discussion of *idrāk*, explanations of several dozens of terms associated with “‘ilm” (knowledge) such as *shu‘ūr*, *taṣawwur*, *ḥifẓ*, *tadhakkur*, *ma‘rifa*, *fahm*, *fiqh* etc., are paraphrased from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s (d. 1209) Qur’an commentary.<sup>20</sup>

In the second chapter (*al-bāb al-thānī*) of the Prologue, Fanārī first emphasizes the virtues of *Tafsīr* as an Islamic discipline and discusses the need that people feel for it. Then he explains the importance of knowledge (‘ilm) by commenting on several verses of the Qur’an, prophetic traditions, and statements of religious authorities regarding the virtues of knowledge. In these pages, he presents interesting commentaries on the prophetic traditions regarding the

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20 Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ‘Umar al-Rāzī, *Maḥāṭib al-ghayb* (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyya, 2000), 2:187-191.

virtues of knowledge, which reflect his Akbarī ideas. For example, on the hadith that reads, “Whoever follows a path through which he seeks knowledge, Allah lets him in one of the paths to Paradise. Angels put their wings down out of respect for a knowledge seeker...” he comments:

Following the path of knowledge is rewarded with the path of Paradise because the follower of the path of knowledge is intentioned, in his pursuit, to the [ontological levels of] divine names and attributes (*al-asmā’ wa-l-ṣifāt*) named as *jabarūt* and *malakūt*, higher and lower [levels respectively]. When “the day that all secrets will be made manifest” (Q. 86:6) comes, it will appear that this path has been the path of Paradise and he has walked on the wings of angels.

This comment is based on the idea that knowledge sought by a person in this life is associated with divine knowledge, as everything is a manifestation of divine names and attributes. As an essential attribute, divine knowledge precedes the other attributes and names and becomes their source. Therefore, the wayfarer who aims at this level through his pursuit of knowledge will attain Paradise, where divine names and attributes perfectly manifest. This connection between the two worlds through knowledge (*‘ilm*) is real, not metaphorical according to Fanārī, like what the rest of the hadith says about knowledge seekers’ walking on angels’ wings. This is real; however, it will become manifest only in the hereafter.

The discussion regarding the categories of the religious sciences in this chapter is quite important because it demonstrates Fanārī’s understanding of esoteric knowledge. This chapter also includes an explanation of the virtues of the Qur’an, of its recitation, and of those who attach themselves to it.

The third chapter of the Prologue (*al-bāb al-thālith*) finds Fanārī defining the Qur’an as a scripture and demonstrating the insufficiency of other current understandings of it. This chapter is reserved for the discussion of various topics relating to the interpretation of the Qur’an,

including revelation (*wahy*), the coming down of revelation (*inzāl*), variant readings (*qirā'āt*), and the miraculousness of the Qur'an (*i'jāz*). He also analyzes historical accounts of the compilation of the Qur'an, lists the names of the Qur'an, and discusses the structural parts of the Qur'anic text. He reserves the last long discussion for the subject of abrogation (*naskh*) in the Qur'an.

The fourth and the last chapter of the Prologue (*al-bāb al-rābi'*) first argues how the linguistic and semantic features of the Qur'an necessitate interpretation of the Qur'an based on other than narrated reports. What follows is that an interpreter should be very well acquainted with linguistic and religious sciences to be able to interpret the Qur'anic text thoroughly. Drawing mostly on al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (d. 1108 or 1109),<sup>21</sup> Fanārī lists sixteen sciences that a commentator needs to know, divided into three categories: (1) linguistic sciences, (2) intellectual sciences, and (3) God-given knowledge.<sup>22</sup> (In chapter 5, I will attempt to explain his intention in categorizing the sciences.)

### *Commentary*

After discussing the questions and the themes of Qur'anic exegesis in a lengthy prologue, which constitutes approximately one fourth of the *'Ayn*, Fanārī introduces the methodology he will use in the rest of the work, in his commentary on the *al-Fātiḥa* chapter.<sup>23</sup> He explains the *al-Fātiḥa* piece by piece (*faṣl*). At the beginning of each piece, he discusses how the phrases to be interpreted are perfectly suited to their places in the text (*ḥusn mawḍi'*). Fanārī's explanation

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21 Abū al-Qāsim Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, *Muqaddima jāmi' al-tafāsīr: Ma'a Tafṣīr al-Fātiḥa wa-maṭāli' al-Baqara* (Kuwait: Dār al-Da'wā, 1984), 94-96.

22 Fanārī, *'Ayn*, 86-87.

23 Ibid., 88-89.

regarding the position of the *isti'ādha*, an Arabic phrase that reads in English “I seek refuge in Allah from Satan the accursed” with which the recitation of the Qur’an should be started, is a good example.<sup>24</sup> He mentions the debates between the majority of scholars, who required pronouncing the formula before reciting the Qur’an, and others, including Ibrāhīm al-Nakha‘ī (d. 717), Muḥammad ibn Sīrīn (d. 728), and Dāwūd al-Iṣfahānī (d. 883), who did not. One of the arguments the minority presented was that to take refuge with God after recitation is more reasonable, and that is why the last two chapters of the Qur’an, called *al-Mu‘awwidhatān* (“two chapters of refuge”), are placed at the end.<sup>25</sup> After refuting their arguments, Fanārī ends his words with a quotation from Abū Ḥafṣ Najm al-Dīn al-Nasafī (d. 1142):<sup>26</sup> “Qur’anic recitation is opened with the refuge (*isti'ādha*) and closed with the chapters of refuge (*mu‘awwidhatān*) and in this way [by supplicating at the beginning and end], protection is hoped between them.”<sup>27</sup>

Linguistic analysis follows the discussion of *ḥusn mawḍi‘*. Fanārī investigates four aspects within the scope of linguistic analysis:

First are the variant recitations transmitted by consensus of the reporters under the title of *qirā’a*. However, not every commentary piece (*faṣl*) includes the *qirā’a* section because variant recitations are not transmitted for every verse of the Qur’an. The *al-Fātiḥa* chapter, for example, has a few *qirā’a* cases, one of which is a well-known debate regarding whether the divine name

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24 Ibid., 90. The *isti'ādha* in Arabic is as follows: *A‘ūdhu billāh min al-Shayṭān al-rajīm*. This is not a verse from the Qur’an, but its utterance is enjoined by Q. 16:98 before Qur’anic recitations: “When thou dost read the Qur’an, seek Allah’s protection from Satan the rejected one.” Therefore, the *isti'ādha* has been an inseparable part of the Qur’anic text and starting Qur’anic commentary with the interpretation of the phrase has been a custom in the *Tafsīr* literature.

25 They are *al-Falaq* (ch. 113) and *al-Nās* (ch. 114), two consecutive short chapters both beginning with the phrase, “Say: I seek refuge with the Lord.”

26 Nasafī’s commentary entitled *al-Taysīr fī al-tafsīr* is one of Fanārī’s major sources. It has not been published.

27 Fanārī, *‘Ayn*, 90.

in the fourth verse should be recited as *malik* or *mālik*. Fanārī lists the arguments of both sides and provides short explanations.<sup>28</sup> That he is contented with citing the opinions without mentioning his own position does not escape notice. This is probably because he straddles his attachment to the Ḥanafī School, which prefers reciting it as *mālik*, and to Qūnawī, who favors *malik*.<sup>29</sup>

Second, the sections Fanārī calls *lugha* have lengthy passages reserved for the lexicology and morphology of Qur’anic words. He includes many opinions for each word of the *isti’ādha* regarding its etymology, which leads him to set forth different possible meanings according to different verbal roots.<sup>30</sup> Here, he also engages in a long discussion, in which he explores ideas regarding whether the divine name Allah is derivative or non-derivative. Those who consider the name Allah derivative suggest several verbal roots for the name, including *a-l-h*, *w-l-h*, and *l-w-h* with their variant meanings. Fanārī also mentions the assertion that the name Allah came from the Hebrew or Syriac word *Lāha*.<sup>31</sup> He rejects the idea, drawing on al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. Another etymological idea he mentions suggests that the name Allah evolved in time. First, it was *Hū*, which referred to the Divine, and it gradually turned in to Allah with additional letters.<sup>32</sup> After discussing all the opinions that aim to explain the root of the name Allah, Fanārī offers a comprehensive meaning that reflects these different ideas, in a passage beautifully written with the use of assonances:

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28 Ibid., 205-207.

29 Qūnawī, *I’jāz al-bayān*, 326.

30 Fanārī, *‘Ayn*, 91-98.

31 Ibid., 96.

32 Ibid., 97.

The meaning is “I take refuge with the One who is worshipped by mankind (*anām*), exalted away from doubts (*awhām*), concealed from understandings (*afhām*), known by divine revelation (*i’lām*), about whose attributes the minds (*afhām*) are perplexed and through whose worship the bodies (*ajsām*) find peace; the hearts of elite and common (*‘awāmm*) are excited about Him; passage of nights and days (*ayyām*) is in His disposal; glory be to Him, Sovereign, Great, and All-knowing (*‘Allām*).”<sup>33</sup>

Third, the section entitled *i’rāb* is where Fanārī discusses the grammatical details of the text he comments on, and fourth, rhetorical subtleties deduced from the text are taken up in the sections entitled *bayān*. In the commentary on the *isti’ādha*, Fanārī addresses such questions as these: Is the sentence of the *isti’ādha ikhbārī* (declarative) or *inshā’ī* (imperative)? How does taking the phrase in either way make it colorful and rich in meaning? Why does the *isti’ādha* not begin with the name Allah before the verb? Why “taking refuge with Allah,” rather than the other names of God? In answering the last question, Fanārī categorizes “taking refuge” according to its relation to the divine actions (*af’āliyya*), attributes (*ṣifātiyya*), and essence (*dhātiyya*). The first is the believer’s request to God to make him strive to attain God’s pleasure. The second is the believer’s consciousness of devoting pleasure to God. The last is the essence of all and the state of advanced wayfarers who have reached the highest level of spirituality (*muntahīs*). Since the name Allah is the most comprehensive divine name, it refers to all categories of the *isti’ādha*.<sup>34</sup>

After the linguistic analysis, Fanārī records narratives about the text under the titles of *Tafsīr* and *Hadith*. The former is the section in which he cites comments narrated from previous authorities. It mostly includes prophetic statements uttered about the text under discussion. The

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33 Ibid., 97.

34 Ibid., 108.

*Tafsīr* sections in the *ʿAyn* and what Fanārī includes in them are actually congruent with his opinion regarding the *tafsīr-taʿwīl* distinction. As we will see in the fifth chapter, Fanārī considers *tafsīr* to be comments transmitted from the Prophet and the early generations, and *taʿwīl* as interpretation based on rational inquiry, including spiritual cognition. The *Hadith* section also contains the prophetic traditions about the text. For example, Fanārī lists several hadiths related to the *istiʿādha* and provides explanations, some of which reflect Sufi teachings.<sup>35</sup>

Fanārī then starts to discuss religious matters relating to the phrases or verses under interpretation. These discussions can be considered to fall within the scope of *taʿwīl* and are categorized under several subtitles: “*Kalām*,” “*Aḥkām*,” “*Ḥaqāʾiq*,” and “*Maʿārif*.” The section “*Kalām*” contains theological subjects evoked by the Qurʾanic phrases under interpretation. Regarding the *istiʿādha*, Fanārī discusses the following questions: What is the theological meaning of “taking refuge” from Satan? How does Satan deceive if taking refuge from him is possible? Does “taking refuge” mean accepting that Satan has spiritual power like God? How do Islamic sects such as the Muʿtazila and Jabriyya approach Satan’s deception and taking refuge from him? Apart from anything else, what is the nature of Satan and his deception?<sup>36</sup> Fanārī prioritizes Akbarī teachings in regard to theological disputes. In the sixth chapter, I will demonstrate how he explains these theological problems through Akbarī ideas.

Theoretical and practical jurisprudential matters are investigated under the title “*Aḥkām*.” These sections give Fanārī an opportunity to show his full grasp of jurisprudential subjects. For instance, when discussing the opinions of various scholars and jurisprudential schools about whether the oral pronunciation of the *istiʿādha* is obligatory before every separate Qurʾanic

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35 Ibid., 110-111.

36 Ibid., 111-112.

recitation, Fanārī demonstrates very well how theoretical principles produce different practical jurisprudential results:<sup>37</sup> According to ‘Aṭā’ ibn Abī Rabāḥ (d. 732), a prominent scholar in the follower generation (*tabi’īn*), whenever a separate Qur’anic recitation is performed, the *isti’ādha* should be repeated because of the divine command found in Q. 16:98 which reads, “When you recite the Qur’an, take refuge with Allah from Satan the rejected one.” Fanārī associates ‘Aṭā’’s opinion with the principle that “if a legal judgment is based on derivatives of a word, the root of the word reveals the reason of the judgment.” Since the divine command is based on a derivative (*qirā’a*: recitation) mentioned in the verse, repetition of the formula of the *isti’ādha* is required when recitation is repeated. However, Fanārī and the majority believe that what Q. 16:98 suggests is no more than supererogation.

What remains are the mystical subtleties, Sufī teachings, and moral values in separate sections entitled “*Ḥaqā’iq*” (truths), “*Ma’ārif*” (gnosis), and “*Tadhkīr*” (remembrance). In the *Ḥaqā’iq* sections, Fanārī mainly interprets the Qur’anic text and hadiths related to the text according to the theory of *marātib al-ma’nā* (multiple layers of meaning), which he bases on the hadith that speaks of the four aspects of Qur’anic meaning. His *Ḥaqā’iq* comments aim to explore graduated spiritual depths in accordance with the hierarchical Akbarī ontology through the text. (An analysis of this theory can be found in chapter 5, and examples of this fourfold exegetical practice in chapter 6.) The *Ma’ārif* sections also contain Sufī ideas, which Fanārī cites from various sources. The difference between *Ḥaqā’iq* and *Ma’ārif* is not always clear. However, the former seems to be exclusively dedicated to Akbarī teachings, whereas the latter pertains to general Sufī ideas, including those of the Akbarīs. For example, Fanārī states that just as the unpurified cannot touch the paper on which the names of God are written, the hearts of the

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid., 121-122.

lovers that contain God's love should be cleansed from the impurity of carnal desires. This must be preceded by purification with divine guidance, which is the *isti'ādha*. The "*Tadhkīr*" section contains affecting poignant anecdotes, hagiographical stories, and witty remarks quoted mostly from Rāzī's commentary.

In the commentary section, Fanārī frequently cites well-known commentators such as Maḥmūd ibn 'Umar al-Zamakhsharī (d. 1144), Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1209), al-Ḥusayn ibn Mas'ūd al-Baghawī (d. 1117), 'Abdullāh ibn 'Umar al-Bayḍāwī (d. 1286), Abū Mansūr al-Māturīdī (d. 944), Abū Ḥafṣ Najm al-Dīn al-Nasafī (d. 1142), al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (d. 1108 or 1109) and other authorities. However, the references he makes to Qūnawī dominate the *'Ayn* to the extent that it includes a considerable proportion of Qūnawī's commentary, *I'jāz al-bayān*. In this regard, Fanārī prioritizes Qūnawī's Qur'anic comments and attempts to make his own comments in a similar fashion. Thus, the *'Ayn al-a'yān* can be considered, albeit not a super-commentary, an essential source that enormously contributes to making Qūnawī's *I'jāz al-bayān* easier to understand, just as Fanārī's *Miṣbāḥ al-uns* is the most important commentary on Qūnawī's *Miftāḥ al-ghayb*.

In the commentary section of the *'Ayn*, the following points are observed:

1. Most of the discussions are loosely connected to the text being interpreted. Fanārī very often uses the Qur'anic phrases as a pretext for raising different points. In this sense, the *'Ayn* goes beyond being a commentary and looks like a book of grammar or theology or Islamic law in its many pages. For example, Fanārī devotes a lengthy discussion to the etymology of the names Allah and Satan (*Shayṭān*) when commenting on the *isti'ādha*.<sup>38</sup> He also explains, in very

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38 Ibid., 93-97 and 97-98.

long passages, the grammatical cases of the Arabic prepositions *min* and *bā'*, which respectively mean *from/than* and *with/by* in English.<sup>39</sup> These details can be considered valuable linguistic information, but most are irrelevant to the interpretation.

In the same way, Fanārī starts to discuss various indirectly related topics along with the jurisprudential and theological aspects of the text. For example, he goes into delicate jurisprudential details about the *isti'ādha*, such as whether it is obligatory to recite the *isti'ādha* before separate Qur'anic readings, whether it should be pronounced out loud or silently in ritual prayers, whether it should be considered annexed to Qur'anic recitation or to the prayer, and correspondingly, in what circle of the prayer it is required, and so forth. Not only does Fanārī give information in these pages, but also he analyzes various opinions and refutes some of them, as if he is authoring a work on *fiqh*. In a similar way, the word *Shayṭān* in the *isti'ādha* leads him into many theological discussions on topics such as the wisdom behind Satan's creation and his leading humans astray, disputes among Islamic sects about human freewill and predestination, the nature of Satan and the angels, and their difference etc.<sup>40</sup> These theological details are not directly germane to the text, but Fanārī brings them into discussion for two reasons. First, he mostly follows Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's commentary in outlining the theological discussions in the *'Ayn*. Therefore, he includes what Rāzī discusses in his commentary. Second, Fanārī obviously aims to work around to the Akbarī points he wants to emphasize in the theological sections through the specific questions and the themes Rāzī raises in his commentary. In the sixth chapter, I will show through examples how Fanārī leads up to Akbarī metaphysics through his discussion of the theological debates.

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39 Ibid., 99-105.

40 Ibid., 112-120.

2. Fanārī always wants to emphasize Sufi teachings in his commentary. He reserves the sections he calls “*Ḥaqā’iq*”, “*Ma’ārif*” and “*Tadhkīr*” for Sufi subjects. He also very often jumps to Sufi doctrines, especially to Akbarī teachings, when discussing linguistic, structural, and even jurisprudential aspects of the verses. Linguistic possibilities in the Arabic language provide many opportunities for Fanārī to lead up to Sufi themes. Regarding the etymology of the name Allah, he explores the idea that the verb *l-w-h*, which is considered one of the verbs from which the name Allah was derived, has two opposite meanings: to hide oneself (*iḥtajaba*) and to be illuminated (*istanāra*). Fanārī bases a Sufi lesson on this contrariness, using a metaphor. He states that if the sun never set, we would not know what light is. Likewise, since God, at any moment without interruption, grants existence to everything that exists (*mawjūdāt*), He stays concealed from the eyes of the intellect like a never-setting sun. This is the meaning of God’s being both illuminated and hidden.<sup>41</sup> In another linguistic discussion on the preposition *bā’*, Fanārī leads up to a Sufi theme, saying,

The function of every preposition is to associate the verb with the noun. If this meaning of connection is valid for every preposition, it is [more suitably] valid for the preposition *bā’*. Regarding this [meaning of connection], it is said that all the knowledge of the four sacred Scriptures is in the Qur’an; all the knowledge of the Qur’an is in the chapter *al-Fātiḥa*; the knowledge of the *al-Fātiḥa* is in the *basmala*, and the letter *bā’* contains all this knowledge. “For the goal from this knowledge” [as Rāzī says] in the *Tafsīr al-kabīr*, “is to link the servant to God and the letter *bā’* connects them.”<sup>42</sup>

Fanārī uses not only linguistic but also jurisprudential details to open Sufi discussions. For example, he associates the religious obligation of the utterance of the *isti’ādha* to one of the

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41 Ibid., 94-95.

42 Ibid., 99.

most famous Sufi concepts, the idea that one should turn away from anything other than God (*mā siwā Allah*).<sup>43</sup>

3. In the jurisprudential discussions in the *‘Ayn*, Fanārī supports the Ḥanafī viewpoints. For example, he reserves pages for the discussion of whether the *basmala* should be considered the first verse of the *al-Fātiḥa* chapter and whether it was repeatedly revealed at the beginning of each chapter. Different opinions among the jurisprudential schools about the *basmala* resulted in variant practices among them, such as whether it should be pronounced out loud or silently before the *al-Fātiḥa* in ritual prayers and whether it should be recited or not before the other chapters. After mentioning opposing arguments and the evidence for them, Fanārī explains and defends the Ḥanafī viewpoint, which considers the *basmala* to be a part of neither the *al-Fātiḥa* nor the other chapters, but an individual verse that was revealed to the Prophet and placed at the beginning of each chapter to separate them.<sup>44</sup> Another disagreement among the jurisprudential schools occurred about whether the recitation of the *al-Fātiḥa* chapter is obligatory (*farḍ*) in ritual prayers. The Ḥanafīs do not consider its recitation to be obligatory; the recitation of any portion of the Qur’an suffices, according to them. Here, Fanārī lists points of criticism against the Ḥanafīs made by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī of the Shafī‘ī School and responds to them one by one.<sup>45</sup>

4. In the theological sections, Fanārī mostly cites from Rāzī’s commentary to summarize theological discussions. However, he heavily criticizes Rāzī’s conclusions about problematic issues among Islamic theological schools such as predestination (*qadar*) and denomination

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43 Ibid., 122.

44 Ibid., 150-153.

45 Ibid., 194-195.

(*tasmiya*).<sup>46</sup> Therefore, it would not be right to identify Fanārī as a follower of Ash‘arī doctrines or of Rāzī. He even opposes Māturīdī, although he is a Ḥanafī, regarding some theological debates, such as the audibility of God’s speech (which I will touch on in chapter 4).

### Fanārī’s Impact on Qur’anic Studies

It seems that Fanārī made an impact on discussions of Qur’anic studies regarding the nature and the authority of *Tafsīr* as an Islamic discipline. His ideas entered the discussions through several channels, one of which was Muḥyī al-Dīn al-Kāfiyajī (d. 1474), Fanārī’s student who established himself in the Egyptian Mamluk madrasas as a leading scholar and who was a prolific writer on many religious and non-religious subjects.<sup>47</sup> One of Kāfiyajī’s treatises, *al-Taysīr fī qawā‘id ‘ilm al-Tafsīr*, which was on the Qur’anic sciences, won recognition as one of the early examples of this genre.<sup>48</sup> Kāfiyajī does not cite Fanārī in his *al-Taysīr*, but he evidently follows the latter’s line of argumentation in many places. A large part of the treatise obviously summarizes or paraphrases from the *‘Ayn*. The difference that Kāfiyajī displays in the *Taysīr* is his discussion of the principles of *Tafsīr*, because he believes that *Tafsīr* has principles (*qawā‘id*), unlike Fanārī, and he explains, albeit unsatisfactorily, these principles.<sup>49</sup> However, we would not be wrong to suggest that Fanārī influenced him even in the originality he manifested. Fanārī’s emphatic insistence on the lack of principles and methodologies in *Tafsīr* probably prompted Kāfiyajī to

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46 See chapter 6.

47 For Kāfiyajī, see Franz Rosenthal, “Kāfiyajī,” in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed. Brill Online [www.brillonline.com].

48 The most recent publication of *al-Taysīr* is the following: Muḥyī al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Sulaymān al-Kāfiyajī, *al-Taysīr fī qawā‘id ‘ilm al-Tafsīr*, ed. Muṣṭafā Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Dhahabī (al-Qāhira: Maktabat al-Qudsī, 1998). Kāfiyajī believed that he was not preceded by anyone in presenting a work in this class but Suyūṭī states that his teacher, Kāfiyajī, was not aware of Zarkashī’s *al-Burhān* and Bulqīnī’s *Mawāqī‘ al-‘ulūm* before *al-Taysīr*. See Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, *Bughyat al-wu‘āh*, 48. Suyūṭī also wrote one of the most important works in the field entitled *al-Itqān fī ‘ulūm al-Qur‘ān*.

49 Muḥyī al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Sulaymān al-Kāfiyajī, *al-Taysīr fī qawā‘id ‘ilm al-Tafsīr* (al-Qāhira: Maktabat al-Qudsī, 1998), 30.

attempt to identify these principles and methodologies. As a result, *al-Taysīr* was treated with admiration; however, Kāfiyajī's heavy dependence on the *ʿAyn* has remained unnoticed.

One of the items Kāfiyajī took from the *ʿAyn* was the definition of *Tafsīr*. He formulated the following statement by actually integrating two definitions made by Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī and Fanārī, both of which are discussed in the *ʿAyn*:<sup>50</sup> “[*Tafsīr* is] a science in which the states of God’s speech are investigated, commensurate with the human capacity, in terms of their indication to the divine intention.” This definition won great popularity, especially in modern works of Qur’anic studies.<sup>51</sup> However, since Kāfiyajī did not discuss the parts of the definition, as Fanārī did, the latter’s intention –by including the detail “human capacity”– to point out that commentators only “presume” to know God’s intention in most cases was not fully apprehended in the later works.

In addition, Kāfiyajī adopted the list of the sciences that was to be employed in exegesis of the Qur’an, itemized first by al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī and then expanded to sixteen sciences by Fanārī, with minor differences.<sup>52</sup> Kāfiyajī’s list, which enumerates fifteen sciences, became widespread after being included by Suyūṭī, along with explanations, in his famous *al-Itqān*.<sup>53</sup>

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50 In the fifth chapter of my study, I discuss Fanārī’s definition of *Tafsīr* and his criticism of other definitions including Taftāzānī’s.

51 It seems that Muḥammad ʿAlī Salāma (d. 1942), one of the contemporary Azharite professors, was the first to popularize the definition among Egyptian scholars. See Muḥammad ʿAlī Salāma, *Manhaj al-furqān fī ʿulūm al-Qurʾān* (al-Qāhira: Dār Naḥdat Miṣr, 2004), 2:6. Then Muḥammad ʿAbd al-ʿAzīm al-Zurqānī (d. 1948) analyzed the definition in his *Manāhil*. See Muḥammad ʿAbd al-ʿAzīm al-Zurqānī, *Manāhil al-ʿirfān fī ʿulūm al-Qurʾān* ([al-Qāhira]: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-kutub al-ʿArabiyya: ʿĪsā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1943), 1:471-472. Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Dhahabī (d. 1977), former Egyptian minister and *shaykh* of al-Azhar, known by his important work, *al-Tafsīr wa-l-mufasssirūn*, also discussed the definition. See Muḥammad Ḥusayn Dhahabī, *al-Tafsīr wa-l-mufasssirūn: Baḥth tafṣīlī ʿan nashʾat al-tafsīr wa-taṭawwuruh, wa-alwānuh, wa-madhāhibuh, maʿa ʿarḍ li-ashhar al-mufasssirīn* ([al-Qāhira]: Dār al-Kutub al-ḥadītha, 1976-1989), 1:15.

52 Kāfiyajī, *al-Taysīr*, 27-29.

53 Jalāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Suyūṭī, *al-Itqān fī ʿulūm al-Qurʾān* (al-Qāhira: al-Hayʾat al-Miṣriyya al-ʿamma li-l-kutub, 1974), 4:213-216. Many writers have cited the same list from Suyūṭī. For example, see Ṭashkubrīzāda,

The list also contains the God-inspired knowledge (*'ilm al-mawhiba*) that Fanārī calls *'Ilm al-ḥaqā'iq*. By this, he obviously means (as will be discussed in the fifth chapter) esoteric mystical knowledge. However, Suyūṭī treats *'ilm al-mawhiba* as ordinary piety. Being at pains to explain this inclusion of God-given knowledge among the other sciences “accessible” to human effort, Suyūṭī underlines the importance of pious practices to understanding the Qur'an more thoroughly. In the pages that follow, he completely rules out esoteric interpretation and quotes antithetical, and even anathematizing, opinions against Sufi esoteric exegesis. Suyūṭī's efforts to isolate the *'ilm al-mawhiba* from Sufi esoteric knowledge did not escape the notice of Abū al-Thaṅā al-Ālūsī (d. 1854), a notable thinker and commentator who was the mufti in Ottoman Baghdad. He states that *'ilm al-mawhiba* is for the cognizance of esoteric secrets (*al-asrār*), not for seeking to explain the textual meanings of the Qur'an.<sup>54</sup>

Fanārī's ideas also found a way into scholarship through Kātib Chalabī (d. 1657), the great Ottoman historian, bibliographer and geographer. In his monumental bibliographical dictionary, *Kashf al-zunūn*, Kātib Chalabī places Fanārī's explanations of the definition of *Tafsīr* at the beginning of the section he reserves for *'Ilm al-Tafsīr*, accentuating the importance of the discussion.<sup>55</sup> After a long quotation, he refers readers who want to learn the subtleties of the science of *Tafsīr* to the *Ayn*. Şiddīq Ḥasan Khān al-Qannawjī (d. 1890), an Indian scholar and statesman who is considered one of the founders of the reformist Ahl-i Ḥadīth movement in India, includes the same discussion in his *Abjad al-'ulūm*, an encyclopedic work on sciences and

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*Miftāḥ al-sa'āda*, 2:82-84; Muḥammad A'lā ibn 'Alī al-Tahānawī, *Kashshāf iṣṭilāḥāt al-funūn* (Bayrūt, Lubnān: Dār al-Kutub al-'ilmiyya, 1998), 1:34-37; Dhahabī, *al-Tafsīr wa-l-mufasssīrūn*, 1:265.

54 Maḥmūd ibn 'Abdullāh al-Ālūsī, *Rūḥ al-ma'ānī fī tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-'Aẓīm wa-l-sab' al-mathānī* (al-Qāhira: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 2005), 1:7.

55 Kātib Chalabī, *Kashf al-zunūn*, 1:427-428.

outstanding representatives of these sciences in the history of Islam.<sup>56</sup> He also approvingly mentions Fanārī's definition in the introduction to his voluminous Qur'anic commentary, *Fath al-bayān*.<sup>57</sup>

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56 Muḥammad Şiddīq Ḥasan al-Qannawjī, *Abjad al-'ulūm* (Dimashq: Wizārat al-Thaqāfa wa-l-irshād al-qawmī, 1978), 2:176-178.

57 Muḥammad Şiddīq Ḥasan al-Qannawjī, *Fath al-bayān fī maqāşid al-Qur'ān* (al-Qāhira: 'Abd al-Muḥyī 'Alī Maḥfūz, 1965-), 1:7.

### CHAPTER III

*The Qur'an is sent down on seven letters. For every verse of it, there are outward and inward [meanings]. For every letter, there is a limit. For every limit, there is a point of transcendency.*

Prophet Muḥammad

#### THE HADITH OF

#### “ZĀHR – BAṬN – ḤADD – MAṬLA‘ / MUṬṬALA‘”

A famous tradition attributed to the Prophet in the Hadith literature speaks of four aspects of the Qur'an: *zahr*, *baṭn*, *ḥadd* and *maṭla‘/muṭṭala‘* (henceforth abbreviated, ZBḤM).<sup>1</sup> Sufi writers generally cling to this hadith to justify esotericism in the interpretation of the Qur'an; therefore, the so-called “layers of Qur'anic meaning” cannot be discussed without mention of this tradition. Non-Sufi scholars, on the other hand, interpret the hadith in a way that provides no justification for the Sufi understanding of the esoteric sense. Thus, interpretation of the hadith differs among the different Islamic traditions. Akbarī Sufis assign more specific and deeper meanings to the hadith. Fanārī, for example, accepts the four notions spoken of by the hadith as a framework for a great part of his commentary. The hadith plays a primary role in his explanations of scriptural hermeneutics, the nature of divine speech, Qur'anic exegesis, and even epistemology. In the chapters that follow, I will analyze how Fanārī employs the hadith in his work when building his theories and how he enacts these theories in his Qur'anic exegesis, but first, it would be better to establish the place of the hadith of ZBḤM within classical Islamic scholarship. Therefore, in this

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<sup>1</sup> A version of the hadith reads as follows: “*Unzila al-Qur'ān 'alā sab'at aḥruf. Li-kull ḥarf minhā zahr wa-baṭn. Wa-li-kull ḥarf ḥadd. Wa-li-kull ḥadd muṭṭala'.*”

chapter, I will discuss the notions of the hadith, its various versions, its weight of authenticity, and the comments on it made by Sufi and non-Sufi scholars.

### **The Words of the Hadith**

The meaning of the hadith is ambiguous. The word *zahr* (ظهر) literally means “the back” in English,<sup>2</sup> and *baṭn* (بطن) means “the belly” or “abdomen.”<sup>3</sup> However, as regards the hadith, they are understood to be the literal meaning of the Qur’an and the meaning not apparent in the text but deduced through interpretation respectively, as we will see in the comments below. Sometimes, when *zahr* and *baṭn* are used together in a sentence, as seen in some Arabic idioms, contrary meanings are emphasized, such as the contrariness of internal and external or up and down.<sup>4</sup> The word *ḥadd* (حد) has many denotations in the dictionary, some of which are prevention, prohibition, punishment, and a limit or boundary.<sup>5</sup> The word مطلع can be read as both *maṭla‘* and *muṭṭala‘*.<sup>6</sup> As is discussed below, commentators on the hadith have read and interpreted the word in both ways. Both forms are derived from the Arabic verb *ṭ-l-‘a* (طلع), which takes on various meanings according to the different subjects and objects associated with it, such as the rising of the sun or moon, or of a star, or the appearance of a thing, such as the tooth of a child or new growth on a plant. It can also mean to ascend a mountain, to come forth,

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2 See Edward William Lane, *An Arabic-English Lexicon* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1863), 5:1927-1928.

3 Ibid., 1:220.

4 There are several idioms in which *zahr* and *baṭn* are mentioned. For instance, Lane translates “*Taqallaba zahran li-baṭn*” as follows: “It turned over and over, or upside down, (lit. back for belly) as a serpent does upon ground heated by the sun.” He also translates “*qalabtu al-arḍa zahran li-baṭn*” as “I turned the earth over, upside-down.” Ibid., 5:1927-1928.

5 For all the meanings of *ḥadd*, see Lane, *An Arabic-English Lexicon*, 2:525.

6 For the possibility of both readings, see Majd al-Dīn al-Mubārak ibn Muḥammad Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Nihāya fī gharīb al-ḥadīth wa-l-āthār* (al-Qāhira: Dār Iḥyā al-kutub al-‘Arabiyya, 1963), 3:132.

to arrive, etc.<sup>7</sup> *Maṭla‘* is rendered as the place and the time of the rising of the sun, a place to ascend a mountain, and the beginning of an ode in poetry.<sup>8</sup> *Muṭṭala‘* can mean a place of ascent, an elevated place overlooking a lower place, and the way to perform an affair.<sup>9</sup> This polysemy of the terms manifests as various interpretations of the hadith, as we will see below.

### **Variants of the Hadith**

The hadith is found in many hadith collections other than the “nine books” (*al-Kutub al-tis‘a*), which are considered the most reliable hadith sources. There are various versions of the hadith, which differ in their texts (*matn*) and chains of transmission (*isnād*). The earliest sources contain the version transmitted by al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d. 728) directly from the Prophet, skipping the narrator at the level of the first generation (*marfū‘*). ‘Abdullāh ibn al-Mubārak (d. 797) records the following version of the hadith on the authority of Ḥasan in his *Kitāb al-Zuhd*: “There is no verse in the Book of God but has *ẓahr* and *baṭn*. For every *ḥadd* there is *maṭla‘/muṭṭala‘*.”<sup>10</sup> In his work *Faḍā’il al-Qur’ān*, al-Qāsim ibn Sallām (d. 837) provides two different chains of narration for the following statement, which is slightly different from what ‘Abdullāh ibn al-Mubārak reported: “God did not reveal any verse but it has *ẓahr* and *baṭn*. Every letter (*ḥarf*) is a *ḥadd*, and every *ḥadd* is a *maṭla‘/muṭṭala‘*.”<sup>11</sup> In addition, ‘Abd al-Razzāq ibn Hammām al-Ṣan‘ānī (d. 827) relates the statement as made by al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī not by the Prophet:

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7 Lane, *An Arabic-English Lexicon*, 5:1867-1868.

8 Ibid., 5:1870.

9 Ibid.

10 ‘Abdullāh ibn al-Mubārak al-Marwazī, *Kitāb al-zuhd wa-l-raqā’iq* (Bayrūt: Muassasat al-Risāla, 1971), 23.

11 al-Qāsim ibn Sallām al-Harawī, *Kitāb Faḍā’il al-Qur’ān* (Dimashq: Dār Ibn Kathīr, 1995), 97-98.

Do not make the Qur'an your headrest [do not abandon reciting it]! By (God) who has my soul, it [the Qur'an memorized by heart] is much more prone to flee [to be forgotten] than a tied camel in her resting place. By (God) who has my soul, there is no verse in it but has *ẓahr* and *baṭn*, and there is no letter in it but has *ḥadd*. For every *ḥadd*, there is a *maṭla' /muṭṭala'*.<sup>12</sup>

Table-1 below illustrates the chains of the early narrators of the hadith, transmitted on the authority of al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī:

The Prophet		The Prophet	The Prophet
ZBḤM		ZBḤM	ZBḤM
↓		↓	↓
al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī	ZBḤM	al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī	al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī
↓	↓	↓	↓
Hishām b. Ḥassān	Hishām b. Ḥassān	↓	‘Alī b. Zayd
↓	↓	↓	↓
‘Abd al-Wahhāb	↓	Mubārak b. Faḍāla	Ḥammād b. Salama
↓	↓	↓	↓
Nu‘aym	↓	Ḥajjāj	Ḥajjāj
↓	↓	↓	↓
‘Abdullāh b. al-Mubārak	‘Abd al-Razzāq b. Hammām	Al-Qāsim b. Sallām (I)	Al-Qāsim b. Sallām (II)

Table- 1: Chains of narrators of the hadith, transmitted on the authority of al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī

The hadith was also reported on the authority of ‘Abdullāh ibn Mas‘ūd (d. 653). Several variants of this version are found in the available sources, with different texts and chains of narrators. In one of the variants, *ḥadd* and *maṭla' /muṭṭala'* are missing from the text: “The Qur'an was sent down on seven letters (*sab‘at aḥruf*). For every verse of it, are there *ẓahr* and *baṭn*.” Abū Bakr al-Bazzār (d. 905),<sup>13</sup> Abū Ya‘lā al-Mawṣilī (d. 919),<sup>14</sup> Abū Ja‘far al-Ṭaḥāwī (d.

12 ‘Abd al-Razzāq ibn Hammām al-Ṣan‘ānī, *al-Muṣannaf* ([S.l.]: al-Majlis al-‘Ilmī; Bayrūt: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1970-1972), 3:358.

13 Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn ‘Amr al-Bazzār, *al-Baḥr al-zakḥkhār al-ma‘rūf bi-Musnad al-Bazzār* (Madīna: Maktabat al-‘Ulūm wa-l-ḥikam, 2003), 5:441-442.

14 Abū Ya‘lā Aḥmad ibn ‘Alī al-Mawṣilī, *Musnad Abī Ya‘lā al-Mawṣilī* (Dimashq: Dār al-Ma‘mūn li-l-turāth, 1987), 9:278.

933),<sup>15</sup> and Ibn Ḥibbān (d. 965)<sup>16</sup> include this version with slight differences in the chains of transmission. Abū al-Qāsim al-Ṭabarānī (d. 970) transmits the same hadith with a considerable difference in its chain,<sup>17</sup> as seen in the Table-2 below:

The Prophet	The Prophet	The Prophet	The Prophet	The Prophet
ZB	ZB	ZB	ZB	ZB
↓	↓	↓	↓	↓
‘Abdullāh b. Mas‘ūd	‘Abdullāh b. Mas‘ūd	‘Abdullāh b. Mas‘ūd	‘Abdullāh b. Mas‘ūd	‘Abdullāh b. Mas‘ūd
↓	↓	↓	↓	↓
Abū al-Aḥwaṣ	Abū al-Aḥwaṣ	Abū al-Aḥwaṣ	Abū al-Aḥwaṣ	Abū al-Aḥwaṣ
↓	↓	↓	↓	↓
Abū Ishāq	↓	Abū Ishāq	Abū Ishāq	Ibn Abī al-Hudhayl
↓	↓	↓	↓	↓
Muḥammad b. Ajlān	↓	Muḥammad b. Ajlān	Muḥammad b. Ajlān	Wāsil b. Ḥayyān
↓	↓	↓	↓	↓
Sulaymān b. Bilāl	Sulaymān b. Bilāl	Sulaymān b. Bilāl	Sulaymān b. Bilāl	Mughīra
↓	↓	↓	↓	↓
↓	Brother of Ibn Abī Uways	↓	Brother of Ibn Abī Uways	Jarīr b. ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd
↓	↓	↓	↓	↓
Ibn Abī Uways	Ibn Abī Uways	Ibn Abī Uways	Ibn Abī Uways	Al-Fayḍ b. Wāthiq
↓	↓	↓	↓	↓
Ayyūb b. Sulaymān	Sahl b. Zanjala	Ayyūb b. Sulaymān	Ishāq b. Suwayd	Aḥmad b. Yahyā
↓	↓	↓	↓	↓
Muḥammad al-Bukhārī	Abū Ya‘lā (I)	Ibrāhīm b. Abī Dāwūd	‘Umar b. Muḥammad	Ṭabarānī (I)
↓	↓	↓	↓	↓
Al-Bazzār	↓	Ṭahāwī (I)	Ibn Ḥibbān	↓

Table- 2: Chains of narrators of the hadith, transmitted on the authority of ‘Abdullāh-1

Ṭabarānī narrates another variant of the hadith as ‘Abdullāh ibn Mas‘ūd’s own statement through two chains. In this version, *ẓahr* and *batn* are missing: “Truly, there is no letter in the Qur’an but has *ḥadd*. For every *ḥadd*, there is *maṭla* ‘/muṭṭala’.”<sup>18</sup> The narrators of this version are shown in the Table-3 below:

15 Abū Ja‘far Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Ṭahāwī, *Sharḥ mushkil al-āthār* (Bayrūt: Muassasat al-Risāla, 1994), 8:87.

16 Abū Ḥātim Muḥammad Ibn Ḥibbān, *Ṣaḥīḥ Ibn Ḥibbān* (Bayrūt: Muassasat al-Risāla, 1984), 1:242-243.

17 Abū al-Qāsim Sulaymān ibn Aḥmad al-Ṭabarānī, *al-Mu‘jam al-kabīr* ([Baghdād]: Iḥyā’ al-Turāth al-Islāmī, 1984), 10:106. In Ṭabarānī, the hadith is preceded by the following addition: “If I were to have an intimate friend (*khalīl*) among people, I would have chosen Abū Bakr, but your companion (I) is God’s intimate friend.”

18 Ṭabarānī, *al-Mu‘jam al-kabīr*, 9:136.

‘Abdullāh b. Mas‘ūd	‘Abdullāh b. Mas‘ūd
ḤM	ḤM
↓	↓
Abū al-Aḥwaṣ	Abū al-Aḥwaṣ
↓	↓
Salama b. Kuhayl	Salama b. Kuhayl
↓	↓
Sufyān	Shu‘ba
↓	↓
Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Firyābī	‘Amr b. Mazrūq
↓	↓
‘Abdullāh b. Muḥammad	Yūsuf al-Qāḍī
↓	↓
Ṭabarānī (II)	Ṭabarānī (III)

Table- 3: Chains of narrators of the hadith, transmitted on the authority of ‘Abdullāh-2

Yet another version, by Abu Abū Ya‘lā al-Mawṣilī,<sup>19</sup> Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (d. 923),<sup>20</sup> Abū Ja‘far al-Ṭahāwī,<sup>21</sup> and Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Sulamī (d. 1021),<sup>22</sup> has all four notions in it: “The Qur’an is sent down on seven letters. For every verse of it, there are *zahr* and *baṭn*. For every letter, there is a *ḥadd*. For every *ḥadd*, there is a *maṭla* ‘*muṭṭala*’.” Table-4 below shows the chains of narrators for this version.

The Prophet	The Prophet	The Prophet	The Prophet	The Prophet
ZBHM	ZBHM	ZBHM	ZBHM	ZBHM
↓	↓	↓	↓	↓
‘Abdullāh b. Mas‘ūd	‘Abdullāh b. Mas‘ūd	‘Abdullāh b. Mas‘ūd	‘Abdullāh b. Mas‘ūd	‘Abdullāh b. Mas‘ūd
↓	↓	↓	↓	↓
Abū al-Aḥwaṣ	Abū al-Aḥwaṣ	Abū al-Aḥwaṣ	Abū al-Aḥwaṣ	Abū al-Aḥwaṣ
↓	↓	↓	↓	↓
Ibn Abī al-Hudhayl	Unknown	Ibrāhīm al-Ḥajarī	Ibn Abī al-Hudhayl	Ibn Abī al-Hudhayl
↓	↓	↓	↓	↓
Wāsil b. Ḥayyān	Wāsil b. Ḥayyān	Sufyān	Wāsil b. Ḥayyān	Wāsil b. Ḥayyān
↓	↓	↓	↓	↓

Table- 4: Chains of narrators of the hadith, transmitted on the authority of ‘Abdullāh-3

19 Mawṣilī, *Musnad Abī Ya‘lā al-Mawṣilī*, 9:80. In Abū Ya‘lā’s report, the hadith is preceded by the same addition as in Ṭabarānī: “If I were to have an intimate friend (*khalīl*) among people, I would have chosen Abū Bakr, but your companion (I) is God’s intimate friend.”

20 Abū Ja‘far Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr al-Ṭabarī: Jāmi‘ al-bayān ‘an ta’wīl āy al-Qur’ān* (Riyād: Dār ‘Ālam al-kutub, 2003), 1:22.

21 Ṭahāwī, *Sharḥ mushkil al-āthār*, 8:109.

22 Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Sulamī, *Ḥaqā’iq al-tafsīr: Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-‘Azīz* (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyya, 1421 [2001]), 1:21.

Mughīra	Mughīra	Mihrān	Mughīra	↓
↓	↓	↓	↓	↓
Abū Ya‘lā (II)	Jarīr b. ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd	↓	Jarīr b. ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd	Jarīr b. ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd
	↓	↓	↓	↓
	Muḥammad b. Humayd	Muḥammad b. Humayd	Mūsā b. Hārūn	Ishāq b. Ibrāhīm
	↓	↓	↓	↓
	Ṭabarī (I)	Ṭabarī (II)	Yaḥyā b. ‘Uthmān	Muḥammad b. Ishāq
			↓	↓
			Yaḥyā b. ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd	‘Abdullāh b. Muḥammad
			↓	↓
			Fahd b. Sulaymān	Sulamī
			↓	
			Ṭahāwī (II)	

Table- 4 continued

In addition, Abū Nu‘aym al-Iṣfahānī (d. 1038) ascribes a similar statement to Ibn Mas‘ūd with an entirely different chain of narrators: “‘Abdullāh ibn Mas‘ūd said, ‘The Qur’an was truly sent down on seven letters. There is no letter in it but has *ẓahr* and *baṭn*. Truly ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib has knowledge of *ẓāhir* and *bāṭin*’.”<sup>23</sup>

Sulamī also reports from ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib a statement that speaks of the same four aspects of the Qur’an and their interpretation. The entire chain of narrators is omitted from this report:

‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib said, “There is no verse [in the Qur’an] but has four meanings (*ma‘ānī*): *ẓāhir*, *bāṭin*, *ḥadd*, and *maṭla‘/muṭṭala‘*. *Ẓāhir* is the recitation (*tilāwa*); *bāṭin* is the understanding (*fahm*); *ḥadd* is the literal expression (*‘ibara*) and allusion (*ishāra*), as well as the judgments of lawful and unlawful; *maṭla‘/muṭṭala‘* is [what God] intends the servant [to do] with [the verse].”<sup>24</sup>

In evaluating the versions of the hadith, the following points are worth considering. Technical weaknesses in the version of the hadith on the authority of al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī raise

23 Abū Nu‘aym Aḥmad ibn ‘Abdullāh al-Iṣfahānī, *Ḥilyat al-awliyā’ wa-ṭabaqāt al-aṣfiyā’* (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyya, 2007), 1:105.

24 Sulamī, *Ḥaqā’iq al-tafsīr*, 1:22-23.

some doubts about its reliability. The omission of a narrator at the level of the companions makes the authenticity of the hadith questionable. In addition, ascription of the text not to the Prophet but to al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī in the *Muṣannaḥ* of ‘Abd al-Razzāq reinforces doubts about its authenticity. Regarding the Ibn Mas‘ūd version, there are ambiguities in the chains of narrators and discrepancies in the text. The ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib version is the weakest among the three because it lacks the entire chain of narrators, besides the fact that it is not narrated as a hadith of the Prophet.<sup>25</sup> The major canonical hadith compilations include none of the three versions. However, if we ignore the thorny issues about the narrators and the ambiguities in the text and focus on the content narrated by the early authorities, such as ‘Abdullāh ibn al-Mubārak, al-Qāsim ibn Sallām and ‘Abd al-Razzāq al-Ṣan‘ānī, and its wide dispersion in later sources, it is tempting to not so easily disregard the hadith as unreliable. Some medieval and contemporary hadith critics, such as Nūr al-Dīn al-Haythamī (d. 1405), Shu‘ayb al-Arna’ūṭ, and Ḥusayn Asad, take a favorable tone about the authenticity of some variants of the hadith transmitted on the authority of Ibn Mas‘ūd.<sup>26</sup> That being said, the discussions regarding authenticity are of little importance for the current study because the fact remains that the notions contained in the hadith were in very early circulation in Islamic sources, and the Sufis employed them to reinforce their idea of multilayered Qur’anic meaning.

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25 Böwering, who questions the authenticity of ‘Alī’s authorship of this statement, suggests that “Sulamī does in fact quote Tustarī, not ‘Alī.” See Gerhard Böwering, *The Mystical Vision of Existence in Classical Islam: The Qur’anic Hermeneutics of the Sufi Sahl at-Tustari* (d. 283/896) (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1980), 140.

26 See Nūr al-Dīn ‘Alī ibn Abī Bakr al-Haythamī, *Majma‘ al-zawā‘id wa-manba‘ al-Fawā‘id* (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Arabī, 1982), 7:152; Ṭahāwī, *Sharḥ mushkil al-āthār*, 8:87, note: 1; Ibn Ḥibbān, *Ṣaḥīḥ Ibn Ḥibbān*, 1:243, note: 1.

## Interpretations of the Hadith

It is possible to find many interpretations of the hadith in the sources, but here I will present selected comments. The earliest comments we read in the sources show confusion among the commentators regarding the notions mentioned in the hadith. They try to resolve ambiguities by focusing on the literal meanings of the words in Arabic. For example, according to one comment ascribed by al-Qāsim ibn Sallām to al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, *ẓahr* is the outward meaning (*ẓāhir*) of the Qur'an, and *baṭn* is the secret meaning (*sirr*). *Ḥadd* is the passage (*ḥarf*) that contains knowledge of goodness and evil (*'ilm al-khayr wa-l-sharr*), while *maṭla'*/*muṭṭala'* pertains to religious commands and prohibitions (*al-amr wa-l-nahy*).<sup>27</sup> In another report narrated by al-Qāsim ibn Sallām, al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī was asked about *maṭla'* after he quoted the hadith. In his reply, he said, “A group of people, who will practice it [*ḥadd?*], emerges” (*yaṭlu 'u qawmun ya 'malūn bih*). As seen, Ḥasan's comments do not help much to resolve the uncertainty. Noting the peculiarity of what Ḥasan said about *maṭla'*, Ibn Sallām associated the former's comment with the following statement attributed to 'Abdullāh ibn Mas'ūd: “There is no letter or verse [in the Qur'an] but a group of people have practiced it (*'amila bihā*) or a group of people will practice it.”<sup>28</sup> Therefore, what seems to follow from Ḥasan's explanation is that *ḥadd* denotes the actions learned from the Qur'an, and *maṭla'* indicates the putting into practice of those actions. Al-Qāsim ibn Sallām objects to this interpretation of Ḥasan, emphasizing that this usage of *maṭla'* is unknown in the Arabic language. He renders the term *maṭla'*/*muṭṭala'* as the “place where something comes

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27 Harawī, *Kitāb Faḍā'il al-Qur'ān*, 98.

28 al-Qāsim ibn Sallām al-Harawī, *Gharīb al-ḥadīth* (Haydarābād, al-Dakkān: Maṭba'at Majlis Dā'irat al-Ma'ārif al-'Uthmāniyya, 1964), 2:12. Māwardī presents Ibn Mas'ūd's statement as the explanation of *ẓahr* and *baṭn*. Accordingly, what has been practiced is *ẓahr*, and what will be practiced is *baṭn*. See 'Alī ibn Muḥammad al-Māwardī, *al-Nukat wa-l-'uyūn: Tafsīr al-Māwardī* (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-'ilmiyya: Mu'assasat al-Kutub al-thaqāfiyya, [1992]), 1:41.

from” (*ma'tā*). Thus, according to him, this word refers to the source (*al-ma'tā wa-l-miṣ'ad*) of the Qur'anic knowledge.<sup>29</sup>

‘Abdullāh ibn al-Mubārak notes that he heard some commentators on this hadith who understood *zahr* as the apparent meaning (*zāhir*) and *baṭn* as the hidden interpretation (*tafsīr khaḥfiyy*). *Muṭṭala'* means an outcome of the examination of the Qur'anic text by people who will continue to deduce different meanings generation after generation until the end of the world. However, according to him, this method of interpretation is prohibited. Only the Prophetic tradition (*Sunna*) can interpret the Qur'an. Taking this into account, by “hidden interpretation” he seems to mean a connotation assigned to the text that is acquired through a narrated interpretation, not through reasoning.<sup>30</sup> Ṭaḥāwī also emphasizes the hidden aspect of interpretation stating that *zahr* refers to the meaning that is disclosed (*zahara*) and *baṭn* to the meaning that remains hidden (*baṭana*).<sup>31</sup>

According to another comment mentioned by al-Qāsim ibn Sallām, *zahr* is the text of the Qur'an (*lafz*), and *baṭn* is its interpretation (*ta'wīl*).<sup>32</sup> Note that early scholars used the term *ta'wīl* with the same meaning as *tafsīr*, interpretation of the Qur'an based on narration. However, what Ibn Sallām presents as the soundest interpretation of *zahr* and *baṭn* is another opinion: In Qur'anic stories of nations destroyed in the past, such as ‘Ād and Thamūd, descriptions of their wrongdoings and punishment are *zahr*. The morals of the stories, namely the lessons the readers

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29 Harawī, *Gharīb al-ḥadīth*, 2:12. Māwardī also mentions an anonymous explanation for *maṭla'/muṭṭala'* that evokes Ibn Sallām's opinion: “For every ambiguous point in the laws (*aḥkām*), there is *muṭṭala'* through which knowledge of (laws) is attained and the aim of (laws) is understood.” See Māwardī, *al-Nukat wa-l-'uyūn*, 1:42.

30 ‘Abdullāh ibn al-Mubārak, *Kitāb al-zuhd wa-l-raqā'iq*, 23.

31 Ṭaḥāwī, *Sharḥ mushkil al-āthār*, 8:88.

32 Harawī, *Gharīb al-ḥadīth*, 2:13. Māwardī attributes the same comment to Jāḥiẓ (d. 869), the famous Mu'tazilī master of Arabic literature. See Māwardī, *al-Nukat wa-l-'uyūn*, 1:41.

get from these narratives, are *baṭn*.<sup>33</sup> In this regard, Ibn Sallām relates *ẓahr* and *baṭn* exclusively to the Qur’anic narratives.

In respect to *ẓahr* and *baṭn*, al-Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī (d. 857) thinks like the previous commentators, saying that *ẓahr* is the verbal expression of the Qur’anic text (*tilāwa*), and *baṭn* is its interpretation (*ta’wīl*). He understands *ḥadd* as the last limit of understanding of the Qur’an. *Maṭla’/muṭṭala’* thereby becomes “encroaching beyond the limit with excessiveness and transgression.”<sup>34</sup> Therefore, Muḥāsibī, like ‘Abdullāh ibn al-Mubārak, does not consider *maṭla’/muṭṭala’* to be something within the bounds of legitimate interpretation.

Sahl ibn ‘Abdullāh al-Tustarī (d. 896) also interprets the hadith of Z̤B̤Ḥ̤M, but does so without stating that he is commenting on the hadith. The parallel between his interpretation and the aforementioned explanation ascribed to ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib by Sulamī is worth noting:

Every verse of the Qur’an has four senses: an outward (*ẓāhir*) and an inward (*bāṭin*), a limit (*ḥadd*) and a point of transcendency (*maṭla’*). The outward sense is the recitation, and the inward sense is the understanding (*fahm*) of the verse; the limit defines what is lawful and unlawful, and the point of transcendency is the heart’s place of elevation (*ishrāf*) [from which it beholds] the intended meaning, as an understanding from God, Mighty and Majestic is He (*fiqhan min Allah ‘azza wa jalla*). The outward knowledge [of the Qur’an] is a knowledge [accessible to the] generality (*‘āmm*); whereas the understanding of its inner meaning and its intended meaning is [for] a select few (*khāṣṣ*).<sup>35</sup>

Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (d. 923) agrees that *ẓahr* and *baṭn* embody the outward aspect of the Qur’an, which appeared in its recitation (*tilāwa*) and its interpretation (*ta’wīl*) (which was hidden

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33 Ibid.

34 al-Ḥārith ibn Asad al-Muḥāsibī, *Fahm al-Qur’ān wa-ma’ānīh* (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kindī, Dār al-Fikr, 1978), 328.

35 Sahl ibn ‘Abdullāh al-Tustarī, *Tafsīr al-Tustarī*, trans. Annabel Keeler and Ali Keeler (Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae; Amman, Jordan: Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought, 2011), 2.

before), respectively. *Ḥadd* is specific to the legal aspect of the verses, denoting religiously lawful and unlawful things (*ḥalāl* and *ḥarām*). In connection with this interpretation of *ḥadd*, *muṭṭala‘* refers to the otherworldly reward and punishment that one will experience (*yaṭṭali‘u*) in the hereafter according to one’s compliance with or disobedience of religious law.<sup>36</sup> Therefore, Ṭabarī identifies only two levels of interpretation in this hadith. He associates the other two notions with the legal content of the Qur’an and with the otherworldly consequences that follow from this legal content.

Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālī (d. 1111) cites the hadith several times in his famous *Iḥyā‘* and *Mishkāt al-anwār* when he defends esoteric exegesis.<sup>37</sup> He does not provide a direct interpretation of the hadith but he reveals that he understands *zahr* as exoteric interpretation (*tafsīr*) and *baṭn* as esoteric interpretation in his commentary on Q. 20:12, which recounts the divine address to Moses: “Verily I am thy Lord! Therefore (in My presence) put off thy shoes!” According to Ghazzālī, Moses extrapolated two meanings from this divine command: the removal of his shoes, which is the apparent meaning (*zāhir*), and the renunciation of the both this world and afterlife, which is the esoteric meaning (*bāṭin*). Ghazzālī criticizes both the literalists and the esotericists, who obstinately insisted on an exclusive choice between apparent and hidden meanings. However, the best path is to consider both types of meaning without ignoring either of them, as Moses complied with both commands.<sup>38</sup> Ghazzālī’s silence about *ḥadd* and *muṭṭala‘* does not escape notice.

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36 Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr al-Ṭabarī*, 1:67.

37 For example, see Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Ghazzālī, *Mishkāt al-anwār* (al-Qāhira: al-Dār al-Qawmiyya li-l-ṭibā‘a wa-l-nashr, 1964), 73; Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazzālī, *Iḥyā‘ ‘ulūm al-Dīn* (Bayrūt: Dār al-Ma‘rifā, [19--?]), 1:289.

38 Ghazzālī, *Mishkāt al-anwār*, 73.

Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (d. 1234) also provides a discussion on the hadith in his famous *Kitāb ‘Awārif al-ma‘ārif*. It seems that he renders *ẓahr* as *tafsīr* (interpretation by tradition) and *baṭn* as *ta’wīl*, in its sense of ascribing to the text one of the possible meanings concurrent with the Qur’an and Prophetic tradition. Suhrawardī understands *maṭla’/muṭṭala’* as a special knowledge granted by God. As the Sufi makes spiritual progress through asceticism and the isolation of the heart from things other than God (*mā siwā’ Allāh*), he attains this special knowledge about each verse of the Qur’an. As long as the Sufi continues to engage in spiritual practices, he keeps receiving new understandings about the verses. However, according to Suhrawardī, *muṭṭala’* is not restricted to the bestowal of confidential knowledge on the Sufi. Another aspect of *muṭṭala’* is the Sufi’s spiritual experience of witnessing (*shuhūd*) the One who speaks (God) in each verse of the Qur’an. Since, as God’s speech, the Qur’an is one of the attributes of God, manifestations (*tajallī*) from God consistently occur when one recites or listens to the Qur’an. Suhrawardī draws on the following statement, which he ascribes to Ja‘far al-Ṣādiq (d. 765): “God manifests in His speech [the Qur’an] for His servants, but they do not see Him.” “*Muṭṭala’* is advancement,” Suhrawardī adds, “from the verbal form of speech (*kalām*) to witnessing the Speaker (*Mutakallim*: God).” *Ḥadd* becomes, in this case, the border that separates the speech from the Speaker.<sup>39</sup>

‘Alā al-Dawla al-Simnānī (d. 1336) understands the four notions of the hadith as four levels of meaning in the Qur’an and associates them with the four realms of existence. Jamal J. Elias presents Simnānī’s scheme as follows: “The exoteric dimension of the Qur’an [*ẓāhir*] relates to the Human Realm [*nāsūt*], the esoteric level [*bāṭin*] to the secrets of the Realm of

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39 ‘Umar ibn Muḥammad Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī, *Kitāb ‘Awārif al-ma‘ārif* (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kitāb al-‘Arabī, 1966), 25-26.

Sovereignty [*malakūt*], the limit [*ḥadd*] of the Qur'an to the Realm of Omnipotence [*jabarūt*], and the point of ascent [*muṭṭala'*] to the Realm of Divinity [*lāhūt*].”<sup>40</sup> According to Simnānī, the method of interpretation differs according to the level. The exoteric dimension relies on the external sense, whereas the esoteric dimension relies on inspiration. The limit is the dimension where a qualified commentator presents his comments only with divine permission. The point of ascent should not be subjected to commenting at all.<sup>41</sup> Simnānī seems to be influenced by Ibn al-‘Arabī, who explained the hadith with the ontological levels a century ago, as we will see below.

#### *Interpretation of the hadith in Akbarī writers*

In Akbarī writings, we find interpretations of the hadith that are similar to those discussed above. For example, ‘Abd al-Razzāq al-Qashānī (d.1330), one of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s commentators, mentions the hadith in the introduction to his Qur’anic commentary.<sup>42</sup> He apparently adopts Suhrawardī’s interpretation:

I understand that *ẓahr* refers to *tafsīr* [interpretation by the apparent meaning] and *batn* to *ta’wīl* [interpretation by the hidden meaning]. *Ḥadd* means [the limit] where understanding can reach regarding the meaning of the speech; *muṭṭala’* is where to one ascends from (the *ḥadd*) and experiences (*yaṭṭali’*) the witnessing (*shuhūd*) of the All-knowing Sovereign (God).<sup>43</sup>

Like Suhrawardī, Qashānī cites the statements attributed to Ja‘far al-Ṣādiq to reinforce his interpretation. He obviously understands *ta’wīl* as interpretation by mystical knowledge (*kashf*),

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40 Jamal J. Elias, *The Throne Carrier of God: The Life and Thought of ‘Alā’ ad-Dawla as-Simnānī* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 108.

41 Ibid.

42 ‘Abd al-Razzāq al-Qāshānī, *Tafsīr Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn al-‘Arabī* (Egypt: Maṭba‘at Būlāq, 1283 [1867]), 3-4.

43 Ibid., 3-4.

although it generally refers to interpretation by reason.<sup>44</sup> He emphasizes that he will pay attention only to the *baṭn* and *muṭṭalaʿ* aspects in his commentary without discussing the *ẓahr* and *ḥadd*. In this regard, his commentary appears as an example of a wholly esoteric exegesis of the Qur'an. However, in Qashānī's commentary, the reader does not distinguish any difference between *baṭn* and *muṭṭalaʿ*.

Dāwūd al-Qayṣarī (d. 1350 or 1351), Qāshānī's student and another commentator on Ibn al-ʿArabī, asserts that *ẓahr* is what is understood from the outward form of the expression, and *baṭn* is about understanding (*fahm* and *fiqh*). *Ḥadd* is the limit of understanding. It seems that Qayṣarī considers *ḥadd* as a limit for the exoteric people, not everyone, because he does not assess *muṭṭalaʿ* as a forbidden field for commentators, as Muḥāsibī does. *Muṭṭalaʿ* is "what proceeds from the complete unveiling (*al-kashf al-kullī*) and the manifestations of divine names, attributes and essence [available] for the notable saints."<sup>45</sup> In this regard, Qayṣarī takes the hadith as a description of the twofold dimensions of Qur'anic exegesis, exoteric and esoteric.

Although the interpretations of the hadith offered by Qāshānī and Qayṣarī among the Akbarī writers do not sound original, we see that Ibn al-ʿArabī assigns deeper meanings to the hadith by associating it with the hierarchical ontological order he theorizes in regard to existence. Hence, the most striking aspect of his interpretation is the parallelism he establishes between the levels of Qur'anic meaning and existence:

There is not a thing but has external (*ẓāhir*), internal (*bāṭin*) [aspects], limit (*ḥadd*), and transcendency (*muṭṭalaʿ*). *Zāhir* is what you see as its physical form (*ṣūratuh*). *Bāṭin* is what you understand as something that sustains (*yumsik*) the physical form. *Ḥadd* is what

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44 Pierre Lory, *Les Commentaires ésotériques du Coran d'après 'Abd ar-Razzaq al-Qashani* (Paris: Les Deux Océans, 1980), 10-11.

45 Dāwūd ibn Maḥmūd al-Qayṣarī, *Sharḥ Ṭāiyyāt Ibn al-Fāriḍ al-kubrā* (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 2004), 164.

distinguishes (*yumayyiz*) it from others. And *muṭṭala‘* is what makes you comprehend its [reality] if you are able to unveil it (*kashf*). Whatever you do not unveil, you cannot comprehend its *muṭṭala‘*.<sup>46</sup>

The statement is unclear. Considering Ibn al-‘Arabī’s other comment on the hadith, to be mentioned below, and Qūnawī’s and Fanārī’s further explanations, it would not be wrong to suggest that he means the correspondences of an existing thing in the other ontological realms. In other words, the hadith is taken by Ibn al-‘Arabī as pointing not only to the layers of meaning in the Qur’an, but also to the stages of existence lined up between its origin and the physical world in a way similar to the Neo-platonic concept of emanation. In this sense, *muṭṭala‘*, for example, seems to refer to the realm of the divine names. Since everything is the appearance of the divine names in the physical world, these names are, in fact, the essences or the realities of the physical forms. Therefore, unveiling (*kashf*) is the ability to see the reality of appearances.

