

The University of Chicago

# **The Impact of Cultural Differences on Interstate Crisis Mediation Attempts**

by Payton Riley

June 2024

A paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts degree in the  
Master of Arts Program in the Committee on International Relations

Faculty Advisor: Paul Poast

Preceptor: Linnea Turco

## Abstract

How do cultural differences between states impact the effectiveness of international crisis mediation attempts? This question has important practical implications for how international crises are handled, including how crisis mediation should be approached. I argue that cultural differences between states can negatively impact crisis mediation attempts, specifically focusing on how goal formation influences this process and can lead to misperceptions. I hypothesize that increased cultural differences between states decrease the likelihood of a successful crisis mediation attempt. I deploy a quantitative analysis which utilizes a measure of culture that differs from those used in the existing literature, measuring culture through the level of importance states assign to central aspects of society. The results of my analysis provide support for my hypothesis.

## Introduction

Mediation of international conflicts rose to prominence in the 1990s and has since become a heavily relied upon form of conflict resolution (Bercovitch and Foulkes 2012). This rise occurred amidst some major changes in the international system, including a rise of intercultural conflicts and civil wars, accompanied by a simultaneous shift in international relations scholarship towards these issues. Largely due to this, mediation scholars and practitioners have long considered the impact of culture on the mediation process (Busch 2010); however, much of this work is framed in this new turn in international relations literature (Bercovitch and Foulkes 2012). Yet despite a shift in focus towards civil war due to its rise, recent international events, such as Russia's shocking invasion of Ukraine, have shown that interstate war is not finished. This warrants exploration of the impact of culture on the mediation

process from a different perspective which analyzes this process outside of the lens of issues often associated with intrastate conflict, such as ethnic divisions.

Additionally, existing work on the intersection between culture and conflict resolution has taken the impact of culture as implicit (Busch 2010; Lücke and Rigaut 2002), rather than explicitly examining it, and focused more on the role of the mediator in reducing their own cultural biases (Bercovitch and Houston 2000; Cohen 1996; Lücke and Rigaut 2002; Salmon et al. 2013) than on the mediation parties themselves. Despite the high degree of focus on the mediator in existing literature, the impact of cultural differences between mediation parties is still important to understand outside of consideration of the mediator. Although mediators often seek to address cultural differences, their attempts at doing so may not be completely effective. Considering this, it is important to understand if cultural differences between states are still having a measurable impact on mediation attempts, in light of the fact that mediators are already addressing this issue. Literature with this specific focus is sparse, however this paper addresses these shortcomings in the literature.

Mediation can be a powerful tool in conflict resolution. Distinct from both negotiation and intervention, mediation is a “noncoercive and voluntary form of conflict management” assisted by a third party (Bercovitch and Langley 1993, 670). Similarly, Brecher et al. (2023) defines several criteria that must be met for mediation to be considered as having taken place in a crisis, which can be summarized as the following: intervention by a third-party which is voluntarily accepted by all parties (including the mediator) and is conducted in a non-violent manner, the results of which are non-binding.<sup>1</sup> The value of mediation is clear, as it presents opportunities for crisis resolution or management. One commonly lauded example of mediation

---

<sup>1</sup> This definition is taken from the codebook for the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997; Brecher et al. 2023) which will be utilized in this paper’s analysis.

success is US mediation efforts between Egypt and Israel which culminated in the Camp David Accords (Gartner 2014). However, mediation failures are also common. A popular example of mediation failure is the recurring unsuccessful attempts by the UN to mediate the ongoing struggle for Kashmir between India and Pakistan (Gartner 2014; Naveed 2021). Mediation failure is undesirable because it represents prolonged conflict and sunk costs. Further study of mediation and the factors which impact it is imperative because it may lead to more effective mediation attempts and help avoid future mediation failures. This research is urgent, as there are several ongoing conflicts currently experiencing mediation in hopes that these efforts could bring forth reduction in tensions or cessation of the conflict, including the situations in Gaza and Ukraine (O'Grady 2023; Shurafa and Press 2024).

This paper seeks to enhance the depth and breadth of research on this topic by providing a more detailed argument regarding the process through which culture impacts crisis mediation attempts, as well as performing a quantitative analysis which deploys a measure of cultural difference not used in the existing literature. I argue that culture influences the formation of goals which are important to the mediation process, leading to increased opportunities for misperceptions and yielding less effective mediation attempts. Furthermore, I measure cultural differences through the level of importance countries place on central aspects of society (such as family, the economy, etc.). This measure is distinguished from existing analyses on this topic (Bercovitch and Elgström 2001; Inman et al. 2014; Leng and Regan 2003) that rely on political and demographic proxy variables to measure cultural differences, allowing for an enriching comparison of results to the existing literature and addressing some of the shortcomings which the existing measures hold.

This paper proceeds as follows. First, I review the existing literature on the impact of culture on the mediation process, placing my research in relation to it. Next, I present my argument alongside illustrative examples to demonstrate how my argument may take form. I also explain how my measure of culture adds to the understanding of this issue and addresses shortcomings of the measures deployed in the existing literature. Then, I further describe the methods used in the quantitative analysis I perform, including explanation of how variables are operationalized, as well as sources for data and data management practices. Following this, I report and discuss the results of the analysis. Lastly, I conclude by presenting further implications of the findings, including how the results interact with the existing literature, and suggest topics for future research.

### Literature Review

Authors which have examined the intersection of culture and conflict mediation are few. The most impactful among them is Jacob Bercovitch. Bercovitch was a renowned conflict mediation scholar who published several works which reference or focus on the intersection between culture and conflict mediation (Bercovitch and Houston 2000; Bercovitch and Elgström 2001; Bercovitch and Foulkes 2012). Bercovitch views culture as one of many contextual factors which have an impact on occurrences of conflict mediation. He models this in his “contingency framework”, in which context variables (nature of the parties, nature of the issues, conflict environment, and identity and rank of the mediator) are channeled through process variables (mediation strategy, mediation timing, and mediation setting) to yield the mediation outcome (Bercovitch and Houston 2000; Bercovitch and Elgström 2001; Bercovitch and Foulkes 2012).

The degree to which Bercovitch’s work focuses specifically on culture progressively increases over time. In his early work, Bercovitch presents culture as a factor which can

contribute to difficulties in the mediation process because of existing grievances between groups that may be brought into the process (Bercovitch and Houston 2000). However, his argument develops in later works to further emphasize the impact of culture on all type of social relations, which Bercovitch and Foulkes (2012) argue is “omnipresent” and acts as a lens which influences “*all behavior*”.

