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Scapegoating, Social Disorganization, and the Causes of Refugee-on-Refugee Violence

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Abstract: What motivates refugee-on-refugee violence? With protracted displacement on the rise, it is increasingly important to understand the causes of violence against refugees in order to protect the most vulnerable people. While most of the literature on refugee-related violence focuses on organized violence, I approach refugee-on-refugee violence at the individual level. I argue that forced displacement leads to the development and exacerbation of discriminatory attitudes, such as homophobia and misogyny, because people look for scapegoats to blame for their suffering. I predict that these discriminatory attitudes, combined with the social disorganization and immense stress caused by forced displacement, are responsible for refugee-on-refugee violence and thus expect most violence to be identity-based or domestic violence. Looking at reports from 22 refugee-hosting countries from 1996 to 2015, I find that most reports of refugee-on-refugee violence with sufficient evidence to identify the motivations are identity-based or domestic violence.

Keywords: refugee, displacement, lawlessness, sexual violence

Word count: 10,802

Introduction

In 2008, following a series of deaths due to diarrhea and malnutrition, male refugees in Chad's Dosseye camp accused a group of female refugees of witchcraft (U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2008). They then brutally attacked them and set their tents on fire (Ibid). This violence, although especially vicious, was nothing out of the ordinary. From 2010 to

2011, over 500 refugees in Chad reported experiencing sexual or gender-based violence, with a substantial portion naming other refugees as their attackers (U.S. Department of State, 2011).

The problem of refugee-on-refugee violence is not limited to Chad. Throughout the early 2000s, refugees in Tanzanian camps were beaten and tortured by other refugees who claimed they were engaging in vigilante justice (U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2006). From 2008 to 2009, attacks by refugee youth on other habitants of a camp in Nepal forced nearly 100 refugees to flee (U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2008). The list continues: since 1996, refugees in over a dozen countries have experienced violence at the hands of other refugees (Gineste and Savun, 2018).

In this paper, I seek to understand what motivates refugees to commit acts of violence against other refugees. Why do desperate people fleeing conflict turn against other desperate people fleeing conflict, including civilians from the same country? This question is especially pressing right now for two reasons.

First, the scale and length of forced displacement are on the rise. A record 100 million people were forcibly displaced as of June 2022, and the average refugee is now displaced for 10 to 26 years (Ferris, 2018; UNHCR, 2022). More people are refugees and they are refugees for longer periods of time than has been the case in the past, so the population at risk of refugee-on-refugee violence is growing. In order to devise policies and strategies that can protect the most vulnerable refugees from violence at the hands of other refugees, policymakers and humanitarian actors must understand why that violence occurs.

Second, migration has become increasingly criminalized over the past two decades, with formerly accepted forms of migration now viewed as crimes worldwide, to the detriment of refugees and people who help them (Brachet, 2018; Healy, 2004; Amnesty International, 2020).

Refugees and asylum-seekers themselves are often portrayed as criminals who are likely to commit violent acts; they are labeled threats to national security (Ibid). Since acts of violence in refugee camps make it easy to stereotype refugees as dangerous criminals, it is important to understand why refugee-on-refugee violence occurs to avoid unnecessarily contributing to the criminalization of all refugees because of the actions of a minority.

Unfortunately, the question of refugee-on-refugee violence is largely ignored by the literature on refugees and violence. The existing literature has focused primarily on civil and interstate conflict (Bove & Bohmelt, 2016; Choi & Salehyan, 2013; Milton, Spencer & Findley, 2013; Salehyan, 2008). While some recent studies have begun to explore other aspects of the relationship between refugees and security, these studies look at violence between refugees and local militias or community members more broadly, rather than isolating refugee-on-refugee violence as a separate phenomenon (Bohmelt, et al., 2019; Fisk, 2019; Ruegger, 2019).

I believe that these other types of violence, such as civil war and organized non-state violence, cannot sufficiently explain why refugee-on-refugee violence occurs. Instead, refugee-on-refugee violence must be understood at the individual level by looking at the stress, violence, and social disorganization that refugees experience. I argue that forced displacement leads to the development and exacerbation of discriminatory attitudes, including misogynistic, homophobic, and racist views, because people scapegoat others to make sense of their problems and because the destruction of traditional social organization forces people to interact with those they otherwise could have avoided. I then argue that forced displacement increases the likelihood that such attitudes lead to violence. Not only are there now more people who hold these views, which increases the potential number of perpetrators of misogynistic and other discriminatory violence, but the psychological stress caused by forced displacement leads people to act more

aggressively. This phenomenon is especially common with men, whose traditional gender roles may be undermined when they are forced into refugee camps, leading them to lash out and assert dominance in other, more violent ways. My argument also discusses the environment of lawlessness in refugee camps that enables this violence and the lower perceived cost of violence for people who feel that they have already lost everything. Ultimately, my argument is that refugee-on-refugee violence should be understood through the lens of individual-level stress, discrimination, and violence, not as part of organized politically or economically motivated violence.

This argument is important. It challenges traditional, reductive views of refugees and security and shows that refugees can be both perpetrators and victims of violence and that such violence is not necessarily a part of other violence in the region. Indeed, if my argument is correct, then strategies to prevent refugee-on-refugee violence should focus on identifying and addressing these tensions and protecting the most vulnerable groups in refugee camps, rather than simply addressing broader instability in the region.

To test my argument, I use the Political and Societal Violence By and Against Refugees (POSVAR) dataset, which captures levels of refugee-on-refugee violence in every country from 1996 to 2015. I first examine the relationship between other forms of refugee-related violence (such as refugee participation in organized non-state violence) and refugee-on-refugee violence and show that other types of violence do not sufficiently explain refugee-on-refugee violence. I then analyze each report of refugee-on-refugee violence to identify the main motivations and identify the most common motivations across countries and years. As predicted, I find that the most common forms of refugee-on-refugee violence are identity-based violence and domestic violence.

Because the kinds of personal sentiments that I argue lead to refugee-on-refugee violence are only reported on when violence occurs, I cannot evaluate the extent to which they exist in peaceful refugee settings and whether they sometimes do not lead to violence. Thus, I do not claim to show that individual-level tensions are sufficient to explain refugee-on-refugee violence but instead show that the most common motivators of refugee-on-refugee violence are the factors that I identify.