Ibn al-‘Arabī also classifies the saints (*rijāl*: lit. men) according to the quadripartite system offered by the hadith. His classification is in line with the ontological system he bases on the hadith, because to each category he ascribes a different disposal (*taṣarruf*) of spiritual authority in different realms. Accordingly, the “men of outside” (*rijāl al-zāhir*) have authority in the visible world (*‘ālam al-mulk wa-l-shahāda*); the “men of inside” (*rijāl al-bāṭin*) have authority in the invisible world of spirits (*‘ālam al-ghayb wa-l-malakūt*); the “men of the limit” (*rijāl al-ḥadd*) have authority in the interval world (*‘ālam al-barzakh wa-l-jabarūt*). As for the “men of transcendency” (*rijāl al-muṭṭala‘*), they are the greatest of all saints who have authority in the realm of the divine names.<sup>47</sup> It seems Ibn al-‘Arabī categorizes the spiritual authority here

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46 Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn al-‘Arabī, *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya* (al-Jumhūriyya al-Yamaniyya: Wizārat al-Thaqāfa, 2010), 12:281.

47 Ibn al-‘Arabī, *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya*, 1:549-551.

according to both ontological and epistemological levels. In other words, the men in a certain category have an influence on the subjects of the related realm, while having knowledge about that realm. For example, the spiritual influence (*himma*) of the *rijāl al-bāṭin* enables celestial spirits (*arwāḥ al-kawākib*) to descend. They can also discover esoteric secrets of the sacred scriptures and know the language of the invisible world and the principles of the letters. The *rijāl al-muṭṭala‘* excel all others in their influence on things because they are at the highest spiritual level.<sup>48</sup> They have the greatest authority among the saints for they are connected to the divine names, which are the sources of everything.

According to Naṣr Ḥāmid Abū Zayd (d. 2010), a contemporary scholar of Qur’anic studies, Ibn al-‘Arabī makes the hadith under discussion the foundation of his ontology by imagining four distinct ontological levels: (1) *ẓāhir*: the perceptible universe (*‘ālam al-shahāda*), (2) *bāṭin*: the unseen universe (*‘ālam al-ghayb*), (3) *ḥadd*: the interval universe (*‘ālam al-barzakh*), and (4) *muṭṭala‘*: the universe of the divine names (*‘ālam al-asmā’*).<sup>49</sup> It is true that Ibn al-‘Arabī offered numerous versions of these hierarchical levels in his writings, and subsequent scholars have made various attempts to provide their own variously named and numbered levels following him. Thus, the subject of the “ontological levels,” known with the term “the divine presences” (*al-ḥaḍarāt al-ilāhiyya*), has become one of the most famous teachings of the School

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48 Ibid., 1:550-551.

49 Naṣr Ḥāmid Abū Zayd, *Falsafat al-ta’wīl: Dirāsa fī ta’wīl al-Qur’ān ‘inda Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn ‘Arabī* (Bayrūt, Lubnān: Dār al-Tanwīr, 1993), 277.

of Ibn al-‘Arabī.<sup>50</sup> The number of the levels is sometimes increased to five, six, or seven in the Akbarī writings.<sup>51</sup>

However, on what basis does Ibn al-‘Arabī use a hadith that announces the four aspects of the Qur’an to define ontological levels? According to him, all existing things (*mawjūdāt*) are God’s words, just as the Qur’an is also His words. He associates this idea with the Qur’anic concept of God’s (verbal) command: “Be!” (*Kun!*). God’s breath (*nafas al-Raḥmān*) is another notion frequently used by Ibn al-‘Arabī to define all of existence as God’s words. Accordingly, every existing thing appears as the result of God’s breath. Since Ibn al-‘Arabī takes all of existence to be the words of God, he does not find it unsuitable to apply the hadith of Z̤BḤM to existence. As a result, he defines existence within the framework of a quadripartite system. However, he does not develop an exegetical system based on the parallels between the hadith and ontology or spirituality. Instead, Qūnawī and Fanārī, as we will see in the following chapters, attempted to present a coherent exegetical system that would use the hadith as a practical tool to link ontology to spirituality.

### *Evaluation of the comments*

Regarding the comments on the hadith of Z̤BḤM, three observations can be made. First, all the commentators understand the notions *zahr* and *baṭn* in a similar way; the former indicates the literal rendering of the text, and the latter points to the meaning that is not apparent in the text, but which can be deduced either through a narrated or a reasoned interpretation, or through esoteric knowledge. ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, in Sulamī’s report, and Sufī commentators, such as

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50 William C. Chittick, “The Five Divine Presences: From Al-Qūnawī to Al-Qayṣarī,” *The Muslim World* 72 (1982): 107.

51 Ibid., 107-128; Ahmed Avni Konuk, *Fusūsu’l-hikem Tercüme ve Şerhi* (İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Vakfı, 1999), 10.

Tustarī, Suhrawardī, and Qāshānī, seem to ascribe to *baṭn* the meaning of esoteric exegesis, which is similarly represented in Sufi terminology. The other explanations of *baṭn* can simply be stated as the usual interpretation of the text, a description acceptable to non-Sufi scholars.

Second, the hadith of ṢBḤM links *zahr* to *baṭn* and *ḥadd* to *maṭla' / muṭṭala'*, but none of the versions of the hadith establishes a connection between the first and the second pairs.<sup>52</sup> Taking this detail into account, the aforementioned non-Sufi commentators emphasize the obvious relevance between *zahr* and *baṭn* but do not treat the four notions as interrelated parts that inform a fourfold exegetical theory. Conversely, this distinction between the two pairs does not appear in the Sufis' comments. For example, Muḥāsibī and Ghazzālī cite the hadith as follows: "For every verse of the Book of God, there are *zahr*, *baṭn*, *ḥadd* and *maṭla' / muṭṭala'*."<sup>53</sup> Tustarī and Sulamī (through the statement he ascribes to 'Alī) also present the four notions as the four meanings of the Qur'anic verses without paying attention to the line of separation drawn by the hadith between these notions. However, Muḥāsibī does not assign any significant place to *ḥadd* and *maṭla' / muṭṭala'* because he discards this pair from his exegetical methodology by defining the former as an indicator of the limit of understanding and the latter as an unlawful attempt at interpretation. Although Tustarī speaks of a fourfold sense, as Böwering observes, he differentiates only a twofold meaning that is a literal and hidden sense in practice, and he combines *zahr* and *ḥadd* on the one hand, and *baṭn* and *maṭla' / muṭṭala'* on the other.<sup>54</sup> According to Böwering, Ja'far al-Ṣādiq and other Sufis who make mention of the four meanings

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52 See Gerhard Böwering, *The Mystical Vision*, 140.

53 Muḥāsibī, *Fahm al-Qur'ān*, 328; Ghazzālī, *Mishkāt al-anwār*, 73; Ghazzālī, *Iḥyā' ulūm al-dīn*, 1:289.

54 Böwering, *The Mystical Vision*, 141; Gerhard Böwering, "Scriptural Senses in Medieval Sūfī Qur'ān Exegesis," in *With Reverence for the Word: Medieval Scriptural Exegesis in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam*, ed. Jane Dammen McAuliffe, Barry D. Walfish, and Joseph W. Goering (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 352.

in their Qur'anic exegesis also do not employ this fourfold pattern in their works. He states, "In fact, there is not a single Qur'anic verse or keynote to which the fourfold pattern has been applied in a rigorous fashion."<sup>55</sup> Böwering's conclusion may be true for the early Sufi commentators, such as Ja'far, Tustarī, and Sulamī, but Fanārī significantly uses the notions of the hadith and develops a fourfold system in his commentary, following Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī.

Third, we observe a semantic evolution in the chronology of the interpretations of the hadith. In the beginning, the hadith was understood as a simple description of the Qur'anic text as having both apparent and non-apparent meanings. However, the non-apparent aspect did not refer to exegesis by reason or by mystical knowledge. As we saw in 'Abdullāh ibn al-Mubārak's statement, the early scholars were worried about attempts to interpret the Qur'an that were not founded on tradition. In later comments, *ta'wīl* emerged as the meaning of *batn*. Sufis, of course, understood *ta'wīl* as esoteric interpretation by mystical knowledge. Suhrawardī took a further step by associating hadith with mystical experience of witnessing God through the Qur'anic text. In Ibn al-'Arabī's writings, the hadith became the direct and concise expression of his thought, probably because the words of the hadith sound favorable for Ibn al-'Arabī, who adopted a hierarchy of spirituality and of ontology between visible and invisible worlds.

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<sup>55</sup> Böwering, "Scriptural Senses," 352.

## CHAPTER IV

*[Divine speech] emanates from the level of the Real (Ḥaqq) and reaches us as colored by the effect of the five essential ontological presences.*

Şadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī

### NATURE OF DIVINE SPEECH (KALĀM)

The nature of divine speech (*kalām*) was the subject of one of the most important debates on Islamic theology that occupied the early centuries of Islamic history. Fanārī discusses the subject in the *Muqaddima* of the *‘Ayn al-a‘yān*, especially in the consecutive sections he reserves for the concepts of *wahy* (revelation), *inzāl* (the bringing down of the Qur’an) and *i‘jāz al-Qur’ān* (the miraculousness of the Qur’an). In these sections, Fanārī’s primary concern is the ontology of divine speech; he focuses on how it transforms into different forms. Thus, he makes an effort to reinforce the idea that the Qur’an exists in a hierarchy of ontological stages. In this chapter, first I summarize the opinions of the Islamic schools regarding divine speech because it is important to know them to understand where Fanārī stands. God’s speech as a theological problem is, of course, a huge subject. Therefore, I will confine myself to raising some specific points that can help us understand what Fanārī is trying to do in his work. Then, I show how Fanārī imagines ontological levels in divine speech, in light of Qūnawī, who also theorizes about similar levels in existence. In their discussion, the hadith of Z̤BḤM plays a central role. I also discuss how Fanārī supports the idea of ontological levels in divine speech when explaining the Qur’anic concepts of *wahy*, *inzāl*, and *i‘jāz*.

## Divine Speech in Islamic Schools

There are many verses in the Qur'an that state that God spoke to his creatures, including human prophets. Most of these verses can be interpreted as not necessarily indicating a direct conversation, but some of them, such as Q. 4:164<sup>1</sup> and Q. 7:143,<sup>2</sup> have been understood as explicitly stating that God spoke directly to Moses; however, how this address was realized has been interpreted differently. Q. 42:51<sup>3</sup> also takes on specific importance, explaining how God speaks to humans. Muslim theological schools differed in their understandings of the nature of divine speech during the early centuries of Islamic history. Whether or not God's speech was an eternal divine attribute and, if it was accepted as such, how it manifested in the limited transient world were topics at the center of the debates. The problem of heavenly and earthly forms of the Qur'an, related to the problem of divine speech, was also discussed.<sup>4</sup>

Ja'd b. Dirham (ex. 743) and Jahm b. Safwān (ex. 746) appear in the sources as the first notable theologians who systematically tried to propagate the idea of the createdness of the Qur'an (*khalq al-Qur'ān*).<sup>5</sup> It is reported that Jahm denied that God actually spoke, claiming that

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1 "Of some messengers We have already told thee the story; of others We have not; and to Moses Allah spoke direct [*Wa-kallama Allāh Mūsā taklīma*]."

2 "When Moses came to the place appointed by Us, and his Lord addressed him [*Kallamahū Rabbuhū*]..."

3 "It is not fitting for a man that Allah should speak to him except by inspiration [*wahy*], or from behind a veil, or by the sending of a messenger to reveal, with Allah's permission, what Allah wills: for He is Most High, Most Wise."

4 For the summary of the opinions of the Islamic theological schools on the divine speech, see Arthur S. Tritton, "The Speech of God," *Studia Islamica* 36 (1972): 5-22; Louis Gardet, "Kalam," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. 2d ed. Brill Online. [www.brillonline.com]; Margaretha T. Heemskerk, "Speech," in *Encyclopaedia of the Qur'an*. [www.brillonline.com]. For a detailed analysis of the theological debates on divine speech and the Qur'an, see Harry Austryn Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), 235-303.

5 We read the ideas attributed to Jahm and his alleged theological school, called Jahmiyya, from works by traditionalist opponents, such as Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal's *al-Radd 'alā al-Zanādiqa wa-l-Jahmiyya* and Dārimī's *Kitāb al-Radd 'alā al-Jahmiyya*, and by the Sunni theologians, such as Ash'arī's *Maqālāt* and *al-Ibāna*. On Jahm b. Safwān, see Montgomery Watt, "Djahm b. Safwan," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. 2d ed. Brill Online [www.brillonline.com]. For Jahmiyya, see Montgomery Watt, "Djahmiyya," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. 2d ed. Brill Online [www.brillonline.com]. For a discussion of the ideas attributed to Jahm, see Wilferd Madelung, "The Origins of the Controversy Concerning the Creation of the Qur'an," in *Religious Schools and Sects in Medieval Islam*

He communicated through the sound He created outside Himself. God communicated to Moses in this way by creating the sound of talk.<sup>6</sup> The motivation of the doctrine presented by Jahm is obvious, according to Madelung: “God, being different from his creation in every respect, cannot be described with any of the attributes that apply to man.”<sup>7</sup> The Jahmiyya was portrayed in the sources as a theological group that denied the existence of eternal divine attributes, including speech.<sup>8</sup>

The Mu‘tazilites also denied the existence of an eternal attribute of speech subsisting in God and believed that God speaks by creating speech outside.<sup>9</sup> The Mu‘tazilites’ assertions regarding the createdness of the Qur’an was due to their primary doctrine of negation of the “eternal divine attributes of the Essence.”<sup>10</sup> They insisted on denying such eternal attributes in order to rule out the conclusion that there are multiple eternal entities besides God’s essence, which would damage the most important Islamic teaching, which is the unity of God (*tawhīd*). Mu‘tazilite theologians tried to explain God’s qualities and acts without approving the existence of any distinct attribute in Him; they said, “God is knowing, powerful, living through Himself (*bi-naḥsihī*), and not through a knowledge, a power and a life.”<sup>11</sup> This principle results in a denial

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(London: Variorum Reprints, 1985); Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, 264-267.

6 Madelung, “The Origins.”

7 Ibid. According to Wolfson, the early theological debates on the divine attributes among Muslims were caused by the controversy between Muslims and Christians over the Trinity doctrine. See: Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, 235-244.

8 Watt, “Djahmiyya.”

9 Ash‘arī reports many opinions attributed to the Mu‘tazilī theologians. According to these reports, all the theologians of this school agree on the createdness of the divine speech but disagree on the details. See Abū al-Ḥasan ‘Alī ibn Ismā‘īl al-Ash‘arī, *Kitāb Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn wa-ikhtilāf al-muṣallīn* (Vīsbādin: Dār al-Nashr Frānz Shtāyṅir, 1963), 191-194.

10 For brief explanations of the Mu‘tazila’s theses, see Daniel Gimaret, “Mu‘tazila,” in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. 2d ed. Brill Online [www.brillonline.com].

11 Ibid.

of divine speech as an eternal attribute and an acceptance of the view that the Qur'an had been created.<sup>12</sup> According to al-Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār (d. 1025), the great Mu'tazilī theologian,<sup>13</sup> speech is one of God's acts that God generates not in Himself, but outside. Since it is generated and not subsisting with God, it is not eternal. Spoken words or written text are "not speech, but only a sign of speech once spoken."<sup>14</sup> Thus, God communicates through speech He creates in an earthly substrate, as it occurred when God spoke to Moses from the burning bush.<sup>15</sup>

Early traditionalist 'ulamā' and traditionists (*muḥaddithūn*) were opposed to these ideas declared by the Mu'tazila and the so-called Jahmiyya. Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 855), who rigorously refused the Jahmite and Mu'tazilite theses and wrote refutations against them, was the champion of the traditionalist opposition.<sup>16</sup> Madelung argues that the traditionalist view evolved over time.<sup>17</sup> In the beginning, they denied the view that the Qur'an was created, but they did not generally mention the eternity of the Qur'an.<sup>18</sup> Some placed the Qur'an between God and

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12 This teaching became the official policy during the reign of the Abbasid caliph al-Ma'mūn (r. 813-833) and was applied by his two successors. During this period, called the *Miḥna* (inquisition, trial or persecution), scholars were tested and forced to accept the doctrine of the "created Qur'an." See: Martin Hinds, "Miḥna," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. 2d ed. Brill Online [www.brillonline.com].

13 For an extensive survey and detailed analysis of 'Abd al-Jabbar's speculative theology, see J.R.T.M. Peters, *God's Created Speech: A Study in the Speculative Theology of the Mu'tazilī Qāḍī l-Quḍāt Abū l-Ḥasan 'Abd al-Jabbār bn Aḥmad al-Ḥamadānī* (Leiden: Brill, 1976).

14 Ibid., 417. Another theological sect known as the Karrāmiyya also believed that the attribute of speech is not eternal but, unlike the Mu'tazila, they held that God produces the speech within Himself. See Gardet, "Kalam." They affirmed the idea that God is subject to uneternal accidents, including willing and speaking. See Clifford E. Bosworth, "Karramiyya," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. 2d ed. Brill Online [www.brillonline.com].

15 Josef Van Ess, "Verbal Inspiration?" in *The Qur'an as Text*, ed. Stefan Wild (Leiden; New York: E.J. Brill, 1996), 181.

16 Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal was portrayed in the Sunni sources as one of the scholars who resisted the official order to accept the doctrine of the creation of the Qur'an during the *Miḥna* period. He was imprisoned due to his refusal. See Henri Laoust, "Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. 2d ed. Brill Online [www.brillonline.com].

17 Madelung states, "The traditional denial that the Koran was created, rather than spoken, by God thus was turned into a positive thesis, that of the eternity of the Koran." Madelung, "The Origins."

18 The traditionalist position regarding the eternity of the Qur'an during the pro-*Miḥna* period is ambiguous. Opinions both affirming and denying the eternity of the Qur'an are reported in the sources. See Madelung, "The Origins."

creation by declaring that the Qur'an was neither the Creator nor creation. However, the traditional standpoint turned, in time, into the adoption of the doctrine of "eternal speech" and the "uncreated Qur'an."<sup>19</sup> That the early discussions about the nature of the Qur'an referred neither to the *Lawḥ mahfūz* (the preserved tablet) nor the *Umm al-kitāb* (the heavenly Scripture) supports this thesis. Although what Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal thought about the uncreatedness of the pronunciation of the Qur'an is not clear, as contradictory statements were attributed to him, his followers became certain that the Prophet received "verbal inspiration"; namely, the exact words of God came down on him.<sup>20</sup> They went even further, saying the pronunciation (*lafz*) of the Qur'an is uncreated.<sup>21</sup> Thus the Ḥanbalīs saw no problem maintaining that God's eternal speech is composite in nature, containing words and sound,<sup>22</sup> in spite of the Sunni theologians, who required that the speech be simple and indivisible. Later, the Ḥanbalī Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) argued that divine speech was directed by the divine will, so that God spoke whenever He wanted to speak and in whatever language He wanted to use.<sup>23</sup> According to him, the Arabic expression of the Qur'an is the exact words of God when recited, but the voice belongs to the reciter and is created. It is heresy to deny that God speaks using words and sound. Ibn Taymiyya emphasizes that affirming the uncreatedness of the Qur'an does not mean accepting its eternity. In other words, since God spoke the Qur'an, it is not created; however, it is not eternal either,

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19 Ibid.

20 Ess, "Verbal Inspiration?", 183. Wolfson calls this view the "*inlibration*" of pre-existent divine speech, drawing an analogy to the Christian controversy over the beliefs of Christ's incarnation and His two natures, man and divine. See Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, 246.

21 Ess, "Verbal Inspiration?", 184.

22 Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, 248-254.

23 For a summary of Ibn Taymiyya's thoughts regarding divine speech, see Tritton, "The Speech of God." For an analysis of them, see Henri Laoust, *Essai sur les doctrines sociales et politiques de Taḳī-d-Dīn Aḥmad B. Taimīya*, (Cairo: 1939); Madelung, "The Origins."

because it was spoken in time.<sup>24</sup> As regards the last detail, Ibn Taymiyya seems to try to solve the problem of accepting the eternity of composite things such as words or sound, which is a widespread criticism raised against the Ḥanbalīs.<sup>25</sup>

Sunni theologians generally position themselves between the Mu‘tazila and the Ḥanbalīs by affirming two forms of God’s speech: one is eternal and the other is the created expression of eternal speech. They use various terms to denote the eternal heavenly form, such as *al-ma‘nā qāim bi-l-Dhāt* (the entity that subsists with God’s essence), *al-kalām al-qadīm* (the eternal speech), *al-Qur’ān al-qadīm* (the eternal Qur’an), and *al-kalām al-nafsī* (the inner speech). In this way, they go counter to the Mu‘tazila, which disapproves of the existence of any eternal entity besides God’s essence. ‘Abdullāh ibn Kullāb (d. 854), who is considered a forerunner of Ash‘arī, describes God’s speech as His divine attribute, which inheres in Him, one, simple and indivisible.<sup>26</sup> Subsequent Sunni theologians agree with him on this description of the speech as a divine attribute. They also distinguish themselves from the Ḥanbalī standpoint by accepting the expression of the Qur’an as created. Ibn Kullāb taught that the text of the Qur’an is not uncreated like its heavenly prototype, “rather it is only an expression (*‘ibāra*) of God’s speech, its created phonetical form.”<sup>27</sup> Like Ibn Kullāb, prominent Māturīdī and Ash‘arī scholars such as Abū al-

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24 Madelung, “The Origins.”

25 For example, Taftāzānī states in his commentary on *al-‘Aqāid al-Nasafīyya*, “It should not be said that the Qur’an (the book) is uncreated in order not to call to mind that (the book) formed by sound and words is eternal, just as the Ḥanbalīs assert because of their ignorance or obstinacy.” Mas‘ūd ibn ‘Umar al-Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ al-‘Aqā'id al-Nasafīyya fī uṣūl al-dīn wa-‘ilm al-kalām* (Dimashq: Wizārat al-Thaqāfa wa-l-Irshād al-Qawmī, 1974), 56.

26 Tritton, “The Speech of God.” For an analysis of the statements attributed to Ibn Kullāb, see Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, 248-251.

27 Ess, “Verbal Inspiration?”, 182.

Yusr al-Bazdawī (d. 1100), Abū Muṭī‘ Makhūl al-Nasafī (d. 930), and Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālī (d. 1111) did not affirm the uncreatedness of expression (*lafẓ*).<sup>28</sup>

The idea of the pre-existence of the Qur’an before the Creation, on which Muslims have a consensus, is based on several verses from the Qur’an. Q. 56:77-78 states, “This is indeed a Qur’an Most Honorable, in Book well-guarded (*Kitāb maknūn*).” Q. 43:3-4 states, “We have made it a Qur’an in Arabic, that ye may be able to understand (and learn wisdom). And verily, it is in the Mother of the Book (*Umm al-Kitāb*), in Our Presence, high (in dignity), full of wisdom.” “The well-guarded Book” and “the Mother of the Book” have generally been called the *Lawḥ mahfūz* in the Islamic religious vocabulary, which is also mentioned in the Qur’an, 85:22: “Nay, this is a Glorious Qur’an, (Inscribed) in a Tablet Preserved (*Lawḥ mahfūz*)!” The Preserved Tablet is believed to have contained the pre-existing heavenly copy of the Qur’an and the record of all the divine predestinations. Some hadiths describe the Tablet as creation.<sup>29</sup>

There are different opinions on whether the pre-existent heavenly copy of the Qur’an in the *Lawḥ* is created or uncreated. Generally, the Ḥanbalīs and their followers among the Sunni theologians believe in its uncreatedness. However, the belief that God created His speech on the *Lawḥ mahfūz* seems to be a prevalent idea among the Mu‘tazilī theologians.<sup>30</sup> Ash‘arī attributes the idea of the created Qur’an in the *Lawḥ* to Ja‘far b. Ḥarb (d. 850), Ja‘far b. Mubashshir (d.

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28 Ibid., 185. Wolfson shows that Ash‘arī’s opinion regarding the eternity of the expressions of the Qur’an is ambiguous. According to his statements in *al-Ibāna*, Ash‘arī appears to have thought like Ibn Ḥanbal on this issue. However, according to the statements attributed to him by Shahrastānī, Ash‘arī sounds just like Ibn Kullāb. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, 254-257.

29 For the *Lawḥ mahfūz*, see Arent J. Wensinck and Clifford E. Bosworth, “Lawḥ,” in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. 2d ed. Brill Online [www.brillonline.com]. Wolfson argues that the belief in a pre-existent but created Qur’an was revised to a belief in the pre-existent uncreated Qur’an. He assumes that the pre-existent created Qur’an was modeled after the Jewish belief in the pre-existent created Torah. He also assumes that this early version of the Muslim view was not initially considered heretical. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, 238-241 and 264-265.

30 Some of them, such as Abū Ishāq al-Nazzām (d. 835-845) and Mu‘ammar ibn ‘Abbād (d. 830), are reported to have believed that God created His word outside the *Lawḥ*. See Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, 274-278.

848-9), and Abū al-Hudhayl al-‘Allāf (d. ca. 841), early leading theologians.<sup>31</sup> Later Mu‘tazilī scholars such as al-Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār<sup>32</sup> and Maḥmūd b. ‘Umar al-Zamakhsharī (d. 1144)<sup>33</sup> also adopted the same idea. The Sunni theologians are generally silent about the eternity of the pre-existent Qur’an in the *Lawḥ*,<sup>34</sup> but Abū al-Yusr al-Bazdawī, a prominent Māturīdī *mutakallim*, concludes that the text of the Qur’an is an expression of the eternal divine speech “created” by God in the *Lawḥ mahfūz*, or in the Angel.<sup>35</sup> Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1209), the celebrated theologian from the Ash‘ariyya, also accepts the idea that God communicates his will by creating “sound” in a locus outside Himself or by writing in the *Lawḥ*.<sup>36</sup> In this sense, the Sunni theologians from the Schools of Ash‘ariyya and Māturīdiyya come closer to the Mu‘tazila by accepting the idea that God creates something to express His speech outside, although they depart from them by affirming the existence of eternal divine attribute of speech.

All of these assertions regarding divine speech resulted in different understandings of how Qur’anic revelation was sent down. The Qur’an uses the term *inzāl* in many verses to denote

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31 Ash‘arī, *Kitāb Maqālāt*, 597-600.

32 Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār uses the consensus of Muslims regarding the existence of the heavenly form of the Qur’an in the *Lawḥ* to justify the Mu‘tazilī doctrine of the creation of the Qur’an. See ‘Abd al-Jabbār ibn Aḥmad al-Asadābādī, *al-Muḥīṭ bi-l-taklīf* ([al-Qāhira]: al-Dār al-Miṣriyya li-l-ta’līf wa-l-tarjama, 1965), 324-325. See also Peters, *God’s Created Speech*, 394.

33 Zamakhsharī states, “[God speaks] by creating the speech that sounds in some physical objects or He creates it as a writing in the *Lawḥ*.” See Maḥmūd ibn ‘Umar al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf ‘an ḥaqā’iq ghawāmiḍ al-tanzīl wa-‘uyūn al-aqāwīl fī wujūh al-ta’wīl*, (al-Riyāḍ: Maktabat al-‘Ubaykān, 1998), 2:501.

34 Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, 288.

35 Abū al-Yusr Muḥammad al-Bazdawī, *Uṣūl al-Dīn* (al-Qāhira: al-Maktabat al-Azhariyya li-l-turāth: 2003), 68.

36 Rāzī mentions three possibilities when he explains how the Angel seizes the eternal speech of God: (1) God creates the abilities of “hearing” (*sam‘*) and “verbalizing” (*‘ibāra*) in the Angel; (2) God creates a writing that expresses the speech in the *Lawḥ*, so that the Angel reads and memorizes it; or (3) God creates a sound that expresses speech in certain physical objects, so that the Angel grasps it. See Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ‘Umar al-Rāzī, *Maḥāṣin al-ghayb* (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyya, 2000), 2:30. In addition, see Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ‘Umar al-Rāzī, *Asās al-taqdīs* (Miṣr: Maṭba‘at Kurdistān al-‘ilmiyya, 1328 [1910]), 130. Goldziher, who argues that the Mu‘tazila influenced Rāzī in certain respects, presents this as an example for his argument. See Ignác Goldziher, “Aus Der Theologie Des Fachr Al-Din Al-Razi,” *Der Islam: Zeitschrift Für Geschichte Und Kultur Des Islamischen Orients* 3 (1912): 213.

the descension of revelation.<sup>37</sup> Two verses among them shaped the Sunni understanding regarding the phases of *inzāl*: Q. 2:185 states that the Qur’an was sent down (*unzila*) in the month of Ramadan. Q. 97:1 specifies the day when the Qur’an was revealed, saying, “We have indeed revealed this (Message) in the Night of Power (*Laylat al-Qadr*).” Having consensus on the fact that the Night of Power is in the month of Ramadan,<sup>38</sup> Muslims have generally taken these two verses to refer to the same reality. However, scholars presented different opinions on how this *inzāl* came true at this specific time. Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī (d. 1392) summarizes the ideas in his famous *al-Burhān fī ‘ulūm al-Qur’ān*, according to which the majority of Sunni scholars believe that the Qur’an was first sent down to the worldly heaven (*samā’ al-dunyā*) entire in the *Laylat al-Qadr*, and then its smaller portions were revealed to the Prophet during the twenty odd years of his prophethood. Others assert that once a year during the twenty odd years, a part of the Qur’an was sent down to the worldly heaven in the *Laylat al-Qadr*. During each year, smaller parts of that yearly Qur’anic share were revealed to the Prophet, as required by the occasion. In addition, other scholars think that revelation was initiated in the *Laylat al-Qadr* and then continued to come down sporadically.<sup>39</sup>

Another part of the problem is how the revelation was transferred to the Prophet, either from the *Lawḥ mahfūz* or from the worldly heaven. What is clear from the Qur’anic exposition is that the Angel functioned as an intermediary conveying the divine revelation, and the whole Muslim *umma* accepts the agency of the Angel in the process. According to the Mu‘tazila, the

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37 For the semantic analysis of the terms *inzāl*, *nuzūl* and *tanzīl*, see: Stefan Wild, “We Have Sent Down to Thee the Book with the Truth: Spatial and Temporal Implications of the Qur’anic Concepts of *Nuzūl*, *Tanzīl*, and *Inzāl*,” in *The Qur’an as Text*, ed. Stefan Wild, (Leiden; New York: E.J. Brill, 199), 137-153.

38 The Qur’an is silent about what night the *Laylat al-Qadr* is but there are hadiths telling that it is found in the Month of Ramadan.

39 Badr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ‘Abdullāh al-Zarkashī, *al-Burhān fī ‘ulūm al-Qur’ān* ([al-Qāhira]: Dār Iḥyā’ al-kutub al-‘Arabiyya, 1957-1958), 1:228-229.

word that the Angel conveyed was “created in him during the act of revelation.”<sup>40</sup> However, Sunni scholars hold different opinions, which Zarkashī and Suyūṭī (d. 1505) summarize as follows:<sup>41</sup> (1) The Angel Gabriel brought down both the meaning (*ma‘nā*) and the words. This means that he carried the pre-existent form (*ma‘nā*) that is equivalent to the actual words of the Qur’an. According to this scenario, the Angel simply memorized the Qur’an from the *Lawḥ mahfūz* and delivered it to the Prophet; (2) The Angel received only the *ma‘nā*, and knowing what it corresponded to in the Arabic language, verbalized this meaning in Arabic and conveyed it to the Prophet; (3) The Angel delivered only the *ma‘nā*, and the Prophet verbalized it in Arabic.

The first opinion, to the effect that what came into existence in the *Lawḥ* is identical to what the Prophet recited as the Qur’an, refers to the Ḥanbalī view that the Angel brought down God’s exact words. In this sense, the reciter pronounced exactly what God pronounced in eternity. The Ash’arī followers of Ibn Kullāb adopt the second opinion<sup>42</sup> and the same view is attributed to Māturīdī who asserts that “God gave His commands to Gabriel in mental speech and he passed them on to Muḥammad in Arabic.”<sup>43</sup> The third opinion is found in the view that belongs to Ibn Kullāb, who is said to have believed that the expressions of the Qur’an were created by the recital.<sup>44</sup> Najm al-Dīn al-Nasafī (d. 1142) from the Māturīdiyya and his commentator, Mas‘ūd b. ‘Umar Sa‘d al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 1390) also agree with this view.<sup>45</sup>

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40 Ess, “Verbal Inspiration?”, 181.

41 Zarkashī, *al-Burhān fī ‘ulūm al-Qur’ān*, 1:229-230; Suyūṭī, *al-Itqān fī ‘ulūm al-Qur’ān*, 1:157-158.

42 Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, 290.

43 Tritton, “The Speech of God.”

44 Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, 249-250.

45 Ibid., 290.

The second and the third opinions can be understood as suggesting that wording of the Qur'an belongs to either the Angel or the Prophet, but I think their primary aim is to emphasize the difference between the forms of divine speech, one in the *Lawh* and one after it, because the Angel and the Prophet are depicted here as “mediators,” converting the meaning into the words rather than freely producing the words.

The idea of the Prophet's receiving a revelation in the form of a “non-verbalized entity” carried by an Angel, who is a “non-human spiritual being,” also raises another problem: How is it possible for a human prophet to encounter an angel to receive something alien to human nature? Some suggest the following solution:

[In the process of] coming down [of the revelation] are there two ways: First, the Prophet is stripped of his human form, [acquires] an angelic form and receives [the revelation] from Gabriel. Second, the Angel transforms into a human form [when conveying the revelation] and the Prophet receives. The first way is more difficult [on the Prophet].<sup>46</sup>

### **Divine Speech in Fanārī**

Fanārī was evidently well acquainted with the medieval thinking regarding divine speech discussed above, as we find many references to it in the *'Ayn*. It is also obvious that he followed Qūnawī's view on the subject, explaining the process of revelation as a gradual manifestation of God through the divine name *Mutakallim* (Speaker). Ibn al-'Arabī extensively talks about the ontological levels of existence (*marātib al-wujūd*) in his works, but he does not present a systematic doctrine. Chittick asserts that Qūnawī is the first Akbarian writer to systematize the ontological levels.<sup>47</sup> In his system, there are “five presences”: divine, spiritual, imaginal, sensory,

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46 Zarkashī, *al-Burhān fī 'ulūm al-Qur'ān*, 1:229. Suyūfī, *al-Itqān fī 'ulūm al-Qur'ān*, 1:156.

47 William C. Chittick, “The five divine presences: From al-Qūnawī to al-Qaysarī,” *The Muslim World* 72 (1982): 109.

and all-comprehensive human levels.<sup>48</sup> Qūnawī imagines similar ontological levels in the divine speech, drawing on the hadith of Z̤BḤM. As we discussed earlier in Chapter 2, Ibn al-‘Arabī uses the hadith of Z̤BḤM to express his ideas regarding the ontology of existence, but neither links it to the ontological levels of divine speech nor develops an exegetical system for the notions mentioned in the hadith. These two tasks fell to Qūnawī. Fanārī provides a further explanation of Qūnawī, with obvious efforts to situate the latter’s philosophical-sounding ideas in mainstream Islamic scholarship. Therefore, Fanārī’s originality lies in the fact that he discusses the subject in the context of the *‘ulūm al-Qur’ān* (the Qur’anic sciences).

*The hadith of Z̤BḤM and the ontology of divine speech*

Qūnawī presents the systematic view of the Akbariyya on divine speech and its revelation in his *I’jāz al-bayān*, a partial Qur’anic commentary on the *al-Fātiḥa* chapter. As a matter of fact, the most outstanding feature of the *I’jāz al-bayān* is that the commentary is centered on the ontological theories of the school and especially on the five ontological levels (*al-ḥaḍarāt al-khams*). He explicitly states,

As one of the primary comprehensive divine attributes, which encapsulate all the levels of clarity (*marātib al-īdāḥ wa-l-iḥṣāḥ*), divine speech emanates (*ṣadara*) from the presence of the Real (*Ḥaqq*) and reaches us as colored (*munṣabighan*) by the effect (*ḥukm*) of the five essential presences (*al-ḥaḍarāt al-khams al-aṣliyya*) [i.e., it traverses the five ontological levels].<sup>49</sup>

Qūnawī then explains these levels through the notions of the hadith of Z̤BḤM. *Zahr* represents the furthest point in the manifestation (*zuhūr*) of divine speech, which corresponds to sensible

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48 Ibid., 115.

49 Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ishāq al-Qūnawī, *I’jāz al-bayān fī ta’wīl Umm al-Qur’ān*, ed. ‘Aṭā, ‘Abd al-Qādir Aḥmad, ([al-Qāhira]: Dār al-Kutub al-ḥadītha [1969]), 377-378.

forms (*al-ṣuwar al-mahsūsa*) in existence. He seems to mean that *zahr* is the physical form of divine speech that we call the Qur'an. Divine speech also has another and deeper form that resembles heavenly spirits (*al-arwāḥ al-qudsiyya*), which are hidden from the eyes. Qūnawī understands *baṭn* as indicating this level. *Ḥadd* is the intervening level, both between *zahr* and *baṭn* and between *baṭn* and *maṭla' /muṭṭala'*. It pertains to the intervening world (*'ālam al-mithāl*), which distinguishes between the visible and invisible worlds. *Maṭla' /muṭṭala'* refers to the level in which the other three levels have their origin. This is the level of the divine names,<sup>50</sup> because the names are the essence of everything. According to Qūnawī, all these levels, in fact, are stages where the divine attribute of speech (*kalām*) and the divine name of the Speaker (*Mutakallim*) manifest. In other words, these levels are different forms of the same reality. Qūnawī also coins another word inspired by the hadith to include this ultimate reality and to culminate number of the ontological levels: *mā ba'da al-muṭṭala'* (what is beyond transcendency).<sup>51</sup> This refers to the attribute of divine speech, which is beyond the divine names. Qūnawī understands this divine speech as having no being apart from the divine essence (*dhāt*), which means that the divine attribute of *kalām* is the same, in a sense, as the essence.<sup>52</sup> Fanārī explains the term *mā ba'da al-muṭṭala'* as pertinent to the first manifestation of the divine essence.<sup>53</sup> Considering what Qūnawī and Fanārī said together, we can conclude that *mā ba'da al-muṭṭala'* refers to the first ontological level that differentiated from the essence, not to the absolute divine oneness. As a matter of fact, the absolute oneness is not the subject of human knowledge in Akbarī metaphysics.

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 378.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 498.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 378.

<sup>53</sup> Fanārī, *'Ayn*, 10.

In another place, Qūnawī again mentions the stages that divine speech passes through. Here, we notice three stages: (a) divine essence, called *ghayb* (unknown), (b) divine knowledge (the “level of divine names,” or “the Cloud,” or “the divine breath”), (c) and the one who is spoken to.

Since all manifestations of names, attributes and others, are veils on their reality (*‘aṣl*), which neither manifests nor becomes distinguishable except by means of a determiner (*mu‘ayyin*), speech (*kalām*) as an attribute is also a veil on the Speaker (*Mutakallim*) with regard to that it is an outcome (*nisbat*) of His divine knowledge (*‘ilmihī al-dhātī*). Speech attributed to God is the divine manifestation (*tajallī*) from His unknown [realm] (*ghaybihī*), then from the presence of the divine knowledge in the Cloud (*‘amā’*), which is the breath of All-Compassionate (*al-nafas al-Raḥmānī*) and the station (*manzil*) where other levels and realities appear (*ta‘ayyun*). The effect (*ḥukm*) of this manifestation appears through the [divine] deliberate inclination (*al-tawajjuh al-irādī*) to creating (*ijād*) or speaking (*khiṭāb*)... then the aforementioned effect passes from the aforesaid station of the breath of God which is the level of divine names to the one spoken to (*mukhāṭab*) by means of a deliberate assigning and a natural ability of receiving.<sup>54</sup>

Thus, the Qur’an emerges from the divine attribute of speech (*kalām*) and follows from the divine name, Speaker (*Mutakallim*), just as all existence unfolds from God’s names and attributes. However, this process is initiated by God’s deliberate action, which is an inclination (*tawajjuh*) that is willed (*irādī*) rather than an action without cause or reason. It seems that, with this detail, Qūnawī hopes to avoid falling into the position of the philosophers who see existence as a causeless overflowing of the Divine. As a result, the words of the Qur’an we recite are only the manifestation of divine speech at the level of the perceptible world.<sup>55</sup>

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54 Qūnawī, *I’jāz al-bayān*, 178.

55 Ibid., 104.

*The problem of divine speech/human language*

Fanārī contributes to the subject by commenting on Qūnawī and quoting and discussing the opinions of other non-Sufī classical authorities, such as Baghawī (d. 1117), Zamakhsharī (d. 1144), al-Qāḍī ‘Iyāḍ (d. 1149), Bayḍāwī (d. 1286), etc. It is notable that he tries to find a ground where he can position the Akbarī theory of Qur’anic ontology within the mainstream of Sunni theology. This intention is obvious, for example, in his discussion of *wahy* (revelation) in the *‘Ayn*.

Fanārī first cites Zamakhsharī’s comments on Q. 42:51, the verse that explains the means of communication God uses with humans, saying, “It is not fitting for a man that Allah should speak to him except by inspiration [*wahy*], or from behind a veil, or by the sending of a messenger to reveal, with Allah’s permission, what Allah wills: for He is Most High, Most Wise.” Zamakhsharī discerns from the verse three sorts of divine communication: (a) *Wahy*, (b) speaking from behind a veil (*min warā’ hijāb*), and (c) sending the message via messengers (*irsāl al-rasūl*).<sup>56</sup> Defining *wahy* as “secret speech done abruptly” (*kalām khafiyy fī sur‘a*),<sup>57</sup> he understands this first type as “the inspiration (*ilhām*) and putting [something] in the heart [when awake] or when sleeping as He (God) inspired Moses’ mother and Abraham to sacrifice his child.”<sup>58</sup> The second type (i.e., *min warā’ hijāb*) means that God “makes His speech heard by **creating** it [emphasis is mine] in some objects without that the hearer sees the speaker; for (God)

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<sup>56</sup> Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, 5:421.

<sup>57</sup> *Sur‘a* seems to mean an untimeless transfer or occurrence of revelation. *Khafiyy* also seems to imply that inspiration occurs without an intermediary, such as sounds or words. Fanārī agrees with this definition of *wahy*, which was mentioned by Zamakhsharī and repeated by Bayḍāwī.

<sup>58</sup> Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, 5:421.

Himself cannot be seen.”<sup>59</sup> This resembles a king speaking from behind a curtain, whose voice is heard but whose body is not seen. In this way, God speaks to the angels and spoke to Moses. The third way (i.e., *irsāl al-rasūl*) is God’s communicating His message by sending an angel; divine revelation came to all the prophets in this way, except Moses’ direct conversation with God. “Sending messengers” may also mean that God appoints prophets among the people, who will speak to them in their own language. So the first interpretation of *irsāl al-rasūl* speaks of God’s inspiration to the prophets by the agency of the angel; the second interpretation is that God speaks to humanity through the mouths of prophets.<sup>60</sup>

There are two important details in Zamakhsharī’s comment. First, he asserts that God creates sound when He speaks directly, as in the burning bush story told in the Scriptures. Second, he takes the Qur’anic expression “behind a veil” as proof of the impossibility of God’s being seen. He reinforces the idea of God’s invisibility through several narratives, which clearly state that neither Moses nor Muḥammad saw God.<sup>61</sup> Thus, following the school he is affiliated with, the Mu‘tazila, Zamakhsharī disconfirms two beliefs here: “God can be seen” and “God’s actual voice can be heard.”

Fanārī criticizes Zamakhsharī, who, in his opinion, understates the experience of Moses told in the Qur’an. According to Fanārī, what Moses heard was God’s voice (*al-muhtaf bih*: an address through calling out with the voice), not something created.<sup>62</sup> The idea that “God’s eternal speech can be heard” is attributed to the Ash‘ariyya.<sup>63</sup> However, Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d.

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59 Ibid.

60 Ibid.

61 Ibid., 5:421-422.

62 Fanārī, *‘Ayn*, 44.

63 Tritton, “The Speech of God.”

944) denies the audibility of God’s speech, a point on which Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī agrees.<sup>64</sup> That Fanārī runs up against Māturīdī on this particular issue, although he is a Ḥanafī, shows that he selects opinions from among the schools in accordance with his Akbarī priorities. In addition, his opposition to Rāzī casts doubt on the claim that he is a follower of the Rāzīan School.

But why does Fanārī so persistently object to the assertion that the divine voice Moses heard (or the divine revelation the prophets received, in a more general sense) was only the “sound” God created? Would the idea of created sound not be favorable for Fanārī, who imagines ontological levels for the Qur’an similar to those of existence so that the created sound would correspond to created things? It should be noted that what Fanārī discusses here is divine speech before it penetrates the human realm and is “forged” into human language not the “spoken” Scripture because it is obviously created according to him because of its compositeness.<sup>65</sup> In order to emphasize the extraordinariness of the voice Moses heard, Fanārī mentions a narrative telling that Moses heard God’s voice from “all directions” (*min jamī‘ jihātih*).<sup>66</sup> He also adds that some commentators interpret “the veil” (*ḥijāb*) as an obstacle that prevents one from comprehending the nature of the speech. It does not mean something that filters divine speech to created sound. Thus, one of Fanārī’s purposes is, obviously, to reject the Mu‘tazilī doctrine of the createdness of divine speech.

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64 According to Māturīdī, God spoke to Moses through a sound He created. Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Māturīdī, *Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-‘Azīm, al-musammā Ta’wīlāt ahl al-Sunna* (Bayrūt: Mu’assasat al-Risāla, 2004), 2:281. Rāzī says that eternal speech cannot be heard in this world (*al-ān*). Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ‘Umar al-Rāzī, *Kitāb Muḥaṣṣal afkār al-mutaqaddimīn wa-l-muta’akhhirīn min al-‘ulamā’ wa-l-mutakallimīn* ([al-Qāhira]: al-Maṭba‘at al-Ḥusayniyya al-Miṣriyya, [1905]), 134-135.

65 Fanārī, *Ayn*, 43.

66 Some commentators, including Zamakhsharī and Bayḍāwī also quote this report. See Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, 2:501; ‘Abdullāh ibn ‘Umar al-Bayḍāwī, *Tafsīr al-Bayḍāwī al-musammā Anwār al-tanzīl wa-asrār al-ta’wīl* (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyya, 2006), 1:358. Bayḍāwī uses this report to reinforce the Ash‘arī view that Moses heard God’s eternal speech.

I believe Fanārī also aims, with his criticism against Zamakhsharī, to object to the common Mu‘tazilī idea that the divine names should not be taken as real, that they are just metaphors.<sup>67</sup> By means of metaphorical interpretation, not only are the Mu‘tazilite theologians able to negate all the divine attributes assigned to God in the Qur’an, but also to reduce divine speech to being a creation. However, for an Akbarī like Fanārī, to take these names as unmetaphorical is critically important. Since Akbarīs explain everything in existence as the manifestation of the divine names, Fanārī could not gloss over the problem he saw in Zamakhsharī’s comment. Therefore, he also wants to emphasize here the Akbarī theory that the multiplicity in existence is caused by diversity of the divine names. Revelation is a manifestation of the divine attribute of “speaking,” not of “creating.” If we take revelation as only something created by God, we would have to ignore the divine name, Speaker. Fanārī underlines this point, stating, “The claim that it [revelation] is the sound God creates in something, besides absurdity with no proof, contradicts God’s being actual ‘Speaker’ (*Mutakallim*).”<sup>68</sup>

Fanārī also criticizes Zamakhsharī for disregarding the direct conversation (*mushāfaha*) between God and the Prophet Muḥammad that is believed to have taken place on the occasion of Muḥammad’s Night Journey (*Mi‘rāj*). He cites several narratives that describe the Prophet’s journey and comments on the Qur’anic chapter *al-Najm* from the famous *al-Shifā’* by al-Qāḍī ‘Iyāḍ, all of which are in consensus that God spoke directly to the Prophet on the Night of

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67 For example, the Mu‘tazilī Ma‘mar (early 3rd/9th century) says that *Mutakallim* means “maker of speech in others.” According to Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā’ī (d. 915-6), the Mu‘tazilī teacher of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash‘arī, *Mutakallim* means “giver of speech.” Al-Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār says both reason and Scripture urge us to understand *Mutakallim* as “maker of speech.” See Tritton, “The Speech of God.”

68 Fanārī, *Ayn*, 44.

*Mi'rāj*.<sup>69</sup> Fanārī also seems to agree with 'Iyād, who understands *wahy* in the verse under discussion as a “face-to-face conversation” (*al-mushāfaha ma'a al-mushāhada*), because this *wahy* should be something other than inspiration “behind a veil” or “through an intermediary,” which are mentioned elsewhere in the verse.<sup>70</sup>

The discussion reaches a critical point after Fanārī reveals his disagreement with the idea that God speaks by creating: What is the nature of divine speech? Since speech consists of sounds that are composite in nature and subject to change (i.e., not eternal), how can it be compatible with God, to whom neither compositeness nor change can be assigned? In answering this question, Fanārī begins by quoting 'Abdullāh b. 'Umar al-Bayḍāwī (d. 1286), the celebrated commentator. Bayḍāwī offers the following distinction: “What issues (*al-ṣādir*) from God is not like what happens from us. The divine revelation is a sudden (*bi-sur'a*) and hidden (*khafiyy*) speech. It is a sudden (*daf'iyy*) appearance (*tamaththul*: taking the form) that is not composite in nature.”<sup>71</sup> Fanārī takes this statement of Bayḍāwī as emphasizing the decisive difference between human speech and divine speech and then underlines the following point: Divine speech is not comparable to human speech. Moreover, there are several types of speech. Fanārī states,<sup>72</sup>

This [revelation] is like the meanings taking the appearance of the imaginal images (*ṣuwar khayāliyya*) that contain parts (*ajzā'*) freed from chronological order (*min ghayr*

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69 al-Qāḍī 'Iyād ibn Mūsā, *al-Shifā' bi-ta'rīf ḥuqūq al-Muṣṭafā* (al-Qāhira: Maṭba'at 'Īsā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1977), 1:267-273.

70 Fanārī, *Ayn*, 44-45; 'Iyād, *al-Shifā'*, 1:268.

71 Fanārī, *Ayn*, 45. Fanārī makes some additions and alterations to Bayḍāwī's statement. This is what Bayḍāwī actually says: “[*Wahy* is] hidden speech. It is perceived through a sudden formation (*tamthīl*). Its nature is not composite of sounds that are subject to constant changes.” Bayḍāwī, *Tafsīr al-Bayḍāwī*, 2:367. Note that the first sentence quoted by Fanārī, “What issues from God is not like what happens from us,” is missing from Bayḍāwī.

72 Fanārī, *Ayn*, 45.

*taqaddum wa-ta'akhhur*).<sup>73</sup> Since the imaginal (*khayālī*) speech is not like the perceptible (*hissī*) one, it would also not be like the mental (*'aqlī*) or the spiritual (*ma'nawī*) speeches for sure.

It is essential to remember here that in Akbarī metaphysics, the imaginal world (*khayāl*) is an ontological level, and it represents an intervening or connecting stage between the levels of existence. Just as the *khayāl*, the stages of “*hissī*,” “*aqlī*,” and “*ma'nawī*” indicate the hierarchical levels of existence discussed earlier. By drawing attention to the differences between them, Fanārī implies that divine revelation passes through a similar sequence of stages until it takes the form of Scriptures in different languages, as in the Arabic Qur'an, for example. Thus, the dilemma of the “One/many,” which is the main concern of the Akbarī ontology, becomes here the dilemma of “God's speech/human language.” The composite nature of Qur'anic language appears in actuality at the level of sensible speech (verbal expression of the Qur'an), while the same composite condition exists potentially at the level of imagination. Likewise, the plurality of creation potentially appears in the intervening stage (*'ālam al-khayāl, barzakh*) between the level of the divine essence (the absolute oneness) and the level of divine attributes.

What is striking in Fanārī's explanations is not his repetition of the analogy between divine revelation and existence, but his juxtaposition of the classical scholarship and Akbarī terminology. By doing this, he seems to imply that his school offers an explanation similar to the opinions in the classical scholarship when trying to understand the characteristics of divine speech. To this end, he quotes Bayḍāwī, with a curious addition that gives a certain direction to the statement. Bayḍāwī clearly does not mean to accept the ontological stages of divine speech, but Fanārī employs his explanations regarding divine revelation in a way that would support

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<sup>73</sup> With the phrase “without any chronological order,” he seems to imply “the potentiality” (not actuality) of these parts.

Fanārī's Akbarī theories. He also closes the section on the nature of divine speech with a quotation from Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfi'ī (d. 820): "Uneternity (*ḥudūth*) is in utterance (*talaffuz*) not in word (*lafz*)."<sup>74</sup> In this way, he carefully wraps up the Akbarī view with the Sunni understanding by mentioning Bayḍāwī at the beginning and Shāfi'ī at the end.

### *The Theory of Connections (Muta'allaqāt)*

In addition to the different types of speech, Fanārī explains the transformation of speech from a non-composite nature to a composite state, drawing on Qūnawī. Accordingly, divine speech is one of the manifestations (*ṣūra*) of divine knowledge (*'ilm*). This manifestation originates with the coincidence of two divine attributes, the will (*irāda*) and the power (*qudra*). Every divine attribute is possessed of absolute singularity (*aḥadiyya*) in respect to its relationship with the divine essence (*dhāt*); however, the attributes accommodate plurality because of the connections they have with existence. Likewise, the compositeness of divine speech is imaginary (*i'tibārī*: theoretical) and is due to the multitude of connections it has. It resembles the state of an eye with a plurality of sight. This plurality is caused by the multitude of objects seen and their connections with the eye.<sup>75</sup> Fanārī implies that the "connection" between God and the receiver, i.e., the human prophets, gives the divine revelation "compositeness." In other words, God's speech is substantiated into language, which human beings can understand, although it was "something else" before. What make the Scripture Syriac, Hebrew or Arabic are these connections with collocutors. Divine speech is eternal and free from the restrictions of time and space, like the

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74 Fanārī, *'Ayn*, 45. Bukhārī also makes the same distinction between *lafz* and *talaffuz* in his *Kitāb Khalq al-af'āl*: "The word (*lafz*) is different from the pronunciation of it (*talaffuz*). For, when you pronounce the word Allah, Allah (Himself) is definitely not your pronunciation." Muḥammad ibn Ismā'īl al-Bukhārī, *Kitāb Khalq al-af'āl* (al-Riyād: Dār al-Ma'ārif al-Su'ūdiyya, 1978), 1:108. This statement got Bukhārī into trouble in locales where the Ḥanbalīs were predominant. See Ess, "Verbal Inspiration?", 184-185.

75 Fanārī, *'Ayn*, 45.

divine essence. However, in respect to the stages it dwells in (*hissī, khayālī, aqlī, and ma'nawī*), it becomes uneternal.<sup>76</sup>

This means that all prophets are connected to the same reality when they receive revelation, namely, the divine attribute of speaking, but the same divine attribute manifests differently in each of them. At this point, one may ask what makes a prophet different from any other prophet. Akbarīs associate the individual differences of the prophets with the effects of the divine names, not with the different socio-historical contexts that shape individual characteristic features, as we would do. Fanārī touches on this subject when discussing the miraculousness of the Qur'an (*i'jāz*). He first cites from Fīrūzābādī (d. 1415), the great lexicographer contemporary with Fanārī, following opinion on the Prophet Muḥammad's miracles: Whatever miracle was given to the other prophets, a similar miracle of every kind was witnessed being performed by the Prophet Muḥammad.<sup>77</sup> According to Fanārī, these miracles of the Prophet are narrated through *āḥād* reports but Qūnawī provides decisive rational arguments (*al-barāhin al-ḥaqīqiyya wa-l-'aqliyya*) to reinforce the reliability of these reports in his book *al-Fukūk*.<sup>78</sup> Qūnawī explains there how each prophet is the locus of manifestation (*mazhar*) for a certain divine name, and his prophethood originates from and depends on God (*al-Ḥaqq*) through that particular divine name. Since the divine names vary in their comprehensiveness and their effects (*ḥukm*) in existence, their places of manifestations (the prophets in this case) differ in their ranks and abilities. There is no difference between the prophets from the standpoint that all of them are

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76 Ibid.

77 Muḥammad ibn Ya'qūb al-Fīrūzābādī, *Baṣā'ir dhawī al-tamyīz fī laṭā'if al-Kitāb al-'Azīz* (al-Qāhira: [1964-...]), 1:67.

78 Fanārī, *'Ayn*, 62. See: Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ishāq al-Qūnawī, *al-Fukūk fī asrār mustanadāt ḥikam al-Fuṣūṣ* (Bayrūt: Kitāb Nāshirūn, 2013), 117-126. Qūnawī's *al-Fukūk* is a commentary on Ibn al-'Arabī's *Fuṣuṣ al-ḥikam*. Fanārī cites extensively from the last section of the *al-Fukūk* on the Prophet Muḥammad.

endowed with prophethood (*risāla*), which relies on the same divine Reality (*al-Ḥaqq*); Q. 2:285<sup>79</sup> points to this fact. However, they are different because of the variety of the divine names through which they are connected to the divine Reality, and Q. 2:253<sup>80</sup> refers to this fact. That is why the miracles given to the prophets are distinct. The more comprehensive divine name a prophet is connected to, the greater the variety of miracles he can perform. For example, while fire, staff, tree, water, stone, etc. were placed in Moses' service when he performed miracles, only the wind was at Hūd's disposal. The Prophet Muḥammad is subject to the manifestations of all the divine names because he is the first manifestation of the divine essence (*al-ta'ayyun al-awwal*). Therefore, he is capable of all types of miracles seen in the other prophets. Since speech (*kalām*), as a form of the divine knowledge (*'ilm*), is the reason for the appearance of everything in existence and affects both this world and the next, the greatest miracle of the Prophet Muḥammad, namely the Qur'an, appeared as the outcome of speech. The universality of the message that Prophet Muḥammad brought, in contrast to locality of other prophetic messages, is also pertinent to his rank, which is the most comprehensively associated with all the divine names.

We understand from Fanārī's summary of Qūnawī that the prophets acquire different natures due to their connections to particular divine names, as the places of the manifestations of these names. In return, the miracles they perform appear distinctive because of their different natures, as does the divine revelation they receive, because it is the manifestation of the name *Mutakallim*. This idea, as a matter of fact, is coherent with the Akbarī ontological theory that the absolute singular being, i.e., the divine essence, manifests itself as multiplicity, first potentially

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79 "We make no distinction between one and another of His messengers..."

80 "Those messengers We endowed with gifts, some above others..."

in the divine realm and then actually in physical existence. Divine names bestow on every thing its distinctive characteristics.

### *Inzāl*

Fanārī discusses the notion of *inzāl* in the ‘*Ayn*. Apparently, he is well informed about the classical discussions of *inzāl*. Since the term concerns the movement of revelation from the Source to the receiver, he focuses on the elements that play a role in the process, namely, the Angel who brings the revelation down and the *Lawḥ mahfūz*, where the heavenly form of the Qur’an is believed to have appeared. As would be expected from Fanārī, who believes that divine speech gradually manifests itself at ontological levels, he argues that God creates his speech neither in the Angel nor in the *Lawḥ*. Here, I will provide some examples to show how Fanārī explains his way of thinking through the details.

Fanārī opens the section he reserves for *inzāl* with a quote from Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥṭānī (d. 1364), a scholar well known for his works on logic. Taḥṭānī summarizes the possible meanings of *inzāl* and how different theological schools have understood it, saying,<sup>81</sup>

The literal meanings of *inzāl* are to set [something or somebody] in a place (*īwā’*) or to move something down. Neither meanings turn out to be true about “speech” (*kalām*) so that it is used in a figurative meaning (*majāz*). Some say, “[The heavenly form of] the Qur’an is an “entity” (*ma’nā*) that exists eternally with the divine essence (*qā’im bi-dhāt Allāh*) and its *inzāl* is God’s creating (*ījād*) the words and the letters that express that meaning in the Tablet preserving God’s decrees (*Lawḥ mahfūz*). Some say, “[The origin of] the Qur’an is the words (*alfāz*) and its *inzāl* is to make them appear (*ithbāt*) in the *Lawḥ mahfūz*.” This definition is proper because of its compatibility with both literal meanings. The meaning of *inzāl* can be to put it in appearance (*ithbāt*) in the worldly

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81 Fanārī quotes the passage from Taḥṭānī’s super-commentary on Zamakhsharī’s *al-Kashshāf*, entitled *Hāshiya ‘alā al-Kashshāf*, which has not been published. See Fanārī, ‘*Ayn*, 46. Suyūṭī also quotes the same passage. See Suyūṭī, *al-Itqān*, 1:165. I translate the passage from Suyūṭī.

heaven (*al-samā' al-dunyā*) after making it appear in the *Lawḥ mahfūz*, which is coherent with the second [literal] meaning. The meaning of *inzāl* of the Scriptures to the prophets is that the Angel spiritually seizes them (*talaqquf rūḥānī*) from God or memorizes them (*hiḏ*) from the *Lawḥ mahfūz*, brings them down and delivers them [to the prophets].

Taḥṭānī emphasizes here that the literal renderings of *inzāl* are not suitable to use in reference to “speech” (*kalām*), because speech is not a “placeable” or “moveable” object. In this case, the metaphorical meaning should be meant. Naturally, when an abstract meaning is juxtaposed with a physical movement, metaphor is inevitable, so the reason for assigning a metaphorical meaning to the notion is obvious. After quoting Taḥṭānī, Fanārī seizes the opportunity to lead up to what he wants to emphasize. According to him, the truest meaning among the possible renderings of *inzāl* that Taḥṭānī mentions is that God sends down “someone” who carries the speech. Fanārī finds this interpretation more appropriate than that of “forming the speech” (*ithbāt*) somewhere else.<sup>82</sup>

To reinforce his opinion that *inzāl* refers to the Angel’s carrying the speech, Fanārī reminds the reader that the famous hadith narrated by ‘Āisha, which describes how the Prophet receives divine revelation, mentions nothing about the creation of speech, either in the *Lawḥ mahfūz* or in the worldly heaven. In this hadith, included by Bukhārī, the Prophet is reported to have stated, “Sometimes, (the revelation) comes to me sounding like ringing of a bell, which is the most difficult (of all revelations) on me. (When this state) goes away from me, I grasp what he says.”<sup>83</sup> Regarding the sound like a ringing bell that the Prophet hears, Fanārī cites Khaṭṭābī,<sup>84</sup>

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82 Fanārī, *Ayn*, 47.

83 In the rest of the hadith, the Prophet is reported to have added, “Sometimes the Angel appears in the form of a man and speaks to me and I understand what he says.” Bukhārī, *bad’ al-wahy*, 2.

84 Ḥamd ibn Muḥammad al-Khaṭṭābī, *A’lām al-Ḥadīth fī sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī* (Makka: al-Mamlakat al-‘Arabiyya al-Sa‘ūdiyya, Jāmi‘at Umm al-Qurā, Ma‘had al-Buḥūth al-‘ilmiyya wa-iḥyā’ al-turāth al-Islāmī, Markaz Iḥyā’ al-turāth al-Islāmī, 1988), 1:121.

the earliest commentator of *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, describing it as “a repeated (*mutatābi*)<sup>85</sup> sound that the Prophet hears. The Prophet does not surely comprehend when it first comes to his ears but tries to understand it (*yatafahham*) and to be sure about it (*yastathbit*). He eventually seizes it (*yatalaqqaf*) and comprehends it.” Fanārī implies that what the Prophet experiences during the revelatory process concerns the transformation of divine speech to human language. Thus, this hadith, which refers to direct revelation from God, does not support the Mu‘tazila’s claim that the speech was created either in the Angel or in the *Lawḥ mahfūz*.<sup>86</sup>

That Fanārī accepts the eternal heavenly form of divine speech (*al-ma‘nā qā’im bi-l-dhāt*) while he rejects the creation of speech in the Angel or the Tablet has several implications. First, by disapproving of the idea of intermediate created forms of divine speech, Fanārī considers only two ways for revelation to come down (*inzāl*): (1) God’s direct inspiration (*ilhām*) to the Prophet’s heart and (2) God’s inspiring the Angel and then the Angel’s inspiring the Prophet, or the Angel’s communicating to the Prophet after appearing in a human form (*tamaththul*).<sup>87</sup> As a matter of fact, Fanārī categorizes all the incidents reported in the Hadith literature when the Prophet receives revelation and every one of them refers either to direct revelation to the Prophet or to indirect revelation by the agency of the Angel.<sup>88</sup> Second, according to Fanārī, the agency of the Angel in the process of revelation does not mean that the Angel carries something created that can be physically picked up and delivered.<sup>89</sup> In this regard, he is careful in his word preferences to eliminate this idea. For example, he emphasizes the

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85 “*Mutadārak*” (seized as one after another) in Khaṭṭābī.

86 Fanārī, *‘Ayn*, 47.

87 Ibid.

88 Ibid., 45-46.

89 Ibid., 47.

words “spiritual seizure” of speech (*talaqquf rūḥānī*) that Taḥṭānī uses. He understands this expression as referring to God’s inspiring the Angel not creating words, which according to him is the Sunni standpoint.<sup>90</sup> This suggests that the Angel does not transport the letters of the speech but rather employs a transformed form of divine speech, or the spiritual counterpart of it that manifests in their (angelic) ontological level in a way that is suitable with its nature to exist and to be internalized. We should remember here that angels are beings that inhabit the spiritual level of existence (*‘ālam al-arwāḥ*: world of the spirits), according to the Akbarī ontology.<sup>91</sup> Third, if an angel functions as an intermediary in the process of revelation, thanks to its spiritual nature, how would a human prophet receive this spiritual-natured revelation? Here, Fanārī uses the idea we mentioned earlier, which is that either the Angel acquires a human nature or the Prophet gains an angelic character to make the reception of the revelation possible. Note that both ways require an angelic intercession, which means that divine speech must traverse a certain ontological level inhabited by spiritual entities. Therefore, a certain form of divine speech must be carried by either an angel or an angelized human.