Bercovitch and Elgström (2001) perform a quantitative analysis on the impact of cultural indicators (including geographic proximity, political system, political rights and freedoms, civil liberties and freedoms, and dominant religion) on mediation outcomes. The authors determine if these indicators are the same or different for each party in the conflict and whether the mediation attempt was successful or unsuccessful. With the exception of political system, they find that differences in these cultural indicators are more highly associated with unsuccessful outcomes. Inman et al. (2014) performs a similar quantitative analysis on the impact of culture on conflict mediation. However, this paper only argues that cultural differences will inhibit the decision to enter mediation, arguing that the impact of cultural differences on mediation success is “an open question” (Inman et al. 2014, 690). Regarding the impact of cultural differences on mediation, mostly pertaining to acceptance, Inman et al. (2014) argues that cultural differences may impact the mediation process through expectations of difficulty, in-group/out-group bias, or perceptions of mediator bias.

Furthermore, Leng and Regan (2003) perform a quantitative analysis on this topic as well but limit their analysis to militarized interstate disputes. This work applies Huntington’s (1993; 1996) argument regarding the “clash of civilizations” to mediation, measuring “social culture”<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Leng and Regan (2003) differentiate between social and political culture. This paper does not consider political culture, which Leng and Regan (2003) primarily measure in reference to democracy, and therefore does not discuss this aspect of the paper.

primarily through religion. They find that social culture does have an impact on mediation outcomes, but do not find support for Huntington's (1996) hypotheses. Because of this they suggest that social culture should not be measured primarily through religion, as the patterns they identify are more closely associated with regional cultural factors (Lee and Regan 2003).

Similar to Leng and Regan (2003), my frame is different from Bercovitch and most other existing literature on the intersection between culture and conflict mediation because I am solely considering interstate rather than intrastate conflicts. Bercovitch and Foulkes (2012) contextualize their work in reference to the "new wave" of international relations theory which studies civil war, terrorism, and nontraditional aspects of international relations. I apply this topic to interstate conflicts, and by moving away from this narrow concept of what contexts culture can be impactful in expand upon the arguments which are made in favor of culture's significance. Though Leng and Regan (2003) approach this topic from an interstate focus as well, they focus on testing Huntington's (1996) arguments which differ significantly from my own.

### *Defining Culture*

Before diving further into theoretical concepts, it is important to define culture. The lack of significant focus on culture in international relations and its broadness as a term has led to difficulties in pinpointing a consistent definition of it. However, while culture is an imprecise concept, there is some consistency in the existing literature on culture and its relationship to mediation. As explained by Cohen (1996), culture is a shared "system of meaning and value" acquired through socialization and learning, which is specific to a group of people (109). This definition of culture is reminiscent of the sociological tradition, but many international relations

scholars echo key elements of it in their own writing (Bercovitch and Elgström 2001; Bercovitch and Foulkes 2012; Iriye 1990; Lücke and Rigaut 2002).

The idea that culture is a framework which shapes perceptions is also commonly shared among various scholars. Drawing on the work of renowned anthropologist, Edward T. Hall, Cohen describes the importance of culture as such, “Simply put: culture constructs reality; different cultures construct reality differently; communication across cultures pits different constructions of reality against each other,” (Cohen 1996, 110). Other scholars also liken culture to a framework, such as Rubin and Sander (1991), who describe culture as a “profoundly powerful organizing prism” (249), and Bercovitch and Foulkes (2012), who visualize it as a “lens” which influences how actors think and behave.


This paper adopts its concept of culture from the literature discussed above, considering it a socially reproduced framework of meanings and values that permeates cognitive processes. The idea of culture as a “lens” through which people in societies think and act (Bercovitch and Foulkes 2012; Cohen 1996; Rubin and Sander 1991) is particularly important to this project. As discussed above, Bercovitch and Foulkes’s (2012) definition of culture is incredibly pervasive, impacting all behaviors and social interactions. This redefinition of culture is central to the formation of their argument; the authors conclude that because culture is “omnipresent” in all social interactions and mediation is a social interaction, then culture must have an impact on mediation. Bercovitch and Foulkes (2012) float several mechanisms through which they believe this process may occur: including perceptions, behavioral norms, beliefs about issue salience, and dispute intensity, in addition to considering the role of the mediator. Each of these potential mechanisms are briefly explored, but none are committed to.

I focus on the potential for increased misperceptions in the mediation process due to cultural differences. The idea of misperceptions causing communication issues in international relations is not an uncommon one. Broadly, Jervis (1976) describes how misperceptions regarding the intentions of other states are often active in decision-making processes. Additionally, as stated above, this idea is proposed by Bercovitch and Foulkes (2012) to have an impact on the mediation process. Bercovitch and Foulkes (2012) allude to the impact of goals in this process by citing Mitchell (1981), who envisions goal incompatibility as central to conflict. Whereas Bercovitch and Foulkes (2012) reference goals fleetingly, they are central to my argument.

### Argument


I argue that cultural differences between states lead to less effective mediation attempts. This is because of how culture acts as a pervasive lens through which actors filter their cognitive processes (Bercovitch and Foulkes 2012; Cohen 1996). Culture, then, is an important factor in how actors form goals. This can lead to difficulties in the mediation process because of the central role of goals in crisis mediation. Crisis mediation seeks to either prevent or end conflict, or in other words, secure peace. According to Galtung (1969), peace is the absence of violence, and violence is when people are prevented from reaching their full potential. Then, crisis mediation, which attempts to avoid violence and seek peace, is ultimately an attempt to protect people's ability to pursue their aspirations and reach their full potential. When the end goals which are driving actors in the mediation process differ, opportunities for misperceptions increase because of the difficulty of contextualizing out of your own experience and correctly predicting the goals of opposing actors. When misperceptions abound, the likelihood that mediation attempts are successful is greatly decreased.

For the purpose of visualizing this argument, I present the following figures:



(Figure 1) The role of culture in goal formation.

The visual above demonstrates the impact of culture on the process of goal formation for actors. In line with the definition of culture as a lens (Bercovitch and Foulkes 2012; Cohen 1996), the actor's own desires are filtered through culture in this visual. The impact of culture in goal formation is unavoidable because of its pervasiveness, and all goals are formulated through this process. There are other factors which may influence goal formation which may be due to internal (within the actor) or external (contextual) factors, but culture is a consistent factor which always influences goal formation.




(Figure 2) Goals in the mediation process.