The paper proceeds as follows. I first examine the literature on refugees and violence, showing that it has neglected the question of refugee-on-refugee violence but offers insights into the relationship between refugee flows and violence that may be useful. I then examine the literature on forced displacement and discriminatory beliefs, including misogyny, homophobia, and ethnic tensions in refugee camps, as well as domestic violence. Building on this literature, I lay out my argument that refugee-on-refugee violence is a result of misogynistic, homophobic, and racist views that are either developed or exacerbated by the pressures of forced displacement and social disorganization. Finally, I test my argument using the POSVAR data on refugee-on-refugee violence and conclude with a discussion of what these results demonstrate, the limitations of this study, and avenues for future research and policy action.

Literature Review

Refugees and Conflict

The primary focus of the literature on refugees and violence is civil and interstate war. Several studies, including both systematic analyses and case studies, have found a positive linear relationship between the number of refugees in a host community and the risk of civil and interstate wars (Bove & Bohmelt, 2016; Choi & Salehyan, 2013; Milton, Spencer & Findley,

2013; Salehyan, 2008). Some of the explanations for this relationship include refugees transporting weapons across borders and strengthening militant groups, refugee flows upsetting the ethnic balance in a country and triggering civil war, and militant groups recruiting desperate refugees to serve as fighters in exchange for resources or protection (Bove & Bohmelt, 2016; Ruegger, 2019). More recent research has also identified a positive linear relationship between refugees and organized non-state violence (Bohmelt, et al., 2019; Fisk, 2019). These studies have identified several of the same causal mechanisms as the civil and interstate war literature, in addition to new ones, such as economic competition between refugees and host communities.

Drawing from the existing literature on refugees and violence, I identify two potential explanations for refugee-on-refugee violence, both of which are insufficient to explain refugee-on-refugee violence. The first is that refugee-on-refugee violence is a part of organized and/or political violence. This explanation includes the arguments that desperation and poor living conditions make it easier for militant groups to recruit refugees, that refugees bring weapons across the border to support militant groups (which implies a prior ideological affiliation with those groups), and that militants cross the border pretending to be refugees, as well as explanations about organized ethnic violence involving the host community. This also includes any arguments about refugees having political grievances against the government or another group.

Militant groups certainly attack refugee dwellings. The Janjaweed militias in Sudan and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have notoriously carried out violent massacres against refugees (Savun and Gineste, 2019). However, these militant groups do not need refugees on the inside to carry out their attacks for them because refugee communities have minimal security. The UNHCR's guidelines on refugee protection note that states that host large numbers

of refugees usually do not have the capacity or willingness to provide extensive security at camps, making it relatively easy for outside groups to attack (UNHCR, undated). In addition, refugees are often housed in the poorest, most unsafe regions, often close to the border they crossed, with limited government presence and high levels of crime and banditry (Ibid). Ultimately, refugee camps tend to be targeted by militants because they are "largely undefended" (Jacobsen, 1992).

In addition to the fact that refugee camp attacks do not require refugee perpetrators, militant groups have incentives not to use refugee perpetrators. The strategic purpose of targeting vulnerable civilians such as refugees is usually to send a message to the government, competing local actors, or international sponsors about the group's strength and willingness to use force (Balcells and Stanton, 2021; Wood, 2015). For this to work, the militant group needs the attack to garner significant attention. However, attacks perpetrated by refugees against other refugees are likely to be underreported on and taken less seriously; they may not even be linked to organized political violence (Delaney, 2016; UNHCR, 2017; UNODC, 2015). Refugees who join armed groups on their own or are motivated to participate in political violence are similarly unlikely to want to focus on refugee targets since such violence is underreported and receives less coverage than attacks on or by other actors (Delaney, 2016; UNHCR, 2017; UNODC, 2015). Organized and/or political violence thus does not seem to explain why refugee-on-refugee violence occurs.

The second potential type of explanation identified in the literature is economic competition, including competition for scarce natural resources, public services, and jobs, as well as resentment over which actors "deserve" more resources. While economic competition may explain conflict between refugees and host communities, it does not compellingly explain the

prevalence of refugee-on-refugee violence. First, refugees tend to have limited mobility and difficulty obtaining employment, in part because of state restrictions on where refugees can work (UNHCR, 2018; UN Women, 2017). As a result, refugees frequently rely on humanitarian aid (Ibid). High levels of violence and safety concerns would force humanitarian actors to reduce their involvement in order to protect their staff, harming refugees who rely on their assistance and making refugee-on-refugee violence counterproductive (AFP, 2022; Wilkinson, undated). Second, because resources are allocated by camp staff or humanitarian workers, refugees can engage in other types of unlawful behavior, such as bribes and threats of violence, to obtain resources directly from the source. Refugee camps have an environment of lawlessness that enables some male refugees to amass large amounts of power; this power imbalance allows them to obtain resources with threats and other tactics short of violence (Chrisafis, 2009; NBC News, 2013; UNHCR, 2021). Third, the communities where refugees live are extremely poor and other refugees are unlikely to have many resources themselves, so violence against other refugees for resources is likely to be futile. It would make more sense for refugees in need of resources to direct their efforts towards external populations. Thus, while economic competition may explain isolated incidents of refugee-on-refugee violence or may contribute to a general atmosphere of violence, I argue that it is insufficient to fully explain the phenomenon.

Stress, Scapegoating, and Violence

I draw from the literature on extreme poverty and social cohesion to understand how stress and social disorganization can lead to the development or exacerbation of discriminatory attitudes and promote violence. The most prominent explanation in the literature is the scapegoat theory (Jedwab, et al., 2021; Doob, et al., 1939; Hovland and Sears, 1940; Glick, 2005). The

scapegoat theory holds that people who experience stress or trauma seek an explanation for their suffering in order to make sense of what is happening to them, allowing them to feel emotional relief (Jedwab, et al., 2021). They find this explanation by pointing to members of marginalized groups that cannot easily defend themselves, such as women, ethnic minorities, and LGBTQ+ people, and blaming them for their situation (Ibid). Scapegoating explanations may arise because members of a group had pre-existing discriminatory attitudes (e.g., already looked down on immigrants or ethnic minorities) and now have an outlet to express those attitudes, or because members turn inward and become suspicious of others, even if they were not previously prejudiced against them, when things go wrong.