Taḥṭānī also mentions the debate about the nature of the heavenly form of the speech in the *Lawḥ*. Sunni Ash‘arī and Māturīdī theologians in general are silent about whether the speech in the *Lawḥ* is created or not. The Mu‘tazila in general and some Sunni theologians, such as Bazdawī and Rāzī, hold the opinion that God actually creates in the *Lawḥ* the expression of eternal speech. Their difference is that Bazdawī and Rāzī accept the heavenly eternal form of speech before its creation in the *Lawḥ*. The Ḥanbalīs think that it is the words of the Qur’an that

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90 Ibid., 47. However, there is no Sunni consensus on this. As we mentioned earlier, according to Bazdawī from the Māturīdiyya and Rāzī from the Ash‘ariyya, God creates the expression of His speech in the *Lawḥ*, in the Angel, or in something else.

91 Chittick, “The Five Divine Presences,” 112.

subsist with the divine Essence, so that God transfers them as they are to the *Lawḥ*. It seems that Fanārī disagrees with both opinions. We already mentioned that he rejects the creation of speech in the Tablet. He also rejects the identity of speech in the Tablet with its eternal form subsisting with God. He includes an interesting discussion to underline this point:<sup>92</sup>

Fanārī cites the contemporary renowned scholar, Mas‘ūd b. ‘Umar Sa‘d al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 1390), stating that Zamakhsharī must have interpreted the *inzāl* literally as meaning to make one carry the actual words of the speech in spoken or written form (*ḥāmil ḥurūfih*). Otherwise, if this process of *inzāl* were taken metaphorically, by considering it, for example, as “revealed” or “created” in the *Lawḥ mahfūz*,<sup>93</sup> it would not indicate the createdness of the Qur’an, which would contradict the Mu‘tazilī doctrine that Zamakhsharī follows.<sup>94</sup> Fanārī objects to Taftāzānī, basically saying that the latter is not right in his criticism against the Mu‘tazila because, according to this school, both the *Lawḥ mahfūz* and whatever manifests in it would be considered uneternal (*ḥādīth*). However, Taftāzānī does not discuss the eternity of what manifests in the *Lawḥ*. His concern is to point to Zamakhsharī’s inconsistency by rejecting the uncreatedness of divine speech on one hand, but accepting its *inzāl* to the *Lawḥ* and then to the worldly heaven on the other. In other words, Taftāzānī tries to emphasize the difference between eternal speech (*al-kalām al-naḥsī*) and its manifestation in the *Lawḥ*. He means to say that every interpretation that leads to a distinction of the two forms of divine speech would mean approval of an “entity” that differs from its manifestation in the *Lawḥ*, and that would amount to accepting the eternity of that entity. Thus, this interpretation would not support the discourse on the

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92 Fanārī, *‘Ayn*, 47.

93 Note that Zamakhsharī accepts both the creation of speech in the *Lawḥ* and its *inzāl* to the worldly heaven. See: Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, 2:501 and 6:409.

94 Fanārī cites this statement from Taftāzānī’s super-commentary on Zamakhsharī’s *al-Kashshāf*. This work has not been published, so that we depend on Fanārī’s citation for our comments.

createdness of divine speech. However, Fanārī focuses on whether the manifestation of divine speech in the *Lawḥ* is eternal or not. According to him, uneternal status of the speech would originate “not by unconditional manifestation (*izhār mutlaq*) but by its manifestation in composite form (*mu'allaf*); no doubt, compositeness is the indication of uneternity.”<sup>95</sup> The manifestation of speech in the *Lawḥ*, since it is composite, is not eternal.

Thus, Fanārī rejects both points of view, that the manifestation in the *Lawḥ* should be regarded as (a) identical to the *al-kalām al-naḥsī*, the eternal reality of divine speech, or (b) created. In this regard, Fanārī departs from both the Ḥanbalīs and their followers, who believe in the eternity of speech on the Tablet (i.e., its sameness with the divine attribute of speech that subsists with the essence) and the Mu‘tazila and their Sunni affirmers, such as Bazdawī and Rāzī, who believe in the creation of speech on the Tablet. This leaves only one option to him: what appears in the *Lawḥ* is an intermediate form of speech that manifests at a different ontological level. As a matter of fact, the *Lawḥ maḥfūz* is one of the ontological stages in the Akbarī terminology.<sup>96</sup> That is why Fanārī criticizes Taftāzānī, I presume, because the latter’s objection seemingly leads to an affirmation of the creation of divine speech in the *Lawḥ*.

Fanārī’s admission that the heavenly form of the Qur’an in the *Lawḥ* is not created, in spite of the prophetic traditions that describe the *Lawḥ* as created, is a critical move that unveils his preference among the schools of thoughts. Akbarīs interpret creation as a gradual divine manifestation, so that their worldview is not dualistic, that is, not restricted to a Creator-creation dichotomy. It means that there are intermediate forms between the levels of the Creator and the

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95 Fanārī, *Ayn*, 48.

96 Su‘ād Ḥakīm, *al-Mu‘jam al-Ṣūfī: al-Ḥikma fī ḥudūd al-kalima* (Bayrūt: Dār Nadra, 1981), 996; Chittick, “The Five Divine Presences,” 126 (note: 26). For an explanation of the *Lawḥ* as one of the divine manifestations and its relationship with spiritual beings and angels, see Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ishāq al-Qūnawī and Muḥammad ibn Ḥamza al-Fanārī, *Miftāḥ al-ghayb and sharḥuhu Misbāḥ al-uns* ([Tīhrān]: Mawlā, 2005 or 2006), 391-408.

creation. That is why Fanārī does not feel obligated to define the *Lawḥ* and what manifests there as created. He also does not have to equate the manifestation of divine speech in the *Lawḥ* with the divine attribute of speech that is indivisible and eternal. In this regard, his Akbarī background grants Fanārī this flexibility.

*The Qur'an: A physical manifestation of divine speech*

Fanārī defines the Qur'an as a form of divine speech expressed in Arabic along with its divinely intended meaning, which was passed down to the Prophet. We will discuss in the next chapter his definition of the Qur'an at length and how he employs the definition to reinforce his exegetical thinking. The definition is also in keeping with the ideas he embraces regarding the ontological levels of divine speech. The Qur'an is the manifestation of divine speech in the physical world according to Fanārī, so that he takes pains to tailor the definition in such a way as to not go beyond this meaning.

According to Fanārī, the definition of the Qur'an must refer only to what manifested through the Prophet as “the Qur'an,” but should not include the eternal speech.<sup>97</sup> In this regard, Fanārī criticizes other definitions that do not seem to offer complete exclusivity because of the terms they use, such as *nuzūl* (coming down), which associate them with eternal speech or the Angel's recitation. For example, defining the Qur'an as “*al-kalām al-munzal*” (divine speech that is sent down) does not adequately emphasize the completeness of the revelatory process.<sup>98</sup> In his opinion, disassociating the definition from eternal speech is much more fitting to the limitations of our knowledge, because human beings cannot define an eternal concept that is beyond their

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<sup>97</sup> Fanārī emphasizes the difference by calling this eternal form *al-Qur'ān al-qadīm* (eternal Qur'an). See: Fanārī, 'Ayn, 42-43.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid., 43.

limited knowledge; they can define only what they comprehend. Therefore, the eternal form of speech that is beyond human capacity should not be subjected to definition. In this respect, Fanārī is extremely sensitive in his wording when defining the Qur'an. For example, he prefers saying “*taḥaqquq nuzūlih*” (the coming down of the Qur'an has been complete) to restrict the definition to only what manifested in the Prophet.

One may question whether Fanārī contradicts himself by saying that the Arabic expression of the Qur'an (*naẓmuhū al-'Arabī*) came down to the Prophet, because he accepts the eternal, non-verbal form of divine speech and constantly highlights the different stages of speech, as we discussed at length above. I think he does not intend to say that it was the actual words in the Arabic language delivered to the Prophet. Rather, he emphasizes here that the revelatory process has been completed by the manifestation of the expression. In addition, since the previous forms of divine speech before its manifestation in the Arabic language already encapsulate this verbal form, it would not be incorrect to say that the Arabic expression came down to the Prophet. According to the theory embraced by Fanārī, divine speech could have been manifested in a different language –Persian, for example– if the context had been different; however, what we call the Qur'an is the manifestation of divine speech specifically in Arabic. Fanārī points out this fact, saying,

[In the definition,] with our word ‘the Arabic expression (of the Qur'an)', [we intend] to exclude (from the definition) the recitation in the Persian language since some consider it permissible. For, the revelation has been complete as regards to its Arabic expression, which can be substituted by Persian according to Abū Ḥanīfa because of evidence.<sup>99</sup>

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99 Ibid., 42.

Abū Ḥanīfa considers the permissibility of reciting the Qur'an in Persian in the ritual prayers. However, recitation in Persian is not the Qur'an, the physical manifestation of divine speech, and this must be indicated in the definition according to Fanārī.

With the same detail (*taḥaqquq nuzūlih*), Fanārī intends to differentiate between the Prophet's recitation and the Angel Gabriel's recitation.<sup>100</sup> It seems that, in his definition, he wants to exclude the Angel's recitation during revelation because it was not the Qur'an, the physical form of divine speech that appeared in human language. He also disapproves of the use of the words *qirā'a* (recitation), *kitāba* (writing down) and *naql bi-l-tawātur* (transmission by a general consensus of reports) because they disregard what had been recited as the Qur'an before it was written or transmitted through *tawātur*.

This oversensitivity in regard to this definition should not seem odd. Definitions are important and should be made carefully, according to Fanārī, a medieval scholar who embraced Aristotelian logic. The most crucial aspect of a definition is that it should include every member of the group that it frames and exclude anything that does not belong to the group. Hence, Fanārī attempts to provide an inclusive definition for the Qur'an that covers what it means to cover, which is the Qur'an recited by the Prophet. In this way, he stresses his ideas about ontological levels of divine speech by differentiating different modes of the speech and disconnecting what he defines as the Qur'an from its preceding forms before manifesting in the Prophet.

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100 Ibid., 42-43.

## CHAPTER V

*If I clearly mention the levels of meaning in any place, I do not exceed the four because these are the principles of the meanings. For what is comprehended is either perceptible, which would be zahr, or spiritual, which would be baṭn, or metaphysical and nominal [i.e., pertaining to the divine names], which would be muṭṭala‘, or imaginal, which would be ḥadd. These are the levels according to the five divine presences. As for divine absolute unity, it would be beyond transcendency. Allah knows the best.*

Shams al-Dīn al-Fanārī

### SCRIPTURAL HERMENEUTICS IN FANĀRĪ:

#### LAYERS OF QUR’ANIC MEANING

Fanārī, following the Sufī writers before him, reads the Qur’an as a text that has an esoteric meaning besides its literal meaning. However, the simple dichotomy of esoteric and exoteric meanings in Qur’anic interpretation, which is common in Sufi hermeneutics, does not adequately explain Fanārī’s exegetical approach. He embraces a fourfold interpretational movement based on the hadith of Z̤BḤM. Thus, the most outstanding feature of Fanārī’s commentary is his emphasis on “the layers of meaning” (or “*marātib al-ma’nā*” as he puts it) that include, but are not reducible to, esoteric meaning. This chapter discusses how Fanārī comes to the conclusion that the Qur’an contains different layers of meaning and how he argues that a human being is capable of deciphering those layers. Before addressing this, however, it is pertinent to discern how the idea of reading the Qur’anic text in a non-literal manner appeared and developed in Sufi writings and how non-Sufi scholars reacted to it.

## Layers of Qur’anic Meaning in Sufi Writings

The idea that Qur’anic interpretation cannot be reduced to its literal sense because it contains hidden meanings beneath its outward expression has stood out in many Sufi writings since the early period of Sufism. According to Sufi hermeneutics, the esoteric meaning is not accessible to everyone; only the spiritually elite can detect the inner sense of the Qur’an. One of the earliest explicit expressions of these ideas found in Sufi writings is perhaps the following statement ascribed to Ja‘far al-Şādiq (d. 765)<sup>1</sup>:

The Book of God has four things: literal expression (*‘ibāra*), allusion (*ishāra*), subtleties (*laṭā‘if*) and the deepest realities (*ḥaqā‘iq*). The literal expression is for the commonalty (*‘awāmm*); the allusion is for the elite (*khawāṣṣ*); the subtleties are for the friends [of God] (*awliyā‘*); and the deepest realities are for the prophets (*anbiyā‘*).<sup>2</sup>

If the attribution of this statement to Ja‘far is correct,<sup>3</sup> we may conclude that the essentials of Sufi hermeneutics were in circulation very early in the Islamic world. We discern two basic

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1 Ja‘far al-Şādiq’s comments on the Qur’an were recorded by ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Sulamī (d. 1021) in the latter’s *Ḥaqā‘iq al-Tafsīr*, a compilation of early Sufi Qur’anic comments. Paul Nwyia published a critical edition of Ja‘far’s comments based on three manuscripts of Sulamī’s *Ḥaqā‘iq*: Paul Nwyia, “Le Tafsīr Mistique attribué à Ga‘far Şādiq” *Melanges de l’Université Saint-Joseph* 43 (1968):181-230. Michael A. Sells translated some passages from Nwyia’s edition with annotations: Michael A. Sells, *Early Islamic Mysticism: Sufi, Qur’an, Mi‘raj, Poetic and Theological Writings* (New York: Paulist Press, 1996), 75-89. Farhana Mayer published an annotated translation of Nwyia’s edition into English in full: Ja‘far al-Şādiq, *Spiritual Gems: The Mystical Qur’an Commentary Ascribed to Ja‘far al-Şādiq as contained in Sulamī’s Ḥaqā‘iq al-Tafsīr from the text of Nwyia*, trans. Farhana Mayer (Louisville: Fons Vitae, 2011).

2 Ja‘far al-Şādiq, *Spiritual Gems*, 1.

3 Ibn Taymiyya firmly rejects the attribution of the comments included by Sulamī to Ja‘far. He believes that the Shi‘ts fabricated these comments. See Aḥmad ibn ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm Ibn Taymiyya, *Majmū‘ al-fatāwā* ([Miṣr]: Dār al-Wafā, 2005), 35:183-184; Aḥmad ibn ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm Ibn Taymiyya, *Kitāb Minhāj al-Sunna al-nabawiyya fī naqd kalām al-Shī‘a wa-l-Qadariyya* (Miṣr: Al-Maṭba‘at al-Amīriyya, 1322 [1904]), 4:146; Aḥmad ibn ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm Ibn Taymiyya, *Bughyat al-murtād al-ma‘rūfā bi-l-sab‘īniyya li-l-Imām Ibn Taymiyya* (Bayrūt: Dār al-Fikr al-‘Arabī), 99. Nwyia also discusses the issue of authenticity. See Nwyia, “Le Tafsīr Mistique,” 181-185. Mayer notes that the vocabulary of some of the comments attributed to Ja‘far indicate an early date, but some terms seem to belong to later centuries. See Farhana Mayer, introduction to *Spiritual Gems: The Mystical Qur’an Commentary Ascribed to Ja‘far al-Şādiq as contained in Sulamī’s Ḥaqā‘iq al-Tafsīr from the text of Nwyia*, by Ja‘far al-Şādiq (Louisville: Fons Vitae, 2011), xxii-xxv. Gerhard Böwering concludes that “The items included in the *Ḥaqā‘iq* on Ja‘far al-Şādiq’s authority may be understood as reflecting third/ninth and fourth/tenth century Sufi terms and ideas that echo certain fundamental notions of Ja‘far al-Şādiq, yet are stripped of any specifically Shi‘ite coloring.” See

premises of Sufi hermeneutics in this short statement. First, Qur’anic meaning has supplementary layers other than the apparent one, which Ja‘far listed as four. Subsequent Sufi commentators also used the terms *ishāra*, *laṭā’if* and *ḥaqā’iq* for their esoteric interpretations. Second, people are not equal in understanding the layers of the Qur’anic meaning. Thus, the dichotomy of ‘*awāmm* and *khawāṣṣ* (common and elite), which stands as one of the central notions in Sufism, is recognized in the Sufi interpretation of the Qur’an.

After Ja‘far, the distinctions between *zāhir* and *bāṭin* and between ‘*awāmm* and *khawāṣṣ* continued to be emphasized in subsequent Sufi commentaries. For example, Sahl b. ‘Abdullāh al-Tustarī (d. 896) is one of the early Sufis who speaks of the layers of Qur’anic meaning in his commentary, which is arguably the earliest extant Sufi commentary attributed to a single commentator.<sup>4</sup> He persistently underlines the distinction between outward and inner meanings (*zāhir* and *bāṭin*) of Qur’anic verses in his commentary, especially in his introduction.<sup>5</sup> For example, he states, “Truly God has not taken as a friend (*walī*) one of Muḥammad’s nation (*umma*) without teaching them the Qur’an either in its outward (*zāhir*) or inner (*bāṭin*) aspects.” When Tustarī was asked what the inner aspect was, he replied, “That is its understanding (*fahm*); and it is its understanding that is intended.”<sup>6</sup> According to Tustarī, God guides some people

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Gerhard Böwering, “The Qur’an commentary of al-Sulamī,” in *Islamic Studies presented to Charles J. Adams*, ed. Wael b. Hallaq and Donald P. Little (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 55. Even though the authorship of Ja‘far cannot be ascertained, these comments still belong to the early phase of Sufism and are fundamental to the matter.

<sup>4</sup> Tustarī did not compose the *Tafsīr*, but his pupils collected his comments on the Qur’an. For a detailed discussion on Tustarī and his commentary, see Gerhard Böwering, *The Mystical Vision of Existence in Classical Islam: The Qur’anic Hermeneutics of the Sufi Sahl at-Tustarī (d. 283/896)* (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1980). Michael A. Sells translated and annotated some parts from Tustarī’s *Tafsīr* in his *Early Islamic Mysticism* (pp. 89-96). Annabel and Ali Keeler translated the *Tafsīr al-Tustarī* in full with annotations and an introduction: Sahl ibn ‘Abdullāh al-Tustarī, *Tafsīr al-Tustarī*, trans. Annabel Keeler and Ali Keeler (Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae; Amman, Jordan: Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought, 2011).

<sup>5</sup> Tustarī, *Tafsīr*, 2-9.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 7.

(those who are rooted in knowledge) and discloses His mysteries to them. These people are capable of producing the truest interpretations of the Qur'an, unadulterated by whims or set arguments.<sup>7</sup> Not only does Tustarī consider speaking of the inner meaning as legitimate, but also he identifies himself as one of those who were divinely taught by God; therefore, he has the rightful authority to esoterically interpret the Qur'an.<sup>8</sup> He states, "I have been granted wisdom (*ḥikma*) and [a knowledge of] the unseen (*ghayb*) which I was taught from the unseen of His secret (*min ghaybi sirrihī*), and thus He sufficed me from the need for all other knowledge."<sup>9</sup>

At the heart of the discussion regarding the distinction of *ẓāhir/bāṭin* and *ʿawāmm/khawāṣṣ* in Qur'anic interpretation lies the question of whether an individual or a group has access to confidential knowledge granted by God. As we see in Ja'far's and Tustarī's statements, Sufis believe in this kind of knowledge. The subsequent Sufi writers provide some examples when discussing the possibility of confidential knowledge. For example, Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj (d. 988) replies to the objection that the Prophet has never allotted any special knowledge exclusively to anybody by recalling the famous hadith in which the Prophet is reported to have said to his companions, "If you knew what I knew, you would have laughed less but wept more." He also identifies reports indicating that the Prophet entrusted confidential information to some of his companions, such as Ḥudhayfa ibn al-Yamān and ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib.<sup>10</sup> According to

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7 Ibid., 41.

8 When Tustarī esoterically interprets the Qur'anic text, he assigns non-literal meanings to the letters and the words, like Ja'far. Annabel Keeler notes that Tustarī often juxtaposes exoteric and esoteric interpretations. When revealing the esoteric meaning, he uses metaphorical or allegorical interpretation. He also discusses "the spiritual or ethical significance of a word mentioned in a verse" and sometimes expresses his mystical thoughts on the pretext of the "Qur'anic keynotes." See Annabel Keeler, introduction to *Tafsīr al-Tustarī*, by Sahl ibn ʿAbdullāh al-Tustarī (Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae; Amman, Jordan: Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought, 2011.), xxviii – xxix.

9 Tustarī, *Tafsīr*, 14.

10 Abū Naṣr ʿAbdullāh ibn ʿAlī al-Sarrāj, *al-Lumaʿ* (Miṣr [al-Qāhira]: Dār al-Kutub al-ḥadītha; Baghdād: Maktabat al-Mithannā, 1960), 38, 455-456.

another tradition cited by ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Sulamī (d. 1021), ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib declared that he was given an understanding (*fahm*) of the Qur’an when he was asked whether he received any revelation other than the Qur’an from the Prophet. Apparently, Sulamī takes the “understanding” in this report to indicate esoteric interpretation.<sup>11</sup> When commenting on Q. 5:67, the verse that states that God commanded the Prophet to announce all of what God revealed to him, Sulamī distinguishes between the knowledge the Prophet had received to announce to all and the knowledge he kept hidden:

Some interpreted [this verse as it follows]: [O Prophet!] Announce what has been revealed to you from your Lord, but do not announce what we made private for you from the station of unveiling (*kashf*) and witnessing (*mushāhada*) because they cannot endure even listening to the load of sights of [spiritual] pleasures and the manifestation of [the divine] attributes that you have endured carrying.<sup>12</sup>

Sufis keep bringing up some features of the Qur’anic text to reinforce the idea of the “hidden meanings” of the Qur’an, such as the mysterious isolated letters (*al-ḥurūf al-muqaṭṭa‘a*) found at the beginning of 29 chapters of the Qur’an. Like many traditional Qur’anic commentaries, early Sufi exegetical works contain attempts to explain these letters, which do not *literally* mean anything. For example, Ja‘far asserts that these letters “are allusions to the [divine] onliness, singularity, and permanence, and to the [Self-] existence of the Truth in Himself, having no need of anything other than Himself.”<sup>13</sup> According to Tustarī, the combination of the Arabic letters, *alif*, *lām*, and *mīm* is a name of God, or they stand for some of His divine

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11 Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Sulamī, *Ḥaqā’iq al-tafsīr: Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-‘Azīz* (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyya, 1421 [2001]), 1:20.

12 Ibid., 1:182.

13 Ja‘far al-Šādiq, *Spiritual Gems*, 17.

attributes.<sup>14</sup> According to a comment by ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Qushayrī (d.1072 or 1073), these letters refer to the devotional and spiritual responsibilities of a servant.<sup>15</sup> Thus, interpretations of the *hurūf* by Sufi commentators vary, but they have a common point: they treat these letters as cryptic messages, as divine secrets in the Qur’an.

Sufi commentators esoterically read not only the isolated letters but also the letters of full words as exemplified by the interpretation of the *basmala*, the first verse of the Qur’an. They assign different meanings to the first three letters of the *basmala* –*bā’*, *mīm*, and *sīn*– which literally reads “in the name.” Comments of this kind were extensively recorded in Sufi commentaries.<sup>16</sup> The following comments made by Ja‘far are a typical example:

[Concerning the word] *bism*, Ja‘far b. Muḥammad said: The [letter] *bā’* is His eternal subsistence (*baqā’uh*); the *sīn* is for His names (*asmā’uh*), and the *mīm* is His sovereignty (*mulkuh*). The faith of the believer is his recollection of His eternal subsistence, and the service of the [spiritual] seeker is his recollection of His names, while the extinction of the sage from the kingdom is through its King.

He also said: [The word] *bism* [has] three letters: *bā’*, *sīn*, and *mīm*. The *bā’* is the gate (*bāb*) of prophethood; the *sīn* is the secret (*sirr*) of prophethood which the Prophet confided to the elite of his community, and the *mīm* is the kingdom (*mamlakah*) of faith which embraces the white and the black.<sup>17</sup>

Another argument used by Sufis to support the basic tenets of their hermeneutics is the idea that the Qur’an is the source of limitless knowledge; therefore, the meaning of the verses

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14 Tustarī, *Tafsīr*, 12.

15 ‘Abd al-Karīm ibn Hawāzin al-Qushayrī, *Laṭā’if al-ishārāt: Tafsīr Sūfī kāmil li-l-Qur’ān al-Karīm* (al-Qāhira: Dār al-Kātib al-‘Arabī, [1968]), 1:64.

16 For example, see Tustarī, *Tafsīr*, 8; Sulamī, *Ḥaqā’iq al-tafsīr*, 1:24-26; Qushayrī, *Laṭā’if al-ishārāt*, 1:56. Sulamī even records a hadith, although with reservation, that interprets the letters of the *basmala* separately. According to this tradition, the Prophet is reported to have stated, “The letter *bā’* (means) His (God’s) magnificence (*bahā’*); *sīn* His exaltedness (*sanā’*), and *mīm* His glory (*majd*).”

17 Ja‘far al-Ṣādiq, *Spiritual Gems*, 3-5. Tustarī offers a similar interpretation for the letters of the *basmala*, *bā’*, *sīn*, and *mīm*. See Tustarī, *Tafsīr*, 8.

cannot be reduced to only the literal meaning. This idea is based on several verses of the Qur'an, on Prophetic traditions, and on the theological doctrine of the Qur'an's eternity. After quoting the last part of Q. 16:89, which states that the Qur'an contains explanations of everything,<sup>18</sup> al-Sarrāj states that this verse indicates, "Beneath each letter of the Book of God, there are many (subjects) of understanding (*fahm*) stored for the qualified according to their lots from this (understanding)."<sup>19</sup> According to him, verses 6:38,<sup>20</sup> 36:12,<sup>21</sup> and 15:21<sup>22</sup> reinforce the same idea. Al-Sarrāj also cites several hadiths that state that the Qur'an is a source of inexhaustible lessons and knowledge. In one hadith the Prophet is reported to have stated, "The Qur'an is God's strong rope. Its wonders are never exhausted" (*Lā tanqadī 'ajā'ibuh*). In another report, 'Abdullāh ibn Mas'ūd said, "The knowledge of the past and the future generations is contained in the Qur'an." In addition to these verses and hadiths, Tustarī grounds the idea of the inexhaustibility of Qur'anic knowledge on the Sunni doctrine that the Qur'an is the eternal speech of God. When commenting on Q. 18:109,<sup>23</sup> Tustarī states,

His Book is part of His knowledge, and if a servant was given a thousand ways of understanding each letter of the Qur'an, he would not reach the end of God's knowledge within it. This is because it is His pre-eternal speech, and His speech is one of His

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18 "And We have sent down to thee the Book explaining all things, a Guide, a Mercy, and Glad Tidings to Muslims."

19 al-Sarrāj, *al-Luma'*, 106.

20 "Nothing have we omitted from the Book, and they (all) shall be gathered to their Lord in the end."

21 "Verily We shall give life to the dead, and We record that which they send before and that which they leave behind, and of all things have We taken account in a clear Book (of evidence)."

22 "And there is not a thing but its (sources and) treasures (inexhaustible) are with Us; but We only send down thereof in due and ascertainable measures."

23 "Say: If the ocean were ink (wherewith to write out) the words of my Lord, sooner would the ocean be exhausted than would the words of my Lord, even if we added another ocean like it, for its aid."

attributes, and there is no end to any of His attributes just as He has no end. All that can be comprehended of His speech is as much as He opens to the hearts of His friends.<sup>24</sup>

### *Criticism of the idea of “hidden meanings” in the Qur’an*

Although Sufis believe in the possibility of reading the Qur’anic text in a non-literal manner, non-Sufi Sunni scholars approach esoteric interpretation with considerable reserve. When Sulamī’s compilation of Sufi comments on the Qur’an appeared, many scholars met this commentary with resentment while many others exuberantly celebrated it.<sup>25</sup> For example, ‘Alī ibn Aḥmad al-Wāḥidī (d. 1075), a renowned medieval Qur’anic commentator, fiercely objected to Sulamī’s work, saying, “Abū ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Sulamī compiled the *Ḥaqā’iq al-tafsīr*. If he believed (*i’taqada*) that this was *tafsīr*, he would be an infidel (*kafara*).”<sup>26</sup> According to Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 1200), a prominent Ḥanbalī traditionist and jurist, the comments on the Qur’an Sulamī collected in his *Tafsīr* were without foundation in Islamic sciences;<sup>27</sup> the commentary was full of statements that amount to infidelity, error, or nonsense.<sup>28</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī cited a report identifying Sulamī as an unreliable narrator who fabricated traditions in favor of Sufism.<sup>29</sup> Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) also questioned Sulamī’s commentary and his other writings, although he admired the latter’s piety. According to Ibn Taymiyya, Sulamī, as a commentator, lacked the qualification of

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24 Tustarī, *Tafsīr*, 118.

25 Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Dhahabī, a renowned medieval historian and traditionist, records how scholars and rulers welcomed Sulamī’s work with great admiration. He also records negative opinions about the work. Dhahabī’s following statement very well summarizes people’s mixed feelings about the commentary: “Some leading scholars (*a’imma*) considered this (work) heresy (*zandaqa*) of the Bāṭiniyya, while some others considered it wisdom (*’irfān*) and truth (*ḥaqīqa*).” Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Dhahabī, *Siyar a’lām al-nubalā’* (Bayrūt: Mu’assasat al-Risāla, 1982-1983), 17:252.

26 ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, *Fatāwā Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ* (al-Qāhira: Maktabat Ibn Taymiyya, 1980) 35; Zarkashī, *al-Burhān fī ‘ulūm al-Qur’ān*, 2:171.

27 Abū al-Faraj Ibn al-Jawzī, *Talbīs Iblīs* (Bayrūt: Dār al-Fikr li-l-ṭibā’a wa-l-nashr, 2001), 148.

28 Ibid., 294.

29 Ibid., 148.

scholarly discretion to distinguish between sound and unsound information; therefore, his writings were unreliable.<sup>30</sup> He also criticized Sulamī for his inclusion of the comments ascribed to Ja‘far al-Šādiq in the *Ḥaqqā’iq al-tafsīr*. These comments were, Ibn Taymiyya asserted, no more than blatant lies fabricated and attributed to Ja‘far by Shi‘īs.<sup>31</sup> According to Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Dhahabī (d. 1348), Sulamī’s *Ḥaqqā’iq al-tafsīr* contained the groundless opinions<sup>32</sup> and comments of heretics (Bāṭiniyya).<sup>33</sup>

Sulamī’s *Ḥaqqā’iq* was not the only Sufi commentary criticized by other scholars. Non-Sufi scholars find the Sufi exegesis problematic for the following reasons: Sufis generally do not have scriptural or intellectual proof for their Qur’anic comments. Their assertions that the Qur’an has secrets and that they can discover these secrets with the aid of special knowledge granted by God are not acceptable because God revealed the Qur’an as a message that had no mystery in it, and no one is granted confidential knowledge. In this regard, the Sufi exegesis resembles the Bāṭinī mode of interpretation.

Non-Sufi scholars generally do not consider Sufi comments on the Qur’an as *tafsīr*, sound interpretation of the Qur’an. These comments, they think, should be regarded only as the meanings Sufis feel when they recite the Qur’an.<sup>34</sup> According to Ibn al-Šalāḥ (d. 1246), for example, the Sufis’ words are not *tafsīr*; they are only utterances similar (*naẓīr*) to the Qur’anic verses.<sup>35</sup> Ibn Taymiyya, who provides a lengthy discussion on the Sufi exegesis, divides esoteric

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30 Aḥmad ibn ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm Ibn Taymiyya, *Talkhīṣ Kitāb al-Istighātha al-ma‘rūf bi-l-Radd ‘alā al-Bakrī* (al-Madīna: Maktabat al-Ghurabā’ al-athariyya, 1996), 1:59, 1:73.

31 See the note 3 above.

32 Dhahabī, *Siyar a’lām al-nubalā’*, 17:252.

33 Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Dhahabī, *Tadhkirat al-ḥuffāz* (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyya, 1998), 3:166.

34 Zarkashī, *al-Burhān fī ‘ulūm al-Qur’ān*, 2:170; Suyūṭī, *al-Itqān fī ‘ulūm al-Qur’ān*, 4:223.

35 Ibn al-Šalāḥ, *Fatāwā*, 35.

interpretations into two categories: (a) groundless comments that have no evidence to prove that they are true (for this category, he gives examples from commentaries of the Bāṭiniyya) and (b) Comments whose meanings are sound but irrelevant to the particular verses. He asserts that Sufi commentaries are full of these kinds of comments, which Sufis call *ishārāt* (allusions). These allusions resemble what the jurists (*fuqahā'*) call *qiyās* (analogy); therefore, they can be either sound or fallacious in their indication. If any comment on the Qur'an does not correspond to the apparent meanings of the Qur'an and the Sunna, it must be rejected. Moreover, to claim that God intends these allusions, Ibn Taymiyya emphasizes, would be a bald lie about God.<sup>36</sup>

The discussion of the Sufi exegesis is directly associated, in fact, with the question of the legitimate source of knowledge in Qur'anic interpretation. There are different approaches to this question among the *Tafsīr* traditions, but it can be said that "esoteric knowledge" (*ilm bāṭin*) did not receive unconditional recognition by non-Sufi scholars as a source of knowledge. Therefore, the Sufi claim that they had guidance from special knowledge from God in their Qur'anic exegesis was not welcomed with open arms by other scholars, especially by those who saw transmitted traditions as the only sound means of Qur'anic interpretation, such as Ibn al-Jawzī and Ibn Taymiyya. For instance, Ibn al-Jawzī, who vigorously attacked Sufi interpretation, emphasized that Sufi commentators deviated from the sound way of exegesis, which was based on transmitted knowledge.<sup>37</sup> Ibn Taymiyya also rejected the outcomes of esoteric knowledge when they were inconsistent with the apparent meaning of the text, contradicted it, or claimed to

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36 Ibn Taymiyya, *Majmū' fatāwā*, 13:240-243.

37 Ibn al-Jawzī, *Talbīs Iblīs*, 293 and 295. For the summary of Ibn al-Jawzī's criticism against Sufi interpretation, see Kristin Zahra Sands, *Šūfī Commentaries on the Qur'ān in Classical Islam* (London; New York: Routledge, 2006), 50-55.

add extra knowledge not contained in it,<sup>38</sup> although he approached with leniency the idea of esoteric knowledge granted by God because of devotional, spiritual, or intellectual efforts.<sup>39</sup> However, according to Ibn Taymiyya, the Prophet neither taught esoteric knowledge that speaks differently from exoteric knowledge nor gave anyone exclusive access to knowledge hidden from others. For example, the Prophet entrusted no one among his companions with a secret that he intended to conceal from the others. However, some companions who had deeper comprehension than others were able to understand what had been said more thoroughly.<sup>40</sup> In addition, the Qur'an explicitly states that the Prophet conveyed the divine message to people clearly.<sup>41</sup> Ibn Taymiyya also persistently argued that the Qur'an could not contain a secret that is not known to anybody. It cannot be said that God revealed an unknown message to anybody, including the Prophet, or that scholars rooted in knowledge (*al-rāsikhūn*) may not know the interpretation of a Qur'anic verse,<sup>42</sup> for the aim of speech is to be understood, and expressing incomprehensible words is an exercise in futility, which is unthinkable about God.<sup>43</sup> As a result, in Ibn Taymiyya's opinion, the entire Qur'an is capable of being comprehended, but there may be verses whose interpretation is inscrutable for some because of ambiguities in their expressions

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38 Ibn Taymiyya, *Majmū' fatāwā*, 13:236.

39 Ibid., 13:245-247. For the summary of Ibn Taymiyya's criticism against Sufi interpretation, see Sands, *Ṣūfī Commentaries*, 50-56.

40 Ibn Taymiyya, *Majmū' fatāwā*, 13:252. Ibn Taymiyya interprets the examples mentioned by Sufis to support the idea that the Prophet taught hidden knowledge differently. For example, 'Alī's statement that he was given *fahm* (understanding) does not necessarily mean that he knew hidden knowledge; rather it refers to the ability to understand the Qur'an correctly. See Ibn Taymiyya, *Majmū' fatāwā*, 13:244-245. The names of the hypocrites told by the Prophet to Ḥudhayfa as a secret have nothing to do with the religious principles. If we are to count this secret as "esoteric knowledge," this knowledge is then compatible with exoteric knowledge, as the Qur'an describes the attributes of hypocrites in detail. See Ibn Taymiyya, *Majmū' fatāwā*, 13:254-255.

41 Ibn Taymiyya, *Majmū' fatāwā*, 13:264-265.

42 Ibid., 17:390.

43 Ibid., 17:397.

and meanings and because of inadequate investigation on the part of the commentator.<sup>44</sup> He also made remarks about the traditions regarding the comprehensibility of the whole Qur'an and of each verse.<sup>45</sup> Accordingly, there is no verse in the Qur'an on which the Prophet, the companions, and the next Muslim generation (*tābi'ūn*) have not commented.<sup>46</sup>

The critics of Sufi exegesis, who disapproved the idea of the existence of secrets in the Qur'an and of the discovery of these secrets by selected people drawing on confidential knowledge, also drew attention to the resemblance between Sufi and Bāṭinī ways of exegesis. For example, Ibn al-Jawzī, after discussing some examples of Sufi exegesis, concluded that there was no difference between them and Bāṭinī Qur'anic comments.<sup>47</sup> According to Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, one who claimed these comments to be *tafsīr* of the Qur'an would be doing the same thing as Bāṭinīs do.<sup>48</sup> Ibn Taymiyya also criticized the Qur'anic comments of those whom he identified as esoteric Sufis (*Bāṭiniyyāt al-Ṣūfiyya*)<sup>49</sup> including Ghazzālī.<sup>50</sup> He saw no difference between them and Bāṭinī *tafsīr*.<sup>51</sup> Additionally, Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Dhahabī stated that Sulamī's *Ḥaqā'iq al-tafsīr* contained Bāṭinīs' heresies.<sup>52</sup>

It is generally observed that Sufis were careful not to challenge the precedence of the apparent meaning in their interpretation.<sup>53</sup> Against the accusations that they resembled the

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44 Ibid., 17:399-400.

45 Ibid., 17:391 and 17:406-407.

46 Ibid., 17:397.

47 Ibn al-Jawzī, *Talbīs Iblīs*, 149, 294.

48 Zarkashī, *al-Burhān fī 'ulūm al-Qur'ān*, 2:171.

49 Ibn Taymiyya, *Majmū' fatāwā*, 13:238.

50 Ibid., 5:550, 13:238.

51 Ibid., 5:551, 13:359-360, 13:236-238.

52 Dhahabī, *Siyar a'lām al-nubalā'*, 17:252; Dhahabī, *Tadhkirat al-ḥuffāz*, 3:166.

53 Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Sulamī, *Ṭabaqāt al-Ṣūfiyya* (al-Qāhira: Dār al-Kitāb al-'Arabī, 1953), 78, 231.

Bāṭinīs, Sufis defended themselves by accentuating the differences between their *tafsīr* and that of the Baṭinīs'. Ibn 'Aṭā'-Allāh al-Iskandarī (d. 1309), for instance, explained that Sufis do not disregard the apparent meaning, as the Bāṭinīs do. According to him, the Qur'an includes both external and inner meanings, and the Sufī *tafsīr* is "not turning away from [the external meaning]. It would have been turning away [from the external sense] if they said 'there is no meaning at all except this [inner sense we tell].' But they do not say this."<sup>54</sup> Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālī (d. 1111) points out this difference when providing an esoteric comment on a hadith:

The Prophet said, "Angels do not enter a house in which there is a dog." The heart is also a house; it is the halting place of the angels, the location of their traces, and their site of settling. Bad moral qualities, such as anger, lust, grudge, jealousy, haughtiness, conceit and the like are barking dogs. How then shall the angels enter while it is full of dogs?

After this interpretation Ghazzālī adds,

I am not saying that the word "house" means heart and the word "dog" means anger and other blameworthy qualities. But I am saying there is a hint [in the hadith] to that [interpretation]. There is a difference between leaving aside the apparent meaning in favor of esoteric sense and deducing an esoteric interpretation from the words while approving the literal meaning. This subtle point is where Bāṭinīs depart [from the orthodox way]. This is the method of interpretation by allusion (*i'tibār*), which is the way of the learned and the pious.<sup>55</sup>

#### *Esoteric interpretation according to Ibn al-'Arabī and Qūnawī*

Ibn al-'Arabī and his followers agree with other Sufis on the idea that people can deduce new meanings from the Qur'an through spiritual concentration, aside from exoteric denotations based on the obvious sense of Qur'anic exposition, on transmitted knowledge or on rational inquiry. When Ibn al-'Arabī explains his manner of interpretation, he uses allusion (*ishāra*) as some other

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54 Ibn 'Aṭā'-Allāh al-Iskandarī, *Laṭā'if al-minan* (al-Qāhira: s. n., 1974), 248-249.

55 Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazzālī, *Iḥyā' 'ulūm al-Dīn* (Bayrūt: Dār al-Ma'rifa, [19--?]), 1:49.

Sufis do, such as Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj and al-Qāsim al-Qushayrī.<sup>56</sup> According to Ibn al-‘Arabī, allusion is also how God speaks in the Qur’an:

...God had the power to state explicitly the interpretations (*ta’awwul*) of the Folk of Allah in His Book, yet He did not do that. On the contrary, He inserted into those divine words, which descend in the language of the common people the sciences of the meanings of election, which He allows His servants to understand when He opens up the eye of understanding, which He has provided for them.<sup>57</sup>

Therefore, the Sufis who employ allusion when commenting on a verse actually imitate God. Although the method of allusion based on *kashf* (mystical knowledge through unveiling) is the soundest way of interpreting the Qur’an, Sufis do not call their comments a *tafsīr*. The reason, according to Ibn al-‘Arabī, is that Sufis want to avoid the accusations of exoteric scholars, just as Mary resorted to allusion when faced with the people’s condemnation as is told in the Qur’an.<sup>58</sup>

Ibn al-‘Arabī’s answer to one who would ask why the religion contains secrets and the language of the religion uses allusions is that people differ according to their intellectual and spiritual capabilities so that the Prophet revealed to the common people only what they could comprehend in order not to alienate them. Otherwise the common people would have misunderstood and dared to deny the prophetic message. Prominent companions acted similarly, as referred to by Ibn al-‘Arabī. For example, Abū Hurayra said, “If I disclosed it [the secrets],

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56 For translated passages from Ibn al-‘Arabī’s writings regarding his method of interpretation, see William C. Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-‘Arabī’s Metaphysics of Imagination* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1989), 231-252. For a summary of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s interpretation, see Sands, *Ṣūfī Commentaries*, 39-41. For more detailed discussion of the subject, see Naṣr Ḥāmid Abū Zayd, *Falsafat al-ta’wīl: Dirāsa fī ta’wīl al-Qur’ān ‘inda Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn ‘Arabī* (Bayrūt, Lubnān: Dār al-Tanwīr, 1993).

57 Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Knowledge*, 247. In addition, for more regarding how and why the Qur’an employs allusion according to Ibn al-‘Arabī, see Abū Zayd, *Falsafat al-ta’wīl*, 266-275.

58 Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Knowledge*, 247.

my neck would have been cut.” Ibn ‘Abbās talked similarly saying, “If I explained it, I would have been a heretic who should be stoned in your opinion.”<sup>59</sup>

Ibn al-‘Arabī also justifies commentary by allusion based on narrative reports from the Prophet’s life and statements made by his companions. For example, the Prophet, who was preparing to make an agreement with the Meccan polytheists in Ḥudaybiyya, interpreted the name of the envoy of the opposing party, Suhayl, as auspicious, suggesting that advantageous consequences would result from the agreement, alluding to the verbal root of the name which is “*s-h-l*” meaning “to become easy” in Arabic.<sup>60</sup>

According to Ibn al-‘Arabī, the source of esoteric knowledge is divine. God reveals an understanding of the Qur’an to the hearts of the elite just as He revealed the books to His prophets.<sup>61</sup> However, the person who wants to be the recipient of this knowledge should be prepared by means of spiritual efforts such as ascetic practices, spiritual purification, and freeing oneself from worldly attachments.<sup>62</sup> Ibn al-‘Arabī identifies the real inheritors of the Prophet referred to in the prophetic traditions<sup>63</sup> as the enlightened Sufis.<sup>64</sup> The difference between the prophets and these is that the latter do not bring a new law (*sharī‘a*) nor change any rule of the law, but they understand and interpret it in the truest way with divine assistance.<sup>65</sup> The real inheritors of the Prophet can even verify the soundness of a weak hadith or the weakness of a

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59 Ibn al-‘Arabī, *Kitāb Khatm al-wilāya: ‘Anqā’ mughrib fī ma‘rifā khatm al-awliyā’ wa-shams al-Maghrib* (Dimashq: Dār al-Madā, 2004), 60; Abū Zayd, *Falsafat al-ta’wīl*, 271.

60 Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Knowledge*, 249-250.

61 Ibid., 248.

62 Ibid., 245.

63 The most famous hadiths about this subject are the following: “The scholars are the inheritors of the prophets” and “The scholars of my nation are like the prophets of the People of Israel.”

64 Abū Zayd, *Falsafat al-ta’wīl*, 242.

65 Ibid., 243.

sound hadith by means of God-given knowledge.<sup>66</sup> Ibn al-‘Arabī links exoteric scholars’ disapproval of esoteric interpretation to their judgment that knowledge comes only through learning. “But they are wrong,” he states, “in their belief that God does not teach him who is not a messenger or a prophet.”<sup>67</sup>

Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī, Ibn al-‘Arabī’s most prominent student, describes divine speech in the form of historical revelation as having both obvious and cryptic messages.<sup>68</sup> By sending revelation in a form not wholly comprehended, God intends to exhort people to make an effort to explore hidden truths in the message by which the reader can attain knowledge of these truths through the expressed words.<sup>69</sup> Qūnawī states that the Prophet “neither concealed nor disclosed, rather he expressed the secrets through perfect wording (*‘ibāra tāmma*) that serves the intention.”<sup>70</sup> Like his master, Qūnawī accords the right to decipher the secrets of the Qur’an to select people spiritually taught by God. In the introduction to his *I’jāz al-bayān*, he explicitly states that God taught him the secrets of the Qur’an.<sup>71</sup> The *I’jāz* from start to end, in fact, is where he enacts the task of decoding the secrets. Furthermore, Qūnawī frequently states in the commentary that there are more secrets he is not permitted to divulge.<sup>72</sup>

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66 Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Knowledge*, 251; Abū Zayd, *Falsafat al-ta’wīl*, 244.

67 Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Knowledge*, 247.

68 Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ishāq al-Qūnawī, *I’jāz al-bayān fī ta’wīl Umm al-Qur’ān*, ed. ‘Abd al-Qādir Aḥmad ‘Aṭā, ([al-Qāhira]: Dār al-Kutub al-ḥadītha, [1969]), 524-525.

69 Ibid., 524.

70 Ibid., 525.

71 Ibid., 96.

72 Ibid., 100.

## Esoteric Exegesis According to Fanārī

### *Layers of meaning*

Fanārī discusses the nature and the boundaries of *Tafsīr* as an Islamic discipline in one of the chapters in the prologue of *‘Ayn al-a‘yān*.<sup>73</sup> In this chapter, he reserves a section for the discussion of *marātib al-ma‘nā* (layers of meaning), which centers on the hadith of Z̤B̤H̤M.<sup>74</sup> We saw before how he used the hadith to explain the ontology of divine speech following Qūnawī. Here, Fanārī resorts to the same hadith to justify his hermeneutics, which assesses the Qur’anic text as having several layers of meaning.

Fanārī first cites the annotation of the hadith by al-Ḥusayn ibn Mas‘ūd al-Baghawī (d. 1117), a renowned medieval hadith scholar and commentator, in order to prepare the reader for the concept of layers of meaning. Baghawī’s explanation is no more than a summary of what non-Sufī scholars said about the hadith, which we discussed in Chapter 3;<sup>75</sup> however, from this summary Fanārī understands the following: the literal meaning of a word is called *ẓahr*, because it is the first to appear (*yazharu*) to the listeners. The meaning acquired through interpretation based on narrations from the Salaf (*tafsīr*) is *baṭn*, because the intended meaning of the speech is its spirit and essence (*bāṭin*). The meaning gained through the analysis of linguistic features (*ta’wīl*) such as metaphors (*majāz*) and allusions (*kināya*) is called *muṭṭala’*.<sup>76</sup> What draws our attention in this retelling of Baghawī’s summary is that Fanārī outlines a hierarchical order in

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73 Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ḥamza al-Fanārī, *‘Ayn al-a‘yān: Tafsīr al-Fātiḥa* (Istanbul: Rıfat Bey Matbaası, 1325 [1907]), 4-16.

74 Ibid., 9-12.

75 Ibid., 9. Cf. al-Ḥusayn ibn Mas‘ūd al-Baghawī, *Sharḥ al-Sunna* (Dimashq, Bayrūt: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1984), 1:262-265.

76 Fanārī, *‘Ayn*, 9.

Qur'anic exegesis. In this hierarchy, (a) the literal meaning, (b) *tafsīr* and (c) *ta'wīl* respectively refer to the gradual levels of Qur'anic meanings according to the varying complexity of the text. Since, in Fanārī's understanding, *ta'wīl* refers to a method of interpretation that based on means other than narration, as we will see below, Baghawī is presented here by Fanārī as if he accepts this method. However, Baghawī explicitly stated that he understands *ḥadd* as the limit for both *zahr* and *batn*, namely, the recitation of the Qur'an and its interpretation. Accordingly, no one should cross the border in recitation (*tilāwa*) by conflicting with the official copy of the Qur'an (*al-Imām*) and in interpretation by relying on means other than narration (*masmū'*). He takes *muṭṭala'* as a deeper understanding of the text but within these limits. As a matter of fact, he warns his readers, in the same pages where he explains the hadith, against interpreting the Qur'an according to their own opinion (*ra'y*), which basically means interpretation by other means than narration in this context. Thus, Fanārī's explanation should be taken as an attempt to prepare the readers for what he really understands from the hadith and to convince them there is no major distinction between the Akbarī and non-Sufī approaches. He clearly prefers Qūnawī's standpoint regarding the meaning of the hadith.

Fanārī then paraphrases Qūnawī's explanation of the hadith, which we mentioned when discussing the subject of the gradual manifestation of divine speech. In brief, the hadith is speaking of “the levels of Qur'anic meaning that vary in terms of clarity (*zuhūr*) and concealment (*khafā'*) according to the [gradual] manifestations of the divine name *Mutakallim* (Speaker) and congruent to the manifestations of the ontological universal presences (*al-ḥaḍarāt al-kulliyya*).”<sup>77</sup> Fanārī concludes:

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<sup>77</sup> Ibid., 9-10.

These [notions in the hadith] are the names of the meaning according to levels of appearance (*zuhūr*) and hiddenness (*khafā'*). What is apparent [is two categories]: the appearance of sensible things is *zahr*, and the appearance of spirits is *batn*. What is hidden [is also two classes]: the hiddenness of realities (*ḥaqā'iq: a'yān thābita*) is *muṭṭala'*, and the hiddenness of the most perfect Muḥammadan manifestation of unity [the first divine manifestation] is what is beyond *muṭṭala' (mā ba'da al-muṭṭala')*.<sup>78</sup>

It is true that Qūnawī uses the hadith when explaining the ontological levels of divine speech and when interpreting the Qur'anic text as having multiple layers each of which points to a different ontological level in existence. Fanārī takes these ideas a step further by *explicitly* establishing an organic connection between the layers of meaning in the Qur'anic text and the gradual manifestation of divine speech. In other words, the text contains the traces of divine manifestation that passes through the ontological levels. This means that deciphering the text is more than an intellectual activity; it also requires spiritual experience to make sense of the hints in the text about what lies beyond the physical world. I will discuss this in Chapter 6, but I would like to say here that Fanārī evaluates exegesis not only at the epistemological level but also the spiritual level. This inevitably brings up the subjects of spiritual knowledge and the qualifications of the commentator.

In the following passage, Fanārī presents the theory of “*marātib al-ma'nā*” more clearly. Here, he lists all the different dimensions of meaning a qualified commentator is capable of extracting from the text:

If I clearly mention the levels of meaning in any place, I do not exceed the four because these are the principles (*kulliyāt*) of the meanings. For what is comprehended (*mudrak*) is either perceptible (*ḥissī*) which would be *zahr*, or spiritual (*rūḥānī*) which would be *batn*, or metaphysical (*ma'nawī*) and nominal (*asmā'ī*, i.e., pertaining to the divine names)

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78 Ibid., 9.

which would be *muṭṭala‘*, or imaginal (*khayālī* and *mithālī*) which would be limits (*hudūd*). These are the levels according to the five divine presences (*al-ḥaḍarāt al-khams*). As for divine absolute unity, it would be beyond transcendency (*mā ba‘da al-muṭṭala‘*). Allah knows the best.<sup>79</sup>

Fanārī juxtaposes all the elements of his theory on the basis of the hadith of Z̤B̤H̤M in this short passage: From an ontological perspective, these notions are the names of ontological levels lined up hierarchically, which result in a multiplicity of meanings in a single text. From an exegetical perspective, they are the names of the multiple Qur’anic meanings. From an epistemological perspective, they are the names of what a human being can comprehend. However, the dimensions are not restricted to these four. They are the “principles” (*kulliyāt*), as Fanārī puts it, of the epistemological, ontological, and exegetical levels. Namely, they are top categories and may contain many sub-elements. For example, Qūnawī refers to another hadith that describes the Qur’an as having multiple strata, with one *zahr* and seven *abṭun* (pl. *baṭn*).<sup>80</sup> When explaining the seven strata of the *baṭn*, Fanārī again describes the Qur’anic meanings as varying in depth and associates them with the spiritual levels. Accordingly, *zahr* is the text. The first *baṭn* pertains to worldly actions and physical capacity (*al-quwwa al-‘āmila*), the second to otherworldly actions and the intellectual faculty (*al-quwwa al-‘āqila*), and the third to spirit (*rūḥ*). All of the remaining *baṭns* are related to different levels of the inmost consciousness (*sirr*). For instance, the seventh *baṭn* refers to the highest level of spirituality connected to the ontological level of the absolute unity of multiplicities (*aḥadiyyat jam‘ al-jam‘*).<sup>81</sup> The number of *abṭun* increases to

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79 Fanārī, *‘Ayn*, 90.

80 Qūnawī, *I’jāz al-bayān*, 255-256.

81 Fanārī, *‘Ayn*, 10.

seventy in another version of the hadith. The number seventy refers to the existence of esoteric depths beyond those mentioned, according to Fanārī.<sup>82</sup>

In sum, Fanārī reads the Qur'anic text as having multiple layers of meaning. We saw how he explained this hierarchy through Akbarī ideas based on the hadith of Z̤B̤H̤M. He also tries to justify the theory through the non-Sufi classical terminology. For example, when discussing Baghawī's explanation of the hadith, Fanārī mentions the tripartite hierarchy of literal meaning/*tafsīr/ta'wīl*. This classification does not exclude esoteric meaning because Fanārī considers esoteric exegesis as an aspect of *ta'wīl*.<sup>83</sup> Therefore, we should also examine how Fanārī approaches the term *ta'wīl* and its difference from *tafsīr* (in its meaning of interpretive method, not as the discipline of Qur'anic exegesis) in order to understand his position regarding esoteric exegesis.

#### *The tafsīr-ta'wīl distinction*

Regarding the etymology of *tafsīr*, Muslim scholars generally point to the Arabic verbal roots, *f-s-r* and *s-f-r*, both of which mean “to expose.”<sup>84</sup> The verbs take on the meaning of “clarification” when transferred to the second stem (*taf'īl*). The word *tafsīr* occurs once in the Qur'an, in Q. 25:33,<sup>85</sup> where it means “explanation.” The word *ta'wīl* is derived from the second stem of the verb *a-w-l* meaning “to return from.” *Ta'wīl*, in this regard, literally means to make something return. The word occurs in 17 places in the Qur'an with various meanings, some of which are the

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82 Ibid.

83 Ibid., 89.

84 For the opinions on the meanings of *tafsīr* and *ta'wīl* and on their difference, see Muḥammad Ḥusayn Dhahabī, *al-Tafsīr wa-l-mufasssīrūn*, 1:13-22. For morphological, grammatical, semantic, theological and historical analyses of the terms *tafsīr* and *ta'wīl*, see Hussein Abdul-Raof, *Schools of Qur'anic Exegesis: Genesis and Development* (London; New York: Routledge, 2010), 84-110.

85 “And no question do they bring to thee but We reveal to thee the truth and the best explanation (*tafsīran*) (thereof).”

following: interpretation of the Qur'an (Q. 3:7), explanation of intention (Q. 18:78, 82), conclusion (Q. 4:59, 7:53), and interpretation of dreams (Q. 12:6, 37, 44, 45, 100).

According to Muḥammad Ḥusayn Dhahabī (d. 1977), a contemporary scholar of Qur'anic studies, the meaning of *ta'wīl* underwent semantic change over the course of time. In the early centuries, *ta'wīl* had the same meaning as *tafsīr*, which was “interpretation,” so that these two words were used interchangeably. Later scholars distinguished *ta'wīl* from *tafsīr* by redefining the former as ascribing a meaning to a text outside of its semantic axis (*marjūh*: non-preponderant), not the obvious meaning, by force of evidence.<sup>86</sup> Theologians, especially, favored this later understanding of *ta'wīl* as a method of interpretation because it allowed them to interpret anthropomorphic verses of the Qur'an as divine attributes. However, this method also caused fierce debates among Islamic schools. The reason for the conflict over the notion was the use of *ta'wīl* in its later meaning by theological schools to support their own agendas, according to Amīn al-Khūlī, a contemporary Egyptian scholar.<sup>87</sup> Some thinkers also trace the distinction of *tafsīr* and *ta'wīl* back to the early sectarian conflicts between the Shī'a and their opponents. The Shī'a adopted an esoteric mode of interpretation in the name of *ta'wīl* to justify their doctrines.<sup>88</sup> Similarly, Sufis who favored esoteric exegesis and rational commentators who appropriated exegesis by reason defended their positions by considering them within the scope of *ta'wīl*. As a result, a variety of opinions emerged regarding the definition of *ta'wīl* and its difference from *tafsīr*. In the various explanations of *ta'wīl*, especially those presented by the Sunni scholars

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86 Dhahabī, *al-Tafsīr wa-l-mufasssīrūn*, 1:17-18.

87 Ibid., 1:19.

88 Abdul-Raof, *Schools of Qur'anic Exegesis*, 104-105.

listed in works of Qur’anic studies, we see the scholars’ eagerness to determine the boundaries of “legitimate” *ta’wīl*.<sup>89</sup> As a result, they categorized *ta’wīl* practices as acceptable and rejected.

Fanārī also focuses on the scholarly discussions about the *tafsīr/ta’wīl* distinction. He is primarily interested in the exegetical rather than the theological aspect of the subject. After discussing various opinions regarding the difference between the two, he accepts *tafsīr* as a method of interpretation that relies on narration (*riwāya*) and *ta’wīl* as a method on rational investigation (*dirāya*).<sup>90</sup> The approach of the later scholars (*al-uṣūliyyūn*) helped Fanārī to shape his understanding regarding the subject. They emphasize that *tafsīr* signifies the apparent meaning of the text whereas *ta’wīl* deals with inexplicit meaning. They also understand *tafsīr* to be interpretation that proceeds by choosing one of the possible meanings of a text, indicated by definite evidence, as opposed to *ta’wīl*, where possible meanings are indicated by conjectural evidence.<sup>91</sup> These two points, namely the clarity/obscurity of the meaning and the definiteness/speculativity of evidence, are two important components of Fanārī’s thoughts about exegesis of the Qur’an, as will be discussed in detail below. These two points help Fanārī to distinguish between meanings that are determined and those that are assumed to be God’s intention.

According to Fanārī, *ta’wīl* is as permissible as *tafsīr*.<sup>92</sup> To reinforce this idea, he recalls Qur’anic verses that call upon people to ponder the Qur’an and Prophetic traditions, and

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89 For example, see Dhahabī, *al-Tafsīr wa-l-mufasssīrūn*, 1:19-22.

90 Fanārī, *‘Ayn*, 5. He attributes this opinion to Abū al-‘Abbās Muwaffaq al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Yūsuf ibn al-Ḥasan al-Kawāshī al-Mawṣilī (d. 1281), a scholar of Qur’anic exegesis and recitation and the author of a Qur’anic commentary entitled *Tabṣīrat al-mutadhakkir*. However, Zarkashī relates this as Ibn al-Ḍurays al-Bajalī’s (d. 906) opinion. See Zarkashī, *al-Burhān fī ‘ulūm al-Qur’ān*, 2:150.

91 Fanārī, *‘Ayn*, 7.

92 Ibid., 8.

statements of prominent companions, in the same line.<sup>93</sup> Among them, the statement attributed to Ibn ‘Abbās and its explanation by Fanārī stand out:

“*Tafsīr* has four aspects: an aspect that Arabs can know with their language skills; an aspect for ignorance of which nobody can be excused; an aspect known to scholars; and an aspect known only to God.” They say, the first is about the depths of the language; the second involves the principles of belief and rituals; the third concerns the details of the religious rules and possibilities of interpretation (*ta’wīl*); and the fourth is unknowable things (*ghuyūb*) such as the time of the doomsday and of appearance of its signs.<sup>94</sup>

Fanārī disagrees with those who do not allow *ta’wīl* because of their literal understanding of the famous Prophetic tradition that states, “Whoever interprets the Qur’an according to his own opinion should be prepared for his place in Hell.” He does not infer a prohibition of interpretation based on rational investigation from this tradition. This hadith, according to him, refers to those who make their opinion the sole criterion for interpretation and ignore other evidence, to those who speak on ambiguous verses of the Qur’an (*mutashābihāt*) about which no knowledge is possible, or to those who consider their opinions certain and put themselves in God’s position.<sup>95</sup> In light of this, we can accept these objections listed by Fanārī as his conditions for permissible *ta’wīl*. In addition, he emphatically states that the comments he offers within the scope of *ta’wīl* never exclude nor negate the primary meaning and the other comments, which otherwise would constitute a Bāṭinī attitude.<sup>96</sup>

Fanārī bases the need of the commentators to adhere to *ta’wīl* on the linguistic characteristics of the Qur’an drawing on the explanations by al-Rāghib al-Isfahānī (d. 1108 or

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93 Ibid., 8, 85.

94 Ibid., 8.

95 Ibid., 9.

96 Ibid., 89.

1109), a prominent medieval scholar of Qur’anic exegesis.<sup>97</sup> Accordingly, the reason necessitating *ta’wīl* is the presence of syntactic and semantic ambiguities in the Qur’anic text. The semantic ambiguities are mostly caused by brief and condensed expression (*ījāz*), one of the most important characteristics of the Qur’anic exposition. Because of this feature, the Qur’an contains many polysemous words. The Prophetic statement that he was given “*jawāmi‘ al-kalim*” (the ability to express many meanings with the most concise wording) points to this characteristic, according to Fanārī.<sup>98</sup> That the linguistic features of the Qur’anic text may involve more than one possible meaning is a recurrent theme in the *‘Ayn* so that many pages of the commentary are reserved for discussions of linguistic details. Fanari states,

With [the efforts of understanding such as] designation of a meaning (*taḥdīd*), iteration (*tardīd*), explanation (*tibyān*) or demonstration (*burhān*) about a rational or narrated subject, the discussant only means that the Qur’an indicates [her/his interpretation] by either expressing (*‘ibāra*) or alluding (*ishāra*) or unambiguously manifesting (*ṣarīḥ*) or indirectly implying (*kināya*) or literally (*ḥaqīqa*) or metaphorically (*isti‘āra*) verbalizing. However, [these interpretation efforts should be practiced] not through the custom of philosophers of metaphysics but according to the methodologies of experts on Arabic language for two important reasons: the first is what the following verse of God refers to: “We sent not a messenger except (to teach) in the language of his (own) people.” [Q. 14:4]. The second is the need for the use of linguistic subtleties (*daqā‘iq*) in order to reach the truths [of the text] (*ḥaqā‘iq*). [This need is true] not only for the people incapable of understanding the intention of the clear speech [but also for the advanced], more specifically about such speech (the Qur’an) that convinces the common with general exposition and satisfies the elites with hidden subtle points as the Prophet says, “For every verse there are *zahr* and *batn*; for every letter there is a *ḥadd*; for every *ḥadd* there is a *muṭṭala‘*.” Because of all these, whose share from the sciences is greater his share from knowledge of the Qur’an is more abundant. This is the meaning of referring to

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97 Abū al-Qāsim Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, *Muqaddima jāmi‘ al-tafāsīr: Ma‘a Tafsīr al-Fātiḥa wa maṭāli‘ al-Baqara* (Kuwayt: Dār al-Da‘wā, 1984), 50; Fanārī, *‘Ayn*, 7.

98 Fanārī, *‘Ayn*, 7, 85.

the contemplation of the people of discernment and pondering of the people of understanding about some parts of the Book.<sup>99</sup>

Another reason that necessitates *ta'wīl* is the insufficiency of narrative material to clarify every linguistic or semantic ambiguity, as we do not always find a tradition regarding every verse. Fanārī emphasizes that the Qur'an contains many passages concerning the ritual, theological, ethical, and spiritual aspects of religion. The Prophet explained only a small portion of the Scripture, while entrusting the explanation of the most of it to qualified scholars. In addition, the use of reason to understand the Qur'an is encouraged in religious accounts. In this regard, Fanārī draws attention to praise for rational inquiry (*ijtihād*) found in Qur'anic verses. These verses state that the Qur'an contains explanations of everything and urge people to ponder the Qur'an and draw conclusions by reason.<sup>100</sup> Fanārī examines rational inquiry practiced in exegesis of the Qur'an in terms of two aspects: language and content. We have already mentioned linguistic analysis as a practice involving *ta'wīl*. The analysis of content is another aspect of *ijtihād* in exegesis of the Qur'an.<sup>101</sup> Fanārī takes the prophetic statements that compare scholars to Jewish prophets to mean that the Prophet vested the scholars with the authority to produce their own comments on the Qur'an and that a scholar's function should go beyond solely transmitting information. However, the scholars would need to know some sciences, sixteen of them to be precise, in order to thoroughly clarify Qur'anic messages.<sup>102</sup> "Whose share

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99 Ibid., 86.

