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From Reform to Revolution: The Intersection of Political-Economic and Enlightenment Ideologies in the Eighteenth-Century Evolution of Irish Patriotism

By

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Abbreviations:

JHC-I: *Journals of the House of Commons of the Kingdom of Ireland*

JHC-GB: *Journals of the House of Commons* (Great Britain)

PRHC-I: The Parliamentary Register of the House of Commons of Ireland

Introduction

The Irish Rebellion of 1798 fundamentally originated in the political-economic conflict which developed between various ideologies of Whig political economy in the British Empire in the late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-centuries. This conflict came to a head in the latter half of the eighteenth-century as the public sphere in Ireland expanded and the populous developed a greater degree of influence in politics. Irish Patriotism originated as a specific form of Whiggish political-economic ideology. In its most general definition, Whig political-economic ideology in the eighteenth-century consisted of increased state intervention in the pursuit of inciting labor-wealth creation and civil development, financed through the strengthening of a credit-based economic system. By the late-eighteenth century, this economic philosophy had become normative in the British metropole; what was primarily contested now was in regard to the degree and extent such aims should or could be sought across the empire. Irish Patriotism, in its political-economic element, sought these aims within Ireland through Irish Parliamentary autonomy. Proponents of this political-economic objective in Ireland initially utilized constitutional arguments for legislative independence but over the course of the eighteenth-century grew to include natural rights justifications for the same economic aims, such as free trade. While the older constitutional arguments did not necessarily require Whiggish political-economic aims, they did often serve the purposes of those pursuing such aims before the explosion of the Irish Patriot platform within the populace after the mid-century.

The transformation of justifications by those in favor of Irish Parliamentary autonomy is seen in the popular sentiments expressed in newspapers and pamphlets by newly formed social clubs and societies within a burgeoning associational culture. The impact of these societies on

politics and *vice versa* can be tracked in the published writings of prominent thinkers, their correspondences, and the Parliamentary Journals and Registers of the period. When considered from this light, the failed rebellion of 1798 is better understood as a failed *revolution* within an age of enlightened revolutions. Since this essay is primarily concerned with the political-economic conflict and the sociopolitical enlightened ideologies which contributed to the failed revolution of 1798, the scope of this essay sets its lattermost boundary at around the formation of the Society of United Irishmen in 1791.[1]

I will briefly here give an outline of the conflicting Whig ideologies so as to set the stage before delving too deeply into them in the next chapter. James Livesey locates at least three differing forms of Whiggish free trade ideology during this period: imperial free trade, Smithean free trade, and national free trade.[2] Similarly, Justin du Rivage categorized the eighteenth century's political-economic ideological differences into three groups: the establishment Whigs, the authoritarian reformers, and the radical Whigs.[3] For du Rivage, the establishment Whigs were advocates of a commercial empire but were also painted with the hues of fiscal-militarism;

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[1] For a few of the historical accounts which have taken different approaches in analyzing the revolutionary nature of the Society of United Irishmen, see Michael Alpaugh, *Friends of Freedom: The Rise of Social Movements in the Age of Atlantic Revolutions,* (Cambridge University Press, 2022); Kenneth L. Dawson, *The Belfast Jacobin: Samuel Neilson and the United Irishmen,* (Irish Academic Press, 2017); Jim Smyth, *The Men of No Property: Irish Radicals and Popular Politics in the Late Eighteenth Century,* (Palgrave Macmillan, 1998); and Keeron Ó Luian, *Rathcoole and the United Irish Rebellions, 1798-1803,* (Four Courts Press, 2019).

[2] James Livesey, "Free Trade and Empire in the The Anglo-Irish Commercial Propositions of 1785," *Journal of British Studies* Vol. 52, no. 1 (2013): 103. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41999183.

[3] Justin du Rivage, *Revolution against Empire: Taxes, Politics, and the Origins of American Independence,* (Yale University Press, 2017), p. 6.

authoritarian reformers were proponents of fiscal austerity and imperial hierarchy which saw the colonial assets of the empire as necessarily subordinate to the metropole; and the radical Whigs held that the government should promote the well-being of all of its imperial citizens "whether they lived in colonies or not" and that the foundations of an empire of liberty rested in commercial reciprocity and civil development.[4] Of the radicals, du Rivage writes, "Most radicals believed that Parliament had a right to regulate commerce, but they also insisted that when these restrictions benefited the mother country at the expense of the colonies they ceased to be legitimate."[5] Intentionality behind ideology will an important political-economic distinction for this essay.

This essay considers useful Livesey's distinctions of free trade and du Rivage's ideological categorizations of Whigs. However, my research has led me to a further refining and recategorizing of these differences under a new system of parameters which bifurcates the Whig political-economic ideology into its two most general groupings: regionalist Whigs and inter-imperial Whigs. From these two groupings there are further subgroups. The two subgroups for the regionalist Whigs are the regionalist-hierarchical Whigs and the regionalist-autonomous Whigs. For the inter-imperial Whigs, the subgroups are the imperial-axial Whigs and the imperial-nondiscriminatory Whigs. To be clear, these groupings and subgroups are not intended as comprehensive party platforms or even factions; these are merely very general political-

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[4] Thomas Jefferson's conception of an empire of liberty for the United States was predicated on radical Whig ideology which held similar ideals for the British Empire after the Glorious Revolution, see du Rivage, *Revolution against Empire*, pp. 8, 183, 245.

[5] du Rivage, *Revolution against Empire*, p. 245.

economic identifiers with regard to the desired degree and extent of labour-wealth creation through Whiggish development across the empire.

Both subgroups of the regionalist Whigs were of the perspective that the implementation of Whiggish political-economic ideology for the fullest development of labour-wealth creation could not be extended to all parts of the empire simultaneously. The manufacturing and commercial sectors of one's own region could not be developed in an imperially shared interest of true positive-sum labor-wealth creation across the empire. For the regionalist-hierarchal subgroup, this limited view of labor-wealth creation was ideological and was predicated on the idea that particular manufacturing and commercial progress in non-metropole regions could often be to the competitive disadvantage of the metropole and thereby the empire. Since this regionalist-hierarchical subgroup perceived the metropole as the foremost region of the imperial hierarchy, this subgroup's ideology was therefore imbued with an intentionality to subordinate the economies of other regions of the empire and often to suppress their manufacturing potential for the benefit of England then Britain's manufacturing and commercial interests. For the regionalist-autonomous subgroup, the limited view of Whiggish political-economic implementation was rather more a matter of practical necessity given the lack of adequate regional representation within the imperial system to ensure equitable Whiggish development across the empire and particularly in one's own region. In other words, for the regionalist-hierarchical subgroup, the issue was truly ideologically oriented; for the regionalist-autonomous subgroup, the issue was often instead oriented on what was most practicable.

The inter-imperial Whigs believed that Whiggish political-economic ideology could be implemented to the mutual benefit of the commercial and manufacturing potentials of all regions

of the empire. Both subgroups of the inter-imperial Whigs were true positive-sum ideologists for the potential of creating labor-wealth within and across the empire. The imperial-axial Whigs believed that the Westminster Parliament should implement policies unequally but equitably per region so as to foster the particular needs of commerce and manufacturing in any given region with the greater intention of positive-sum labor-wealth creation in a noncompetitive imperial system predicated on *equitable* relations. The imperial-nondiscriminatory Whigs, on the other hand, were of the perspective that political-economic policy should be *equally* and universally applied within the imperial system and were generally proponents of inter-imperial free trade. Both of the inter-imperial Whig ideological subgroups were intricately associated with the need for expanded recognition and representation of peripheral regions within the imperial system to ensure fair treatment and Whiggish economic development in the pursuit of labor-wealth creation across the empire.

In delving into the long term development of the ideologies which defined the Society of United Irishmen and Irish Patriotism of the 1790s, this essay establishes a more clear evolutionary line which provides evidence for the authenticity of enlightened Patriot ideology. The Irish Patriot platform, which was later adopted by the Society of United Irishmen, evolved over the course of the eighteenth-century to fuse Whiggish political-economic ideology and enlightenment sociopolitical philosophy in pursuit of regionalist-autonomous ideological ends, particularly legislative independence and free trade. Understanding these concepts is vital to understanding the uprising of 1798 as a failed revolution which developed alongside – not because of – other enlightened revolutions of the late eighteenth-century. What can be conceived of as core enlightenment ideological thought – expanded political representation, social equality,

free association – was intricately related in the British imperial peripheries to the necessities of the pursuit of the most general ideas of Whiggish political-economic ideology in the eighteenth-century.

The need for an expansion and deepening of the franchise of political representation as a means to ensure a form of Whiggish or bourgeois political-economic development in pursuit of the creation of labor-wealth in commerce and industry was an especially salient factor which contributed to the transatlantic age of revolutions. Political-economic development in the pursuit of increased labor-wealth through manufacturing and commercialism was a primary economic motivating factor for enlightened revolutions across Europe and the Americas. Ireland in the eighteenth-century developed under similar conditions and in conjunction with other revolutions of the period. The Irish uprising in 1798 would be better considered a failed enlightenment revolution than some form of peasant *jacquerie* or sectarian conflict.[6]

An examination of the Whiggish political-economic conflict which spanned the eighteenth-century also sheds light on the interconnected and ultimately shared nature of the Irish question with other eighteenth-century British imperial shifts such as the American Revolution and the turn towards despotic rule in the East with what has been called the "Second British Empire" in the late eighteenth-century.[7] The political-economic ideology which was amenable to despotic and extractive British rule in the East was always present in British politics

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[6] For the peasant *jacquerie* perspective, see Thomas Pakenham, *The Year of Liberty: The Story of the Great Irish Rebellion of 1798,* (Hodder and Stoughton, 1969).

[7] For conceptions of the Second British Empire, see James Vaughn, *The Politics of Empire at the Accession of George III: The East India Company and Transformation of Britain's Imperial State,* (Yale University Press, 2019); and C.A. Bayly, *The Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the Modern World 1780-1830,* (Longman Group, 1989).

as the ideology of the regionalist-hierarchical ideology which conceived the empire in terms of subordinating the economies of the peripheries of the empire to the economic development of the metropole. The degree and extent of the implementation of this despotic political-economic ideology was most actualized in the East but was implemented to a lighter degree in Ireland and eventually in America as well. This essay will limit itself primarily the conflict created by this political-economic ideology in Ireland but will also often tie the narrative back to the imperial perspective through the examination of similarities with America and the East such as in India and Bengal.

The early 1780s was a period of significant legislative reform in the relationship between Ireland and Great Britain. During this period, the Parliament of Ireland managed to attain a degree of legislative and economic autonomy which had been long denied through imperial policies; these reforms are often referred to as the legislative revolution of 1782.[8] However, the ostensible amelioration of relations from this legislative revolution was not permanent. This inquiry reveals that a deterioration of relations between the British imperial government and the Irish Patriots in Parliament and populous occurred due primarily to the conflict between varying eighteenth-century conceptions of Whiggish political-economy which were debated both across the empire and in the metropole.

The political-economic ideological factors which created the Irish Patriot platform of the eighteenth-century also lay at the heart of other social and political conflicts occurring on a larger scale across the British Empire within the greater age of revolutions. Ultimately, the Irish

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[8] Steve Pincus provides evidence for the significance of the legislative revolution of the early 1780s, Steve Pincus, "Ideological Origins of the Irish Revolution," *The New England Quarterly* 91, no. 1 (2018): 240–74. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26405913.

legislative revolution of 1782 was part of this larger crisis but failed to lastingly assuage unrest in Ireland because proponents of a varied strains of Whiggish political-economic thought in the British Parliament failed to adequately address the true ideological crisis at the core of Irish Patriot discontent with the metropole. The Irish Patriot Parliamentarians and the Volunteers were both largely fueled by a specific form of Whiggish political-economic ideology that was only ever acquiesced to by the British government due to practical necessities but was never ideologically assented to. The Volunteers in Ireland, as the primogenitor of the Society of United Irishmen, fit neatly into the same mould as other prominent revolutionary societies in the age of revolutions such as the Sons of Liberty in Colonial America or the Jacobin Club in France.[9]

The reason why Britain during the age of revolutions only experienced revolution and rebellion in its non-metropole appendages is that "bourgeois" or "Whiggish" political-economic aims had become normative in the British metropole by the end of the eighteenth-century due to an increased degree of Parliamentary agency which was attained at the end of the Glorious Revolution. However, the desired extent and degree in the implementation of these Whiggish political-economic aims was still hotly debated in the metropole and across the empire. Even "new Tories" of the late eighteenth-century such as William Pitt the Younger sought Whiggish labor-wealth creation through prioritizing manufacturing and trade for the metropole. While initially Pitt expanded British economic policies to Ireland, he remained preferential to the regionalist-hierarchical perspective as is most clearly seen in the extractive nature of Britain's relationship with India and Asia.[10] While Pitt's India Act of 1784 partially sought to implement a

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[9] Alpaugh, *Friends of Freedom.*

[10] Bayly, *The Imperial Meridian*, pp. 30-32.

degree of law and order to British India and Bengal, it also effectively recognized the legitimacy of the extractive commercial practices of the East India Company. A record of the Parliamentary debates on Pitt's India Bill of 1784 reveal Pitt's contentedness with commercial extraction so long as it was done through legal public offices and not to the benefit of private individuals:

> "Government and commerce were the two great objects to be looked to…The commerce of the Company exclusively belonged to them; nor was it till the territorial acquisitions of the Company became considerable, that the public claimed any participation in the advantages arising from the resources of those acquisitions, in the obtainment of which they had borne so large a share. The commerce to and from India, therefore, he [Pitt] meant to leave, where it ought to be left, in the management of the Company.[11]

Charles Fox, expressed his concern about Pitt introducing three distinct components in one bill on the matter: reforms for the government of India, the treatment of the natives, and the punishing of delinquents. Fox was satisfied with the reforms suggested with regard to treating the natives better and harsher punishments for delinquents but thought it improper that Pitt would not allow a separate bill for reforms of governmental control of India. Fox found that Pitt's idea of governmental control "differed so much from what he conceived to be the true principle on which reform of the government of India ought to be founded, that he thought it his duty to give every opposition to it in his power."[12] Of course Fox may have just been sour that his own proposed bill to reform the East India Company had lead directly to the dismissal by the King of of the Fox-North coalition; however, Fox's bill was also much more intense in its reformative intentions, seeking to essentially nationalize the East India Company so as to bring it fully under

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[11] "Debate in the Commons on Mr. Pitt's Bill for the Government of India," *The Parliamentary History of England from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803* v. XXIV, edited by William Cobbett, (Printed by T.C. Hansard, 1814), p. 1090, HaithiTrust, https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015087741123.

[12] "Debate in the Commons on Mr. Pitt's Bill…India," p. 1100.

control of the British Parliament. It seems likely then that Fox may have legitimately found concern with the fact that Pitt was content to allow the East India Company to continue its commercial methods, albeit under partial authority and benefit of the British government. Fox held a relatively consistent perspective of opposition to regionalist-hierarchical policies; he had also opposed Lord North's imperial posturing in the American Colonies, stating as early as 1774:

> Just as the House of Commons stands to the House of Lords, with regard to taxation and legislation, so stands America with Great Britain. There is not an American, but who must reject and resist the principle and right of our taxing them. The question, then, is shortly this, whether we ought to govern America on these principles…whether it is more proper to govern by military force, or by management.[13]

For Fox, management and cooperation were clearly more preferential methods of colonial governance than domination and force. Pitt the Younger sought to bring the East India Company under British governmental oversight so as to redirect a portion of the profits from private pockets to the metropole's coffers without disrupting the company's core commercial practices too much. Any stated concern Pitt had about the treatment of the natives and the compatibility of government action in India with English constitutional liberties would seem to have been primarily the mere sleight-of-hand of an experienced politician attempting to camouflage to some degree his unsavory intentions to continue an extractive commercial relationship with India and Bengal for the metropole's benefit.

All this is to provide some evidence for the Whiggishness of the regionalist-hierarchical perspective; more evidence will be provided on this over the natural course of the paper. Due to the normative nature of the implementation of Whiggish political-economic ideology for at least

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[13] "Reconciliation with America," in *The speeches of the Right Honourable Charles James Fox, in the House of Commons* v. 1, (May 2nd, 1774), p. 30, HaithiTrust, https://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433075877120.

the metropole, manufacturing and commercial development in the late eighteenth-century were never seriously threatened in the British isles by Parliament; however, the discord between ideological differences in varied conceptions of the desired degree and extent of Whiggish political-economy across the empire during the eighteenth-century created environments of conflict in non-metropole regions. The consequences of this ideological conflict would result in revolutionary developments in regions of the empire which were not securely assured of equitable treatment in the pursuit of Whiggish political-economic improvement. These revolutions can be termed "enlightened revolutions" in the sense that the bourgeois political-economic aims of these uprisings developed in tandem with a general revolution in social consciousness that tended towards ideas of social equality, expanded political participation, and natural rights.

In their essay "Challenging the Fiscal-Military Hegemony," Steve Pincus and James Robinson emphasize the political choices stemming from the dialogue between Whigs and Tories after the end of the Glorious Revolution until the end of the eighteenth-century. These political choices, according to Pincus and Robinson, provide evidence for the intentionality behind what they see as a Whig-driven modernization process that was much more than *just* militarily competitive in nature. They write, "In many ways, then, the institutionalization of party politics after 1688 made the implementation of Whig economic ideology possible."[14] This development of party politics is central to the political-economic model that Pincus and Robinson propose as a more comprehensive model than the purely fiscal-military political-economic paradigm. It is

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[14] Steve Pincus and James Robinson, "Challenging the Fiscal-Military Hegemony: The British Case," in *The British Fiscal-Military States, 1660-c.1783,* (Routledge, 2016), p. 249.

evident that Pincus and Robinson view a cohesive Whig party as primarily responsible for the liberalization of Britain as a modern developmental state. They write, "And it turns out, the British government spent most heavily on civil development not in England, but in Scotland, Ireland, and in the plantations. Britain diverged from the European and historical pattern because the Whigs, in large part, believed that unlimited economic growth was possible."[15] Pincus and Robinson emphasize the interventionist model of a solidly Whig imperial system proactively prioritizing civil development in Ireland, Scotland, and the West Atlantic. This political-economic model is crucial for comprehending the economic interests behind the interventionist British state of the eighteenth century; however, this model of a united Whig ideology doesn't fully convey the more distinctive differences of commercially-motivated ideologies within the genre of Whiggish political-economy across the empire in the eighteenth-century.

While Whigs certainly differed from Tories in their preference for the manufacturing and commercial sectors of the economy over the landed interests, the political-economic visions within the Whig faction itself were just as divisive if not more so. The extent to which Whigs in the early eighteenth-century, as a united party, earnestly sought to pursue economic growth in a region of the empire like Ireland is questionable. This is not to say that there weren't discernible party-like differences between Whigs and Tories but only that the flux of perspectives within these amalgamated groups were often more consequential than any party-to-party differences. These Whig differences prevailed from the post-Glorious Revolution until the end of the eighteenth century and were often a more contributive component of various eighteenth-century British imperial conflicts than the standard diametric of Whig-Tory differences.

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[15] Pincus and Robinson, "Challenging the Fiscal-Military Hegemony," p. 248.