Several studies in psychology and political science have found empirical support for the scapegoat theory (Jedwab, et al., 2021; Glick, 2005; Poppe, 2001). For example, one study of ethnic relations in Slovakia found that acts of violence against one's own ethnic group made one twice as likely to scapegoat innocent members of other ethnic groups, blaming them for crimes that they did not commit in order to make sense of the violence that one's group had experienced (Bauer, 2021). This scapegoating then escalated into group conflict (Ibid). Furthermore, several epidemics and pandemics – which lead to sickness and death within communities, thus creating trauma for loved ones who survive – have led to scapegoating against immigrants and minorities (Jedwab, et al., 2021; Lin, et al., 2015; Nelkan and Gilman, 1988). In other instances, the trauma of forced displacement was linked to the development of superstitious beliefs (Kaplan, 2022). Superstitious beliefs often target women and other marginalized communities and blame them for society's woes (Yasmin, 2018).

Stress and trauma may also lead people to act violently on pre-existing discriminatory attitudes. In other words, most societies have misogynistic people, but they do not all commit

acts of violence against women; certain environmental pressures, however, may lead them to do so. The literature has identified three main causal mechanisms. First, the psychological impacts of experiencing stress and trauma may make one more prone to aggression. For example, research on growing up in urban poverty has shown that chronic conditions of high stress and exposure to violence increase the risk that one will commit acts of violence or live a disorganized, chaotic lifestyle in the future (Collins, et al., 2010). In addition, extensive research on the Covid-19 pandemic identified a strong positive relationship between the stress created by the crisis and intimate partner violence (Glowacz, et al., 2022; Nikos-Rose, 2021).

Second, crises that lead to severe stress may cause individuals – especially men – to feel that they are losing control of their lives and are unable to fulfill their obligations as the traditional breadwinner or head of the household, leading them to lash out and assert dominance in other, more violent ways. Research on the Covid-19 pandemic in Canada found that while remote working and reduced employment were not linked to increased domestic violence, the inability to meet financial obligations and maintain social ties were linked to an increase in violence (Beland, et al., 2020). In other words: domestic violence occurred when breadwinners felt more out of control, not when they spent more time at home with their families.

Third, experiencing extreme poverty or stress of some sort reduces the opportunity cost of engaging in violent acts because people feel as though they have nothing left to lose (Jedwab, et al., 2021). In the United States, for instance, there is a significant correlation between extreme poverty rates and violent crime, which researchers have attributed to the lower opportunity cost (and subsequent higher marginal benefit) of committing violent crimes for people who are already in poverty (Quednau, 2021).

Refugee Camp Dynamics

Refugee camps are unsafe environments, enabling actors who hold discriminatory views to act on those views. As discussed previously, they have minimal security due to a lack of funding and political will from host countries and because they are often located in extremely poor borderland regions (UNHCR, undated; Jacobsen, 1992). When they do have security, the security usually protects the camp from people outside of it, rather than protecting people in the camp from each other. Because camps tend to lack governing authorities and structures within the camp, they are frequently characterized as "lawless" environments where people are free to amass power and act violently and coercively against others (NBC News, 2013).

For instance, Zaatari refugee camp in Jordan, the largest refugee camp outside of Kenya and the world's fifth largest refugee camp overall, has been described as a lawless city with no police or government structures to enforce rules (UNHCR, 2021; NBC News, 2013). Journalists reported in 2009 that the main threat facing refugees in Chad was the lawlessness and crime in the border regions where refugees live (Chrisafis, 2009). Even when refugees actively try to engage with domestic law and assert their rights, they are not able to: host country law is, at best, something they can observe from afar, as it applies to citizens in regions outside of refugee camps (Holzer, 2013). In some cases, the lawlessness is deliberate. In several refugee camps, including Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, extremist sympathizers who rule the camps prevent other authorities from enforcing rules to keep people safe (Reuters, 2017).

Argument

Drawing from the literature discussed above, I believe that refugee-on-refugee violence is best understood by looking at the stress and trauma caused by forced displacement. My argument is that forced displacement leads to the development and exacerbation of discriminatory beliefs

and makes people who hold those beliefs, whether they held them before their displacement or not, more likely to commit acts of violence. Refugee-on-refugee violence is influenced by ongoing political and economic violence insofar as those contribute to an environment of stress and social disorganization, but it is not a part of that violence.

Forced displacement leads to the development and exacerbation of discriminatory beliefs because of scapegoating. When groups experience extreme stress, such as when they are forced to leave behind all their belongings and flee horrific violence, they look for ways to make sense of it. A common way they do so is through blaming other groups for their suffering, whether through "rational" beliefs or through superstitions. Furthermore, forced displacement disrupts the normal organization of communities and societies and throws people into crowded, disorganized environments where they are forced to interact with people whom they might otherwise have avoided (Kaplan, 2022; Vinck, et al., 2022). This destruction of social organization and forced interaction with people of different identities in a high-stress environment makes it easier to find people to scapegoat.

Forced displacement leads to increased violence for four reasons. First,with more people holding the extreme views discussed above and blaming minorities and others for their harms, there are more potential actors to commit acts of violence; in other words, if there are more misogynistic people, the likelihood that someone commits a misogynistic act of violence is greater. Second, the political science and psychology literature on poverty, stress, and domestic violence demonstrates that increased stress is correlated with worse emotional regulation and more aggressive behavior; people in stressful environments, such as refugee camps, are more likely to act out violently. Third, when men feel that they have no control over their lives and cannot meet their obligations, their masculinity is threatened and they want to regain control,

which they often do by lashing out violently against others. Fourth, there is a lower opportunity cost of violence in refugee camps, both because people already feel that they have lost everything and so there is nothing left to lose and because of the environment of extreme lawlessness that prevents criminals from being punished and held accountable. While people may not commit acts of violence when they are at home and have stable lifestyles or know that they would be punished, if they already feel as though they have lost everything in a refugee camp, they will be more likely to.