100 Ibid., 8 and 85.

101 Ibid., 86.

102 Ibid., 85-87.

from these sciences is greater,” Fanārī states, “his share from knowledge of the Qur’an is more abundant.”<sup>103</sup>

However, Fanārī points out one problem with the acceptance of *tafsīr* as interpretation by tradition and *ta’wīl* as by reason; he hypothesizes: What if a “*tafsīr*” is based on a singular tradition (*khābar al-wāḥid*), whereas a “*ta’wīl*” is supported by obvious verses (*muḥkam*) of the Qur’an or a *mutawātir* tradition with accompanying rational evidence? Are we going to say, in this case, that *tafsīr* is lower than *ta’wīl*?<sup>104</sup> For a theoretician like Fanārī, it is not important whether this case ever occurred; the possibility suffices for his argument. He tries to solve this problem drawing on Abū Mansūr al-Māturīdī’s (d. 944) understanding. The latter restricts *tafsīr* to interpretation made only by the companions of the Prophet (*ṣaḥāba*) who witnessed the events in person. He classifies what others have said about exegesis as *ta’wīl*.<sup>105</sup> It seems that Fanārī understands Māturīdī as asserting that what the companions witnessed meant certain knowledge only for them, and when this knowledge was passed to on others, it automatically became “conjectural” *ta’wīl* to those who received it.<sup>106</sup> It would follow that all comments passed down from previous generations through singular narrations should be classified as *ta’wīl* not *tafsīr*, which, I think, is not the point Māturīdī wanted to make. In other words, Fanārī, although he does not explicitly say as much, assesses *tafsīr* as that which was narrated from the first generation by *tawātur* and reduces every comment based on either singular narration or rational deduction to *ta’wīl*. It seems that Fanārī focuses here on determining what the exegetes can know

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103 Ibid., 86.

104 Ibid., 6.

105 Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Māturīdī, *Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-‘Aẓīm, al-musammā Ta’wīlāt ahl al-Sunna* (Bayrūt: Mu’assasat al-Risāla, 2004), 1:1.

106 Fanārī, *‘Ayn*, 6.

for certain about Qur’anic meanings. We will see below how he distinguishes between certain and uncertain outcomes of exegesis of the Qur’an when explaining his definition of *Tafsīr*. In this regard, he accepts Fakhr al-Islām al-Bazdawī’s (d. 1089) description of *tafsīr* as “unveiling without leaving any doubt” (*al-kashf bi-lā shubha*), on the condition that it is taken as the exclusive knowledge of the companions or as a comment irrefutably supported by the Qur’anic verses.<sup>107</sup> A comment based on an *āḥad* report is inconclusive (*ẓannī*) in its indication of true meaning, not “without doubt,” that is, not in the same class with *tafsīr* in terms of certainty.<sup>108</sup>

In short, Fanārī argues that *ta’wīl* is indispensable because of the linguistic features of the Qur’an and because of the insufficiency of the explanatory narrations. In addition, the Prophet indirectly entitled Muslim scholars to offer comments on the Qur’an. Fanārī also opines that *ta’wīl* produces indefinite knowledge. However, what does he mean by considering esoteric interpretation an aspect of *ta’wīl*?<sup>109</sup> This move may imply two things: (1) *ta’wīl* should be understood as exegesis based on “other means than narration” including rational inquiry and esoteric enlightenment, and (2) esoteric interpretation should be regarded as rational inquiry. In his *‘Ayn*, Fanārī uses statements that seem to confirm the second option, as we will see below.

#### *The classification of Islamic religious sciences*

Fanārī, in a long chapter,<sup>110</sup> discusses the virtues of Islamic *‘ulūm* (religious sciences) in general, and of *Tafsīr* in particular.<sup>111</sup> His categorization of religious sciences is of great importance

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107 Abū al-Ḥasan ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad al-Bazdawī, *Kanz al-wuṣūl ilā ma’rifat al-uṣūl*, in ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ibn Aḥmad al-Bukhārī, *Kashf al-asrār ‘an Uṣūl Fakhr al-Islām al-Bazdawī* (Bayrūt, Lubnān: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyya, 1997), 1:70. Fanārī, *‘Ayn*, 7.

108 Fanārī, *‘Ayn*, 7.

109 Ibid., 89.

110 Ibid., 17-41 (chapter 3).

111 The Arabic word *‘ilm* means both knowledge and science. Fanārī uses the word with both meanings.

because it reveals his understanding of esoteric knowledge and its place in Qur'anic exegesis. Thus, as would be expected, the exoteric/esoteric dichotomy plays an important role in Fanārī's understanding of *'ulūm* and in his categorization.

Fanārī describes esoteric knowledge and its possessors in a manner similar to what we read in Sufi writings: Esoteric knowledge pertains to the heart and what is beyond the physical world whereas exoteric knowledge is the expression of what is bounded by this world. The authority of the exoteric scholars is valid in this world; their exoteric knowledge provides them only with worldly benefits. Esoteric scholars form their views of everything with a clear discernment not adulterated with doubts. They dedicate themselves to devotional and spiritual practices, so that God will inspire them and guide them to the truest knowledge.<sup>112</sup>

Esoteric knowledge is legitimate, according to Fanārī. To show its legitimacy, he quotes Prophetic traditions, one of which divides knowledge into esoteric and exoteric categories: "Knowledge is two types: Exoteric knowledge that is explicit in the language. This will be God's argument (*ḥujjat Allāh*) against the creatures. Esoteric knowledge in the heart; this is the beneficial knowledge."<sup>113</sup> The authenticity of this hadith is not strong, but the following tradition is very popular in Islamic literature: "The search for knowledge (*al-'ilm*) is incumbent upon all Muslims."<sup>114</sup> Most Muslim scholars have taken the pursuit of knowledge in this hadith to mean pursuit of the knowledge of religious duties, and some have even identified it with the knowledge of the five pillars of Islam.<sup>115</sup> However, Fanārī, who summarizes all these scholarly

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112 Ibid., 27-28.

113 Ibid., 26.

114 Ibn Māja, *Muqaddima*, 20.

115 Fanārī, *'Ayn*, 26-27.

comments on the hadith, puts special emphasis on esoteric knowledge, stating that the obligatory knowledge refers to sincerity (*ikhlās*), knowledge of heart (*'ilm al-qalb*), and esoteric knowledge (*'ilm al-bāṭin*). Regarding the last, Fanārī adds, “Esoteric knowledge is incumbent on the people of heart in an exclusive manner rather than others.”<sup>116</sup>

Esoteric knowledge is not only legitimate, but also the ultimate aim of scholarly activities, and even of creation, according to Fanārī. To emphasize this point, he agrees with Maḥmūd ibn ‘Alī al-Qāshānī al-Ḥamawī (d. 1335), who argues that the knowledge whose virtues are rehearsed at length in the Islamic sources is the knowledge of physical and spiritual actions that will eventually lead to the *'ilm al-Mukāshafa* (direct unveiling).<sup>117</sup> This would mean that Fanārī considers only scholarly efforts that produce esoteric knowledge to be meritorious. Furthermore, he recalls the well-known interpretation of Q. 51:56 that reads, “I have only created jinns and men, that they may serve Me,” according to which, the phrase “that they may serve Me” means “that they may know Me”; therefore, the jinns and the humans, as conscious creatures, were created in order that they should attain knowledge of God. Although Fanārī does not specifically identify this knowledge as esoteric, it would not be wrong to suggest this.<sup>118</sup> Thus, the rational soul (*al-nafs al-nāṭiqa*) reaches perfection by knowing God as much as it can<sup>119</sup> because it was created for this purpose.

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116 Ibid., 26.

117 Ibid., 20. Fanārī frequently cites from Qāshānī’s *Lubāb al-qūṭ min khazā’in al-malakūt*. This book exists as manuscripts in the libraries.

118 Ibid., 21.

119 Ibid., 24

We also see the significance Fanārī attaches to esoteric knowledge in his classification of the religious sciences derived from the Qur'an and Prophetic traditions.<sup>120</sup> Drawing on Bayḍāwī, Fanārī divides these sciences into two categories. The first concerns faith, and the only science in this category is theology, which takes several names, such as *al-'Ilm al-ilāhī*, *Uṣūl al-Dīn*, and *'Ilm al-Kalām*.

The second category is about human actions and states, and is divided into two subcategories: (A) Sciences that focus on actions and states in terms of their religiosity. These are in turn divided according to exoteric or esoteric actions: (1) exoteric actions (*al-a'māl al-zāhira*) are the subject of two Islamic sciences, theoretical jurisprudence (*Uṣūl al-Fiqh*) and law (*Fiqh*), and (2) esoteric states (*al-aḥwāl al-bāṭina*) are investigated according to their practical and theoretical aspects: (a) the practical aspect is described by a variety of names including *'Ilm al-Taṣawwuf* (Sufism), *'Ilm Makārim al-akhlāq* (good moral conduct), *'Ilm al-Riyāḍa* (mortification of the flesh), *'Ilm al-Tazkiyya* (purification of the self), *'Ilm al-Taḥliyya* (beautification of the soul); (b) the theoretical and transcendental aspects of spirituality are named by Fanārī as *'Ilm al-Ḥaqā'iq* (realities), *'Ilm al-Mushāhada* (witnessing, visionary experience), and *'Ilm al-Mukāshafa* (direct unveiling). (B) Sciences that focus on actions and states in terms of historiography: (1) history and storytelling (*Tārīkh* and *Qaṣaṣ*) and (2) exhortation (*'Ilm al-Tadhkīr*). The Figure-1 below shows these seven sciences derived from the Qur'an and the Prophetic traditions together:

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120 Ibid., 24-25.




Figure- 1: Religious sciences derived from the Qur'an and hadiths

Thus, Fanārī gives a place to esotericism in his classification of the religious sciences derived from the Qur'an and hadiths, for two important reasons. First, according to him, esoteric states constitute a human condition. Second, the ultimate sources of religious knowledge, i.e., the Qur'an and hadiths, address this human condition. The divisions Fanārī makes among the esoteric sciences is also worth noting. The knowledge of spiritual practices should be distinguished from the knowledge gained at the transcendental spiritual level, which is reached by means of the practices. The former trains one spiritually to become a recipient of the latter. Fanārī calls this transcendental spirituality *ḥaqā'iq*, *mushāhada*, and *mukāshafa*, all of which refer to esoteric knowledge following from mystical enlightenment. *Ḥaqā'iq* is also the section of his commentary in which he explains the esoteric dimensions of the verses under

consideration. In this section, as we will see in the next chapter, he reveals what the text corresponds to in the unseen ontological and spiritual realms.

Fanārī presents another categorization of the sciences.<sup>121</sup> In this case, he lists sixteen sciences that a commentator needs to know when interpreting the Qur'an and divides them into three categories: (1) linguistic sciences, (2) intellectual sciences, and (3) God-given knowledge. This tripartite categorization and most of the list belong in fact to al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī.<sup>122</sup> The list is as follows:

(A) The linguistic sciences (*al-'ulūm al-laḫẓiyya*): (1) lexicology (*Lughā*), (2) etymology (*Ishtiḳāq*), (3) morphology (*Ṣarf*), (4) grammar (*Naḥw*), (5) lexicology in rhetoric (*Ma'ānī*), (6) style of speech in rhetoric (*Bayān*), (7) verbal embellishment in rhetoric (*Badī'*), and (8) methods of reciting the Qur'an (*Qirā'āt*).

(B) The intellectual or metaphysical sciences (*al-'ulūm al-'aqliyya* or *al-ma'nawiyya*) are the following: (1) storytelling and narrative (*Qaṣaṣ* and *Āthār*), (2) Prophetic tradition (*Ḥadīth*), (3) theology (*Kalām*), (4) realities (*Ḥaqā'iq*), (5) jurisprudence (*Uṣūl al-Fiqh*), (6) duties towards God and man, and prohibitions (*Mu'āmalāt* and *Mazājir*), (7) rituals and ethics (*'Ibādāt* and *Akhlāq*), (8) and exhortation (*Tadhkīr*).

(C) Knowledge bestowed by God by divine inspiration (*al-'ilm al-wahbī*). Fanārī mentions the science of “realities” (or “truths”) (*Ḥaqā'iq*) in the second group as the only

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121 Ibid., 86-87.

122 Iṣfahānī, *Muqaddima*, 94-96. Iṣfahānī's list contains the following ten sciences: *Lughā* (lexicology), *Ishtiḳāq* (etymology), *Naḥw* (grammar), *Qirā'āt* (recitation), *Āthār* and *Akḫbār* (narrative), *Ḥadīth* (prophetic tradition), *Uṣūl al-Fiqh* (jurisprudence), *Fiqh* (law), *Kalām* (theology), and *'Ilm al-mawhibā* (God-given knowledge).

example of this kind. The figure below shows these sixteen sciences that serve as sources of exegesis of the Qur'an:




Figure- 2: Religious sciences that are sources of Tafsīr

Fanārī agrees with Iṣfahānī on that these sciences are necessary for Qur'anic exegesis because they address the fundamental aims of the Qur'an (*maqāṣid*), which can be summarized as the knowledge of faith essentials and religious actions. These fundamental aims cannot be attained without expertise in the linguistic sciences, which delineate the meanings of the words, and expertise in the intellectual sciences, which illuminate the connections of the words to the concepts.<sup>123</sup> Whoever masters these sixteen sciences, Fanārī emphasizes, is not subject to the serious Prophetic warning against interpretation by personal opinion.<sup>124</sup>

The list above clearly shows that linguistic analysis dominates exegesis of the Qur'an, according to Fanārī. In this sense, he follows the Akbarī tradition, which treats the language of

<sup>123</sup> Fanārī, *'Ayn*, 86. Cf. Iṣfahānī, *Muqaddima*, 94.

<sup>124</sup> Fanārī, *'Ayn*, 87. Cf. Iṣfahānī, *Muqaddima*, 96.

the Qur'an as the most important key to extracting meanings. The three sciences of rhetoric (*Ma'ānī*, *Bayān*, and *Badī'*) that Fanārī adds to Iṣfahānī's list show that he does not find a simple linguistic analysis at a basic level to be sufficient.<sup>125</sup> Since he considers the Qur'anic text extremely complicated, as expressing many subtleties with very concise wording (*ījāz*), he favors a deeper evaluation that involves rhetoric in order to unfold the complexities of the text. In addition, one of Fanārī's aims in interpretation, like that of other Sufis, is to distill wisdom and abstruse points from the text. That is why the 'Ayn has sections titled *Raqā'iq* (subtleties), *Ḥaqā'iq* (realities or truths) and *Tadhkīr* (exhortation). To extract deep meanings obviously requires more than a basic linguistic inquiry.

Fanārī's inclusion of *'ilm al-mawhibā* (the knowledge bestowed by God) among the sciences needed by commentators is not surprising. Although Iṣfahānī means by this divine guidance attained through piety,<sup>126</sup> Fanārī takes it as esoteric knowledge whose source is divine inspiration (*al-ilhām al-ilāhī*) and identifies it as *'Ilm al-Ḥaqā'iq*. Furthermore, he counts *'Ilm al-Ḥaqā'iq* among the intellectual sciences. This move indicates that he sees the knowledge bestowed by God as equal to intellectual knowledge in terms of authority. It also indicates that he associates divine inspiration with intellectual/rational knowledge. Does this mean that Fanārī considers divine inspiration as a function of human intellect? What is the nature of esoteric knowledge, in this case, according to Fanārī? We will try to find an answer to this question but before we attempt that, we need to mention a problem addressed by Fanārī:

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125 Zarkashī also sees these rhetorical sciences as essential knowledge for commentators, along with the grammatical sciences. See Zarkashī, *al-Burhān fī 'ulūm al-Qur'ān*, 2:173-174. It seems that Fanārī integrated Iṣfahānī's list with Zarkashī's and added minor details.

126 Iṣfahānī, *Muqaddima*, 95-96.

The first list provided by Fanārī names the sciences derived from the Qur’an whereas the second list contains the sciences needed to understand the Qur’an. As a result, Fanārī is prompted to accept some sciences, such as *‘Ilm al-Ḥaqā’iq*, as both the source and the outcome of Qur’anic exegesis, which poses a problem for him. In answer to the hypothetical question, “Is it not a tautology to accept these sciences as both a source and an outcome?” he states:

Since the Qur’an is an ocean whose wonders are never exhausted nor whose mysteries ever cease, the effort to benefit and the endeavor to deduce [new meanings] from it never have a limit where the activity [of producing interpretation] stops or the effort becomes unfruitful. If the truths (*ḥaqā’iq*) of what the Salaf deduced and compiled, their sources and the ways to acquire them are known, this would be a useful key to open the secrets undiscovered by them. [It also would be] a clear route to discovering the treasures of the cyphers of allusions [of the Qur’an] not comprehended before. The divine grace and blessings are truly unlimited, as it is said, “the door of the divine realm is never closed.” For every aspirant soul there is a share from the divine mysteries. Since the outcome that the aspirant attains is different from previous outcomes, benefitting from [the previous ones] does not entail tautology.<sup>127</sup>

This passage summarizes, in fact, how Fanārī approaches Qur’anic exegesis in general, and its esoteric aspect in particular. First, he accepts the Qur’an as a limitless source of knowledge and exegesis as the endless effort to understand the text of the Qur’an. Here he apparently refers to *ta’wīl* as a form of exegesis by intellect that includes esoteric knowledge. Second, he attaches importance to knowing previous exegetical results because he believes they can guide the commentator to produce new interpretations. Whether Fanārī evaluates the guidance of previous comments on an epistemological or spiritual plane is not certain, but both are possible. In other words, on one hand, a commentator should adopt what these comments suggest as her/his source of knowledge and try to interpret in conformity with this knowledge. As a matter of fact, what

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127 Ibid., 88.

Fanārī does in his commentary, especially in the sections reserved for Sufi thoughts, is to cite previous Sufis, mostly Qūnawī, to explain their commentaries and to suggest similar comments. On the other hand, the commentator should try to reach the spiritual level, where she/he can experience what has been narrated in previous commentaries and be able to fathom new depths of meaning. This means that the exegetical process involves not only intellectual activities, but also spiritual experience.

### *The nature of esoteric knowledge*

Fanārī engages in long discussions on epistemology in his works, especially in his commentary on Qūnawī's *Miftāḥ al-ghayb*. A detailed overview of these discussions on epistemology is beyond the scope of this study but we need to touch upon some points essential to understand the position of esoteric knowledge in Fanārī's hermeneutics. It seems that he takes esoteric knowledge as something that can be grasped by human intellect. We saw some clues to this understanding in Fanārī's classification of esoteric knowledge by the name of *ḥaqā'iq*, as both intellectual and inspired by God. His emphasis on the notion of intellectual cognition when defending the legitimacy of *ta'wīl*, which includes both rational and esoteric exegesis in his understanding, may be considered another indication. For example, in the following passage, Fanārī states in defense of *ta'wīl*:

As for those who say that whoever has extensive erudition (*adab wasī'*) can comment on the Qur'an: this [conclusion] is right following from the praise for contemplation (*tadabbur*) [found in religious sources], the exhortation to pondering (*tafakkur*) and the indication to the fact that there is full explanation of everything in the Qur'an and following from the testimony of the consensus (*ijmā'*) made by the Salaf on [the necessity] of independent reasoning (*ijtihād*) in logical deducing (*istinbāṭ*)...<sup>128</sup>

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128 Fanārī, *Ayn*, 85.

This passage argues that any qualified commentator can produce new comments not found in the narrated reports. What attracts our attention here, and Fanārī's exposition in general in the *'Ayn*, is that he does not emphasize mystical knowledge (*kashf*: unveiling) as much as Ibn al-‘Arabī and Qūnawī do. In the passage above, he defends *ta'wīl*, using notions, such as *tadabbur*, *tafakkur*, *ijmā'*, *ijtihād*, *istinbāt*, etc. which are important for Islamic traditions that attend to intellectual pursuits in their epistemology.

The reason for Fanārī's prioritizing of the terminology of discursive knowledge over mystical Sufi terminology in epistemological discussions in the *'Ayn* might be a desire to bring esoteric exegesis into a moderate zone acceptable to non-Sufi scholars. Since Akbarī writers are distinctively eager to demonstrate their Sufi ideas through Qur'anic exegesis, Fanārī's explanation may be assessed as an attempt to defend and validate Akbarī esoteric interpretations and to reconcile them with classical Islamic disciplines by giving them a place within the borders of intellectual inquiry.

Another possibility is that Fanārī might take mystical knowledge as intuitive reasoning. He does not speak about this concept in the *'Ayn*, but the fact that Avicennian influence is clearly observed in Fanārī's writings tempts us to consider this possibility.<sup>129</sup> For example, Fanārī

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129 For examples of Avicennian influence on Fanārī in regard to his ontology, see Jules Janssens, "Elements of Avicennian Influence in al-Fanārī's Theory of Emanation," in *Uluslararası Molla Fenârî Sempozyumu: International Symposium on Molla Fanârî*, ed. Tevfik Yucedogru et al. (Bursa: Bursa Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2010), 315-328; Heidrun Eichner, "Intertextuality and Intellectual Affiliations: The Case of Molla Fanârî's Ontology," in *Uluslararası Molla Fenârî Sempozyumu: International Symposium on Molla Fanârî*, ed. Tevfik Yucedogru et al. (Bursa: Bursa Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2010), 459-466. Nicholas Heer argues that Fanārī, along with other Sufis from the School of *Wahdat al-wujūd*, agrees with Ibn Sīnā that universals exist outside the mind, although he differs on the details. They go counter to Muslim theologians such as Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī and Sa'd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, who "concluded that universals existed only in the mind." See Nicholas Heer, "The Sufi Position With Respect to the Problem of Universals." Unpublished paper. <http://faculty.washington.edu/heer/universals-sep.pdf>. Cf. 'Abd al-Rahmān Jāmī, *al-Durrat al-Fākhira* (al-Qāhira: Maktabat al-Thaqāfat al-dīniyya, 2002), 13-14. Fanārī also follows Ibn Sīnā on certain subjects of logic. El-Rouayheb explains that Fanārī departs from Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī regarding the "syllogism of equality" and embraces Ibn Sīnā's opinion. See Khaled El-Rouayheb, *Relational Syllogisms and the History of Arabic Logic, 900-1900* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 82-83.

discusses the subject of comprehension (*idrāk*) through Ibn Sīnā's terminology, which is apparently cited from the latter's famous *al-Ishārāt*.<sup>130</sup> Fanārī defines *idrāk* here as the "mental representation (*tamaththul*) of a reality (*ḥaqīqa*) in the manner of contemplative vision (*mushāhada*)."<sup>131</sup> He explains *mushāhada* with the notion *ḥuḍūr*, which denotes the "presence" of that which is comprehended by the intellect.<sup>132</sup> It is probable that Fanārī was influenced by Ibn Sīnā's teachings through Qūnawī.<sup>133</sup> It is also probable that Fanārī adopted Rāzī's approach to intuition as a method of acquiring knowledge that the latter is said to have developed under the influence of Ibn Sīnā.<sup>134</sup>

At this point, it would be pertinent to requote a passage from the *ʿAyn* that reinforces the idea that Fanārī considers spiritual enlightenment as a function of the human intellect in acquiring knowledge. As we mentioned before, the four notions of the hadith of Z̤B̤Ḥ̤M refer to and include all that is subject to human knowledge:

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130 Avicenna, *Kitāb al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt (Le livre des théorèmes et des avertissements)* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1892), 1:122-123.

131 Fanārī, *ʿAyn*, 13.

132 Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and Taftāzānī also use the same notion, *ḥuḍūr*, as an explanation of *mushāhada* when commenting on Ibn Sīnā. See Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar al-Rāzī, *Kitāb Lubāb al-Ishārāt* (Miṣr: Muṣṭafā Afandī al-Makkawī wa-Muḥammad Amīn al-Khānjī al-Kutubī, 1326 [1908]), 74; Masʿūd ibn ʿUmar al-Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid* (Bayrūt: ʿĀlam al-kutub, 1989), 2:299.

133 For Ibn Sīnā's influence on Qūnawī and his followers, see Ekrem Demirli, "The Influence of Ibn Sīnā on Sadr al-Dīn Qūnawī and His Followers," *Ishrak* 1 (2010): 472-478.

134 Rāzī's *Kitāb Lubāb al-Ishārāt* is considered one of the most popular commentaries on Ibn Sīnā's *al-Ishārāt*. According to Ayman Shihadeh, Rāzī accepted Ibn Sīnā's notion that discursive knowledge may be acquired through intuition aside from reflection. Shihadeh also argues that Rāzī distinguished the mystical knowledge of the Sufis from intuition. See Ayman Shihadeh, "The Mystic and the Skeptic in Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī," in *Sufism and Theology*, ed. Ayman Shihadeh (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 113. Damien Janos disagrees with Shihadeh on the latter's characterizing Rāzī as opposing mystical knowledge to the knowledge acquired by cogitation and intuition. See Damien Janos, "Intuition, Intellection, and Mystical Knowledge: Delineating Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's Cognitive Theories," in *Islam and Rationality: The Impact of al-Ghazzālī (Papers Collected in His 900th Anniversary)* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2015), 192. According to Janos, Rāzī defined "mystical knowledge as a kind of intuitive intellectual knowledge" and accepted intuitive cognition as a feature of the human intellect. Reflection and intuition as two methods of acquiring knowledge were compatible not opposing in Rāzī's theory. (See *ibid.*, 224-225).

If I clearly mention the levels of meaning in any place, I do not exceed the four because these are the principles (*kulliyāt*) of the meanings. For what is comprehended (*mudrak*) is either perceptible (*ḥissī*) which would be *ẓahr*, or spiritual (*rūḥānī*) which would be *batn*, or metaphysical (*ma‘nawī*) and nominal (*asmā‘i*, i.e., pertaining to the divine names) which would be *muṭṭala‘*, or imaginal (*khayālī* and *mithālī*) which would be limits (*ḥudūd*). These are the levels according to the five divine presences (*al-ḥaḍarāt al-khams*). As for divine absolute unity, it would be beyond transcendency (*mā ba‘da al-muṭṭala‘*). Allah knows the best.<sup>135</sup>

This passage suggests that the levels of meaning that parallel the ontological gradations of divine speech, including esoteric depths, are the subjects of “comprehension” (*idrāk*). This means that esoteric meaning is linked to intellectual cognitive processes and that the human intellect is capable of comprehending esoteric mystical knowledge. Now, we will look at how Fanārī defines the Qur’an and the discipline of Qur’anic exegesis (*Tafsīr*) in ways that accommodate a theory of multilayered meaning.

#### *Definition of the Qur’an as a scripture*

Fanārī reserves a section in the introduction of the *‘Ayn* to the discussion of the definition of the Qur’an.<sup>136</sup> This discussion shows us how he approaches exegesis of the Qur’an because, as we will see in detail below, he offers a definition compatible with his hermeneutical thinking. The following is his definition:

[The Qur’an] is what is held in consideration as God’s speech insofar as that the revelations of both its wording in Arabic and its meaning intended by God have been finalized upon our Prophet [Muḥammad].<sup>137</sup>

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135 Fanārī, *‘Ayn*, 90.

136 Ibid., 41-43.

137 “*Huwa kalām Allāh al-mu‘tabar min ḥaythu taḥaqquq nuzūl naẓmih al-‘Arabī wa-mā huwa ma‘nāhu al-murād ‘inda Allāh ta‘ālā ‘alā rasūlinā ṣallā Allāh ‘alayh wa-sallam.*” Ibid., 41.

Fanārī explains the rationale behind his definition by expounding upon each word he uses. For example, the phrase “held in consideration” (*al-mu‘tabar*) is used to exclude Qur’anic expressions often used in daily life, such as *al-ḥamdu li-llāh* (“all praise is due to God”). If such expressions are not uttered for the purpose of recitation, they are not considered God’s speech; in this case, ritual purification is not required to say them. The phrase “the certain completion of the revelation of its Arabic discourse” (*taḥaqquq nuzūl naẓmih al-‘Arabī*) aims to exclude variant Qur’anic recitations not transmitted by consensus (*qirā’āt shādhḥa*), Qur’anic verses whose text was abrogated (*mansūkh*), and the *basmala* found at the beginning of Qur’anic chapters (except the one in the Chapter *al-Naml* [Q. 27:30]). The phrase “its Arabic discourse” (*naẓmih al-‘Arabī*) excludes recitation of the Qur’an in the Persian language, as we discussed in Chapter 4. The phrase “upon our Prophet” (*‘alā rasūlinā*) obviously excludes God’s speech sent in the form of sacred texts to the other prophets.

Fanārī criticizes three definitions of the Qur’an that became popular in Islamic literature.<sup>138</sup> One was offered by Fakhr al-Islām al-Bazdawī (d. 1089): “The Qur’an is God’s speech sent down (*munzal*) to the Prophet, written in the books (*maṣāḥif*), and transmitted by *tawātur* with no doubt.”<sup>139</sup> The second belongs to Ibn al-Ḥājib (d. 1249): “It is God’s speech sent down to display miracle (*li-l-i‘jāz*) even by a chapter of it.”<sup>140</sup> The third definition is found in Ghazzālī’s (d. 1111) *al-Muṣtaṣfā*: “It is what was transmitted to us between two covers of the books (*daffatay al-maṣāḥif*) by *tawātur*.”<sup>141</sup> We can summarize all of the critical points listed by

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138 Ibid., 42-43.

139 Bazdawī, *Kanz al-wuṣūl*, 1:36.

140 ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Umar Ibn al-Ḥājib, *Kitāb Mukhtaṣar al-muntahā al-uṣūlī* (al-Qāhira: Maṭba‘at Kurdistān al-‘ilmiyya, 1326 [1908]), 48.

141 Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazzālī, *al-Muṣtaṣfā fī ‘ilm al-uṣūl* (Bayrūt, Lubnān: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyya, 1993), 81.

Fanārī as follows: they do not offer a perfect definition of the Qur’an because (1) they associate it with what is beyond speech that manifested in human language (e.g., with eternal divine speech), (2) they are redundant (with the word *maṣāḥif*), and (3) they fail to exclude Persian recitations and Qur’anic expressions used in daily life.

Two components that stand out in the definition are references to the Arabic expression of the text and to its divinely intended meaning. First, Fanārī emphasizes that the Arabic discourse of the Qur’an was certainly revealed to the Prophet. Namely, what we call the Qur’an is the Arabic text we possess in hand. This emphasis on the Arabic exposition of the Qur’an manifests itself in Fanārī’s practice of exegesis as excessive attention to linguistic analysis. Second, he underlines that God also revealed the intended meaning of this Arabic discourse to the Prophet.<sup>142</sup> This means that the Prophet knew what God’s meaning as regards the words of the Qur’an. However, did the Prophet pass down the “intended meaning” for every part of the Qur’an? Fanārī’s answer to this question is negative, as we touched on when discussing his thoughts regarding the *tafsīr/ta’wīl* distinction. Therefore, the revelation of meaning to the Prophet does not mean that we know exactly what God means in every verse of the Qur’an.

Consensus (*tawātur*) plays a role, not in the definition but in the explanations, as a major factor in defining what the Qur’an and its valid interpretation are. First of all, consensus qualifies what should be considered the Qur’an. For example, unconventional recitations (*al-qirā’āt al-shādhda*) that were not transmitted by *tawātur* are not considered to be of the Qur’an. Debates among Islamic schools over the *basmala* are more interesting in this regard. Since there is disagreement among Islamic schools because of conflicting reports about whether the *basmala*

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<sup>142</sup> This “*ma’nā*” (“meaning”) mentioned in the definition is not the eternal entity that subsists with God called *kalām naḥsī*, which we discussed in the previous chapter.

was revealed as a distinctive Qur’anic verse –except for Q. 27:30– the claim that the *basmalas* at the beginning of the chapters are not from the Qur’an does not make one non-religious. Some schools require their recitation at the beginnings of the chapters –except for the Chapter *al-Tawba*– considering the *basmala* to be part of these chapters, whereas others believe that the *basmala* was revealed only once and put at the beginning of the chapters in order to separate them, as a result of human opinion (*ijtihad*), not divine inspiration. Fanārī states that there is consensus on the transmission of the *basmalas* at the beginning of the chapters, but no consensus on whether they are part of the Qur’an. He likens the *basmala* to the sacred prophetic traditions (*aḥādith qudsiyya*), saying, “Even if we imagine that the sacred hadiths were reported by consensus, we would not call them the Qur’an.”<sup>143</sup>

The divinely intended meaning of the Qur’an is also known through consensus, according to Fanārī. He uses the phrase “the meaning intended by God” (*ma‘nāhu al-murād ‘inda Allāh*) to exclude meanings assigned by commentators to the Qur’an that are not supported by definite evidence (*al-dalīl al-qat‘ī*), or are not supported by a consensus of reports (*tawātur*), such as comments on the parabolic verses of the Qur’an (*mutashābih*) or comments made by conjectural evidence, which are based on singular narration (*al-khabar al-wāḥid*) or personal opinion in this context. In this case, there are two types of consensus that play a role in determining the certain meaning of the Qur’an: (a) general acceptance of what Fanārī calls the “irrefutability of evidence,” and (b) transmission of Prophetic comments on the Qur’an by *tawātur*, which are authentic reports about divinely intended meanings. Regarding the first, Fanārī does not explain what the definite evidence is here. He probably means what can be certainly known from Qur’anic exposition, given that he excludes comments on ambiguous verses from being intended

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143 Fanārī, *‘Ayn*, 42.

by God. Regarding the second, since he affirms that God revealed his intention to the Prophet, the Prophetic comments are the true meanings of the text. However, only those comments narrated by consensus are certain. In short, Fanārī restricts “the meaning intended by God” to (a) the incontrovertible apparent meaning and (b) Prophetic interpretations transmitted by *tawātur*. Every comment other than these is uncertain and cannot be exclusively called God’s intention. What follows from this is that most of the comments offered on the Qur’an do not fall into the category of “divinely intended,” as Fanārī reminds us several times, because they depend on either singular narration or reason, both of which count as inconclusive evidence.

With this discussion regarding the knowability of divine intention, Fanārī aims to emphasize two things. He affirms that, on one hand, the Qur’an is not a totally encoded book from which we receive no explicit message. Thus, the Muslim *umma* has reached a consensus on the meaning of some parts of the Qur’an, if not the entire Scripture, because of their self-evident character and because of *mutawātir* reports of prophetic comments. On the other hand, Fanārī wants to secure the validity of offering interpretations other than transmitted reports for the intellectual and spiritual inheritors of the Prophet. While non-Sufi Muslim scholars restrict the prophetic heritage to only “exoteric” Islamic sciences, Fanārī, like other Sufis, insists on mystical knowledge as an additional tool in the interpretation process.

#### *Definition of Tafsīr as an Islamic discipline*

Fanārī opens the prologue of *‘Ayn al-a’yān* with a discussion on *Tafsīr*, the Islamic discipline whose subject is the Qur’an (not with the meaning of *tafsīr* as a method of interpretation).<sup>144</sup> The

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144 Ibid., 4-13.

discussion consists of several subsections, which include the definition of *Tafsīr*, its subject, and its relationship with the other Islamic sciences. Fanārī formulates his own definition, as follows:

*Tafsīr* is the knowledge of the states of God’s speech in terms of its Qur’anness and in terms of its indication to God’s intention that is known or assumed according to the human capacity.<sup>145</sup>

This definition may sound odd at first glance for Qur’anic exegesis, but each word of it is carefully chosen by Fanārī in order to specify the nature and the authority of *Tafsīr* and to avoid the criticism he directs against other definitions that had been made by scholars before him, such as Qutb al-Dīn al-Taḥṭānī and Sa‘d al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī.

First of all, *Tafsīr*, in Fanārī’s opinion, cannot be approached as a systematic science (*‘ilm*), as defined in Taftāzānī’s description, but only as “knowledge” (or study) (*ma‘rifa*).<sup>146</sup> Fanārī wants to point out the fact that *Tafsīr* has no authority to determine God’s intention in most of the Qur’an by preferring *ma‘rifa* over *‘ilm*. As epistemological notions, both *‘ilm* and *ma‘rifa* literally mean “knowledge,” but they have been treated as different concepts in the Islamic literature.<sup>147</sup> The two most common differences discussed by Muslim scholars are the following: *‘ilm* refers to the comprehension of universals (*kulliyāt*) and is pertinent to assent (*taṣdīq*), whereas *ma‘rifa* refers to the comprehension of particulars (*juz‘iyyāt*) and concerns

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145 Ibid., 5. “*‘Ilm al-Tafsīr ma‘rifat aḥwāl kalām Allāh ta‘ālā min ḥaythu al-Qur‘aniyya wa-min ḥaythu dalālatuh ‘alā mā yu‘lam aw yuẓann annahū murād Allāh bi-qadar al-ṭāqat al-insaniyya.*”

146 Ibid., 4. Taftāzānī defines *Tafsīr* as follows: “It is the science (*al-‘ilm*) that investigates the states (*aḥwāl*) of the words of God’s speech in terms of their indication (*al-dalāla*) to the intention (*al-murād*).” Fanārī cites Taftāzānī’s definition from his super-commentary on Zamakhsharī’s *al-Kashshāf*, which has not been published yet. Al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī, who also wrote a super-commentary on *al-Kashshāf* and criticized Taftāzānī on many points, adopted this definition of his rival. See ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī, *al-Ḥāshiyā ‘alā al-Kashshāf li-l-Zamakhsharī* (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyya, 2016), 110.

147 For the discussion of these differences, see Peri Bearman et.al., “‘Ilm,” in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. 2d ed. Brill Online [www.brillonline.com]; Roger Arnaldez, “Ma‘rifa,” in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. 2d ed. Brill Online [www.brillonline.com].

conceptualization (*taṣawwur*).<sup>148</sup> *‘Ilm* is also used to refer to systematic sciences that have methodologies and principles (*al-uṣūl wa-l-qawā‘id*); *ma‘rifā* lacks this qualification. Fanārī emphasizes that since *Tafsīr* has neither methodology nor universal principles, except in a few cases, it cannot be defined as *‘ilm*, unlike other Islamic sciences that are bound to the logic of a premise-conclusion system, such as Islamic theoretical jurisprudence (*Uṣūl al-Fiqh*).<sup>149</sup> The following example, which is given by Fanārī when he mentions some of the principles discussed by commentators, shows us what he understands from the principles (*qawā‘id*): Every address in the Qur’an that begins with “*Yā ayyuhā al-nās!*” (O people!) is directed to Meccans, with “*Yā ayyuhā alladhīna āmanū!*” (O believers!) to Medinans, and with “*Yā ahl al-Kitāb!*” (O people of the Book!) to Jews and Christians.<sup>150</sup> In this regard, a “principle” refers to a systematic method that always gives the same result.

The characterization of *Tafsīr* as *ma‘rifā* rather than as *‘ilm* inevitably results in the acceptance of a multiplicity of interpretations that should be considered valid, the idea favored by Sufis, especially Akbarīs. For to say that *Tafsīr* has neither methodology nor principles makes its outcomes (most of the outcomes, according to Fanārī) inconclusive (*ẓannī*). If we consider that methodologies and principles are established through inductive reasoning, i.e., through an analysis of individual comments leading to general conclusions, again we face the fact pointed out by Fanārī, that most of the comments are conjectural because they are based on either reason or singular hadith. Either way (that is, (a) *Tafsīr* does not have the authority to produce certain knowledge because it lacks universal principles or (b) most comments provide conjectural

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148 Fanārī, *‘Ayn*, 15.

149 Ibid., 5.

150 Ibid., 79.

knowledge, so that *Tafsīr* is not able to derive principles from them), *Tafsīr* does not deserve to be called *‘ilm* rather than *ma‘rifā*. With this well-considered detail, not only does Fanārī question the authority of *Tafsīr* to determine God’s intention in the words of the Qur’an, but also he validates interpretive efforts based on means other than narration by placing them on equal terms. Otherwise *Tafsīr* would be reduced to “exegesis by tradition,” by which a static interpretation is continuously passed down.

The description of *Tafsīr* as related to either assents or concepts has been debated in the works of Qur’anic studies. For example, ‘Abd al-‘Azīm al-Zurqānī, a prominent contemporary Egyptian scholar of Qur’anic studies, reports that ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm al-Siyalkūtī (d. 1656), a notable Mughal gloss writer, asserts that *Tafsīr* is a science of concepts (*taṣawwurāt*) because its only function is linguistic delineation (*al-ta‘ārif al-laḥẓiyya*). Conversely, al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d. 1414) treats *Tafsīr* as a science that produces assents (*taṣdīqāt*) because it becomes a determining factor (*yataḍamman ḥukm*) for the language of the text by assigning meanings to the words.<sup>151</sup> Muḥyī al-Dīn al-Kāfiyajī (d. 1474), Fanārī’s pupil, agrees with Jurjānī that the outcomes of *Tafsīr* should be considered assents, in consequence of his idea that *Tafsīr* has principles (*qawā‘id*).<sup>152</sup> Kāfiyajī then attempts to enumerate and explain these *qawā‘id* in his work on the Qur’anic sciences, but it cannot be said he succeeds, for his very short work is far from providing principles that satisfactorily respond to needs. Several of the principles he identifies concern only the subjects of *muḥkam/mutashābih* (obvious/unclear verses) and *naskh*

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151 Muḥammad ‘Abd al-‘Azīm al-Zurqānī, *Manāhil al-‘irfān fī ‘ulūm al-Qur’ān* ([al-Qāhira]: Dār Iḥyā’ al-kutub al-‘Arabiyya: ‘Īsā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1943), 1:471.

152 Muḥyī al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Sulaymān al-Kāfiyajī, *al-Taysīr fī qawā‘id ‘ilm al-Tafsīr* (al-Qāhira: Maktabat al-Qudsī, 1998), 30.

(abrogation in the Qur'an).<sup>153</sup> As a matter of fact, Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, Kāfīyajī's student, expresses his dissatisfaction with his teacher's work in the introduction of his *al-Itqān*.<sup>154</sup>

With the phrases “states of God's speech” (*aḥwāl kalām Allāh*) and “in terms of its Qur'anness” (*min ḥaythu al-Qur'āniyya*), Fanārī implies that the subject of *Tafsīr* is the physical form of God's speech, which is manifested as the words of the Qur'an. This is congruent with his definition of the Qur'an, which does not deal with eternal divine speech. This is also an objection to Qutb al-Dīn al-Taḥṭānī, who defines *Tafsīr* as a science that “investigates (*yabḥathu*) God's intention (*murād Allāh*) in the Qur'an.”<sup>155</sup> Fanārī states that exegetical investigation cannot be reduced to explanations of meaning; it also includes linguistic, structural and historical analyses, such as examinations of variant readings, abrogation, and places and occasions of revelation. In addition, other Islamic sciences such as Islamic theology and Islamic theoretical jurisprudence, also aim to investigate God's intention in the Qur'an, so that Taḥṭānī's definition does not adequately draw a line between *Tafsīr* and other Islamic sciences. In his definition, Taftāzānī mentions “the states of the words” (*aḥwāl alfāz*) and “in terms of their indication to the intention” (*min ḥaythu al-dalāla 'alā al-murād*), but his definition is still open to criticism, according to Fanārī, for the words of the Qur'an are not always investigated because of their relation with the meaning. For example, many aspects of the science of reciting the Qur'an (*Qirā'āt*), which constitute an important part of *Tafsīr*, have nothing to do with the meaning.<sup>156</sup> That is why Fanārī adds the word “Qur'anness.” He implies that some aspects of the Qur'an are

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153 Ibid., 51-72.

154 Suyūṭī, *al-Itqān fī 'ulūm al-Qur'ān*, 1:16-17.

155 Fanārī, *Ayn*, 4.

156 Ibid. This criticism, without reference to any source, was also presented in some contemporary works of Qur'anic studies. See Muḥammad 'Alī Salāma, *Manhaj al-furqān fī 'ulūm al-Qur'ān*, 2:6; Zurqānī, *Manāhil al-'irfān*, 1:471; Dhahabī, *al-Tafsīr wa-l-mufasssīrūn*, 1:15.

subject to interpretive investigation although they are not involved in the meaning, but just because they are aspects of the Qur'an.

According to Fanārī, *Tafsīr* also studies the words of God “in terms of their indication to God’s intention that is known or assumed” (*min ḥaythu dalālatuh ‘alā mā yu‘lam aw yuẓannannahū murād Allāh*). He explains this when he criticizes Taftāzānī, who employs the phrase “the intention” without specifying it. Fanārī states, if “the intention” refers to the meaning of the text, Taftāzānī’s definition does not exclude the linguistic sciences (*al-‘ulūm al-adabiyya*). If it refers to God’s intention, Taftāzānī, in this case, defines *Tafsīr* incorrectly by mis-assigning the task of determining God’s intention to it. Fanārī expresses here, for the first time, a point on which he harps throughout his work: most of the comments on the Qur’an depend on either singular narrations or rational deduction (*dirāya*) based on linguistic analysis, both of which provide only conjectural knowledge.<sup>157</sup> That is why he divides “God’s intention” into two parts: known and assumed. Since we do not always know God’s intention, according to him, the scholars advise the believers to pronounce the testimony of Islamic creed as follows: “I believe in God and what came to us from Him in accordance with His intention. I believe in His prophet and what he stated in accordance with His intention.”<sup>158</sup>

However, when we accept that the commentators only presume to know God’s intention in most cases, are we subordinating God’s intention to the commentators’ conclusions for most of the Qur’an? Are we accepting, in other words, as many divinely intended meanings as there are numbers of comments on a given Qur’anic verse? The question “Can we know God’s

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157 Fanārī, *Ayn*, 5.

158 Ibid.

intention with certainty?” is an important topic of debate argued in Islamic jurisprudence.<sup>159</sup> Fanārī, who transposes this discussion into the context of *Tafsīr*, seems to embrace a partial relativism, saying, “Multiplicity is not in a generic truth (*al-ḥaqīqa al-naw‘iyya*); rather, in its different particulars (*al-juz‘iyyāt al-mukhtalifa*) due to diversity of perceptors (*qawābil*).”<sup>160</sup> What are generic truths? Fanārī does not explain this, but I think he means the foundational principles in the Qur’an upon which the Muslim community have agreed. These are absolute and do not differ with different perceptions; however, apart from these universal principles, particulars are open to diverse interpretations. Another important point is that Fanārī does not argue with the monosemy of the parts of the Qur’an whose meanings are agreed upon through self-evidence or the consensus of transmitted reports. As we saw above, Fanārī accepts layers of Qur’anic meaning, which means that a commentator can understand meanings other than the apparent ones. This means that even unambiguous verses of the Qur’an are open to exegetical searches for deeper meanings. Namely, the “known” intention of God in any part of the Qur’an does not negate the possibility of other “assumed” intentions in the same part. Therefore, not only does Fanārī place meanings extracted from the text into two categories, certain and uncertain, but also he concludes that attempts at interpretation in both certain and uncertain areas are equally valid. Fanārī paraphrases Qūnawī here:

All interpretations of the Qur’anic text based on either sound narration (*riwāya saḥīḥa*) or sound rational deduction (*dirāya saḥīḥa*) are God’s intention. But this is according to the levels (*marātib*) and receivers (*qawābil*), not [binding] for everyone.<sup>161</sup>

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159 Fanārī informs the reader here that a similar debate on the definition of Islamic jurisprudence (*Fiqh*) occurred between Taftāzānī and Ṣadr al-Sharī‘a ‘Ubayd Allāh ibn Mas’ūd. Ibid.

160 Ibid.

161 Ibid. Fanārī quotes Qūnawī with a considerable difference. Qūnawī states: “Among the words of the Qur’an, there is no word that has many meanings in the language but all its meanings are meant by God. If a commentator

In this statement, Fanārī lays down two conditions for the validity of any interpretation of the Scripture: (a) it must be based on sound narration or sound rational deduction, and (b) it should not claim to bind anyone other than the commentator. If these conditions are met, any comment is considered legitimate and true. The detail of adding the word “assumed” to the definition indicates that all comments, even different or opposing ones, are equally valid. Fanārī also links the multiplicity of valid comments to differences among the commentators, as he explains differentiations of divine speech according to the different collocutors. In this sense, what commentators experience when commenting on the Scripture is similar to what the prophets experienced during the revelatory process. The Scriptural text manifests as various interpretations by the commentators, just like divine speech that is manifested variously by the prophets. In short, there may be more than one true comment on the text. However, we can speak of different degrees of preferability for the comments, according to the various capacities of the commentators.

Thus, Fanārī adds another detail to the definition with the phrase *human capacity (al-tāqat al-insaniyya)* regarding knowledge of God’s intention. This detail implies a gradation in exegesis (and also in exegetes), which is the fundamental aspect of Sufī Qur’anic hermeneutics. The more a commentator increases his scholarly and spiritual capacity, the nearer he draws to knowing God’s intention, namely the more acceptable are the comments he offers. In this sense, Fanārī’s list of the sciences needed for exegesis functions as a tool to assess the capacities of the commentators. The knowledge possessed by a commentator about the linguistic and intellectual

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comments on God’s speech [i.e. the Qur’an] according to the requirement of its language and in a way that does not violate the indubitable religious principles (*al-uṣūl al-shar‘iyya al-muḥaqqqa*), this [comment] is true and God’s intention. [The accuracy of the comment] is with respect to the commentator and those who share his state, taste, and understanding.” Qūnawī, *I’jāz al-bayān*, 334. As seen, Fanārī sounds his own opinion here more than quoting or paraphrasing Qūnawī. As a matter of fact, Qūnawī makes this statement in line with Ibn al-‘Arabī’s ideas about literalist esotericism, which I will discuss in the next chapter.

sciences on the list is measurable, but since God-inspired mystical knowledge is indeterminable, there is no limit to the depths of the meaning that can be extracted from the text.

Fanārī's questioning the authority of *Tafsīr* to determine God's intention does not mean that he denies the value of Qur'anic exegesis. According to him, *Tafsīr* is one of the noblest Islamic disciplines, for several reasons. He states:

From the standpoint of its instrumentality (*āliyyatih*), [*Tafsīr* is necessary] because it is a source where religious sciences are produced from other ipso facto needed sciences (*al-maṭlūba bi-l-dhāt*). In terms of its essentiality (*naẓariyyatih*), it is noble: first, because of nobility of its subject, the Qur'an, which is the source of every wisdom and the mine of every goodness as its proofs through which the merits [of the Qur'an] appear will be explained; second, because of nobility of its objective which is the acquirement of theoretical (*'ilmī*) and practical (*'amalī*) wisdom and the attainment of eternal otherworldly happiness [...]; third, because of the intense need for it as both religious and worldly and both urgent (*'ājil*) and non-urgent (*ājil*) perfections are dependent on religious sciences and knowledge. The center (*madār*) [circulated by all these sciences] is the knowledge of God's book.<sup>162</sup>

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162 Fanārī, *'Ayn*, 17.

## CHAPTER VI

*Since the Qur'an is an ocean whose wonders are never exhausted nor whose mysteries ever cease, the effort to benefit and the endeavor to deduce [new meanings] from it never have a limit where the activity [of producing interpretation] stops or the effort becomes unfruitful... The divine grace and blessings are truly unlimited, as it is said, "the door of the divine realm is never closed." For every aspirant soul there is a share from the divine mysteries.*

Shams al-Dīn al-Fanārī

### FANĀRĪ'S PRACTICE OF EXEGESIS

In the previous chapters, I addressed how Qūnawī and Fanārī established connections among the ontology of existence, divine speech, and Qur'anic meaning and how the latter defended, through the terminology of the Qur'anic sciences, the theory of hierarchical phases of divine speech and the theory of multi-layered Qur'anic meaning. This chapter discusses how the idea of layers of meaning in the Qur'an manifests itself in Fanārī's practice of interpretation. Fanārī clearly uses Qur'anic exegesis as a ground for communicating Akbarī ideas, especially the theory of ontological levels (*marātib al-wujūd*), which is central to the Qūnawīan interpretation of Ibn al-ʿArabī's teachings. The chapter also explores Fanārī's approach to literalist esotericism, the most distinctive and the most criticized interpretive method in Akbarī exegesis.

## **Qur’anic Exegesis as a Ground for Communicating Akbarī Ideas**

*‘Ayn al-a’yān* goes beyond commentary, as I explained in the second chapter, in that it contains long discussions not directly relevant to the Qur’anic text. Fanārī obviously uses the phrases of the Qur’an as a pretext for raising many points in several fields, such as linguistics, rhetoric, theology, and jurisprudence. In most of the commentary, he brings together opinions expressed in these fields from many sources; therefore, we encounter no more than citations and paraphrases in most pages of the *‘Ayn*. However, Fanārī’s originality lies in his ability to connect the discussions to Akbarī teachings. He mostly reserves the sections titled “*ḥaqā’iq*” (truths) for this purpose. As we saw in the fifth chapter, the *ḥaqā’iq*, which also means “esoteric knowledge,” is the most important source as well as the most important outcome of Qur’anic exegesis. Therefore, we can consider that the highest aim of exegesis, according to Fanārī, is to explore the Qur’anic text seeking clues in the metaphysical theories of the School through mystical knowledge. He also brings up this theme at every turn in other sections of the commentary. One of the methods he employs to this end is to pay excessive attention to God’s names in his exegesis, because the analysis of divine names is always the most productive way to put forward Akbarī ideas, especially the idea of hierarchy in ontology.

### *Qur’anic exegesis as a medium between ontology and spirituality*

As I have stated in this study several times, Fanārī correlates ontological levels with Qur’anic meanings. This correlation is, in fact, based on the premise that the human can know about the ontological levels and what they correspond to in the Qur’anic text. We already saw that Ibn al-‘Arabī recognized that certain people are engaged in epistemological and spiritual relations with the ontological realms, and he used the notions of the hadīth of Z̤B̤Ḥ̤M to categorize them as *rijāl*

*al-zahr*, *rijāl al-baṭn*, *rijāl al-ḥadd* and *rijāl al-muṭṭala'*. Along the same lines, Qūnawī links the faculty of perception in the human (*qalb*: lit. heart) to ontological levels. He states, “We say that the aspects of the heart pointed out before are five, the same number of the fundamental (ontological) presences (*al-ḥaḍarāt al-aṣliyya*).”<sup>1</sup> He details this idea, saying,

Thus know that the *qalb* has five levels: the metaphysical level (*ma'nawiyya*), the spiritual level (*rūḥāniyya*), the imaginal level (*mithāliyya*), the physical level (*ḥissiyya*), and the comprehensive level (*jāmi'a*)... Every *qalb* also has five aspects: an aspect is directed towards the presence of God (Ḥaqq) in such a way that there is no agency between them. Another aspect is linked to the spiritual world (*'ālam al-arwāḥ*). Through this aspect, [the *qalb*] receives from God what its potentiality (*isti'dād*) entails by the agency of the spirits. Another aspect is pertaining to the imaginal world (*'ālam al-mithāl*) through which [the *qalb*] acquires [what overflows from God] in conformity with its share from the station of unity (*maqām al-jam'*), with its moderateness of nature and character and with its decency of states in actions, thoughts, presence and gnosis. Another aspect concerns with the visible world (*'ālam al-shahāda*) and the divine names al-Zāhir (the Manifest One) and al-Ākhir (the Last). Another aspect is pertinent to the unity of the multiplicity (*aḥadiyyat al-jam'*). What proceeds from this aspect is the level of spiritual identity that brings together the first, the last, the invisibles (*buṭūn*), and the visibles (*zuhūr*), and unites these four qualities (*nu'ūt*).<sup>2</sup>

What both Ibn al-‘Arabī and Qūnawī suggest is that a person is spiritually and epistemologically subject to what emanates from the ontological realms, as theorized in Akbarī metaphysics, according to her/his capacity. Ibn al-‘Arabī often interprets the Qur’anic passages in his writings as referring to these ontological levels; however, Qūnawī and Fanārī systematize Akbarī exegesis in regard to the interrelations among ontology, spirituality, and the Qur’an. In this exegetical system, the hadith of Z̤B̤Ḥ̤M plays a central role.

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1 Qūnawī, *I'jāz al-bayān*, 355.

2 Qūnawī, *al-Fukūk*, 70.

Qūnawī ardently finds a way to lead the discussion to the subject of ontological levels in almost every word of the *al-Fātiḥa* chapter. For example, the term *‘ālamīn* (worlds) (Q. 1:2) refers to the ontological levels. The presences of existence (*al-ḥaḍarāt al-wujūdiyya*) are the primary *‘ālam*s according to him.<sup>3</sup> The divine names, such as Raḥmān and Raḥīm, and the other words mentioned in the *al-Fātiḥa* such as *ḥamd* (praise), *‘ibāda* (worship), *hidāya* (divine guidance), and *ḍalāla* (transgression) become pivotal points around which Qūnawī’s mystical speculations revolve. This is the expected outcome of Qūnawī’s approach to the *al-Fātiḥa* because he takes this Qur’anic chapter as containing the secrets of existence.<sup>4</sup> He divides the chapter into three categories. The fifth verse (“Thee do we worship, and Thine aid we seek!”) refers to the interval level (*barzakh*) between divine and the contingent existence. Thus, the verses preceding this midpoint concern the level of the divine, whereas the verses that follow are about the level of creation.<sup>5</sup> In this regard, Qūnawī mostly focuses on these specific levels in related parts of the chapter.

Qūnawī even explains the technical terms of Qur’anic exegesis through his Sufi ideas. For instance, the term *naskh*, which denotes abrogation in the verses of the Qur’an, may also be considered as related to the expiration of the influence of the divine names.<sup>6</sup> *Muḥkam*, a term that refers to unambiguous verses of the Qur’an whose meanings are clear, also means features that can be predicated only to God or to creation. *Mutashābih*, on the other hand, can be predicated to either, although it means, as a technical term, the verses of the Qur’an that are ambiguous.<sup>7</sup>

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3 Qūnawī, *I’jāz al-bayān*, 310.

4 Ibid., 226.

5 Ibid., 205-209.

6 Ibid., 529.

7 Ibid., 529.

Not only Qur'anic words and terms, but also some human activities such as speaking and writing are used by Qūnawī as examples to illustrate the theory of ontological levels. He compares these levels to humans' speaking by emphasizing that there are five vocal organs: the inside of the breast (*bāṭin al-qalb*), which is the source of breath, the lips, the breast, the pharynx, and the palate. Whereas any letter has to be produced by one of the vocal organs, any existing thing (*mawjūd*) has to rely upon one of the ontological levels. However, the letter *wāw* is the object of all organs, just as the perfect man (*al-insān al-kāmil*) is the object of all levels.<sup>8</sup> In this sense, human breath, as the source of every letter, resembles the divine breath (*al-naḥas al-Raḥmānī*), which is the source of all existence.<sup>9</sup> Writing also resembles contingencies arising from the darkness of the unseen (*ghayb*) into existence. The black ink represents the unseen in this metaphor. It contains the writing potentially, but not yet in actuality, as the realities of the contingent (*mumkin*) exist potentially in the unseen. Writings on paper are like the manifestation of the divine as the physical world.<sup>10</sup>

Qūnawī provides long discussions under the titles of “*zahr*,” “*baṭn*,” “*ḥadd*,” and “*muṭṭala*” in order to formulate his exegetical theory based on the hadith. In these discussions, he does not always establish a clear connection between the verse under investigation and the title. Rather, he provides a general explication of the subject. For example, when introducing his commentary on the fifth verse of the *al-Fātiḥa* chapter, which reads, “Thee do we worship, and Thine aid we seek,” he states,

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8 Ibid., 194-195.

9 Ibid., 211.

10 Ibid., 202-203.

Let us begin first, with the aid and the will of God, by mentioning what the external aspect (*zāhir*) of the language and its level involve. Then, we go deeper, step-by-step, to the inner aspect (*bāṭin*), then, to the limit (*ḥadd*), the transcendence point (*muṭṭalaʿ*), and the comprehensive dimension which is superior to all.<sup>11</sup>

Accordingly, Qūnawī first gives brief information about the outward meaning of the words and their grammatical functions. Then he explains how appropriate it is to mention worship (*ʿibāda*) in this verse, which follows the verses that enumerate God's attributes of perfection and imply that He deserves to be worshipped. It is also appropriate to bring up supplication for divine help after clearly devoting worship to Him.<sup>12</sup> After remarking on the linguistic and syntactical features of the phrase, Qūnawī engages in esoteric explanations that aim to reveal the mystical reality of the act of worship. This leads him to describe how worshippers differ in their natures and characteristics. He explains that every worshipper turns towards a divine they worship, but this divine is only a mental concept that is never identical with the real divine; therefore, real worship is never realized.<sup>13</sup> He proceeds to explain that each divine name is the source of a group of entities, such as spirits, natures, and composites. Each existent thing depends on a divine name and knows about God through that name. Thanks to their comprehensive nature, human beings are associated with all of the divine names. However, if a divine name dominates in a human being, that particular name causes distinctive characteristics to emerge in that person.<sup>14</sup> Finally, Qūnawī introduces two types of worship (*ʿibāda*): unconditional essential worship (*dhātiyya muṭlaqa*) and conditional attributional worship (*ṣifātiyya muqayyada*). The former is the obedience of entities pre-existing in eternal divine knowledge by accepting existence given by

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11 Ibid., 380.

12 Ibid., 380-381.

13 Ibid., 381-384.

14 Ibid., 385-388.

God. The latter concerns the different worship practices performed by worshippers, who acquire different characteristics through their given distinctive natures.<sup>15</sup> Thus, Qūnawī makes mystical speculations about the notion of “worship” by discussing the ontological diversification of existence. However, he does not present a direct and well-defined relationship between the notions in the hadith of Z̤BḤM and his explanations under these titles.

Qūnawī uses the term *mā ba‘da al-muṭṭala‘* (beyond the point of transcendence) once in the commentary. Under this category, he discusses how the wayfarer who can escape all kinds of limits becomes the recipient of the manifestation (*tajallī*) descending from the divine essence (*dhāt*) without an intermediary.<sup>16</sup> In another place, he employs the term *unity of unity* (*jam‘ al-jam‘*), instead of *mā ba‘da al-muṭṭala‘*.<sup>17</sup> Thus, we understand that Qūnawī is referring to the spiritual experience that the wayfarer has in relation to the ontological level of divine essence described by these terms. Since the divine essence can be subject to neither knowledge nor experience, what he is referring to is the first manifestation of the divine essence.

Fanārī enacts the theory of *marātib al-ma‘nā* in the *‘Ayn*, mostly in the sections which he calls “*ḥaqā‘iq*” (truths). In his explication of these *ḥaqā‘iq*, he generally paraphrases and explains Qūnawī’s comments on the *al-Fātiḥa*. However, he also provides his own original interpretation in accordance with the levels of meaning. In his comments, we observe that he establishes a connection between spirituality and ontology, a much clearer and more specific connection than what we see in Qūnawī’s general explanations. Consequently, in keeping with

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15 Ibid., 389-391.

16 Ibid., 498-500.

17 Ibid., 514.

the hierarchy of Akbarī ontology, Fanārī extrapolates gradations of spirituality, as we will see in the following examples from the *ʿAyn*.

Fanārī presents the first application of the theory of *marātib al-maʿnā* in the *Muqaddima* of the *ʿAyn*, in which he structures his exegetical model and explains its rationale.<sup>18</sup> Here, he gives hints of what he will do in his commentary. He draws on Qūnawī in his explanations of the interrelation between the divine and creation through divine mercy, but he brilliantly links the comments to the hadith of ﷲ and well-known Sufī terminology. He argues that two divine names in the *basmala*, Raḥmān and Raḥīm, derived from the same root (*raḥma*, or “mercy”), refer to two different types of mercy. The first is comprehensive mercy related to the divine essence, which unconditionally covers everything gratis, and not in return for an effort or a due. God’s accepting Satan’s wish, the story of which is told in the Qur’an, can be explained by this mercy because Satan was granted his wish to be given time until the day of resurrection without deserving it.<sup>19</sup> The second type of divine mercy is specific and conditional and is directed according to the potential (*qābiliyya*) and predisposition (*istiʿdād*) of the recipient. In this sense, the first is the result of divine eternal and unconditional love (*maḥabba dhātiyya sābiqa*), whereas the second is the consequence of divine attributional and conditional love (*maḥabba šifātiyya lāḥiqa*). Thus, Fanārī takes two of the divine names mentioned in the *basmala* to refer to two different ontological levels of divinity, the level of essence and the level of attributes, and to their different relationships with the creation. Having pointed this out, he continues to explain the layers of meaning he sees in the *basmala*:

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18 Fanārī, *ʿAyn*, 10-11.

19 Q. 7:11-25.

The aim of [reciting] the *basmla* is seeking for help by turning toward Creator the Real in uncertain situations. Seeking help (*isti'āna*) differs according to different levels of turning toward (*tawajjuh*). *Tawajjuh* by the recital (*dhikr*) with expression (*malḥūz*) and contemplation (*malḥūz*) is *zahr*. This is the first level of spirituality (*ihsān*) as explained in the Master's [Ibn al-'Arabī] following statement: "(This is) doing what is necessary for what is necessary in a necessary way, even though it is not contemplated on." If the reciter considers himself as reciting by his self (*nafs*) or by his spirit (*rūh*) or by his heart (*qalb*), which is a comprehensive faculty for all, it is *batn*. This is the mid level of *ihsān* pointed out by the following Prophetic statement: "Worship God as if you see Him." This is (also called) spiritual vigilance (*murāqaba*). If he considers that every effect (*athar*) is because of God, the contingent (*mumkin*), inasmuch as it is contingent, is nonexistence ('*adam*) without effect, and both the caller (*dhākir*) and the called (*madhkūr*) is God in reality, albeit not in appearance, it is *muṭṭala'*. This is the level of certain belief ('*ilm al-yaqīn*) explained as "the serenity (*sukūn*) with the unseen (*ghayb*) because of power of its indicators." This is the last level of *ihsān* and the first level of sainthood (*wilāya*). This is the level of witnessing (*mushāhada*) that comes true after mystical ecstasy (*istighrāq*) during *murāqaba* when omitting the letter *kāf* of *ka'anna* [which changes the meaning "as if" to "it is"].<sup>20</sup> If the remembrance (*dhikr*) of God reaches the level that the Great Master [Ibn al-'Arabī] defines in the *Mawāqī' al-nujūm* as the state of forgetting both the calling (*dhikr*) and the caller (*dhākir*) in [a spiritual experience of] the Called (God), this is *mā ba'da al-muṭṭala'* and the level of reality of certainty (*ḥaqq al-yaqīn*) attained after the last level of *ihsān*.<sup>21</sup>

Three points are observed in this passage. First, Fanārī explains the hierarchical levels of spiritual progress using the terminology of the hadith of Z̤BḤM. Audible recitation of the *basmla* represents the level of *zahr*, which is the first and necessary step on the path. If the wayfarer feels the meaning of the *basmla* in her/his inner dimensions, which are defined by Fanārī as self, spirit, and heart, it means that she/he has reached the level of *batn*. When she/he realizes that God is the only real existence, this is the level of *muṭṭala'*. When the wayfarer

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<sup>20</sup> He refers to a famous Prophetic tradition known as the Hadith of Gabriel. The explanation is below.