“Figure 2”, as seen above, demonstrates the importance of goals in the mediation process. The actor is trying to advance toward their goals but is blocked by the presence or potential of

conflict. Conflict serves as a force which obscures the goals of actors through the enaction of violence, which prevents actors from reaching their full potential (Galtung 1969). Mediation is displayed as providing a way to bypass or move around the obscuring effect of conflict in order for an actor to have the ability to achieve their goals. Mediation is then a means by which actors strive to realize their goals. This is why goals drive actors in the mediation process.


(Fig 3.1) Actor Perception of Goals:




(Fig 3.2) Actor 1- Reality:



(Fig 3.3) Actor 1 Perception of Actor 2 Goals:



(Fig 3.4) Actor 2- Reality:



The series of diagrams above demonstrates how misperceptions in the mediation process may occur. “Figure 3.1” illustrates how actors formulate perceptions regarding the goals of other actors. Although many political theorists may argue that actors are completely rational, my diagram illustrates that actors do not formulate perceptions purely based on objective analysis of their adversary’s behavior. Instead, their observations are filtered through the lens of their own cultural experience, yielding a perception of their opponent which is influenced by both objective observation and their own experience.

As seen in “Figure 3.2” and “Figure 3.4”, Actor 1’s goals are not the same as Actor 2’s goals; the goals of the respective actors are responsive to their differing cultural inputs. When actors have significant cultural differences, including different beliefs over important issues, their goals will significantly differ. It is easier for actors to recognize and understand cultures more similar to their own, because of the difficulty of contextualizing outside of one’s own experience. Actors may inappropriately assume the goals of their counterparts because have only ever experienced the context behind their own goals and they do not understand the context behind their opponent’s goals. “Figure 3.3” and “Figure 3.4” illustrate the reality of Actor 2’s goals compared to Actor 1’s perception of Actor 2’s goals. “Figure 3.3” applies the model from “Figure 3.1” to show how the perception forming process causes differences in Actor 1’s perception of Actor 2 and reality. When actors misestimate the intentions of their adversary, it is likely that they will doubt their commitments, leading to difficulties in the mediation process, which necessitates a level of trust and mutual understanding.

This argument yields the following hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 1: Increased cultural differences between states decrease the likelihood of a successful crisis mediation attempt.*

I test this hypothesis by conducting a quantitative analysis on the impact of cultural differences between states on international crisis outcomes. If my hypothesis is supported, this analysis should show that mediation attempts which occur between states with substantial cultural differences are less likely to see a reduction in tensions. If my hypothesis is not supported there will be no detectable relationship between my variables, or the results of my analysis will be contrary to my hypothesis.

Although there is some disagreement over if states themselves are truly actors in the mediation process, I still believe it is appropriate to account for the culture of states in these processes regardless of stance on this issue. Individuals representing states in the mediation process likely reside in that state and were brought up in that state's culture. I acknowledge that culture is not homogenous, even within states, and that each person's lived experience is different. However, an important component of culture is that it is shared among and reproduced through societies and has a significant influence on those who participate in them, warranting this approach. This influence is deep and foundational, impacting how individuals process information and informing their goals. Because the influence of cultural frameworks is so pervasive, they are difficult for actors to contextualize out of. This may lead to latent assumptions that incorrectly assume the goals of others, increasing the likelihood for misunderstandings.

For example, one party may enter the mediation process earnestly hoping for a ceasefire. One of the core reasons they are seeking this outcome may be because of civilian casualties on their side. Although continuing, and winning, the war could bring great material benefit to their country, this country is very committed to honoring a ceasefire if one is reached, because their society views the well-being of families as highly salient. Because of this, one of the goals

driving this state in the mediation process is the protection of families, informing their desire for a ceasefire.

However, the opposing party in this process may not share the same cultural framework. Their society, as a whole, may value economic success and advancement very highly, more highly than individual life or families. This difference in the cultural frameworks between the parties may lead the second party to misunderstand the intentions of the first party. Because the second party values advancement so highly, they may doubt the other party's commitment to a ceasefire, thinking that they would not pass up on the opportunity to obtain the extremely valuable material resources the other party would gain from winning this war. They may see the civilian casualties experienced by their opponent as a natural feature of war, thinking the other side could not be motivated by them because the number of civilian deaths is relatively small and would be deemed by themselves as acceptable. Because of the misplaced doubt of the second state towards the first state, a ceasefire may be unreachable, even if it were the preferred outcome of the second state as well. In this way, misunderstandings over intentions, such as the example above, which are based in the cultural differences between parties, may impede the success of mediation efforts.

Israel and Egypt experienced several key elements of this example prior to the Camp David Accords. This case is previously listed in this paper as an example of success in mediation; however, prior to the Camp David Accords, Egypt and Israel struggled through several rounds of failed negotiations in the midst of repeated conflicts. This case demonstrates a crisis in which one party (Egypt) indicates willingness for peace based in importance placed on a particular cultural value (family) but is met with doubt from the opposing party (Israel) over their true intentions. Failed negotiations persisted for almost a year after the event discussed below.

In November 1977, Egyptian President Anwar El-Sadat shockingly expressed his desire to visit Israel in order to meet with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin (Shoufani 1978). In a statement regarding his decision, President Sadat expressed heavy grievances over the state of family life due to the pattern of conflict between Israel and Egypt. Amongst multiple references to this issue, President Sadat stated, “Any life that is lost in war is a human life, be it that of an Arab or an Israeli. A wife who becomes a widow is a human being entitled to a happy family life, whether she be an Arab or an Israeli. Innocent children who are deprived of the care and compassion of their parents are ours. They are ours, be they living on Arab or Israeli land. They command our full responsibility to afford them a comfortable life today and tomorrow” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1981). This statement reflects a high level of importance placed upon family values by Sadat, and explains how this value influences Sadat’s goals through the responsibility he feels to protect it. Sadat’s statement also provides evidence that his commitment to these values is culturally informed, as he makes extensive references to religious beliefs that are deemed important in his country.<sup>3</sup>

Despite President Sadat’s emphatic expressions over the sincerity of his intentions and excitement over the possibilities his proposal could provide from both sides, there was a high level of doubt regarding the level of Sadat’s commitment. It is reported that the Israeli government was weary of Sadat’s rhetoric and was so doubtful of his sincerity that they did not begin to prepare for the visit “seriously until one or two days before it occurred” (Shoufani 1978). Though the reason for Israel’s doubt cannot be pinpointed to higher prioritization of a cultural value other than family, there is a strong likelihood that their doubt had a cultural

---

<sup>3</sup> Later in this paper, I argue that religion is an insufficient measure of culture. However, this does not mean that religion does not have cultural content or impacts, but rather that it should not be a standard measure of culture across all societies because its salience is not equal across all societies. In this society, religion is viewed as important, so religion is an appropriate gauge of culture.

component. The two countries are widely accepted to have substantial cultural differences, making it highly plausible that any number of differences in the countries' respective cultures influences Israel's doubt over Egypt's intentions.