This argument is a departure from the traditional understanding of refugee-related violence as being motivated by political or economic incentives or linked to ongoing organized violence. However, as I explain, because refugee-on-refugee violence receives less media attention than other violence, refugees and refugee-aligned actors motivated by political incentives will not achieve much if they only target other refugees. Similarly, because refugee camps are so devoid of resources and often lose what few resources they have when they become too unsafe for humanitarian workers, economic motivations are inadequate to explain all refugee-on-refugee violence. My argument thus explores refugee-on-refugee violence on a more individual, personal level, while recognizing that broader political, security, and economic dynamics influence the experiences of individual refugees and the context in which refugee-on-refugee violence occurs.

Methodology

I use the Political and Societal Violence By And Against Refugees (POSVAR) dataset, which was published by Gineste and Savun of the University of Pittsburgh in 2019 (Gineste & Savun, 2019). Burcu Savun is an associate professor of political science specializing in refugees,

civil war, and conflict resolution, and Christian Gineste is a data scientist who focuses on using data and artificial intelligence to advance social justice. The POSVAR dataset provides cross-sectional data on violence by and against refugees in every country in the world from 1996 to 2015, using the country-year as its unit of analysis (Ibid). The data are compiled from several existing conflict datasets, including the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, Social Conflict in Analysis Database, and Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict Dataset (Ibid). The authors supplement the data from these datasets with information from U.S. State Department country reports on human rights; the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) website; ReliefWeb, the UN's humanitarian news site; the databases ProQuest and LexisNexis; and the United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants' annual surveys (Ibid). Within each database, they found sources by searching for the keyword "refugee" as well as variable-specific keywords (Ibid). This dataset is extremely comprehensive but has 3 limitations: underreporting bias (refugees are likely to underreport violence), political bias (one of their main sources is the U.S. Department of State, which may be less likely to report on anti-refugee violence in U.S. ally nations), and temporal bias (advances in technology have made it easier to report and access reports of refugee violence between 1996 and 2015) (Ibid).

POSVAR measures a variety of types of violence by and against refugees, including refugee-on-refugee violence, violence between refugees and civilians (in both directions), and violence between refugees and governments (in both directions), as well as the political and economic situation in each country-year (Gineste & Savun, 2019). For the variables measuring specific types of violence, the dataset uses an ordinal scale from 0 to 3: 0 means that there is no mention of a violent event in a country-year, 1 means that there are isolated reports or an event with 1 to 25 victims/recruits, 2 means that a violent events are common or there are 25 to 99

victims/recruits, and 3 means that there is widespread violence (100 or more victims/recruits) (Ibid).

As a preliminary analysis, I perform a regression analysis to see if there is a linear relationship between external refugee-related violence and refugee-on-refugee violence. If refugee-on-refugee violence is a part of organized violence rather than a separate phenomenon, then we should expect to see a strong correlation between the two. If, however, I am correct that refugee-on-refugee violence is not a part of other forms of refugee-related violence, then there should not be a strong linear relationship between these variables. This regression analysis is not meant to definitively support or rule out any explanations; it is merely a preliminary analysis to shed light on the relationship between refugee-on-refugee violence and other violence.

The first independent variable for this regression analysis is "violence against refugees." I create this variable, which is meant to capture the extent to which organized actors target refugees, by averaging three scores in the POSVAR dataset: government violence against refugees, non-state actor violence against refugees, and terrorist violence against refugees. The second independent variable is "violence by refugees," and is intended to capture the participation of refugees in organized violence. I create this variable by averaging three scores in POSVAR: refugee violence against the government, refugee violence against non-state actors, and terrorist activities by refugees. The dependent variable is refugee-on-refugee violence. The two hypotheses are listed below.

H1: The linear relationship between violence against refugees and refugee-on-refugee violence is not statistically significant.

H2: The linear relationship between violence by refugees and refugee-on-refugee violence is not statistically significant.

I then move on to the main part of my analysis. After removing from the dataset all countries that do not have sufficient data (because they are missing some years or host a negligible number of refugees), I identify 59 country-years with a score of 1 or above for refugee-on-refugee violence. These are listed in Table 1.

Table 1: Country-years With At Least 1 Incident or Victim of Refugee-on-Refugee Violence

Bangladesh 2006	Ghana 2007	Kenya 2006	Sierra Leone 2007
Chad 2007	Ghana 2008	Kenya 2007	Tanzania 1999
Chad 2009	Ghana 2014	Kenya 2008	Tanzania 2000
Chad 2010	Guinea 2007	Kenya 2009	Tanzania 2001
Chad 2011	India 2001	Kenya 2011	Tanzania 2002
Chad 2012	Iraq 2014	Kenya 2012	Tanzania 2003
Chad 2013	Iraq 2015	Kenya 2013	Tanzania 2004
Chad 2014	Ivory Coast 2007	Kenya 2014	Tanzania 2005
Democratic Republic of the Congo 1996	Jordan 2013	Kenya 2015	Tanzania 2007
Djibouti 2013	Kenya 1999	Lebanon 2008	Tanzania 2014
Djibouti 2015	Kenya 2001	Nepal 2002	Tanzania 2015
Egypt 2006	Kenya 2002	Nepal 2007	Thailand 2006
Ethiopia 2002	Kenya 2003	Nepal 2008	Uganda 2001
Ethiopia 2003	Kenya 2004	Rwanda 2012	Uganda 2011
Ghana 2006	Kenya 2005	Sierra Leone 2006	

If I am correct in my individual-level explanation of refugee-on-refugee violence, then instances of violence should be driven by misogynistic, homophobic, racist, or other discriminatory attitudes targeting marginalized groups and should also include domestic and intimate partner violence, as those are closely linked to stress and social disorganization. To test

this, I look at the descriptions of refugee-on-refugee violence provided by POSVAR for each country-year that scores above 0 on the ordinal scale, as well as the primary sources, including news articles and database entries, that POSVAR cites. I identify the motivations for violence that are discussed in each primary source. To do this, I search each description or primary source for keywords in order to sort attacks into one of four categories; upon identifying the keywords, I then read the article and verify that the description does indeed belong in that category.

The first category is gender-based violence (including domestic violence, child abuse, and rape that is committed outside of war settings), and the keywords I use are "gender-based violence," "sexual violence," "sexual abuse," "domestic violence," "child abuse," and "rape." The second category is anti-LGBT violence (keywords: "LGBT," "LGBTQ," "gay," and "homophobic"). The third category is ethnic, religious, or tribal violence not explicitly associated with fighting or conflict outside of the camp (keywords: "racial," "ethnic," "sectarian," "tribal," "clan," and "religious"). The fourth category includes any articles that do not fall into the previous categories, including acts motivated by individual issues (such as tensions between two refugees or vigilante justice), as well as acts motivated by economic competition or political reasons. For this category, I do not include any specific keywords but read each remaining source to determine if it belongs here. I then analyze the frequency of each of these four categories of motivations for refugee-on-refugee violence to search for trends and identify the main motivations of refugee-on-refugee violence.