Over the following chapters, I will delve into the sources of evidence which support the aforementioned Whig categorizations and further explicate how they operated in their place and time. I will then get into the specifics of the relations between Ireland and Britain starting in the mid-century with the development of Irish Patriotism, culminating with an examination of the reforms of the1780s and why they failed to produce lasting peaceable relations between Britain and Ireland. Throughout all of this I will be utilizing the various Whig categorizations I have developed to better conceptualize the ideological political-economic conflict at hand.

Chapter 1. Conflicting Whig Ideologies - Groups and Subgroups

The imperial-axial Whigs conceived the empire to be an equal compact between different parts, all under a single sovereign authority. Edmund Burke, along with some other Rockinghamites, was a proponent of the imperial-axial ideology. Whereas a hierarchy would be predicated on serving the benefit of the highest authority, imperial-axial ideology could be thought of as a wheel of spokes which all benefit from their connection to the center and *vice versa*. While a given colony may benefit by a particular political privilege so as to maximize its natural labor-wealth potential, another colony may benefit by another, and still the metropole by another with none benefiting to the detriment of another's labor-wealth development. Edmund Burke summed up the imperial-axial perspective where he wrote:

> An empire is the aggregate of many states under one common head, whether this head be a monarch or presiding republic. It does in such constitutions frequently happen…that the subordinate parts have many local privileges and immunities. Between these privileges and the supreme common authority, the line may be extremely nice. Of course disputes… will arise. Bu though every privilege is an exemption – in the case – from the ordinary exercise of the supreme authority, it is no denial of it. The claim of privilege seems rather, *ex vi termini,* to imply a superior power…Now in such unfortunate quarrels among the component parts of a great political union of communities I can scarcely conceive anything more completely imprudent than for the head of the empire to insist that, if any privilege is pleaded against his will or his acts, his whole authority is denied; instantly to proclaim rebellion, to beat arms, and to put the offending provinces under the ban.[16]

The idea presented here by Burke was to allow the American colonies to legally act through their colonial assemblies, as if by Parliamentary committee, in pursuit of the political-economic policies that they understood as best benefiting the development of their economy. This would not negate the legislative authority of the British Parliament nor would it divide that authority

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[16] Edmund Burke, *Speech on Conciliation with America: With other Writings of Burke, Speeches by Pitt and Fox, and Extracts from Trevelyan, Lecky, and the Parliamentary History,* edited by C.H. Ward, (Scott, Foresman and Company, 1919), pp. 78-79.

between the colonies and Parliament. Rather, this approach to the imperial system would verify the imperial authority of British Parliament under the ideological premise that only Parliament could legitimize particular imperial privileges in the Whiggish pursuit of developing the labor-wealth potential of every province to its highest degree. For imperial-axial Whigs like Burke considering Ireland, direct representation in the British Parliament was more practicable and would therefore suffice.

Since the American colonies were too far away for practical representation in the British Parliament, Burke considered the colonial assemblies as a self-sufficient but ultimately obedient mechanism which could communicate with the imperial center. These assemblies would essentially act self-sufficiently, almost like a sub-sect of British Parliamentary representation, but not autonomous from the British Parliament since the assemblies would be ultimately a small piece of a larger system centered on Parliament. This differs from the regionalist-autonomous perspective which would grant legislative-autonomy to a totally equal parliament or assembly united with the metropole by a shared constitution. For Burke and other imperial-axial Whigs, the American Revolution was understood as the result of an attempt to shut down the channel of communication and representation that was the colonial assemblies. Whether regionalist-autonomous or imperial-axial, the sidestepping of colonial assemblies in America by regionalist-hierarchical Whigs in the metropole shifted Whig opinion in the colonies further toward the regionalist-autonomous perspective as a necessary means to ensure the pursuit of Whiggish political-economic aims within the region. Without representation through the colonial assemblies, there was no assurance for the continuation of an equitable degree of Whiggish political-economic advancement across the empire.

Imperial-axial Whigs conceived themselves to be an equal piece of a single empire which was based in the metropole but was ultimately for the equitable Whiggish development of all. For this reason, imperial-axial Whigs in the American colonies were deeply troubled by how easily other regions of the empire be made victims of extractive, regionalist-hierarchical policies. The despotic and extractive actions of the British state's East India Company in Bengal and India were of particular concern for American colonists. In the famous pamphlets simply titled *The Alarm,* the threat posed to liberty by the extractive despotism of the state-backed East India company is plainly stated:

> Taught by the monopoly of trade they had wickedly acquired, with impunity from their countrymen, they were lost to all the feelings of humanity, and monopolized the absolute necessaries of life in India, at a time of apprehended scarcity…What the nominal Christians could not extort from these wretched mortals, for want of their bellies, they determined to torture from them by the pains of their backs."[17]

But it wasn't only the actions of the East India Company that was of concern; it was the toleration of these unjust actions by the metropole. It was Britain's acceptance of the East India Company's despotism that "ruined the Constitution at home."[18] For the regionalist-hierarchal ideology to be practiced anywhere in the empire is for the regionalist-autonomous ideology to be immanent in the very structures of the empire everywhere, thus threatening despotism over the entirety of the empire. For the anonymous author of *The Alarm,* the regionalist-autonomous proponents in Westminster along with the East India Company would "enslave the West, and

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[17] Hampden (Anonymous), *The Alarm: Number II*, (October 9th, 1773), p. 1, LLMC, https://discover-llmc-com.proxy.uchicago.edu/LLMC-20808-0002-001.1.1.

[18] Hampden (Anonymous), *The Alarm: Number II*, (October 9th, 1773), p. 2.

prepare us fit victims for the exercise of that horrid inhumanity they have such dread abundance, and with more than savage cruelty practiced, in the Face of the Sun, on the helpless Asiaticks."[19]

Even from the late seventeenth-century, imperial-nondiscriminatory Whigs like John Locke and William Molyneux, understood properly that the Irish economy was directly threatened by the political-economic choices of regionalist-hierarchical Whigs and their intentions to subordinate Ireland's manufacturing and commercial potential for the presumed benefit of labor-wealth creation in England and Wales. A tilt in the metropole toward a regionalist-hierarchical perspective predicated a shift for some imperial-nondiscriminatory Whigs like Molyneux toward the regionalist-autonomous perspective, thereby contributing to the an evolution of thought that would develop into the Patriot platform in Ireland in the mid-century.

As for late eighteenth-century proponents of imperial-nondiscriminatory Whigs, Adam Smith is a good example. As an imperial-nondiscriminatory Whig, Smith called for the procurement of economic liberation for Ireland through a legislative union with Britain similar to that of Scotland. In 1776, Smith first published *The Wealth of Nations* in which he wrote:

> The extension of the custom-house laws of Great Britain to Ireland and the plantations, provided it was accompanied, as in justice it ought to be, with an extension of the freedom of trade, would be in the highest degree advantageous to both. All the invidious restraints which at present oppress the trade of Ireland, distinction between the enumerated and non-enumerated commodities of America, would be entirely at an end… The trade between all different parts of the British Empire would, in consequence of this uniformity in the custom-house laws, be as free as the coasting trade of Great Britain is at

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[19] Hampden (Anonymous), *The Alarm: Number II*, (October 9th, 1773), p. 2.

> present…So great an extension of market would soon compensate both to Ireland and the plantations, all that they could suffer of the increase of the duties of customs.[20]

Smith makes the case that Ireland cannot remain both economically and legislatively subservient to Britain. He sees the most beneficial path forward for all involved to be the liberation of the commercial interests of Ireland, accompanied by equal representative status within the imperial structures of Great Britain. Perhaps a bit naively, Smith additionally suggested that this union would result in neatly replacing the Anglo-Protestant aristocracy in Ireland with one based on "the natural and respectable distinctions of birth and fortune."[21] However, even after the 1801 Act of Union, it would be nearly thirty years before Westminster would pass the 1829 Catholic Relief Act and still then Catholics across Britain remained restricted from some of the highest legal offices as well as the ancient universities.[22] However, given that Smith was writing with regard to the overall prosperity of Great Britain, it is significant that he viewed the oppression of the Catholic Irish as problematic for the empire as a whole. For Smith, the prosperity of Ireland was determined by Ireland's degree of equality, both internally and externally; this prosperity would contribute to the prosperity of the empire as a whole and perhaps help Britain out of its financial woes from the Seven Years War.

Josiah Tucker, who is often modernly called a Tory but who self-identified as a Whig, was a mid-century proponent of imperial-nondiscriminatory ideology. Tucker wrote:

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[20] Adam Smith, *An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations, 4th ed. Vol. 3.,* (Printed for A. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1786), The Making of the Modern World (accessed March 20, 2025), pp. 443-444, https://link-gale-com.proxy.uchicago.edu/apps/doc/U0102034196/MOME?u=chic_rbw&sid=bookmark-MOME&xid=eb13fec1&pg=449.

[21] Adam Smith, *An inquiry,* p. 460.

[22] Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837,* (Yale University Press, 1992), p. 334.

> Our ill-judged policy, and unnatural jealousy, in cramping the commerce and manufacturers of *Ireland,* is another very great bar against extending our trade. This is a most unaccountable infatuation which has not the shadow of a public and national reason to defend it. For if Ireland gets rich, what is the consequence? England will be rich too, and France will be the poorer. the wool which is now smuggled from Ireland into France, and manufactured there, and from thence sent to oppose our own commodities at foreign markets, would be manufactured in Ireland; the French would lose the benefit of it, the Irish would get it: – the rents of the estates in Ireland would rise; and then the money would soon find its way into England."[23]

Tucker and others like him sought to equally extend Whiggish political-economic ideology beyond the metropole and across the empire. While Tucker pushed for the integration of Ireland into a shared imperial political-economic system of free trade, he would go on to defend the concept of American independence as it became apparent that the positive-sum creation of labor-wealth in both America and Britain would always be hampered by oppressive regionalist-hierarchical political economics. Colonial integration had become less politically and economically efficacious than simply attaining a friendly trading partner through American independence.[24]

As for the regionalist-hierarchical Whigs, John Cary is one example of an early proponent while Lord North is a later example of the same subgroup. My reasoning for denominating Lord North's politics as a form of Whiggish endeavor will be given later in this chapter but will also be expressed further in later chapters. This subgroup of Whigs were well aware of the benefit which Whiggish economic development could have on the peripheries of the empire but they considered such developments to be at the competitive disadvantage of the

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[23] Josiah Tucker, *A Brief Essay on the Advantages and Disadvantages which Respectively Attend France and Great-Britian, with regard to Trade. With Some Proposals for Removing the Principal Disadvantages of Great Britain in a New Method,* 3rd edition, (Printed for T. Tryre, 1753), pp. 43-44, Eighteenth Century Collections Online.

[24] Livesey, "Free Trade and Empire," p.113.

metropole. It is largely due to the antagonism of the regionalist-hierarchical subgroup that regionalist-autonomous ideology became as relevant as it did in the late eighteenth-century. In a letter written in 1775 by the Scottish historian William Robertson to an unknown recipient, Robertson agreed with North's regionalist-hierarchical ideology that Colonial American commercial development is promising for the colonies and therefore dangerous for Britain as an empire but he criticized what he perceived to be the light-handedness of North's handling of the developing crisis in the colonies. Robertson wrote:

> There is not an argument against our right to tax, that does not conclude with tenfold force against our power of regulating trade. They may profess or disclaim what they please, and hold the language that best suits their purpose; but if they have any meaning, it must be that they should be free states, connected with us by blood, by habit, and by religion, but at liberty to buy and sell and trade where and when and with whom they please. This they will one day attain, but not just now, if there be any degree of political wisdom or vigour remaining. At the same time one cannot but regret that prosperous, growing states should be checked in their career. As a lover of mankind, I bewail it; but as a subject of Great Britain, I must wish that their dependence should continue.[25]

This letter was included in a government sanctioned compilation titled *The Correspondence of King George the Third with Lord North from 1768 to 1783* which was "published by permission of the Queen." While the letter itself is not from or to Lord North or George III, it was considered prominent enough of a political perspective to be included as contextually significant to the correspondence of the King and the Prime Minister on the matter of the crisis developing in the American Colonies.

These regionalist-hierarchical Whigs were undergirded by the ideological presupposition of a hierarchically-based empire wherein the economies of regions of the empire outside of the

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[25] "Letter 320," *The correspondence of King George the Third with Lord North from 1768 to 1783* v. 1, edited by Bodham Donne, (John Murray, 1867), p. 280 https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b3318087?urlappend=%3Bseq=378%3Bownerid=9007199274224135-382.

metropole would be centrally organized so as to be subservient to the pursuit of the economic prosperity of the metropole. This political-economic ideology supported an almost *novo* zero-sum ideology that was utilized by the metropole to subjugate the regional economies of the empire for the benefit of the empire. This ideology presupposed that the economic prosperity of labor-wealth creation through manufacturing and commerce was not an entirely positive-sum game as it related to competition between imperial regions as separate economies instead of a singular imperial economy; the belief was essentially that labor-wealth creation which was beneficial to Ireland would necessarily hamper or damage the economy in England. This subgroup of regionally-oriented Whigs contrasts sharply with those inter-imperial Whigs who sought the economic development of all parts of the empire under an equal (as with the imperial-nondiscriminatory) or equitable (as with the imperial-axial) imperial system based on the underlying assumption of true positive-sum economic development within a single imperial economy.

One example of an early proponent of the regional-hierarchical subgroup is John Cary. Cary was a member of the 1696 Board of Trade which coordinated and dictated trade relations within the imperial system and which directly resulted in greater restrictions on Irish trade.[26] For Cary's own political-economic sentiments, one needs only to examine his widely-read *Essay on the State of England.*[27] Sophus Reinert describes Cary's *Essay* as "an encomium to labor,

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[26] Livesey, "Free Trade and Empire," p. 108.

[27] John Cary, *An Essay on the State of England in Relation to its Trade, its Poor and its Taxes, For Carrying on the present War against France,* (Printed by W. Bonny, 1695), Early English Books Online.

industry, and manufactures in alignment with the Whig political economy of the 1688–89 revolutions."[28] In the *Essay,* Cary writes:

> Ireland is now destructive to the interest of England, I think it will admit of little dispute; for as long as that people enjoy so free and open a trade to foreign parts, and thereby are encouraged to advance in their woollen manufactures, they must consequently lessen ours, than which they cannot do us greater mischief, being the tools whereon we trade, when they sink our Navigation sinks with them.[29]

Cary goes on to insist that, for the sake of England's manufacturing prosperity, and thereby to the empire's benefit, Ireland's economic sector must be imperially relegated to cultivating the land; their prosperity in manufacturing poses too great a risk to England otherwise. This regionalist-hierarchal perspective, which limited the desirable degree and extent of Whiggish economic ideology, runs directly contrary to the notion that there was a largely unified Whiggish mindset that the metropole should develop a region such as Ireland because "unlimited economic growth was possible." Instead of being reckoned as a kingdom in communion with that of England, Ireland was viewed as one of the foremost competitors for English trade, particularly in wool.[30] Due to this ideological perception, the government in England passed the Woollen Act in 1699 to restrict the export of Irish wool for the express "encouragement of the woollen manufacturers in

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[28] Sophus Reinert, "Cary's Essay on the State of England," in *Translating Empire: Emulation and the Origins of Political Economy,* (Harvard University Press, 2011), p. 80.

[29] Cary, *An Essay on the State of England,* p. 91.

[30] Cary, *An essay on the state of England,*" p. 133.

the Kingdom of England."[31] The restrictions placed on the Irish wool trade were implemented by conscious design to reduce Ireland "to the terms of a colony" so as to secure England's own woolen commercial interests.[32] William Molyneux, an Irish parliamentarian and imperial-nondiscriminatory Whig, took direct aim at the unconstitutionality of this debasement of Ireland's political status and economy. Molyneux writes:

> The last thing I shall take notice of, that some raise against us, is that Ireland is to be look'd upon only as a colony from England…Of all the objections raised against us, I take this to be the most extravagant; it seems not to have the least foundation of colour from reason or record: Does it not appear in the Constitution of Ireland, that 'tis a compleat Kingdom within itself?[33]

Molyneux, as an imperial-nondiscriminatory Whig, believed there should be equal economic footing between Ireland and England under the imperial banner. However, barring the option of Irish representation in the English Parliament to ensure Irish equality under imperial economic policies, Molyneux's ideology stipulated a necessary shift to the regionalist-autonomous camp whereby Ireland could legislatively implement Whiggish political-economic aims autonomously.[34] For Molyneux, this ideological shift is intentional and plainly stated where he

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[31] "An Act to prevent the Exportation of Wooll out of the Kingdoms of *Ireland* and *England* into Foreign Parts; And for the Encouragement of the Woollen Manufactures in the Kingdom of England," (1699), Goldsmiths' Library of Economic Literature in the Senate House Library of the University of London, The Making of the Modern World (accessed March 15, 2025). https://link-gale-com.proxy.uchicago.edu/apps/doc/U0100382138/MOME?u=chic_rbw&sid=bookmark-MOME&xid=f2baaf1d&pg=5.

[32]Cary, *An essay on the state of England,*" p. 113.

[33] William Molyneux, *The Case of Ireland's Being Bound by acts of Parliament in England, Stated,* (printed for J. Milliken, in College-Green, 1773), National Library of Ireland, accessed through Eighteenth Century Collections Online, (accessed March 15, 2025), p. 125, https://link-gale-com.proxy.uchicago.edu/apps/doc/CB0126282070/ECCO?u=chic_rbw&sid=bookmark-ECCO&xid=c57bd1be&pg=11.

[34] Molyneux, *The Case of Ireland's Being Bound,*" p. 82.

writes, “If…it be concluded that the Parliament of England may bind Ireland; it must also be allowed that the people of Ireland ought to have representatives in the Parliament of England. And this I believe we should be willing enough to embrace; but this is an happiness we can hardly hope for.”[35] This political-economic shift from imperial-nondiscriminatory to regionalist-autonomous was in a large part induced by the policies of the regionalist-hierarchical Whigs in Westminster in the decades following the Glorious Revolution.

For imperial-nondiscriminatory Whigs, expanded representation was seen as necessary to ensure Whiggish political-economic development which was threatened by regionalist-hierarchical Whigs who only sought Whiggish development insofar as it benefited the metropole. If regional representation to the imperial authority could not be attained, then it could only be assured through a regionalist-autonomous Whiggish political-economic ideology. When antagonized by regionalist-hierarchical Whigs in the metropole, the regionalist-autonomous ideology naturally lent itself to the centrifugal developments which predicated independence movements as in America and Ireland. It needs to be emphasized here that proponents of these conflicting ideologies were not necessarily regionally exclusive but rather they existed together and interacted with each other across the empire; however, the proponents of regionalist-autonomous ideology became increasingly more influential in the American colonies and Ireland when the administration in Britain would take on a more regionalist-hierarchical tilt. As will be seen in later chapters, some Whigs in Westminster such as the Foxites did at times shift in favor of regionalist-autonomous arguments for Ireland.

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[35] Molyneux, *The Case of Ireland's Being Bound,*” p. 82.