Because of the high cost and shock value of Sadat's visit to Israel, it should have been a powerful signal to the Israeli government that he was serious about peace, leading to an expedient negotiation process. However, numerous proposed agreements were rejected by Israel following the visit (Farrell 1978; The New York Times 1978). Yet despite these doubts over Sadat's intentions, the two countries ultimately reached an agreement. This fact indicates that there was a degree of truth to Sadat's claims of his (culturally informed) intentions and that the (culturally different) Israeli government incorrectly estimated them.

At its core, the argument I make is one which elevates the importance of domestic factors in international politics. In this way, it builds off of other IR scholars which have done the same. The most common form of this argument is one which elevates the importance of domestic politics and audience costs, such as is prevalent in the democratic peace literature (Gibler and Hutchison 2013; Potter and Baum 2010). My argument is sharply distinguished from this literature in that it does not argue that culture is important because of domestic political costs.<sup>4</sup> Rather than portraying culture's impact on the decision-making process of actors as a deliberate or strategic consideration, I explore its unconscious impact on actors themselves, in accordance with the conceptualization of culture as a "lens" discussed above.

---

<sup>4</sup> Domestic political costs may be a mechanism through which the importance of culture is elevated but is not the primary mechanism my argument explores.

My argument is closely related to that of Powell and Mitchell (2007),<sup>5</sup> who argue that the ability of states to communicate through signals via commitments to the ICJ may be inhibited if their domestic legal traditions are not well aligned. Powell and Mitchell (2007) acknowledge that domestic legal traditions are often an “embodiment of societal preferences, interests, and ideas”, concepts which are closely linked to culture and values, which I examine in this paper. However, my research is distinct from Powell and Mitchell (2007) in that the mechanism through which culture is impactful in communication processes is broader, and the context I examine it in is specific to crisis mediation.

Some may disagree with my claims by arguing that states are not as heavily influenced by culture as I and other scholars claim. Scholars which strongly adhere to the rational actor assumption may believe that states make decisions based solely on cost/benefit analyses and that culture does not factor into these analyses. Several mainstream paradigms in international relations would argue this, but research to the contrary has been established by numerous scholars, primarily constructivists (Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1999). Others may concede that culture does influence actors, but that they are aware of its impact and therefore its true influence is negligible. Some may also posit that since mediators are often highly aware of culture, they are able to dampen its impact on the mediation process. I argue in response that the study of the influence of culture in international relations has been so suppressed that the field does not accurately understand the depth of its true impact on state interactions. Additionally, the impact of culture and social environments, is so deeply ingrained in actors that it cannot be dampened to the point of negligibility, thus necessitating further study of this issue. Opposing claims are also based on assumptions which this paper seeks to explore more explicitly.

---

<sup>5</sup> These authors also make similar arguments in several subsequent articles and books in relation to domestic legal systems (Mitchell and Powell 2009; Mitchell and Powell 2011).

Furthermore, multiple scholars, whose work was explored in the previous section have already found evidence that cultural differences do have an impact on various aspects of the mediation process (Bercovitch and Elgström 2001; Inman et al. 2014; Leng and Regan 2003). These findings demonstrate that further research on the intersection between culture and mediation is warranted. My work adds to the understanding of this topic in several ways. Aside from offering a more detailed argument regarding the process through which culture impacts the conflict mediation process, I add to the existing literature by utilizing a different means to measure culture.

### *Operationalization*

Existing quantitative analyses on this topic, as discussed above, all measure culture through demographic or political proxy variables. Bercovitch and Elgström (2001) measure cultural difference through physical and political contexts such as religion, geographic proximity, rights and liberties, and type of political system. Inman et al. (2014) create a cultural difference composite variable by measuring race, religion, and language. Similarly, Leng and Regan (2003) primarily measure culture through religion. While using these measures of culture is beneficial for several reasons, such as wide availability of data, they make assumptions about the salience of certain identities, such as race and religion.

Measuring religion as a key component of culture is sensible because religion can be very important to certain societies and often denotes a set of values which guide behavior. However, measuring the majority religion in a society does not account for how important it is to the people in those societies and the degree to which it impacts a society's culture. For example, there are some areas of the world that claim a particular religion but many people residing in those areas do not actively practice it. In these situations, the religion still has some impact on

the society's culture, but it is greatly weakened because people do not strongly adhere to it. Many European countries would fall into this category. A plurality, if not majority, of their populations still identify as Christian, but the impact of Christianity on the culture of those societies is increasingly dwindling (Pew Research Center 2018). These societies are integrating a distinct post-Christian identity into their culture (Pew Research Center 2018), but it is unlikely that tools which measure religious identity would capture this.

Measuring race as an element of culture is problematic as well. Race itself contains little to no culture substance and can only serve as a proxy variable that assumes states with the same majority race will have similar cultures. Inman et al.'s (2014) measurement of race also includes the aspect of ethnicity, meaning their measurement of culture is biased toward accounting for ethnic divisions, rather than cultural divisions at large. Another major issue with incorporating race into a composite variable for culture is that it can inadvertently measure factors such as distance, which is known to be one of the most significant predictors of conflict between states (Bremer 1992). Similarly, I believe it is also problematic for Bercovitch and Elgström (2001) to have directly measured geographic proximity as an aspect of culture when this variable has such strong correlations with conflict, because of the potential for this variable to account for factors which it is not intended to.

I choose to measure culture differently because I believe the existing measures do not adequately measure the cultural differences which may impact the mediation process. The existing measures of culture assume that different identities will lead to friction in the mediation process simply because of their presence, assigning a level of salience to them which may not be accurate for all actors. As discussed earlier, this assumption is likely based in literature on the impact of ethnic divisions in intrastate conflicts and recent interest of international relations

scholarship in religious extremism.<sup>6</sup> My argument does not rely on these assumptions, but points to the possibility of states having cultural differences which cause substantive differences in their goals and beliefs, leading to friction in the mediation process. The measure of culture I employ improves upon the existing measures by directly measuring, rather than assuming, what societies view as salient and reflects my argument because it more closely reflects the substantive differences which can lead mediation parties to seek different goals.