Results and Analysis

Refugee-on-Refugee Violence and Other Forms of Violence

As expected, my preliminary regression analysis demonstrates that the relationships between external violence against refugees and refugee-on-refugee violence and external violence by refugees and refugee-on-refugee violence are not statistically significant. The r-squared value for the former is 0.01602 (adjusted r-squared: 0.01575), and the r-squared value for the latter is 0.003265 (adjusted r-squared: 0.002991). Most states have low levels of external violence by refugees, regardless of their level of refugee-on-refugee violence, and refugee-on-refugee violence exists across all levels of external violence. Thus, the puzzle of refugee-on-refugee violence cannot be solved solely by looking at the explanations for other forms of violence. The full results of each regression analysis are shown below.

Table 2: Results of Regression Analysis: External Violence Against Refugees vs. Refugee-on-Refugee Violence

Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-0.88922	-0.01708	-0.01708	-0.01708	2.98292

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(>|t|)	
(Intercept)	0.017082	0.003338	5.118	3.25e-07	***
Ext_violenceagainstref	0.096904	0.012586	7.699	1.75e-14	***

Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

Residual standard error: 0.1959 on 3641 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.01602, Adjusted R-squared: 0.01575
F-statistic: 59.28 on 1 and 3641 DF, p-value: 1.75e-14

Table 3: Results of Regression Analysis: External Violence By Refugees vs. Refugee-on-Refugee Violence

Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-0.56061	-0.02181	-0.02181	-0.02181	2.97819

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)	0.021809	0.003287	6.634	3.74e-11 ***
Ext_violencebyref	0.089800	0.026003	3.453	0.00056 ***

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.1972 on 3641 degrees of freedom
(1 observation deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared: 0.003265, Adjusted R-squared: 0.002991
F-statistic: 11.93 on 1 and 3641 DF, p-value: 0.0005597

Motivations and Causes of Refugee-on-Refugee Violence

The main part of my analysis, as mentioned above, is to identify the specific motivations of refugee-on-refugee violence in the descriptions and primary sources for each country-year with a score of above 0 for refugee-on-refugee violence. Category 1 is gender-based violence that is not explicitly linked to war or politics (such as witchcraft accusations leading to violence and intimate partner violence), category 2 is anti-LGBTQ violence, category 3 is ethnic, racial, religious, or tribal violence, and category 4 is any attacks that do not fall into one of the former categories. Country-years with multiple attacks may fall into multiple categories. Prior to analyzing my results, I evaluate the incidents in categories 1, 2, and 3 to see if they are linked to political or economic motivations. I look especially closely at incidents in category 3 because of the strong overlap between ethnic violence and organized political violence.

I begin with the countries with several years of refugee-on-refugee violence. The data for Chad, Ghana, Kenya, Nepal, and Tanzania are shown below.

Table 4: Types of Refugee-on-Refugee Violence in Chad

Country-year	Category 1	Category 2	Category 3	Category 4
Chad 2007	Yes (women accused of witchcraft and attacked)	No	No	No
Chad 2009	Yes (rape)	No	No	No
Chad 2010	Yes (rape)	No	No	No
Chad 2011	Yes (rape)	No	No	No
Chad 2012	Yes (rape)	No	No	No
Chad 2013	Yes (rape)	No	No	No
Chad 2014	Yes (rape)	No	No	No

Notably, every instance of refugee-on-refugee violence reported in Chad was either rape or another form of gender-based violence. There were no references to any other type of violence. Rape perpetrated by refugees against other refugees was also not connected in the reports to any external political violence or conflict.

Table 6: Types of Refugee-on-Refugee Violence in Ghana

Country-year	Category 1	Category 2	Category 3	Category 4
Ghana 2006	Yes (coerced into having sex in exchange for favors)	No	No	No
Ghana 2007	Yes (rape and child abuse)	No	No	No
Ghana 2008	Yes (rape and statutory rape)	No	No	No
Ghana 2014	Yes (rape)	No	No	No

As with Chad, every instance of refugee-on-refugee violence reported in Ghana was sexual or gender-based violence. The violence included rape, statutory rape, child abuse, and sexual coercion. The sexual coercion in 2006 may have been linked to economic pressures (e.g., people were coerced in exchange for financial resources). However, that economic pressure does not explain why the perpetrator committed the crime; it was just a factor that enabled him to do so successfully. This report therefore does not count as economically motivated.

Table 7: Types of Refugee-on-Refugee Violence in Kenya

Country-year	Category 1	Category 2	Category 3	Category 4
Kenya 1999	Yes (domestic violence)	No	Yes (inter-clan fighting)	No
Kenya 2001	No	No	Yes (inter-clan fighting; religious and ethnic violence; violence against Somalis who marry non-Muslims)	Yes (violent clashes between Sudanese Dinka refugees)
Kenya 2002	No	No	Yes (inter-clan fighting)	No
Kenya 2003	No	No	Yes (inter-clan fighting)	No
Kenya 2004	No	No	Yes (inter-clan fighting)	No
Kenya 2005	Yes (rape as part of robbery)	No	Yes (inter-clan fighting; religious and ethnic violence)	Yes (robbery; see category 1)
Kenya 2006	Yes (rape)	No	Yes (inter-clan fighting; religious and ethnic violence)	No
Kenya 2007	Yes (rape, domestic violence)	No	Yes (inter-clan fighting)	No
Kenya 2008	Yes (rape)	No	No	Yes (banditry)
Kenya 2009	No	No	Yes (inter-clan violence)	No
Kenya 2011	Yes (rape)	No	No	Yes (banditry)
Kenya 2012	No	No	Yes (ethnic violence)	Yes (banditry)

Kenya 2013	No	No	Yes (ethnic violence)	No
Kenya 2014	No	No	Yes (ethnic violence)	Yes (banditry)
Kenya 2014	No	No	Yes (ethnic violence)	Yes (banditry)

There are three important points to note here. First, thirteen years include reports of ethnic, religious, or inter-clan violence. Most of these incidents took place at Dadaab refugee camp in the northeast of Kenya, which primarily hosts refugees from Somalia, and reflect pre-existing rivalries between Somali clans (Gineste and Savun, 2019). The descriptions of violence do not provide much detail; the 2006 report, for example, reads: "Inter-clan violence occasionally erupted among rival Somali clans at the camps" (Ibid). Because many of the refugees in Dadaab camp fled inter-clan fighting, I cannot determine if this violence is a continuation of the inter-clan fighting in Somalia or if it reflects increased tensions and biases caused by the experience of forced displacement (Ibid; Crisp, 2000). I count this violence as neither individual identity-based violence nor organized violence in my comparative analysis.