<sup>21</sup> Fanārī, 'Ayn, 11.

experiences a total annihilation of the self in the existence of God, this indicates the level of *mā ba‘da al-muṭṭala‘*. Second, Fanārī associates these spiritual levels with the Islamic terminology used also by non-Sufi scholars. Thus, the mystical hierarchy finds itself expressed in the hierarchy of the following notions: *ihsān*, *murāqaba*, *‘ilm al-yaqīn*, and *ḥaqq al-yaqīn*. He also employs favorite Sufi terms such as *sukūn*, *wilāya*, *mushāhada*, and *istighrāq*, and thus explains mystical states through a blend of Sufi and Sufized Islamic terminology. Third, the prophetic tradition known as the hadith of Gabriel (Jibrīl), in which the story of Angel Gabriel visiting the Prophet is told, proves to be a favorable source for Fanārī to communicate his ideas. According to this tradition, transmitted on the authority of ‘Umar ibn al-Khattāb, the Angel Gabriel visits the Prophet in human form in the presence of a group of companions who do not know he is the angel. Gabriel first asks the Prophet about Islam then about Islamic faith (*īmān*). The Prophet enumerates the pillars of Islam and the principles of Islamic faith. Third, the angel asks the meaning of *ihsān* (lit. goodness). The Prophet replies, “It is that you worship Allah as if you see Him. Although you do not see Him, truly He sees you.”<sup>22</sup> Fanārī uses the prophetic definition of *ihsān* to refer to two levels of spirituality by playing with the word *ka-annaka* (as if you...) mentioned in the hadith. When a wayfarer worships “as if he sees God,” this is the level of *baṭn*; if he worships “as he sees God,” this indicates the level of *muṭṭala‘*.

Fanārī’s commentary on the phrase “taking refuge in God” (*isti‘ādha*) is another good example of how he uses exegesis to detail spiritual gradualness. He states that the simple oral pronunciation of these words would be *zahr*. Internalizing it and emancipating the self from all connections other than God would be *baṭn*; annihilating the self would be *muṭṭala‘*, and

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22 Bukhārī, *īmān*, 37; Muslim, *īmān*, 57.

transcending self-annihilation would be *mā ba‘da al-muṭṭala‘*.<sup>23</sup> In another interpretation, *zahr* is to take refuge in God from Satan; *baṭn* is the refuge from the lower self (*nafs*); *muṭṭala‘* is from the spirit (*rūḥ*) connected to the lower self (*nafs*); and *mā ba‘da al-muṭṭala‘* is from the secret faculty of the heart (*sirr*) connected to both the lower self and spirit.<sup>24</sup> Both interpretations draw attention to the gradations of spiritual improvement in accordance with the characteristic ontological gradualness of the Akbarī School. The latter steps are always harder to achieve and are, of course, superior to the earlier ones. And since at the most basic ontological level there is only God, the highest point of the spiritual journey is to realize there is no real existence other than God. At this point, the wayfarer must be unaware of even his annihilation, as the first interpretation suggests, because otherwise he would claim to have existence. According to the second interpretation, the wayfarer must abandon his inmost consciousness (*sirr*), which again means a complete annihilation.

Fanārī suggests yet another interpretation in which he categorizes the *isti‘ādha* according to its connections with actions (*af‘āl*), attributes (*ṣifāt*), and divine essence (*dhāt*). He reinforces his comment with prophetic supplications in which the Prophet is reported to have taken refuge in God from certain actions and attributes and from God Himself. Accordingly, *zahr* is a person’s taking refuge in God about her/his thoughts and actions. The supplication for this level is the following: “I take refuge with God from all words, acts, and thoughts that God dislikes.” *Baṭn* involves actions (*af‘āl*). According to Fanārī, whatever action or attribute one shuns is divine in reality because God is its source; therefore, in any case, one takes refuge from God’s actions and attributes in God. Therefore, this level is where the wayfarer realizes that all actions

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23 Fanārī, *Ayn*, 123.

24 Ibid.

in fact belong to God, no matter if they are enacted by others. At this level, the wayfarer supplicates, saying, “O God! I seek refuge in you from the difficulty of calamities, the terrible misery, the evil destiny, and the taunts of enemies.” *Muṭṭala‘* concerns attributes (*ṣifāt*). The famous Prophetic supplication that “I seek refuge in You from knowledge that is futile, a heart that is not humble, a prayer that is not answered and a lower self that is not satisfied” refers to this level. Lastly, *mā ba‘da al-muṭṭala‘* pertains to the divine essence (*dhāt*). The prophetic supplication of this level is this: “I take refuge with You from You.”<sup>25</sup> Consequently, this interpretation emphasizes a hierarchical order among *dhāt*, *ṣifāt* and *af‘āl* and correlates the phases of spiritual experience to them. The highest point of the spiritual journey has to do with the level of divine essence.

Fanārī applies the same method to explain narrated hadiths as they relate to the verses that are involved. He identifies four levels of taking refuge in God regarding the following Prophetic tradition: “Whoever lodges at a halting place and says ‘I take refuge (with God) in God’s perfect words (*kalimāt*) from the evil that He created,’ nothing can give him harm until he leaves.” Fanārī does not feel the need to state the obvious –that taking refuge with God from evil by expressing this supplication is *zahr*. By arguing that God’s words (*kalimāt*) also refer to spirits, he implies that taking refuge from evil spirits (*arwāḥ khabīthāt*) with sacred spirits (*arwāḥ ṭāhirāt*), which are the angels, would be *baṭn*. Therefore, the word *kalima* (word) is taken as esoterically to mean “spirit” at this level of meaning. Taking refuge with divine names on which the angels depend and with other divine names which are the source of evil spirits, such as al-Muḍill (Who leads astray) or al-Qāhir (the Compeller), would be *muṭṭala‘*. So this level of meaning aims to reveal what sustains the spirits, which are the realities of the previous level:

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25 Ibid.

divine names. The reality called by Fanārī “the greatest reality” (*al-ḥaqīqat al-kubrā*) that sustains divine names is *mā ba‘da al-muṭṭala‘*.<sup>26</sup> This reality, which is the divine essence, comprises both sides, the sources of good and evil. In this interpretation, the connection Fanārī theorizes between the actions of taking refuge and their direction is clear, as he associates the four actions with the ontological levels, namely the visible world, the spirits, the divine names, and the divine essence, respectively.

In his commentary on another hadith, Fanārī focuses again on the hierarchy of the divine essence, attributes, and actions and their connections with the spiritual dimensions. In this hadith the Prophet is reported to have supplicated God, saying, “(O God!) I take refuge with your consent (*riḍā*) from your wrath (*sakhat*) and with your forgiveness from your punishment. I also take refuge with You from You.” Fanārī first identifies three types of taking refuge that are pertinent to divine actions (*af‘āliyya*), divine attributes (*ṣifātiyya*), and divine essence (*dhātiyya*), respectively. *Forgiveness* and *punishment* in the hadith refer to divine actions, while *consent* and *wrath* are relevant to divine attributes. The last part of the hadith is apparently about divine essence. Fanārī identifies *baṭn* as taking refuge with the divine actions and *muṭṭala‘* as taking refuge with the divine names. As for *mā ba‘da al-muṭṭala‘*, he states,

If this state [taking refuge with divine names] happens with the consciousness [of the wayfarer], it is *muṭṭala‘*... However, if it results without consciousness and self-determination, it is *mā ba‘da al-muṭṭala‘*. Then, taking refuge becomes *dhātiyya* (with the divine essence).<sup>27</sup>

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26 Ibid., 110-111.

27 Ibid., 108.

This means abandoning consciousness and internalizing the act of taking refuge to the extent that it becomes part of nature or even is nature itself. This last level, therefore, implies the complete annihilation of the self in the divine.

Fanārī applies the same fourfold methodology when he discusses subjects that indirectly come under inquiry in the commentary. For example, the discussion of *isti'ādha* indirectly brings forward the subject of “proximity to God” (*qurb*) and “knowledge of God” (*ma'rifa*). Fanārī thinks that one begins attaining knowledge of God and proximity to Him by knowing oneself through insufficiency (*'ajz*) planted in one's nature, such as ignorance, and by considering that God has perfect attributes, such as limitless knowledge. This level would be *zahr*. If the wayfarer knows God by focusing on her/his attributes of perfection bestowed by God, this would be *batn*. *Muṭṭala'* is the level where the wayfarer acts by God's will, not her/his own will. Finally, *mā ba'da al-muṭṭala'* refers to spiritual rapture (*istighrāq*) in God's presence (*huḍūr*). At this level, the wayfarer loses her/his self, and she/he is not even aware of her/his unawareness but ironically attains the most perfect knowledge.<sup>28</sup>

Fanārī pays special attention to the divine names, as do the other Akbarī writers, because divine names play an important role in explaining hierarchical levels of both existence and spirituality. When he discusses the basic ontological ideas of the School in relation to the *basmala*, Fanārī exploits the etymologies and the order of the divine names mentioned in the phrase to emphasize the Akbarī idea of ontological gradation. He first argues that the word *ism* (name), which takes its place in the formula, is a symbol of distinctness. Everything that becomes distinct from the unseen world (*ghayb*, i.e. its origin) is a “name” and vice versa. The

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28 Ibid., 123-124.

reason for the diversification of existence out of the One is the diversity of the divine names and attributes.<sup>29</sup> The three divine names mentioned in this verse (Allah, Raḥmān, and Raḥīm) suggest a gradation of existence in the divine realm. The name Allah symbolizes the level of non-entification (*lā ta'ayyun*); the name Raḥmān refers to the absolute existence (*al-wujūd al-muṭlaq*), and the name Raḥīm refers to the level of manifest existence (*al-mawjūdāt al-muta'ayyina*).<sup>30</sup> This gradation from general to specific is concurrent with the common interpretation of the names Raḥmān and Raḥīm as the source of general and specific mercy respectively.<sup>31</sup>

In his interpretation of the *basmla*, Fanārī takes up the question, “Why does not the *basmla* begin with *billāh* (I begin with God) instead of *bismillāh* (I begin with the name of God)?” He answers the question with a subtle Sufī point: The meaning of the *basmla* is to ask for God’s help. The existence of a person (*wujūd*) is dependent on the divine essence (*dhāt*), while one’s actions, states and speech are connected to the divine names. The person, by pronouncing the *basmla*, asks for God’s help about her/his actions, states, and speech, not about existence, because she/he has already been given it. Therefore, she/he calls upon God’s names, which her/his request for help concerns.<sup>32</sup> In another explanation regarding the syntax of the *basmla*, Fanārī emphasizes again one of the teachings of the School, saying that the arrangement of the three divine names mentioned in the *basmla*, Allah, Raḥmān and Raḥīm,

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29 Ibid., 154.

30 Ibid., 155.

31 Abū al-Qāsim Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, *Mufradāt al-fāz al-Qur’ān* (Dimashq: Dār al-Qalam, 2011), 347-8.

32 Fanārī, *Ayn*, 139.

indicates that there is a gradation among them in terms of their comprehension because adjectives are arranged from general to specific in Arabic.<sup>33</sup>

In all these examples of Fanārī's comments, we read his attempt to build an exegetical model on the notions of the hadith of Z̤B̤H̤M. These notions refer to hierarchy in three planes: ontology, Qur'anic meaning, and spirituality. The commentator's function is to explore the relationships among these planes through the Qur'anic expressions. However, the practice of exegesis goes beyond an intellectual activity and involves mystical experience. The idea of a human ability to perceive metaphysical depths of existence entails a hierarchy of human spirituality, which is also a subject of exegesis. In this sense, the reason for why Fanārī requires mystical knowledge in Qur'anic interpretation, as we discussed in the fifth chapter, falls into place. Qūnawī is the most important source for Fanārī's interpretation. However, what Qūnawī is trying to do in his commentary becomes more lucid and focused in Fanārī's *'Ayn*. We may consider Qūnawī's explanations as what a commentator feels in her/his mystical journey. The commentator discloses the secrets of existence revealed to her/him through mystical experience. Fanārī, on the other hand, provides valuable examples regarding how the wayfarer explores her/his inner spiritual dimensions by focusing on the relationship between these dimensions and the ontological realms. These spiritual depths are not other than subject to the fundamental ontological realms, the levels of spirits, divine names, and the divine essence. Note that Fanārī generally ignores the level of *ḥadd*, which corresponds to the interval imaginal world (*barzakh* or *'ālam al-mithāl*) in his comments. According to Fanārī, the task of a commentator is bilateral: to know what is revealed before and to discover new dimensions by following the previous examples. He states,

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33 Ibid., 140.

If the truths (*ḥaqā'iq*) of what the Salaf deduced and compiled, their sources and the ways to acquire them are known, this would be a useful key to open the secrets undiscovered by them. [It also would be] a clear route to discovering the treasures of the cyphers of allusions (of the Qur'an) not comprehended before.<sup>34</sup>

### *Akbarī-oriented theology*

Fanārī leads up to the Akbarī teachings not only in the sections reserved for Sufi discussions but also in other sections, especially in those dedicated to theology. He illustrates the theological problems he considers related to the text in the sections titled “*Kalām*.” He selects most of these problems from the theological debates Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī includes in his commentary. Although he paraphrases Rāzī when summarizing the problems, he mostly ends up criticizing Rāzī's conclusions. The following examples will clearly show that Fanārī cannot be simply identified as Rāzī's follower and that he prioritizes Akbarī teaching when taking a theological position.

One of the theological problems Fanārī devotes attention concerns predestination and freewill, and the *isti'ādha* gives him an opportunity to enter upon the subject. Rāzī explains, in his commentary, how the Mu'tazila exploit the formula of *isti'ādha* to justify their theological viewpoints regarding predestination and freewill.<sup>35</sup> He lists six arguments of the Mu'tazila, which can be summarized as follows: If Satan's deception and humans' falling into his deception are not by their own choice but by God's creation, what would be the meaning of taking refuge from Satan? Furthermore, if these are not their own actions but actions created by God, how would divine punishment be fair? Rāzī then mentions several arguments, which he calls the Sunni refutation of the Mu'tazila. The core of these arguments is the belief in God's omniscience

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 88.

<sup>35</sup> Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Mafātīḥ al-ghayb*, 1:65-66. Cf. Fanārī, *'Ayn*, 112-113.

and omnificreativity. In other words, according to Rāzī, no thing, including human choice, can be considered outside God’s knowledge and His creation. After explaining these arguments, he ends the discussion by saying,

Know that this debate shows that the truth of taking refuge [cannot be understood] unless the reality that everything is from God and by God is unveiled to the servant. The essence of the discussion is what the Prophet stated [in his supplication]: I take refuge in Your (i.e. God) consent from Your wrath. I take refuge in Your forgiveness from Your anger. I take refuge in You from You...<sup>36</sup>

Thus, in this statement and the arguments he makes against the Mu‘tazila, Rāzī expresses his inclination toward determinism regarding predestination and human will.<sup>37</sup>

Fanārī criticizes Rāzī for affirming the Jabriyya (the so-called Determinist School of theology in Islam). He attempts to solve the problem by drawing on the Māturīdī form of the theory of *kasb* (acquisition).<sup>38</sup> The theologians who accept the theory of *kasb* emphasize God’s omnipotence and omnificreativity on the one hand, and human responsibility on the other, basically saying that God creates (*khalq*) an action, which the human chooses to do (*kasb*).<sup>39</sup> What is problematic in the theory is the question of whether human choice is created by God or not. If the answer is yes, then how can humans be held accountable? If it is no, then how would the Islamic principle of God’s omniscience, omnipotence and omnificreativity, explicitly stated in

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36 Rāzī, *Mafātiḥ al-ghayb*, 1: 66-67.

37 Rāzī’s taking a determinist position has been discussed in modern studies. For the references showing that Rāzī adopted determinism in his writings, see Ayman Shihadeh, *The Teleological Ethics of Fakhr al-Din al-Rāzī* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006), 37.

38 Rāzī abandoned the theory of *kasb* in his later writings, although he generally followed the Ash‘arī theology and accepted the theory previously. See Shihadeh, *The Teleological Ethics*, 40.

39 For the theory of *kasb*, see Louis Gardet, “*Kasb* (as a theological term),” in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. 2nd ed. Brill Online. Note that Gardet, in this article, characterizes Rāzī as accepting a Māturīdī form of the theory of *kasb*.

many Qur’anic verses be understood? To solve this problem, Fanārī, like the later Māturīdī theologians, identified human choice as something that is not subject to creation. Fanārī states,

Human acquisition (*kasb*) is no more than a relative matter (*amr nisbī*), which [human choice] depends on and makes a locus (*maḥall*) where God creates an action suitable for that relativity (*nisba*). Since this acquisition is non-existent (*ghayr mawjūd*) and pertaining to non-existence (*‘adamī*), it does not belong to God; it is not considered God’s creation. Since it is attributed to humans, it makes humans loci for and receptive to God’s creation. This receptiveness (*qābiliyya*) is a condition for creation and its effect (*ta’thīr*) but not a part of (creation). That the realization of the condition of receptiveness is dependent on the human negates determinism (*jabr*). That the human has no share in execution of an action negates *qadar* [the belief that the human determines his actions by himself, not God].<sup>40</sup>

The theory of *kasb* enables Fanārī to refute both sets of arguments discussed by Rāzī, which Fanārī labels as the two extremes of the Mu‘tazila and the Jabriyya. Fanārī identifies this *kasb* as humans’ inclination (*tawajjuh*) among alternatives, namely as their choice. He also explains human responsibility through the Akbarī theory of *isti’dād*, drawing on Qūnawī’s commentary, *I’jāz al-bayān*. *Isti’dād*, literally meaning “preparedness,” denotes the ontological potentiality of the realities that manifest in God’s eternal knowledge, namely, their inherent capacity for having different individual features. Accordingly, the reality of every existing thing is a manifestation (*ta’ayyun*) of God’s existence (*wujūd*) in God’s eternal knowledge. The existing things (*mawjūd*) become diverse according to the diversity of the ontological potentiality of their realities, i.e., their different degrees of receptiveness (*qābiliyya*) to divine names. Following Ibn al-‘Arabī, Fanārī associates human inclination (*tawajjuh*) with this ontological potentiality.<sup>41</sup> He states that

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40 Fanārī, *‘Ayn*, 114.

41 Ibn al-‘Arabī also associates human will in his actions with *isti’dād*. See Ibn al-‘Arabī, *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya* (al-Jumhūriyya al-Yamaniyya: Wizārat al-Thaqāfa, 2010), 4:69;. Note that Ibn al-‘Arabī does not accept the forms of the theory of *kasb* that give a human complete freedom to choose in his actions. See *ibid.*, 6:496; 7:84.

human inclination plays a role in the creation of actions done by choice (*ikhtiyārī*), but these individual inclinations appear as outcomes of the ontological potentialities.<sup>42</sup> In this regard, Fanārī subordinates *kasb* to *isti'dād*.

However, the same problem with the theory of *kasb* is valid for the theory of *isti'dād*: How can we think of something in existence that was not created by God? Furthermore, it is obviously more difficult to explain freewill in such a teaching as Akbariyya, which accommodates monist and panentheistic elements. Being aware of this difficulty, Fanārī voices an objection, saying, “If the manifestations (*ta'ayyun*) are contingent on their potentialities (*isti'dād*), which are dependent on God, everything is contingent on God, which means determinism (*jabr*).” He says in answer, “The manifestations are contingent on the relations (*marātib*) of the potentialities [with God]. What is contingent on God is the existence (*wujūd*) of potentialities [not their *marātib*].” Fanārī implies that there is a part that is not subject to God’s creation by making a distinction between the existence of ontological potentialities and what he calls their *marātib*. As a matter of fact, he confirms Akbarī idea that the ontological potentialities are unmade (*ghayr maj'ūl*). The particular (*juz'ī*) potentialities, in our case humans’ individual inclinations, are made (*maj'ūl*), but they are outcomes of the unmade general (*kullī*) ontological potentialities, and this makes humans responsible.<sup>43</sup>

Fanārī also objects to Rāzī who equates God’s creating to His knowledge by saying that what is in God’s knowledge must come into existence, an idea drawn from many Qur’anic verses that announce God’s omniscience and omn creativity. These verses must be interpreted differently according to Fanārī. For example, what is meant by the verses that state, “God is the

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42 Fanārī, *Ayn*, 116.

43 Ibid., 116-117.

creator of every thing” (Q. 6:101 and 102, 13:16, 39:62, 40:62) is “existent things” (*shay’iyyat al-wujūd*). However, in the verses that state, “God is the knower of every thing,” (Q. 2:29, 2:231, 2:282, 5:97, 6:101, 9:115, 24:35, 29:62, 42:12, 58:7, 64:11) “fact” (*shay’iyyat al-thubūt*) is meant, not existence. As a matter of fact, God does not create impossibilities (*muḥāl*), although His knowledge contains them. In short, everything found in God’s knowledge does not have to come into existence.<sup>44</sup>

Another theological debate in the *‘Ayn* is about whether a name (*ism*) is the same as the named (*musammā*), a debate that comes up in the interpretation of the *basmala*, which reads, “In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.”<sup>45</sup> Fanārī again cites the summary of the discussion from Rāzī’s *Mafāṭīḥ al-ghayb*:<sup>46</sup> Some theological schools, including the Ash‘ariyya hold the opinion that the name is identical to the named. According to the Mu‘tazila, the name and the named are totally different. Rāzī finds this debate frivolous (*‘abath*). “If it is meant, with the name, the verbal expression (*lafz*) which constitute sounds and letters, and with the named, the essence of the things,” Rāzī says, “[in this case] knowledge of necessity is resulted that the name and the named are different.”<sup>47</sup> Conversely, if both the name and the named refer to the essence of a thing, they would be the same and one thing. In either case, no information is added to our knowledge; therefore such a discussion is a futile exercise for Rāzī. However, the problem has grave consequences when it is applied to the relationship between God and His names and

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44 Ibid., 116.

45 For an insightful analysis of the debate as it was held among the medieval grammarians and theologians, see C.H.M. Versteegh, *Greek Elements in Arabic Linguistic Thinking* (Leiden: Brill, 1977), 155-161.

46 Rāzī, *Mafāṭīḥ al-ghayb*, 1:95-97.

47 Ibid., 1:95.

attributes; rather, the opposing conclusions of the Mu‘tazila and the Ash‘ariyya regarding denomination result from their theological approaches to God’s attributes.

Fanārī, who criticizes Rāzī’s understatement of the problem, attempts to solve it again through Akbarī teachings. He states that every manifestation (*ta‘ayyun*) has two aspects: (1) it is contingent on God because God is its source and pours (*ifāda*) existence into it; (2) it is contingent on the reality (*ḥaqīqa*) of the thing because its reality accepts the pouring of existence into it (*istifāda*). Therefore, we have two concepts here: creating (*ījād* and *izhār*) and coming into existence (*wujūd* and *zuhūr*). From one perspective, a manifestation is a name (*ism*) for that which manifests (*mu‘ayyin*), namely God, because it originates from God. In this regard, the named (God) and the name (manifestation) are the same. From another perspective, that particular manifestation differs from the named (God) and bears its own name, because it has its own identity among other manifestations due to its distinct ontological reality.<sup>48</sup> Thus, Fanārī tries to solve the problem with an intermediate solution, as he does in the debate on predestination, following Ibn al-‘Arabī who accepted that the manifestation and the one who manifests are identical in one sense and different in another.<sup>49</sup>

Fanārī also shows how various consequences of the different approaches to the problem of denomination appear in interpretive practices regarding Q. 87:1,<sup>50</sup> which instructs the Prophet and his followers to glorify the name of God. Ash‘arīs take this verse to mean to glorify God Himself, whereas Mu‘tazilīs understand it as freeing (*tanzīh*) God’s name from any attribute inappropriate to predicate to Him. According to a third group, whom Fanārī calls “the scholars of

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48 Fanārī, *‘Ayn*, 147.

49 Ibn al-‘Arabī, *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam wa-l-ta‘līqāt ‘alayh bi-qalam Abū al-‘Alā ‘Aḥḥī* (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kitāb al-‘Arabī, 2002), 90-91.

50 “Glorify the name of thy Guardian-Lord Most High”

reality” (*muḥaqqiqūn*), it means to avoid attributing to God something that does not suit His glory (*jalāl*), His grace (*jamāl*), and His perfection (*kamāl*). Therefore, the opinion confirmed by Fanārī refers to God’s attributes, whereas Ash‘arīs identify God’s name with His essence and the Mu‘tazilīs emphasize their complete distinction. With this move, he implies that God’s divine attributes are the same as the divine essence in one sense but different from it in another.<sup>51</sup>

The different opinions of the schools also manifest in their approaches to another important theological problem, the morality of good and evil (*ḥusun/qubuh*). Accordingly, Ash‘arīs hold that God, who is unquestionable in His actions (*lā yus‘al*), creates both good and evil. Mu‘tazilīs believe that God creates no evil because the creation of evil does not suit His divine wisdom (*ḥikma*). According to the *muḥaqqiqūn*, Fanārī states, the creation of evil is a manifestation of God’s perfection because it is God’s creation, or, in Akbarī terms, evil becomes a good act in the sense that it appears according to the realities, which are in fact God’s divine states (*shu‘ūn*). However, it is a defect in the sense that it appears in us according to our inherent personal potentials (*isti‘dād*).<sup>52</sup>

These examples of the theological discussions in the *‘Ayn* suggest two key points. First, Fanārī takes his theological position based on his Akbarī priorities. He accepts the theory of *kasb*, for example, but a specific form of the theory suitable to the Akbarī idea that potentiality (*isti‘dād*) is not created. Likewise, he tries to solve the problems of denomination and the morality of evil with a mid-course solution offered by the Akbarī School, which considers existence as the manifestation of God. The idea of the unity of existence shared by the Creator and creation makes the co-existence of *tashbīh* and *tanzīh* possible as well as that of *ḥusun* and

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51 Fanārī, *‘Ayn*, 147.

52 Ibid.

*qubuh*. In this regard, Akbarī metaphysics becomes a determining factor in Fanārī’s theological conclusions, just as it does in his affirmations regarding the heavenly form of the Qur’an, as we discussed in the fourth chapter. Second, Fanārī is clearly not a Rāzī’s follower, but a fierce critic. Therefore, the assertions repeated in contemporary Turkish studies on Fanārī that he represents the Rāzīan School of theology and that he attempted to synthesize the Rāzīan metaphysics with Ibn al-‘Arabī’s should be reevaluated.

### **Literalist Esotericism**

The examples we discussed above clearly show that Fanārī extracts from the Qur’anic text what is not expressed by the external aspect of the text. However, he does not treat the Qur’anic text as an entirely encoded book incomprehensible to the common person; rather it is intelligible to the common person but also contains deeper meanings for the select. The hadith of Z̤B̤Ḥ̤M refers to this multi-layered nature of the Qur’an.<sup>53</sup> The possibilities of interpretation (*ta’wīl*) are endless, but they do not preclude the literal meaning. Fanārī considers disregarding the literal meaning as a Bāṭinī “heresy.”<sup>54</sup> Contrary to disregarding the exoteric side of the text, he opines that it is extremely important to attend to this aspect of the Qur’an in order to attain the possibilities of *ta’wīl*. He states,

With [the efforts of understanding such as] designation of a meaning (*taḥdīd*), iteration (*tardīd*), explanation (*tibyān*) or demonstration (*burhān*) about a rational or narrated subject, the discussant only means that the Qur’an indicates [her/his interpretation] by either expressing (*‘ibāra*) or alluding (*ishāra*) or unambiguously manifesting (*ṣarīḥ*) or indirectly implying (*kināya*) or literally (*ḥaqīqa*) or metaphorically (*isti‘āra*) verbalizing. However, [these interpretation efforts should be practiced] not through the custom of

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53 Ibid., 86.

54 Ibid., 89.

philosophers of metaphysics but according to the methodologies of experts on Arabic language.<sup>55</sup>

Thus, to know linguistic features of the text is of great importance to producing a sound interpretation, according to Fanārī. Indeed, Fanārī identifies sixteen required sciences for Qur’ānic exegesis, eight of which are linguistic sciences (*al-‘ulūm al-laḥẓiyya*).<sup>56</sup> As a result, linguistic analysis dominates exegesis in the *‘Ayn*, where he reserves very long and tedious passages for linguistic discussion. He also emphatically underscores the point that the function of Qur’anic exegesis is to attempt to discover God’s intention by looking at the “letter” of the Qur’anic text.<sup>57</sup>

Fanārī, in fact, follows the School of Ibn al-‘Arabī by paying attention to the outward expression of the Qur’an, as one of the most important aspects of Akbarīan Qur’anic hermeneutics is that they produce “esoteric” interpretations based on the literal form of the text. Ibn al-‘Arabī adopts this approach as his hermeneutical principle and applies it in his Qur’anic comments, but he is not unique in this literalism-based esotericism. We see the precedents of this approach to Qur’anic exegesis in comments ascribed to Ja’far al-Ṣādiq. For example, Ja’far interprets Ṣafā and Marwa (Q. 2:158), the names of two hills in Makka between which the pilgrims run forth and back during the Hajj, as the spirit (*rūḥ*) and the soul (*nafs*). In this interpretation, he focuses on the etymological roots of the words *ṣafā’* and *marwa*, which mean purity and heroic virtues (*muruwwa*), respectively. He also interprets Ṣafā as “the purity of *ma’rifā*” and Marwa as “the heroic virtues of the *‘arif*,” emphasizing the same roots of the

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55 Ibid., 86.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid., 5.

words.<sup>58</sup> Following Ja‘far, subsequent Sufi commentators sometimes employed this method. However, Akbarī writers made it an important aspect of their Qur’anic exegesis. In this regard, Ibn al-‘Arabī displays extreme loyalty to the etymology of Qur’anic words. When he interprets the text, he sometimes produces alternative interpretations focusing on the cognates of words. For example, in Ibn al-‘Arabī’s universe of Qur’anic exegesis, one of the possible meanings of the Qur’anic phrase “those who disbelieve” (*alladhīna kafarū*) can be “those who hide their love for God in their hearts from the others,” because the etymological root of the verb *kafara* means to cover or to close something.<sup>59</sup> Consequently, he adopts the hermeneutical principle that can be epitomized as follows: “If a cognate of the word supports an interpretation, that interpretation must be accepted as valid.” Ibn al-‘Arabī clarifies this, stating,

Every sense (*wajh*) which is supported (*iḥṭimal*) by any verse in God’s Speech (*kalām*) – whether it is the Koran, the Torah, the Psalms, the Gospel, or the Scripture– in the view of anyone who knows that language (*lisān*) is intended (*maqṣūd*) by God in the case of that interpreter (*mutaawwil*). For His knowledge encompasses all senses... Hence, every interpreter correctly grasps the intention of God in that word (*kalima*). This is the truth, “[a Mighty Book:] to which falsehood comes not from before it nor from behind it; a sending down from One Wise, Praiseworthy” (41:42) upon the heart of him whom He chooses from among His servants. Hence no man of knowledge can declare wrong an interpretation, which is supported by the words (*lafẓ*). He who does so is extremely deficient in knowledge. However, it is not necessary to uphold the interpretation nor to put it into practice, except in the case of the interpreter himself and those who follow his authority.<sup>60</sup>

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58 Ja‘far al-Šādiq, *Spiritual Gems*, 11-12.

59 Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn al-‘Arabī, *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya*, 1: 354-355.

60 Ibn al-‘Arabī, *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya*, 5:22. The translation is Chittick’s (Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Knowledge*, 244). For the passages where Ibn al-‘Arabī expresses similar thoughts, see Ibn al-‘Arabī, *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya*, 6:631 and 10:207.

In this passage, Ibn al-‘Arabī emphasizes the following points: (a) Every interpretation allowed by the letter of the text is among the meanings intended by God; therefore, no one has the right to falsify an interpretation that is etymologically possible. (b) However, this interpretation cannot be imposed upon one as the sole truth; it is subjective and binding only to the interpreter and to those who choose to accept his authority. Qūnawī agrees with Ibn al-‘Arabī on these points, saying:

Among the words of the Qur’ān, there is no word that has so many meanings in the language that God has not intended them all. If a commentator comments on God’s speech (i.e. the Qur’ān) according to the requirement of its language and in a way that does not violate the indubitable religious principles (*al-uṣūl al-shar‘iyya al-muḥaqqāqa*), this [comment] is true and God’s intention. [The accuracy of the comment] is with respect to the commentator and those who share his state, taste, and understanding.<sup>61</sup>

As can be seen, Qūnawī adds conformity to religious principles in addition to linguistic rules as another criterion for acceptable interpretation. This statement can be assessed as Qūnawī’s attempt to justify the most distinguished –and of course the most criticized– aspect of Akbarī hermeneutics. Fanārī, curiously, quotes Qūnawī’s statement with considerable variation: “All interpretations of the Qur’ānic text based on either sound narration (*riwāya saḥīḥa*) or sound reasoning (*dirāya saḥīḥa*) are God’s intention. But this is according to the levels (*marātib*) and receivers (*qawābil*), not [binding] for everyone.”<sup>62</sup> Thus, to Fanārī, compliance with religious and linguistic requirements is stipulated in order for a comment to be accepted on the basis of either sound narration or sound reasoning. This would, in fact, equate Akbarī exegesis to the classical “exoteric” tradition of interpretation by ignoring its most distinctive aspect; however

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61 Qūnawī, *I’jāz al-bayān*, 220.

62 Fanārī, *Ayn*, 5, 89.

Fanārī's intention to do so is doubtful, for, Fanārī cites Qūnawī's statement when he discusses whether a commentator can identify God's intention for sure. He means to say, like Qūnawī, that interpretations should not contradict the principles of religion. Fanārī definitely excludes the universal principles agreed upon by the Muslim community from being subject to various interpretations.<sup>63</sup> Neither Qūnawī nor Fanārī say what these principles are, but it is probable that they imply a very broad set of Muslim principles, including the belief in One God, the hereafter, angels, daily ritual prayers, and so forth.

The etymological and grammatical possibilities of Qur'anic words and expressions allow Akbarī writers to use Qur'anic verses to explain their Sufi ideas. For instance, when Ibn al-'Arabī infers that the nature of divine punishment in the hereafter will change, he focuses on the etymology of the word *'adhāb* (punishment), as one of its cognates (*'adhb*) means "sweetness."<sup>64</sup> He also speculates on how divine attributes pervade the Prophet Abraham, drawing on Abraham's Qur'anic epithet Khalīl whose cognate is *takhallul*, which means "penetration."<sup>65</sup> Qūnawī emphasizes that the secrets of the Qur'an can be discovered by means of its words. Although he does not resort to cognates of the words to extract esoteric comments in his commentary as often as Ibn al-'Arabī does, he provides general explanations focusing on the subjects evoked by Qur'anic words. For example, he classifies people according to their levels of "bewilderment" (*ḥayra*) under the pretext of the Qur'anic expression *al-dāllīn* (Q. 1:7), which literally means "lost ones" and "transgressors." The notion enables him to speculate on spirituality. Emphasizing its literal meaning, he considers the notion to relate to obedient people

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63 Ibid., 5

64 Ibn al-'Arabī, *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, 94.

65 Ibid., 80.

and even saints (*ahl Allāh*), contrary to the widely-held interpretation of the term, which restricts it to only the disobedient or disbelievers.<sup>66</sup> Fanārī also bases his esoteric comments on linguistic analysis. For example, when he discusses the sentence structure regarding the three divine names in the the *basmala*, he notes that the syntax alludes to an order from general to specific, following a grammatical rule that “what is general precedes in the order.”<sup>67</sup> Thus, the divine names, Allah, Raḥmān, and Raḥīm, are deliberately arranged according to their ontological comprehensibility.<sup>68</sup> Although Fanārī sometimes refers to the etymological or the grammatical aspects of the text to emphasize certain points, he mostly focuses on, like Qūnawī, providing general explanations of the Qur’anic keynotes.

Such loyalty to the external aspect of the text necessarily brings forward letter symbolism. The letter symbolism, which is one of the aspects of esoteric interpretation, has always been popular in Sufī writings from early times onward. Ja‘far al-Ṣādiq is known as a scholar who possessed the knowledge of the secrets of the letters (*jafr*) and used this knowledge in his Qur’anic commentary. It is said that this mode of interpretation was first used by ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib and passed down from him to Ja‘far through the latter’s uncle Zayd ibn ‘Alī.<sup>69</sup> Ibn al-‘Arabī, like many Sufī writers, attributes mysterious meanings to the letters. According to him, the source of the science of letters (*‘ilm al-ḥurūf*) is divine, and Jesus represents this knowledge.<sup>70</sup> Ibn al-‘Arabī also associates the letters of the Arabic alphabet with divine names

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66 Qūnawī, *I’jāz al-bayān*, 486-500.

67 Fanārī, *Ayn*, 140.

68 Ibid., 141-142.

69 On the origin and the aspects of the usage of the letters in the sciences of divination and the occult, see Toufic Fahd, “Djafir,” in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed. Brill Online [www.brillonline.com]. Ibn Taymiyya rejects Ja‘far’s relationship with the so-called science of *jafr*. See Ibn Taymiyya, *Majmū‘ al-fatāwā*, 35:183.

70 Ibn al-‘Arabī, *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya*, 1: 508-510.

and existence.<sup>71</sup> Qūnawī, moreover, establishes a parallel between the formal and sound features of the letters and existence. He provides long explanations of the ontological and spiritual values of the letters of the *basmala*.<sup>72</sup> Fanārī also speculates on and understands meanings from the features of the letters and quotes Sufī writers who reveal the secrets of the letters such as Qūnawī, Mu‘ayyid al-Dīn al-Jandī (d. 1291), and Najm al-Dīn al-Kubrā (d. 1221).<sup>73</sup> According to him, only those who know the secrets of the letters and their spiritual values can discover their connections and features.<sup>74</sup> Fanārī apparently considers the writers from whom he quotes as authorities in this field because he does not approve every interpretation based on letter symbolism. For example, he rejects a comment narrated by Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Tha‘labī (d. 1035), a renowned medieval commentator, which links the first three letters of the *basmala* to the divine names whose initials are the same letters. Fanārī thinks that this comment was produced by a certain school on a false conviction that every letter of the alphabet has the characteristic of a divine name that begins with that letter.<sup>75</sup>

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71 For examples of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s interpretation based on letter symbolism, see Abū Zayd, *Falsafat al-ta’wīl*, 297-331.

72 Qūnawī, *I’jāz al-bayān*, 244-257.

73 For examples, see Fanārī, *‘Ayn*, 156-157 and 160-162.

74 Ibid., 156.

75 Ibid., 161.

## CONCLUSION

The significance of Fanārī's *'Ayn al-a'yān* lies in its two important features: First, its prologue touches on critical subjects of Qur'anic exegesis. Here Fanārī goes beyond describing structural and thematic features of the Qur'an and exegetical approaches to it by discussing the nature of Qur'anic exegesis and the limits of its authority to know God's exact intention in the Qur'anic text. In this sense, he aims to present a well-defined theory of exegesis. He understands *ta'wīl* as a legitimate interpretive method whose source is other than narration, and then assesses esoteric exegesis within this category. He tries to establish the legitimacy of *ta'wīl* by underlining the linguistic characteristics of the Qur'an and the insufficiency of narration to provide information for the entire Qur'an. Through *ta'wīl*, a commentator extracts meanings not spoken by the tradition, including esoteric ones, which are not certain to be God's intention. However, God's intention is not totally veiled in the Qur'an; we "know" God's intention in the parts of the Qur'an whose obvious messages the Muslim community has achieved a consensus about, or about which there are Prophetic comments narrated by a consensus of reporters. These obvious portions are still open to *ta'wīl* and can "assume" more and deeper dimensions of meaning besides their primary meaning. I argue that Fanārī questions the authority of *Tafsīr* to know God's exact intention in the text in order to make his Sufi hermeneutics, which favor fluidity instead of unilaterality and stasis, possible.

Second, the commentary part of the *'Ayn* contains outstanding examples of esoteric exegesis, which Fanārī presents according to the theory he embraces, mostly following Qūnawī. Fanārī's esoteric interpretation does not disregard the literal meaning of the Qur'anic text. At the level of esoteric sense, the text encodes the secrets of existence, which the commentator must then decipher. Fanārī also uses esoteric exegesis as a path to spirituality, which in his view is the

true purpose of life. In this regard, in Fanārī's commentary, the Qur'an functions as an epistemological medium that connects Akbarīan ontology to spirituality.

Fanārī attempts to justify esoteric interpretation on several planes. On the epistemological plane, he underscores the spiritual aspect of human nature and humans' intellectual capacity to comprehend mystical knowledge and the acknowledgment of this spiritual aspect in the Qur'an and the hadiths. On the ontological plane, he associates the multiplicity of the meanings with the hierarchical Akbarī ontology. On the exegetical plane, he explains the existence of implicit meanings in the Qur'an through its linguistic, stylistic and thematic characteristics. In this regard, the hadith of Z̤B̤Ḥ̤M provides a favorable ground for Fanārī, on which he brings together his epistemological, ontological, and exegetical ideas in harmony.

The hadith of Z̤B̤Ḥ̤M is found in several early works and in later non-canonical hadith compilations. It was transmitted by many channels from two sources, al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī and 'Abdullāh ibn Mas'ūd. From the early centuries on, Muslim scholars paid attention to the hadith. Early Sufi commentators employed the hadith to justify their understanding of the Qur'an as having both exoteric and esoteric meanings. Later Sufi philosophers, such as Suhrawardī and Simnānī, linked the hadith to their metaphysical ideas. Ibn al-'Arabī, Qūnawī and Fanārī assign deeper meanings to the hadith in their discussion. The most striking aspect of their interpretation of the hadith is the parallelism they establish between the Qur'an and existence. In the ontology of the Qur'an, they imagine the same hierarchical structure that they theorize about existence. This approach has brought with it significant ontological and exegetical consequences. First, the ontology of the Qur'an is explained in terms similar to the ontology of the physical world. Second, the Qur'anic text is taken to have levels of meaning that correspond with the hierarchical

“levels” of existence. But just as these levels of existence are not known to all, only the elites can comprehend Qur’anic indications regarding the levels of existence.

When Fanārī establishes his position on the nature of divine speech, he affirms the Qūnawīan interpretation of revelation as the gradual manifestations of the divine essence through the divine name *Mutakallim*. These manifestations occur in four essential stages, named after the notions of the hadith of Z̤B̤H̤M. Fanārī considers each manifestation that appears in a different ontological realm as a different type of speech. In this regard, he denies both the monolithic and dualist interpretations of divine speech seen in the Islamic theological schools. The eternal, uncomposite divine speech turns into uneternal, composite language through the process of revelation. The loci (*maḥall*) in which the speech dwells during the process give it compositeness. The text of the Qur’an in the physical world is the last stage of the sequence of manifestation of divine speech and can be defined as created. Fanārī tries to back up these theories by blending the opinions of the classical scholars with Qūnawī’s and discussing the subject on the grounds of the *‘ulūm al-Qur’ān*.

Fanārī embraces a moderate approach to literalist esotericism and letter symbolism. He focuses on the linguistic aspects of the text when interpreting but he is careful not to produce out-of-context comments. His comments are mostly general explanations of the Akbarī ideas invoked by the textual keynotes. He also generally avoids interpretation based on letter symbolism although he expresses his respect for comments by those he recognizes as authorities.

**Appendix – A**  
**(IMAGES OF MANUSCRIPTS)**

ابتدئ في دعوت الله تعالى وحسن يومه في يوم  
 الاربعاء وقت الاستواء فاحسن صفر ختم  
 بالحرف والطف وذا ساعة تمام اسبوع سنين  
 لمولف من اعوامه وفتة الله لا ختامه  
 قبل احواله وجعله  
 وسيله افضال  
 الصالح الى دار  
 سلامه امين  
 بحرمه سيد  
 الكرسيين  
 الخ  
 في شهر ربيع الثاني  
 وسنة 1111  
 وسنة 1111

Figure- 3: Note in the Murad Molla manuscript




Figure- 4: Colophon in the Atif Efendi manuscript




Figure- 5: Mahmud Paşa manuscript



للزيادات الا في مواضع نادرة فلا يتناول غيرها تلك المواضع الا بالضرورة قالوا  
ان يقال علم التفسير معرفة احوال كلام الله تعالى من حيث القرآنية وحيث  
ولا يتناول ما يعلم او يظن انه مراد الله بقدر الطاقة الانسانية فهذا  
يتناول اقسام البيان باسمها **الفصل الثالث** في تقسيمه الى التفسير  
والتاويل قال الفاضل في شرحه بيان معاني القرآن اما بالنقل عن النبي  
صلى الله عليه وسلم او عن الصحابة و هو التفسير واما بحسب قواعد العربية  
وهو التاويل ويرجع عليهما ان تعيين احد المحتملات بالادلة العقلية خارج  
عن القسمين وذلك كما سيحكي في قسمي العقلية والاعتقادية  
ان فرع التاويل فيها الدليل العقلي وقال الامام محيى السنن وغيره من  
اهل التفسير ان التفسير بيان سبب نزول الآيات وشانها وقصتها  
والقوم الذين اريدوا فلا يجوز الا بالتامج والتاويل بمراد اللفظ الى  
معنى محتمل هو اقرب لما قيلها وما بعد ما غير محتمل للكتاب والاشنة ويرجع  
عليه اللفظ الذي له معنى واحد هو المراد والموضوع له ولا يتر فيه  
اذ يخرج عنها والمشهور ما في الكواشي وعليه آخر كلام شارحين  
ان التفسير ما يتعلق بالرواية والتاويل ما يتعلق بالدراسة وفيه بعد ما  
احتمل ان التفسير انزل من التاويل بل جواز ان يكون الرواية بخبر الواحد  
ويكون التاويل بالقرت الى محكم الكتاب والاشنة المتأثره وبالدرليل  
العقلي وهو خلاف الاجماع ولا يندفع هذا عن الاقوال الثلاثة الا ان يحمل  
هذا على اذكرة علم الهدى ان التفسير بيان من شهد المرور فهو يقول  
بالعلم وغيره بالرأى قال جميع اجابا عن الاية وبني العقبا عليه هو تاويل  
لا تفسير كذا نقل عنه في التفسير ومنه يعلم كما قال الاصفهاني ان كلام التفسير  
والتاويل يشترك لغوي بين المعنى الاصح والخص كالعلم بين مطلق الادراك  
والاعتقاد والحجرات الثابتة فاقول في الجواب عن الثالث لما كانت الرواية  
من حيث هو طريق بيان العلوم اى المشاهد سميت تفسير الانهاض وتكشف  
العلوم وسببها وان لم يحصل العلم للمرور لها انما الفرق عن الظاهر فليس

من حيث هو طريق العلم وعن الثاني ان التفسير الى التفسير والتاويل هو  
بيان المعنى المحتاج الى البيان اذ بيان اليقين تحصيل الحاصل وذلك  
مخصص في القسمين لما قال في عين المعاني التفسير اطلاق محسوس اللفظ  
وقال الاصفهاني ان التفسير انما يتحقق انما في غريب الالفاظ نحو الجيق  
والسائبة والوسيلة واما في وجيزتين بشرح قوله تعالى **تحيى الصلاة**  
**وانت الزكاة** واما في كلام متضمن لقصة لا يمكن تصوره الا بمعرفتها  
نحو قوله تعالى **انما النفس زياردة في الكفر** وقوله تعالى **ليس البر بان تاتوا**  
**البيوت من ظهورها** وعن الاقوال ان تعيين المطلق او تخصيص العلم  
او تعيين المعنى المجازي واحد ومعنى المشترك هو ذلك بالقرينة العقلية  
من جملة قواعد العربية ليس خارجا عنها فتمثيلها بما في التفسير ان بيان  
ان المراد بالظاهرين في قوله تعالى **ان طائفتان من المؤمنين اقتتلوا**  
الاولى والظهير والقوم في سدة عود لا قوم اولى يا هرهم فارسي اليمامة  
ومن يحكي في قوله تعالى **من الناس من يحكي** قوله هو الحسن بن شريك  
تفسيرا اما قوله في قوله تعالى **انفوا خفايا** فقالوا اي سبنا وشيونا  
او نفرا وغنيا او صحاحا ورضى وشاطا وغير نشاط فتاويل اولى من  
تمثيلها بما في الكواشي من ان قوله تعالى **لا ريب فيه** معنى لا شك فيها  
تفسيره بمعنى لا ريب فيه المتأثر في شواهد صدقها واول اذ الرواية  
الشعرية في الاول غير موهوبة مدلول المفسرين فيها وناخذها ان  
السفر والفسر تبنيان عن الكشف كفسرة الطيب وسفر وجه الجيب  
والسفرة المقدمة لسفر الغريب فالنفسر والسفر معنى واحد وقيل  
الاول كشف المعاني والثاني كشف الاعيان واما قول آخر الاسلام  
ان التفسير هو الكشف بلا شبهة فانما يصح بحمله على ما سلف من  
قول علم الهدى ان التفسير للمشاهدة وعلى تفسير بعض القران بعضا كما  
عرفه الاصويون والافاكرة ما يتعلق بالرواية بظنيات ثابتة باخبار  
الاحاد والتاويل اما من الاول وهو الانصاف فالضعيف للتعدية

Figure- 7: Atif Efendi manuscript

للقوف على حقايق التفسير بالتدقيق \* ان يقدم معرفة حده الجامع المانع \* ثم معرفة وجه الحاجة اليه بمعرفة فضله الرفيع الرافع \* ثم معرفة موضوعه الذي يبحث فيه عن احواله الخاصة بالوجه الشامل الجامع \* ثم معرفة ان استمداده من اى علم نافع \* فرأى هذا العبد الضعيف ان يمهد هذه الاربعة الابواب \* مع عدة فصول يتضمنها كل باب \* قبل الخوض في مقصود الكتاب.

﴿ الباب الاول ﴾

فما يتعلق بمجد علم التفسير وفيه فصول ( الفصل الاول ) في نفس حده قال مولانا قطب الدين الرازى رحمه الله في شرحه للكشاف واياء اعنى بالشارح الفاضل انما وقع هو ما يبحث فيه عن مراد الله تعالى من قرآنه المجيد ويرد عليه ان البحث فيه ربما كان عن احوال الالفاظ كمباحث القراءات من نحو ملك ومالك ومباحث ناسخية الالفاظ ومنسوخيتها ومباحث اسباب نزولها وترتيب نزولها وانها مكية او مدنية الى غير ذلك فامثالها من التفسير ولا يجمعها حده وايضا يدخل فيه البحث في الفقه الاكبر والاصغر عما يثبت بالكتاب فانه بحث عن مراد الله تعالى من قرآنه فلا يذمه حده فكان الشارح التفتازانى رحمه الله انما عدل عنه لذلك الى قوله هو العلم الباحث عن احوال الالفاظ كلام الله تعالى من حيث الدلالة على المراد فزاد لفظ احوال الالفاظ ليجمع الاولى وقيد بالحينية ليمنع الثانية ويمنع العلوم الادبية فانها باحثة عن احوال كلام الله لكن البحث من حيث انه كلام مطلقا لا من حيث الدلالة على مراد الله تعالى الذى هو المراد \* واقول يرد على مختارنا ايضا وجوه (الاول) ان البحث المتعلق بالفاظ القرآن ربما لا يكون بحيث يؤثر في المعنى المراد بالدلالة والبيان بخلاف ملك ومالك والناسخية والمنسوخية واسباب النزول مما له اثر في تعيين المعنى في الجملة وذلك كبحث علم القراءة عن امثال التفخيم والامالة والمد والقصر والاطالة الى ما لا يحصى فان علم القراءة جزء من علم التفسير افرز عنه لمزيد الاهتمام لانها مهم كل الانام افرز الكحالة من الطب والفرائض من علم الاحكام وقد خرج بقيد الحينية ولم يجمعه ﴿ فان قيل ﴾ اراد تعريفه بعد افرز علم القراءة ﴿ قلنا ﴾ فلا يناسب الشرح المشروح للبحث فيه عمالا يتغير به المعنى في مواضع لا تخص منها الحمد لله بالضمتين او الكسرتين وانذرتهم بالتحقيق والتخفيف واقحام الالف ( الثانى )

( ان )

Figure- 8: Published version of the 'Ayn

Appendix – B

SELECTIONS FROM

PROLOGUE OF ‘AYN AL-A‘YĀN

and

COMMENTARY ON THE AL-ISTI‘ĀDHA

[ مقتطفات من ]

مقدمة عين الأعيان في تفسير الفاتحة

وتفسير الاستعاذة

لمحمد بن حمزة شمس الدين الفناري

(2) ربّنا آمنا بما أنزلت واتّبعنا الرسول، فاكتبنا مع الشاهدين. اللهم إنا نسألك فهم النبيين، وحفظ المرسلين، وإلهام ملائكتك المقربين، وتوفيق عبادك الصالحين. اللهم اجعلنا ممن يطلب التفسير لتيسير عسير نفسه بالعلم والعمل، لا لتخييل الخيلاء أو الترفع بالمرء والجدل. وارزقنا الترقى باجتناء أثمار الأعمال، وباقتناء آثار الكمال، والتوقى عن وهج طول الآمال، ولهج فرط الكسل والإهمال، بمحمد وآله خير آل صلّى الله عليه وعليهم ما بورك بالدعاء لهم افتتأخ المقال، وتُدورُك بالثناء عليهم انشراخ البال.

الحمد لله الذي أنزل على عبده الكتاب إنذاراً وتبشيراً، وآتاه الله الحكمة وفصل الخطاب تفسيراً وتيسيراً، كما خصصه بجوامع الكلم تعظيماً وتوقيراً، فرصه بمجامع الحكم تميمياً وتوقيراً. دبر الملكوت والممالك تقديمياً وتأخيراً، وقدّر أخلاق الخلائق وأرزاق العلائق تقسيماً و تقديراً . فمنهم من كمله في عوالم الإيمان بمعالم العرفان تشريفاً وتنويراً. ولذلك أرسل رسله وأنزل كتبه تعريفاً وتبصيراً. ومنهم من خذله وختم على سمعه وقلبه وجعل على بصره غشاوة، فأقبل على الهوى عن الهدى، ولم يثمر له التحذير إلا تحسيراً. ثم أرسل إلينا على تلك القاعدة الممضاة رحمةً مهداةً، مهديةً مرضاةً، مروجةً لنا بضاعة مزجاة. فجاء مجيء الصبح والليل داجن، وحل محل الغيث والقفر محل، فاستفرغ في الأداء أي مجهود، واستغرق في الوفاء بأي معهود، حتى وصل من شيم السيادة غلاها فعلاها، كما حصل من كنه العبودة فحويها فحوهاها، محمد خاتم النبيين وأم كتاب المرسلين.(3)

فلاح فلاح البيض من جوّ جاهه وعاش عطاش السود من جود جوده  
عليه من التسليم ما زاد عدّة على رمل قفرٍ بات تحت جنوده

وعلى آله الآخذين بحدوده، الوافين بعهوده، من آله الأبرار وصحبه الأخيار، كالأختان والأصهار. وأشهد أن لا إله إلا الله شهادةً تُبَوِّئنا دار القرار، مع أولي الأيدي والأبصار، فنعم عقبى الدار. وأشهد أن محمداً عبده ورسوله شهادةً تستوجب شفاعته المختار، بين يدي الغفار.

وَأدِّمِ اللَّهُمَّ دَوْلَةَ مَنْ تُسَبِّبُ لِهَذَا الْجَمْعِ بَشَارَةً إِشَارَتَهُ، وَتُشَمِّرُ عَنْ سَاقِ الْجَدِّ فِيهَا نَحَايَةَ عِنَايَتِهِ! فَأَتَمَّرُ تَحْتَمُّ طَاعَتِهِ هِمَّةً صَادِقَةً تَفْتَرُّ عَنِ الْإِهْتِمَامِ التَّامِ فِي كِتَابَتِهِ! وَلَا تَفْتَرِّ حِينَ يَنْظُرُ إِلَى قُصُورٍ مِنْ أَشَارٍ إِلَيْهِ وَقَلَّةِ بَضَاعَتِهِ، وَغَلْوِ عُلُوِّ رَتْبَةِ هَذِهِ الصَّنَاعَةِ مِنْ زِينَةِ صِيَاغَتِهِ! كَمَا قَالَ:

مالي وللأمر الذي قلّدتَه      ما للذباب وطُعمة العنقاء  
أبكي لعجزِي وهو يبكي ذلّة      شتان بين بكائه وبكائي

وهو الذي تفرد بين أهل زمانه بتمكين أساس الشريعة الشريفة في مكانه، وتسكين غلغل الأشرار عن ملل قُتل الأقطار، حتى انتهى إلى أمد من محبة الدين وأهله متباعداً، وترقى في تربية أصحاب اليقين إلى أن عدّ ألفٌ بواحد، فأصبح مثقُ الفضل برياسته متيناً، وركنُ العدل بسياسته مكيناً. فهو كما قيل:

ملكٌ يُرِيكَ شسوعُ منزلِ قدره      زهرُ الكواكب منه صفٌّ نعال  
ليثٌ لأقرانِ المجمع ما له      ثانٍ إذا دعت الملوكُ نزال  
وله طبيعة منطق يعلو به      دين الإله القادر المتعال  
لا مثل لي حبًّا ولا لك في الوري      حسناً كلانا مضرب الأمثال  
وكأنني إلاّ لحبك لم أكن      وكأن حبك لم يكن إلاّ لي

السلطان ابن السلطان محمد بن السعيد الشهيد علاء الدين بكُ ابن قَرَمَانَ،

لا زال بائك مثوى العدل مسكنه مأوى العلى والمباغي مجمع الدول  
وعشت في عزة تزهى الملوك بها وسيرة ترتضي في الله والرسل  
ومتع الله نسلأ أنت والده بالعمر والسعد محفوظاً عن الخلل

أما بعد، فاعلموا معشر طلاب اليقين! سلام عليكم لا نبتغي الجاهلين. إن الحقيق بطلبة طلبه التحقيق تحصيل  
البصيرة التامة، والرأي الوثيق، قبل خوضهم في سلوك الطريق. وهذا مركز في طبيعة كل فريق. فلهذا يحق على مرید  
مزید التوفيق (4) للوقوف على حقائق التفسير بالتدقيق، أن يقدم معرفة حده الجامع المانع، ثم معرفة وجه الحاجة إليه  
بمعرفة فضله الرفيع الرافع، ثم معرفة موضوعه الذي يبحث فيه عن أحواله الخاصة بالوجه الشامل الجامع، ثم معرفة أن  
استمداده من أي علم نافع. فرأى هذا العبد الضعيف أن يمهد هذه الأربعة الأبواب مع عدة فصول يتضمنها كل  
باب، قبل الخوض في مقصود الكتاب.

## الباب الأول

فيما يتعلق بحد

### علم التفسير

وفيه فصول:

### الفصل الأول

#### في نفس حده

قال مولانا قطب الدين الرازي رحمه الله في شرحه للكشاف (وإياه أعني الشارح الفاضل أينما وقع): "هو ما يبحث فيه عن مراد الله تعالى من قرآنه المجيد". ويُردّ عليه أن البحث فيه ربما كان عن أحوال الألفاظ كمباحث القراءات من نحو "ملك ومالك"، ومباحث ناسخية الألفاظ ومنسوخيتها، ومباحث أسباب نزولها، وترتيب نزولها، وأنها مكية أو مدنية إلى غير ذلك فأمثالها من التفسير، ولا يجمعها حده. وأيضاً يدخل فيه البحث في الفقه الأكبر والأصغر عما يثبت بالكتاب، فإنه بحث عن مراد الله تعالى من قرآنه، فلا يمنعه حده.

فكأن الشارح التفتازاني رحمه الله إنما عدل عنه لذلك إلى قوله: "هو العلم الباحث عن أحوال ألفاظ كلام الله تعالى من حيث الدلالة على المراد". فزاد لفظ "أحوال الألفاظ" ليجمع الأولى، وقيد بالحيشية ليمنع الثانية، ويمنع العلوم الأدبية فإنها باحثة عن أحوال كلام الله. لكن البحث من حيث إنه كلام مطلقاً لا من حيث الدلالة على مراد الله تعالى الذي هو المراد. وأقول: يُردّ على مختاره أيضاً. وجوه: الأول: أن البحث المتعلق بألفاظ القرآن ربما لا يكون

بحيث يؤثر في المعنى المراد بالدلالة والبيان بخلاف "ملك ومالك"، والناسخية والمنسوخية، وأسباب النزول مما له أثر في تعيين المعنى في الجملة. وذلك كبحث علم القراءة عن أمثال التفخيم والإمالة والمد والقصر والإطالة إلى ما لا يحصى. فإن علم القراءة جزء من علم التفسير، أُفرز عنه لمزيد الاهتمام لأنها مهم كل الأنام، إفراز الكحالة من الطب، والفرائض من علم الأحكام. وقد خرج بقيد الحيثية ولم يجمعه. فإن قيل: أراد تعريفه بعد إفراز علم القراءة. قلنا: فلا يناسب الشرح المشروح للبحث فيه عما لا يتغير به المعنى في مواضع لا تحصى، منها {الحمد لله} بالضميتين أو الكسرتين، و{أأندرتهم} بالتحقيق والتخفيف وإقحام الألف.

**الثاني: (5) أن المراد بـ"المراد" إن كان المراد بمطلق الكلام فقد دخل العلوم الأدبية، وإن كان مراد الله تعالى بكلامه** فإن أريد مراده في نفس الأمر فلا يفيد به بحث التفسير لأن طريقه غالباً إما رواية الآحاد أو الدراية بطريق العربية وكلاهما ظني كما عرف، ولأن فهم كل أحد بقدر استعداده. ولذلك أوصى المشايخ في الإيمان أن يقال "آمنت بالله وبما جاء به من عنده على مراده، وآمنت برسول الله وبما قاله على مراده" ولا يعين بما ذكره أهل التفسير ويكرر ذلك عَلمُ الهدى رحمه الله في تأويلاته. وإن أريد مراده تعالى في زعم المفسر ففيه حزاة من وجهين. الأول: كون علم التفسير بالنسبة إلى كل مفسر بل إلى كل أحد شيئاً آخر. وهذا مثل ما اعترض على حد الفقه لصاحب التنقيح وظن وروده. وإلا فيني أجيب عنه بأن التعدد ليس في حقيقته النوعية بل في جزئياتها المختلفة باختلاف القوالب. وأيضاً ذكر الشيخ رحمه الله في تفسير {مالك يوم الدين} أن جميع المعاني المفسر بها لفظ القرآن روايةً أو درايةً صحيحتين مراد الله لكن بحسب المراتب والقوالب، لا في حق كل واحد. الثاني: أن الأذهان تنساق بمعاني الألفاظ إلى ما في نفس الأمر على ما عرف فلا بد لصرْفها عنه من أن يقال من حيث الدلالة على ما يُظنّ أنه مراد الله تعالى.

**الثالث:** أن عبارة العلم الباحث في المتعارف تنصرف إلى الأصول والقواعد أو ملكتها وليس لعلم التفسير قواعد يتفرع عليها الجزئيات إلا في مواضع نادرة فلا يتناول غير تلك المواضع إلا بالعناية.

فالأولى أن يقال "علم التفسير معرفة أحوال كلام الله تعالى من حيث القرآنية ومن حيث دلالاته على ما يُعلم أو يُظنّ أنه مراد الله تعالى بقدر الطاقة الإنسانية". فهذا يتناول أقسام البيان بأسرها.

## الفصل الثاني

### في تقسيمه إلى التفسير والتأويل

قال الفاضل في شرحه: بيان معاني القرآن إما بالنقل عن النبي صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ أو عن الصحابة رضوان الله عليهم أجمعين وهو التفسير، وإما بحسب قواعد العربية وهو التأويل. ويُردّ عليه أن تعيين أحد المحتملات بالأدلة العقلية خارج عن القسامين وذلك كما سيجيء في قسمي العقليات والاعتقاديات أن مفرغ التأويل فيهما الدليل العقلي.

وقال الإمام محيي السنة وعدة من أهل التفسير أن التفسير بيان سبب نزول الآية وشأنها وقصتها والقوم الذين أريدوا، فلا يجوز إلا بالسمع. والتأويل صرف اللفظ إلى معنى يحتمله موافق لما قبلها وما بعدها غير مخالف للكتاب والسنة. ويرد عليه: اللفظ الذي له معنى واحد - وهو المراد والموضوع له - ولا رواية فيه إذ يخرج عنهما.

والمشهور ما في الكواشي وعليه آخر كلام الشارحين أن التفسير ما يتعلق بالرواية، والتأويل ما يتعلق (6) بالدراية. وفيه بعد ما مر احتمال أن التفسير أنزل من التأويل لجواز أن يكون الرواية بخبر الواحد ويكون التأويل بالصرف إلى محكم الكتاب أو السنة المتواترة وبالذليل العقلي، وهو خلاف الإجماع. ولا يندفع هذا عن الأقوال الثلاثة إلا أن يحمل هذا على ما ذكره علكم الهدى أن التفسير بيان من شهد المروي فهو يقول بالعلم، وغيره بالرأي. قال: وجميع ما جاء

عن الأئمة وبنى الفقهاء كلامهم عليه هو تأويل لا تفسير. كذا نقل عنه في التيسير. فمنه يعلم كما قال الإصفهاني أن التفسير والتأويل مشترك لفظي بين المعنى الأعم والأخص كالعلم بين مطلق الإدراك والاعتقاد الجازم الثابت.

فأقول في الجواب عن الثالث: لما كانت الرواية من حيث هي طريق بيان المعلوم أي المشاهد سميت تفسيراً لأنها طريق كشف المعلوم وسببه، وإن لم يحصل العلم للمروري له أما الصرف عن الظاهر فليس من حيث هو طريق العلم.

وعن الثاني أن المنقسم إلى التفسير والتأويل هو بيان المعنى المحتاج إلى البيان، إذ بيان المبين تحصيل الحاصل، وذلك منحصر في القسمين لما قال في عين المعاني: التفسير إطلاق محتبس اللفظ. وقال الإصفهاني أن التفسير إنما يتحقق إما في غريب الألفاظ نحو "البحيرة" و"السائبة" و"الوصيلة"، وإما في وجيز يتبين بشرح كقوله تعالى {أقيموا الصلاة وآتوا الزكاة}، وإما في كلام متضمن لقصة لا يمكن تصويره إلا بمعرفتها نحو قوله تعالى {إنما النسيء زيادة في الكفر}، وقوله تعالى {ليس البر بأن تأتوا البيوت من ظهورها}.