### Methods

Cultural difference acts as the independent variable in my analyses. I measure it in multiple ways for a robustness check. I use the World Values Survey as my primary source to measure culture (Inglehart et al. 2014). Although culture is relatively stable, it does change and can shift in important ways over time. To utilize the most accurate data possible, I use the Time Series tool, which includes data from several surveys that have been conducted across the last four decades.<sup>7</sup> The most recent survey included data from 100 countries, but previous iterations of the survey were more limited in scope.<sup>8</sup> I look at two sets of questions which have been asked across each iteration of the survey. The first is a set of questions in which participants rate how important different aspects of life are to them. There are six individual questions in this set which ask participants about the importance of family, friends, leisure time, politics, work, and religion. Respondents may choose from answers on a 4-point scale which range from “not at all important” to “very important”. The final set of questions allows participants to select what is “most important” to them, giving them a first choice and second choice. Participants can choose

---

<sup>6</sup> Bercovitch and Foulkes (2012) frame their research in this way.

<sup>7</sup> There are six rounds of WVS surveys from 1981-2022. Some countries may have data for every survey iteration, while others may have only been surveyed once during this time (Inglehart et al. 2014). See Appendix 10 for a table which includes the countries surveyed and the years they were surveyed in.

<sup>8</sup> See Appendix 10 for a table which includes the countries surveyed and the years they were surveyed in.

from selecting “a stable economy”, a more humane society, a society which prioritizes ideas over money, and “the fight against crime” (Inglehart et al. 2014).

I choose these questions because I believe they reflect views on aspects of society which are commonly held to be important across societies. Though no survey question can adequately capture the culture of a society, differences in beliefs regarding the importance of these key aspects of society indicate culture differences which help to formulate the end goals of actors. This corresponds to a key segment of my argument, regarding the importance of goals in the mediation process. Additionally, these questions are selected because they are framed in a way that captures degrees of salience, which can help to avoid accounting for differences between states which they do not deem important themselves.

In its raw form, the WVS survey data includes data for each individual survey response (Inglehart et al. 2014). I aggregate the responses for each country and year each survey occurred in. This process results in one entry per country for each year in which a survey occurred. For the first set of questions, I aggregate the data by finding the mean of the responses, since these questions are asked on a scale. For the other set of questions, I use the mode of the data, since the numerical values assigned to these questions have no significance and are uncorrelated.<sup>9</sup>

I apply the data from the first survey done in that country from the first year of crises analyzed to the year the survey was conducted. I then consider each survey conducted to be valid from the year it was conducted, until the year the next survey was conducted.<sup>10</sup> Additionally, I

---

<sup>9</sup> Please see the Codebook (Appendix 5) for specific information on this process, including how numerical values are assigned to the survey results.

<sup>10</sup> Another method regarding which years survey results are considered valid was employed in preliminary analyses but yielded identical or almost identical results and is therefore not reported. This method was considering survey results valid until the halfway point between the year a survey was conducted, and the year the next survey was conducted.

apply the data from the last survey done in that country from the year it was conducted until 2019 (the last year of crises analyzed). If there is only one survey conducted during the allotted time, that data is applied to all years.

Following this, I merge the dataset created through the previously described processes with the International Crisis Behavior dataset<sup>11</sup> (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997; Brecher et al. 2023), my source for international crises<sup>12</sup> which have experienced mediation.<sup>13</sup> International crisis is defined as “a change in type and/or an increase in intensity of *disruptive*, that is, hostile verbal or physical, *interactions* between two or more states, with a heightened probability of *military hostilities*; that, in turn, destabilizes their relationship and *challenges* the *structure* of an international system—global, dominant, or subsystem”<sup>14</sup> (Brecker and Wilkenfeld 1997, 5-6). For each crisis, I then measure the difference between actors’ aggregated survey responses for each question.<sup>15</sup> For the first set of questions, this is the difference between the means. For the second set, this is simply a “1” to indicate different modes. I perform my analysis with each question individually, as well as with composite variables created by totaling the differences between countries for each question per set. The variables which result from this process act as different measures of my independent variable: cultural difference.

---

<sup>11</sup> I combine the ICB Actor-Level and System-Level datasets (Version 15) so that I can match the WVS data (Ingelhart et al. 2014) to each actor in a crisis.

<sup>12</sup> Intrastate crises which have no external actors listed as participants are dropped from this dataset for two reasons. First, my research question specifically asks about crises between states. Second, it would be impossible to utilize the WVS data (Ingelhart et al. 2014) in these crises because this data only includes state-wide data, meaning it cannot account for cultural divisions within states.

<sup>13</sup> Mediation is defined earlier in this paper using criteria from the ICB dataset (see Page 2).

<sup>14</sup> Emphasis is included in the original work.

<sup>15</sup> If there are more than two countries involved in a conflict, the greatest difference between actors is taken.

The dependent variable, mediation effectiveness, is measured by tension reduction. Data on tension reduction is included in the ICB dataset (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997; Brecher et al. 2023) and is coded according to the following values:

- “(1) No mediation, or not supplied, or not accepted
- (2) No effect
- (3) Had effect, crisis escalated
- (4) Had effect, marginal decrease in tensions
- (5) Had effect, mediation was important factor in easing tensions
- (6) Had effect, mediation was the most important factor in easing tensions
- (9) Cannot be determined, missing data.”

My analysis only measures cases which have received mediation, so it does not account for this value. Inman et al. (2014) measure mediation effectiveness through tension reduction using the ICB dataset as well but do so in a binary fashion which measures only whether there was tension reduction of any degree. I choose to measure tension reduction in a nonbinary fashion according to the values provided above. I use OLS to evaluate *Hypothesis 1* and measure the influence of cultural differences on tension reduction in crises which have experienced mediation.

Due to the size of the sample,<sup>16</sup> the analysis includes one control variable: mediation style. Bercovitch and Houston (1996) argue that mediation strategy is the most important factor impacting the probability of mediation success. Additionally, Inman et al. (2014) utilize

---

<sup>16</sup> The analysis for Set 1 questions includes 69 cases. The analysis for Set 2 questions includes 74 cases. There are a different number of cases for each analysis because of data availability. Please see the Codebook (Appendix 5) for more details.

mediation style as a control variable which is found to be statistically significant in each of their analyses. Mediation style is including in the ICB dataset (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997; Brecher et al. 2023) and is measured through the following values:

- (1) No mediation, or not supplied, or not accepted
- (2) Facilitation
- (3) Formulation
- (4) Manipulation

As is the case with tension reduction, the value for no mediation is not considered because only cases which experience mediation are analyzed.