Second, inter-clan tensions in Kenya contributed to a general atmosphere of lawlessness, especially in the Kakuma camp in the southwest, which primarily hosts Sudanese refugees (Crisp, 2000). Traditional clan leaders have significant amounts of power and essentially control law enforcement activity, including arrests and punishment, which allows them to protect some refugees while targeting others (Ibid). This lawlessness helps explain the high level of crimes that fall into the fourth category (specifically, banditry and robbery). Although I do not count category 4 crimes as support for my argument about bias and discrimination, they help to paint a

picture of lawlessness in refugee camps that is not a direct part of external organized political violence.

Third, as in Chad and Ghana, domestic abuse and sexual violence are prevalent in Kenya's refugee camps, with reports from more than six years. This violence is not explicitly linked to inter-clan, religious, or ethnic violence. In one instance, it is linked to economic motivations (the rape was committed during a robbery), so I do not count that incident as an evidence for my individual-level bias and discrimination argument.

Table 8: Types of Refugee-on-Refugee Violence in Nepal

Country-year	Category 1	Category 2	Category 3	Category 4
Nepal 2002	Yes (sexual violence)	No	No	No
Nepal 2007	No	No	No	Yes (political disagreement over refugee resettlement policies)
Nepal 2008	No	No	No	Yes (same as above)

Nepal, like the previous countries, has reports of sexual violence that are not linked to political or economic motivations. It also has reports of political violence. According to the reports: "In August, a group of women refugees beat a camp secretary in a conflict over who would attend a meeting in Thailand about resettlement. Later that month, nearly 100 refugees fled the camp after refugee youths allegedly assaulted pro-resettlement refugees." (Gineste and Savun, 2019). This political violence is explicitly focused on refugee issues. Because it is political, I categorize it separately from the other forms of violence discussed – it does not

provide support for my proposed explanation – but because it is refugee-specific, I also do not count it as external organized violence in my analysis.

Table 9: Types of Refugee-on-Refugee Violence in Tanzania

Country-year	Category 1	Category 2	Category 3	Category 4
Tanzania 1999	Yes (rape)	No	No	Yes (vigilante justice)
Tanzania 2000	Yes (rape)	No	No	Yes (robbery)
Tanzania 2001	Yes (rape)	No	No	Yes (robbery)
Tanzania 2002	Yes (rape)	No	No	Yes (vigilante justice)
Tanzania 2003	Yes (rape	No	No	Yes (vigilante justice)
Tanzania 2004	Yes (rape)	No	No	No
Tanzania 2005	No	No	No	Yes (vigilante justice, robbery)
Tanzania 2007	No	No	No	Yes (vigilante justice)
Tanzania 2014	Yes (domestic violence)	No	No	No
Tanzania 2015	Yes (domestic violence)	No	No	No

There are two main types of refugee-on-refugee violence reported in Tanzania: sexual violence and vigilante justice. Some of the reports of sexual violence in Tanzania explicitly mention domestic violence, providing strong support for my proposed explanation. Males feel that their dominance is threatened, and that threat combined with the immense pressure they are under and the violence they have witnessed, leads to more violence against women. I do not

count vigilante justice as evidence for my explanation because there is no link to bias and discrimination, but it supports my argument that refugee camps are characterized by a culture of lawlessness.

Below are the results for the countries that had two years with reports of refugee-on-refugee violence.

Table 10: Types of Refugee-on-Refugee Violence in Countries with Two Years of violence

Country-year	Category 1	Category 2	Category 3	Category 4
Djibouti 2013	N/A; insufficient reporting	N/A; insufficient reporting	N/A; insufficient reporting	N/A; insufficient reporting
Djibouti 2015	N/A; insufficient reporting	N/A; insufficient reporting	N/A; insufficient reporting	N/A; insufficient reporting
Ethiopia 2002	No	No	Yes (ethnic)	No
Ethiopia 2003	No	No	Yes (ethnic)	No
Iraq 2014	Yes (rape, forced prostitution, and child marriage)	No	No	No
Iraq 2015	Yes (rape, forced prostitution, and child marriage)	No	No	No
Sierra Leone 2006	Yes (rape and sexual abuse)	No	No	No
Sierra Leone 2007	Yes (rape and sexual abuse)	No	No	No
Uganda 2001	Yes (sexual violence)	No	No	No
Uganda 2011	No	Yes (attacks against LGBTQ refugees)	No	No

Two country-years (Djibouti 2013 and Djibouti 2015) did not have sufficient details in their reports to categorize the violence, so I exclude them from my analysis. There are significant levels of sexual violence, including rape, forced prostitution, and child marriage among the remaining data points. There are also two other cases worth discussing here.

First, in Uganda in 2011, there were also reports of violence against LGBTQ refugees, lending support to my proposed explanation: "During the year, a local NGO reported attacks on Congolese LGBT refugees by other Congolese refugees" (Gineste and Savun, 2019). This is the first instance of anti-LGBTQ violence identified in the data.

Second, there were reports of ethnic violence in Ethiopia. The 2002 source reads: "Due to violent clashes between different ethnic groups during the year, thousands of persons were killed, injured, and displaced internally (see Section 5). For example, on November 27, ethnic clashes within the Fugnido camp between Dinka and Nuer refugees left 39 refugees dead and 9 injured" (Gineste and Savun, 2019). The Dinka and Nuer are the two largest ethnic groups in South Sudan and have historically clashed because of competition over land and water (Richardson, 2011). However, as of the early 2000s when the refugee-on-refugee violence took place, these clashes had not escalated into large-scale conflict (Ibid). Because it is not possible to determine whether the tensions between the Dinka and Nuer were exacerbated by forced displacement, I do not count this case as evidence for my explanation, but I also do not count it as external organized violence.