The regionalist-autonomous Whigs sought legislative autonomy for their region to thereby ensure their region's capacity for pursuing Whiggish manufacturing and commercial ideological aims separate from imperial dictation and with particular partiality for the benefit of their own region but with no hierarchical perception. While regionalist-autonomous ideology did present itself as hospitable to ideas of independence, it was not exclusively so; regionalist-autonomous ideology could be applicable within the imperial framework. The regionalist-autonomous Whigs were generally proponents of deepening the franchise of representation within their region, thereby making the cause of legislative autonomy more appealable to the general population of their region. In an address to the King from the Irish House of Commons in 1782, the Irish Parliament made a direct claim for legislative autonomy:

> Resolved that an humble address be presented to his Majesty…to assure his Majesty that his subjects of Ireland are a free people. That the Crown of Ireland is an imperial Crown, inseparably annexed to the Crown of Great Britain, on which connexion the interests and happiness of both nations essentially depend: but that this Kingdom of Ireland is a distinct kingdom, with a Parliament of her own, the sole legislature thereof. There is no body of men competent to make laws to bind this nation, except the King, Lords and Commons of Ireland, nor any other Parliament which hath any authority of power, of any sort whatsoever, in this country, save only the Parliament of Ireland.[36]

Ireland was declared to be legislatively distinct from Great Britain but still united within the imperial system. Thomas Drought's 1783 *Letters on Subjects Interesting to Ireland* further provides a clear framework for the political dynamic of regionalist-autonomous ideology and

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[36] *Journals of the House of Commons of the Kingdom of Ireland* v. 20, (16 April 1782), p. 353, HaithiTrust, https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/011570754. Hereafter referred to as *JHC-KI.*

how the implementation of this ideology could exist within a single, cohesive empire.[37] Drought, an Irishman living in England, acknowledges the rational, legitimate reasons for Ireland's apprehension at any dealings with the "English" government but he also emphasizes that legislative and commercial autonomy *within* the imperial system is the most secure route to liberty.

As regarding his views on industry, Drought wrote, "It is in the power and it is the duty of every man of fortune in Ireland, to plant some manufacture on or near his estate. This will purge his lands of idle mouths, and render those numerous herds of naked children…into valuable members of the community."[38] Drought then went on to defend the Volunteers who had recently been engaged in a widespread non-importation campaign against the British for the sake of free trade for Ireland and the liberation of Irish commerce from repressive imperial policies, particularly those policies which inhibited Ireland's woolen manufacturing or which were subsequently implemented punitively against Ireland with the intention of damaging the primary industry left available to them – linen.[39] In justification of the Volunteer's non-importation campaign, the *Freeman's Journal* published a letter from the patriot Frederick Jebb, writing under the pseudonym "Guatimozin," to British MP Cecil Wray. Jebb wrote, "Do you as a British legislature, avow the influence of that policy, which would reduce to beggary three millions of

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[37] Drought goes on to give some cursory detail into how this new system should be structured. Thomas Drought, "Letter III," *Letters on subjects interesting to Ireland, and addressed to the Irish volunteers,*(Printed for W. Colles, 1783), pp. 21-22, Eighteenth Century Collections Online, https://link-gale-com.proxy.uchicago.edu/apps/doc/CB0127683666/ECCO?u=chic_rbw&sid=bookmark-ECCO&xid=d3619c5c&pg=10.

[38] Drought, "Letter IV," p. 41.

[39] Drought, "Letter III," pp. 30-31.

the best subjects in the empire, in order that double the number, in another part, shall derive superfluous wealth from their ruin?"[40] Intricately related to the arguments for legislative autonomy for Ireland was the non-equitable and non-equal dynamic which existed between imperial policies for Ireland and the metropole as regarding Whiggish economic development in commerce and industry. Jebb continued:

> The associations of the people of Ireland to consume, exclusively, their own manufactures, are formed upon the principles which suggested the spirit and letter of the whole code of the trade laws of England. A spirit of monopoly in favour of ourselves. Is there a single manufacture of England, linen only excepted, that is not entrenched in prohibitory importation laws. The only difference between your associations and ours is that yours is sealed by the sovereign legislative authority, ours by the consent and acclamation of three million people.[41]

Drought's defense of the Volunteers aligns ideologically with Jebb upon a regionalist-autonomous Patriot platform. For Drought, the best imperial political structure would therefore be to "cement the Union with England in the Executive Branch, as carefully, as it would be to separate in the Legislative."[42]

Free trade and the prioritization of manufacturing over landed interests were of the upmost concern for Drought; these economic aspirations could be implemented with adequate legislative autonomy for Ireland. Drought stressed that the relationship dynamic between Ireland and England must be one whereby "the legislatures of both countries" are "eternally distinct,

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[40] Frederick Jebb/"Guatimozin," "To the Committee for Conducting the Free-Press. Letter VII. To Cecil Wray…" The letters of Guatimozin, on the affairs of Ireland, at first published in the Freeman's journal, (Printed by R. Marchbank 1779), pp. 50-52, Gale Primary Sources: The Making of the Modern World, link.gale.com/apps/doc/U0101809665/MOME?u=chic_rbw&sid=bookmark-MOME&xid=b369993d&pg=49.

[41] Jebb/Guatimozin, "To the Committee for Conducting the Free-Press. Letter VII."

[42] Drought, "Letter III," p. 25.

both in external and in internal cases" but still united under a single Crown and, importantly, a single navy which he believed Ireland should contribute to.[43] Drought continued by warning his fellow Irish countrymen that "rashness, in avoiding Scylla, is destroyed by Charybdis, and Ireland, in avoiding England, in an extreme degree, may involve herself in dangers which may not be easily removed."[44] Underneath a single Crown and united by a shared navy for the protection of commerce, Drought imagined a path forward for Ireland in the empire, post-1782 legislative revolution. Henry Grattan, Francis Dobbs and Luke Gardiner are other more prominent proponents of regionalist-autonomous Whiggery but Drought's letters explicate particularly succinctly one way in which the implementation of regionalist-autonomous ideology for Ireland could have politically conformed to a united imperial system.

In the first half of the eighteenth-century, the constitutional argument for legislative and economic autonomy developed into a central feature of the emerging Irish Patriot platform. Jonathan Swift, the famous satirist, can be traced back as a key progenitor in developing the future Patriot ideology which sprang more to life after the mid-century with the Money Bill Dispute. However, Swift also exemplifies the complications which pervade attempts at defining cohesive party politics during this period. The Whig-Tory diametric, whatever it may have been in the late seventeenth-century, was already dissolving by the early eighteenth-century. However, Tories of this early period can still be recognized in their largely shared disinterest in fostering the continuance of the economic transformation of the British state from the reaping of agricultural resources to an economy powered by industrial manufactures at home and

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[43] Drought, "Letter III," p. 22.

[44] Drought, "Letter III," p. 22.

commercial paramountcy internationally. However, by the late eighteenth-century, the traditional landed interests of Tories were largely replaced by the "new Toryism" of one like Lord North whose policies and ideology, in reality, originated as a variant of the Whig tradition. For example, when North pressed the legitimacy of British governmental power over the American Colonies, he did so through claims of British Parliamentary authority to legislate for the colonies, not the King's authority. While North did have the support of the King, it was not in the King that North presupposed legislative legitimacy came from. Additionally, if Lord North can be characterized by any single economic perspective it would be his zeal in seeking to increase and stabilize state finances for longterm sustainability of an active state apparatus. There is little reason to suppose that North's political-economic outlook developed out of old Tory sentiments which sought a regression to an agricultural economy or a withdrawal of the Parliamentary government apparatus from continued interventionism in directing the industrial and commercial economy to greater profitability.

If one were to develop a conception of Lord North based on later conceptions of Tories in the nineteenth- and twentieth-centuries, then one could say assuredly that North was a Tory. However, in this case, I have found it more useful to develop an understanding of late eighteenth-century figures like Lord North based on the forward evolution of concepts and ideologies from their near origins; I have done this in the same manner as I have sought to do with Irish Patriotism. The tenuous nature of the meaning of the term "Tory" over the course of the eighteenth-century does not lend itself to a continuity of ideology. In fact, it seems more likely that variations of Whig ideology began to diverge so drastically as to have those of the

regionalist-hierarchical variation of Whig political-economic thought supplant the old Torys as the "conservatives" on the political spectrum, eventually assuming the appellation.

Jonathan Swift was undoubtably a old Tory in some ways, such as his hard-line preservation of the religio-cultural traditions of the establishment Church of England. However, Swift can also be described as a Whig through his immovable position in favor of representative authority over the arbitrary rule of monarchs, be they Anglican or Catholic. He was also a Whig in terms of state intervention to promote economic development in commerce and industry. Swift was particularly displeased with the stunting of Ireland's manufacture and commercial potential by British imperial policies. He would go to directly intertwine Irish economic concerns with the constitutional conflict in his *A Proposal for the Universal Use of Irish Manufacture, &c.* pamphlet.[45] While not entirely ideologically synonymous with Molyneux, Swift would also come to the conclusion that the Irish Parliament must operate autonomously from the British Parliament for the sake of economic improvement in Ireland. Moylneux and Smith's conceptions of the economic and legislative liberation of Ireland are at the very least consistent in the sense that "[both] Molyneux and Swift were arguing for a system of political harmony based on a voluntary contract. This idea of contract, as the basis of all political civilization, derived from Locke and Hobbes."[46]

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[45] Jonathan Swift, *A proposal for the universal use of Irish manufacture, in cloaths and furniture of houses, &c*., (printed by E. Waters, in Essex-street, 1720), Goldsmiths Library of Economic Literature in the Senate House Library of the University of London, accessed through Eighteenth Century Collections Online (accessed March 15, 2025), https://link-gale-com.proxy.uchicago.edu/apps/doc/CB0126398530/ECCO?u=chic_rbw&sid=bookmark-ECCO&xid=68cfa34d&pg=16.

[46] Joseph McMinn, "A Weary Patriot: Swift and the Formation of an Anglo-Irish Identity," *Eighteenth-Century Ireland / Iris an Dá Chultúr* 2 (1987): 103–13. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30070840.

For both Molyneux and Swift, Ireland could not exist as a subordinate colonial state beneath the British Parliament. Between Molyneux and Swift, constitutional arguments were utilized in the pursuit of Irish Parliamentary autonomy. There was a shared emphasis between these writers that the repression of Ireland's commercial economic development was a direct result of Ireland's lack of Parliamentary autonomy; their shared perspective reveals here that, quite early on in the eighteenth-century, Whiggish intentions were already becoming intertwined with a position in favor of Irish legislative autonomy. Implicit in their arguments is the idea that without adequate representation of a region of people in the political system, economic prosperity for the people could not be assured. For now, those of this mindset like Swift would not extend constitutional arguments and ideas of representation beyond Anglo-Protestants; however, the seeds were unintentionally planted for extensions of representation with the implicit notion that internal representation in a state was intimately associated with governmental accountability to the economic prosperity of the state. Enlightened conceptions of national citizenship, natural rights, and republican representation would come to be seen by late-eighteenth century Patriots in both America and Ireland as being naturally aligned to such a perspective even if not yet recognized by Swift himself.

Swift's pamphlet would draw its grievances from both the Woollen Act of 1699 and the more recent Declaratory Act of 1719. The Declaratory Act politically fortified the regionalist-hierarchical perception that the Kingdom of Great Britain "of right ought to have full power and authority to make laws and statutes of sufficient force and validity, to bind the Kingdom and the

people of Ireland."[47] In explicitly combining the effects on Ireland of both of these Acts, Swift's pamphlet united under one banner a critique of the economic suppression and the political subordination of Ireland by Britain. While regionalist-autonomy was never universal in Ireland, it gained momentum with every constitutional crisis.

If Whiggish commercial and manufacturing aims could not be attained *and* secured in Ireland through political-economic equity or equality, then the natural shift was to pursue Whiggish development through regionalist-autonomous ideology. A similar sentiment was prevalent among Colonial American patriots in the decades leading up to the American Revolution. There existed a degree of ideological synonymity between the American revolutionaries and the Irish Patriots who pushed for the legislative reforms of the early 1780s. In this regard, Steve Pincus writes, "Just as the Americans preferred imperial reform to independence, so did the Irish. Just as the Americans moved from political economic concerns and non-importation agreements to fundamental constitutional issues, so did the Irish. Just as the American discussion became ever more widespread, ever more popular, so did the Irish."[48] This statement is accurate but what needs to be further examined is why the Irish reforms of 1782 failed to thoroughly ameliorate the strained relationship between Ireland and Britain.

While the argument for adequate legislative representation in the Irish Parliament began as a constitutional argument with William Molyneux, by 1791 it had grown to include arguments of natural rights. More over, the ideological heart of the movement which led to the legislative

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[47] "Irish Parliament Act, 1719," in *Selected Documents in Irish History,* edited by Josef L. Altholz, (M.E. Sharp, 2000), pp. 58-59.

[48] Steve Pincus provides evidence for the significance of the reforms of the early 1780s. Pincus, "Ideological Origins," 243.

revolution of 1782 was continually relevant in Ireland as it sought to solidify its gains over the ensuing decade and into the 1790s. By 1782, the regionalist-autonomous perspective was particularly strong in Ireland. For these Whigs, the only means by which labor-wealth creation and economic prosperity could be secured in Ireland was through a recognition of the Parliament of Ireland's right to legislative autonomy and thereby Ireland's commercial policies. British politicians from the likes of Lord North to Pitt the Younger consistently refused this ideological recognition even while retracting British commercial and legislative restraints on Ireland.[49] This was always problematic for regionalist-autonomous Whigs in Ireland even during periods of reform such as the early 1780s.[50]

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[49] It is made explicitly clear that Britain is *granting* benefits to Ireland due to the exigencies of the American war and greater conflict with the Bourbons rather than *recognizing* Ireland's *right* to equality. *Journals of the House of Commons* v. 37, (25 November 1779), pp. 461-463. HaithiTrust, https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/000541172. Hereafter referred to as *JHC-GB*.

[50] Francis Dobbs, *A Letter to the Right Honorable Lord North on his Propositions in Favor of Ireland*, (Printed by M. Mills, 1780), Eighteenth Century Collections Online.

Chapter 2. The Money Bill Dispute and Developments in Irish Patriotism

By the eighteenth-century, the Parliament of Ireland had managed to somewhat work around Poynings' Law by drafting laws as the head of bills to be sent to the Irish Privy Council and then on to the English Privy Council to be amended or dismissed before being sent back to the Parliament of Ireland as an engrossed bill which could then proceed through the formal legislative process.[51] However, this was a far cry from true legislative or economic agency. The Irish Parliament had no official political authority to pass bills for something even as basic as the allocation of Ireland's own revenue without first getting the metropole to sign off on it. This is important for understanding the 1753 Money Bill Dispute and the rise of popular Irish Patriotism which accompanied it.

Irish Patriotism, as a regionalist-autonomous political-economic and popular movement, gained significant momentum through the 1753 Money Bill Dispute. This dispute was predicated on the constitutional crisis regarding the right of Ireland to legislative and commercial equality with the metropole. The years 1749, 1751, and 1753 saw a surplus in the Crown's hereditary revenue in Ireland. The Parliament of Ireland sought to dispose of this surplus in the payment of the national debt.[52] The authority for the disposing of this surplus was ideologically contested between the Parliament of Ireland and the metropole. The tactful wording on behalf of Irish parliamentarians Henry Boyle and Anthony Malone ensured that the heads of the money bills

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[51] David A. Fleming, *Edmund Sexten Pery: The Politics of Virtue and Intrigue in Eighteenth-Century Ireland,* (Four Courst Press, 2023), pp. 30-31.

[52] *Insula sacra & libera. A list of the members of the Honourable House of Commons of I-------d, who voted for and against the altered Money-Bill, which was rejected on Monday the 17th day of December, 1753,* Eighteenth Century Collections Online, https://link-gale-com.proxy.uchicago.edu/apps/doc/CW0106207394/ECCO?u=chic_rbw&sid=bookmark-ECCO&xid=be232f50&pg=1.

sent to Britain neither overtly contested nor acceded to the Crown's claim of authority over spending the surplus; however, the king's "consent" was inserted by the English Privy council in the preambles of the 1751 and 1753 bills before being sent back to the Irish House of Commons.[53] In 1753 when the money bill returned once again with a reaffirmation of the Crown's authority for disposing the surplus, a group in the Irish Parliament headed by Henry Boyle moved to reject the bill on the constitutional basis that the King had not the authority to give his consent over the matter.

For the time being, Boyle and his bloc were publicly identified as Patriots standing up for the rights and authority of the Parliament of Ireland.[54] This popular patriotic sentiment was not one of nationalistic, sectarian, or seditious foundations. In fact, it wasn't uncommon for Protestants praising the rejection of the money bill for asserting the legislative authority of the Parliament of Ireland to also, in the same breath, give deference to the Hanoverian lineage and thereby the empire at large. Reported in the *Belfast News-Letter* was an address from the freeholders of Cavan to their parliamentarian representative Cosby Nesbit who was listed fourth on the list of those voting to reject the engrossed money bill:

> We with singular pleasure take this opportunity of returning you our unfeigned thanks for your steady and irreproachable conduct in Parliament this last session, as one of the Members for the Burrough of Cavan: And we do this with the greater sensibility, as we are so well assured of dour unalterable attachment to the Protestant succession in the illustrious House of Hanover which we sincerely wish to be perpetual…May the Commons of Ireland ever preserve the spirit they shewed last sessions. The Beaver's fate to the D[uke] of [N]ewcastle…May the Commons of Ireland ever hold the purse of the

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[53] Fleming, *Edmund Sexten Pery,* pp. 40-41.

[54] Fleming, *Edmund Sexten Pery,* pp. 40-41.

> nation…May all antipatriot lawyers carry empty bags in the Four Courts and empty purses out.[55]

The Duke of Newcastle was the incoming Prime Minister as well as a London ally of Primate George Stone, a prominent political rival of Henry Boyle and his coterie.[56] What exactly the "beaver's fate" meant can only be speculated but given the patriotic sentiments of the address and the anti-Patriot connections of Newcastle, one is led to surmise that it was less than positive, perhaps relating to the extinction of the beaver in Great Britain or just due to the rapacious hunting of beavers at the time in general. In any case, it's interesting that this patriotic address directed its qualms not at the Crown but rather at the imperial administration of Great Britain and the Irish MPs who were willing to accept the presumption of legislative and economic authority from the British administration. The predominate message by the Irish Patriots was for equality between Ireland and Great Britain with an underlying understanding that Ireland's economic development must find its route through Irish Parliamentary agency.

This period of Irish politics is notoriously known as the era of the undertakers. Dublin Castle, the executive administrative center of British interests in Ireland, would utilize "undertakers" in the Parliament of Ireland so as to maintain communication and control over the direction and tone of Irish politics. An Irish politician would develop as large a coterie of courtiers as he could so as to present himself as influential and favorable to the Lord Lieutenant in Dublin Castle who would then seek him out as an undertaker of British interests in the Irish

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[55] For the address to Nesbit, see *Belfast News-Letter and General Advertiser* no. 1711, edited by Henry and Robert Joy, (March 12, 1754), p. 3, Irish Newspaper Archives. https://archive.irishnewsarchive.com/olive/APA/INA/Default.aspx#panel=document.
For Crosby's vote to reject the money bill, see *Insula sacra & libera…Money-Bill*.

[56] Eoin Magennis, *The Irish Political System, 1740-1765: The Golden Age of the Undertakers,* (Four Courts Press, 2000), pp. 70-71.