Performing the analysis as described above results in several shortcomings. One of the largest is that crises with countries that are not measured by WVS data cannot be analyzed, leading to incomplete data which may be biased towards patterns present in the countries measured.<sup>17</sup> Additionally, though I believe my measure of culture is as time sensitive as possible, there is a large gap of time during which changes in culture cannot be accounted for. The first year of analysis in the WVS is 1981 (Inglehart et al. 2014), whereas first year in ICB dataset is 1918 (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997; Brecher et al. 2023). Eliminating cases prior to 1981 is not a viable option because it yields too few cases for analysis.<sup>18</sup> This may lead to some inaccuracies in the independent variable because of the wide period of time some surveys are applied to.

---

<sup>17</sup> See Appendix 10 for a table which includes the countries surveyed and the years they were surveyed in.

<sup>18</sup> An additional analysis was performed utilizing only crises which occurred after 1945 to consider the assumption that culture shifted globally after World War II. This analysis was intended to serve as a robustness check, but there were not enough cases to seriously consider the results.

Additionally, even when including all cases in the ICB dataset (1918-2019) which match with the countries surveyed in the WVS, there are still relatively few cases for a large-N study.<sup>19</sup>

Despite this, measuring cultural differences through what aspects of society individuals deem important is still valuable. Most simplistically, this is because doing so offers a measure of culture which is highly distinct from the measures deployed in the existing literature. It is valuable to measure this variable in a different way and important to compare the results of this analysis with existing analyses which deploy different measures. This process can serve as a sort of robustness check and may inform which measures of culture are most useful. Furthermore, I have introduced goals as a key mechanism in the process through which cultural differences impact mediation attempts. Measuring culture through demographic variables or political systems cannot capture the substantive cultural differences which may lead to differences in goal formation, whereas measuring culture in the way I have proposed much more adequately captures this. Then, deploying a new measure of culture is necessary to accurately test the argument I have proposed.

---

<sup>19</sup> See Footnote 16.

## Results and Analysis

<b>Cultural Difference Measure</b>	<b>Cultural Difference Ratio</b>	<b>Mediation Style Ratio (control)</b>
Important Aspects (Set 1 composite)	-2.08**	1.08
Most Important (Set 2 composite)	-2.23**	1.16
Important in life: Family (Set 1)	-0.97	1.18
Important in life: Friends (Set 1)	-1.80	1.53
Important in life: Leisure Time (Set 1)	-0.73	1.37
Important in life: Politics (Set 1)	-2.30**	1.37
Important in life: Work (Set 1)	-1.07	1.18
Important in life: Religion (Set 1)	-1.30	0.98
Most Important: first choice (Set 2)	-1.82	1.15
Most Important: second choice (Set 2)	-1.55	1.39

(Table 1) This table displays the results of the final analysis for Set 1 and Set 2 questions.

This analysis measures the impact of cultural differences between states on degrees of tension reductions in international crisis mediation attempts. Several different measures of “cultural difference” are employed, using two sets of survey questions regarding important aspects of society. Composite variables which measure the total difference for each set of questions are measured, as well as each question individually. As shown above in “Table 1”, each measure of cultural difference is negatively correlated with tension reduction, to varying degrees of statistical significance. For all analyses, mediation style (the control variable) is shown to have a positive correlation with tension reduction. Mediation style is not statistically significant in any of the analyses, and the strength of its correlation is extremely similar across each analysis.

Most importantly, these results show that there are three measures of cultural difference which yield statistically significant results: both composite variables and the question regarding the importance of politics. This offers support for *Hypothesis 1 (Increased cultural differences between states decrease the likelihood of a successful crisis mediation attempt)*. All results indicate a negative correlation between the variables and are close in value numerically, indicating a level of consistency among the measures of cultural difference deployed. Though only one individual question measured resulted in a statistically significant result, the individual questions themselves are less intended to serve as stand-alone measures of the independent variable than the composite variables and are more useful when viewed as potentially informing which elements of society are important to the mediation process or useful in measuring culture.<sup>20</sup>

Because culture has not been measured before in the way deployed in this paper for a quantitative analysis, there was uncertainty regarding which elements of society best capture cultural differences that are important in the mediation process. The results of this analysis may be viewed as providing an indication of which elements are most meaningful to this process, inferring that measures which return a stronger correlation are more influential. This process is imprecise but is a useful exercise. There are several potential reasons that the results vary among the individual questions. Regarding the first set of questions, it is simply possible that some aspects of society are more highly correlated to the content of mediation processes than others. It is understandable that differences regarding the value of leisure time, something that is likely low

---

<sup>20</sup> This is particularly true pertaining to questions from Set 1. Recall: the first set of questions asks participants to rate how important different aspects of life are to them. There are six individual questions in this set which ask participants about the importance of family, friends, leisure time, politics, work, and religion. Respondents may choose from answers on a 4-point scale from “not at all important” to “very important”.

on the priority list of those looking to avoid deadly conflict, is less correlated to mediation success than something like politics. Differences over the importance of politics in society yields a statistically significant result in this analysis. This may be because political issues are more directly linked to mediation outcomes than the other individual aspects which are measured. This conclusion is also consistent with the statistically significant results from the Set 2 composite variable, as the options available for participants to select for this question are more closely related to policy visions.<sup>21</sup>

Additionally, it is notable that the question regarding family is not statistically significant. Recall that a goal informed by family values is integral to the example I proposed for my argument.<sup>22</sup> Although this value is important to the example provided, differences over other values can also be important to the mediation process. Furthermore, though it is possible that differences in family values between mediation parties does not matter, I believe that alternative explanations are far more likely. Primarily, the survey results for this question differ very slightly. This question is aggregated by measuring the mean of all respondents per country; however, it is worth noting that the mode for all countries is the same (all modes returned that the societies surveyed valued family as “very important”). This may be because there is truly not much variation between societies regarding the importance of family. This could also be because of social desirability bias, meaning respondents felt it necessary to answer that family was very important because they felt like it was appropriate or admirable, rather than it being an honest answer (Grimm 2010).

---

<sup>21</sup> Recall: this set of questions allows participants to select what is “most important” to them, giving them a first choice and second choice. Participants can choose from selecting “a stable economy”, a more humane society, a society which prioritizes ideas over money, and “the fight against crime”.

<sup>22</sup> In brief summarization, this hypothetical example describes a situation where a state desires a ceasefire because of the importance it places on family values. However, the opposing state prioritizes different values and does not understand the first state’s perspective, mistrusting their intentions and obscuring the potential for a ceasefire to occur. For reference, this example begins on Page 12.