وعن الأول أن تقييد المطلق أو تخصيص العام أو تعيين المعنى الجاري أو أحد معنيي المشترك، كل ذلك بالقرينة العقلية، وذلك من جملة قواعد العربية ليس خارجاً عنها. فتمثيلهما بما في التفسير أن المراد بـ"الطائفتين" في قوله تعالى {وإن طائفتان من المؤمنين اقتتلا} الأوس والخزرج، وبالقوم {في استدعون إلى قوم أولي بأس} هم فارس وأهل اليمامة، وبمن يُعجبك في قوله {ومن الناس من يعجبك قوله} هو الأخنس بن شريق تفسير؛ أما في قوله تعالى {انفروا خفافاً وثقالاً} أي شباناً وشيوخاً، أو فقراءً أو أغنياء، أو صحاحاً ومرضى، أو نشاطاً و غير نشاط فتأويل؛ أولى من تمثيلهما بما في الكواشي من أن قوله تعالى {لا ريب فيه} بمعنى لا شك فيه تفسير؛ وبمعنى لا ريب فيه للمتأمل في شواهد صدقه تأويل. إذ الرواية الشرعية في الأول غير معهودة.

هذا قول المفسرين فيهما. ومأخذهما أن السفر والفسر ينبئان عن الكشف كتفسرة الطبيب، وسفر وجه الحبيب. والسفرة المقدمة لسفر الغريب. فالتفسير والتفسير بمعنى واحد. وقيل: الأول كشف المعاني، والثاني كشف الأعيان.

(7)

وأما في قول فخر الإسلام أن التفسير هو الكشف بلا شبهة فإنما يصح بحمله على ما سلف من قول علم الهدى أن التفسير للمشاهد أو على تفسير بعض القرآن بعضاً كما عرفه الأصوليون وإلا فأكثر ما يتعلق بالرواية ظنيات ثابتة بأخبار الآحاد.

والتأويل إما من الأول وهو الانصراف، فالتضعيف للتعدية، وإما من الإيالة وهي السياسة والصرف، فالتضعيف للتكثير. وقد يراد المصروف إليه كقوله تعالى {وهل ينظرون إلا تأويله} أي عاقبة أمره.

وقال الأصوليون: التفسير بيان ما يحتمله اللفظ ظاهراً، والتأويل بيان ما يحتمله باطناً. وقريب منه قولهم: التأويل حمل الظاهر على المحتمل المرجوح. ويتناولان التأويل الصحيح المسمى منقاداً، والفساد المسمى مستكرهاً، ولو قيل بدليل يصيرُه راجحاً خُصَّ بالصحيح. وقيل التأويل: حمل اللفظ على أحد احتمالاته بدليل ظني، إذ لو كان بدليل قطعي كان تفسيراً. فحمل المشترك على أحد معانيه بدليل ظني تأويل على هذا دون الأولين لكنهما يشملان الصرف بالدليل القطعي دون الثالث، فبينه وبينهما عموم من وجه. قال الإصفيهاني: التأويل المنقاد ما لا يعرض فيه استقباح. وقد يقع فيه الخلاف بين الراسخين في العلم بوجوه. الأول: اشتراك اللفظ نحو {لا تدركه الأبصار}، هل هو بصر العين أو القلب؟ الثاني: اقتضاء النظم نحو {أولئك هم الفاسقون إلا الذين تابوا}، هل الاستثناء مقصور على المعطوف أو راجع إلى الكل؟ الثالث: غموض المعنى ووجازة اللفظ نحو {وإن عزموا الطلاق فإن الله سميع عليم}. ووجوه اعتبارها أن ينظر، فإن كان ما ورد فيه التأويل المنقاد أمراً عقلياً فزع في كشفه إلى الأدلة العقلية لقوله تعالى {ليدبروا آياته

وليتذكر أولو الألباب}. وإن كان أمراً شرعياً فرع في كشفه إلى آية محكمة أو سنة مبينة. وإن كان من الأخبار الاعتقادية فرع إلى الحجج العقلية. وإن كان من الأخبار الاعتبارية فرع إلى الأخبار الصحيحة المشروحة في القصص. أما التأويل المستكره مما يستبشع لابتنائه على التدلّيسات المزخرفة المروّجة، وذلك من أربعة وجوه. الأول: بتقييد المطلق بلا دليل، كقولهم: المراد بـ"صالح المؤمنين" في قوله تعالى {فإن الله هو مولاه وجبريل وصالح المؤمنين} هو عليّ. الثاني: بالتلفيق بين آيتين، كقولهم: الحيوانات كلها مكلفة لقوله تعالى {وإن من أمة إلا خلا فيها نذير}، وقوله تعالى {وما من دابة في الأرض ولا طائر يطير بجناحيه إلا أمم أمثالكم}. الثالث: بالخبر المزور كقولهم في قوله تعالى {يوم يكشف عن ساق} أنه الجارحة المخصوصة لحديث موضوع. الرابع: باستعارة بديعة أو اشتقاق بديع، كقولهم المراد بـ"البقر" إنسان يقرر عن أنواع العلوم، وبـ"الهدهد" إنسان جيد البحث و التتقير. (8)

## الفصل الثالث

### في جواز الخوض فيهما

قال في التيسير: قيل لا يجوز إلا بنقل صحيح لما روى ابن عباس رضي الله عنهما عن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم أنه قال: "من قال في القرآن برأيه فليتبوأ مقعده من النار". وفي رواية له: "من قال في القرآن بغير علم...". ويروى "من فسر القرآن برأيه...". وروى جندب عنه صلى الله عليه وسلم أنه قال: "من قال في القرآن برأيه فأصاب فقد أخطأ". وقال أبو بكر رضي الله عنه حين سئل عن قوله تعالى {وفاكهةً وأباً}: "أيّ سماء تظلني و أي أرض تقلني إذا قلت في كتاب الله ما لا أعلم به!"

أما عامة أهل العلم فعلى جوازه بالكتاب والخبر والأثر ودلالة الإجماع. أما الكتاب فالآيات الحاثّة على التدبر فيه للوقوف على معانيه والاستنباط منه والتبيين للناس، وفيها كثرة. وأما الخبر فقوله صلى الله عليه وسلم: "أول ما يرفع

من الأرض العلم." قالوا: "يا رسول الله! يرفع القرآن؟" قال: "لا، ولكن يموت من يعلم تأويله، ويبقى قوم يتأولون على أهوائهم." وما روى ابن عباس رضي الله عنهما عن النبي صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ أنه قال: "القرآن ذلول ذو وجوه، فاحملوه على أحسن وجوهه!" فلكل من هذه الكلمات الثلاث وجهان. فقوله "ذلول": أي ممكن القراءة أو واضح المعاني للمجتهدين. وقوله "ذو وجوه": أي كلماته محتملة لإعجازها وجوهاً كثيرة متناسبة أو جامعة، وجوهاً من الأمر والنهي والوعد والوعيد وغيرها. وقوله "فاحملوه على أحسن وجوهه": أي أولوه بأحسن معانيه، أو اعملوا بأحسن ما فيه من العزائم دون الرخص ومن العفو دون الانتصاف. وأما الأثر فقول ابن مسعود رضي الله عنه: "من أراد العلم فليثور القرآن." وقول علي رضي الله عنه: "ما من شيء إلا وعلمه في القرآن، ولكن رأي الرجال يعجز عنه." ونظموه بقولهم:

جميع العلم في القرآن لكن      تقاصر عنه أفهما الرجال

وقول الحسن رحمه الله تعالى: "أنزل الله مائة وأربعة كتب من السماء. أودع علومها أربعة: التوراة، والإنجيل، والزبور، والفرقان. ثم أودع علوم هذه الأربعة الفرقان. ثم أودع علوم الفرقان المفصل. ثم أودع علوم المفصل فاتحة الكتاب. فمن علم تفسيرها كان كمن علم تفسير جميع كتب الله المنزلة." وقول ابن عباس رضي الله عنه: "التفسير على أربعة أوجه: وجه يعرفه العرب بكلامها، ووجه لا يعذر أحد بجهالته، ووجه يعلمه العلماء، ووجه لا يعلمه إلا الله." قالوا: فالأول حقائق اللغة، والثاني هو أصول التوحيد وأصول الشرائع، والثالث فروع الأحكام وتأويل المحتملات، والرابع الغيوب كوقت قيام الساعة وظهور أشراتها. فما لا يعذر فيه أحد بجهله فرض عين وما يختص به (9) العلماء فرض كفاية. والجواب عن احتجاجهم بقول أبي بكر واضح، وقوله صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ: "من قال في القرآن برأيه" الحديث وجوه. الأول: معناه من حمله على ما يترأى له بخواطره ولم يعمل بشهادة دلائله فأصاب الحق فقد أخطأ الدليل.

وقريب منه ما قال الفاضل أن معنى "برأيه" بمجرد الحسبان من غير الاستنباط المعهود من القواعد العربية والشرعية. الثاني: أنه جعل الرأي عياراً لما في القرآن وحمله على مذهبه، كحمل المعتزلة النظر في قوله تعالى {إلى ربّها ناظرة} على انتظار الكرامة دون الرؤية، وحمل إسناد الإضلال على التسبيب دون الإيجاد. الثالث: أنه من المتشابه الذي ليس للناس حاجة إلى معرفة ما فيه كما مر في "الساق". الرابع: أنه في حق من يقطع القول بصحة ما أداه إليه اجتهاده، لأنه نصب نفسه صاحب وحي، ولم يقل "إن أصبت فمن الله و إن أخطأت فمني ومن الشيطان" مع أن الحق أن ليس كل مجتهد مصيباً. اللهم إلا لثواب اجتهاده أو في مقدمات اجتهاده أو في حق العمل لنفسه ومتبعيه. وعن هذا قيل: إن الوعيد مخصوص بالتفسير بمعنى كشف المراد بلا شبهة، والوجوه المذكورة أعم.

## الفصل الرابع

### في معرفة وجوههما المسماة

"بطوناً" أو "ظهراً وبتناً وحدّاً ومطلّعاً وما بعده"

ذكر الإمام محيي السنة بالإسناد إلى عبد الله بن مسعود عن النبي صلّى الله عليه وسلم أنه قال: "إن القرآن نزل على سبعة أحرف. لكل آية منها ظهر وبتن ولكل حدّ ومطلّع." ويروى: "لكل حرف حد ولكل حد مطلع." فقال: قيل الظهر لفظه، والبتن تأويله. وقيل الظهر ما حدث من عصيان من تقدم وعقابهم فهو في الظاهر خبر، وباطنه عظة وتحذير. وقيل هما تلاوة وتفهم أي لكل آية ظاهر هو ترتيلها، وباطن هو تدبرها. ولكل حرف حد في التلاوة أي لا يجاوز المصحف، و في التدبر والتفسير أي لا يجاوز المسموع. ولكل حد مطلع أي مصعد من علمه يفتحه الله على المتدبر ما لا يفتحه على غيره، وفوق كل ذي علم عليم. هذا حاصل قوله رحمه الله وغير مستبعد أن يفهم منه أن المعاني الحقيقية المفهومة بمجرد وضع العرب يسمى ظهراً، لأنه أول ما يظهر للسامع، والمعاني التفسيرية المروية عن

السلف بطناً، لأن مراد الكلام روحه وباطنه، والمعاني التأويلية المجازية أو الكنائية على مراتبها متفاوتة بحسب التعميق والتغلغل في وجوه الانتقال وقوانينه مطلعاً، ووجوه الانتقالات حدوداً.

أما الذي يُفهم من مساق كلام الشيخ رحمه الله في تفسير الفاتحة أنها عبارة عن مراتب المعاني القرآنية المتعينة ظهوراً وخفاءً بتعينات تجليات الاسم (10) المتكلم، نظير تعيينات الحضرات الكلية. فالمتعين في أقصى الظهور كالمتعين بحضرة الملك والشهادة ظهر. والأخفى منه نظير الأرواح القدسية بطن. والمطلع ما يفيدك الاطلاع على الحقيقة التي إليها يستند الظاهر والباطن وهو باب حضرة الأسماء، والحقائق العينية، وأول منزل الغيب الإلهي. والحدّ هو المميّز بين الظاهر والباطن، وبين الباطن والمطلع، والبرزخ الجامع بذاته للطرفين. نظيره عالم المثال الجامع بين الغيب المحقق والشهادة. وما بعد المطلع ما ليس بشيء زائد على ذات المتكلم يعرف من سر النفس الرحماني.

أقول: فالحاصل أنها أسماء المعاني بحسب مراتب الظهور والخفاء. فالظاهر ظهور المحسوس ظهر، وظهور الأرواح بطن. والخفي خفاءً للحقائق مطلع، وخفاءً التعين الأكمل الأحدي المحمدي ما بعده.

وذكر الشيخ رحمه الله أيضاً رواية "أن للقرآن بطوناً إلى سبعة" وفي رواية "إلى سبعين". فقيل: الظهر لفظه، والبطن الأول معناه المتعين في مرتبة ضبط النفس الأمور الدنيوية بالقوة العاملة، والثاني المتعين في مرتبة ضبطها الأمور الأخروية في القوة العاقلة المنورة بنور الشرع، والثالث المتعين في مرتبة الروح، والرابع المتعين في مرتبة السر الآلهي الذي هو الوجود المضاف من حيث ظهوره العيني، والخامس ذلك أيضاً لكن من حيث بطونه الاستقراري في القلب القابل لتجليه، والسادس ذلك أيضاً لكن من حيث جمعه الرحماني بين الظهور والبطون في الدائرة البرزخية الثابتة التي هي منتهى الكمّل والأفراد، والسابع ذلك أيضاً لكن من حيث أحدية جمع الجمع للكل وهي مرتبة الأكملية ولا يفتح شمة منها إلا لصاحب الإرث المحمدي صلّى الله عليه وسلم. أما السبعون - والله أعلم - فإشارة إلى أن في كل بطن

مراتب متفاوتة تفاوتاً بالغاً حد الكثرة لأن العشرة حد أول كثرة الآحاد، والسبعة منتهى كثرة أمهات الأسماء، والسبعون جامع بين الحدين، فجعل في عرف العرب ضرب مثال للتكثير كما في قوله تعالى ﴿إن تستغفر لهم سبعين مرة﴾ الآية.

### تتمة: في تمثيل مراتب المعنى في بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

قال الشيخ رحمه الله في تفسير سورة الفاتحة ما معناه هذا: رحمتا البسمة للتعميم والتخصيص على أن في الأول خصوص العموم وفي الثاني عموم الخصوص. ورحمتا الفاتحة: إحداهما للذاتية الامتنانية التي وسعت كل شيء وليست في مقابلة عمل أو استحقاق، و إليه الإشارة بقولنا "قبل من قبل لا لعله وُرد من زُد لا لعله"، وبها يتعلق رجاء إبليس على ما يُحكى. والأخرى للشرطية التقييدية التي تفيض بحسب (11) القابلية والاستعداد، وإليها الإشارة بقوله تعالى ﴿كتب على نفسه الرحمة﴾. فللحق سبحانه باعتبارهما محبة ذاتية سابقة ومحبة صفاتية لاحقة، إليهما الإشارة بقوله تعالى ﴿يحبهم ويحبونه﴾، وقوله ﴿فاتبعوني يحببكم الله﴾. وتقول الصديقة الصغرى

أحبك حين حبّ الهوى	وحبّاً لأنك أهلٌ لذاكا
فأما الذي هو حب الهوى	فذكرك إيتاي حين أراكا
وأما الذي أنت أهلٌ له	فشغلي بذكرك عن سواكا
فلا الحمد في ذا ولا ذاك لي	ولكن لك الحمد في ذا وذاكا

إذا عرف فالمقصود من البسمة الاستعانة بتوجه المعبود الحق في الأمر الملتبس، وتتفاوت الاستعانة بحسب تفاوت التوجه. فالتوجه بالذكر الملفوظ الملحوظ ظهر، وهو أول مراتب الإحسان المفسر بقول الشيخ رحمه الله: فعل ما ينبغي لما ينبغي على ما ينبغي، وإن لم يُلاحظ. فإن لاحظ الذاكر كونه ذاكرةً بنفسه أو بروحه أو بقلبه الذي هو الهيئة

الجامعة بين الكل فبطنٌ، وهو أوسط مراتب الإحسان المشار إليها بقوله صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ "اعبد الله كأنك تراه"، وهي المراقبة. وإن لاحظ أن كل أثر هو للحق، والممكن من حيث هو ممكن عدم لا يؤثر، فهو الذاکر والمذكور لكن في الحقيقة لا في الصورة فهو مطَّلَعٌ، وهو مرتبة علم اليقين المفسر بالسكون بما غاب لقوة دليله، وهي آخر مراتب الإحسان وأول مراتب الولاية، وهي مرتبة المشاهدة الحاصلة بعد الاستغراق في المراقبة بحذف كاف "كأن". وإن بلغ ذكر الحق إلى المرتبة التي سماها الشيخ الكبير رحمه الله في مواقع النجوم بدرجة نسيان الذكر و الذاکر بالمذكور فهو ما بعد المطلع، وهذه مرتبة حق اليقين بعد آخر مرتبة الإحسان. والبرازخ حدود والله أعلم.

أما تمثيل البطون السبعة في التوجهات على ما يستفاد من تفسير الفاتحة فهو أن توجه المشبهة إلى الوجه الظاهر من التحلي البرزخي الكشبي الذي هو آخر مراتب الظهور وأول مراتب البطون توجهاً يختص بإنسانية الأمر فهو ظهر. وقبله النفوس نفس التحلي البرزخي فهو بطن أول لأن شأنه التدبير الملقق بينهما. قال: وقبله أهل السنة روح الأمر و مرتبه معاً، أعني الألوهية، وله تنزيه "ليس كمثله شيء" وتشبيهه "اعبد الله كأنك تراه". وأعلى مراتبه ظاهر العماء، يعني بذلك -والله أعلم- التحلي المطلق من حيث ظهوره العام فهذه بطن ثان إذا اعتبر في روح الأمر التدبير العام. قال: وقبله العقول مطلقاً أحادية معنى الأمر من حيث إسنادها إليه لا من حيث هو، فهذه بطن ثالث لاعتبار استناد فيض الكل إليه. قال: وقبله العارفين وجود مطلق (12) الصورة الربانية وظاهر الحق، فهذه بطن رابع لاعتبار ظهور الوجود المطلق في الأعيان. قال: وقبله المحققين وجود الحق في مرتبته الجامعة بين الوجود والمراتب من غير تفرقة وتعدد، فهذه بطن خامس لاعتبار استقرار الوجود المطلق في المرتبة المطلقة. قال: وقبله الراسخين مرتبة الحق من حيث عدم مغايرتها له وانضياف مظهريته التي حُذِي آدم عليها إليها ولها حضرة أحادية الجمعن فهذه بطن سادس

لاعتبار الأحذية الجامعة للباطن والظاهر. قال: وقبله الإنسان الحقيقي الذي هو العبد الأكمل حضرة الهوية التي لها أحذية جمع الجمع المنعوتة بكل صفة وإن كانت متقابلة وبالجمع بين الجمع والتفصيل فهذه بطن سابع، والله أعلم.

## الفصل الخامس

### في أن تحصيل علم التفسير فرض كفاية

وذلك لأن تحصيل العلوم الشرعية من أصول الدين وأصول الفقه والفقه فرض كفاية بالإجماع. وإذا يتوقف عليه كالحديث، وما لا يحصل الفرض المطلق إلا به وكان مقدوراً للمكلف يكون فرضاً مثله. فإن قلت: قوله صلى الله عليه وسلم "طلب العلم فريضة على كل مسلم" - رواه أنس - يدل على أنه فرض عين لما مر أن تحصيل العلم يتوقف عليه، قلت: ليس المراد مما في الحديث العلم المدون، بل علم الحال، أي علم ما لا بد لكل أحد في رعاية دينه كمعرفة الصانع، ووحدانيته، ونبوة رسوله، وضروريات الدين، وذلك فرض عين، لكنه غير موقوف على علم التفسير المدون، بل على دليله المخصوص أو السؤال عن أهل الذكر كما قال تعالى {فاسئلو أهل الذكر إن كنتم لا تعلمون}.

## الفصل السادس

### فيمن أخذ منه التفسير من الصحابة والتابعين

### رضوان الله تعالى عليهم أجمعين

فصدر مفسري الصحابة علي بن أبي طالب رضي الله عنه. ويتلوه عبد الله بن عباس رضي الله عنهما. فقد روي أنه قال: "ما أخذت من تفسير القرآن فمن علي بن أبي طالب فهو تتبّعه وكَمَله"، وهو الذي قال فيه الرسول صلى الله عليه وسلم "اللهم فقهه في الدين"، وحسبُه ذلك. ويتلوه عبد الله بن مسعود وأبي بن كعب وزيد بن ثابت وعبد الله بن عمرو بن العاص. وكان عبد الله بن مسعود يقول: "نعم ترجمان القرآن عبد الله بن عباس." وكل ما أخذه الصحابة

فحسن متقدم. ومن المبرزين في التابعين الحسن البصري ومجاهد وسعيد بن جبير وعلقمة. ويتلوهم عكرمة والضحاك. وقد أخذ عن ابن جبير ولم يلق ابن عباس. وأما السدي فكان عامر الشعبي يطعن فيه وفي أبي صالح بالتقصير في النظر. ثم حمل التفسير عدول كل خلف عن سلف وألّفوا فيه كعبد الرزاق (13) والمفضّل وعلي ابن أبي طلحة وغيرهم. ثم محمد بن جرير الطبري جمع أشتات التفسير وشفا الناس في الإسناد. ومن المبرزين في المتأخرين أبو إسحاق الزجاج وأبو علي الفارسي. وأما أبو بكر النقاش وأبو جعفر النحاس فكثيراً ما استدرك الناس عليهما وعلى سننهما مكّي بن أبي طالب وأبو العباس المهدوي. وكل متقن مأجور جزاهم الله عنا خير الجزاء. كذا ذكره الإصفهاني رحمه الله. وروي عنه أنه قال: "تتبع الكشاف فوجدت أن كل ما أخذه أخذه من تفسير الزجاج."

## خاتمة الباب

### في التنبيه على حقائق الإدراك وأقسامه وطرقه

اعلم أنّها لكونها من الوجدانيات التي تحصل للنفس أنفسها لا صورها تكون بديهيةً وغنيّةً عن التعريف. فلا تحتاج إلا إلى تنبيه يخلصها عن نزاع الوهم ويدفع اشتباه الألفاظ الدالة عليها. أيّ لفظ وضع لأيّ معنى منها فتعاريفها لفظية.

أما الإدراك: ففي اللغة اللحوق. قال تعالى: {قال أصحاب موسى إنا لمدركون}. وتَدَارَكَ القوم تلاحقوا. قال تعالى: {حتى إذا أدركوا فيها جميعاً}. وفي العرف تمثّل حقيقة الشيء عند المدرك يشاهدها ما به يدرك. ولأنّ التعريف لفظي لم يتحاش فيه عن إيراد المشتق في تعريف المشتق منه. لأن الغرض تعيين المعنى المتميز عن سائر الصفات النفسانية. وحاصله تمثّل الحقيقة على وجه المشاهدة.

وللتمثل أقسام، لأن المدرك إما نفس المدرك، أو غيرها غير خارج عنها، أو خارجاً مادياً، أو غير مادي. فإدراك الأولين بحصول نفس حقيقتها عند المدرك، لكن الأول بدون الحلول والثاني بالحلول. وإدراك الأخيرين بحصول مثال الحقيقة سواءً استفيد الإدراك من الخارجي أو الخارجي من الإدراك، لكن الثالث بحصول صورة منتزعة مجردة عن المادة، والرابع لم يحتج إلى انتزاع. فالتمثل هو الحصول بنفسه وذا في الأولين، أو بمثاله وذا في الأخيرين. وقوله "عنده" يشمل غير الحلول والحلول في نفسه أو في آله. وقوله "ما به يدرك" يشمل الذات والآلة. والمشاهدة أيضاً الحضور، لكن ليس المراد الحضور مرتين بل الحضور عند النفس بواسطة الحضور عند الآلة.

وتقسيمه: إن الإدراك بالمشاعر الخمسة الظاهرة إحساس، ومجرداً عن الغواشي الغريبة واللواحق المادية التي لا تكون لازمة ماهيته عن ماهيته تعقل، وللمعنى الجزئي المتعلق بالمحسوس توهم، ومكتنفاً بالغواشي الغريبة واللواحق المادية تخيل. والفرق أنه لا يشترط فيه حضور (14) المادة بالنسبة الخاصة بخلاف الإحساس.

ثم العلم: قد يراد به مطلق الإدراك، وقد يخص بإدراك ما ليس بمحسوس. ويقسم بالمعنى الأول تارةً إلى التصور، أعني ما لم يلحقه حكم بنفي أو إثبات، وإلى التصديق وذا ما لحقه هو؛ وتارةً إلى التصور الساذج، وإلى تصور معه تصديق أي حكم. فالأول في قولك "البياض عرض" أن تحصل في الذهن صورة هذا التأليف، والثاني أن يحصل أن هذا الصورة مطابقة لما في نفس الأمر، أي النسبة الحاصلة في الذهن عند اعتبار نفسها تصور، وعند اعتبار الذهن معها تطبيقها لما في نفس الأمر تصديق. ثم تلك النسبة باعتبار عروض التطبيق لها إما جازم، أي مانع احتمال النقيض. فإن كان مطابقاً للواقع ولم يقبل التشكيك فيقين، وقد يخص العلم به. وإن قبله فهو الاعتقاد. وإن لم يكن مطابقاً فهو الاعتقاد الفاسد والجهل المركب. وكلا قسمي الاعتقاد يسمى تقليداً. وإما غير جازم فمتساوي الطرفين شك، والراجح ظن، والمرجوح وهم. وقد يطلق الظن على الأقسام الثلاثة المتقابلة لليقين، أعني قسمي التقليد وغير الجازم،

وقد يسمى الظن المتناهي في القوة علماً و بالعكس. قال الله تعالى {الذين يظنون أنهم ملاقوا ربهم}، قيل أي يعلمون.

ثم **الظن** إما في أصول الدين أو فروعه. والأول مذموم مطلقاً، وإليه الإشارة بقوله تعالى: {إن تتبعون إلا الظن و إن الظن لا يغني من الحق شيئاً. ولا تقف ما ليس لك به علم. إن هم إلا يظنون} والثاني إن كان عن أمانة قوية بين اعتبارها في أصول الفقه كظن المجتهد غير مذموم، أو عن أمانة ضعيفة فمذموم، إليه الإشارة بقوله تعالى {يا أيها الذين آمنوا اجتنبوا كثيراً من الظن. إن بعض الظن إثم}.

وأما **الفكر** فيطلق تارةً على حركة النفس بالقوة المتصرفة التي آلتها البطن الأوسط من الدماغ، أيّة حركة كانت. فإن كانت في المعقولات فتسمى القوة مفكرةً، وإن كانت في المحسوسات تسمى متخيّلةً وفعلها تخيلاً. وهذه الحركة واقعة في مقولة الكيف لأنها في الكيفيات النفسانية بارتسام المخزونات الباطنة عند الاستعراض كهي في الكيفيات المحسوسة. فملاحظة النفس الأمور عند الاستعراض نظرٌ، والحركة فيها فكرٌ. ولتلازمهما أطلق اسم أحدهما على الآخر. وقد يطلق الفكر على حركتي النفس مبتدئةً من المطالب إلى المبادئ وراجعةً إليها. وهذا المعنى هو الذي يتوقف عليه العلوم الكسبيّة.

ثم **الشعور** إدراك بغير استثبات، وهو أول وصول العلم إلى النفس، وكأنه إدراك متزلزل ولذا لا يستند إلى الله تعالى. و**التصور** حصول الصورة. و**الحفظ** حصولها وتأكيدها (15) بحيث لو زالت تمكنت النفس من استرجاعها، ولذا لا يسمى علم الله حفظاً لأن الاحتياج إلى التأكيد فيما يجوز زواله. و**التذكر** محاولة النفس استرجاع الصورة الزائلة. و**الذكر** حصولها بعد الاسترجاع. و**المعرفة** قيل هي إدراك الجزئيات، والعلم إدراك الكليات. وقيل هي التصور، والعلم التصديق. وقيل هي إدراك الشيء ثانياً بعد الغفلة ولذا لا يقال "الله عارف". و**الفهم** تصور الشيء مما دل عليه عبارةً

كانت أو خطأً أو إشارةً أو غيرها. والإفهام إفادته وتحصيله للغير. وال**فقه** الفهم، ثم خص به علم الشريعة، ثم خص به العلم بالأحكام الشرعية الفرعية عن أدلتها التفصيلية. وقيل **الفقه** العلم بغرض المخاطب من خطابه. لذلك قال الله تعالى في كفار قريش: { لا يكادون يفقهون قولاً }. أي، لا يقفون على المقصود الأصلي من التكليف الشرعي.

**والعقل**: قيل العلم بصفة الحسن والقبح للعلم بالمضارّ والمنافع. وقيل غريزة يلزمها العلم بالضروريات عند سلامة الآلات أي المشاعر الظاهرة والباطنة. والغريزة والطبيعة والتريجة هي السجية التي جبل الإنسان عليها. وقد يطلق العقل على التعقل بالمعنى السالف، وعلى الجوهر المجرد الذي لا يتعلق بالجسم تعلق التدبير والتصرف، وعلى قوى النفس التي بها يحسب تكمل جوهرها كالقوة التي بها تستفيض العلوم. وهي العقل النظري المنقسم إلى أربع: كالعقل الهولاني، والعقل بالملكة، والعقل بالفعل، والعقل المستفاد. وتعاريفها مشهورة. والقوة التي بها تصلح أحوال البدن عقل عملي. وال**لبّ** هو العقل الخالص عن شوب الوهم. وال**الدراية** هي المعرفة الحاصلة بضرب من الحيل كتقديم المقدمات واستعمال الروية، ولذلك لا يطلق على الله تعالى لامتناع الفكر.

ثم **الحكمة** إما علمية وهي العلم بالأشياء على ما هي عليه، أو عملية وهي العمل على الوجه المصلح. والعلمية إن كانت علماً بما لا يتعلق بالعمل فهي نظرية، وإن كانت علماً بما يتعلق به فعملية أيضاً. وقيل **الحكمة** الإتيان بفعل له عاقبة حميدة. وقيل هي الاقتداء بالخالق سبحانه في السياسة بقدر الطاقة البشرية وذلك أن يجتهد في أن ينزه علمه عن الجهل وفعله عن الجور وجوده عن البخل وحلمه عن السفه. وال**اليقين** العلم الحاصل بعد الشك، ولذا لا يقال "تيقنْتُ وجودي"، و"إن السماء فوقي". ولذلك لا يوصف الله سبحانه به. وال**الذهن** هو الاستعداد التام لإدراك العلوم والمعارف بالفكر السالف وهو الجاري مجرى التضرع إلى الله في استرسال العلوم من عنده، وذا في التصديقات لا يتم إلا بمتوسط معلوم بين طرفي مطلوب مجهول، ولذلك المتوسط نسبة إلى الطرفين بما يحصل (16) مقدمتان للإثبات

كالشاهدين. فحصول هذا المتوسط في النفس بسرعة **حَدَسٌ**. و**الذكاء** شدة الحدس و يطلق على قوة الذهن أيضاً. و**الفطنة** التنبه لشيء فيه خفاء كالأحاجي والرموز. و**الخاطر** ما يحضر في النفس بغتة عند التوجه إليه لكون النفس محلاً للخواطر. سميت خاطراً تسميةً للمحل باسم الحال. و**الخيال** هو الصورة الباقية عن المحسوس بعد غيبته عن الحس، ويقال للصورة الحاصلة في القوة التي آلتها مؤخر البطن الأول من الدماغ. وقد يقال لتلك القوة أيضاً. وطيف الخيال مجيئه في النوم، أو مرادف له كما قال:

ما سرت إلا وطيف منك يصحبي      سرى أمامي وتأويباً على أثري

وطيف من الشيطان لم منه، واللحم صغائر الذنوب، وقيل مقارنة المعصية من غير موقعة. و**البديهة** العلم الحاصل لا بسبب الفكر والأوليات البديهيات. و**الروية** التفكير في الأمر، وقيل ما كان من المعرفة بعد فكر كثير. و**الكيس** خلاف الحمق. و**الحمق** قلة العقل. وقيل الكياسة تمكن النفس من استنباط ما هو أنفع. قال صلى الله عليه وسلم: "الكيس من دان نفسه وعمل لما بعد الموت." و**الخبر** العلم بالشيء المتوصل إليه بالتجربة. و**الخبير** العالم وبمعنى الابتلاء أيضاً ك**الخبرة**. قال:

قد استكثر الأخبار قبل لقائه      ولما التقينا صغر الخبر الخبر

ومنه قول أبي الدرداء رضي الله عنه: "وجدتُ الناسَ أُخْبِرُ تَقْلُهُ"، يريد إذا خبرتهم قليتهم، فلفظه أمر ومعناه خبر. وقيل **الخبر** غزارة المعرفة من قولهم: "ناقة خبيرة" أي، غزيرة اللبن. و**الرأي** إجمالة الخاطر في المقدمات التي يرجح منها إنتاج المطلوب، وقد يقال للقضية المستنتجة. و**الرأي** للمفكرة كالآلة للصانع. و**الفراصة** هي الاستدلال بالخلق الظاهر على الخلق الباطن. ففي الحديث: "اتقوا فراصة المؤمن، فإنه ينظر بنور الله." وفي القرآن: ﴿سِيمَاهُمْ فِي وُجُوهِهِمْ. إِنْ

في ذلك آيات للمؤمنين}. والفراسة من "فَرَسَ السبعُ"، فهو اختلاس المعارف. وذلك ضربان: ضرب من الوحي وإياه عنى صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ بقوله: "إن في أمي محدثين وإن عمر منهم". ويسمى ذلك أيضاً النفث في الروح. والضرب الثاني ما يكون بصناعة معلمة وهو الاستدلال بالأشكال على الأحوال الباطنة. قال أهل المعرفة في قوله تعالى: {أفمن كان على بينة من ربه} ويتلوه شاهد منه أن البينة هو القسم الأول وهو الإشارة إلى صفاء جوهر الروح، والشاهد هو القسم الثاني. (17)

## الباب الثاني

### فيما يتعلق بوجه الحاجة إلى علم التفسير

وفيه فصول:

#### الفصل الأول

إن وجه الحاجة إلى علم هو جهة مطلوبيته. وذلك في العلوم النظرية -أعني غير الآلية- كونها مطلوبة لذاتها، وفي العلوم الآلية كونها وسيلةً إلى المطلوب لذاته. ثم كون العلم مطلوباً لذاته إنما يكون لشرفه. وشرف العلم والصناعة إما لشرف موضوعه كما أن صناعة الصياغة التي موضوعها الجواهر النفيسة أشرف من الدباغة التي موضوعها الجلد؛ وإما لشرف مقصوده كما أن الطب المقصود به إفادة الصحة لبدن الإنسان أشرف من الكناسة المقصود بها تنظيف الخلاء؛ وإما لشدة الحاجة إليه كما أن الفقه لأنه يحتاج إليه كل العباد في انتظام صلاح المعاش وفلاح المعاد أشرف من الطب الذي يحتاج إليه البعض في بعض الأوقات. ووجه الحاجة الأربعة معتبرة في علم التفسير.

أما اعتبار جهة آليته من وجه فلكونه محل استنباط العلوم الشرعية عن آخرها المطلوبة بالذات. وأما اعتبار جهات نظريته فلشرفه، أولاً بشرف موضوعه وهو القرآن الذي هو ينبوع كل حكمة ومعدن كل فضيلة كما سيفصل أدلته ويحصل بها مزيته؛ وثانياً بشرف مقصوده الذي هو حصول الحكم العلمية والعملية، والوصول إلى السعادة الأخروية الأبدية التي محصلها أربعة كما ذكر في فصول الدقائق: سرورٌ لا غمَّ له، وصحة لا سقم معها، وغنى لا فقر فيه، وحياة لا موت بعدها؛ وثالثاً لشدة الحاجة إليه لان كل كمال ديني أو دنيوي عاجلي أو آجلي مفتقرٌ إلى العلوم

الشرعية والمعارف الدينية ومدارها كلها على العلم بكتاب الله الذي { لا يأتيه الباطل من بين يديه ولا من خلفه }، حتى قيل في تفسير الحكمة في قوله تعالى {ومن يؤت الحكمة فقد أوتي خيراً كثيراً} إنها تفسير القرآن.

يروى عن علي بن أبي طالب رضي الله عنه أنه وصف جابر بن عبد الله بالعلم، فقال رجل: "جعلت فداك، تصف جابراً بالعلم وأنت أنت"، فقال: "إنه كان يعرف تفسير قوله تعالى {إن الذي فرض عليك القرآن لرادك إلى معاد}.". ولما كان الأمر هكذا ناسب أن نعقب هذا الفصل بفصل في فضل مطلق العلم الديني الذي مناطه التفسير، ثم بما في فضل القرآن وسوره وأهله وتلاوته وتعليمه. فنقول:

## الفصل الثاني

### في فضل العلم

فضله يدل عليه الكتاب والسنة والأثر والمعقول. أما الكتاب فمنه قوله تعالى: {شهد الله أنه لا إله إلا هو والملائكة وأولو العلم} حيث بدأ بنفسه وثنى بملائكته وثلث بأهل العلم. وناهيك بهذا مرتبةً وجلالاً ومنقبةً وكمالاً. وقوله تعالى: {يرفع الله الذين آمنوا منكم والذين أوتوا العلم درجات}. (18) قال ابن عباس رضي الله عنهما: "للعلماء فوق المؤمنين سبعمائة درجة، ما بين الدرجتين مسيرة خمسمائة عام". واعلم أن الله تعالى فضل العلماء بهذه الآية على كل المؤمنين لعمومه، فيكونون أفضل من مجموع الفرق الثلاث المفضلين بدرجات في القرآن على غيرهم: إحداها أهل بدر في قوله تعالى {إنما المؤمنون الذين إذا ذكر الله وجلت قلوبهم} إلى قوله {لهم درجات عند ربهم}. وثانيها المجاهدون في قوله تعالى {وفضل الله المجاهدين على القاعدين أجراً عظيماً درجات}. وثالثها الصالحون في قوله تعالى {ومن يأتيه مؤمناً قد عمل الصالحات فأولئك لهم الدرجات العلى}. والآيات الدالة على تفضيل أهل العلم

كثيرة، مثل {قل هل يستوي الذين يعلمون و الذين لا يعلمون}، {قل كفى بالله شهيداً بيني وبينكم ومن عنده علم الكتاب}، {وما يعقلها إلا العالمون}.

وأما السنة فأكثر. منها حديث أبي الدرداء رضي الله عنه المذكور في حسان المصابيح: "من سلك طريقاً يطلب فيه علماً سلك الله به طريقاً من طرق الجنة. وإن الملائكة لتضع أجنحتها رضىً لطالب العلم. وإن العالم ليستغفر له من في السموات ومن في الأرض والحيتان في جوف الماء. وإن فضل العالم على العابد كفضل القمر ليلة البدر على سائر الكواكب. وإن العلماء ورثة الأنبياء. وإن الأنبياء لم يورثوا ديناراً ولا درهماً وإنما ورثوا العلم. فمن أخذه أخذ بحظ وافر." وفيه لطائف من وجوه. الأول: أن سلوك طريق العلم يجازى بسلوك طريق الجنة لأن سالك طريق العلم قاصد حضرة الأسماء والصفات المسماة بالجنوت والملكوت الأعلى والأسفل في طريقه. فإذا كان {يوم تبلى السرائر} يظهر أن ذلك الطريق طريق الجنة وأنه عابر على الملائكة وأجنحتها.

الثاني: أن تنكير "طريقاً" يفيد أن واحداً من طرقه كاف لذلك، فيتعدد طرق الجنة حسب تعدده؛ وأنه أيّ طريق كان من طرق العلوم الدينية إذ مراد شارع الدين طرقه غير أن مراتب العوض يتفاوت بحسب مراتب المعوض لكن عدلاً. وقد قال الشيخ الكبير رحمه الله: "العدل لا يغلب الفضل كعكسه".

الثالث: أن استناد السلوك الجزائي في قوله صلى الله عليه وسلم "سلك الله به" إلى اسم الجلالة الذي هو الاسم المستجمع لسائر الأسماء يفيد أن شرف العلم يستتبع شرف سائر الصفات والكمالات، لأنه أقدمها وألزمها للذات وأقربها للاقتضات التي عليها جرت مشيئة الله تعالى، وسائر الكمالات تابعة له وظاهرة بحسبه حتى إن الحياة شرطه لا سببه.

**الرابع:** إن وضع الملائكة أجنحتها ذكر فيه وجوه أربعة: فقليل يصح أن يكون حقيقةً، ويراد الكف عن الطيران حين (19) ينزلون لسماح الذكر. وذلك لنزول السكينة بنزولهم، وهو معنى قوله "رضاءً لطالب العلم" على هذا -والله أعلم- كما قال صَلَّى اللهُ عليه وسلم في رواية أبي هريرة في التالين والمتدارسين لكتاب الله: "إلا ونزلت عليهم السكينة وحفت بهم الملائكة". فإن السكينة التي ينزلها الله {في قلوب المؤمنين ليزدادوا إيماناً} مفسرة بطمأنينة القلب كمشاهدة المعلوم بالبصر الحقيقي الذي سمى الله تعالى فاقدية عُميةً، وهو الذي يُبصر به آياتُ الوحدانية ولا شك أن الطمأنينة بوحدة الحق رضاء به. أو يراد بسط الجناح ليحملوه عليها ويبلغوه حيث يقصده. وصنيعهم ذلك إما في الدنيا أو في الآخرة أو فيهما جميعاً؛ وأن يكون مجازاً عن التواضع كما هو كذلك في قوله تعالى: {واخفض جناحك للمؤمنين} أي، تواضع لهم، أو عن المعونة وتيسير السعي في طلب العلم. واعلم أن هذا ليس لكل طالب علم ديني بل لمن طلبه ليتفقه في الدين ولينذر قومه إذا رجع إليهم، أي طلب لإصلاح نفسه بالعلم والعمل ثم لإصلاح سائر عباد الله بالإرشاد، لا للمقاصد الدنية الثلاثة من المفاخرة والخيلاء على العلماء أو المجادلة والمرآة مع السفهاء، أو ليصرف وجوه الناس إليه بالتعظيم والإطراء لحديث كعب بن مالك رضي الله عنه أنه صَلَّى اللهُ عليه وسلم قال: "من طلب العلم ليحاري به العلماء أو ليماري به السفهاء أو ليصرف به وجوه الناس إليه أدخله الله النار".

**الخامس:** استغفار من في السموات و الأرض للعالم ظاهر في العقلاء حقيقةً وفي غيرهم مجازاً، لكن ليس لهم هنا جمع بين الحقيقة والمجاز عند من لا يقول به، إما لأنه حقيقة في الكل كالتسييح والتحميد في قوله تعالى {وإن من شيء إلا يسبح بحمده ولكن لا تفقهون تسييحهم}؛ وإما لأن فيه عموم المجاز وهو أن يكتب الله للعالم مغفرة بعدد كل منهم. وسببه وحكمته أن إصلاح العالم بالعالم، وما من شيء من العالم إلا وله مصلحة معقودة بالعلم لأن بركة علمه

وعمله وإرشاده وفتواه رحمة للعالمين. قال أبو الدرداء فيما يروى عنه: "تركنا محمدًا صَلَّى اللهُ عليه وسلم وما من طائر يجرّك جناحيه إلا أذكرنا منه علماً فكتب اللهُ على كل نوع منها لطالب العلم استغفاراً جزءاً له عنها".

**السادس:** أن تخصيص الحيتان بالذكر بعد التعميم تتميم كذكر الرحيم بعد الرحمان. ووجهه الإشارة إلى أنه كما أن المطر والخصب ببركة العلماء حيث قال صَلَّى اللهُ عليه وسلم: "بهم يمطرون وبهم يرزقون". فعيش ما لا يحتاج إلى المطر لاستغراقه في الماء كالحيتان ببركتهم أيضاً. والتحقيق فيه -والله أعلم- أن الماء مظهر العلم كما ذكره المشايخ رحمهم اللهُ في قوله تعالى {فيها (20) أنهار من ماء غير آسن}. ولذلك {كان عرشه على الماء}. وقد قال اللهُ تعالى: {وجعلنا من الماء كل شيء حي}. وعلم بذلك أن العلم مناط الكل وبه صلاحهم وعلى طبقه غدوهم ورواحهم. فأينما تحقق ظهوره يترشح إلى نحور المستمدين بحوره ثم يعود إلى صاحبه ببركته لما علم في قاعدة الفيض أنه دائر حركته.

**السابع:** أن تشبيه العالم بالبدر والعابد بالكواكب إشارة إلى أن تحليتهم بالأنوار بعد تحليتهم بالاستغفار غالبية جداً وبالغة حدّاً هو بالنسبة إلى أنوار العبادة أكملها وأتمها وهي كالفائضة منه وإن لم يكن في نفسه ذاتياً بل مستفاداً من نور النبوة وشمس الحقيقة استفادة نور القمر من نور الشمس. واعلم أن العالم المفضل ليس المعطل عن العمل، والعابد المفضل عليه ليس العاقل عن العلم. بل إن علم ذلك غالب على عمله وعمل هذا غالب على علمه. وأوضحوا ذلك بأن المراد بالعالم البالغ درجة الفتوى الآتي بما وجب عليه فقط، وبالعابد الذي يعرف الفرائض والسنن ولم يبلغ درجة الفتوى. ويمكن أن يقال المراد بالعالم العالم تحقيقاً أو العالم بالله ويلزمه العمل، وبالعابد العابد تقليداً ولا يلزمه العلم الأول. يدل عليه قوله صَلَّى اللهُ عليه وسلم في حديث أبي أمامة الباهلي رضي اللهُ عنه: "فضل العالم على العابد كفضلي على أدناكم". وناهيك فضلاً للعلم. قال محمود بن علي القاشاني في لباب قوت القلوب أن هذه

الفضيلة إما لصاحب علم الوراثة وهو العالم بالله الدال عليه؛ وإما لصاحب علم الدراسة لكن لا مطلقاً بل إذا طلب بعلمه عملاً يتقرب به إلى مرضاة الله تعالى، لا لصاحب سائر علوم الفتيا والأحكام بدليل وصفه بإنتاج الخشية والخضوع وإلا لزم العالم بالبيع والشري أن يقتني المال فيعمل بعلمه. وليس كذلك، بل قد يروى في كراهته ما يكثر ذكره. ثم قال الحاصل من أقوال السلف أن العلم الذي هو فضيلة علم المعاملات الذي يستعقب الأعمال القلبية والقالية، وعلم المكاشفات الذي هو ثمرة المعاملات. وما سواهما من علم الفتاوى وعلم المعاملات بلا عمل فهو غير فضيلة بل حجة على صاحبه.

**الثامن:** كون "العلماء ورثة الأنبياء" وميراثهم العلم دليل أنه أفضل متاع بقي من أفضل مخلوق. لكن فيه نكتة هي أن الميراث لا يراد لذاته بل للانتفاع به. فإنما يكون العلم ميراثهم إن لو عمل به وعلم الغير كما هو حال علم الأنبياء. وقد يروى عن الإنجيل "من علم وعمل وعلم يدعى في ملكوت السموات عظيماً." هذا أتمودج من تحقيق أحاديث المصاييح في باب فضل العلم وعليك بتحقيق غيره صحاحاً وحساناً.

أما من (21) غيره فيروى قوله صلى الله عليه وسلم: "يوزن يوم القيامة مداد العلماء و دم الشهداء". وسره أن كلاً منهما مصوب في الله ومسكوب في إعلاء كلمته إقداماً أو إعلاماً. فلا غرو أن يتجوهرها ويعودا إلى صاحبهما إكراماً وإعظماً.

وقوله صلى الله عليه وسلم: "من تفقه في دين الله كفى الله همهم ورزقه من حيث لا يحتسب". وسره أن مبنى التفقه الإعراض عن مشاغل الدنيا بالتوكل على الله، {ومن يتوكل على الله فهو حسبه}؛ وأنه مجاهد فيعود عليه نفعه لقوله تعالى {ومن جاهد فإنما يجاهد لنفسه}.

وقوله صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ: "أوحى اللهُ تعالى إلى إبراهيم إني عليم أحب كل عليم". وسره إجراء سنته على أن المناسبة مدار الميل والمودة كما أن المباينة مدار البغض والمردة. ومنشأهما حاملة الأنوار الإلهية أو الظلمات الإمكانية. وسبب التفاوت فيهما أمران: إحداهما القلة أو الكثرة في الوسائط ووجوه الإمكان، والآخر مقدار التخلق بأخلاق الله الداخلة تحت وسع الإنسان.

وقوله صلى الله عليه وسلم: "صنغان من أمي إن صلحوا صلح الناس: الأمراء و الفقهاء". وسره أن الصلاح أولاً بالتخلية عن تسويلات الشيطان، ووازع السلطان في ذلك أقوى من وازع البرهان؛ وثانياً بالتخلية بدلالة طريق الرحمان، إما بأن يساعده فضل المنان بكشف العيان وإلا فبقوة الدليل والبرهان.

وقوله صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ: "إذا أتى عليّ يوم لم أزد فيه علماً يقربني إلى الله فلا بورك لي في طلوع شمس ذلك اليوم". وسره سر قوله صلى الله عليه وسلم فيما يروى: "من استوى يومه فهو مغبون". وذلك لأن الشيء يفوت بفوات مقصوده، ومقصود الخلق العلم كما فسر قوله تعالى {وما خلقت الجن والإنس إلا ليعبدون} بقولهم "أي ليعرفوني". والخلق متجددة في كل يوم لقوله تعالى {كل يوم هو في شأن}، وقوله تعالى {بل هم في لبس من خلق جديد}.

وقوله صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ: "يشفع يوم القيامة ثلاثة: الأنبياء ثم العلماء ثم الشهداء". فَأَعْظَمُ بمرتبة العلم التي هي تلو النبوة وفوق الشهادة. وسره أن الله تعالى أمرهم بالاجتهاد فاجتهدوا وليس بحيث يعود منفعة الاجتهاد إليه لأنه غني عن العالمين بل إلى عباده، فظهر هذا السر منهم في الشفاعة يوم تبلى السرائر بتقدم ما هو الأعم نفعاً فالأعم.

وقوله صَلَّى اللهُ عليه وسلم: "ما عبد الله بشيء أفضل من فقهه في الدين، ولفقيه واحد أشد على الشيطان من ألف عابد. ولكل شيء عماد وعماد الدين الفقه". وسره أن البيت لما لم يقيم إلا بالعماد، فمن بيده (22) العماد أشد على طالب هدمه وأجدد من غيره في تسديد سده وتشديد ردمه.

وقوله صَلَّى اللهُ عليه وسلم: "يبعث الله العباد يوم القيمة ثم يبعث العلماء ويقول: يا معشر العلماء! إني لم أضع علمي فيكم إلا لعلمي بكم، ولم أضع علمي فيكم لأعذبكم. اذهبوا! فقد غفرت لكم". وسره ما مر في قوله تعالى "إني عليم أحب كل عليم".

وأما الأثر: فمنه قول عمر بن الخطاب رضي الله عنه: "أيها الناس! عليكم بالعلم فإن لله رداء محبة، فمن طلب باباً من العلم رداه بردائه. فإن أذنب ذنبا استعبته لئلا يسلب رداه ذلك". قلت: رداء المحبة شمول ثمراتها وإحاطة بركاتها إياه ومن جملتها الاستعتاب المذكور. وإنما جعل هذا الشمول جزاء لطلب باب من العلم لأن المشيئة الإلهية جارية على موجب قوله صَلَّى اللهُ عليه وسلم حكايةً عن الله تعالى "ومن تقرب إليّ شبراً تقربت إليه ذراعاً، ومن تقرب إليّ ذراعاً تقربت إليه باعاً، ومن أتاني يمشي أتيته هرولاً". وقد أجمعوا أن لا تقرب إلى الله إلا بالعلم.

ومنه قوله علي رضي الله عنه لكُميل: "يا كميل! العلم خير من المال. العلم يحرسك وأنت تحرس المال. والعلم حاكم والمال محكوم عليه. المال ينقصه النفقة والعلم يزكو على الإنفاق". وقوله رضي الله عنه: "العالم أفضل من الصائم القائم المجاهد". قلت: وذلك لأن العلم روح العمل، ومن شأن البدن أن يحرسه الروح ويحكم عليه ولا يساويه البدن بوجه. وقوله رضي الله عنه:

علم الهدى لمن استهدى أدلاء

ما الفخر إلا لأهل العلم إنهم

والجاهلون لأهل العلم أعداء

ووزن كل امرئ ما كان يحسنه

وقول ابن عباس رضي الله عنهما: "تذاكر العلم بعض ليلة أحب إلي من إحياءها." وقول ابن مسعود: "عليكم بالعلم قبل أن يرفع، ورفعته أن يهلك رواته. فوالذي نفسي بيده ليودن رجال قتلوا في سبيل الله شهداء أن يعثهم الله علماء لما رأوا من كرامتهم". وسره أن الشهادة عمل، والعلم روحه حتى لو قاتل ليقال أنه جريء وقتل استحق النار. وفيه كثرة عظيمة من أرادها فعليه بكتب الأخلاق.

وأما **المعقول**: فمن وجوه. الأول: أن العلم خاصية بما ميز الإنسان ومزيته على سائر الحيوان. والإنسان إنسان بما هو شريف لأجله وهو العلم لا غيره. فإن الجمل أقوى والفيل أعظم والسبع أشجع والبقر أكثر أكلاً وأخس العصافير أقوى جماعاً. والثاني: أن العلم غداء القلب حتى قال ابن المبارك: "القلب إذا منع منه الحكمة ثلاثة أيام يموت." ولقد صدق لان حياة القلب به فالجاهل مريض وموته لازم لكنه لا يشعر به لأن شغله بأمر (23) الدنيا أبطل إحساسه كما يبطل غلبة الخوف إحساس ألم الجراح. فإذا حط الموت عنه أعباء الدنيا أحس بألمه ولا ينفعه. فقد قال علي رضي الله عنه: "الناس نيام فإذا ماتوا انتبهوا." الثالث: دليل الإمام الشافعي على شرفه أن كل من نُسب العلم إليه ولو في شيء حقير فرح ومن نُفي عنه ترح. الرابع: أنه فضيلة على الإطلاق إذ في الله تعالى وصف كمال وبه شرف الملائكة والأنبياء، والكيس خير من البليد. الخامس: أن الشيء النفيس المرغوب فيه إما مطلوب لذاته كمعرفة الله تعالى ولذة النظر إلى وجهه الكريم؛ وإما مطلوب لغيره كالدراهم والدنانير فإنهما لو لا قضاء الحاجة بهما بتقدير الله تعالى حجران لا منفعة فيهما كالحصاء؛ وإما مطلوب لذاته ولغيره كسلامة البدن ومطلوب للسلامة عن الألم وللمشي والتوصل إلى الحاجات. والعلم من قبيل الثالث لأنه لذيذ في نفسه ووسيلة إلى سعادة الآخرة الأبدية التي هي أفضل المطالب. فما لا يتوصل إليه إلا به وهو العلم أفضل الأعمال. السادس: فضيلة الشيء بشرف ثمرته، وثمره العلم القرب من رب العالمين والاتحاق بأفق الملائكة ومقارنة الملاء الأعلى، هذا في الآخرة. وأما في الدنيا فالعز و الوقار

ونفوذ الحكم على الملوك والكبار ولزوم الاحترام في طباع الأخيار والأشرار حتى أن أغبياء الترك وأجلاف العرب يصادفون طباعهم مجبولاً على توقيير شيوخهم لاختصاصهم بمزيد العلوم التجريبية، بل البهيمة توقر الإنسان لشعورها بتميزه بكمال مجاوز لدرجتها.

السابع: أن لذة العلم عقلية فهي أعظم اللذات كما أن ألم الجهل أشد الآلام. وذلك لأن اللذة إدراك ونيل من أحد لوصول ما هو كمال وخير عنده من حيث هو كذلك، فالكمال والخير للذة كالأفة والشر للألم فإن المناسب اللائق بالشيء من حيث يُخرجه من القوة إلى الفعل كمال، ومن حيث أنه مؤثر له خير. أما الالتذاذ فيختص باعتقاد كماله وخيرته، وكذا كون المنافي آفةً وشرّاً والتألم به. ثم قد تختلف الخير والشر بالقياس إلى القوى. فالخير عند الشهوة كالمطعم والملبس الملائمين نيل وصوله لذة شهوانية. والخير عند الغضب كالغلبة نيل وصولها لذة غضبية. والذي هو عند العقل خير وكمال وهو الحق ليعتقد فيكمل الإنسان به بحسب القوة العلمية ويفيد بعد الموت، والجميل ليعمل فيكمل به الإنسان بحسب القوة العملية ليثمر قبل الموت من جهات مثل تهذيب الظاهر باستعمال الشرائع الحقة وتحلية الباطن عن الأخلاق الذميمة وتحليته بالأخلاق الجميلة. فكمال الشهوة أن يتكيف العضو الذائق بكيفية الحلاوة مأخوذةً عن مادتها وكذا اللامس والمبصر والسامع والشام. وكمال الغضب بأن (24) يتكيف النفس بكيفية غلبة أو شعور تأذّ يحصل للمغضوب عليه. وكمال الوهم التكيف بهيئة ما يرجوه ويذكره وكذا سائر القوى. وكمال النفس الناطقة العاقلة أن تعلم الحق تعالى قدر ما يمكنه، ثم تعلم الموجودات علماً مجرداً عن الشوائب الوهمية والخيالية والحسية، وبهذا الكمال تصير مطمئنة مخاطبة بقوله تعالى {يا أيتها النفس المطمئنة ارجعي إلى ربك راضية مرضية. فادخلي في عبادي وادخلي جنتي}. وما سلف هو الكمال الحيواني وذا شوب كله بخلاف الإدراك العقلي. إذا عرفت هذه المقدمات فنقول نسبة اللذة إلى المدرك الملتذ به إلى المدرك ونسبة النيل والإدراك إلى النيل

والإدراك، فنسبة اللذة العقلية إلى سائر اللذات نسبة جلية الحق تعالى والملاء الأعلى والكروبيين إلى نيل كيفية الحلاوة أو الغلبة أو الرجاء. فلا شك أن العقلية أعظم وأقوى من سائر اللذات.

قال الإمام الرازي رحمه الله: "مآل المشارب والمآكل إلى العذرة، ومآل الملابس إلى متاع المزابل، ومآل المناكح إلى لذة ساعة ربما أورثت حزناً طويلاً وحاصلها نطفة ماء مهين، ومآل اللذة العقلية إلى الحياة الأبدية {في جنات ونهر في مقعد صدق عند ملك مقتدر}.

وعن معاذ بن جبل في وصف العلم والعلماء به قال: "تعلموا العلم! فإن تعلمه لله حسنة، وطلبه عبادة، وممارسته تسييح، والبحث عنه جهاد، وتعليمه من لا يعلم صدقة، وبذله لأهله قرية، وهو الأنس في الوحدة، والصاحب في الخلوة، والدليل على السراء والضراء، والوزير عند الأجلاء، والقريب عند الغرباء، ومنار سبيل إلى الجنة. يرفع الله به أقواماً فيجعلهم في الخير قادة وهداة يقتدى بهم أدلة في الخير يقتص آثارهم ويرمق أعمالهم ويقتدى بفعالهم وينتهى إلى آرائهم ويرغب الملائكة في خلقتهم وبأجنتها تمسحهم. وكل رطب ويابس مسح ومستغفر لهم حتى حيتان البحر وهوامه وسباع البر وأنعامه والسماء ونجومها، لأن العلم حياة القلوب من العمى ونور الأبصار من الظلم وقوة الأبدان من الضعف. يبلغ به العبد منازل الأبرار و الدرجات العلى. والتفكر فيه يعدل بالصيام ومدارسته بالقيام، به يطاع الله وبه يعبد وبه يوحد وبه يتورع وبه يوصل الأرحام. العلم إمام والعمل تابعه يلهمه السعداء ويحرمه الأشقياء."

## خاتمة الفصل

### في تعيين العلوم النافعة والشرعيات

قال الإمام البيضاوي رحمه الله من الآيات والسنن ما هو متعلق بالعقائد والمعارف، (25) ومنها ما يتعلق بأفعال الناس وأحوالهم إما على طريقة شرع الأحكام أو على سبيل القصص والأخبار. فالأول استنائه الناظر في المعارف و

تصرف فيها بالتفصيل و التكميل حتى حصل على الطبقة العليا المسمى بالعلم الإلهي وأصول الدين و علم الكلام. والثاني وهو ما يتعلق بالأفعال على طريقة التخيير أو الاقتضاء، انقسم قسمين يتعلق أحدهما بالأعمال الظاهرة وثانيهما بالأحوال الباطنة. فأخذ المجتهد في طلب الأحكام الشرعية القسم الأول من هذين القسمين وجعل ما كان منهما معرباً عن قاعدة كلية يمكن التوصل بواسطتها إلى أحكام شتى أوضاعاً وأساساً وسمها ما أضاف إليها مما يتعلق بأذيالها أصول الفقه، وما كان دليلاً على قضايا تختص بفعل وفعل سناً وتأمل فيها حق تأمله وبذل غاية جهده حتى حصل له من مفهوم منطوقها ومدلول مفهومها ومقتضى معقولها أحكام تقف الحاضر دون إحصائها وسمها علم الفقه و علم الشريعة و علم المذهب.

واستخلص أرباب السلوك السائحون في الملاء الأعلى السائرون إلى الله ما يتعلق بالأحوال الباطنة وغاصوا فيها وجعلوها ظهراً لبطن ففهموا ظواهرها ودرّبوا بالعمل بها حقائقها وبواطنها فجمعوا الأمرين مناصحة للمريدين ومعاونة للمقتبسين، فسموا القسم الأول علم التصوف و علم مكارم الأخلاق و علم الرياضة و علم التزكية و علم التحلية و سموا الثاني علم الحقائق و علم المشاهدة و علم المكاشفة.

والمقسم الثالث من الأقسام الثلاثة الأول أخذه القاصّ باعتبار الحكاية نفسها تارة متبددة وأخرى متسقة وبنى عليه القصص والتواريخ. وأخذه المذكر من حيث أنه باعث لما يصحبها من الاعتبار المرغّب والمرهب واستخرج منها علم التذكير.

فهذه السبعة هي العلوم الدينية المستنبطة من القرآن والحديث. وقال الشيخ محمود القاشاني رحمه الله في لباب القوت: كل علم مقتبس من مشكاة الشريعة أو مصباح الحقيقة من علوم الدراسة والوراثة فهو فضيلة، وكذا ما يتعلق هذا العلم به من العلوم الآلية وإلا فرديلة. وعلوم الدراسة هي التي تحصل بالتعلم من علم الكتاب والسنة والفقه والأصوليين

وما يتوقف عليه من العرييات، وبعضها أفضل من بعض، وأفضل الكل علم الوراثة وهو نور ينعكس في مرآة القلب المصقول عن طبع الطبع بمصقلة الشرع، وله الفضيلة المطلقة التي ورد فضل صاحبه على العابد حتى كفضله على أدنى أمته. فالفضيلة لصاحب علم الوراثة مطلقاً ولصاحب علم الدراسة إذا كان (26) عالماً أخروياً يطلبه للتقرب إلى مرضاة الله تعالى لا دنيوياً يطلب بعلمه شيئاً منها فيضره علمه لورود الوعيد فيه كما مر. ولذلك قيل: كان الصحابة والتابعون يتدافعون أربعة: الإمامة، والوديعية، والوصية، والفتيا. وقال بعض السلف: كان شغل الصحابة والتابعين لهم بإحسان في خمسة أشياء: قراءة القرآن، وعمارة المسجد، وذكر الله، والأمر بالمعروف، والنهي عن المنكر. وعن ابن أبي ليلى رحمه الله قال: "أدرت في هذا المسجد مائة وعشرين من أصحاب رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم. ما منهم من أحد يسأل عن حديث أو فتيا إلا ودّ أن أخاه كفاه ذلك."

وأما العلم الذي طلبه فريضة على كل مسلم بالحديث فقال سهل وهو من أساطين العلماء بالله: "هو علم الحال الذي يقتضيه مقامه." وقيل: علم الإخلاص لأنه شرط كل عمل مفترض، ويستلزم معرفة آفات النفوس ووساوسها ومكائد العدو لئلا يخرب مباني الإخلاص. وقيل: علم القلب ومعرفة الخواطر لأنها أول النية التي هي أول العمل ولأنها إما رسل من الله إلى عبده يجب عليه تنفيذ أحكامها، وإما هواجس النفس ووساوس الشيطان تجب مخالفتها، وإما محتملة للأمرين وهي خواطر العقل، لأنه مع الروح تارة ومع النفس أخرى. وقيل: هو علم الحلال لأنه أول مهم. وقيل: علم الباطن لكونه فريضة على خصوص هم أهل القلوب دون غيرهم، وهو العلم النافع لما روي أنه صلى الله عليه وسلم قال: "العلم علمان: علم ظاهر على اللسان، وعلم باطن في القلب وهو النافع." وعلم الباطن هو علم الإيمان الذي قدمه الرسول على علم القرآن كما رواه جندب رضي الله عنه. وقيل: علم ما لا يسع الإنسان جهله من علم التوحيد وأصول الأمر والنهي. وقال سفيان وأبو حنيفة وأصحابهما رحمهم الله: هو علم البيع والشراء والنكاح إذا

أريد الدخول في شيء منها. وقيل: علم التوحيد. وقيل: علم الشبهات المسموعة أو المدغدة للقلب حيث يجب دفعها ولا يجوز السكوت. وكلهم مجمعون على أن ليس المراد به علم الأفضية والفتاوى وعلم اختلاف المذاهب. وقال صاحب القوت: الذي عندي هو علم الفرائض الخمس التي بُني الإسلام عليها لأنه المفترض على كل مسلم. ثم قال: وعلم التوحيد داخل فيها لأنه أولها، وكذا علم الإخلاص لأنه شرطها لقوله تعالى ﴿وما أمروا إلا ليعبدوا الله مخلصين له الدين﴾. قال شيخ الإسلام شهاب الدين عمر السهروردي روح الله روحه: وميلي إلى قول أبي طالب المكي أنه علم مباني الإسلام، وإلى قول من قال (27) هو علم البيع والشراء والنكاح إذا أراد الدخول فيهما أكثر. قال في لباب القوت: وعندني حد جامع لعلم الفريضة وهو علم الأمر والنهي المتوجهين على مسلم توجهاً مستمراً كما في قول الشيخ أبي طالب أو غير مستمر كما في قول سفيان وأبي حنيفة وأصحابهما. هذا هو الفرق بين العلم النافع وغيره.