Parliament in exchange for government offices and other favors for himself and his allies. The proprietary-based remunerations of these offices were well known but could only be extended so far before accusations of corruption would mount with an ensuing inquiry.[57]

Henry Boyle, as Speaker of the Commons and chief undertaker from the 1720s into the 1750s, demonstrated a proficiency for balancing opposition interests with those of the Lords Lieutenant over the years. To make sense of why Boyle would take up the Patriot position when he was chief undertaker, Eoin Magennis and other historians suggest that the primary motivation for Boyle was that his hegemony was being challenged by his rival the duke of Dorset whom had recently been appointed Lord Lieutenant; for historians of this perspective, Boyle was primarily seeking to flex his muscles against Dorset by acting against the interests of Dublin Castle and successfully getting the money bill rejected.[58] However, even if Boyle's opposition to the money bill was a political power-play in one dimension, it was also a legitimate constitutional issue in an other. Before the head of the bill was ever even sent off to the privy councils, the initial preamble was carefully written by Boyle to inquire for the *recommendation* of the king rather than to request any *consent*; Boyle was tactfully intentional here in his wording so as to not concede any implication of Irish Parliamentary dependence on Britain's assent nor to overtly challenge the regionalist-hierarchical perspective of the Crown and metropole.

The right for the Irish Parliament to finance the Kingdom of Ireland was evidently not something Boyle was flippant about even before sending out the head of the bill. It seems plausible then that Boyle did hold a legitimate constitutional qualm over the engrossed bill while

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[57] Magennis, *The Irish Political System,* p. 72.

[58] Magennis, *The Irish Political System,* p. 227.

simultaneously utilizing the issue to display his influence. There was evidently a genuine concern in directly assenting to an imposed regionalist-hierarchical perspective in which Britain retained full control over the finances of the Irish political system.

The legitimacy of concern for the constitutional crisis at hand is further evidenced in a letter written to the Earl of Kildare by an anonymous "Patriot" of the Dublin Society:

> We can have no Act of Parliament, without the King's Consenting; but on the late important occasion, it was justly apprehended, that the inserting that Preamble, would give the C[row]n a greater and more unlimited power over the Treasury, than it had by our original Constitution; for if that was not the intention, why was it inserted? Surely omitting it left the prerogative as before. I think myself clearly right, when I assert, that the Preamble with the words previous consent, enlarged the power of the C[row]n, but the omitting of them, as they certainly were in the Bill of 1749, on the like occasion, did not in any respect, diminish or alter the prerogative.[59]

The money bill of 1749 posed no threat to the constitutional legitimacy for the Parliament of Ireland to self-determine the allocation of the surplus to the payment of the national debt. The issue in 1753 was intrinsically and legitimately ideological in nature.

This author of the letter from the Dublin Society seems to have an intimate understanding of parliamentary proceedings and its worthwhile to take a step back and delve momentarily into the origins and nature of this society. The original Dublin Society, the Dublin Philosophical Society, was founded in 1683 by William Petty and William Molyneux as Ireland's version of the London Royal Society and, in fact, maintained consistent correspondence with both the Royal Society and the Oxford Philosophical Society until it petered out in the early eighteenth-

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[59] *A letter to the Right Honourable James, Earl of Kildare, on the present posture of affairs. With some occasional reflections on the conduct of a certain Justice of Peace, on Friday the 10th instant,* (1754), Eighteenth Century Collections Online, https://link-gale-com.proxy.uchicago.edu/apps/doc/CW0104195178/ECCO?u=chic_rbw&sid=bookmark-ECCO&xid=c56687f9&pg=9.

century.[60] A new "Dublin Society" would be founded in 1731 as an inheritor of the Dublin Philosophical Society, albeit more commercialist in political-economic thought.[61] Both of the Dublin Societies were noteworthy in their devotion to propagating contemporary modern knowledge in the sciences and arts. However, they were more than just practically enlightened in terms of economics; from its very beginnings, the Dublin Philosophical Society was ideologically enlightened as well, allowing Irish Catholics to learn alongside and equally with Anglo-Irish Protestants.[62] In short, both Dublin Societies were enlightenment societies dedicated to the study of advancements in the sciences and the arts and were ideologically acquainted with ideas of societal leveling and Whiggish political-economics.[63]

The letter from the Dublin Society patriot goes on to outline the reasons for the accrual of national debt as well as the blending of revenues in attempt to compensate for the previous insufficiencies of the hereditary revenue to meet the "exigencies of government."[64] When in 1729 the national debt reached £300,000, Parliament made an act for the provision of appropriated duties for the express purpose of paying both the principal and the interest of the debt.[65] The author writes:

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[60] Theodore K. Hoppen, "The Dublin Philosophical Society and the New Learning in Ireland," *Irish Historical Studies* 14, no. 54 (1964): 99-118, http://www.jstor.org/stable/30005795.

[61] Hoppen, "The Dublin Philosophical Society," 118; Kevin, Bright, "Reflections on the Royal Dublin Society (1731-2001)," *Dublin Historical Record* 56, no. 1 (2003): 18–30, http://www.jstor.org/stable/30101381.

[62] Hoppen, "The Dublin Philosophical Society," 103.

[63] Hoppen, "The Dublin Philosophical Society," 99-118; Bright, "Reflections on the Royal Dublin Society," 18–30.

[64] *A letter to the Right Honourable James, Earl of Kildare,* p. 9-10.

[65] *A letter to the Right Honourable James, Earl of Kildare,* p. 10.

> The money was never borrowed on the Royal Credit, but on the several votes of credit passed by the Parliament. We all know that in almost every reign…there were Acts passed, declaring the power of the people, of granting the publick money, in such manner and for such purposes, as they thought proper, and that any redundancy in the Treasury, was the property of the nation, and might be disposed of, in discharge of the national debts. Nay this right was carried so far, that in many Acts, (both before and since Poyning's Law) it is expressly declared, that the King has no right to dispose of the money appointed by Parliament, and limit the C[row]n from any alienations, grants, pensions, incumbrances whatever, of the funds appointed for public uses.[66]

Here the author of the letter directly invokes the previously established constitutional rights of the Parliament of Ireland. If the need for the consent of the King be affirmed now, then a precedent would be set for the future where the metropole could choose to dispose of the money for any purpose it saw fit.[67] The connection between commercial and legislative freedom is made once again in this letter when the author writes:

> There is an easy and plain cure for all our griefs and fears, namely to let our Acts pass in the usual forms; to encourage our foreign trade and domestic commerce; (and particularly that useful and important part, the *woolen manufacture*) to support our Dublin Society by Parliamentary aids; and lastly to encourage our tillage, by large premiums distributed to every county; then we would be a happy and flourishing people, and be able to supply the government with millions instead of thousands.[68]

The Patriots of this Whiggish and regionalist-autonomous perspective clearly valued a strong Parliament to intervene in the economy of the kingdom in the same way as the regionalist-hierarchical Whigs in the metropole sought a strong Parliament for the same purposes, the difference being in the desirable degree and extent with which Whiggish political-economic ideology would be applied. Regionalist-autonomous Patriots in Ireland sought to develop

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[66] *A letter to the Right Honourable James, Earl of Kildare,* p. 11.

[67] *A letter to the Right Honourable James, Earl of Kildare,* p.14.

[68] *A letter to the Right Honourable James, Earl of Kildare,* p. 24.

Whiggish developmental aims unreservedly in Ireland and thereby equally to the metropole without yet any substantial calls for independence.

It has already been established that the 1749 engrossed bill presented no threat to Ireland's constitutional rights. The 1751 bill, however, did present concerns but was not met with the same resistance as the 1753 bill. Historians have pointed to this as evidence that Boyle and the other Patriots in the Irish Parliament rejected the 1753 bill solely for self-serving factional aims.[69] However, when analyzing the financial state of Ireland between 1751 and 1753, the practical necessity of approving the 1751 bill becomes evident.

The constitutional crisis that motivated the money bill rejection of 1753 was an ideological crisis and, although legitimately vital in the longterm, was not immediately economically viable in 1751. The arrears for 1751 (£313,877) had shrunk by 1/3 by 1753 (£205,439).[70] Even after a new loan of £70,000 for militia arms – which was listed separately – is calculated into the arrears with £9,000 subtracted from it in previous payment, the combined total for 1753 (£266,439) was *still* approximately £50,000 less than in 1751.[71] Not only does this reveal that the Irish Parliament was under less immediate financial strain in 1753 than in 1751, it also reveals a sustained dependency on a credit-based system for the government of Ireland as a modernizing state. The Parliament of Ireland was much more active and involved than one would expect from some colonial backwater; there was clearly a natural growth in the political-economic activity of the state as credit became crucial to the operation of the state. The Irish

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[69] Magennis, *The Irish Political System*, pp. 44-47; Brewer, *Sinews of Power*, pp. 62-83; and Fleming, *Edmund Sexten Pery,* pp. 41-42.

[70] *JHC-I* v.9, pp. 35-36.

[71] *JHC-I* v.9, pp. 35-36.

Parliament spent £1.1million in two years with £59,272 going to "appropriated funds," £152,415 going to "extraordinary charges," and £143,000 on the civil list;" this indicates a not insignificant degree of civil interventionism for the state. Even though the largest bulk of the expenditure was towards the military list (approximately 68%), one should take into account that "horse, foot, and dragoons" made up 79% of that expenditure.[72] Being that London would have ultimate authority over these personnel, these expenditures can be viewed as more contributive to the British imperial military system as a whole than to Ireland alone; it would therefore be potentially misleading to compare the percentage of the military list to the combined percentage of the civil list, appropriated funds, and extraordinary charges to say that Ireland itself was a fiscal-military state rather than an aspiring developmental state in a similar vein as Great Britain.[73] Rather, one could say that even beyond having to financially contribute to the imperial military, the Irish state showed itself dedicated to supporting civil development through expanding its own credit-based economic system.

The difference of situation between 1751 and 1753 is further verified by the unnamed patriot of the Dublin Society who stated directly that the passing of the money bill in 1751 was due to a greater degree of financial necessity as well as for the sake of the government's credit due to a provision of "loan duties" in the 1751 act which assured creditors of Parliament's continued efforts to repay the credit.[74] A credit-based system was widely understood at the time

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[72] *JHC-I* v.9 1751/56, pp. 33-34.

[73] For eighteenth-century Great Britain as a modern developmental state see Pincus and Robinson, "Challenging the Fiscal-Military Hegemony, pp. 229-261.

[74] *A letter to the Right Honourable James, Earl of Kildare*, p. 12.

to have been the basis of the eighteenth-century British Atlantic economy.[75] This system is what allowed for substantial Whiggish development in Britain but also necessitated being able to make payments on at least the accrued interests of the national debt. The British Parliament was able to finance interventionist Whiggish development by being a safe bet for wealthy creditors to make money off the accrued interest. If the Irish Parliament wanted to continue to finance the Irish state, then it would have to retain a reliable credit. The financial difference between 1751 and 1753, along with the "loan duties provision" to reassure creditors, cannot simply be ignored.

All of this more sufficiently accounts for the lack of resistance in 1751 compared to the resistance Patriots mounted in 1753 than mere factional rivalry alone. In 1751, a rejected bill would have assuredly resulted in financial damage to creditors and public credit alike but in 1753 there was less immediately on the line. The Money Bill Dispute wasn't replicated after 1753 as the hereditary revenue failed to bring in a surplus, particularly due to the Seven Years War which necessitated significant increases in government spending.[76] However, this Money Bill Dispute is a salient example of the development of the ideals of popular Irish Patriotism and its connection to regionalist-autonomous ideology.

By the 1750s, the Irish House of Commons was the only governmental institution in Ireland which the English had yet to overtly infiltrate as they had previously done with the judiciary, bishop's bench, and army; the threat from the British to absorb the financial power of the House of Commons was a direct threat to the future of Irish interests as well as to the

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[75] Mary O'Sullivan, "Ireland's Role in British Colonial Capitalism: 'Men of Capitals' and Pitt's Irish Proposals. 1784-1785," *Business History Review* 98, no1 (Spring 2024): 119-163, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007680524000187; Patrick Walsh, "The Fiscal-State in Ireland, 1691-1769," The Historical Journal 56, no. 3 (2013): 629–56. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24529088.

[76] Charles Ivar McGrath, *Ireland and Empire, 1692-1770,* (Pickering & Chatto, 2012), p. 193.

political relevance of Irish MPs themselves.[77] The financial independence of the Parliament of Ireland was at a critical point during the mid-eighteenth century. Old repressive policies still ensured British authority but the regionalist-hierarchical suppression of Whiggish economic development in the peripheries was beginning to show signs of being unsustainable in regions of the empire like the American Colonies and Ireland which were culturally acquainted with British constitutional concepts and the notion of an "empire of liberty" proceeding from the Glorious Revolution.[78] The specific moment chosen by Boyle, the primary undertaker, to make an official challenge to the Crown's authority was potentially partially due to the need for political posturing against his rival but the challenge itself was not ideologically unfounded and the evidence suggests a financial strain in 1751 that may have prevented Boyle and other Irish MPs from pursuing the constitutional concern.

Widespread support for the regionalist-autonomous Patriot position during the Money Bill Dispute reveals the conscious nature of the public sphere in eighteenth-century Ireland as well as the importance of this conflict. This new public element significantly altered the relationship between public and Parliament in Ireland. Irish public opinion came to be seen as a force to be reckoned with by Irish Parliamentarians; even the non-patriot proponents in the Irish Parliament had to acknowledge that their power-base from this point on had to be accommodated

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[77] Magennis, *The Irish Political System*, p. 13; Declan O'Donovan, "The Money Bill Dispute," in *Penal Era and Golden Age: Essays in Irish History 1690 - 1800,* edited by Thomas Bartlett and D.W. Hayton, (Ulster Historical Foundation, 1979), pp. 86-87l ;

[78] To quote Livesey, "Free trade properly understood would not be an innovation, or a concession granted from Britain to Ireland, but a constitutive element of British liberty." Livesey, "Free Trade and Empire," p. 111; Vaughn, *The Politics of Empire.*

to public opinion.[79] The constitutional questions which were brought to the fore of the public and parliamentary consciousnesses by the Money Bill Dispute were an instrumental step towards the establishment of legislative independence in 1782.[80] However, as the MPs in Dublin shifted towards greater consideration for Irish interests through a regionalist-autonomous ideology, MPs in Westminster were swinging towards the regionalist-hierarchical approach to Whig political-economics. Declan O'Donovan writes, "England was coming more and more to see Ireland in a colonial light; indeed, was becoming more and more conscious of her imperial role, and, from the onset of the Seven Years War at least, there was a move towards tougher imperial government."[81]

The constitutional crisis over the regionalist-hierarchical perception of Ireland in the imperial system was a central facet of the Money Bill Dispute. The rejection of the money bill was founded on the grounds that the King cannot give his *consent* with regard to how Ireland utilizes the surplus of the hereditary revenue. Regionalist-autonomous MPs in the Irish Parliament rejected an engrossed bill that was altered to cater solely to the practical effects of their request while reversing the ideological premise of it – a discordant dynamic which will be similarly displayed in the 1780s with regard to the legislative revolution and subsequent attempts at commercial reform.

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[79] O'Donovan, "The Money Bill Dispute," p. 87.

[80] O'Donovan, "The Money Bill Dispute," p. 56.

[81] O'Donovan, "The Money Bill Dispute," p. 87.

Chapter 3. Catholics and Developments in Conceptions of National Loyalty

The popular patriotism of eighteenth-century Ireland was imbued not with sectarianism nor nationalism but with an endeavoring spirit for the legislative liberties of a nation long denied the same extent and degree of Whiggish economic development as the metropole. While Catholic emancipation was not yet a ubiquitous position among Irish patriots and MPs in the mid-century, the next few decades would see the further development of a sociopolitical enlightenment ideology that would call for Catholic suffrage and an end to the penal laws. This is the true beginnings of the formation of the popular Patriot movement – a movement predicated on regionalist-autonomous notions that Whiggish economic prosperity and labor-wealth creation in Ireland could only be assured through Irish Parliamentary autonomy. Whether the form of autonomy pursued was confederal or fully independent would become evermore reliant on public perceptions of the potential for perpetual Parliamentary autonomy within the imperial structures. Without such autonomy, there could be no ultimate legislative accountability to the people of Ireland; without legislative accountability, there could be no assurance of earnest economic endeavor in policy-making for Ireland.

After the Money Bill Dispute, a popular brand of politics began coalescing under the banner of legislative and economic freedom in Ireland. Over the next few decades, this budding movement would evolve into a more comprehensive movement in pursuit of typical enlightenment concepts such as social leveling and religious toleration. The nonsectarian nature that the Patriot movement would take on was largely due to the recognition of a commonality of interests between regionalist-autonomous Anglo-Irish Whigs and long oppressed Irish Catholics in pursuit of economic development for Ireland as a whole. Domestic hierarchical

socioeconomics were obviously directly disadvantageous to Irish Catholics but were also incompatible with the Whiggish developmental aspirations of the Anglo-Irish Patriot politicians and public alike.

In the years following the Money Bill Dispute, Patriot clubs began developing all over Ireland.[82] A posting in the *Belfast News-Letter* from October 1754 is especially telling in this regard; it reads:

> Notice is hereby given, that a publick meeting of gentlemen of county of Down will be held at Downpatrick on Wednesday the thirteenth of this instant October, in order to form a Patriot Club. Where all will be welcome who, animated by that truly loyal and liberal spirit which so universally manifests itself in the various Patriot clubs already instituted or now widely forming themselves throughout this Kingdom, are determined to testify their distinguished gratitude and confidence by every constitutional measure in their power, towards those worthy patriots, by whose inflexible fidelity, the rights of this country were so critically vindicated last session of Parliament: — And who, now taught by experience how much the public interests of this country depend upon the wisdom and fidelity of the House of Commons, are ready to pledge their faith to each other never to give their voices or interest upon any future occasion, for sending men into Parliament who they have cause to suspect would be induced to concur in measures injurious to the rights and liberties and legal government of this Kingdom.[83]

Patriot clubs tended towards regionalist-autonomous Whiggery in the pursuit of economic development. This pursuit was naturally conducive to enlightenment ideals like expanded representation, free association, social equality, and the "public use of reason" as Kant would call

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[82] Bob Harris, "The Patriot Clubs of the 1750s," in *Clubs and Societies in Eighteenth-Century Ireland,* edited by James Kelley and Martyn J. Powell, (Four Courts Press, 2010), pp. 224-243.

[83] *Belfast News-Letter* no. 1783*,* (October 14, 1754), p. 3.

it.[84] As the public sphere was rapidly growing in Ireland, remarkably similar public associations were developing across the British Empire in the eighteenth-century, often for ideologically related reasons.[85] The regionalist-autonomous, imperial-nondiscriminatory, and imperial-axial Whigs outside the metropole all largely sought greater representation in their own ways to ensure equitable or equal treatment and had a common antagonist in the regionalist-hierarchical Whigs who held no ideological reason for extending representation nor in seeking equity or equality in the imperial system. However, without the extension of representation for the peripheries to the metropole, both subgroups of the inter-imperial Whigs as they existed outside the metropole would largely shift to the regionalist-autonomous camp; this shift was due primarily as a means to ensure Whiggish political-economic development in their respective regions. Across the

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[84] The writings of mid- to late eighteenth-century political-philosophers like Kant, Rousseau, and even the anti-original-contract theorist/monarchist David Hume provide ample evidence for a growing understanding across Europe that public participation and public opinion is fundamentally important for politics and governance. Immanuel Kant, "On the Common Saying: This May Be True in Theory, but It Does Not Hold True in Practice," in Toward Perpetual Peace *and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History,* edited by Pauline Kleingaurd, translated by David L. Colclasure, (Yale University Press, 2006); Jean-Jaques Rousseau, *Of the Social Contract,* in *Rousseau: The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings* 2nd edition*,* edited and translated by Victor Gourevitch, (Cambridge University Press, 2019); David Hume, "Of the Measures of Allegiance," in *A Treatise of Human Nature,* edited by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton, (Oxford University Press, 2000); and for specifically Kant's "public use of reason" see, Immanuel Kant, "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?," in Toward Perpetual Peace *and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History,* edited by Pauline Kleingaurd, translated by David L. Colclasure, (Yale University Press, 2006).