Furthermore, my results reinforce those of Leng and Regan (2003), who measure the impact of cultural differences on interstate conflicts when measured through religious differences. They find that cultural differences do matter, but that religion is not the most appropriate means by which to measure cultural differences. As my analysis shows, the variable which measures differences in religion is not statistically significant and there are other measures of cultural difference which are more highly correlated to mediation success than religion.

The results also indicate that this analysis would likely benefit from an increased number of inputs. This is because the majority of the analyses do not yield any variable which is statistically significant. This may simply indicate that differences over individual aspects of society alone are not impactful enough to cause friction in the mediation process, but differences over multiple issues cause friction because they indicate more comprehensive or compiled differences. Regardless, I still recommend an analysis with more cases due to the size of the sample used in this analysis.<sup>23</sup> Unfortunately, expanding the number of cases included in this analysis is not possible, as all crises which include the necessary data from both the ICB dataset (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997; Brecher et al. 2023) and WVS survey data (Ingelhart et al. 2014) are included. To do so would necessitate utilizing different sources for either the independent or dependent variable, or both. This process would be a beneficial undertaking for future research.

Ultimately, these results indicate that there is a negative correlation between cultural differences among states and mediation success. This offers significant support for *Hypothesis 1 (Increased cultural differences between states decrease the likelihood of a successful crisis mediation attempt)*, as both composite variables for cultural difference yielded a statistically significant result. This result also reinforces this paper's argument over the legitimacy of

---

<sup>23</sup> Recall: there are 69 cases for the Set 1 analysis and 74 cases for Set 2. See Footnote 16 for more details.

measuring culture in the new way which this paper proposed, through differences in the level of salience placed on central aspects of society. This measurement reflects my argument over the important of goals as a mechanism through which culture impacts the mediation process.

### Conclusion

This paper has asked: how do cultural differences between states impact the effectiveness of international crisis mediation attempts? It has argued that culture is a pervasive lens through which actors form goals, and that differences in these goals may cause friction in the mediation process due to the probability of misperceptions, leading to less successful mediation attempts. This paper has also offered an alternative method to measuring cultural differences between parties, which has not before been utilized in the literature on this topic. The quantitative analysis performed presents support for this argument and the hypothesis presented but indicates that further analyses with more inputs should be done to reinforce the results.

This paper adds to the understanding of culture's impact on the crisis mediation process in several ways. In reference to the existing literature, the results of this paper support the findings of Leng and Regan (2003) who find that cultural differences impact the mediation process, but that measuring culture solely through religion is not the most appropriate approach. The results of this paper also partially support Bercovitch and Elgström (2001) which finds that cultural differences do have an impact on mediation outcomes but measure cultural differences in a way which this paper does not. Inman et al. (2014), measures culture is a way that is similar to Bercovitch and Elgström (2001). Inman et al.'s (2014) analysis of mediation effectiveness does not find that cultural differences are statistically significant. In this way, this paper contradicts Inman et al.'s (2014) findings. However, Inman et al. (2014) does find that cultural differences lead to a decreased likelihood of accepting mediation.

In tandem with the existing literature, my findings reinforce that cultural differences do have an impact on the mediation process. This is because I find evidence of correlation between cultural differences and decreased mediation effectiveness and is further strengthened because I do so by utilizing a different measure of culture than the existing literature does. Additionally, my analysis finds correlation between these variables purely utilizing cases of interstate conflict, not considering intrastate conflict which is often considered to be more culturally significant. Arguments over the importance of culture in conflict mediation often center around ideas of intrastate or ethnic conflicts. However, these results show that the relationship persists beyond this narrow conception. More broadly, my research shows evidence that domestic factors matter in international politics in more ways than they are commonly considered to, expanding past arguments over audience costs and rather considering how the behavior of actors themselves may be influenced by the culture of their state.

Furthermore, and more specific to the practice of mediation, the results may also shed some light on how impactful efforts by mediators to dampen the effect of culture are. Mediation style, which partially accounts for the behavior of the mediator, is controlled for in the analysis performed. Despite this, cultural differences still returned a statistically significant result. It can be inferred that the strength of the correlation between cultural differences and mediation effectiveness not being incredibly strong, but marginally surpassing the threshold for statistical significance, may indicate that mediator efforts to reduce the impact of culture in the mediation process are somewhat, but not completely effective. However, further analyses which control for the mediator's approach to culture more specifically should be done to interpret these results more accurately.

What do these findings mean for the practice of international crisis mediation? These results indicate that mediation practitioners and scholars need to take the role of culture in mediation more seriously. Doing so entails expanding the conception of culture in mediation past the limitation of conflict with an obvious cultural component and beyond discussion of the role of the mediator's culture. This analysis has demonstrated that the impact of culture surpasses these limitations. Furthermore, mediators must consider how cultural differences may be present and influential to the mediation process, even when they are less apparent. This means taking care to consider the role of culture in cases where the parties do not appear to have typical cultural differences (such as differences in race, religion, or government type), because they may have underlying differences regarding their beliefs over what is important to their societies. This analysis has shown that cultural divisions are impactful in the mediation process even when measured in an atypical way, which does not account for demographic differences. Additionally, when cultural differences are identified, mediators should be diligent in assisting both parties in understanding the cultural context behind their adversary's goals, working to reduce and manage misperceptions.

In addition to the further research on this topic already suggested, further research should explore alternative methods to researching this question. One among these may be demonstrating how cultural differences impact mediation through in-depth case studies. Quantitatively, it would be beneficial to continue to explore measures of culture which account for substantive differences but allow for more cases to be reviewed than the analysis conducted in this paper. A quantitative analysis with more inputs would reinforce the results of this study by demonstrating more stability. Additionally, and most importantly, professional mediators should review this paper and consider its implications for their own work. A published response by practitioners

would enhance the communication between practitioners and academics, enhancing their shared knowledge and improving both fields. This communication is key to aiding mediation success and working to avoid its failure.

### References

- Bercovitch, Jacob, and Ole Elgström. 2001. "Culture and International Mediation: Exploring Theoretical and Empirical Linkages." *International Negotiation* 6(1): 3–23.
- Bercovitch, Jacob, and Jon Foulkes. 2012. "Cross-Cultural Effects in Conflict Management: Examining the Nature and Relationship between Culture and International Mediation." *International Journal of Cross Cultural Management* 12(1): 25–47.
- Bercovitch, Jacob, and Allison Houston. 1996. "The study of international mediation: theoretical issues and empirical evidence." In *Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation*. ed. Jacob Bercovitch. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Bercovitch, Jacob, and Allison Houston. 2000. "Why Do They Do It Like This? An Analysis of the Factors Influencing Mediation Behavior in International Conflicts." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44(2): 170–202.
- Bercovitch, Jacob, and Jeffrey Langley. 1993. "The Nature of the Dispute and the Effectiveness of International Mediation." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37(4): 670–91.
- Brecher, Michael and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. 1997. *A Study of Crisis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Brecher, Michael, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Kyle Beardsley, Patrick James and David Quinn. 2023. *International Crisis Behavior Data Codebook, Version 15*. <http://sites.duke.edu/icbdata/data-collections/>.