أما الفرق بين علم الظاهر والباطن و بين علماء الدنيا والآخرة فهو أن العلم الظاهر ما يتعلق باللسان من عالم الملك، والعلم الباطن ما يتعلق بالقلب من عالم الملكوت على ما ورد في الخبر "العلم علمان: علم ظاهر على اللسان فذاك حجة الله على الخلق، وعلم باطن في القلب وهو العلم النافع". وأصحاب العلم الظاهر هم علماء الدنيا، فجارهم {من أصحاب الشمال} وصالحوهم {من أصحاب اليمين}. وأصحاب علم الباطن هم علماء الآخرة وهم المقربون من أرباب القلوب وأصحاب اليقين، يقدمون على الأشياء ببصيرة ولا يقدمون على الشبهات بل يقفون عندها. فإن بان لهم الأمر نطقوا به وإلا سكتوا عنه بقول "لا أدري"، إذ ورد في الخبر أنه من العلم. قال الشعبي: "لا أدري نصف العلم." لأن من قال "لا أدري" عند الشبهة فقد عمل بعلمه وقام بحاله، فله من الثواب منزلة من درى. قال مالك رحمة الله عليه والشافعي رحمه الله: إذا أخطأ العالم قول لا أدري أصيب بمقابله.

والفرق بين علماء الدنيا والآخرة بيّن من ذلك أن من أراد بعلمه استحلاب متاع الدنيا والجاه والمنزلة عند الناس فهو عالم دنيوي لا ينفعه علمه بل يضره ويضر غيره. وإذا كان زاهداً في الدنيا لا يريد قبول الخلق بعلمه فهو أخروي ينفعه علمه وينفع غيره. ولذا ورد في الخبر: "إذا رأيتم الرجل قد أوتي صمتاً وزهداً فاقربوا منه فإنه يلقن الحكمة." وكان الحسن يقول: "يتعلم هذا العلم قوم لا نصيب لهم منه في الآخرة، يحفظ الله بهم العلم على الأمة كيلا يضيع." ومن الفرق بينهما أن الرجل إذا استفتي وهو يودّ أن غيره كفاه ذلك، وإذا سئل عن مسألة من علم الإيمان واليقين يجيب عنها غير مُحيل على غيره، فهو من علماء الآخرة. وإن كان على العكس فهو من علماء الدنيا. ومن علامة علماء الآخرة أن لا يتلقوا العلم دراسة من الكتب أو الألسنة بل كانوا أهل عمل منقطعين إلى الله مشغولين بذكره عما سواه. فإن سئلوا ألهمهم الله رشدهم ووقفهم لسديد قولهم. وقد وصف علي رضي الله عنه علماء الدنيا والآخرة أتم وصف فقال: "الناس ثلاثة: عالم رباني ومتعلم على سبيل نجاة وهمج رعا عتباع كل ناعق يميلون مع كل ريح لم يستضئوا بنور العلم (28) ولم يلجأوا إلى ركن وثيق. مات خزان الأموال وهم أحياء، والعلماء باقون ما بقي الدهر." ثم تنفس الصعداء فقال: "ها إن ههنا علماً جمّاً لو أجد له حملةً، بل أجد لفتاً غير مأمون يستعمل آلة الدين في طلب الدنيا ويستطيل بنعم الله على أوليائه ويستظهر بحججه على خلقه، أو منقاداً لأهل الحق ينزع الشك عن قلبه بأول عارض من شبهة لا بصيرة له. ليسا من رعاة الدين في شيء لا ذا ولا ذاك، فمنهم باللذة سلس القياد في طلب الشهوات أو مُغرى يجمع الأموال والادخار منقاد لهواه. أقرب شهماً بهما الأنعام السائمة. اللهم هكذا يموت العلم إذا مات حاملوه. بلى لا تخلو الأرض من قائم لله بحجة إما ظاهر مكشوف وإما خائف مقهور لئلا يبطل حجج الله وبياناته. وكم وأين أولئك الأقلون عدداً الأعظمون قدراً أعيانهم مفقودة وأمثالهم في القلوب موجودة يحفظ الله بهم حججه حتى يودعها نظراءهم ويزرعوها في قلوب أشباههم هجم بهم العلم على حقيقة الأمر فباشروا روح

اليقين فاستلانا ما استوعر منه المترفون وأنسوا بما استوحش منه الغافلون. صحبوا الدنيا بأبدان أرواحها معلقة بالحل  
الأعلى، أولئك أولياء الله من خلقه وعمّاله في أرضه والدعاة إلى دينه. " ثم بكى وقال: " واشوقاه إلى رؤيتهم!"

## الباب الثالث

### في موضوع علم التفسير هو القرآن المجيد

لأنه يبحث فيه عن أحواله الخاصة الشاملة. أما خصوصها فإما لذاته ككيفية تلاوته ومعناه الظاهر، فإن القرآن اسم للنظم والمعنى، ولذا منكر نزول المحقق منها كافر إما لما يساويه كمعنى الجمل المبين ببيان الجمل أو المعنى المحتمل المعين بالصرف إلى محكم النقل أو العقل. وأما شمولها فإما على سبيل الانفراد كأسباب الإعجاز وكالتواتر أو على سبيل التقابل كأقسامه المتقابلة التي سنذكر إن شاء الله تعالى. وفيه فصول:

## الفصل الأول

### في تعريفه

هو كلام الله المعتبر من حيث تحقق نزول نظمه العربي وما هو معناه المراد عند الله تعالى على رسولنا صلى الله عليه وسلم. واحترزنا بقولنا "كلام الله" عن كلام غيره، وبقولنا "المعتبر" عن قولنا "الحمد لله رب العالمين" المستعمل لا على أنه كلام الله، فإنه ليس بقرآن حينئذ حتى لا يجرم قرائته على مثل الجنب. وبقولنا "من حيث تحقق نزول نظمه العربي" عن القراءات الشاذة التي منها قراءة أبي وابن مسعود رضي الله عنهما بانفرادهما، وعن المنسوخ تلاوته بقي حكمه أولاً، وعن البسمة التي في غير النمل (42) إذ لم يتحقق نزول نظمه على أنها كلام الله، وإلا لما خولف فيها ولا كُفّر منكرها ولجاز الصلاة بها عند من يجعلها آية ولوجب الجهر بها في الجهرية. أما القول بأنها آية فذة أنزلت للفصل والتبرك فعلى سبيل الإلحاق بالقرآن بدليله وهو كتابتها في المصاحف مع التوصية بتجريدتها لا أنه قرآن حقيقة بل اجتهاداً. والتعريف للحقائق وإلا لترتب الأحكام المذكورة وذلك لأن لازم القرآن ليس تواتر النقل مطلقاً. فإننا لو

فرضنا التواتر في الأحاديث القدسية لم نقل بقرآنيته إجماعاً بل تواتره على أنه قرآن وذا لم يوجد في التسمية، على أنا نقول الإجماع في التوصية بالتحديد إنما هو في غير البسمة إجماعاً فلا تقريب. وبقولنا "نظمه العربي" ليدخل القراءة بالفارسية على قول من يجوزها، فإن تحقق النزول فيها باعتبار نظمه العربي الذي قام الفارسي مقامه بدليل لاح لأبي حنيفة رضي الله عنه. وبقولنا "وما هو معناه المراد عند الله" ليدخل ما لم يتحقق أو لم يتواتر معناه بالمفسر به عند الناس كالمشاهات و المبيّنات لا بالحكم أو الدليل القطعي. وبقولنا "على رسولنا" الكتب المنزلة على الأنبياء الآخر.

وهذا التعريف أولى مما قيل: "هو المنزل على رسولنا المكتوب في المصاحف المنقول عنه نقلاً متواتراً بلا شبهة"، ومما قيل: "هو الكلام المنزل للإعجاز بسورة منه"، ومما قيل: "ما نقل إلينا بين دفتي المصاحف تواتراً". وذلك من وجوه.

الأول: خروج "الحمد لله رب العالمين" لا على أنه كلام الله منه لا منها إلا بالعناية. الثاني: عدم ذكر المصحف فيه فلا يرد الدور ولا يحتاج إلى دفعه بما ذكر. الثالث: تناوله القراءة بالفارسية على ما هو مذهب الإمام الأعظم بلا جمع بين الحقيقة والمجاز لما يقال: المراد بالمنزل والمكتوب والمنقول أعم مما هو كذلك حقيقةً أو حكماً كما أول به في الكشف الكبير. الرابع: عدم تناول القرآن بالمعنى القائم بذات الله تعالى على ما هو اللائق لموضوعية علمنا. فإن الكلام ما تركب من كلمتين والكلمة لفظ بخلاف قولهم المنزل على رسولنا والمنقول إلينا والمكتوب. فإن الشيخ الإمام سيف الدين الأبهري ذكر في شرح مختصر ابن حاجب أن المراد ما تعلق به النزول والكتب والقراءة والنقل فيتناول المعنى القائم بذاته تعالى.

فإن قلت: لا نسلم، بل المراد في تعريفاتهم هو المتصف بهذه الصفات بالفعل لما عرف أن النعت حقيقة في الحال و مجاز في المستقبل اتفاقاً، والحقيقة حقيقة بالإرادة. قلت: إن لم يصرف عن الحقيقة لزم الفساد من وجوه. الأول: ورود القرآن الذي يقرأه جبريل أو الرسول أو المشافه منه على تعريفهم (43) دون تعريفنا لأننا اعتبرنا تحقق نزوله لا تواتره.

الثاني: عدم تناول تعريفهم قرآناً بقراءة أحد قبل التواتر أو قبل الكتب بخلاف تعريفنا. الثالث: أن أشهر التعاريف في عرف الناظرين تعريف الإنسان بالحيوان الناطق، وأرادوا بالنطق إدراك الكليات. فلو لم يرد بذلك التعريف من من شأنه ذلك بحسب النوع لم يدخل في تعريف الإنسان الصبي أو المجنون لعدم إدراك الكليات ولا الشيخ الفاني لعدم النماء فيه و غير ذلك. وإذا علم أن المراد ما من شأنه ذلك علم أن المنزل والمؤلف والمنجم والمنظم و المفتتح بالتحديد و المختتم بالاستعادة و المفصل إلى السور والآيات ليس شيء منها دليل الابتداء و سمة الاختراع في محل النزاع كما زعمه صاحب الكشاف بل للعبارة الدالة عليه المتعلقة به فذلك الدليل لا يقوم علينا لأن القرآن القديم عندنا هو القائم بذات الله تعالى وهذا نزل قطعاً للدلالة عليه، ولا على الحنابلة والمشبهة لتجويزهم قيام الحوادث بالذات القديمة كقول من يقول يقدم الأفلاك الغير الخالية عن الحركات أو يقدم بعض الملائكة الذين يسبحون الليل والنهار لا يفترون.

قال الإصفيهاني: المراد بالسورة في قولهم للإعجاز بسورة منه القدر المساوي للكوثر التي هي أقصر سورة، وذكر السورة بيان للواقع لا للإخراج. قلت: بل لفائدة إدخال الآية أو الاثني نحو {مدهامتان} وبالجملة ما هو أقل من أقصر سورة فإنه قرآن وإن لم يكن معجزاً لكون مقدار سورة منه معجزاً على أن التحقيق أن كل كلمة قرآنية باعتبار وقوعها موقعها للخاص من الانتظام المشتمل على جميع مقتضيات المقام التي لا يحيط بها إلا علام الغيوب معجز لا محالة.

## الفصل الثاني

### في أحكامه الكلية

مثل إنه وحي منزل على سبعة أحرف متواتر معجز، وفيه كلام من وجوه:

**الوجه الأول:** في أنه وحي. قيل: الوحي هو كلام خفي بسرعة، لكن المستعمل من الإيحاء في القرآن إما بمعنى إجراء السنة الإلهية نحو {وأوحى ربك إلى النحل} الآية، وإما بمعنى الإلهام نحو {وأوحينا إلى أم موسى}، {وإذ أوحيت إلى الحواريين} وهو وحي الأولياء، وإما بإرسال الرسل ونحوه وهو وحي الأنبياء. وقد استوفى أقسامه في قوله تعالى {وما كان لبشر أن يكلمه الله إلا وحياً أو من وراء حجاب أو يرسل رسولاً فيوحي بإذنه ما يشاء}.

ذكر في الكشف أن معناه ما صح لأحد من البشر أن يكلمه الله إلا على ثلاثة أوجه: إما (44) على طريق الوحي وهو الإلهام وهو القذف في القلب أو المنام. فالأول كما أوحى الله تعالى إلى موسى، والثاني كما أوحى إلى إبراهيم في ذبح ولده. وإما أن يُسمعه كلامه الذي يخلقه في بعض الأجرام كما كلم موسى و يكلم الملائكة. فقوله "من وراء حجاب" مثل أي كما يكلم الملك المحتجب بعض خواصه من غير أن يُرى شخصه. وإما أن يُرسل رسولاً من الملائكة كما كلم الأنبياء غير موسى. وقيل: الوحي بالملائكة والمراد من الرسول هو من البشر.

قلت: ودرج في كلامه امتناع الرؤية بنوع مشعر بانفهامه من الآية، وفيه تأمل من وجوه. الأول: أنه يخرج من هذا الحصر المهتف به كما اتفق لموسى عليه السلام في طوى وطور حتى يروى أن موسى عليه السلام كان يسمعه من جميع جهاته. لذا قال بعض المفسرين أن الحجاب هو إدراك كيفية الكلام، فمعنى "من وراء حجاب" من دون إدراك كيفية على أن القدر المشترك للمهتف به على الأولياء متواتر لا يمكن إنكاره. وادعاء أنه صوت يخلقه الله في شيء مع أنه سقط بلا دليل ينافي كون الله متكلماً به كما علم في موضعه.

الثاني: أنه يخرج عنه المشافه به كما روي في حديث المعراج ذكر في كتاب الشفاء بتعريف حقوق المصطفى أن قوله تعالى {فأوحى إلى عبده ما أوحى}، وإن قال أكثر المفسرين فيه أن الله أوحى إلى جبريل وجبريل إلى محمد صلى الله عليه وسلم. فعن جعفر بن محمد الصادق أن الله أوحى إليه بلا واسطة وكذا قاله الواسطي. وحكي عن الأشعري

ويروى عن ابن مسعود وابن عباس رضي الله عنهما وذكر النقاش عن ابن عباس في قصة الإسراء عنه صَلَّى اللهُ عليه وسلم في قوله {دنى فتدلى}: "فارقني جبريل وانقطعت الأصوات عني فسمعت كلام ربي وهو يقول 'ليهدأ روعك يا محمد! اذن، اذن، اذن!' وفي حديث أنس نحو منه قال: "ومن سمع صريف الأقلام كيف يستحيل في حقه أو يبعد سماع الكلام؟" فقوله "إلا وحيًا" يحمل على المشافهة مع المشاهدة. قال جعفر الصادق رحمه الله: "الدنو من الله لا حد له ومن العباد بالحدود." قال القاضي أبو الفضل: "الدنو من الله ليس بدنو مكان ولا دنو حد" كما قال جعفر رحمه الله. بل تقريبه منه إبانة عظيم رتبته و تشريف منزلته وإشراق أنوار معرفته ومشاهدته أسرار غيبه وقدرته، ومن الله مبرة وتأنيس وبسط وإكرام. وبه تأول قوله تعالى {قاب قوسين أو أدنى} فيمن جعل الضمير عائداً إلى الله لا إلى جبريل كما في قوله صَلَّى اللهُ عليه وسلم: "ينزل ربنا إلى السماء الدنيا" على أحد الوجوه، (45) وقوله صَلَّى اللهُ عليه وسلم: "من تقرب مني شبراً تقربت منه ذراعاً" الحديث. فعلى هذا لا يمتنع رجوع الضمائر إلى الله تعالى وإن كان منزهاً عن الجهة والمكان وإن استبعده لذلك عَلِمَ الهدى في تأويلاته.

فإن قلت: الكلام مركب من الحروف المقطعة الموقوفة على تموجات متعاقبة فيمتنع قيامه بذاته تعالى. قلت: قال القاضي البيضاوي رحمه الله: "الصادر منه تعالى ليس كالصادر عنا لأن الوحي كلام خفي بسرعة فذلك تمثل دفعي ليس في ذاته مركباً" مما ذكر. قلت: وذلك كتمثل المعاني بصور خيالية مشتملة على أجزاء من غير تقدم وتأخر. فإذا لم يكن الكلام الخيالي كالحسي فالعقلي والمعنوي أولى. وتحقيقه أن الكلام في الحقيقة نسبة من نسب العلم أو صورة من صوره كما ذكره الشيخ في تفسير الفاتحة والفكوك. وتلك النسبة نسبة مركبة من مقارعة صفتي الإرادة والقدرة على ما ذكره في أول تفسير الفاتحة. فكما أن كل صفة من صفات الحق أحدية بالنسبة إلى ذاته، وإن عرض لتعلقها بالتعدد الاعتباري باعتبار المتعلقات كالإبصار الواحد المتعلق بعشر مبصرات وكذا باعتبار محالها والحضرات الظاهرة هي فيها

فكذا الكلام. أما باعتبار المتعلقات فكالاختلاف بالسريانية والعبرية والعربية أو بالمضي والمضارعة. والكلام القديم كالذات سبحانه في تنزهه عن قيود الزمان والمكان. وأما باعتبار المحالّ فكالحسي والخيالي والعقلي والمعنوي فهذه المختلفة صور تعلقاته لا نفسه فذلك الاقتضاء للحدوث من التموجات المتعاقبة مقصور على الكلام الحسي لقصور الآلة. وعليه بناء كلام الإمام الشافعي رحمه الله على ما يروى عنه أن الحدوث في التلفظ لا في اللفظ.

الثالث: قال القاضي: أن الآية دليل صحة الرؤية لا امتناعها. قلت: وذلك إما لإمكان أن يحمل الوحي على المشافهة فيحتمل توفيقاً بين الأدلة أو لما قال القاضي عياض في الشفاء مما حاصله أن قوله تعالى "إلا وحيّاً" وقع مقابلاً للتكلم "من وراء الحجاب" وبواسطة الرسول فيكون قسماً لا واسطة فيه ولا حجاب فلم يبق إلا المشافهة بالمشاهدة. والمراد بالحصص نفي التكلم بوجه يقتضي الحدوث كالكلام الحسي المعهود لنا.

ثم نقول: كان لنبينا صلّى الله عليه وسلم جميع هذه الأنواع فمنها المشافهة كما يدل عليه حديث الإسراء. ومنها الرؤيا لقوله تعالى {لقد صدق الله رسوله الرؤيا بالحق}. وقالت عائشة رضي الله عنها: "أول ما بدئ به رسول الله صلّى الله عليه وسلم من الوحي الرؤيا الصالحة في النوم، وكان لا يرى رؤياً إلا جاءت مثل فلق الصبح" تعني ضوءاً. والمراد عدم احتياجه إلى التعبير.

ومنها (46) ما يبدو في اليقظة فيسمع صوتاً أو يرى ضوءاً كما روينا عن ابن عباس رضي الله عنهما قال: "أقام رسول الله صلّى الله عليه وسلم بمكة خمس عشرة سنة أو ثلاث عشرة سنة يسمع الصوت فيرى الضوء سبع سنين ولا يرى شيئاً وثمان سنين يوحى إليه.

ومنها ما يرى ملكاً فيكلمه كما جاء في حديث عائشة رضي الله عنها حتى جاءه الوحي في غار حراء فجاء الملك فقال: "اقرأ!" وقال: "ما أنا بقارئ!" قال: "فأخذني فغطني حتى بلغ مني الجهد، ثم أرسلني فقال: اقرأ! قلت: ما أنا

بقارئ! فأخذني فغطني الثانية حتى بلغ مني الجهد، ثم أرسلني فقال: اقرأ! قلت: ما أنا بقارئ! فأخذني فغطني الثالثة، ثم أرسلني فقال: {اقرأ باسم ربك الذي خلق. خلق الإنسان من علق. اقرأ وربك الأكرم}. " فرجع بها رسول الله صَلَّى الله عليه وسلم يرجف فؤاده، فدخل على خديجة بنت خويلد فقال: "زملوني زملوني!" فزملوه حتى ذهب عنه الروح.

ومنها الإلهام ونفث الملك في الروح كما جاء في الحديث: "إن روح القدس نفث في روعي أن نفساً لن تموت حتى تستكمل رزقها." والروح بالضم الخلد.

ومنها ما ينزل به جبريل على قلبه لقوله تعالى: {نزل به الروح الأمين على قلبك}.

ومنها ما يُلقى الله في القلب بغير واسطة جبريل كما جاء في الأحاديث الربانية: "ومن تقرب إليّ شبراً تقربت إليه ذراعاً" الحديث.

ومنها ما يأتي به جبريل عليه السلام متمثلاً في صورة إنسان كما كان يأتي في صورة دحية وصورة الأعرابي كما أن منها ما يأتي به غيره من الملائكة في صور مختلفة.

ثم منها ما كان سرّاً بين الله وبين رسوله فلم يحدث به أحداً. ومنها ما يحدث به الناس وذلك على صنفين: منه ما كان مأموراً بكتبته قرآناً ومنه ما لم يكن مأموراً بذلك فلم يكن من القرآن.

**الوجه الثاني في الإنزال:** قال الفاضل رحمه الله: الإنزال إما بمعنى الإيواء نحو "نزل الأمير بالبد"، أو تحريك الشيء من علو إلى سفلى كإنزال المطر ولا يتحققان في إنزال القرآن لاستدعائهما المكان. فهو فيه بمعنى ثالث مجازي وهو في الكلام القائم بذات الله تعالى إثبات اللفظ الدال عليه في اللوح المحفوظ، وفي نفس الألفاظ إثباتها فيه أو إثباتها في

سماء الدنيا بعد إثباتها فيه. وإنزال الملائكة الكتب السماوية أن يتلقَّها الملك تلقَّفاً روحانياً أو يحفظها من اللوح فيلقِيها على الرسل. وفيه بحث من وجوه. الأول: أن المتبادر إلى الذهن من استعمال مطلق الإنزال هو المعنى الثاني، وذا أمانة للحقيقة. والمعنى الأول أيضاً ليس بحقيقي وقد أشعر به قوله "ولا يتحققان". (47) الثاني: أن التجوُّز في نحو "أرسلت هذا الكلام إلى فلان" بمعنى "أرسلت من يحمله ويؤدِّيه" متعارف من باب إطلاق الاسم الحال على المحل. فحمل إنزال القرآن عليه أولى بخلاف حمله على الإثبات ولأن اللفظين إذا وجب في تأويل أحدهما فتأويل الثاني أولى، إذ لا ضرورة قبله كما علم في قوله تعالى: {حتى ينكح زوجاً غيره}. الثالث: أن الإلهام في القلب من جبريل نحو: {نزل به الروح على قلبك}، أو من الله بلا واسطة كما جاء في الحديث الرباني من أقسام الوحي الموجود فيه الإنزال وليس فيه الإثبات في اللوح المحفوظ ولا في سماء الدنيا. ويقرب منه ما جاء في حديث صحيح البخاري عن عائشة رضي الله عنها أن الحارث بن هشام سأل رسول الله صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ: "كيف يأتيك الوحي؟" فقال صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ: "أحياناً يأتيني مثل صلصلة الجرس وهو أشده عليّ فيفصم عني وقال وعيت ما قال. وأحياناً يتمثل بي الملك رجلاً فيكلمني فأعي ما يقول." الصلصلة صوت الحديد إذا حرك. قال الخطابي: يريد أنه صوت متتابع يسمعه ولا يتبينه عند أول ما يقرع سمعه حتى يتفهّم ويستثبت فيتلقفه حينئذ ويعيه. والإفصام القلع. فالذي يكون قسم كلام الملك هو الإلهام ظاهراً. الرابع: أن التلقف الروحاني يراد به إلهام الله للملك، وبه يقول أهل السنة، لا خلق الكلام فيه كما في اللوح المحفوظ وهو قول المعتزلة. فليس هذا شرحاً يطابق المشروح. فكيفية الإنزال إلهام الله لقلب النبي أو إلهامه للملك ثم إلهام الملك للنبي أو كلامه بعد التمثيل. والوحي أعم من الإنزال.

قال مولانا التفتازاني: ينبغي أن يكون التجوُّز في إنزال القرآن المذكور في حمل الكشاف عقلياً في النسبة الإيقاعية، والحقيقة العقلية إنزال حامل حروفه الملفوظة أو صورها المحفوظة أو المكتوبة من باب وصف الشيء بوصف صاحبه إذ

لو جعل الإنزال مجازاً عن إظهاره أو إيجاده في اللوح المحفوظ أو جعل القرآن في الصور المحفوظة أو المكتوبة مجازاً لم يتم به الدلالة على حدوثه. وفيه بحث من وجوه. الأول: أن مذهب المعتزلة حدوث ما سوى الله من الموجودات بمعنى السبق بالعدم. فإذا كان اللوح حادثاً كان ما أظهر فيه أولى بالحدوث، فكيف لا يتم دلالة حدوثه؟ الثاني: أن المظهر في اللوح إذا احتمل القدم فلأن يحتمل ما في ذهن جبريل القدم لقربه وكونه عالماً قدسياً وكاملاً بالفعل على ما هو مذهب البعض أولى، فهو أبعد عن الدلالة على الحدوث. الثالث: أن القرآن وإن سلم أنه حقيقة في الصور المحفوظة أو المكتوبة فالدلالة على الحدوث (48) ليس بإظهارها مطلقاً بل بإظهارها مؤلفة منظمة. ولا شك أن التأليف دليل الحدوث. الرابع: أن الدلالة حينئذ لا يتم لأنها حينئذ موقوفة على كون القرآن حقيقة في تلك الصور، ولنا أن نمنع ذلك كما مر.

قال الإصفيهاني رحمه الله: الإنزال بحسب الإجمال وهو إلى السماء الدنيا، والتنزيل بحسب التفصيل منجماً. قلت: الحق أن الإنزال أعم لنحو قوله تعالى: {أنزل على عبده الكتاب}، {وأنزلنا إليك}. ثم في الإنزال إلى السماء الدنيا قولان: أحدهما ما روي عن عكرمة عن ابن عباس رضي الله عنهما أن أنزل جملةً من اللوح إلى السماء الدنيا ليلة القدر، ثم نزل في عشرين سنة. وثانيهما أنه أنزل من اللوح إلى سماء الدنيا كل سنة دفعةً مقدار ما يكون منزلاً في سنة واحدة بحسب المصالح. فعلى هذا الإنزال عشرين مرةً، والتنزيل في عشرين سنة. قيل: وفي التنزيل طريقان: أحدهما أن ينخلع الرسول من صورة البشرية إلى صورة الملكية ويأخذ من جبريل. وثانيهما أن ينخلع الملك إلى صورة البشرية ويأخذ الرسول منه. والأول أصعب الحالين. قلت: وكان وحي "صلصلة الجرس" هو الأول، لذلك قال صلى الله عليه وسلم: "وهو أشده علي".

تتمة: روى عروة عن عائشة رضي الله عنها وبه قال قتادة وأبو صالح أن أول ما نزل من القرآن {اقرأ}. وروي عن جابر أنه {يا أيها المدثر}. والظاهر أنه لما نزل {اقرأ} رجع فتدثر فنزل {يا أيها المدثر}. يدل عليه ما أخرجه في الصحيحين من حديث جابر في بدء لوحى. وروى الثعلبي في تفسيره بإسناده عن عمر بن شرحبيل أن أول ما أنزل {الحمد لله رب العالمين}.

أما آخر ما نزل فروى البخاري في أفراد، أي الأحاديث التي انفرد بنقلها، أن آخر آية نزلت آية الريا. و في أفراد مسلم أنها سورة النصر. وروى الضحاك عن ابن عباس أنها آية {واتقوا يوماً ترجعون فيه إلى الله}، وهو مذهب سعيد بن جبير وأبي صالح. وروى إسحاق عن البراء أن آخر آية {يستفتونك قل الله يفتيكم في الكلاله}، وآخر سورة نزلت براءة. وروي عن أبي بن كعب أن آخر آية نزلت {لقد جاءكم رسول} الآيتين.

ففي أول ما نزل ثلاثة أقوال وفي آخر ما نزل خمسة أقوال.

## الباب الرابع

### في استمداد علم التفسير

أما عند من قال: لا يجوز لأحد أن يتعاطى في تفسير شيء من القرآن وإن كان عالماً أديباً متسعاً في معرفة الأدلة والفقه والنحو والأخبار والآثار، وليس له أن يتجاوز عما روي له تمسكاً بوعيدات التفسير بالرأي كما مر. فلا استمداد عنده الا من الرواية. وأما من قال: من كان ذا أدب وسيع فموسع له أن يفسره كما هو الحق باقتضاء المدح بالتدبر والترغيب إلى التفكير، وإشارة أن في القرآن تفصيل كل شيء وتبينه، ودلالة إجماع السلف على الاجتهاد في الاستنباط ابتهاجاً بالاندراج تحت قوله تعالى: ﴿ولو ردوه إلى الرسول وإلى أولي الأمر منهم لعلمه الذين يستنبطونه منهم﴾. فله عندهم استمداد من جهتين: من حيث لفظه ومن حيث معناه، لوقوع ما يقصر فهم الأكثرين عن حقائقه فيهما.

أما من حيث اللفظ فلوقوع خلاف الظاهر فيه من حيث أنه عادة البلغاء من إيجاز الحذف والقصر والإجمال والتخصيص والتقديم والتأخير والتجوز والاستعارة والكناية وغيرها، وذا مقتضى دلالة اللفظ اليسير على المعنى الكثير على ما قال صلى الله عليه وسلم: "أوتيت جوامع الكلم"؛ كما أن في قوله تعالى: ﴿ولكم في القصص حيوه﴾ من وجوه مصالح حفظ النفس الذي هو أهم المهمات وأقدم الضرورات ما لا يحصى؛ وفي قوله تعالى: ﴿لا خوف عليهم ولا هم يحزنون﴾ دفع كل تنقيص عن أولياء الله لانحصاره في حصول مكروه أو فوت محبوب؛ وفي قوله تعالى: ﴿لا مقطوعة ولا ممنوعة﴾ نفي كل آفة عن فاكهة الجنة، ونحو ذلك مما لا يحصى.

وأما من حيث المعنى فلانطوائه على أصول تنشعب منها فروع دينية يقينية وعضون شرعية تخمينية وحقائق حقية وخلقية ورقائق قلبية وخلقية ووظائف إسلامية أركانية ولطائف (86) إيمانية وروحانية وعجائب سرية إحصائية، بعضها بيّنه نبيه صلى الله عليه وسلم وبعضها فوّضه إلى استنباط الراسخين من أمته تشريفاً لهم وتقريباً لمنزلتهم من منزلة الأنبياء على ما قال: "كاد أمّتي يكونون أنبياء!" و"علماء أمّتي كأنبياء بني إسرائيل." وقال تعالى: {جعلناكم أمة وسطاً}، و{كنتم خير أمة أخرجت للناس}.

فما من تحديد أو ترديد وتبيان أو برهان في عقلي أو سمعي إلا والمتأمل يفيد أنه قد نطق به القرآن إما بعبارة أو إشارته أو صريحه أو كناية أو حقيقة أو استعارته، لكن لا على دأب الحكماء المتأهلين بل على عادة افتنانات العرب العرباء المتعمقين. وذلك لحكمتين عظيمتين. إحداهما: ما يشير إليه قوله تعالى: {وما أرسلنا من رسول إلا بلسان قومه}. والأخرى: أن الحاجة إلى استعمال الدقائق في الاحتجاج على الحقائق ليس إلا للعاجز عن إتمام المرام بالأجلى فالأجلى من الكلام، لا سيما بكلام يُقنع العوامَ جليهاً ويُشبع فهمَ الخواصّ أسرارها وخفيهاً على ما قال صلى الله عليه وسلم: "لكل آية ظهر وبطن، ولكل حرف حد، ولكل حد مطلع." فلهذا كلها من كان حظه في العلوم أوفر كان نصيبه من علم القرآن أكثر. وهو معنى الحوالة في مواضع من الكتاب إلى تدبر أهل البصائر وتفكر أولي الألباب.

إذا تقرر هذا فنقول: المقاصد القرآنية إما العلوم الإيمانية أو الأعمال الإسلامية. أعني معرفة الحق لتعتقد والخبر لتعمل به. ومجمل الأول الإيمان بالله وملائكته وكتبه ورسله واليوم الآخر، ويسمى علم التوحيد والصفات والأفعال. ومجمل الثاني علم الشرائع والأحكام. ولأن مقصود العلم العمل ومقدمة العمل العلم فلا غناء لكل منهما عن الآخر تقارناً في عامة القرآن نحو قوله تعالى: {الذين آمنوا وعملوا الصالحات طوبى لهم وحسن مآب}. ولا تحصل هذه المقاصد

منه إلا بعلوم لفظية تعرّف دلالات ألفاظه، وعلوم عقلية تعرّف الارتباط بين مفهوماته. وهذا كَسْبِيَان يُعَدَّان للعلم الثالث الموهبي وهي علم يورثه الله من عمل بما علم كما قال صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ: "من عمل بما علم ورثه الله علم ما لم يعلم." وهو الهداية المزيدة المرادة بقوله تعالى: {والذين اهتدوا زادهم هدى}. وهو الطيب من القول والصراف الحميد. وسيجيء بيان مراتب الهداية في تفسير {اهدنا الصراط المستقيم} إن شاء الله تعالى.

أما العلوم اللفظية التي لا بد منها: فإن تعلقت بالدلالات الجوهرية **فاللغة**؛ أو بمناسبة ما بين ذلك الدلالات **فالاشتقاق**؛ وإن تعلقت بأحوال الألفاظ من حيث دلالتها على ما وضعت لها المسمى أصل المعنى فتلك الأحوال إن كانت غير الإعراب والبناء فعلم (87) **الصرف**؛ وإن كانت إياهما فعلم **النحو**؛ وإن تعلقت بأحوالها لكن من حيث إفادتها لازمة المسمى معنى المعنى، فمن حيث نفس الإفادة علم **المعاني**؛ ومن حيث طرق الإفادة المختلفة وضوحاً وخفاءً علم **البيان**؛ وإن تعلقت بأحوال زائدة على اعتبار الدلالة والإفادة مفيدة حسنها اللفظي أو المعنوي فعلم **البدیع**؛ وإن تعلقت لا بالدلالة بل بكيفية التلفظ المخصوص بالقرآن فعلم **القراءة**. فهذه ثمانية من العلوم اللفظية لا بد للمفسر منها.

أما لمعرفة لفظ القرآن أو معناه أو حسنه و إعجازه: وأما العلوم المعنوية التي لا بد له منها، فإن تعلقت لا بالدراية بل برواية أسباب النزول وشرح القصص التي ينطوي عليها القرآن سير الأمم السالفة فعلم **القصص والآثار**؛ وإن تعلقت بالسنن التي تبين مجملها وتوضح مبهمها كما قال: {لتبين للناس ما نزل إليهم} فعلم **الحديث**؛ وإن تعلقت بالدراية فإما بالعقائد الأصلية الدينية أو بالشرائع الفرعية، والمتعلق بالعقائد إن حصل بالجهد النظري والجد العقلي برعاية قوانينه والتأمل بالتعمل في براهينه فعلم **الكلام**؛ وإن كان بالإلهام الإلهي والوهب الرباني لمن تعلق به فيض فضله فعلم **الحقائق** الذي يسمى وهبياً؛ وإن تعلقت بالشرائع الفرعية، فإما بقواعد مهمة وأصول مطردة لا بد منها في استنباط

الأحكام الفرعية من دلالاتها اللفظية كنسبة الناسخ إلى المنسوخ والعام إلى الخاص والمطلق إلى المقيد والمجمل إلى المبين والعبارة إلى الإشارة والدلالة والاقتضاء ونسبة ما يجري القياس فيه إلى ما لا يجري وغيرها فهو أصول الفقه؛ وإن تعلق بتعيين الحاصل من هذه القواعد فذا إن طلب لسياسة الرعية والأقارب فعلم المعاملات والمزاجر؛ وإن طلب لسياسة النفس فعلم العبادات والأخلاق؛ وإن طلب لإرشاد الغير بهذه العلوم ترغيباً أو ترهيباً فعلم التذكير. فهذه أيضاً ثمانية من العلوم المعنوية.

فمن استكمل هذه الستة عشر علماً فقد استوفى استمداده وخرج قطعاً عن كونه مفسراً برأيه. ومن نقص منها ما ليس بواجب معرفته في تفسير القرآن فأحسّ نقصه واستعان بأربابه واقتبس منهم لم يكن إن شاء الله من المفسرين برأيه. فإن القائل بالرأي كما مر من لم يجتمع عنده الآلات ففسره تخميناً وظناً غير مستند إلى الدلالة فكان شهادة بغير علم بالصواب فاستحق الوعيد وإن أصاب. أو المراد أنه قطع بذلك الحاصل برأيه كما قال فخر الإسلام رحمه الله إذ التفسير هو الكشف بلا شبهة فنصب نفسه صاحب وحي لا فهم فضلاً عن أن يكون شاهداً بغير علم. فلذلك وجب على من تصدى (88) لتفسير القرآن أن يستشعر لتقوى الله مستعيذاً من شرور نفسه والإعجاب به عندها وأن يكون اتهامه لفهمه لا لفهم السلف ممن صحب الرسول وشاهد الوحي والنزول.

فإن قلت: استمداد علم التفسير مما له مدخل في التلفظ بالقرآن أو تنوير معناه بالبيان كالعلوم العربية الآلية وعلم القصص والسير والسنن النبوية وكأصول الفقه من قواعد الاستنباطات الشرعية ظاهر. أما سائر العلوم الستة عشر فهي المقصودة منه والمستفادة كما مر أنها غاية له ومن ثمراته المستفاد، فلو استمد منها كان دوراً. قلت: لما كان القرآن بجرأ لا تنقضي عجائبه ولا تنتهي غرائب لم يبلغ جهد الاستنفاع وجد الاستنباط منه حداً يقف الأمر عنده ولا يبقى وراه ما يثمر السعي فيه. فإذا علم حقائق ما استنبطه السلف ودونه ومن أين أخذه وأي طريق للفهم عينه كان

ذلك مفتاحاً صحيحاً لما لم يتهياً لهم من فتح مغلقاته ومنهاجاً صريحاً إلى ما لم يسبق الوقوف عليه من كنوز رموز إشاراته. فإن الفيض الآلهي غير محدود واللفظ الرباني غير مسدود كما قيل: "لم يغلق باب الملكوت"، ولكل نفس طالبة قسط من أسرار اللاهوت. فحين كان مستحصل هذا الطالب للحاصل الأول غيراً لم يستلزم استمداده منه دوراً.

هذا آخر الكلام بحمد الله العلام في الأبواب الأربعة لمقدمات التفسير. والآن أوان أن نشرع في نفس التفسير متوكلاً على توفيق القدير الذي بيده تيسير كل عسير.

## [تفسير]

وها أنا آخذ في المقصود الذي أعده ممهداً لعدد أوضاع هي عُده:

**الأول:** أن كل فضل تفرد فكره فنظم الكتاب العزيز المتعلق هو به يقدم بتمامه ذكره لئلا يتوعر تطبيق حقائقه عليه وتحقيق مغالقه بين يديه.

**الثاني:** أن يبدأ في كل فصل بيان حسن موضعه، وإنه بالنسبة إلى نفسه كالفاتحة أو إلى ما قبله كغيرها في كمال محزه وموقعه. ثم يعقب بالوجوه اللفظية تضيوعاً لبعض ما في نظمه من النفحات المسكية. فيشار فيها أولاً بقولي "قراءتها" إلى كيفية القراءات المتواترة لأنها المطلوبة وإلى وجوهها المرغوبة المقبولة؛ وثانياً بقولي "لغتها" إلى ما يُعنى به من مهمات متن اللغة والاشتقاق والمقاصد الصرفية على الإطلاق؛ وثالثاً بقولي "إعرابها" إلى ما يتعلق به من المطالب النحوية بما فيها من الخلاف والوفاق؛ ورابعاً بقولي "بيانها" إلى وجوه الفنون الثلاثة المتعلقة بمقدمات البلاغة وتوابعها أعني ما يليق ذكره منها بحسب كل من مواقعها. فإن استيفاء نكت ذلك المطلوب لا يمكن إلا لعلم الغيوب.

**الثالث:** أن يشار بعد ذلك إلى وظائف الفنون الشرعية سواء كانت متعلقة (89) بالرواية النقلية أو بالدراسة العقلية. فأقدم ما تجب رعايته ذكر التفسير بوجوه بها "روايته"؛ ثم ما ناسب المقام واقتضاه داعية الاهتمام من تحقيق "أحاديث" وردت مناسبة له في الأخبار أو الأحكام؛ ثم ذكر ما فيه من العقائد الدينية والقواعد اليقينية المعلومة في "علم الكلام"؛ ثم ذكر ما يتعلق باستنباط الأحكام من أصول البدائع وفروع شرائع الإسلام، كل ذلك بقدر ما يرتضيه الحال ويقتضيه المقام؛ ثم ذكر لطائف "علم الحقائق"؛ ثم تعقيبه بالوظائف الخلقية من "علم الرقائق"؛ ثم تميم الفصل بالقول اليسير من الترغيب والترهيب المقصود من "علم التذكير". وهذه العلوم الثلاثة الأخيرة تندرج تحت

التأويل الذي هو قسم التفسير في حد القسمة الشهيرة لكن لا ينحصر فيها التأويل لجريانه في فنون العربية وقواعد التعليل. فما مر من العلوم الثمانية العربية والثمانية الشرعية مستوفى في فصوله ما يقتضيه المقام من أصوله. والله سبحانه هو المسؤل أن يوفقني بمحض فضله في تفسير هذا السؤال، وإلا

أين الوصول إلى سعاد ودونها      قتل الجبال ودونها حتوف  
الرجل حافية وما لي مركب      والكف صفر والطريق مخوف

**الرابع:** أن يذكر في أول كل سورة بسبعة مقاصد يطلبها كل من هو لتحقيق التفسير قاصد: تليقها بما قبلها، ثم كمية آياتها وحروفها وكلماتها، ثم سبب نزولها وأين نزلت كلاً أو بعضاً، ثم محصل مضمونها، ثم تعيين ما فيها من الناسخ والمنسوخ، ثم وجه تسميتها، ثم ذكر فضيلتها.

**الخامس:** أن وجوه التأويل غير منحصرة فيما سنذكر وغير دافعة لإرادة الظاهر عياداً بالله من رأي محض الباطنية. أما الأول فلما ذكر الشيخ رضي الله عنه في تفسير الفاتحة من وراية البطون السبعة للقرآن أو سبعين بطناً كيف وقد أسلفنا نقل صاحب التيسير عن عَلم الهدى أن كل ما نُقل عن أهل التفسير من تخصيص العام وتقييد المطلق وتعيين المبهم فهو تأويل والتفسير إجراء اللفظ على ظاهره كما نقلنا عكسه أيضاً من أن التفسير يختص بما فيه رفع الإبهام أو دفع الإجمال ولكن بالرواية لا بالدراية. وأما الثاني فالأن للمعاني مراتب كما أشار إليه حديث "الظهر والبطن والمطلع" -وذكر الشيخ رحمه "ما بعد المطلع" أيضاً- فكلُّ مراد لكن بحسب مرتبته اللائقة بإرادته. فلا تدأع حينئذ كما نقلنا فيما مر عن تفسير الشيخ رحمه الله في {مالك يوم الدين} أن جميع المعاني المفسر بها لفظ من القرآن رواية أو دراية صحيحتين مراد الله تعالى لكن بحسب المراتب والقوابل وسيجيء استيفاء بيانه ثمة إن شاء الله (90) تعالى. ثم إني لو صرحت بذكر مراتب المعاني في موضع من المواضع لم أتجاوز الأربع لأن كلياتها هي، إذ المدركات إما حسية وهي

الظهر أو روحانية وهي البطن أو معنوية وأسمائية فهي المطلع. أما الخيالية والمثالية فحدود. فهذه هي المراتب بحسب

الحضرات الخمس. أما ما هو بحسب الجمع الأحدي الإلهي فما بعد المطلع. والله أعلم!

## الكلام في الاستعاذة

حسن موقعها:

قدمنا الكلام فيها لأنها مقدمة على القراءة عند عامة المسلمين خلافاً للنحويّ وداود الأصفهاني وابن سيرين في إحدى الروايتين عنه. لهم نقلاً ظاهر قوله تعالى: {فإذا قرأت القرآن فاستعذ بالله من الشيطان الرجيم} إذ الجزء متأخر عن الشرط، وكون المراد "إذا أردت القراءة" خلاف الظاهر، فالأصل أن لا يُصار إليه وعلى تقدير تسليم ورود أمثاله من نحو قوله تعالى: {وإذا طلقتم النساء فطلقوهن لعدتهن} وقول الشاعر: "إذا طحنت فابُدئي باليمين" لا يقاس عليه. وعقلاً أن تمام القراءة مظنة تداخل العُجب المبطل للثواب فأمر فيه بالاستعاذة لئلا يتداخل العجب بوساوسه، ولذلك وقع المعوذتان في آخر القرآن. ولنا نقلاً رواية جبير بن مطعم أنه عليه الصلاة والسلام حين افتتح الصلاة قدّم الاستعاذة على القراءة، فيرتكب ذلك التأويل الشائع الجاري مجرى الحقيقة العرفية توفيقاً بين الآية والحديث. وعقلاً أن نزول آية الأمر بالاستعاذة كان عند إلقاء الشيطان في تلاوة النبي صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ كما قص الله تعالى في قوله: {وما أرسلنا من قبلك من رسول ولا نبي إلا إذا تمنى ألقى الشيطان في أمنيته}. أي إذا قرأ وسوس في تلاوته. فدل أن الغرض نفي الوسوسة في نفس التلاوة. أما المعوذتان فقد مر أن وقوعهما في آخر القرآن تنبيه على تعقيب الحلول بالارتحال، فذلك يلائم قولنا ولا ينافي أن يكون أيضاً للاحتراز عن عين الكمال الحاصل بحتم كلام الله المتعال المحيط بكل مراد يخطر بالبال. قال في التيسير: بالتعوذ افتتحت قراءة القرآن وبالمعوذتين اختتمت سورة فيرجى بذلك حفظ ما بينهما. مثاله أن الله تعالى خاطب العبد في أخذ الميثاق بقوله: {أأنت بريكم}، وعند الفراغ بقوله:

{يا أيتها النفس المطمئنة}، فيرجى بذلك عفو ما بينهما. وما قال النبي صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ في حق هذه الأمة: "أنا قائدها وعيسى سائغها"، فيرجى بذلك نجاة ما بينهما.

### نظمها:

قال في التيسير عن النبي صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ أنه كان يقول: "أعوذ بعفو الله العظيم من عذابه الأليم ومن همزات الشياطين إن الله هو السميع العليم." وعن الصديق رضي الله عنه: (91) "أعوذ بالله الواحد الماجد من كل عدو حاسد ومن كل شيطان مارد." وعن الفاروق رضي الله عنه: "أعوذ بالله المعين من الشيطان اللعين إلى يوم الدين." وعن عثمان رضي الله عنه: "أعوذ بالله من الشيطان والكفر والطغيان وهو المنعم المستعان." وعن علي رضي الله عنه: "أعوذ بالله العظيم ووجهه الكريم وسلطانه القديم من الشيطان الرجيم." وكان الحسن والحسين وأبو ذر وأسامة وعمّار يقولون: "أعوذ بالله العظيم من الشيطان الرجيم." قال في عين المعاني: وعليه أهل مكة، وأما أهل المدينة والشام فعلى أن يقولوا: "أعوذ بالله من الشيطان الرجيم." وعن محمد بن الحنفية: "أعوذ بالله القوي من الشيطان الغوي."

قال في الهداية: الأولى أن يقول "أستعيذُ بالله" ليطابق قوله تعالى: {فاستعدذ}. واعترض عليه بعض المعاصرين بوجهين. الأول: أن الرواية الفاشية "أعوذ بالله" كما مر، فالأولى رعايتها. الثاني أن "أستعيذُ" طلب العوذ ولا يلزم منه العوذ المطلوب. قلت: في جوابه مشافهة عن الأول أن موافقة صريح الكتاب قاضية على أخبار الآحاد أجمع. وعن الثاني أن "أستعيذُ" فيه الامتثال بمأمور الكتاب بأي معنى كان مراداً به. ومن الجائز أن يكون السين فيه للتأكيد والمبالغة، كما قال صاحب الكشاف في {يستفتحون على الذين كفروا} بمعنى "يفتحون". ومعنى المبالغة فيه تضمنه طلب الفعل من نفسه سابقاً وفعله لاحقاً، والواقع بعد الطلب أمكن على أن في التفسير الكبير عن ابن عباس أن أول ما نزل جبرائيل على محمد قال: "قل يا محمد! أستعيذ بالله السميع العليم من الشيطان الرجيم". ثم قال: "قل

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم! اقرأ باسم ربك! قلت: وكذا عن الصديق رضي الله عنه "استعدت بالله". وعن حمزة "نستعيز بالله". ولولا ما فيها من الدرايتين لكان الأخذ بما في التيسير أولى. وهو أن المختار قول الجمهور: "أعوذ بالله من الشيطان الرجيم". قال: ولي فيه حديث مسلسل ينتهي إلى عاصم عن زر عن ابن مسعود عن النبي صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ عن جبرائيل عن ميكائيل عن إسرئيل.

### لغتها:

قال في التيسير: "أعوذ" بمعنى "ألتجئ" (پناه مي خواهم)، وقيل "أستعصم" (نگاه داشت مي خواهم)، وقيل "أستجير" (أمان مي خواهم)، وقيل "أستعين" (ياري مي خواهم)، وقيل "أستغيث" (فرياد مي خواهم). وقيل العوذ استجارة بذي منعة. وقيل هو الاستعانة عن خضوع. وقيل مأخوذ من العُوذ بضم العين وفتح الواو المشددة وهو كل نبت في أصل شجرة يتسّر بها. فمعناه "أستسّر بستر الله الحميل، وأتبوّأ في ظل عنايته الظليل". وقيل العوذ بمذه الصيغة ما التصق بالعظم من اللحم. يقال: "أطيب اللحم عُوذَه". فمعناه "أنقطع من غير الله وأتصل بالله". فهذه تسعة وجوه ذكرت فيه.

ثم اسم الجلالة أعني الاسم الله. فيه أقوال: منها أنه (92) موضوع عَلَمًا ولا اشتقاق له. وينسب من أهل اللغة إلى الخليل، ومن النحاة إلى الزجاج وإلى سيويه في إحدى الروايتين عنه، ومن المفسرين إلى الحسين بن الفضل البجلي، ومن الفقهاء إلى محمد بن الحسن الشيباني، ومن أهل الحديث إلى الإمام الشافعي. كذا في التيسير. لهم نقلاً قوله تعالى: {هل تعلم له سمياً}. قال أهل التفسير: معناه هل تعرف أحداً يسمى الله؟ وذلك لأن معنى الاستفهام النفي والإنكار. والمنفي هو المشارك له في الاسم لا في الصفة لوجوه أقلها الوجود. كذا في شرح الكشاف للفاضل وتفسير الإصفهاني. وفيه بحث لجواز أن يكون هذا الاسم مشتقاً ومستعملاً بمعنى للجامعية لصفات الجلال ونعوت الكمال

كما قال في الفتوحات: إن الألوهية مجموع معنوي الاستغناء عن الغير أصلاً واحتياج الغير إليه، فالأول يفيد الجلال والثاني الجمال، ومجموعهما الكمال. فعلى هذا يكون المنفي هو المشارك له في الجامعة ولو بين هذين المعنيين. ويجوز أيضاً أن يكون معاني جميع وجوه الاشتقاق معتبراً فيه بناء على ما مر من قاعدة تفسير الفاتحة. ولا يوجد له مشارك في ذلك. وعقلاً أولاً أنه يوصف ولا يوصف به. فهو في قوله تعالى: {صراط العزيز الحميد الله الذي} عطف بيان. وهذا حكاية لا مدخل فيها بأنه إذا كان بمعنى المعبود كيف لا يوصف به مثله كما زعم الفاضل على أن مراد صاحب الكشاف أنه اسم لذات المعبود لا أنه مرادف له. وثانياً أنه لا بد له من اسم يجري عليه جميع أوصافه في اللفظ أو أن حملها عليه إذ العبارة غير قاصرة عن ذلك إجماعاً، كذا في الكشاف. وتفسير القاضي مع توضيح المراد منه لثلا يرد اعتراض الفاضل أن لا بد له في ذلك الاسم في العبارة ممنوع وفي نفس الأمر مسلم وغير مفيد. نعم لا يفيد شيء من الأدلة الثلاثة العَلَمِيَّة ولا عدم الاشتقاق، بل لو صحت فعلى الإسمية الخاصة. ولذلك زعم صاحب الكشاف بعد الاستدلال بأكثر هذه الأدلة على اسمية الله الخاصة لذات المعبود بالحق. و غلبه الإله له أنه مشتق من أَلِه بالكسر إذا تحيّر لصدق معنى الاشتقاق عليه وهو أن ينتظم الصيغتين فصاعداً معنى واحداً، أي أمرين يتعدد أن من حيث الصيغة لا المادة على أنا نقول صدق معنى الاشتقاق لا يقتضي القطع بوجوده بل احتمالاً فلا يرد الدليل على دعواه. وذلك لأنه لو لزم من وجود الانتظام المذكور وجود الاشتقاق لزم أن يكون لفظ "ما" مشتقاً من ألف لفظ أو أكثر يناسبه معنى "ما" وما دَلَّه. ومن الدليل على بطلانه قوله: الصواعق ليس مشتقاً من الصواعق بل كل منهما بناء على حاله لاستوائهما في التصرف. ولزم أيضاً أن يكون إسم الجلالة (93) مشتقاً من جميع ما قيل به وهو خرق الإجماع، إذ كل قائل باشتقاقه يختصه بأصله. فالتحقيق أن حقيقة الاشتقاق أخذ صيغته من أخرى والانتظام المذكور مصححة ولا يلزم من وجود مصحح الشيء وجوده، بل الصحيح في التمسك من جانبهم أن يقول الخصوصية العلمية ثابتة

قطعاً بما مر من دلالة الإجماع على أن لا إله إلا الله كلمة توحيد والأصل في تلك الخصوصية العلمية الوضعية لا سيما فيما لم يعرف استعماله غير علم. واحتمال الاشتقاق لا يفيد القطع بالعدول عن ذلك الأصل.

فإن قلت: المحققون على أنه غير علم لكون تعين الذات معتبراً في وضع العلم، وحين لم يعلم ذات الحق تعالى وكان تعينه عين ذاته لم يمكن لأحد تعقل تعينه ليضع العلم بإذائه. قلت: اعتبار التعين أعم من تحقيقه والعلم بكنهه، وذلك كاف في وضع العلم كما لو لم ير ذاته. ولئن سلم فإنما يتم لو لم يكن الواضع مطلقاً أو واضح هذا الاسم هو الحق تعالى. أما إذا وضعه فعلم غيره وضعه بالوحي أو الإلهام فلا، ومنها أنه مشتق أصله لكل معبود حق أو باطل غالب اسمية قبل التعريف اللازم لكل معبود بحق وعلميته بعده كالبيت والنجم والصعق. فأولاً لأن العلم كالإشارة في التعيين ولا يصح الإشارة إليه تعالى. وثانياً أن العلم لتمييز المماثل في الحقيقة ولا مماثل فيها. وثالثاً لتعلق الجار به في قوله تعالى: {وهو الله في السموات}. وليس شيء بشيء إذ لا يشترط أن يصح الإشارة إلى المعلم ولا أن يكون له مماثل في الحقيقة. ويصح قولنا "هو زيد في البلد لا نظير له في العلم" في أنه متعلق بما بعده.

ثم فيه وجوه. الأول: أنه مشتق من "إله" بالكسر إذا تحيّر ودهش. والأوهام يتحير في معرفة المعبود وتدهش الفطن لأن كل ما تتخيله الأوهام ويتصوره الأفهام فهو سبحانه بخلافه ولذا كثر الضلال. فلما اشتق منه الإله للمعبود بالحق اشتق من الإله قولهم "تألّه" "وألّه" بالفتح و"استألّه" أي "تعبد" و"عبد" و"استعبد" اشتقاق "استنوق" من "الناقة". هو المفهوم من الكشاف، وفيه مخالفة الجمهور من حيث أن ما بمعنى العبادة مشتق عنده ومشتق منه عندهم. والحق لهم لأن الأصل الغالب اشتقاق الاسم من المصدر لا عكسه، ولأن كون الأفعال مشتقة من المشتقات خلاف مذهبي البصرية والكوفية ولم يذهب إليه ذاهب. وتمثيله بـ"استنوق" و"استحجر" فاسد لأن الناقة والحجر ليسا من

المشتقات التي يمكن أخذ الفعل من أصولها بخلاف الإله، ولأن الاشتقاق بتفسيره يجري من الطرفين. فالأولى القول  
باشتقاق ما الكلام في اشتقاقه.

قال في عين المعاني: اشتقاقه من "أله" بمعنى تحيّر قول أبي عمرو كما قال زهير:

ويبدأ تيه (94) تأله العين وسطها مخفقة غيراء صرماء سملق

وقال الأخطل:

بتسعين ألفاً تأله العين وسطها متى ترها عين الطرامة تدمعا

ومنه يعلم أن قول الفاضل أن أصل إله هذا "وله" ليس بشيء بل هو قول آخر مذكور في التيسير وعين المعاني.

الثاني: أنه من "وله" بالكسر بمعنى تحير وطرب. قال:

ولهت نفسي الطروب إليكم ولهاً حال دون طعم الطعام

وذلك لأن الخلق متحيرون في عظمتهم والهون من شوق رؤيته.

الثالث: قول ابن عباس رحمه الله أنه من "وله" بالكسر لكن بمعنى فزع ولجأ. قال:

ولهت إليكم في بلايا تنوبي فألفيتكم فيها كريماً ممجداً

فقلبت الواو همزة في الوجهين كما في "إشاح"، وذلك لأن الخلق يلجأون به ويفزعون إليه في حوائجهم. كذا في

التيسير. والمذكور في عين المعاني أن الهمزة فيه أصلية.

الرابع: أنه من "أله" بالكسر أي دام وثبت. قال:

ألهنا بدار ما تبين رسومها كأن بقاياها وشام على اليد

وذلك لأنه القديم الأزلي الدائم.

الخامس: قول ابن شميل أنه من "أله" بالفتح يأله إلهة أي عبد عبادة. ومنه قراءة {ويذكر وإلهتك} أي عبادتك.

قال رؤبة:

لله در الغانيات المدّه سبّحن واسترجعن من تأله

وذلك لأنه يحق له العبادة.

السادس: أنه من "أله إلى فلان" أي رجع إليه واعتمد عليه. يقال "أله الفصيل بأمه" بالكسر. قال: ألهت إليها والركابت وقف. وذلك لأن رجوع الخلق إليه وتوكلهم عليه.

السابع: قول المبرد أنه من "أله" بالكسر أي سكن. قال: "ألهت إليها والحوادث جمّة". وذلك لأن قلوب الخلق تسكن بذكره. قال الله تعالى: {ألا بذكر الله تطمئن القلوب}.

الثامن: من "أله" بمعنى ارتفع. وتسمي العرب الشمس إلهة لرفعتها. قال:

تروّحنا من الدهناء أرضاً وأعجلنا الإلهة أن تغيبا

وذلك لأنه العلي العظيم المرتفع عن مشابهة الممكنات ومناسبة المحدثات. وجعلها في عين المعاني أفعالاً من "لاه" بمعنى "ارتفع"، وما في التيسير "أظهر".

التاسع: من "لاه-يلوه" أي "علا"، وذلك لأنه العلي المتعالي.

العاشر: أنه من "لاه-يلوه ويليه" "احتجت". قال:

لاهت فما عرفت يوماً بخارجة ياليتها خرجت حتى رأيناها

وذلك لأنه حجب أبصار أهل الدنيا عن رؤيته وإن وعدهم لقائه في جنة.

الحادي عشر: من "لاه" بمعنى "استنار". كأنه مقلوب "لاح" وذلك لأنه كما هو محتجب بكمال صمديته محتجب بغاية ظهوره عن العقول والأبصار. وتحقيقه أن الوجود الواصل إلى جميع الموجودات نور جناب القدس فلدوام إشراقه خطر ببال ناقصي العقل ذاتية الوجود كما كان يتوهم في نور الشمس. لو كان دائم الإشراق على الآفاق (95) بلا غروب فبكمال تنزهه عن الغروب والزوال احتجب عنهم وهم المحجوبون. وفي ذكر العارفين "سبحان من احتجب عن العقول بشده ظهوره واختفى عنها بكمال نوره". والحق ما أشار إليه الشيخ صدر الدين رحمه الله في تفسير الفاتحة أن احتجاب الحق إما بكمال ظهوره احتجاب نور الشمس عن أعيان الحفائش، وإما بغايت قربه احتجاب الهواء عن أعين الناظرين لمماسته إيانا.

فهذه أحد عشر وجهاً للاشتقاق يكون أصل اسم الجلالة على ستة أوجه. منها فعلاً همزته أصلية. وعلى وجهين: فعلاً همزته مقلوبة من الواو، وعلى ثلاثة أوجه: معتلّ العين لا همزة فيه. والأول والثالث مرويان عن سيوييه كالقول بالعلمية بلا اشتقاق. فنقول: لو كان اسم الجلالة مشتقاً لكان أصله إما مع الهمزة أصلية كانت أو منقلبة أو معتلّ العين. والأول باطل من وجوه. الأول: من حيث المعنى فإن اسم الجلالة خاص برينا في الجاهلية والإسلام، والإله ليس كذلك. ولذلك يفهم مدلولات جميع الأسماء عن ذكر الله لأنه جامع لها ولذلك يقال لكل اسم من أسمائه الكريمة أنه من أسماء الله، ولا يعكس ولا يفهم من الإله إلا المعبود مطلقاً أو بالحق. الثاني: أن الإله ظاهراً إما مهموز أو معتلّ الفاء، واسم الجلالة في الظاهر معتلّ العين. الثالث: أن الهمزة إن حذفت ابتداءً ثم دخل اللام فهو ادعاء حذف فاء

بلا سبب، ولا مشابهه سبب كواو رقة من كلمة ثلاثية وهو أبعد من حذف العين واللام، لأن الأول بعيد من محل التغيير. أما قياس الزمخشري على ناس وأناس فاسد، إذ الشاذ لا يقاس عليه، لأن القياس عليه زيادة في الشذوذ. ويكسر لخلاف الأصل بلا ضرورة، والحق أن ناساً وأناساً بمعنى واحد. لكن أحدهما من "نؤس" والآخر من "أنس".

كذا قال ابن مالك رحمه الله.

وإن حذف بعد نقل حركة الهمزة إلى اللام ففيه دور، لأن العوض يوتى به بعد المعوّض فيتوقف على الحذف. والحذف موقوف على نقل الحركة الموقوف على وجود اللام. وفيه أيضاً مخالفة الأصل من وجوه. الأول: نقل الحركة إلى مثل ما بعدها المستلزم لاجتماع المثليين وهو أثقل من تخفيف الهمزة بعد ساكن. الثاني: إسكان المنقول إليه الموجب كون النقل عملاً كالأعمال. الثالث: لزوم نقل حركة الهمزة في كلمتين ولا نظير له. الرابع: إدغام المنقول إليه فيما بعد الهمزة وهي في تقدير الثبوت مع أن أبا عمرو بن العلاء لم يدغم في {ومن يتبع غير الإسلام ديناً} لكون الياء في حكم الثبوت. فإذا اعتبر الفصل من واجب الحذف فمن غير (96) واجب الحذف أولى. الخامس: أنه لو كان بنقل الحركة كان الحذف قياساً وكان في حكم الثابت فلم يعوض.

واستدلال صاحب الكشاف على أن أصله الإله بقوله "مَعَادَ الإله أن تكون كظيية"، وتنظيره بـ"الناس والأناس"، في كل منهما نظر. أما الأول فلأن استعمال الإله في كلام لا يدل على أنه أصله. وإن أراد استعماله في الجملة فاشتغال بما لا يعنيه. لا يقال الاستدلال باستعمالهما في معنى واحد مع التوافق في أكثر الحروف، لأننا نقول كما مر إمكان الرد لا يقتضي أخذ أحدهما من الآخر. ذكره الإصفيهاني مع أنه لا اتحاد بين معنييهما فإن الإله اسم جنس يقع على كل معبود وغلب على كل معبود بحق. واسم الجلالة يختص بربنا تعالى كما مر. وأيضاً لا نسلم أن الناس أصله

الأناس لما مر من اختلافهما ظاهراً أجوف ومهموز أو من أن مجرد الاستعمال لا يقتضي أصالته. هذا كله لو كان أصله مع الهمزة.

أما لو كان معتل العين فقد استدلووا عليه بقولهم "هَيَّ أبوك" بمعنى "الله أبوك". قال سيبويه: قلب الهاء الذي هو لام الفعل إلى موضع العين وسكن سكون العين في "لاه" وفتح آخره. قال أبو علي الفارسي: لتضمن معنى حرف التعريف. ونظر فيه صاحب التسهيل بأن الألف واللام في "الله" زائدة لكونه علماً، فإذا أخذ لم يبق لها معنى تضمن. وفيه بحث لأن العلمية عند أرباب الاشتقاق غالبية مع اللام فمعناه معتبر. ثم قوله: فبناؤه لتضمن معنى حرف التعجب وإن لم يكن للتعجب حرف كما أن بناء اسم الإشارة لتضمن حرف الإشارة لكونها نسبة وإن لم يوضع للإشارة حرف. فيه ضعف متضاعف.

وقيل: عبرانية أو سريانية، أصله "لاها" فغُرب. قال في عين المعاني. وعليه قوله:

كجِلْفَةٍ من أبي رياح      يسمعها لاهه الكبار

وكذا قوله:

لأهْمَ إن جُرْهماً عبادك      الناس طِرْف وهم تِلادك

قال الإصفيهاني رحمه الله: يحكى أنهم كانوا يقولون إلهاً ورحماناً ومرحاناً. فلما عرب جعل التسمية. ثم قال: والإنصاف أن لفظ الجلالة مستعمل في لغة العرب في الجاهلية والإسلام لقوله تعالى: {ليقولن الله}. وهذا لا يورث وهماً بأنه غير عربي فضلاً عن ظن أو اعتقاد. فإن المشابهة بين اللغتين لا يقتضي أخذ أحديهما من الأخرى. ولئن سلم فعل الأخذ بالعكس أي للعجم من العرب. والتعيين تحكم. واستدل في التفسير الكبير على أنه عربي أولاً بقوله تعالى

{هل تعلم له سمياً}، فإنهم أطبقوا على أن المراد لفظ الجلالة. وثانياً بقوله تعالى: {ليقولن الله}، وليس شيء بشيء، فإن كونه لا سمي له لا يقتضي العربية، وكذا تلفظه مع أن المراد في {ليقولن الله} مدلوله لا لفظه. والأصح أنه عربي لثبوته عنهم بالتواتر، وأن التعريب (97) خلاف الأصل وإذا كاف في كونه عربياً وإلا لاحتاج كل لفظ للعرب إلى دليل على أنه عربي.

