Cognitive Diversity or Cognitive Polarization? On Epistemic Democracy in a Post-Truth World

Pessimism over a democracy's ability to produce good outcomes is as longstanding as democracy itself. On one hand, democratic theorists consider democracy to be the only legitimate form of government on the basis that it alone promotes or safeguards intrinsic values like freedom, equality, and justice. On the other, the skepticism toward the ordinary citizen's cognitive capacities remains a perennial concern. These questions have only been made more pertinent by the post-truth phenomenon which reveals a fundamental problem of epistemic disagreement and of differing epistemic frameworks. I argue that the democratic theorists who have sought to defend democracy on epistemic grounds have thus far neglected such deep and intractable disagreements. Without addressing this oversight, the epistemic democrat will find that collective decision-making processes quickly become paralyzed and will not be able to yield the epistemic benefits it promises. Hence, the work for theorists is to recognize and take into account the ramifications of epistemic disagreements so as to make a stronger case for epistemic democracy.