[85] For association culture see, Peter Clark, *British Clubs and Societies 1580-1800: The Origins of an Associational World,* (Oxford University Press, 2000); and *Association and Enlightenment: Scottish Clubs and Societies, 1700-1830,* edited by Mark C. Wallace and Jane Rendell, (Bucknell University Press, 2020); Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society,* translated by Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence, (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1989); Alpaugh, *Friends of Freedom*; and Jim Smyth, *The Men of No Property: Irish Radicals and Popular Politics in the Late Eighteenth Century,* (Palgrave Macmillan, 1998).

empire in the eighteenth-century, conflicting ideologies about the desirable degree and extent of the implementation of Whiggish political-economy developed into deepening regional divides which predicated uprisings later in the century.

The continual imperial denial of extended representation for the peripheries seeking to ensure Whiggish development and British liberties led to the propagation of the regionalist-autonomous perspective which itself necessitated a deepening of the franchise of representation and sociopolitical equality within one's region. It is not a stretch to speculate from this point that these centrifugal forces were susceptible and amenable to the nationalism phenomenon of the nineteenth-century. However, that lattermost hypothesis on the origins of nationalism will require further research to substantiate such a claim, perhaps a future project.

The Williamite War at the end of the seventeenth-century had seemingly reaffirmed for the English government that Irish Catholics could not be incorporated into a homogenous culture, loyal to the empire; the safest option, then, in the eyes of the English establishment, was the further oppression of Irish Catholics under an Anglo-Protestant hierarchy. However, the intensity of the confessional concerns from the years after the Williamite war had significantly lessened over the eighteenth-century as new political conceptions like national loyalty, and ideas about how to foster such a form of loyalty, had assumed a place of precedence among political thinkers and the public alike. In comparison to the seventeenth-century, the confessional divide in both Ireland and Britain had notably become less predicated upon Protestant concerns of a Catholic civil war than on simply maintaining a favorable sociopolitical structure for the Anglo-Protestant establishment. This shift in the socio-religious paradigm is what led the British peer Earl Ferrers – while arguing in a House of Lords debate *against* Catholic relief and *for* the

reinstatement of restrictions on Catholics – to directly state that he "know[s] that the reasons once prevalent for the severity exercised against Papists no longer exist in this enlightened age" but that restrictions in "the purchase of lands and keeping of schools" must be reinstated against Catholics in order to subdue the growth of Catholicism which he states had been more than doubled in the Diocese of Chester, as an example, from 10,308 in 1717 to 27,228 in 1781.[86]

Historians often balk at the notion of it but it is hard to escape the fact that Ireland in the late eighteenth-century was beginning to resemble a type of apartheid state, backed by British imperial policies benefiting the Anglo-Protestant ascendency.[87] The degree to which oppression in Ireland was *race*-based versus *religious*-based in order to qualify or disqualify it as an apartheid state is somewhat beside the point; there was, at the very least, a *religio-cultural* apartheid predicated on politically and economically propping up a minority population through the oppression of a religio-culturally different majority. Even dissenting Ulster Presbyterians at the time – although still discriminated against by establishment Protestants – were afforded

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[86] Ferrers used the Diocese of Chester as an example because he felt that it was the diocese from which he was able to attain the most accurate numbers. However, the Lord Bishop of Chester expressed his doubts about the accuracy of the numbers quoted by Ferrers. "The Speech of Earl Ferrers," *The Manchester Mercury, & Harrop's General Advertiser* no. 1562*,* (April 3, 1781), p. 1, The British Newspaper Archive, https://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/.

[87] Nicholas Canny gives his reasons for being reticent about calling Ireland an apartheid state between the sixteenth- and eighteenth-centuries. One reason is that to use the term would be "endorsing one of the arguments advanced by exclusivist catholic nationalists as D.P. Moran" and that the argument for using the term is essentially polemical more than anything else. He also sees the Protestant attempts at converting Catholics as sufficiently earnest enough to disvalue the state's apartheid-like policies from being truly apartheid in ideology. Canny, Nicholas. "Protestants, Planters and Apartheid in Early Modern Ireland." *Irish Historical Studies* 25, no. 98 (1986): 105–15. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30008522.
Brandon Bradshaw tracks what he sees as the early development of the apartheid state in Ireland during the Reformation. Brenden Bradshaw, "Sword, Word and Strategy in the Reformation in Ireland," *The Historical Journal* 21, no. 3 (1978): 475–502. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2638923.

greater rights and privileges than Catholics.[88] The wide scale implementation of state policies to disproportionately render the majority of a society to a sociopolitically subservient position beneath a minority ruling class due to religious, racial, or cultural differences *should* qualify a state as a particular form of apartheid in constitution regardless of the ability for upward mobility through something like religious conversion. More to the point, incentive-based conversion policies would require the favored religious minority population to be granted certain privileges that were above the base constitutional rights of citizens in a society; the anti-Catholic policies in Ireland were punitive in a manner which intentionally lowered Irish Catholics beneath the constitutional threshold of rights perceived to have been won through the Glorious Revolution in British imperial society. While this system may have been designed to convert the Irish to Anglicanism, by the late eighteenth-century it had come to be an ineluctable facet of the sociopolitical and socioeconomic structures in Ireland.

Burke described the apartheid-esque system in Ireland as a "grim phantom" that was "as well fitted for the oppression, impoverishment and degradation of a people, and the debasement, in them, of human nature itself, as ever proceeded from the perverted ingenuity of man."[89] The imperially-protected, apartheid-esque, religio-cultural hierarchy in Ireland during the eighteenth-

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[88] John McCann suggests that a shared oppressed identity was why Ulster Presbyterians were eventually willing to incorporate Catholics into the Volunteers after the American Revolution but also addresses how Presbyterians were less sociopolitically oppressed than Catholics. John McCann, "The Northern Irish Liberal Presbyterians 1770-1830," *The Canadian Journal of Irish Studies* 21, no. 1 (1995): 99, https://doi.org/10.2307/25513020.

[89] Edmund Burke, *A letter...to Sir Hercules Langrishe...on the subject of Roman Catholics of Ireland, and the propriety of admitting them to the elective franchise, consistently with the principles of the Constitution as established at the Revolution,* (Printed for J. Debrett, 1792), pp. 87-87, The Making of the Modern World, https://link-gale-com.proxy.uchicago.edu/apps/doc/U0102450067/MOME?u=chic_rbw&sid=bookmark-MOME&xid=6120ac9c&pg=87.

century was foundational to the sociopolitical structure of that society in a way which even proponents of Catholic relief understood could not be easily redressed without fundamentally tearing down the old structure to build a new one – i.e. through revolution, whether legislative or literal. This was a system which "if there was once a breach in any essential part of it; the ruin of the whole, or nearly the whole, was, at some time or other, a certainty."[90] A variety of concepts regarding the extent of British constitutional rights were debated and discussed across empire. Irish Catholics in particular were not at that time considered under British policy to be entitled the same constitutional rights as Anglican Englishmen and thereby the Anglo-Protestant ascendency in Ireland.

Similar constitutional concerns unrelated to Ireland were popping up across the empire at this time in unique ways regarding who had access to the rights one would associate with modern conceptions of citizenship in a politically-representative civil society. For example, a 1773 Boston newspaper columnist wrote, "My next enquiry is, whether I, an inhabitant of this colony, have not a full and absolute right to all the requisites of a wholesome and well regulated society as any man in the British dominions?"[91] I should be clear here that this individual was not specifically advocating for anything related to Catholic relief in Ireland, the abolition of slavery in the American colonies, or anything of that nature; however it is a useful example of the empire-wide flux in ideas regarding imperial rights and the evolution of concepts of citizenship in the eighteenth-century. These questions were being asked and argued socially across the

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[90] Burke, *A letter...to Sir Hercules Langrishe*, p. 87.

[91] "For the Massachusetts SPY," in *The Massachusetts Sun or, Thomas's Boston Journal* vol. III no. 145, (November 11, 1773), pp. 1-2, Library of Congress, https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83021194/1773-11-11/ed-1/seq-1/.

empire in a variety of ways due to a lack of political consensus regarding what regions of the empire and who in those regions were entitled to "British" constitutional liberties. Especially in question were the extent and degree of the implementation of those liberties perceived to have been won with the Glorious Revolution from which grew the idea of an empire of liberty.

Multiple generations after the Williamite war, the confessional tensions in Ireland remained taught due primarily to the sustained oppression of Irish Catholics under the Penal Laws and the consequential unrest of those laws. Fear of "White Boyism" in the 1760s and early 1770s had perpetuated a strained sociocultural relationship between Catholics and Protestants in Ireland.[92] In relation to this sociocultural anxiety, the concern of upsetting Ulster Presbyterians had politically held back the Lord Lieutenant from endorsing Catholic relief petitions in proposal to London.[93] Irish Catholics were the overwhelming majority of the population and were politically oppressed by a minority of Anglo-Irish establishment Protestants who, by the second half of the eighteenth-century, had begun to more often justify this oppression in terms of the fear of losing their cultural, political, and economic advantages to the Irish Catholic majority if the policies of that oppression were retracted. Across the empire, when the political argument for Catholic oppression was inevitably brought back around to concerns of Catholic disloyalty to the empire due to religious reasons, oppositional opinion often countered successfully with the point

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[92] "White Boyism" is in reference to the White Boy organization which pursued Catholic emancipation by acts of violence, see Robert Burns, "The Catholic Relief Act in Ireland, 1778," in *Church History* v. 32 no.2 (1963): 181–186. https://search-ebscohost-com.proxy.uchicago.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=lsdar&AN=ATLA0000668996&site=ehost-live&scope=site.

[93] Burns, "The Catholic Relief Act in Ireland," pp. 181–186.

that loyalty from Catholics could very well be attained through equitable treatment.[94] Many of the arguments presented for the relaxation of property restrictions on Catholics reveal the shifting in perception of what motivates loyalties. A growing belief that "if the Roman Catholics buy land they would never join the invader who comes to take it from them" was a common argument for Catholic relief policies at the end of the 1770s.[95] A British MP's argument is recorded as follows:

> Mr. Charles Turner detested the cruel policy that reduced men, by nature, free, to a state of slavery. Religion, he said, had always been an engine in the hands of power to enslave mankind. He wished to see all his fellow subjects free Catholics and Dissenters alike; and an universal toleration established by law. The Catholics of this country were amiable, worthy citizens; they lived on their estates, improved them, spent the produce of them at home, and daily exercised the most voluntary and most generous acts of charity and humanity among those who reside on or near their estates.[96]

The strengthening of a united national identity to supersede the divisions of religious identity was accompanied by an enlightened sense of citizenship. Of course this shifting cultural consciousness was not without resisters but, all-in-all, British politics at the time were seemingly

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[94] For a similar argument made in a British House of Lords debate over a proposed bill to repeal the the Quebec Act and the religious toleration of Catholics in Quebec: *Leinster Journal* vol. IX no. 42, edited by Edmund Finn, (May 27, 1775), p. 2., Irish Newspaper Archives, https://archive.irishnewsarchive.com/olive/APA/INA/Default.aspx#panel=document.

[95] For the quote from the Irish Parliamentarian Boyle Roche, see "Parliamentary Register of the Second Session of the Third Parliament of Ireland, in the reign of his Majesty George III," in *Hibernarian Journal, or Chronicle of Liberty* no. 93*,* (August 1778), p. 4, Irish Newspapers Archives, (accessed March 22, 2025), https://archive.irishnewsarchive.com/olive/APA/INA/Default.aspx#panel=document.

[96] "House of Commons, May 18," in *The Western Flying-Post; Sherborne and Yeovil Mercury, and General Advertiser* no. 2456, (May 25, 1778), p. 2, The British Newspaper Archive, https://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/viewer/BL/0000410/17780525/002/0002?browse=true&fullscreen=true.

swaying in favor of Burke's enlightened "liberal principles in government, in commerce, [and] in religion" even though opponents of Catholic emancipation remained prevalent.[97]

This perspective on loyalty undergirds the sentiments expressed in a column from the *Freeman's Journal* in 1779 where it was written:

> Let any man give himself but a moment's reflection on the state of the Roman Catholicks in Ireland, and he will not hesitate to pronounce the conduct of the Roman Catholicks pardonable, if not absolutely necessary to people in their circumstances…Let the country party open their arms to receive them, and, I dare say, the Roman Catholicks will prove zealous friends to the liberties of Ireland…I am no advocate fro Roman Catholicks, as such, but I am an advocate for liberty; and I insist upon it, that the civil power has nothing to do with any man's conscience; he is answerable to God alone for his belief; reason, and not the sword, is the argument to be used on such a subject.[98]

By 1783, Irish Parliamentarians were openly discussing how the British were denying Catholic relief in Ireland as a political tactic to disunite Ireland in the manner of the old Roman policy of "*divide & impera.*"[99] Gaining new political ground was the conception that national loyalty could be secured through the equitable implementation of a developmental and interventionist Whiggish political-economic ideology both between imperial provinces as well as between

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[97] Edmund Burke, *A letter from a gentleman in the English House of Commons, in vindication of his conduct, with regard to the affairs of Ireland, addressed to a Member of the Irish Parliament,* (printed for J. Bew, in Pater-Noster-Row, 1780), p. 26, Eighteenth Century Collections Online, https://link-gale-com.proxy.uchicago.edu/apps/doc/CW0106853600/ECCO?u=chic_rbw&sid=bookmark-ECCO&xid=16600846&pg=24.
For an example of the protestant riots which erupted in reaction against legislative action for Catholic relief and the repealing of the Penal Laws in the late 1770s, see "Scotland," *The Northampton Mercury* vol. LIX no. 49, (15 Feb. 1779), p. 1, The British Newspaper Archive, https://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/viewer/bl/0000317/17790215/003/0001.

[98] "To the Committee for Conducting the Free Press," *The Public Register, or, Freeman's Journal* v. XVII no. 49, (December 4th, 1779), p. 3, Irish Newspaper Archives.

[99] *The Parliamentary Register, or, History of the Proceedings and Debates of the House of Commons of Ireland* v. 2, (Printed for R. Byrne and W. Porter, 1784), p. 262, HaithiTrust, https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.hnf9vx. Hereafter referred to as *PRHC-I.*

imperial citizens within those provinces. Michael Alpaugh describes the societal turn to enlightened concepts of equitability:

> Liberty and rights, concepts previously restricted to certain nations and privileged groups, became potentially applicable to anyone, anywhere. Only low barriers existed between movements and countries: indeed, many activists desired the reduction of borders, boundaries, and old hatreds to right past abuses. Exuberant hopes spread that the political, economic, class, religious, racial, national, and other Old Regime barriers could be abolished – perhaps quickly.[100]

This somewhat Kantian cosmopolitism meant that similar social movements in places like America, France, Ireland, and Britain would rightly perceive themselves to be united by shared enlightenment aims; aims such as societal leveling, free association, and the extending and deepening of political representation. The Volunteers in Ireland, as the primogenitor of the Society of United Irishmen, fit neatly into the same enlightened, politically-revolutionary mould as other prominent revolutionary societies of the period such as the Sons of Liberty in Colonial America or the Jacobin Club in France.[101]

For a significant portion of the British and Irish Parliaments, the amelioration of relations with Catholics in Ireland became the most obvious solution for establishing a united and loyal front upon the entering of France into the American conflict in 1778.[102] At this point in the eighteenth-century, it was conceivable to many that the British state could overcome religious-based political loyalty by creating socioeconomic and sociopolitical interests in the empire for Irish Catholics. But it wasn't just Irish Catholics that the British Parliament needed to pacify. Proponents of Whiggish regionalist-autonomous ideology in the Irish Parliament and across Irish

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[100] Alpaugh, *Friends of Freedom*, p. 2.

[101] Alpaugh, *Friends of Freedom.*

[102] Burns, "The Catholic Relief Act in Ireland, p. 187.

society in general would also need a greater stake in the imperial state to keep them committed to the Bourbon war. State loyalty through socioeconomic and sociopolitical enticements were pursued through the twofold effects of Catholic relief in the hopes of pacifying the most disadvantaged sociopolitical group and through a relaxation of trade restrictions on Ireland to pacify the more ardently Whiggish areas of Irish society.[103]

The potential for national loyalty predicated on Whiggish political-economic interests was coming to be better understood by a growing number of both British and Irish politicians who directly expressed their favor for relaxing both the penal laws and the trade restrictions on Ireland. In 1778, Edmund Burke wrote to Bristol merchants to address their discontent with him voting in favor of bills to lessen the restrictions on Irish trade:

> I cannot imagine that you forget the great war which has been carried on with so little success (and, as I thought, with so little policy) in America, or that you are not aware of the other great wars which are impending. Ireland has been called upon to repel the attacks of enemies of no small power, brought upon her by councils in which she has had no share. The very purpose and declared object of that original war, which has brought other wars and other enemies on Ireland, was not very flattering to her dignity, her interest, or to the very principle of her liberty…In this situation, are we neither to suffer her to have any real interest in our quarrel, or to be flattered with the hope of any future means of bearing the burdens which she is to incur in defending herself against enemies which we have brought upon her?…It is for *you*, and for *your* interest, as a dear, cherished, and respected part of a valuable whole, that I have taken my share in this question. …Ireland having received no *compensation*, directly or indirectly, for any restraints on their trade, ought not, in justice or common honesty, to be made subject to such restraints.[104]

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[103] Edmund Burke, "Copy of a Letter to Messrs. and Co. Bristol," in *The Parliamentary History of England from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803* v. XIX, edited by William Cobbett, (Printed by T.C. Hansard, 1814), pp. 1106-1110, HaithiTrust, https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015037395533?urlappend=%3Bseq=581%3Bownerid=13510798899666513-615.

[104] Burke, "Copy of a Letter to Messrs. and Co. Bristol," pp. 1106-1110.

"A valuable whole" adequately conveys Burke's conception of the imperial state. There is no hierarchy for Burke and no value in the somewhat *novo* zero-sum policies of the regionalist-hierarchical ideology which had continued to subjugate the Irish economy for the breadth of the eighteenth-century. Burke was an imperial-axial Whig and as such he believed in true positive-sum commercial prosperity and labor-wealth creation across the empire. It is by these means that Ireland can become better enfolded into the British imperial flock, which was especially needed during that time of great war. For Burke, and the other Parliamentarians who voted similarly, loyalty was believed to be capably incited through the extension of Whiggish political-economic prosperity and adequate representation to ensure that prosperity.