The 2003 report states: "Six refugees were killed and several others wounded during clashes between ethnic Anuak and Nuer refugees in Fugnido camp in August" (Ibid). The Anuak and the Nuer are the two largest ethnic groups in the Ethiopia-Sudan border region, and both view themselves as indigenous to the region (Human Rights Watch, 2005). In the 1980s, the

Anuak were the largest ethnic group in the region, but large levels of Nuer migration threatened their dominance and led to ongoing ethnic tensions and violence between the two groups (Ibid). The violence between Anuak and Nuer refugees in Ethiopia thus reflects ongoing ethnic violence outside of the camp, so I count this fighting as an example of refugee-on-refugee violence that is part of external organized violence.

Below are the results for countries with one year where refugee-on-refugee violence was reported.

Table 11: Types of Refugee-on-refugee Violence in Countries with One year of Violence

Country-year	Category 1	Category 2	Category 3	Category 4
Bangladesh 2006	Yes (sexual abuse)	No	No	No
Democratic Republic of the Congo 1996	No	No	No	Yes (refugee camp leaders killed refugees who tried to return to Rwanda)
Egypt 2006	No	No	No	Yes (refugee youth gangs fought with each other)
Guinea 2007	Yes (rape and gender-based violence)	No	No	No
India 2001	Yes (domestic violence, sexual abuse, child marriage)	No	No	No
Ivory Coast 2007	Yes (child rape)	No	No	No

Jordan 2013	Yes (gang rape)	No	No	No
Lebanon 2008	No	No	No	Yes (unknown attacker shot a Fatah member in a refugee camp)
Rwanda 2012	Yes (gender-based violence)	No	No	No
Thailand 2006	N/A; insufficient reporting	N/A; insufficient reporting	N/A; insufficient reporting	N/A; insufficient reporting

Like the Djibouti data, the Thailand 2006 report does not provide sufficient details to categorize the violence; it only states that "most violence occurred in conflicts among refugees and over half of the reported murders occurred inside the camps" (Gineste and Savun, 2019). The most common type of violence reported was once more sexual violence, including child rape, gang rape, domestic violence, and child marriage. These incidents were not explicitly connected to political or economic motivations. The Rwanda report provides an interesting anecdote demonstrating the lawlessness in refugee camps: "While police issued arrest warrants against some perpetrators, they refused to enter the camps to execute warrants. Intimidation of police and victims by camp leaders contributed to a general sense of impunity within the refugee community, especially in relation to gender-based violence (GBV)" (Gineste and Savun, 2019). Some refugees in the camp amassed power and used that power to enable sexual violence.

There were three instances of violence that do not support my hypothesis about bias and discrimination but demonstrate the lawlessness of refugee camps, including the fighting between refugee youth gangs in Egypt in 2006 and the killing by refugee camp leaders of refugees who wanted to leave in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1996.

Analysis of the Motivations and Causes of Refugee-on-Refugee Violence

Graph 1: Country-Years With Reports for Each Category of Refugee-on-Refugee Violence



The graph above shows the frequency of each category of refugee-on-refugee violence. Category 1 (sexual and gender-based violence) constitutes a majority of the violence. There was only one reported instance of anti-LGBTQ refugee-on-refugee violence, indicating either that this violence does not occur at high levels or that it is underreported. Importantly, a majority of instances of violence (categories 1 and 2) are the type of individual bias and discrimination-based violence that I expected to see, lending support to my hypothesis. The high level of sexual violence, including several mentions of family abuse and domestic violence, lends support to my argument about males feeling that their status is threatened by forced displacement and responding by acting violently towards the people around them.

Category 3, which includes ethnic, racial, religious, and inter-clan violence, also constitutes a significant portion of the violence, as does category 4 (other). These two categories are explored in greater detail below.

Graph 2: Motivations and Types of Violence in Category 4



Graph 2 shows the motivations and types of violence included in category 4. Under "economic," I include crimes labeled as "robbery" or "banditry" in the descriptions; the other categories match the terminology used in the descriptions. The most common cause of violence is economic motivation, indicating that I was incorrect to dismiss economic motivations for refugee-on-refugee violence. There are no forms of violence under category 4 that count as external political violence, supporting the argument that refugee-on-refugee violence is not usually a part of external organized violence. On the contrary, the data paint a picture of refugee camps as lawless environments where robbery, political violence, and vigilante justice occur. I explore this picture in greater detail in my final graph below.

Graph 3: Overall Motivations for Refugee-on-Refugee Violence



Graph 3 ultimately categorizes each report of violence as one of four types. The first category is "Discrimination, Bias, or Intimate Partner/Family Violence," which includes domestic violence; sexual violence that is not explicitly linked to economic or political motivations; anti-LGBT violence; and ethnic, religious, racial, or inter-clan violence that is not linked to external organized violence. (There are no instances that fall into that last group because I am not able to rule out external connections for any of the descriptions of ethnic violence that are provided.) Category 1 captures the types of violence that I predict in my individual-level bias and discrimination argument: identity-based violence, domestic violence, and other violence against marginalized populations.

The second category is other internal violence, including banditry, robbery, vigilante justice, and other crimes that are not linked to external organized violence but do not fit the type of identity-based violence that I argue is most likely. This category does not support my argument about bias, discrimination, and stress – on the contrary, it includes economically

motivated crimes, which my argument initially rejected – but it does support my portrayal of refugee camps as lawless environments. Certain types of crime in this category may also support other parts of my argument, such as the argument that forced displacement makes aggressive behavior more likely; perhaps vigilante justice, for example, is a form of scapegoating and is a result of the stress of forced displacement.

The third category is external violence. The only incident that falls into this category is the violence between the Anuak and Nuer refugees in Ethiopia. All of the other instances of ethnic, racial, religious, or inter-clan violence fall into category 4, unknown, because I cannot definitively determine if they are linked to external organized violence.