- Bremer, Stuart A. 1992. "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36(2): 309–41.
- Busch, Dominic. 2010. "How Does Culture Affect Conflict Mediation? Disentangling Concepts from Theory and Practice." [https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Dominic-Busch/publication/265257374\\_How\\_does\\_culture\\_affect\\_conflict\\_mediation\\_Disentangling\\_concepts\\_from\\_theory\\_and\\_practice/links/5746b98c08ae9ace842442d5/How-does-culture-affect-conflict-mediation-Disentangling-concepts-from-theory-and-practice.pdf](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Dominic-Busch/publication/265257374_How_does_culture_affect_conflict_mediation_Disentangling_concepts_from_theory_and_practice/links/5746b98c08ae9ace842442d5/How-does-culture-affect-conflict-mediation-Disentangling-concepts-from-theory-and-practice.pdf).
- Cohen, Raymond. 1996. "Cultural aspects of international mediation." In *Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation*, ed. Jacob Bercovitch. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Farrell, William E. 1978. "EGYPTIAN DEMANDS REJECTED BY ISRAEL." *The New York Times*: 11.
- Galtung, J. 1969. "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research." *Journal of Peace Research* 6(3): 167–191. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/422690>.
- Gartner, Scott S. 2014. "Third-Party Mediation of Interstate Conflicts: Actors, Strategies, Selection, and Bias." *Arbitration Law Review Arb & Mediation* 6(13): 269-294. <https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1063&context=arbitrationlawreview>.
- Gibler, Douglas M., and Marc L. Hutchison. 2013. "Territorial Issues, Audience Costs, and the Democratic Peace: The Importance of Issue Salience." *The Journal of Politics* 75(4): 879–93. doi:[10.1017/S0022381613000923](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381613000923).

- Grimm, Pamela. 2010. "social desirability bias." *Wiley International Encyclopedia of Marketing*.  
[https://oj8k.gitee.io/knowledge\\_management/files/readings/sdb\\_intro.pdf](https://oj8k.gitee.io/knowledge_management/files/readings/sdb_intro.pdf).
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72(3): 22–49.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. (eds.). 2014. "World Values Survey: All Rounds - Country-Pooled Datafile Version." Madrid: JD Systems Institute.  
<https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWVL.jsp>.
- Inman, Molly, Roudabeh Kishi, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Mechele Gelfand, and Elizabeth Salmon. 2014. "Cultural Influences on Mediation in International Crises." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58(4): 685–712.
- Iriye, Akira. 1990. "Culture." *The Journal of American History* 77(1): 99–107.
- Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1981. "Speech by Egyptian President Sadat to the Knesset." *Israel's Foreign Relations: selected documents, 1977-1979*. Ed. Medzini, Meron. Jerusalem: Ahva Press: 182-90. Print.
- Jervis, R. 1976. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics: New Edition* (REV- Revised). Princeton University Press. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvc77bx3>
- Katzenstein, Peter, ed. 1996. *The Culture of National Security*. New York: Columbia University Press.

- Leng, Russell and Patrick Regan. 2003. "Social and political cultural effects on the outcomes of mediation in militarized interstate disputes." *International Studies Quarterly* 47(3): 431–52.
- Lücke, Kai, and Aloys Rigaut. 2002. "Cultural Issues in International Mediation." <https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/research/groups/ctccs/projects/translating-cultures/documents/journals/cultural-issues-mediation.pdf>.
- Mitchell, C. 1981. *The Structure of International Conflict*. London: Macmillan.
- Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin, and Emilia Justyna Powell. 2009. "Legal Systems and Variance in the Design of Commitments to the International Court of Justice." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26(2): 164-190. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894208101128>.
- Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin, and Emilia Justyna Powell. 2011. *Domestic Law Goes Global: Legal Traditions and International Courts*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Naveed, Amna. 2021. "Why Successful Mediation Efforts Could Not Be Employed to Resolve the Kashmir Conflict?" *Modern Diplomacy*. <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/06/20/why-successful-mediation-efforts-could-not-be-employed-to-resolve-the-kashmir-conflict/> (April 25, 2024).
- O'Grady, Siobhan. 2023. "Russia Releases Four Ukrainian Children after Mediation by Qatar - The Washington Post." *Washington Post*. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/16/ukraine-children-released-russia-qatar/> (April 25, 2024).

Pew Research Center. 2018. "Being Christian in Western Europe." *Pew Research Center*.

<https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2018/05/29/being-christian-in-western-europe/>

(April 25, 2024).

Potter, Philip B. K., and Matthew A. Baum. 2010. "Democratic Peace, Domestic Audience Costs, and Political Communication." *Political Communication* 27(4): 453–470.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2010.516802>

Powell, Emilia Justyna, and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell. 2007. "The International Court of Justice and the World's Three Legal Systems." *The Journal of Politics* 69(2): 397–415.

<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00539.x>.

Rubin, Jeffrey Z., and Frank E. A. Sander. 1991. "Culture, Negotiation, and the Eye of the Beholder." *Negotiation Journal* 7(3): 249–54.

Salmon, Elizabeth D. et al. 2013. "Cultural Contingencies of Mediation: Effectiveness of Mediator Styles in Intercultural Disputes." *Journal of Organizational Behavior* 34(6): 887–909.

Shoufani, Elias. 1978. "The Reaction in Israel to the Sadat Initiative." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 7(2): 3–25. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2536436>.

Shurafa, Wafaa, and Bassem Mroue. 2024. "Mediator Says Talks on Gaza Not 'progressing as Expected' after Momentum in Recent Weeks." *Los Angeles Times*.

<https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2024-02-17/mediator-says-talks-on-gaza-not-progressing-as-expected-after-momentum-in-recent-weeks> (April 25, 2024).

The New York Times. 1978. "EGYPT'S PEACE PLAN FORMALLY REJECTED BY ISRAEL'S CABINET." *The New York Times*: 1, 7.

Wendt, Alexander. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*. of *Cambridge Studies in International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.