The national consciousness of both Britain and Ireland had changed in the nearly one hundred years since the Glorious Revolution. Religious loyalty was coming to take more and more of a backseat to conceptions of a national loyalty that were predicated on the potential and security of Whiggish political-economic development. In the face of economic suppression – be it in the peripheries of an empire as by regionalist-hierarchical Whigs in Britain or in the metropole itself as by the fiscal-militarism of an absolutist regime in France – the security of bourgeois economic development in a modern state was perceived to be naturally aligned with the extending and deepening of political representation. These ideals paired readily with other enlightenment concepts like societal democratization, social contract theory, and natural rights. This is not to say that the adoption of enlightenment ideology by revolutionaries in the late eighteenth-century was solely or even primarily for practical purposes; this is only to say that concepts like social contract theory, free association, and extensions of participation in politics

would have naturally made sense to economically suppressed eighteenth-century commercialists who were seeking to secure economic development for their region or state.

Chapter 4. Associational Culture, the Volunteers, and a Wider Perspective

The propagation of regionalist-autonomous Whig ideology ran through the intersection of politics and populace due to the broader historical phenomenon of flowering public spheres in America and Ireland as well as the increasing influence of popular politics. While Grattan and his Parliamentary pals were not *responsible* for the Irish Rebellion of 1798 – which would be better denominated as a failed *revolution –,* they are bound up within the same ideological forces which centrifugally ejected the American colonies. In the 1790s, these same forces slung Ireland into open conflict with the metropole.

The American Revolution had a significant impact on Irish sociopolitical developments. The Volunteers were a militia network that, in the late eighteenth-century, operated as a socio-military organization in pursuit of regionalist-autonomous reform. They were the lifeblood of the Patriot platform in Irish Parliament as they pushed for legislative independence.[105] As a general whole, the Volunteers were imbued with the democratic ideals of Ulster Presbyterianism but were not limited to Presbyterians alone; they admitted Catholics, Anglicans, and Dissenters alike into their ranks.[106] In addition to this social democratic spirit, the Volunteers largely promoted Whiggish economic aims like free trade through the regionalist-autonomous lens of legislative independence for Ireland. While this regionalist-autonomous tendency was not universally ubiquitous across every Volunteer regiment, it was prolific enough to confidently state that the Volunteers were a socio-military organization who largely advocated for Whiggish regionalist-

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[105] James Stafford, *The Case of Ireland: Commerce, Empire and the European Order,* (Cambridge University Press, 2022), p. 59.

[106] Stafford, *The Case of Ireland*, p. 59.

autonomous political-economic ends.[107] The old constitutional arguments of William Molyneux and Johnathon Swift became the bedrock principles of the Volunteer movement but the ideology was also beginning to shift towards arguments based on conceptions of natural right.

At the initial outbreak of hostilities between Britain and the American colonies, most Irish regiments which had been previously tasked with the defense of Ireland were sent to North America.[108] The real urgency arose when France and Spain involved themselves in the American conflict in 1778. The forming of Irish militias for the protection of Ireland was not uncommon during wartime. What made the Irish Volunteers of the late 1770s and 1780s different was the network of organization which united each branch together. While the Volunteers traced their own origins back to the year 1766 with the formation of the "First Volunteers of Ireland" under MP Sir Vesey Colclough, the Volunteer movement as it would be understood as a broad socio-military network with shared political-economic aims would take shape in 1778.[109]

By and large, the Volunteers were a significant boon for the societal organization of regionalist-autonomous ideology in Ireland. They combined a conscious pursuit of political-economic agency with the further uniting of Irish Catholics, establishment Protestants, and

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[107] T.G.F. Paterson, "The County Armagh Volunteers of 1778-1793," in *Ulster Journal of Archaeology* 5 (1942): p. 31. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20566400.

[108] Fleming, *Edmund Sexten Pery*, p. 132.

[109] *The Volunteers companion; Containing, the description of a firelock, position of a soldier under arms, directions for the manual exercise, &c. Also, the manner of drawing up a regiment to receive the reviewing general; with particular rules for marching and manoeuvring: to which are added, the late Duke of Cumberland's regulations for performing military duty, honours paid to crowned heads and general officers; with an exact plan of a camp. The different situations and manoeuvres engraved on copper-plates.*, (Printed for W. Colles, 1784), National Library of Ireland, Eighteenth Century Collections Online, link.gale.com/apps/doc/CB0131264927/ECCO?u=chic_rbw&sid=bookmark-ECCO&xid=2f9bbd39&pg=4; and Alpaugh, *Friends of Freedom*, p. 121.

dissenting Protestants alike under a single banner of Whiggish political-economic interests in Ireland.

A nuanced relationship existed between the socio-military organization of the Volunteers and the political mechanism of the Irish Parliament, specifically the House of Commons. Historian P.D.H. Smyth lists twenty-three Volunteer officers from Ulster alone who were also MPs in the Irish House of Commons in 1782; Flood and Grattan are specifically mentioned as being representatives from Ulster who commanded Volunteer units in the south.[110] Even with this integrated relationship to the Parliament of Ireland, it is important to note that the Volunteers were explicitly external to the government and were initially formed strictly for the defense of Ireland in the event of a Bourbon invasion; however the rapidity with which the Volunteers took to the pursuit of attaining regionalist-autonomous reform in Ireland is telling of the popularity of this political-economic ideology at the time, both internal and external to Parliament.[111]

In November of 1779, multiple Volunteer companies gathered to celebrate the birthday of King William III and in doing so made a public appeal to the liberties denied to them which they perceived to have been won during the Glorious Revolution.[112] They marched from St. Stephen's Green to the statue of William III in College Green. Of the Volunteer companies present there were the Dublin Volunteers with 200 men, the Liberty Volunteers with 180 men, Lawyers

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[110] Stafford, *The Case of Ireland*, p. 59; and P.D.H. Smyth, "The Volunteers and Parliament, 1779-84," in *Penal Era and Golden Age: Essays in Irish History 1690-1800,* edited by Thomas Bartlett and D.W. Hayton, (Ulster Historical Foundation, 1979), p. 113.

[111]. Smyth, "The Volunteers and Parliament, 1779-84," p. 114.

[112] *The Public Register or The Freeman's Journal* v. XVII no. 32., (Nov. 7, 1779), pp. 127-128., Irish Newspaper Archives, https://archive.irishnewsarchive.com/olive/APA/INA/Default.aspx#panel=document.

Company with 80 men, Goldsmiths Company with 70 men, Merchants Company with 170 men, Barony of Castleknock with 130 men, the Uppercross Fuzileers with 30 men, the Rathdown Light Horse with no headcount given, and the Castleknock Troop of Light Horse also without a headcount. The columnist writes that there were over 1,200 Volunteers present for this occasion. They painted the Volunteer's motto "Q*uinqaginta millia juncta, parati pro patria mori*" (fifty thousand united, ready to die for the fatherland) on the east side of the pedestal. On the west side was painted simply "The Glorious Revolution." The south side was painted with "Relief to Ireland." And finally, on the north side was painted "A short money bill – free trade – or else!!!" The Volunteers saw themselves and their actions as part of the grander narrative of the British "empire of liberty" and they demanded the due liberties – such as free trade – which they perceived to have been won by the Glorious Revolution. The Volunteers, the lifeblood of the Irish patriot movement, were not fueled by confessionalism, nationalism, or mere peasant reform; their claims were founded in both constitutional-based and enlightenment-based conceptions of liberty and their political-economic motivations were staunchly Whiggish.

While Patriot members of the Irish Parliament like Grattan and Flood were the political instruments of change, it was understood in Ireland that "the liberties of Ireland were asserted by the Volunteers; and if they are secured and perpetuated, it must be by the Volunteers. Members of Parliament may be importantly useful in legislative proceedings; but the force and will of the community must create and secure political liberty."[113] But of course, Grattan and Flood were

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[113] Thomas Drought, "Letter II," in *Letters on subjects interesting to Ireland, and addressed to the Irish volunteers,*(Printed for W. Colles, 1783), pp. 9-16, *Eighteenth Century Collections Online,* https://link-gale-com.proxy.uchicago.edu/apps/doc/CB0127683666/ECCO?u=chic_rbw&sid=bookmark-ECCO&xid=d3619c5c&pg=10.

Volunteers in their right, distinct from their roles as MPs.[114] The important thing to note here is that the Volunteers were not instruments of Parliament and neither was Parliament hamstrung by the Volunteers; rather, these two bodies were largely united by a shared Whiggish political-economic, regionalist-autonomous ideology that was lining up ever more naturally with enlightenment sociopolitical philosophy.

Meanwhile, in the Parliament of Ireland, MPs such as Henry Flood, Henry Grattan, Luke Gardiner, and other similarly-minded regionalist-autonomous Whigs consolidated their political efforts to a greater degree and extent than had yet been seen in eighteenth-century Ireland. In the words of Danny Mansergh, "The Irish Whigs (Grattan and his circle in particular) would play a central role in bringing about the civil conflict of the 1790s."[115] While this is true to an extent, it's a statement that verges on the hyperbolic in drawing a direct line of culpability to Grattan's Parliament for the failed revolution of '98. Rather, what is more evidentially obvious is the integration of political-economic interests between socio-military forces and the Parliament of Ireland in general in the decades preceding 1798. The political-economic ideology of regionalist-autonomous Whiggery proliferated throughout eighteenth-century British imperial peripheries – particularly the American colonies and Ireland – due to an ideological conflict with the regionalist-hierarchical political-economic perspective of an influential group of Whigs in the metropole.

Similar to Money-Bill crisis of the 1750s, the essential concern among Irish patriots in the 1780s was the recognition, of lack there of, of Ireland's *right* to self-legislate. Regional-

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[114] Stafford, *The Case of Ireland*, p. 59.

[115] Danny Mansergh, *Grattan's Failure: Parliamentary Opposition and the People of Ireland 1779-1800,* (Irish Academic Press, 2005), p. 1.

autonomous ideology had come to be seen by a large portion of Patriots as the only means by which Ireland's economic prosperity in manufacturing and commerce could be adequately secured; in order to secure this attainment in perpetuity, Ireland's Parliament needed the British government to formally recognize Ireland's *right* to legislate for itself. Merely allowing Ireland legislative autonomy, as if it were an indulgence granted down to Ireland from a hierarchically conceived position, would not suffice.

In a letter written by Francis Dobbs to Lord North with regard to the Irish reforms passed by North in 1780, Dobbs conveys the initial general inflation of spirits in Ireland and subsequent deflation on apprehension that North's reforms were not predicated upon a recognition of Ireland's right to legislative autonomy. Dobbs writes:

> At first, my Lord, your propositions, which have now become a law, gave pretty general satisfaction. Men hitherto restrained in almost every branch, naturally rejoiced at the first view of an extended commerce; but when reason had investigated the principles, on which that extension was given; when it was found to be a matter of expediency, not of right; when it was perceived that it rather established than relinquished the power of British legislation over Ireland, our transports sunk into a very moderate degree of pleasure; and even that pleasure was lessened by the precariousness of enjoyment.[116]

Dobbs emphasizes that the British Parliament has no authority to allow Ireland the legislative freedom to dictate its own trade. He states directly that the Irish Parliament's appeal was under the premise of their right as an equal Parliament under the King.[117] Dobbs goes on to make it clear in no uncertain terms that if Ireland's constitutional right of legislative autonomy was not recognized, then the Irish were endowed with a natural right to resist the tyrannical rule of

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[116] Dobbs, *A Letter to the Right Honorable Lord North,* pp. 5-6.

[117] Dobbs, *A Letter to the Right Honorable Lord North,* p. 6.

British Parliament as all vanquished peoples are endowed with the right to resist their captors. He writes:

> We complain of the British legislature making laws to bind Ireland. We allege it is without right, and we require that the legislature of Great-Britain should relinquish a claim that we say they are not entitled to, and that they should obliterate the name of Ireland from their Statutes…If my ideas, if the ideas of my countrymen are unjust and unreasonable, we are surely entitled to an explanation why they are so. If they are just and reasonable, they should be complied with. If they are just and reasonable and not complied with, we have a right to do ourselves Justice, if ever we have the power.[118]

For Irish patriots, the concern was clearly beyond merely the practical attainment of economic agency and legislative autonomy. Divergent ideologies of political-economics were at the crux of the conflict which predicted the constitutional crisis; so long as Ireland had neither representation in the British Parliamentary system nor imperial recognition of its *right* to economic and legislative agency, then the pursuit of Whiggish political-economic development remained always at risk of arbitrary annihilation by the external body of British Parliament. The legislative revolution of 1782, brought about by the efforts of the Volunteers and the Irish Patriot Parliamentarians, was unsuccessful in ameliorating relations between the metropole and Ireland because the ideological core of the crisis was left unaddressed by the British government in its acquiescence to Irish Patriot demands.

By the late 1770s, associational culture in Ireland had largely taken on a radical disposition. Partially inspired by their regionalist-autonomous American counterparts across the pond and partially instigated by the same core ideological conflict, the Volunteers had emerged as a widespread and active component in the Irish sociopolitical world during the American Revolution. The unrest in America and Ireland was well understood at the time to be caused by

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[118] Dobbs, *A Letter to the Right Honorable Lord North,* pp.6-7

the same imperial despotism being instituted by the regionalist-hierarchical Whigs in the metropole. In the words of the Irish Patriot Thomas Drought:

> The English parliament, which by its corruption on the one hand, and its extravagant claims of power on the other, had very nearly ruined the British Empire, was making hasty strides towards the despotic government of all the English dependencies, when America happily resisted…It was America, which first resisted the oppressions, and oppressive claims of the English Parliament. Here the corner stone of Irish liberty was laid; and every patriotic Irishman will look towards America with gratitude and good wishes.[119]

In the eighteenth-century there were not only a multitude of competing political-economic ideologies across the empire and in the metropole, but the degree and extent of the implementation of political-economic ideology varied as well. The persistent view that Ireland's economy could or should be subordinated to the metropole has similarities with the perspective that colonial fiscal independence in the North American colonies would threaten the metropole economically; both of these perceptions are perhaps lighter degrees of implementation of the ideology of extraction and subordination as was most actualized in India and Asia.

In his book *The Politics of Empire at the Accession of George III,* James Vaughn provides evidence for the interconnectedness of the East India Company's 1765 acquisition and British imperial rule of India with the contemporaneous ideological conflicts raging in the metropole and across the empire regarding the direction and intention of imperial rule and political-economic policy.[120] Vaughn writes, "The consolidation of the EIC's territorial dominion in northeastern India was fundamentally bound up with the emergence and development of the conservative-reactionary political project and its support for an autocratic and extractive

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[119] Drought, "Letter II," pp. 9-13.

[120] Vaughn, *The Politics of Empire.*

imperialism."[121] The loss of the American colonies, doubled with the acquisition of India fueled not only a turn to the East but also both contributed to and acceded from the defeat of what Vaughn terms as radical Whig ideology by conservative reactionaries; this process ushered in a transition to a "Second British Empire" predicated upon the illiberal principles of despotic rule and extractive economics.

The ideology which supported the Second British Empire was always existent in Great Britain to various degrees and extents but there was a stronger shift towards regionalist-hierarchical ideology in the metropole in the second half of the eighteenth-century. It was this shift which fueled the centrifugal effects of regionalist-autonomous ideology, leading to independence movements in Ireland and America. The America colonists – and even the Anglo-Irish to an extent – were felt to be inheritors of the traditions of the conceptions of the English constitution and English rights therein. Their cultural proximity to the metropole during this period may have regulated the degree to which an ideology of subordination and extraction was implementationally possible or desirable. Proponents of political-economic ideologies predicated on imperial hierarchy would have potentially felt much less practically and ideologically restricted in the degree to which extraction and despotism could be implemented in a region of the empire with a more culturally distant people such as in India or Bengal.

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[121] Vaughn, *The Politics of Empire*, p. 16.

Chapter 5: Commercial Reform in the 1780s

On October 21st, 1779, the *Freeman's Journal* reported that "both Houses of Parliament, in Ireland, have unanimously voted an explicit declaration that 'Nothing but a free trade can save this country from impending ruin.'"[122] The columnist goes on to reiterate the necessity of free trade for Ireland by detailing and comparing the expenditures of the Irish state over two years and dividing by half to ascertain the approximate fiscal needs of the state for one year. The columnist comes to the conclusion that state needs £1,100,000 per year to meet the ordinary expenses of the state.[123] The state's finances, however, were deficit of that by £600,0000 before even accounting for the minimum of £60,000 per year payment on accumulated loan interests.[124] Taxes alone would not be able to sufficiently and consistently cover the rising expenses of the Irish state.

The credit-based economy was burgeoning to bust in Ireland under the fiscal demands of an empire at war and as a province limited in its trade by the metropole. The solution promoted by Parliament, the Volunteers, and the media was "free trade." But what did "free trade" mean to the Irish Parliament and how did this meaning stack up against other conceptions of "free trade" in the late eighteenth-century? This very question was asked by Adam Smith himself in a letter to

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[122] *The Public Register or Freeman's Journal,* v. XVII no. 26, (October 21, 1779), p. 101, Irish Newspaper Archives, https://archive.irishnewsarchive.com/olive/APA/INA/Default.aspx#panel=document.

[123] This is exactly double what the state was expending per year during the Money Bill Dispute of the early 1750s. See the earlier section on the Money Bill Dispute or see the exact source, *JHC-I* v.9, pp. 35-36.
For the exact government accounting of Ireland's finances from Lady-Day 1777-1779, see *JHC-I* v. 19, pp. 17-49.

[124] *The Public Register or Freeman's Journal,* v. XVII no. 26, p. 101.

Henry Dundas who had written to Smith on behalf of William Eden (a lord of trade) and the British Parliament in seeking Smith's advice on granting Ireland free trade. Smith wrote:

> I perfectly agree with your Lordship too that to crush the industry of so great and so fine a province of the empire, in order to favour the monopoly of some particular towns in Scotland or England is equally injurious and impolitic…Till the Irish Parliament sends over the Heads of their proposed Bill it may, perhaps, be uncertain what they understand by a free trade. They may, perhaps, understand by it no more than the power of exporting their own produce to the foreign country where they can find the best mercate…They may mean to demand the power of importing such goods as they have occasion for, from any country where the can find them cheapest, subject to no other duties & restraints than such as may be imposed by their own Parlia[ment]…They may mean to demand a free trade to our American & African plantations, free from the restraints which the 18th of the present King imposed upon it…They may mean to demand a free trade to Great Britain, their manufacturers and produce when imported into this country being subjected to no other duties than the like manufactures and produce of our own.[125]

Smith, as an imperial-nondiscriminatory Whig, made it clear that the lattermost option would be the most advantageous for both countries but that any of these options would prove more beneficial than the current state of restrictions on Irish trade.

The crucial issue for all who were significantly involved in the conversation of Irish economic improvement was "the imperative of overcoming Ireland's structural weaknesses in the provision of credit that contemporaries saw as an engine of British colonial capitalism."[126] Two plans emerged to to address this problem. The first plan, proposed by Irish parliamentarian and Volunteer Luke Gardiner, intended to do as England had done and as Britain was doing at the

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[125] Adam Smith, "My Dear Lord,-I am very happy to find that Your Lordship's opinion concerning the consequences of granting a Free trade to Ireland coincides so perfectly with my own…," in "Dam Smith and Free Trade for Ireland," edited by Oscar Browning, *The English Historical Review* 1, no. 2 (1886): 309, http://www.jstor.org/stable/546894.