The results provide strong support for my argument. The most common types of refugee-on-refugee violence, by a significant margin, are identity-based violence, violence that is linked to discrimination or bias against a group, and violence against an intimate partner or family member. These are not the only types of violence - refugee camps are evidently lawless environments with high levels of crime - but that they are the most common supports my argument. In addition, only one example of violence is directly linked to external organized violence, further strengthening my argument that refugee-on-refugee violence should be examined separately from other types of refugee-related violence.

Discussion

This study has three main takeaways. First, the results provide strong support for my argument. I argue that forced displacement leads to the development and exacerbation of discriminatory beliefs because of scapegoating and the destruction of social organization and that it increases violence because of this increased level of bias, the stress and trauma of forced

displacement increase aggressive behavior, men feel that they have no control and lash out against women and children in their lives, and refugee camps are characterized by an atmosphere of lawlessness. Most instances of violence that I am able to categorize are linked to identity, marginalization, and domestic violence. The high level of domestic violence and sexual abuse provides especially strong support for my argument about the psychological impact on men of forced displacement, stress, and loss of control.

Second, most of the other violence that has sufficient information to be categorized is not linked to external organized violence and, although it is not linked to identity-based violence, may still be a result of the individual-level stress that I argue explains refugee-on-refugee violence. A significant portion of that violence was caused by economic motivations, showing that my argument wrongly dismissed economic motivations for refugee-on-refugee violence. However, it is possible that parts of my explanation are compatible with economic explanations. For example, perhaps men are more likely to resort to violence over scarce resources when they feel that they have no control over their lives and are going to lose their status as breadwinner for their families. Or, perhaps the psychological impact of forced displacement makes people more aggressive in economic competition, leading to violence. There may even be overlap between the identity-based and economic explanations: people may be more likely to target women, LGBTQ people, and members of other ethnic, racial, religious, or tribal groups to steal resources from them. Future research should aim to integrate both psychological and economic explanations.

Third, this study identifies political violence in refugee camps that is not linked to civil war or external political violence. Specifically, in Nepal, refugees committed acts of violence against each other because of disagreements over who should get to represent the refugee community and conflict over refugee resettlement policies. These issues are refugee-specific –

they were not important enough to people outside of the refugee setting to lead to organized violence there – and they are political, demonstrating the importance of understanding refugee camps as political environments that can operate separately from host country political environments. Future research should examine political disagreement and political violence within refugee camps to identify if they are prevalent beyond the Nepal example. Researchers should also conduct more investigations into the relationship between identity and marginalization and political violence in refugee camps. For instance, do the cleavages that divide refugees politically reflect differences in identity and marginalization? Are refugee perpetrators of violence more likely to target women or members of different ethnic groups who disagree with them politically than they are to target people with whom they share an identity?

My findings also have important implications for efforts to protect refugees from violence. First, this study demonstrates the vulnerability of refugees with marginalized identities, especially women, children, LGBTQ people, and ethnic minorities. Future policies intended to reduce refugee-on-refugee violence should focus on protecting these groups from violence, including violence committed by their family members. Humanitarian actors and policymakers should provide reporting systems for intimate partner violence and protection for people who experience domestic violence and need to be relocated away from an abusive partner. Protection for women from perpetrators of violence may be difficult to provide within a camp, in which case policymakers should consider creating women-only camps or areas, which can be guarded by security forces. Any reporting system must be paired with sufficient security for people who report crimes to prevent them from retaliation (or from failing to report violence for fear of retaliation).

Second, humanitarian actors should design programs to promote social cohesion within camps and prevent the scapegoating of specific groups. These programs should focus on teaching refugees about the scientific reasons for traumatic occurrences (e.g., why certain diseases spread more quickly in crowded camp environments) and dispelling myths that blame marginalized groups for those occurrences (e.g., refuting beliefs about women and witchcraft). They should also include activities involving communication and interaction between members of different ethnic and racial groups in order to foster ties across ethnic and racial lines and prevent the outbreak of violence. In order to be effective, these programs must be culturally sensitive and recognize the norms and beliefs of different refugee communities. One way to design culturally sensitive social cohesion and public education programs would be to have refugees themselves, especially members of marginalized groups, help design the programs.

Third, these findings show that any attempts to reduce refugee-on-refugee violence must combat the lawlessness that is rampant in refugee camps. Providing security to protect refugees from external violence is not enough: states must ensure that the rule of law is respected in refugee camps and that rogue actors are not able to amass large amounts of power and usurp the state's authority. An important part of this is preventing refugee camps from becoming too large and becoming "states" of their own that the host state cannot penetrate. Another important aspect is ensuring that victims of crimes in refugee camps are supported as victims outside of camps would be supported, whether they choose to pursue punitive justice or seek psychological or other support. States could also reduce lawlessness by providing people with sufficient food and other resources so that they do not have incentives to commit economically-motivated crimes and so that rogue actors cannot use the promise of food and resources to extract support from camp residents. Finally, states should ensure that the physical set-up and infrastructure of camps

are designed to minimize crime. Research on non-camp settings, for instance, has found that better street lights and wider sidewalks are linked to less violence against women (UN Women, undated). Refugee camps should similarly be designed to make crimes more visible and exposed.

My findings also have implications for future academic research. This study demonstrates the strong presence of domestic violence, sexual violence, and other identity-based violence in refugee camps, but to truly identify the causal mechanisms underlying refugee-on-refugee violence, a more comparative approach is necessary. Future research should look at the extent to which prejudiced views exist in refugee camps that do not have refugee-on-refugee violence, as well as the extent to which they exist in communities that experience conflict and poverty but not forced displacement specifically.

Beyond exploring bias and identity-based violence, researchers should also look more holistically at refugee settlements that do not have high levels of refugee-on-refugee violence. What is different about them? Are laws enforced better or differently? Are refugees provided with more humanitarian assistance, reducing their desperation? Are the camps smaller? Less ethnically or racially diverse? Are there higher or lower levels of turnover? In other words, do refugees move in and out of camps more quickly than in camps with high levels of refugee-on-refugee violence, or do they stay for longer periods of time? Research on the differences between environments with high levels of refugee-on-refugee violence and environments without such violence can supplement this study on identity-based violence to identify the factors that come together to cause and enable refugee-on-refugee violence. Regardless of the approach that future research takes, this project has demonstrated the importance of an individual-level, psychologically-informed approach to refugee-on-refugee violence, rather than assuming it is part of organized violence.

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