وقيل: أصله "هاء" الكناية أشاروا بها إلى الحق سبحانه لما وضع في نفوسهم من دلالة الفطرة ولم يعلموا له اسماً ثم أدخلوا "لام" الملك فصار "له"، يعنون له الخلق والأمر. ثم مدّوا بها أصواتهم تعظيماً فقالوا "لاه". ثم وصلوا بالألف واللام فصار "الله". ولغلبة الاسمية أو العلمية مع اللام أو التعويض بها عن الهمزة لزمنا الكلمة حتى لم تسقطا عن النداء بخلاف نحو الرحمن. ولكونها كنفس الكلمة أو كمحض العوض قطعت همزته.

والمجموع أربعة عشر قولاً، فالمعنى: "التجئى إلى المعبود للأنام، المفرغ المرتفع عن الأوهام، المحتجب عن الأفهام، الظاهر بالإعلام الذي تحيرت في صفاته الأفهام، وسكنت في عبادته الأجسام، وطربت إليه قلوب الخواصّ والعوامّ، وبيده كروور الليالي ومرور الأيام، فسبحانه من ملك عظيم عالم."

ثم الشيطان هو إبليس. وفي اشتقاقه عشرة أوجه. الأول: قول البصرية: "فَيْعَال" من "الشطون" وهو البعد. قال أمية بن أبي الصلت:

أيما شاطن عصاه عكاه      ثم يُلقى في السجن والأكبال

وقال رؤبة:

وفي أحاديث السياط المتن      شاف ليغي الكلب المشيطان

ومعناه المبعد من رحمة الله.

الثاني: قول الكوفية أنه "فعلان" من "شاط-يشيط"، أي هلك. قال الأعمش:

قد تطعن العير في مكنون قابله      وقد يشيط على أرماحنا البطل

ومعناه الهالك في الدارين. ورجح الأول بسلامة الصيغة فإن الثاني أجوف والغالب كالمحقق. ورجح الثاني باستعماله

غير منصرف. قال: "وشيطانٌ إذ يدعوهم ويثوب". قلنا: لعله منصرف لأنه مع الانصراف موزون أو لعله اسم امرأة.

الثالث: من "شيط الشيء" أحرقه، و"استشاط غضباً" احترق. فإنه المحرق في الدنيا بنار الفرقة وغداً بنار العقوبة.

الرابع: من "فرس شطون" أي جموح. فإنه العصي الآبي.

الخامس: من "الشطن" وهو الحبل الطويل المديد. فإنه المتماذي في الطغيان الممتد العصيان.

السادس: من قولهم "فرس شيطان" أي فرح نشيط. فإنه المرتفع المتكبر.

السابع: أن الشيطان هو العاتي المتمرد من كل جنس. قاله ابن عباس رضي الله عنهما. ولذا سمي الحية شيطاناً. قال

الله تعالى: {طلعها كأنه رؤس الشياطين} أي الحيات. قال رؤبة:

إني إذا ما شاعر هجاني      زوجت شيطانية شيطاني

وقال أبو النجم:

إني وكل شاعر من البشر      شيطانه أنثى وشيطاني ذكر

يعني الغضب.

الثامن: من قولهم "شيط اللحم" أي دخنه ولم يُنضح. فإنه (98) المفسد لكل شيء وما به صلاح شيء.

التاسع: من قولهم "فرس مشياط" أي ممتل سمناً. فإنه الممتلئ خبثاً ونكراً وشرّاً ومكراً.

العاشر: من "شاط" أي بطل. فإنه الباطل عمله الخائب أمله. ولا يخرج هذه الوجوه عن قولي البصرية والكوفية وزناً.

ثم الرجيم. قال الكسائي: هو المشنوق. من قوله تعالى: {ولولا رهطك لرجمناك}. وقيل: المهلك بأقبح وجه، من

الرحم بالحجارة فإنه أقبح القتلات. وقيل: من الرجم بمعنى الرمي. قال تعالى: {رجماً بالغيب}. فقيل: هو بمعنى

الفاعل لأنه الرامي لبني آدم بالبلايا والدواهي. وقيل: بمعنى المفعول لأنه المرمي من السموات بإلقاء الملائكة حين لعن.

وقيل: لأنه المرمي بشهب السماء إذا قصدها. ففي مأخذه ثلاثة أوجه. وفي المعنى المفسر به على التقدير الثالث ثلاثة

أوجه. قال في التيسير: له في القرآن أسماء مشؤمة وصفات مذمومة. هي "إبليس" و"الشیطان" و"العُور" و"الوسواس

والخناس" و"الصاغر" و"الكافر" و"المارد" و"المريد" و"الطايف" و"الفاتن" و"المدوم" و"الملعون" و"المدحور" و"الكفور"

و"الخذول" و"العصي" و"العدو" و"المضل". وأفعال ذميمة من نحو "أبى واستكبر" و"كان من الكافرين" وغيرها،

فأجمع مقابحه ومساويه. هو الرجيم لأنه بمعنى الراجم جامع لجميع ما يقع منه من الجنايات، وبمعنى المرجوم جامع

لجميع ما يقع عليه من العقوبات. فلذلك خص به الابتداء من بين تلك الأسماء والصفات.

.....

.....

بيانها:

أعني النكات البيانية في وجوهه. الأولى: أن "أعوذ" إخبار بالعوذ بأي معنى كان من معانيه السالفة والإخبار بالشيء ليس عينه فليس هذا امتثالاً لأمر العوذ. وجوابه وجهان. الأول: أن لفظه خير ومعناه دعاء وطلب أي "أعذني". ومثله (107) "أستغفر الله" أي "اغفر لي". ومر نظائره في الباء. قلت: وقد ذكر علماء علم المعاني أن في العدول إلى لفظ الخبر في نحو "رحمه الله" أي "ليرحمه" فائدة التفاعل بالوقوع. فهنا كذلك الوجه محمل لأنه كأنه وقع الإعادة، فيخبر عن مطاوعة. لا يقال هذا المعنى في "أستغفر الله" صحيح لأنه طلب المغفرة فهو بمعنى "اغفر لي". أما في "أستعيز" و"أعوذ" فلا، لأن الإعادة ليست مصدراً لشيء منهما، لأننا نقول طلب الإعادة مقصود جملة الكلام لا منطوقه فيحمل عليه كما في "رحمه الله" من طلب الرحمة له. وكذا شأن "أستغفر الله" لأن حقيقته الإخبار بطلب المغفرة، وطلبها مقصودة فيحمل عليه. وذلك لأن طلب الشيء وسيلة إلى حصوله، فالذي يفهم منه الطلب كذلك. وسره ما في التفسير الكبير أن بين الرب وعنده عهداً. قال تعالى: {وأوفوا بعهدي أوف بعهدكم}. فكأنه يقول: "أنا مع نقص البشرية وفيت بعهد عبوديتي وقلت 'أعوذ بالله' و'أستغفر الله'. فأنت مع كمال الكرم والفضل أولى أن تنفي بعهد الربوبية وتعيذني". قلت: الأمر أوسع من ذلك. فإن كامل كرمه كاف وأصل فضله واف في الإعادة لطلبها، ولا يستدعي العهد السابق حتى في الكرماء المخلوقة القاصرة كذلك.

الثاني: أن المراد بـ"أعوذ" و"أستعيز" إنشاء العوذ، وليس إخباراً به كما في "أحمد الله" و"الحمد لله"، فإنهما إنشاء نفس الحمد لا إخبار به أو عنه. وذلك لأن الإنشاء إيجاد معنى بلفظ يقارنه فأقيم التلطف به مقام إيجاد معناه. وهي عادة فاشية عرفاً وشرعاً كما في ألفاظ العقود وصريح الطلاق والعناق والإتيان بالشهادتين في الإيمان. فالقاضي يحكم بما ولا يسمع دعوى عدم القصد إلى معناها. لا يقال: فكان المناسب أن يقال "استعذت" كما روي عن الصديق رضي

الله عنه ليدل على تحقق وقوعها من جهة صيغة الماضي كما عرف وتعرف. لأننا نقول: ذلك متعارف فيما يقصد به إيجاد فقط. أما ما يقصد به استمرار وجوده بعد الإيجاد فالعرف في ذلك لفظ الحال الدال على الاستمرار كما في "بسم الله أتلو" ونحوه، وكما عرف في {الله يستهزئ بهم} أنه يدل على استمرار تجدد الاستهزاء.

النكتة الثانية في التفسير الكبير أن "بالله أعوذ" أكمل لإفادة للحصر فلم لم يرد الأمر به كما قدر متعلق بسم الله متأخراً؟ والجواب (للمؤلف) أن تقديم المتعلق على الفعل في البسمة لدفع زعم المبتدئين باسم اللات والعزى كما علم. ولا زعم ههنا أما الاهتمام فلنفس الاستعاذة لأنها أولى الوظائف كما قيل للقراءة في {اقرأ باسم ربك} لأنها أول سورة نزلت.

الثالثة: فيه أيضاً أنه جاء "الحمد لله" و"الله الحمد" ولم يجي "بالله أعوذ"، فما الفرق؟ والجواب (للمؤلف) أن الحمد كما يتعلق بالله يتعلق بغيره. قال صلى الله عليه وسلم: "من لم يشكر الناس لم يشكر الله". (108) فصح التخصيص لدفع زعم الثاني. وأما الاستعاذة من الشيطان فلم يتصور أن يزعم تعلقها بغير الله لعجز الكل عنه. فلم يحتاج إلى دفع زعمه.

الرابعة: اختيار اسم الجلالة للاستعاذة به ولم يقل "أعوذ بالقادر" أو "المغيث" أو "المعين" أو "المستعان" وغيرها مما مر في روايات التوصيف بها. والجواب: لتناول عبارة الاستعاذة بالاسم الجامع أنواع الاستعاذة، فإن كلياتها كما أشار إليها الحديث النبوي صلى الله عليه وسلم ثلاث، صفاتية وأفعالية وذاتية، حيث قال: "أعوذ برضاك من سخطك ومعافاتك من عقوبتك، وأعوذ بك منك لا أحصي ثناءً عليك، أنت كما أثنيت على نفسك". فلم يخص ببعض الأسماء لدفع توهم تخصيص الاستعاذة بها. وإنما قدم في الحديث الاستعاذة الصفاتية على الأفعالية، لأنها أصل الأفعالية وهي ثمرتها. وإنما لم يقدم الذاتية مع أنها أصل الكل تنبيهاً على أن الاستعاذة الذاتية شأن المنتهي في الانتهاء.

فالاستعادة الأفعالية باطنها وهو طلب أن يستعمله الله فيما يرضاه وأن يُرضيه بذلك فلا يتألم بشيء وإن كان بمحو الغير عن التفاته فضلاً عن التألم به وعن بعض مقاماته يترجم القائل عرف أو لم يعرف.

فيا جود معن ناج معناً بحاجتي      فما لي إلى معن سواك شفيع

والاستعادة الصفاتية مطلعها، وهي طلب أن لا ينسب الرضاء وغيره إليه بل إلى الله، وإن كان من حيث مظهريته. فإذا حصل هذه الحالة مع شعور بما فهي المطلع. وإليه يشير من بعض الوجوه ما أنشده الشيخ رضي الله عنه في نفحاته:

لو لم ترد نيل ما أرجو وأطلبه      من جود كفيك ما علمتني الطلاب

أما إذا حصلت تلك الحالة بلا شعور واختيار فهي ما بعد المطلع، والاستعادة حينئذ ذاتية. ولسانه الشامل قول الشيخ الكبير رضي الله عنه:

ولست أعرف من شيء حقيقته      وكيف أعرفه وأنتم فيه

الخامسة: لما كان قول الاستعادة مشتملاً على الاستعادة والمستعاذ به والمستعاذ منه وكانت العبارة عن المستعاذ به جامعة لوجود القدرة، والإجابة ناسب لذلك أن لا يقيد الاستعادة بشيء من المهمات المطلوب دفع الملمات عنها، ولا أن يقيد المستعاذ منه بشيء من قبائحه ومضارّه كالهمز واللمز والمس والوسوسة والنزعة وغيرها تطبيقاً لأطراف المقاصد وتعميماً لأصناف الفوائد للمستعيز والمفاسد للمستعاذ منه وليذهب الهمة في كل منها كل مذهب ممكن. قال في التفسير الكبير: الشرور إما من الاعتقادات ويدخل فيها جميع المذاهب الباطلة وعقائد فرق الضلال من اثنين وسبعين فرقة؛ وإما من الأعمال البدنية، فمنها ما يضر في الدين وهو منهيات التكاليف وضبطها كالمعتذر، ومنها ما

ضرره لا في الدين (109) كالأضرار والآلام والحرق والغرق والفقر والعمى والزمانة وغيرها، ويقرب أن لا يتناهي. و"أعوذ بالله" يتناول الاستعاذة من كلها. فعلى العاقل إذا أراد الاستعاذة أن يستحضر هذه الأجناس الثلاثة وأنواعها المتنازلة. وإذا عرف لا تناهيها عرف أن قدرة الخلق لا تنفي بدفعها فحمل عقله أن يقول: "أعوذ بالله القادر على كل المقدورات من جميع المخاوف والآفات".

### التفسير:

سلف من التفسير الكبير عن ابن عباس رضي الله عنهما أن أول ما نزل جبرائيل على محمد صلى الله عليه وسلم أنه قال: قل يا محمد "أستعيذ بالله السميع العليم من الشيطان الرجيم". ثم قال: قل "بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم، اقرأ باسم ربك".

وفي تفسير القاضي عن ابن مسعود: "قرأت على رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم فقلت 'أعوذ بالسميع العليم من الشيطان الرجيم'. فقال: قل 'أعوذ بالله من الشيطان الرجيم'. هكذا أقرانيه جبرائيل عن القلم عن اللوح المحفوظ". قلت: الفرق بينهما -والله أعلم- أن الأول أوفق درايةً من وجهين سلفاً. والثاني أثبت روايةً لما مر في التيسير من قوله: ولي فيه حديث مسلسل ينتهي إلى عاصم عن زرّ عن ابن مسعود عن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم عن جبرائيل عن ميكائيل عن إسرافيل عليهم السلام أنه أخذه من اللوح هكذا.

وفي التفسير الكبير أيضاً روى الحسن أنه بينا رجل يضرب مملوكاً له قال المملوك "أعوذ بالله". إذ جاء نبي الله فقال "أعوذ برسول الله"، فأمسك عنه. فقال صلى الله عليه وسلم: عائذ الله أحق أن يمسك عنه". فقال: "أشهد رسول الله أنه حر لوجه الله". فقال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم: "أما والذي نفسي بيده لو لم تقلها لدافع وجهك سفح النار". قلت: الوعيد لترجيح العوذ بالرسول في مقابلة العوذ بالله حتى لو قال "أعوذ بالله وبك" يخشى عليه الكفر.

وفي تفسير ابن حبان: الظاهر أن المراد بالشیطان إبليس وأعوانه. وقيل عام في كل متمرد عات من جن وإنس كما قال تعالى: {شياطين الإنس والجن} فالوصف بالرجيم على الأول للتأكيد وعلى الثاني للتوضيح.

#### الحديث:

مما يدل على مشروعية الاستعاذة وإفادتها وكيفيةها بعد الأمر الوارد في الكتاب بها وبعد ما علم أن نوحاً عليه السلام قال: {رب إني أعوذ بك أن أسألك ما ليس لي به علم} فأعطي السلامة والبركات. ويوسف عليه السلام قال: {معاذ الله! إنه ربي أحسن مثواي} فأعطي العصمة وصرف السوء والفحشاء. وامرأة عمران قالت: {إني أعيذها بك وذريتها من الشيطان الرجيم} فأعطيت القبول الحسن والنبات الحسن. ومريم قالت: {إني أعوذ بالرحمن منك إن كنت تقياً} فأعطيت (110) البشارة بالولد وتنزيه الله إياها بلسان ذلك الولد. و موسى عليه السلام قال: {أعوذ بالله أن أكون من الجاهلين} فأعطي إزالة التهمة وإحياء القتيل. ونبينا محمد صلى الله عليه وسلم لما قال بأمر الله تعالى: {رب أعوذ بك من هزات الشياطين} الآية، أعطي الشفاعة.

وجوه من الأخبار:

الأول: عن معاذ أنه استبّ رجلان بحضرة الرسول صلى الله عليه وسلم، فقال: "إني أعلم كلمة لو قالها لذهب عنه ذلك، وهي قوله أعوذ بالله". وذلك يوافق قوله تعالى: {إن الذين اتقوا إذا مسهم طائف من الشيطان تذكروا فإذا هم مبصرون}، أي تذكروا جنب الله فاستعاذوا به. وسره أن الاستعاذة تشعر بعجزه من حيث العلم بمصالح نفسه إذ عقله قاصر وقد غلب عليه غضبه، ومن حيث القدرة لأن القدرة المتوهمة للعبد عند الغضب على قهر العدو في جنب قدرة الله ليست بشيء. فالوظيفة التفويض إليه تعالى. فإن كان له الحق فالله يستوفيه. وإن كان للخصم فالأولى أن يترك الظلم والخصومة في الباطل.

الثاني: روى معقل بن يسار أنه صَلَّى اللهُ عليه وسلَّم قال: "من قال حين يصبح ثلاث مرات أعوذ بالله من الشيطان الرجيم وقرأ ثلاث آيات من آخر سورة الحشر وكل الله به سبعين ألف ملك يصلون عليه حتى يمسي. فإن مات في ذلك اليوم مات شهيداً. ومن قالها حين يمسي كان بتلك المنزلة". وإنما جمع بين الاستعاذة وقراءة آخر الحشر لأن في الاستعاذة الإشعار بكمال العجز والعبودية، وفي آخر الحشر الإقرار بجلال القدرة والعظمة والربوبية. فالأول تحلية والثاني تحلية وبهما يتحقق منزل قوله تعالى: {الذين آمنوا وكانوا يتقون لهم البشرى في الحياة الدنيا وفي الآخرة}. فيترتب عليه قوله: {الذين يحملون العرش ومن حوله يسبحون بحمد ربهم ويؤمنون به ويستغفرون للذين آمنوا} الآية. والله أعلم.

الثالث: عن خولة بنت حكيم عن النبي صَلَّى اللهُ عليه وسلَّم: "من نزل منزلاً فقال: 'أعوذ بكلمات الله التامات من شر ما خلق' لم يضره شيء حتى يرتحل منه". وذلك أن سر كلمات الله الأرواح. فالتامات الطيبات الخيرة وغيرها الخبيثات المؤذية. ولما ثبت نقلاً وعقلاً أن السموات والأرضين مملوءة منهما -أعني الملائكة والجن- قال صَلَّى اللهُ عليه وسلَّم: "أطت السماء وحق لها أن تغط. ما فيها موضع شبر إلا وفيه ملك قائم أو قاعد" شرع الاستعاذة من شرور الخبيثة إلى الطاهرة. أما مطلعها فالأسماء الحاكمة التي إليها يستند الملائكة كالكريم واللطيف والهادي والتي إليها يستند الجن والشياطين كالمُضَلِّ والقاهر والمنتقم والاسم الله يجمع النوعين فيستعبد بالتامة من غير التامة، كما جاء في المأثور: "أعوذ بوجهك العظيم (111) الذي ليس شيء أعظم منه، وبكلماتك التامات التي لا يجاوزهن بر ولا فاجر، وبأسمائك الحسنى ما علمت منها وما لم أعلم من شر ما خلقت". فالأسماء الحسنى أصول الكلمات التامة كما أن الوجه العظيم، أعني الحقيقة الكبرى -فقد قال الشيخ رحمه الله: وجه كل شيء حقيقته- أصل الأسماء فهو ما بعد المطَّلَع. وإنما أُخِّر ذكر الأسماء هنا مع أن حضرة الأسماء أقدم من حضرة الأرواح كما أنها أقدم من حضرة المثال ثم

الخيال ثم الحس لأن الفاعل الحقيقي أجرى سنته أن يوجد الأشباح وأحوالها بواسطة الأرواح وأحكامها، لكن لتوسط الرقائق الأسمائية بين الوجه العظيم والحقائق الكيانية حسبما سطره القلم بتعليم الاسم العليم. والمتوسطات من حيث أنها متوسطات إنما تعقل بعد الأطراف، آخر ذكرها تنبيهاً على ذلك. ثم قوله صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ: "من شر ما خلق" مجملٌ فُصِّلَ كلياته فيما روي عن ابن عباس رضي الله عنهما أنه صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ كان يعوذ الحسن والحسين ويقول: "أعيذكما بكلمة الله التامة من كل شيطان وهامة ومن كل عين لامة"، ويقول: "كان إبراهيم عليه السلام يعوذ بهذا إسماعيل وإسحق عليهما السلام". فإن الإيذاء إما من الأرواح الخبيثة أو الأناسي الخبيثة أو من سائر الحيوانات الخبيثة، فالتعويد جمعها. وأوضح منه في التفصيل ما روي عن عمرو بن شعيب عن أبيه عن جده عن النبي صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ: "إذا فرغ أحدكم من النوم فليقل أعوذ بكلمات الله التامات من غضبه وعقابه ومن شر عباده ومن شر هزات الشياطين أن يحضروني فإنها لن يضره". وذلك لشموله الاستعاذة من أفعاله وأسمائه وملائكته وسائر عباده، وخصّ الشياطين بعد التعميم تنبيهاً على أهمية الاستعاذة منهم لأنهم أعلام في الإغواء والإيذاء والسريان إلى القلب والأعضاء.

### المباحث العقلية والكلامية:

وهي من وجوه.

الأول: لما روي عن النبي صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ قوله: "إن الشيطان ليهرب عن البيت الذي يقرأ فيه القرآن". فأى حاجة إلى الاستعاذة منه عند القراءة؟ جوابه: أولاً أنه تعبدّي فلا عدول عنه بهذا. وثانياً أن الوعد في حق من قرأ وعمل به. فقد قال صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ: "إذا لم ينهك القرآن فلست بقارئ". فلا يستغنى عن سؤاله كل أحد وهذا ككون طلب العلم فريضة على كل مسلم مع أن المؤيّد من عند الله بالقوة القدسية مستغن عن الطلب. وثالثاً أن

الاستعاذة قبل القراءة لئلا يصرفه الشيطان عن هذه العزيمة. ورابعاً أن الغرض ما قال جعفر الصادق رحمه الله أن التعوذ تطهر الفم عن الكذب والغيبة والبهتان تعظيماً لقراءة القرآن أو هو الاستيذان لمكاملة الرحمن بالقرآن.

**الثاني:** إذا حصل العوذ عند قراءة القرآن فلم (112) وقوع الخطاء والنسيان والابتلاء بالعصيان؟ جوابه: أولاً لكون حفظ الله مشروطاً بالتقوى والتذكر والإبصار كما يدل عليه قوله تعالى: ﴿إن الذين اتقوا إذا مسهم طائف من الشيطان تذكروا فإذا هم مبصرون﴾. وإلا فهو كالمستحفظ لماله مع الاجتهاد في الاجتماع بدهاة السُّراق من أقاصي الآفاق، كذا في التيسير. قلت: وثانياً أن الإجابة بالإعادة والإفادة للاستعاذة من بعض الوجوه كاف، ولعل فائدتها العصمة من بعض الخطاء كالموجب للكفر أو عن بعض العصيان كالذي لا يعقبه العفو والغفران. وثالثاً أن الامتثال بأمر الاستعاذة والثواب المنوط به فائدة لها، فلعل المرتكب يعنى بتزكية على أن المحققين على أن كل دعاء للمؤمنين مستجاب وإن لم يكن في الحال وبعين المسئول.

**الثالث:** الاستعاذة من الشيطان إظهار الخوف من غير الله وذا مغلّ بالعبودية. وجوابه: أولاً أن اتخاذ العدو عدواً تحقيقاً للمحبة، والفرار من غير الله إلى الله تميم للعبودية، والامتثال بأمر الله تقديم للطاعة، والخوف ممن لا يخاف الله إظهار للمسكنة، والتجاء إلى الله تأكيد للمباشطة. قال أهل المعرفة: كلمة الاستعاذة وسيلة المقربين واعتصام الخائفين وعتبي الجرمين ورجعي الهاربين ومباشطة المحبين وامتثال أمر رب العالمين. وثانياً أن التبعد عن المبعد لا يكون لخوفه بل يكون وفاقاً لمن بعده كالمبعد ممن بعده السلطان وفاقاً له لا إشفاقاً من ذلك. وثالثاً أن المراد بها التبري عن الحول والقوة، كأنه يقول: هلك الشيطان بالنظر إلى أصله وفعله، وأنا أتبرأ إلى الله من مثله. وقيل هو استعاذة بالله من حاله لا عن كيده وإضلاله، كذا في التيسير. قلت: الفرق بين الآخرين مع أن كلاً منهما يستدعي حذف المضاف أن معنى الأول التبرء عن حال إبليس في رؤية الحول والقوة، ومعنى الثاني التبرء عن ضلاله وطرده لا عن إضلاله وكيده.

**الرابع:** قالت المعتزلة: من قال أعوذ بالله فقد اعترف بفاعليته. ولو كان خلق الأفعال من الله امتنع ذلك. وأيضاً الاستعاذة مما خلقه الله -وهو الشيطان- استعاذة من الله. وأيضاً الاستعاذة دليل على عدم رضا العبد بالمعاصي. ولو كانت بتخليق الله وقضائه وجب الرضاء بها، إذ الرضاء بالقضاء واجب إجماعاً. وأيضاً الوسوسة إذا كانت فعلاً لله لا للشيطان كيف يستعاذ من شره؟ وأيضاً إذا لم يكن للشيطان فعل ولا قدرة على مخالفة قدرة الله كيف يجوز في الحكمة أن يذمه ويلعنه؟ وأيضاً إن رجمه بجرمه فقد بطل الجبر وإلا فهو محض الظلم. وقد قال تعالى: ﴿وما الله يريد ظلاماً للعباد﴾. ولا يدفع هذه الوجوه الستة القول بالواسطة كالكسب لأن قدرة العبد إن كانت مستقلة (113) بالأثر فهو اعتزال محض. وإلا فقام الدليل على الجبر، كذا في التفسير الكبير. قلت: وذلك لأن قدرة العبد إذا لم تستقل لم يترتب عليها الأثر. فأما إن يترتب على محض قدرة الله فهو الجبر، أو على المجموع فالعبد لا يستحق الجزاء، لأن إتلاف المال بمعاونة صاحبه العليم بأنه ماله لا يوجب الضمان اتفاقاً. ثم قال أهل السنة والجماعة في إبطال مذهبهم: قدرة العبد إن تعينت لأحد الطرفين لزم الجبر، وإلا فرجحان طرف. إن توقف على مرجح من العبد عاد التقسيم أو من الله فالفعل عند حصوله واجب وعند عدمه ممتنع، فلزم الجبر. وإن لم يتوقف بطل الاستدلال في الممكن على الواجب فكان اتفاقاً من غير اختيار من العبد فلزم الجبر. وأيضاً الله عالم بجميع المعلومات عندكم، وخلاف علمه محال فما أوردتم في القضاء والقدر يرد عليكم في العلم.

ثم قالوا: الاستعاذة تبطل القول بالقدر من وجوه. الأول: أن المطلوب بها إن كان منع الشيطان بالنهي والتحذير فقد حصل وطلبه محال. وإن كان منعه بالجبر والإلجاء فهو يناهني كون الشيطان مكلفاً. وأجابت المعتزلة أن المطلوب فعل الألفاظ التي تدعو العبد إلى فعل الحسن وترك القبيح، ومنها ما لا يحسن فعله إلا عند ذكر الاستعاذة. وأجيبوا بأن الألفاظ إن كان لها أثر في الترجيح وجب الفعل عندها، وإلا كان فعلها عبثاً. الثاني: أن الله تعالى إن أراد إصلاح

حال العبد فالشيطان إن توقع منه إفساده فلم خلقه وسلّطه عليه؟ وإن لم يتوقع فأى حاجة إلى الاستعاذة؟ وإن لم يرد إصلاح حاله فالاستعاذة كيف تفيد الاعتصام؟ الثالث: إن لم يجز الوقوع في المعاصي إلا بوسوسة الشيطان فللشيطان شيطان آخر و يتسلسل. وإن جاز فيجوز مثله في البشر فلا يتم الفائدة بالاستعاذة. وإن قلنا الشيطان سلّط على البشر بلا شيطان آخر مسلط على البشر فهو كيف عليه. الرابع: أن المستعاذ منه إن علم الله وقوعه وحب، وإن علم عدم وقوعه امتنع، فلا فائدة في الاستعاذة.

قلت: هذه اثنتا عشرة شبهة من الطرفين ذكرها في التفسير الكبير، ولم يجب عنها بل قال في الآخر: هذه المناظرة تدل على أنه لا حقيقة لـ"أعوذ بالله" إلا أن ينكشف للعبد أن الكل من الله وبالله كما قال صلى الله عليه وسلم: "أعوذ برضاك من سخطك ومعافاتك من عقوبتك، وأعوذ بك منك لا أحصي ثناءً عليك أنت كما أثنيت على نفسك". قلت: إن كان للعبد في هذا الانكشاف مدخل فقد بطل الجبر وكون الكل من الله. وإن لم يكن فلا فائدة في الأمر بالاستعاذة وأيضاً هذا المنكشف. (114) أما قول بالجبر أو الواسطة: فإن كان قولاً بالجبر كان من الواجب أن يدفع أسئلة المعتزلة الواردة عليه ولم يدفع. وإن كان قولاً بالواسطة كان عليه دفع أسئلة الطرفين وبيان أنه قول لا يلزم منه الجبر. وأنا أقول: وبالله العصمة والتوفيق، المختار هو القول بالكسب الذي به يتحقق الواسطة. وكسب العبد عبارة عن أمر نسبي يقوم به ويعده محلاً لأن يخلق الله فيه فعلاً يناسبه تلك النسبة. وليس هذا الكسب من الله، إذ لكونه عدمياً غير موجود لم يُنسب إلى خلقه وإيجاده، ولا تصاف العبد به صار له مدخل في محلية خلق الله وقابلية ذلك الخلق فيه. وشأن القابلية أن يكون شرط الخلق والتأثير لا جزء منه. فلأن تحصيل شرط القابلية يتوقف على العبد ينتفي الجبر. ولأن ليس للعبد جزء من الفاعلية ينتفي القدر. لذلك قال صلى الله عليه وسلم: "فمن وجد خيراً فليحمد الله، ومن لا فلا يلومنّ إلا نفسه". فذلك الأمر النسبي المعبر عنه بالكسب والاختيار والقدرة الكاسبة وتوجّه

العبد والقصد هو مدار التكليف ومناط الثواب والعقاب. وشبهوه بما إذا أمر ملك عُلم صدق وعده بأن ينادى في ملكه أن كل من حاذى منظرتة يوم كذا يعطيه ألف دينار، فمن حاذى أخذه ومن لا فلا. فلأخذ تحصيل هذه النسبة التي هي محاذة المنظرة وهي أمر لا وجود له. والإعطاء للملك ليس إلا لطفه يتوقف على ذلك التحصيل على ما علم من عادته. فلأخذ ههنا لا مجبور ولا قادر على تحصيل دينار. إنما قدرته الكاسبة على تجديد نسبة المحاذاة فقط. إذا تحقق هذا أمكن دفع أسئلة الطرفين.

أما أجوبة أسئلة المعتزلة، فعن الأول: أن من قال "أعوذ" معترف بتوجهه النسبي وهو ليس بفعل موجود. وعن الثاني: أن الاستعاذة من توجه الشيطان لإغوائه لا من نفس الشيطان ولا من الفعل المخلوق فيه. وعن الثالث: أن وجوب الرضاء بالقضاء مع عدم الرضاء بالمقضي القبيح كالكفر والفسق بناء على أن قضاء الله يتعلق بفعل العبد على تقدير اختياره إياه وهو توجهه النسبي إليه فمبني تعين قضاء الله لما كان من عند العبد وجب رضاه به لكونه حكمه حينئذ وإن لم يرض مقضيه. وعن الرابع: أن الوسوسة المستعاذ منهما هو توجه الشيطان لإغوائه. وعن الخامس: أن لعن الشيطان لتوجهه إلى العصيان. وعن السادس: أن رجمه بجرمة التوجه الذي منه فليس فيه الظلم، والخلق بعد توجهه الاختياري ليس بجبر لتخلل الاختيار فعلم أن القول بالكسب يدفع هذه الوجوه وإن لم يكن قدرة العبد مستقلة بالإيجاد بل يكون (115) كاسبة لا موجدة أصلاً.

وأما أجوبة أسئلة الجبرية فعن الأول: أن رجحان طرف بمرجح من العبد هو توجهه النسبي وليس فعلاً موجوداً حتى يحتاج إلى مرجح لوجوده فيتسلسل أو ينتهي إلى مرجح لوجوده من الله تعالى على أن هذا الأمر النسبي المعبر عنه بالاختيار. وإن فرضنا وجوده واحتاج إلى مرجح من الله لم يلزم منه الجبرية في الفعل الذي يتعلق به لتخلل هذا الاختيار. وهذا معنى قول فخر الإسلام رحمه الله. فقد حصل باختياره وإن كان ضرورياً. وعن الثاني: أن علم الله تابع

لمعلومه الواقع بحسب توجهات العبد وبحسب أسبابه لا مطلقاً فليس موجباً. ولئن سلمنا إيجاب علمه لكن على تقدير تحقق أسبابه وشروطه التي منها اختيار العبد لا يلزم الجبر لتخلل الاختيار. وعن الثالث: أن جبر الشيطان على المنع في أحيان الاستعاذة منه لا ينافي تكليفه في الجملة كالممنوعة عن الأفعال الاختيارية كرهاً. وعن الرابع: أن الله تعالى خلقه وسلّطه عليهم ليميّز الخبيث من الطيب، أعني الصارف توجهه إلى المعصية من الصارف إلى الطاعة. وعن الخامس: أن الشيطان لم يحتج إلى شيطان آخر لأن التوجه للخبيث لازمه بنشأته فلا يحتاج فيه إلى آخر بخلاف الإنسان المتردد نشأته بين الطيب والخبيث على أنحاء لا تحصى، فجمعية نشأته إن عصم من نزغة الشيطان تفضيه عناية الله تعالى إلى مرتبة قال صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ فيها: "لي مع الله وقت لا يسعني نبي مرسل ولا ملك مقرب" وليس في نشأة الشيطان ذلك. وعن السادس: أن المستعاذ منه يعلم وقوعه أو لا وقوعه لكن مترتباً على أسبابه وشرائطه التي منها اختيار العبد، لا مطلقاً. فلا يلزم الوجوب أو الامتناع المحذوران ولعل الاستعاذة أيضاً من أسبابه والوجوب بسبب الغير لا يمنع الطلب ولا التكليف به.

ثم أقول: والذي تقتضيه الحقيقة والتحقيق توسيط الطريق بين طريقي التفريق وذلك يتبين بذكر مقدمات ذكرها الشيخ رحمه الله في تفسير الفاتحة. الأولى: أن لكل موجود ذاتاً وحالاً ومرتبته وحكماً. فذاته حقيقته. وأحواله خواص الحقيقة ولوازمها وعوارضها. ومرتبته في الحق معقولية نسبة حقيقته إلى اللواحق، وتلك النسبة الألوهية واللواحق هي المألوهات؛ وفي الخلق معقولية نسبة حقيقته إلى السوابق واللواحق كالنبوة والولاية والإمامة وغيرها من المراتب الكلية أو الجزئية. وأحكامها الآثار الثابتة بتلك المرتبة. الثانية: أن حقيقة كل شيء كيفية تعينه في علم الله تعالى، (116) فحقائق الأشياء تعقلات تعيناتها كما أن الأشياء تعينات التعقلات. أما وجود كل مخلوق فعبارة عن تعين الوجود من حيث هو. فلا شك أنه صفة نسبية للوجود. والوجود الحق لله تعالى فوجود كل موجود من الخلق تعين ذلك. فموجودية كل

مخلوق نسبه إلى الحق بالتعين، تفاوتت لتفاوت القابليات المتفاوتة بتفاوت الهيآت الاجتماعية للأسماء الإلهية، وتفاوت مراتب الاجتماع. الثالثة: أن الحق سبحانه أجرى سنته على أن لا يكون الابداع المسمى في الإظهار بالنسبة إلى الأعيان إلا له ويكون تعين الوجود للظهور المسمى جنساً أو نوعاً أو شخصاً بحسب مرتبة القابل الكلية أو الجزئية، فكما تسمى نسبة الإظهار في الأفعال الاختيارية كغير الاختيارية خلقاً تسمى نسبة تعين الظهور فيها كسباً. فالأول لا واسطة فيه كما هو المذهب الحق لقوله تعالى: {خالق كل شيء}، أي كل ما له شيئاً الوجود لا كل ما له شيئاً الثبوت في علم الله تعالى إذ المحالات لا تخلق، بخلاف قوله: {الله بكل شيء عليم}، أي بكل ما له شيئاً الثبوت. والثاني فيه تتوسط المعدّات والأسباب العادية التي منها الكاسب وتوجهه لقوله تعالى: {إنّ والقلم وما يسطرون}، وقوله تعالى: {والذاريات ذرواً} إلى قوله {فالمقسمات أمراً}، وقوله: {والنازعات غرقاً} إلى قوله {فالمدبرات أمراً}، وقوله: {ويفعلون ما يؤمرون} إلى غير ذلك. فمن قال بالجبر ألحق التعيين بالإظهار فنسب التعيين النسبي إلى وجود الحق الحقيقي لا إلى المرتبة النسبية، ولم يعتبر أحكام مراتب الوسائط فيما بينها وهو تفريط. ومن قال بالقدرة ألحق الإظهار وهو إعطاء الوجود للأفعال الاختيارية إلى المرتبة القابلة فلزمه الثبوتية والقدرة المجوسية ولم يعتبر أن العاجز من إيجاد ذرة ونملة كيف يقدر على إيجاد فعل تعجز عنه المخلوقات بأسرها وهو إفراط. فمنشأ غلط الفريقين عدم التمييز بين الحقيقتين.

فإن قلت: إذا كانت التعيينات مستندة إلى المعدّات المستندة إلى الحق فقد استند الكل إليه وجاء الجبر، قلت: الذي تستند إليه التعيينات مراتب المعدّات. والذي يستند إلى الحق وجود المعدّات وظهورها. فلم يتحد جهة الإسناد. نعم، قول المشايخ "الاستعدادات الجزئية المجعولة آثار الاستعدادات الكلية الغير المجعولة" دليل أن المراتب الجزئية وتأثيراتها

أيضاً آثار المراتب الكلية وهي تفصيلات مرتبة الحقيقة الجامعة الأهمية الكبرى عندهم بخلاف المعتزلة. لكن ذلك لا يقتضي أن لا يعتبر التفاعل بين الآثار الجزئية ومراتبها وأحكامها المناسبة لها من التكليف وغيره.

ثم نقول: إذا استند وجود (117) معدّات الشيء أيضاً إلى الحق كان وجود المعدّ له مستنداً إلى الحق من جهتين: جهة لا واسطة فيها وهي جهة الفيض الآلي والتجلي الأحدثي ويسمى الوجه الخاصّ. وقد غفل عنه الفلاسفة واختصّ بفهمه المحققون. وهي جهة لا تردد فيها ولا تغير، بل كلها جزم وأمرها حتم. وهي جهة الوجوب وإليها يستند القضاء والقدر والإرادة الأزلية والعلم اللدني والقدرة الحقيقية. والتكليف بالنسبة إليها غير معقول ولا شيء فيما بين المخلوقات من حيثها بعلّة أو معلول. الثانية جهة سلسلة الوسائط وهي لحكايتها آثار المراتب المتوسط وخواصّها جهة الإمكان والتردد والتأخر والعلية والمعلولية فيجري فيها التكليف ويستند آثار مراتب المكلف ذاتاً وحالاً وقولاً وفعلاً إليه ويظهر أثر القدرة الكاسبة بناء عليه. فمن قال كل الأفعال له فلم يكلف المكلف، ولم يجازي بسبب من به لا يوصف، فيعد قوله تعالى: { لا يُسأل عما يفعل } مخلصاً له مع أن المراد به سؤال العتاب لي مطابق قوله تعالى: { وهم يُسألون } لم يعتبر الجهة الثانية فناقض نفسه في ادعاء الحمود على الظاهر معنى ولم يحمد عليه صورة حين شرع تارة أخرى في بيان الحكم والمصالح وقياس الأمر على الأمر. ومن أثبت القدرة المستقلة للعباد فأجاز للحق سبحانه تخلف المراد بسوء اختيار العباد لم يعتبر الجهة الأولى ولم يتحقق المسكين قوله تعالى: { فسبحان الذي بيده ملكوت كل شيء وإليه ترجعون }.

ثم نقول: فقدم صفاته سبحانه وأحدية تعلقاتها الأزلية كالعلم الأزلي بالكلي على وجه كلي وبالجزئي على وجه جزئي بحسب وقته المعين وسائر أسباب جزئية من الجهة الأولى، إذ نسبة الكل إليه من حيث هو لا من حيث هي سوائية. والتعددات الذاتية والحالية والخيالية والمرتببة والحكمية من الجهة الثانية. فلسان الأولى { قدم صدق عند ربهم }،

و {كلمة سبقت من ربك}، و {إنه بكل شيء عليم}، و "لم يزل عالماً به..."، و "وحف القلم..."، و {ليس كمثله شيء}؛ ولسان الثانية {ليعلم من يتبع الرسول ممن ينقلب على عقبيه}، و {إنا أرسلنا نوحاً}، و "مرضت فلم تعدني..."، و "إن الله ليفرح بتوبة عبده..."؛ ولسان الجمع بين الجهتين {وما رميت إذ رميت ولكن الله رمى}. فليتحقق أن تحقيق هذه المقدمات فاتٌ في عضد الشبهات وعاصم عن وجوه الانحرافات عن الطريق المستقيم وخرافات مكائد الشيطان الرجيم.

**الخامس** في حقيقة الشيطان ووجوده ووسوسته: أما حقيقته فعند من لم يقل بالمجردات هي أجسام هوائية -وقيل نارية- قادرة على التشكل بأشكال مختلفة، لها عقول وأفهام تقدر على الأعمال الشاقة السيئة في الأنام. وعند من قال بها هي مجردات أرضية (118) سفلية، وذلك لأن المجردات أعني الموجودات الغير المتحيزة ولا الحالة في المتحيزة أما عالية مقدسة عن تدبير الأجسام وهم الملائكة المقربون -ويسمئها المشائيون عقولاً والإشراقيون أنواراً عالية قاهرة- أو متعلقة بتدبيرها -ويسمئها المشائيون نفوساً سماوية والإشراقيون أنواراً مدبرة- وأشرفها حملة العرش وهم الآن أربعة ويوم القيمة ثمانية، عددناها في شرح مفتاح الغيب. ثم الحافون حوله، ثم ملائكة الكرسي، ثم ملائكة السموات طبقة طبقة، ثم ملائكة كرة الأثير والهواء الذي في طبع النسيم، ثم ملائكة كرة الزمهرير، ثم ملائكة البحار، ثم الجبال. ثم الأرواح السفلية المتصرفة في الأجسام النباتية والحيوانية. وهذه قد يكون مشرقة إلهية خيرة وهي المسماة بصالحي الجن، وقد يكون كدرة شريرة وهي الشياطين.

ثم من القائلين بأنها مجردة من يقول هي النفوس البشرية الشريرة المفارقة للأبدان كما أن الخيرة منها ملائكة، والمختلط الحال جن. فإذا حدث بدن شديد المشابهة لبدنها الذي فارقت حدث لها ضرب تعلق به فيعاون نفسه في الأعمال. فإن كان النفسان من الطاهرة كان إلهاماً وإن كانتا من الحيثة كان وسوسة.

ومنهم من يقول إنها مخالفة لجنس النفوس البشرية، لكن الطاهرة ملائكة أرضية مسماة بصالحى الجن والشريرة شياطين. ولأن الجنسية علة الضم ينضم كل نوع إلى شبيهه من البشرية ويعينه.

أما الأرواح الفلكية التي يشتونها فزعموا أن لكل منها بدنأ هو فلكه وشيئاً يتعلق به أولاً كقلب البشر هو كوكبه. ثم يتعدى أثره إلى كلية فلكه ثم إلى كلية العالم كأجزاء بدن البشر وكما يتولد في قلب البشر ودماغه وكبدته أرواح لطيفة يتأدى في الشرايين والأعصاب والأوردة إلى أجزاء البدن ويصل قوة الحياة والحس والحركة وسائر القوى الطبيعية إلى كل جزء من الأعضاء. كذلك ينبعث من جرم الكوكب خطوط شعاعية تتصل بجوانب العالم ويتأدى إليها قوته بواسطة تلك الخطوط وكما يحدث منها في البدن قوى دَرَآكة وفعآلة كذا يحدث في العالم بواسطة تلك الخطوط الكوكبية نفوس مخصوصة لزيد وعمرو وغيرهما هي كالأولاد للنفوس الفلكية. فجماعة من نفس زحل متجانسة ومتحابة مخالفة للجماعة المتولدة من نفس المشتري وعلى هذا فالفلكيات كالأبآء المشفقة للطبيعات، والطبيعة كالأم. فإذا أدت بالنفس البشرية إمداد التوفيق الإلهي إلى أن تترقى في تدبير الطبيعة في مراتب الكلية حتى تبلغ إلى مرتبة تلك النفس الفلكية الفائضة. صح لها أن يقول:

ولدت أمي أبأها  
وَأنا طفل (119) صغير  
إن ذا من أعجبات  
في حجور المرضعات

فإن قلت: فيه شبه. الأول: أن القول بأن الشياطين أجسام لطيفة باطل إذ ينبغي أن يمزقها الرياح فلا تقدر على الأعمال الشاقة. الثاني: أن الشياطين لا تدرك بالحس ولا يمكن إثباتها بقول الأنبيآء لأن ثبوتها تبطل النبوة لجواز أن يقال حصلت المعجزات بإعانة الجن والشياطين كحنين الجذع لنفوذ شيطان فيه وتكلم الناقة لدخوله فيها مثلاً. الثالث: أن المجردات لا تدرك الجزئيات إلا بالآلات الجزئية الجسمانية وليس لهم ذلك.

قلنا في الجواب عن الأول: أنها لغاية لطافتها لا تقبل التفرق والتمزق. لذلك قال المحققون أن العرش والكرسي والجنة التي بينهما على ما يفهم من قوله صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ: "سقف الجنة عرش الرحمن" دائمت لا تقبل الخرق والالتيام لغاية لطافتها بخلاف السموات العنصرية وعالم الطبيعة. أو نقول تقدر على تشكيل أنفسها بأشكال لا يميزها الرياح.

وعن الثاني: بأن القرآن والخبر يدلان على وجود الجن والشياطين، وأن الجن سمعوا القرآن وأندروا قومهم، وأن الشياطين يعملون لسليمان عليه السلام ما يشاء من محارِب وتماثيل. وأما الخبر ففيه كثرة، منها ما في موطأ مالك رحمه الله أنه صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ قال: "أن بالمدينة جنّاً أسلموا، فمن بدا لكم منه فأذنوه ثلاثة أيام، فإن عاد فاقتلوه فإنه شيطان". ومنها ما روي عن خالد بن الوليد رضي الله عنه أنه قال: "يا رسول الله! أروع في منامي". قال: "قل أعوذ بكلمات الله التامات من غضبه وعقابه وشر عباده ومن همزات الشياطين أن يحضروني". وقد اشتهر ليلة الجن ودعوته إياهم إلى الإسلام. وروى القاضي أبو بكر رحمه الله أن عيسى بن مريم دعا ربه أن يريه موضع الشيطان من بني آدم، فأراه ذلك. وإذا رأسه مثل رأس الحية، واضع رأسه على قلبه. فإذا ذكر الله خنس، وإذا لم يذكره وضع رأسه على حبة قلبه. وقال صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ: "إن الشيطان ليجري من ابن آدم مجرى الدم". وأما كون معجزات النبي صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ بإعانة الشيطان فخيال باطل، لأن شأن النبوة السعي في تنفيذ الحق والخير وتبديد الباطل والشر. ونشأة الشيطنة تنافيه فكيف تعينه؟ لا يقال: الشيطان مخلوق من النار، فلو نفذ في قلب الإنسان كان كنفوذ النار، فينبغي أن يُحس به. وأيضاً فالشيطان يحب الكفر والمعاصي، ثم من يتضرع إليه لتحصيل وجوه الفسق لا يجد له أثراً. وأيضاً عداوتهم للعلماء أظهر، فلو كان لهم قدرة لأذوهم أكثر. لأننا نقول: القلب هو المنظر الإلهي فيجعله برداً

وسلاماً كمنار إبراهيم عليه السلام. ولعل الملائكة يمنعونهم من أكثر القبائح، وفي (120) بعض الأحيان ومن إيذاء العلماء.

وعن الثالث أن المجردات المسماة بالجن والشياطين يجوز أن يكون لهم آلات جسمانية من كرة الأثير والزمهرير بما تدرك الجزئيات وتتصرف في الأبدان.

واعلم أن المتكلمين اختلفوا أن الشياطين أشرار الجن أو جنس آخر غيرهم. ولا شك أن الملائكة ليسوا من جنسهم وذلك لأن الملائكة لا يأكلون ولا يشربون ولا ينكحون، يسبحون الليل والنهار لا يفترقون. أما الجن فالعظم -قيل والروث- زادهم، ويتوالدون لقوله تعالى: {أفتتخذونه وذريته أولياء من دوني}. هذا هو الكلام في حقيقة الشياطين ووجودهم.

وأما تحقيق الوسوسة فبمقدمتين. الأولى: أن للإنسان مطلوباً ومهروباً كل منهما لذاته أو لغيره. وينتهيان إلى ما بالذات دفعاً للدور أو التسلسل. ودل الاستقراء على أن المطلوب بالذات هو اللذة أو السرور، وبالتبع وسيلتهما. والمهروب بالذات الألم والحزن، وبالتبع وسيلتهما. واللذيد لكل قوة شيء آخر: فللباصرة الجمال، وللسامعة النغمة الرخيمة وهكذا للشهوة والغضب والقوة العقلية. فالباصرة إذا أدركت وعلم الإنسان كون المدرك لذيداً مال إلى تحصيله، أو مؤلماً مال إلى البعد عنه، أو خالياً عن اللذة والإيلام لم يرغب فيه ولا عنه. وكل ذلك مشروط بعدم ما يعارضه. الثانية: الأفعال الحيوانية مترتبة عقلاً. فإن مصدرها القرب قوى العضلات والأوتار إلا أنها صالحة للفعل والترك فلا يكون مصدرها لأحدهما معيناً إلا بضميمة الإدراكات الحادثة المورثة للميل أو النفرة. وتلك الإدراكات إن حصلت بفعل الإنسان دار أو تسلسل فانتهت إلى أسباب خارجة هي الاتصالات الفلكية على مذهب أو السبب الحقيقي بلا واسطة وهو الحق الخالق للاعتقادات والعلوم في القلب.

إذا عُرفت المقدمتان فيقول نفاة الوسوسة والشيطان أن الميل والنفرة من لوازم الشعور وهو إما بخلق الله أو بواسطة ووسائط. ترتب كل منها على ما قبلها لازم، إذ الفعل يترتب على حركة القوة إلى الطلب وهي على الميل وهو على العلم بالملازمة وهو على الإحساس سواء كان ثم شيطان ووسوسة أم لا. وإن لم يحصل شيء من المراتب لم يحصل الفعل وإن كان ثم ألف شيطان فلا شيطان بل الوسوسة حصول هذه المراتب في الطرف الضار. والجواب أن المذكر لما يوجب الميل الموجب للفعل بعد غفلة الإنسان يجوز أن يكون هو الشيطان كما قال الله تعالى حكاية عنه: { ما كان لي عليكم من سلطان إلا أن دعوتكم فاستجبتم لي }. فليس للشيطان إلا التذكير.

قال في التفسير الكبير: بقي أن يقال: الإنسان إن فعل المعصية بتذكير الشيطان فالشيطان (121) إن فعل بتذكير شيطان آخر يتسلسل. وإن كان لا بتذكير آخر فالاعتقاد الموجب للميل حادث لا بد له من سبب، وما ذاك إلا الله سبحانه. وعند هذا يظهر أن الكل من الله. وحاصله قول سيد المرسلين: "أعوذ بك منك". قلت: وهذا ميل منه إلى أشعريته المجبرة. والجواب أن كل معصية بتذكير الشيطان أو إنشائه لقوله تعالى: { هذا من عمل الشيطان }، وقوله تعالى: { وما أنسانيه إلا الشيطان } ونحوهما. لكن الشيطان لا يحتاج في فعل معصية إلى شيطان آخر لأن نشأته كافية في ذلك، ولأن كل ما ثبت للغير بواسطة كان للواسطة بالذات. نعم، قوله "أعوذ بك منك" كقول موسى عليه السلام: { إن هي إلا فتنتك تضل بها من تشاء وتهدي من تشاء }. وذا كلام ناظر إلى الجهة الأحادية الوجودية الوجودية والقدرة الإلاهية الأزلية كما قال تعالى: { وما هم بضارين به من أحد إلا بإذن الله }. إذ الحقائق الأسمائية والكونية بأسرها في تلك الجهة تُنشئ الحق الأصلية التي جميع ما بعدها من الهداية والشيطنة متفرّع عنها، وفيها قُبل من قُبل لا لعله وُرد من رُد لا لعله. وتلك الجهة تنافي التكليف إذ لا غير فيها فلا تعدد ولا تردد. والشيطان بذلك الاعتبار مظهر اسمه المُضللّ والقهار والمنتقم وغير ذلك. وإليه يستند سائر أحكام القضاء والقدر فقواعد التكليف من

الترغيب و الترهيب كالاستدعاء. والاستعاذة مبنية على الجهة الإمكانية المنظور فيها إلى مراتب الوسائط المؤثرة في تعين الموجودات. مثلاً، المقتول عمداً عدواناً مقتول الحق بأجله بالجهة الأولى، وظلم بالجهة الثانية، يستوجب القصاص، لأنه تصرف بعض مخلوقاته في بعض لا بموجب العدل الصارف لهما إلى جهة أحديتهما. فالتخليط بين الجهتين أي نسبة الحكم الذي لأحدهما إلى الآخر مظنة التورط في إحدى الحيرتين، أعني حيرة الجبرية وحيرة القدرية.

#### تنبيه

توهم البعض أن للجنّ والشياطين قدرة على الإحياء والإماتة وخلق الأجسام وعلى العلم بالغيب وكل منها باطل. إذ الأول ينزع إلى التثنية، والبرهان قائم على الوحدة وعلى أن لا إيجاد إلا لله، والثاني يردده قوله تعالى: ﴿فلما خر تبينت الجن أن لو كانوا يعلمون الغيب ما لبثوا في العذاب المهين﴾.

#### الأحكام الشرعية

**الأول:** أن الاستعاذة غير واجبة عند الجمهور، وواجبة لكل قراءة عند عطاء، ومرّة في العمر عند ابن سيرين، له الأمر في "فاستعد" وأنه لا يوجب التكرار. وأيضاً دفع مكروه الشيطان واجب وهي الطريق إليه شرعاً، وما لا يتم الواجب إلا به فهو واجب. وللعطاء المواظبة (122) وأن ترتب الأمر على المشتق دليل على ما أحذه فيتكرر بتكرره. قلنا: شرعية الاستعاذة للإعراض عما سوى الله. والمقصود منه التوجه إلى جناب الله وهذا بيسم الله. وهو لا يجب في كل قراءة حتى منعوا عنه قارئ سورة براءة، فالاستعاذة التي هي وسيلة أولى. قال في المجتبى: انعقد الإجماع على عدم وجوبها، أي قبل ظهور المخالف، فدل ذلك أن الأمر في "فاستعد" للندب. يؤيده قوله تعالى: ﴿إنه ليس له سلطان على الذين آمنوا﴾ الآية، حيث نفى سلطانه على المؤمنين فلا يجب دفعه عليهم، وترتب أمر الندب على المشتق دليل تكرر الندب لا تكرر الوجوب. أما المواظبة فليست دليل الوجوب مطلقاً كما في المضمضة والاستنشاق في الوضوء.

ولئن سلم فليس أعلى من الأمر في ذلك. وعن مالك رحمه الله أنه لا يتعوذ في المكتوبة بل في التراويح. قلنا: لا أقل من الندب مع أن الفرض أولى بالاحتياط.

**الثاني:** قال الشافعي رحمه الله في الإملاء: يجهر بها في الصلاة. وإن أسر لم يضره. فالجهر عنده أولى خلافاً لنا. له أن ابن عمر رضي الله عنه روى أنه صَلَّى الله عليه وسلّم أسر التعوذ، وعن أبي هريرة أنه جهر. قلنا: الأصل في الأذكار الإخفاء لقوله تعالى: {ادعوا ربكم تضرعاً وخفيةً}. فصرف الوجوب والندب المستفاد من الأمر إلى قيده عند عدم إرادتهما في نفسه قاعدة لغوية وعرفية ولأن الإخفاء عدم الكيفية الجهرية. والأصل العدم، فلا يعدل عنه بلا موجب. ولأنها بين الاستفتاح والقراءة وبالاستفتاح أشبه من حيث عدم الوجوب.

**الثالث:** لا يتعوذ إلا في الركعة الأولى لما مر من الأصلين. فإن قلت: الترتيب على المشتق دليل تكرره ولم يجب عنه في التفسير الكبير، قلت: هو متروك الظاهر فإن المراد عند غير الظاهر به إذا أردت القراءة ولا يتكرر بتكرر الإرادة إجماعاً. لا يقال فقوله: {إذا قمتم إلى الصلوة فاغتسلوا} الآية مثله ويتكرر وجوب الوضوء عند تكررها، لأننا نقول: لا نسلم التكرر، فإن الوضوء لا يجب إلا إذا انضم إليه الحدث. ولذا قيل سبب وجوبه الحدث. وقلنا: هو شرطه لأن الشيء لا يكون سبباً لظهوره.

**الرابع:** التعوذ تبع القراءة عند أبي حنيفة ومحمد رحمهما الله لأنه شُرِعَ مقدمة لها بالنص، وعند أبي يوسف رحمه الله للصلوة لأنه لا يتكرر بتكرر القراءة بل بتكرر الصلاة ومقتضى اللفظ التكرر. قلنا: متروك الظاهر كما مر وأن خارج الصلاة كالصلاة في استدعاء القراءة التعوذ عندهم. والثمره أن لا يأتي به المقتدي أصلاً ولا المسبوق إلا عند قضاء ما سبق ولا مصلي العيد إلا بعد تكبيراته عندهما وعنده بالعكس. (123)

**الحقائق:**

١- روي عنه صلى الله عليه وسلم أنه قال: "الصلاة معراج المؤمن". فلها ظهر وهو الإعراض عما سوى الله قالياً بالإغضاء والتوجه إلى الله بزم الأعضاء هذا بالأركان. ثم إذا استعاذ من الموسوس وإغوائه وذكر الله بأجمع أسمائه تأيد باللسان. ثم لأنهما أمارتا حال القلب من وجهه ووسيلته من آخر أفضى إلى السر المقصود بالذات وهو الحضور مع الله بالجنان. وحين صار ذلك ملكةً وتقرر بتكرار الركعات حصل مطلع المعراج عند التعوذ بالشهود وتم مقتضى التشهد والتكليم بكمال الرضاء والتسليم. فالاستعادة التي هي مقدمة هذه الوظائف ينبغي أن يعتبر التوسل بها إلى هذه اللطائف.

٢- أن الاستعادة إما باللسان وهو ظهر، أو بالجنان بالفناء عما سواه وهو بطن، أو بالفناء عن نفسه وهو مطّلع، أو وعن فئائه وهو ما بعد المطّلع. وجه آخر في المراتب الاستعادة عن الشيطان ظهر، وعن النفس بطن، وعن الروح الملتفت إليها مطّلع، وعن السر الملتفت إليهما ما بعد المطّلع. وإلى هذين الوجهين ينظر أقسام الشكر والفكر والذكر. فالشكر باللسان والجنان والروح والسر صرفٌ كل منها إلى ما أعطي له واستعادة كل عمّا يشغله عن ذلك. ويتقدمه الفكر في كلٍّ أنه لما خلق فيتبعه الشكر السابق ويقتضي الاستعادة في كل مرتبة عن مغويها. والذكر يتبدئ من اللسان وينتهي إلى مرتبة سَمّاها الشيخ الكبير "نسيان الذكر والذاكر بالمذكور"، واستعادتها بحسبها.

٣- ما مر أن الاستعادة في خواطره وأفعاله، كان يقول: "أستعِذ بالله من جميع ما كره الله قولاً وفعلاً وخاطراً" ظهر. وفي الأفعال من حيث هي إلهية نحو أن يقول: "اللهم إني أعوذ بك من جهد البلاء ودرك الشقاء وسوء القضاء وشماتة الأعداء" بطن. وفي الصفات الإلهية نحو: "أعوذ بك من علم لا ينفع ومن قلب لا يخشع ومن نفس لا تشبع" مطّلع. وفي الذّات نحو: "لا ملجأ ولا منجأ منه إلا إليه" من بعض الوجوه ما بعد المطّلع. وإليه ينظر الحديث

الصحيح "أعوذ برضاك من سخطك ومعاذاتك من عقوبتك وأعوذ بك منك لا أحصي ثناء عليك أنت كما أثنيت على نفسك".

## المعارف:

**الأول:** ذكر في التفسير الكبير أن "أعوذ بالله" عروج من الخلق إلى الخالق ومن الحاجة التامة لنفسه إلى الغنى التام بالحق في تحصيل كل الخيرات ودفع كل الآفات. ففيه سر {ففرّوا إلى الله}. وإذا وصل إلى غيبة الحق وغرق في مشاهدة جلاله شاهد سر {قل الله ثم ذرهم}.

**الثاني:** أن فيه دلالة أن لا وسيلة إلى القرب من (124) حضرة الرب إلا بالعجز كما قال: "من عرف نفسه"، أي بالعجز أو القصور أو الجهل أو اختلال الحال "فقد عرف ربه"، أي بالقدرة على كل مقدور والكمال والعلم والعدل والجلال، هذا ظهره. فبطنه: من عرف نفسه بشيء من الكمالات التي أعطاها الحق عرف ربه بأنها فيه أكمل وبلا نقصان. مثلاً وحدته الذاتية دليل أحديّة ربه الحقيقية، ووحدته الجمعية دليل واحديّة ربه الصفاتية كما قال:

ففي كل شيء له آية                      تدل على أنه واحد

وهكذا سائر صفاته. لذلك قال الله تعالى: {وإن من شيء إلا يسبح بحمده} وهذا بطنه. ولو أنه محي عن نفسه إرادته فاستعمل صفاته حسب إرادة الله تعالى بحيث لا يقدر على التفاته إلى إرادته إلا بكلفة عكس العامة. وفيه قال صلى الله عليه وسلم حكاية عن ربه: "في يسمع ويبي يبصر ويبي ييطش..." فذاك مطّلع. ولو أنه استغرق في الحضور مع الله إلى أن تقرر غفلته عن نفسه وعن غفلته عنها فهي المعرفة التامة التي مرتبتها ما بعد المطّلع.

**الثالث:** أن الاستعادة نوع من الطاعة المفتقرة إلى الفرار من الشيطان لأنها فعل المأمور به الذي فيه رضاء الرحمن فيستدعي استعادة أخرى ويتسلسل إلى منتهى لا يدرك ولا يدري. ففي نفس الاستعادة إشارة إلى العجز عن حق الامتثال وذا منتهى كل الأعمال. فالعجز عن درك الإدراك إدراك. والخوض في طلب الإدراك إشراك.

**الرابع:** المكتوب في الأوراق من أسماء الخلاق إذا كان بحيث لا يمسه إلا المطهرون. فالمكتوب في أفدة العشاق أولى بذلك الميثاق ففي أن تطهر عن نجاسة الهوى لا بد أن تطهر بمقدمة الهدى وهي الاستعادة.

**الخامس:** روي أنه صلى الله عليه وسلم قال: "رجعنا من الجهاد الأصغر إلى الجهاد الأكبر"، وهو الجهاد مع النفس والشيطان الذي يصاحبها في كل حين وأوان. وإنما كان أكبر من جهاد الكافرين لأنه إن وجد الشيطان فرصة ففي الدين واليقين. والعدو الظاهر إن غلبنا كنا مأجورين، والباطن إن غلبنا كنا مغبونين. ومن قتله العدو الظاهر صار شهيداً، ومن قتله العدو الباطن صار طريداً. فأمر الباطن بتكميل مراتب الاستعادة أتم وأولى.

**السادس:** روي أنه صلى الله عليه وسلم قال حكايةً عن الحق تعالى: "لا يسعني أرضي وسمائي ويسعني قلب عبدي النقيّ النقيّ". فالمرأة الجسمية يحجبها أدنى حجاب. والمرأة القلبية لا يحجبها السموات والأرض والكرسي والعرش وغيرها إذا ساعدته عناية الوهاب. فللاشارة إلى طلب تلك العناية في تطهير المنظر الإلهي عن الغباوة والغواية تبهك على الاستعانة به بتكرير الاستعادة عند القراءة.

**السابع:** معنى "فاستعد" "قل أعوذ" كما أن معنى "سلم عليه" "قل سلام عليه" فهو تعليم لعباده (125) عموماً للاستعانة في المهمات على كل الحالات. وذلك لما انكشف لأرباب البصائر أن هذا البدن بالنسبة إلى حال الروح نسبة الجحيم، وأن تسعة عشر زبانية جالسون على بابه وهي الحواس الخمس الظاهرة والخمس الباطنة والشهوة

والغضب والقوى الطبيعية السبع، فنبّه أن مع كثرة هذه الفوائق والعلائق لقلوب الخلائق لا طريق إلى الامتثال بطاعته إلا بإغاثة الله وإعانتة فيجب الاستعاذة في كل الأوقات احتراساً عن تلك المكروهات.

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