[126] Mary O'Sullivan, "Ireland's Role in British Colonial Capitalism: 'Men of Capitals' and Pitt's Irish Proposals. 1784-1785," in *Business History Review* 98, no1 (Spring 2024): 119-163, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007680524000187, p. 125.

time. This plan proposed establishing protections for the Irish market so as to attain high capital individuals and thereby bolster infant manufacturers before attempting to enter into a truly international market.[127] Mary O'Sullivan notes how this plan "anticipated more celebrated plans, notably Alexander Hamilton's *Report on the Subject of* Manufacturers."[128] The other plan was endorsed by John Foster, the Irish Chancellor of the Exchequer. Foster's plan, which would soon become Pitt the Younger's plan, intended to extend the protections of the already existing Navigation Acts to Ireland; Foster believed that by opening up Ireland to free trade within the imperial system, the Irish market would develop into a depot or entrepôt for the empire.[129]

Foster's plan for loosening commercial restrictions on Ireland won out in 1779. However, integral to the success of such a plan was the ability for the Irish state to increase its capital and strengthen its credit-based economy. In a 1781 letter from William Knox to William Eden, Knox explains the importance of a national bank for Ireland in the potential for Irish economic stability within the new economic dynamic.[130] However, economic stability in Ireland was merely one

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[127] Mary O'Sullivan, "Ireland's Role in British Colonial Capitalism: 'Men of Capitals' and Pitt's Irish Proposals. 1784-1785," in *Business History Review* 98, no1 (Spring 2024): 119-163, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007680524000187, pp. 125, 146-147.

[128] Mary O'Sullivan, "Ireland's Role in British Colonial Capitalism: 'Men of Capitals' and Pitt's Irish Proposals. 1784-1785," in *Business History Review* 98, no1 (Spring 2024): 119-163, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007680524000187, p. 147

[129] Mary O'Sullivan, "Ireland's Role in British Colonial Capitalism: 'Men of Capitals' and Pitt's Irish Proposals. 1784-1785," in *Business History Review* 98, no1 (Spring 2024): 119-163, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007680524000187, pp. 125, 150-153.

[130] William Knox, "Letter XLVII. Extract of a Letter," *Extra official state papers. Addressed to the Right Hon. Lord Rawdon, and the other members of the two Houses of Parliament, associated for the preservation of the constitution and Promoting the Prosperity of the British Empire. By a late under secretary of state* vol. 1, (printed for J. Debrett, 1789), pp.166-169, Eighteenth Century Collections Online, https://link-gale-com.proxy.uchicago.edu/apps/doc/CW0105251884/ECCO?u=chic_rbw&sid=bookmark-ECCO&xid=a7ef0791&pg=290.

part of Knox and Eden's intentions. A set of other requisites, when taken together with the implementation of a national bank, would serve other purposes other than just the economic prosperity imagined by regionalist-autonomous Irish patriots.

Once this bank was in place, in the advice of Knox, an act could be passed "making Irish currency the same as English, and then the bank notes would gain circulation here, and throughout all England and Scotland."[131] This would serve economic ends for stability in Ireland and thereby stability for the British metropole as it was engaged in an expanding war with America and the Bourbons; however, Knox also had in it the explicit political intention of "removing a distinction between the two kingdoms."[132] Most significantly, these proposals would link Ireland more directly to Britain's financial system without granting legislative independence to the Irish Parliament – the first steps towards eventual union. When taken together – the creation of a national bank in Ireland in conjunction with the removal of restrictions on Irish trade without legislative independence for the Irish Parliament or protections for Irish trade – a unionist agenda begins to become evident.

This unionist aim doesn't necessarily imply that Knox and Eden are imperial-nondiscriminatory in ideology like Adam Smith or imperial-axial like Burke. One possibility is that the intention here from Knox and Eden was to fully envelope Ireland into the metropole which would remain prioritized above other regions of the empire. Or, as the results of the actual Union of 1801 would suggest, this could be a tactic to eventually diminish real Irish representation as it was developing in the Parliament of Ireland – where it hosted 300 MPs – for

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[131] Knox, "Letter XLVII. Extract of a Letter," p.167.

[132] Knox, "Letter XLVII. Extract of a Letter," p. 168.

a perfunctory representation in the British Parliament where it would be reduced after the 1801 Union to 100 MPs as well as distanced from its Patriot constituency, becoming much easier to curb. While some unionists truly sought equality for Ireland, others of the regionalist-hierarchical tilt saw it as an opportunity to neuter the Irish state of its growing representative community before it could more effectually challenge the metropole politically and economically.

This underlying agenda provides a sufficient motive for why one like Eden, who is linked ideologically to the likes of Lord North, would argue in favor of a national bank for Ireland but then go on to push so ardently against the Duke of Portland's proposals for Irish legislative independence – the goal was integration and dependence, not liberation. This objective is made even more obvious in the arguments given by Eden in his proposal to the British Parliament for a "partial repeal" of the Declaratory Act in 1782.[133] Having spent time in Ireland, Eden was well aware of the severity of the Patriot movement in Ireland and the immediate imperial need to pacify the unrest. The *Parliamentary History of England* gives intimate detail into Eden's position:

> He moved for leave to bring in a bill to repeal so much of the Act of the 6th of George I, as asserted a right in the king and parliament of Great Britain to make laws to bind the kingdom and people of Ireland. He did not wish to precipitate matters; but the gentleman must see the necessity of doing something speedily, and without the loss of a moment, to prevent those consequences which it was not for him so much as to think of: they all knew that the parliament of Ireland was to meet to-morrow se'nnight, and Mr. Grattan would on that day propose to the House of Commons, a vote for a declaration of rights.[134]

Eden was willing to make concessions but only to prevent a more difficult situation from arising. More over, to the concerns of one like Eden, the mere partial repeal of the Declaratory Act would

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[133] *Parliamentary History of England* v. XXII, pp. 1241-1246.

[134] *Parliamentary History of England* v. XXII, p. 1245.

at least not serve to establish a precedent of any *right* for Irish legislative independence. Eden states directly that there need not be concern as it wouldn't change the fact that "no Irish bill could pass into law, without the previous consent of the King, in his council of England, so there was no danger that the independence of the legislature of Ireland could be made use of to make laws injurious to the sister kingdom, the English council being responsible for every advice they give their sovereign."[135]

As a Whiggish endeavor, a national bank for Ireland could serve the economic purposes of either the opposing regionalist-hierarchical or regionalist-autonomous ideological groups depending on what imperial political settlement between Ireland and Britain could be reached. For Irish Patriots in Parliament and in the streets, the motivation of the free trade movement for Ireland was to strengthen the capabilities of Ireland's system of credit upon which Whiggish political-economic development was understood to be predicated. Free trade combined with a national bank would serve this end so long as the Parliament of Ireland could be assured of its right to legislative independence. Without such assurance, movements toward union – and thereby less internal representative accountability for the economic advancement of the Irish state – could just as easily result.

As shown earlier in this essay, the financial needs of the Irish state were continually expanding over the course of the eighteenth-century. Between approximately 1750 and 1780, the state's expenditures and had more than doubled, along with the deficit.[136] Part of this was due to

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[135] *Parliamentary History of England* v. XXII, p. 1244

[136] For an accounting of Ireland's finances from Lady-Day 1777-1779 see, *JHC-I* v. 19, pp. 17-49.
For Ireland's finances between 1751-1753, see *JHC-I* v.9, pp. 35-36.

the state of war the empire was in in 1780 but the trend was upwards over the course of the eighteenth century regardless. The means by which Irish Patriots sought to strengthen the credit-based system included the establishment of a national bank, protections on Irish trade, and Irish Parliamentary legislative independence for political accountability. Pretty much everything that allowed Great Britain to thrive as a Whiggish interventionist developmental state, Ireland sought as well. The Parliamentary Register and Journals of the Irish House of Commons reveal the lucidity of Parliament with regard to Whiggish understandings of Ireland's need to strengthen the state's credit-based economy.

The discourse in Ireland surrounding the potential of establishing a national bank epitomizes the Whiggish political-economic objectives of the competing ideologies pervading imperial discourse during the period. The intended economic impact of this bank, as proposed by William Eden in 1781, was for Whiggish political-economic development in the same manner as in England. His argument orbited the principle that "the increasing state of Irish commerce" necessitated a national public bank to strengthen the credit-based economy and keep "extensive trade from being nipped in the bud."[137] However, Eden was closely associated with the regionalist-hierarchical Knox whose primary motivation was the benefit of the metropole which he perceived to be a movement towards union with Ireland in opposition to the Patriot ideology. An extension of Whiggish development with regard to the credit-based economic system was understood to be beneficial to metropole so long as Ireland either was eventually assumed into the metropole or at least remained legislatively bound to the metropole.

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[137] *PRHC-I* v.1, p. 297.

For the regionalist-autonomous Patriots, this was also a much needed opportunity to strengthen the economy of the Irish state. Acting on a petition from "bankers, merchants and others of the city of Dublin in favor of a national bank," the Irish House of Commons voted to draft heads of a bill to this aim based on their understanding that "the erecting of a public Bank upon a solid foundation, under proper regulations and restrictions, is at this time highly necessary, and will contribute to the establishment of public credit, and the support of the trade and manufacturers of this Kingdom."[138] The Bank of Ireland Act of 1781 is a crucial moment within the legislative revolution of the early 1780s.[139] There could be no real future for the further pursuit of regionalist-autonomous Whiggish developmental political-economy in Ireland without a national bank to stabilize and strengthen the credit-based system.

In presenting heads of a bill for the establishment of a national bank, William Eden directly acknowledged the economic advantage which England had acquired over all of Europe through its particular form of national bank compared to other national banks in Scotland, Venice, and Amsterdam.[140] Eden remarked on the long term successes of the Bank of England which had grown its capital to £11,000,000 at part 3% and part 4% interest from its original capital in 1694 of £1,200,000.[141] It was evident that Ireland had developed into a commercial nation but remained stunted in its potential in comparison to other commercial nations which had

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[138] *JHC-I* v. 19, (25 February 1780), p. 267.

[139] "Bank of Ireland Act, 1781," Irish Statute Book, https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1781/act/16/enacted/en/print.html.

[140] *PRHC-I* v.1, p. 295.

[141] *PRHC-I* v.1, p. 294.

established national banks, especially England.[142] The Parliamentary Register records Eden's perspective that "of these different species of establishment" the present bill would adopt an "intended institution as nearly as might be to the model of the Bank of England."[143] The bill for the national bank proposed by Eden would therefore come prepackaged with Whiggish political-economic policies to stimulate the creation of labor-wealth in Ireland.

The bill proposed that the bank should start with a small capital of £500,000 to get the ball rolling but with the full intention of significantly enlarging that capital in the near future. Notably, the bank would accept depreciated debentures at face value in return for stock in the bank; this would alleviate the burden on current investors whose debentures had significantly depreciated while simultaneously converting a portion of the national debt into bank capital. The current low interest rate of the bank of England was of particular economic significance for Eden in his vision for a similar bank of Ireland. In support of Eden's proposal, Sir Lucius O'Brien emphasized that if they could take out of circulation even just one-third of the 1.5 million circulating debentures, the remaining two-thirds would quickly increase in value.[144]

Eden went on to detail the different effects a high interest would have versus a low interest rate. If the desirable economic effects of this bank were to be for the landed elite then a high interest would be more desirable as this would allow loaners to live off of their loans and "every man might be proportionally rich;" however this would decrease the incentive for loaners to get involved in commercial endeavors and deaden the circulation of wealth, thereby leading to

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[142] *PRHC-I* v.1, p. 295.

[143] *PRHC-I* v.1, p. 295.

[144] *PRHC-I* v.1, p. 298.

more borrowers than lenders overall.[145] Eden makes it very clear that this would be disastrous for the commercialist economy. He recalled the sentiments of Sir John Child when he reiterated that "one per cent. in interest, was equal to two per cent. in duties" in its effect on hampering trade and industry.[146] For this reason, he argued that the bank should never be legally allowed to charge or pay a higher interest rate than 5% nor to lend more than was its capital.

While the proposal was not without opposition, it was notably scant. George Ogle was perhaps one of the last prominent politicians remaining whose economics were closely aligned to the old Tory perspective; he infamously summed up his socioeconomic interests in Ireland when he stated years later:

> I seldom trouble this House…but when the landed property of the kingdom, when the protestant ascendency is at stake, I cannot remain silent…An honorable gentleman has said the value of the lands is fallen; I say it has; it has fallen from very just ground that has been given for jealousy, and it is the business of the representatives of the people to guard the Protestant interest of Ireland, and thereby take care it falls no lower.[147]

Comparisons with Ogle reveal the economic Whiggishness of so-called "new Tories" like William Eden who were commercially-minded, albeit for the ultimate benefit of the metropole above all else. With regard to the bill for a national bank, Ogle was opposed. His unique political-economic perspective for the time explains how he could oppose Whiggish economic improvement while also going on to support Irish legislative independence – but he was certainly a minority in this regard. No other Irish MP is recorded in the Parliamentary Register as taking up his particularly critical argument against the bank and his remarks were quickly repudiated by

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[145] *PRHC-I* v.1, p. 296.

[146] *PRHC-I* v.1, p. 296.

[147] *PRHC-I* v.6, p. 85.

Eden and Sir Lucius O'Brien.[148] Flood would posit his skepticism of ability for the bank to produce what was being promised but he was not ideologically opposed to it in the manner of Ogle.

O'Brien would go on to emphasize the necessity of establishing a national bank to draw any benefit from Ireland's recently attained "free trade."[149] He added, "There is not a person in this state, from the most affluent subscriber to the lowest mechanic, that will not be benefited by it."[150] In listing the intended positive effects which this bank will have on debentures, O'Brien reiterated the logic behind being able to legally require low interest rates:

> By this institution, manufacturers will be able to get money at 5 per cent. As things are at present circumstanced, they sometimes find it impossible to get any rate of interest; and if so, Sir, how is it possible for our manufacturers to contend with the manufacturers of other countries where money is at an easy interest.[151]

Then, as a special argument for the landed class, O'Brien speculated that every acre of land in Ireland will be raised in value as an effect of the projected economic boon.[152] In true political fashion, however, O'Brien went on to emphasize the popular regionalist-autonomous position as well, stating, "The Right Hon. Secretary has said, that this measure will lead to a mint – I rejoice in every *insignia* of an imperial crown – every mark of our being an independent nation."[153] One must imagine Eden suppressing a smirk at this, as he was working under the aforementioned

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[148] *PRHC-I* v.1, pp. 297-298.

[149] *PRHC-I* v.1, p. 298.

[150] *PRHC-I* v.1, p. 298.

[151] *PRHC-I* v.1, p. 298.

[152] *PRHC-I* v.1, pp. 298-299.

[153] *PRHC-I* v.1, p. 298.

unionist designs of William Knox. Ireland had not had an operating mint for three-hundred years, since at least the reign of Edward VI.[154] While the mint never came into fruition during this period, Irish currency was strengthened by the establishment of a national bank and achieved parity with English currency until the currencies were officially merged in 1825.[155]

Henry Flood was less ideological his approach to the proposal and thereby less certain of optimism. He did not see the Bank of England as being any more secure than the current bankers in Ireland nor did he think that a mint would bring them any closer to liberty.[156] Flood and Ogle are the only two MPs recorded in the Parliamentary Register as having spoken against the proposal and Flood's argument was more skeptical than it was critical. He lamented that the proposal was only brought up late in the session as he felt it deserving of a great deal more consideration. Flood gives one of the lengthier statements regarding this thoughts on the matter but he concisely conveyed his perspective early on when he stated, "I rise not to disprove, or wholly to approve of the scheme of the Right Hon. Gentleman – it is a strong medicine, and must have a powerful effect – the measure should have been brought sooner…it will be an engine of very great good or of very great evil."[157] Flood's primary concern though was the potential overwhelming increase in importations which would be incited by the establishment of the proposed bank.[158]

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[154] Joseph Johnston, "Irish Currency in the Eighteenth Century," *Hermathena* 27, no. 52 (1938): 3–26. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23037359.

[155] Joseph Johnston, "Irish Currency in the Eighteenth Century," *Hermathena* 27, no. 52 (1938): 3–26. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23037359.

[156] *PRHC-I* v.1, pp. 300-302.

[157] *PRHC-I* v.1, pp. 301-302.

[158] *PRHC-I* v.1, p. 302

All in all, this political-economic endeavor was about more than just the fiscal prosperity of the government; it was about stimulating a cycle of Whiggish economic prosperity and labor-wealth creation in Ireland to bring it closer in economic parity to Britain – whether that would be more beneficial for independent or unionist designs would all depend on the nature of the future of the settlement for Irish Parliamentary and commercial independence.

"All the consequences of industry thus increased, might be followed to an infinite extent – the multiplying of manufacturers – the prevention of emigrations – the raising the value of lands and debentures – the extension of foreign commerce – and the establishment of public credit."[159] Eden promised the Whiggish development that Irish Patriots so long desired but only to the extent that he and the other regionalist-autonomous Whigs saw it as beneficial to the metropole. There was no ideology of an empire of equitable or equal parts for proponents of regionalist-autonomous ideology; there were only the interests of the metropole to which Eden was ultimately loyal.

When we look at Grattan's Parliament of the 1780s and all the potential present in the reforms, we have to wonder at what went so wrong between 1782 and 1791. What exactly lead to the creation of the Society of United Irishmen, the primary society behind the failed revolution in 1798? In 1782, the movement for legislative independence was acquiesced to by the British government but the core constitutional and natural rights ideologies remained inadequately unacknowledged. Without the unequivocal assurance that legislative independence was a *right* and not a privilege for Ireland, there would remain an underlying tension. The people and Parliament of Ireland pursued representative accountability in the Irish Parliament for Irish

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[159] *PRHC-I* v.1, p. 296.

economics because they largely saw representative accountability as the primary means to ensure an earnestness of intention in economic policy. If legislative independence was merely a privilege granted to the Parliament of Ireland by the metropole then the metropole could retract or restrict that privilege when it felt it most beneficial to the interests of the metropole. This issue would come to a head with William Pitt's 1785 British imperial commercial proposals for Ireland.

Of particular issue was the fourth of Pitt's amended proposals which stated that "the laws for regulating trade and navigation should be the same in Great Britain and Ireland" and that "all laws which have been made, or shall be made in Great Britain, Ireland, and the British colonies and plantations, shall be in force in Ireland (by acts to be passed in the parliament of that kingdom) in the same manner as in Great Britain."[160] Even here, in the British House of Commons, this particular proposal was met with objections by a number of MPs on the grounds that it would conflict with the newly acquired legislative independence of the Parliament of Ireland. Make no mistake though, this proposition was defended by a great deal of others including the familiar William Eden, now back in England as an MP for Heytesbury. Eden opposed the entire premise of Irish legislative and commercial independence from Great Britain but he especially thought it unwise to tip-toe around the problems inherent in the ideological core of the fourth amended proposition. Eden stated:

> If then, the laws must hereafter be the same in the two kingdoms respecting those extensive objects, it would be an absurdity to suppose that the framing of those laws could be left to both: it must necessarily be given to one; and the only question was, under this statements to which should have the preference. Admitting these premisses, which the majority of the House was clearly disposed to admit, it was unmanly to attempt

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[160] *Parliamentary History of England* v. XXV, pp. 667-668.

> to palliate or conceal the conclusion. Undoubtably, if Ireland should decide to accept the essential conditions of the treaty now brought forward, she must wave the independence of her legislature on the points described in the resolution…[161]

Eden never objected to the idea that Ireland should be bound to British commercial legislation but he thought it foolish to think that the Irish Parliament and populous would greet Pitt's proposed settlement kindly. Eden proposed amending the fourth proposed amendment to legalistically permit Irish legislative agency while simultaneously binding Ireland's options so that the mandatory laws to be "reenacted" by the Irish Parliament "be such only as [to] impose the same restraints, and confer the same benefits on the subjects of the two kingdoms."[162] On top of this, Eden suggests that they should stipulate that such laws should only exist in Ireland so long as they exist in England. Eden seems always to have been the pragmatist when it came to the regionalist-hierarchical objective. He saw no need to directly ideologically antagonize the Irish Patriots so long as he could find some legalistic way to keep them bound to the designs of the metropole.

Unsurprisingly, Lord North followed a similar line of thinking as Eden. He refused to approve of the entire premise of Pitt's commercial proposals with Ireland but thought the amendments made the proposals more amenable to him while acknowledging that the amendments also overtly legislate for Ireland – something they all knew the Irish wouldn't take fondly to.[163] Charles Fox, on the other hand, was staunchly against the amendment – perhaps most of anyone. He and Richard Sheridan presented themselves as the British defenders of the

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[161] *Parliamentary History of England* v. XXV, p. 675.

[162] *Parliamentary History of England* v. XXV, p. 675.

[163] *Parliamentary History of England* v. XXV, pp. 678-679.

regionalist-autonomous political-economic aspirations of the Irish patriots. A number of others simply thought Pitt's fourth amendment to be justified as it still granted Ireland equal commercial rights as Britain even though the British Parliament would be effectually legislating for the Parliament of Ireland in this regard, in contradiction to their legislative independence.

What's important to note here is that there was near ubiquitous understanding in the British House of Commons that Pitt's proposed fourth amendment would *de facto* allow the British Parliament to legislate for Ireland on matters of commerce. It's unclear what optimism Pitt may have had moving forward with his proposal but one must suppose that if there were any optimism left at all it would have been a somewhat resigned form of hope. The amended proposals were sent back to Ireland where they were unsurprisingly rejected.

The failure of the British and Irish Parliaments to come to a commercial settlement was much more than just practically problematic; it exposed and exacerbated the ideological divisions between the popular regionalist-autonomous Whigs in Ireland and the majority of the British government who either couldn't or refused to acknowledge the true heart of Irish Patriot concerns. By the late eighteenth-century, Irish Patriots had come to the conclusion that Whiggish economic improvement could best be attained through representative accountability in the Irish Parliament which relied on the *right* of the Irish people to legislative independence. If Britain could legislate for Irish commerce from afar, this would be a negation of perhaps the most essential feature of the Irish Patriot platform.

In 1789 an Irish society calling itself simply "The Whig Club" was established with Irish MP Thomas Connolly at its head alongside co-founder and Volunteers colonel William

Fitzgerald, the Duke of Leinster. The first lines of the prospectus of this club relay the tense background which these Irish Patriots felt necessitated the formation of this club:

> Whereas, under the circumstances of our renovated Constitution, we deem it necessary that a constant and unremitting watch should be kept against every step of encroachment upon those rights which have been lately re-established, and for the safety which we cannot but apprehend more danger from an administration, which has *already* insidiously attempted to infringe them…[164]

Irish Patriots felt far from safely content in their legislative liberty. Actions from the British Parliament such as the amendments made to Pitt's proposals were not only insulting, they certified as reality the heart of Irish Patriot concerns. The *right* of Ireland, through both constitutional and natural rights, to legislative autonomy was never truly assented to by the British Parliament. Without this assurance, Whiggish economic improvement in Ireland would always be in jeopardy of falling victim to the whim of the metropole.

The Whig Club stated directly that "the great object of this society is the Constitution of the Realm as settled by the Revolution in Great Britain and Ireland in 1688 – and re-established in Ireland in 1782…we will support and maintain as a principle object and fundamental part of that Constitution – The 'Sacred Rights of the People.'"[165] The pamphlet goes on to state that the reasons for the failure of the 1785 "commercial adjustment" are "never-to-be forgotten."[166]

This was no minor club either. The aforementioned British MP Richard Sheridan would go on to be admitted and the Foxite Whigs in Britain would retain close connections with this

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[164] Thomas Connolly, *Resolutions and declarations of the Whig Club,* (1789), The National Library of Ireland, https://catalogue.nli.ie/Record/vtls000207295.

[165] Connolly, *Resolutions and declarations of the Whig Club.*

[166] Connolly, *Resolutions and declarations of the Whig Club.*

society throughout the 1790s.[167] While Charles Fox and his coterie were not always friends to the Irish Patriot movement, they had become staunch supporters of their aspirations between 1785 and the outbreak of hostilities in 1798.[168] The Foxite Whigs would notably go on to support the French Revolution and continue to hound British Parliament about the coercive unjustness of Pitt's policies regarding Ireland.

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[167] Douglas Kanter, "The Foxite Whigs, Irish Legislative independence and the Act of Union, 1785-1806," *Irish Historical Studies* v. 36 no. 143 (May 2009): 334, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20720317.

[168] Douglas Kanter, "The Foxite Whigs, Irish Legislative independence and the Act of Union, 1785-1806," *Irish Historical Studies* v. 36 no. 143 (May 2009): 334, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20720317.

Chapter 6: The United Irishman

The Society of United Irishmen were formed in Belfast in October of 1791 by Theobald Wolfe Tone, Thomas Russell, and James Napper Tandy. These Irishmen founded the society on the long developed Patriot platform of regionalist-autonomous political-economic ideology and enlightenment social philosophy as described throughout the previous sections of this essay. The purpose of establishing the Society of United Irishmen was to take the spirit and ideology of the Volunteers and design an organization more intentionally attuned to the other revolutionary societies of the period like the Jacobin Club in France. In describing the birth of the United Irishmen, Guy Beiner writes, "In 1791 and '92, self-styled Irish Jacobins jubilantly commemorated the anniversaries of the fall of the Bastille in the streets of Belfast and Tom Paine's *Rights of Man* was hailed 'the Koran of Blefescu.'"[169]

The Society of United Irishmen inherited the enlightened Irish Patriot platform which evolved over the course of the eighteenth-century but which had taken its most impactful shape in the public sphere through the Volunteers. Wolfe Tone and co. intentionally reformatted this long-developed platform to better match the sound and structure of other revolutionary organizations of the period outside Ireland. By the time the Society of United Irishmen were formed, however, enlightenment sociopolitical ideas and Whiggish regionalist-autonomous political-economics were nothing newly sought after in Ireland; the fusion of enlightenment and political-economic ideologies had been at least a century in the making. What the United

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[169] Guy Beiner, "Disremembering 1798? An Archaeology of Social Forgetting and Remembrance in Ulster." *History and Memory* 25, no. 1 (2013): p. 12. https://doi.org/10.2979/histmemo.25.1.9.

Irishmen did was simply to restructure and formalize this long-developed fusion into a more intentionally revolutionary organization. The initial prospectus of the United Irishmen states:

> In the present era of great reform, when unjust governments are falling in every quarter of Europe; when religious persecution is compelled to abjure her tyranny over conscience; when the rights of men are ascertained in theory; and that theory substantiated in practice; when antiquity can no longer defend absurd and oppressive forms against the common sense and common interests of mankind; when all government is acknowledged to originate from the people, and to be so far only obligatory as it protects their rights and promoted their welfare; we think it our duty, as Irishmen, to come forward, and state what we feel to be our heavy grievance, and what we know to be its effectual remedy.[170]

Their remedy is directly stated as "an equal representation of all the [Irish] people in [Irish] Parliament" so as to empower Ireland with the means to politically resist regionalist-hierarchical political-economic domination by the proponents of that ideology in the metropole "whose instrument is corruption, and whose strength is the weakness of Ireland."[171] They state directly that this new society is not formed due to the particular grievances they have of any given instance of corruption or passage/rejection of any given bill but rather that they are aggrieved by the corrupt ideology which exists at the root of all instances which foster priority of the metropole over Ireland. This regionalist-hierarchical ideology is the "mortal disease" which manifests in all such particular instances.[172]

The best way to ensure that the political freedom to implement Whiggish labor-wealth development in Ireland could not be corrupted by British influence was to deepen the franchise of political representation in the Irish Parliament so as to make a true nation, united by a shared

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[170] "United Irishmen of Belfast," *Belfast News-Letter* no. 5678, (January 10, 1792), p. 3, Irish Newspaper Archives.

[171] "United Irishmen of Belfast," *Belfast News-Letter,* p. 3.

[172] "United Irishmen of Belfast, *Belfast News-Letter,* p. 3.

national interest. This deepening of the franchise was just as enlightened and radical, if not more so, than what was implemented in the newly formed United States. This line of thinking is reaffirmed by some of the earliest circulars of the Society of United Irishmen. A December of 1791 circular from the Dublin branch states:

> Without, therefore, an impartial and adequate representation of the community, we agree in declaring, we can have no condition – no country – no Ireland. Without this, our late [legislative] revolution we declare to be fallacious and ideal; a thing much talked of, neither felt nor seen. The act of Irish sovereignty has been utterly tossed out of the English houses into the cabinet of the minister; and nothing remains to the people, who, of right are everything, but a servile majesty and a ragged independence.[173]

The ideological core of the regionalist-autonomous demands which led to the legislative revolution was never adequately addressed. Ireland's political-economic security was not guaranteed in perpetuity. The legislative revolution was a real form of revolution, but the results were insufficient.

The right of Ireland to resist the "mortal disease" of the tyranny of the metropole was not just based on a backward-looking claim to an ancestral right under the crown to liberty and equality; by this point in the eighteenth-century, the discourse in Ireland had evolved to arguments based on forward-looking claims to the establishment of rights based on enlightened perceptions of the natural rights. A circular written in December of 1791 from the Dublin branch of the United Irishmen emphasizes that "in thus associating we have thought little about our ancestors–much of our posterity."[174] This forward-looking perspective is consistent with the

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[173] "The Society of the United Irishmen of Dublin," *The Rights of Irishmen: or, National Evening Star* no. xxvi, (January 7, 1792), p. 1, Irish Newspaper Archives.

[174] "The Society of the United Irishmen of Dublin," *The Rights of Irishmen: or, National Evening Star* no. xxvi, (January 7, 1792), p. 1, Irish Newspaper Archives.

earlier perspective presented by Francis Dobbs where he invoked the natural rights of the Irish to resist tyranny and despotism even if the constitutional rights of Ireland were null.[175]

In the late seventeenth-century, William Molyneux had invoked the ancient rights of Ireland as an equal kingdom to England under a single crown; over the course of a century, the argument had evolved to better meet the modern necessities of fully overcoming the regionalist-hierarchal ideology which would never assent to Ireland's claim to safeguard its own Whiggish political-economic development. From an early circular of the Dublin branch:

> We gladly look forward to brighter prospects – to people united in fellowship of freedom – to a parliament the express image of the people – to a prosperity established on civil, political, and religious liberty – to a peace, not the gloomy and precarious stillness of men brooding over their wrongs, but that stable tranquility which rests on the rights of human nature, and leans on the arms by which these rights are to be maintained.

From the very beginning of the establishment of the Society of United Irishmen, there was an understanding amongst its founders of the natural applicability of sociopolitical enlightenment concepts with the pursuit of regionalist-autonomous Whig political-economic ideology. They write, "The sole constitutional mode by which this [English/British] influence can be opposed, is by a complete and radical reform of the representation of the people in parliament…No reform is practicable, efficacious or just, which shall not include Irishmen of every religious persuasion."[176] Regionalist-autonomous ideology is naturally suited to the deepening of the franchise of political representation in one's own region and with this deepening of the franchise come other aspects of social equality such as religio-cultural and socioeconomic equality under the law. "We do call on and most earnestly exhort our countrymen in general to follow our

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[175] Dobbs, *A Letter to the Right Honorable Lord North.*

[176] "United Irishmen of Belfast," *Belfast News-Letter,* p. 3.

examples and to form similar societies in every quarter of the kingdom, for the promotion of constitutional knowledge, the abolition of bigotry in religion and politics, and the equal distribution of the rights of man through all sects and denominations of Irishmen."[177] These core enlightenment components were developed over the course of the eighteenth-century in communion with the pursuit of securing "bourgeois" or Whiggish political-economic development. This fusing of enlightenment philosophy with regionalist-autonomous Whig ideology is seen in the evolution of the Irish Patriot platform in Irish politics, the Volunteers, and popular politics in general. The Society of United Irishmen were but the intentional and final formalization of a process that had been developing in Ireland long before the transatlantic age of revolutions. The Society of United Irishmen and the failed Irish revolution of 1798 were not a merely imitative of the revolutionary phenomenon spreading across Europe and the Americas in the late eighteenth-century. Rather, the United Irishmen and 1798 were the result of long-developing political-economic and enlightenment transformations which similarly blossomed in bourgeoning public spheres across Europe and the Atlantic over the course of the eighteenth-century.

The formation of the ideology of a singular, unified Irish nation and identity was born of the centrifugal effects of this fusion of enlightenment philosophy and Whig regionalist-autonomous political-economic ideology. This fusion occurred within the pursuit of securing Whiggish development in Ireland in conflict with the designs of the regionalist-hierarchical perspective pervading the metropole. Naturally, the next line of inquiry which presents itself for future research is what role this process played in the development of Irish nationalism within

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[177] "United Irishmen of Belfast," *Belfast News-Letter,* p. 3.

the wider nationalism phenomenon of the nineteenth-century. After all, the Society of United Irishmen outright state in their earliest circulars that their intention in forming a new society is "to give an example, which, when followed, must collect the public will, and concentrate the public power into one solid mass;" this would be done in order to form a "union of minds, and a knowledge of each other, to will and act as a nation."[178]

[178] "The Society of the United Irishmen of Dublin," *The Rights of Irishmen*, p. 1.

Conclusion

Between the Williamite War and the legislative revolution of ‘82, the arguments for Ireland's right to equally pursue Whiggish political-economic development to the metropole had evolved from ancient constitutional claims to the enlightenment-imbued claims of the natural rights of humankind. Irish Patriotism, as a political ideology, had evolved over the eighteenth-century from initially seeking to level the imperial hierarchy to forward-looking realization that the best assurance for the economic prosperity of Ireland was to challenge the metropole through the public strength of a united Irish nation motivated by the potential for building a new future upon the ideological foundations of what is now well understood to be core enlightenment philosophical thought. This ideological revolution was no mimicry of France or America, it was developed simultaneously over the course of a century through the same or at least similar necessities. The enlightened revolutions of the late eighteenth-century were part of a single network of political-economic and political-philosophical thought. This transatlantic sphere of communication aided in the tone and style of these enlightened revolutions but did not instantiate them; while the violent uprisings themselves were not inevitable, the ideological revolution – at least in Ireland – had been a long time in its own making and evolved *with* but not *because of* other similar conflicts.

A major reason that the legislative revolution was ultimately unsuccessful at ameliorating relations in the longterm was due to its ineffectuality at addressing the true ideological revolution which had developed in the Irish public sphere amongst Irish Patriots. The legislative revolution in Ireland during the late 1770s and early 1780s was only revolutionary in its practical effect; it ultimately failed to ensure longstanding peace due to British Parliamentary refusal to address the

true ideological heart of the matter as it was understood by Volunteers and Patriot Parliamentarians alike. The revolutionary legislation enacted was, in essence, merely the practical acquiescence of the British government to some of the enlightened revolutionary demands coming from Irish Parliament and the Volunteers in order to ensure the stability of Ireland while at war with the Bourbons and Americans. By not actually addressing the core regionalist-autonomous ideological revolution developing in Ireland, the British government only delayed the Irish revolutionary uprising. The Society of United Irishmen would then follow the same ideological line set by the Volunteers to an eventual conclusion of revolution in 1798, albeit a failed revolution.

The American Revolution and the Irish uprising of 1798 were united in more than just their eventual common interest in separating from Britain; they were both rooted in the same ideological crisis and are better understood as part of a single imperial phenomenon. It is therefore more appropriate to call the failed rebellion of 1798 a failed *revolution.* The underpinnings of 1798 were ideologically rooted in the same political-economic conflict as the American Revolution and was imbued with a similar, if not more radical, enlightenment philosophy. Since the revolution of political-economic and enlightenment ideology had already naturally evolved in Ireland over the course of the eighteenth-century and blossomed in the public sphere, the logical pattern suggests that a substantial degree of revolutionary social, economic, and political innovations would have followed from 1798 had it been successful.

The political and economic aims of the Patriot platform were regionalist-autonomous in ideology. By the 1770s, the basic removal of trade restrictions would never have be sufficient in appeasing the economic ambitions of Irish Patriots. Whiggish political-economic development

could only be assured in perpetuity through the same strengthening of the credit-based system in Ireland as it had been strengthened in England. Legislative autonomy was thereby necessary to ensure economic stability through Irish Parliamentary accountability. The most accountable state, as it was perceived by the Patriots, would be the one which had the greatest degree of representation of all its citizens.

In addition to this enhanced accountability, the development in conceptions of national loyalty played a role in certain sociopolitical enlightenment concepts. The old perception that religious loyalty was an inevitable hinderance to national unity was decreasing in the public and political spheres alike. In fact, the public and political sphere were merging within the bubbling of the public sphere. Along with the associational culture of the growing public sphere came the concept of a general Irish public made up of Catholics, Dissenters, and establishment Protestants alike. While there were certainly associations which served the opposite purpose through sectarian organizations, the organizations which saw the greatest success were organizations in favor of societal equalization such as the Volunteers and their inheritors, the Society of United Irishmen.

All of these enlightenment concepts – free association, expanding representation, societal equalization, social contract theory – were naturally amenable to the regionalist-autonomous ideology of the late eighteenth-century. These concepts were not merely mimicked by Irish Patriots in the 1790s; the longterm evolution of the Patriot platform in Ireland reveals a natural shift towards enlightenment philosophy. The regionalist-hierarchical approach to empire in the metropole continually butted heads with imperial-axial, imperial-nondiscriminatory, and regionalist-autonomous Whigs in the peripheries. This conflict of Whiggish ideologies

strengthened the regionalist-autonomous perspective in both Colonial America and Ireland, especially as evidence was revealed of just how far such a despotism was willing to go in British rule in the East. The differences between these factions were not predicated upon whether or not the state should or could intervene to direct the economy; by the mid- to late eighteenth-century, that perspective had become normative. The primary difference was over the nature and role the Parliamentary political system should take in directing the economy; the differences therein affected the kinds of policies pursued as well as the degree and extent of the desired ends of political-economic policies

Both before and after the dissolution of the traditional Tories in 1715, Whigs consistently disagreed as much amongst themselves about ideological intent and the practical application of political-economic philosophies as they did with Tories, both new and old. There were certainly general, party-like differences between the ever evolving Whigs and Tories as regards political-economy. However, there always remained a significant diversity of perspectives within the Whigs in particular which was often more problematic than the general political-economic differences between the Whig-Tory diametric. The amalgamation and contestation of divergent state-prescribed economic ideologies paints a picture of political economy across the eighteenth-century British Empire(s) that was neither passively dictated by externalities nor unified in pursuit of liberalist ideals. Particularly among Whigs, misalignments regarding what would be the most practical and effectual ideological approach and subsequent political implementation of varied understandings of free trade commercialism facilitated various crises across the British Empire which define this period.

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