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Enemy or Not, That Is the Question: Securitization of Anthropomorphous Versus Non-Anthropomorphous Threats

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Abstract

In times of national emergency, the role of government expands — albeit temporarily — to mitigate harm against its citizens, thwart the threat, restore order and normality, and ultimately, dissolve its augmented authority. However, emergency policies are justified in the eyes of the public when the political leadership's response to the threat is proportional to the harm posed by the threat. Thus, the public's perception of the magnitude of a threat and their assessment of a proportional response determine the level of support for the government's proposed emergency policies. Relatedly, securitization theory posits that people in power carefully construct a threat to convince the public of the existence and gravity of the threat, and accordingly, place the threat beyond the realm of "normal politics." The extant international and domestic security literature predominantly focuses on the threat of physical warfare. In contrast, the current global pandemic and other threats like natural disasters constitute a categorically divergent enemy. Physical warfare is largely perceived as anthropomorphous in nature, while epidemics and natural disasters are often portrayed as non-anthropomorphous. Based on the in-group out-group theory, I argue that anthropomorphous threats yield a higher level of public support for emergency policies than non-anthropomorphous threats. To test this hypothesis across regime types and cultures, this study conducts survey experiments in the United States, South Korea, and Egypt. Despite some mixed results (most likely stemming from the issue of saliency), the findings present preliminary support for the chief argument. This research offers an innovative approach to security studies and international relations, and the findings hold significant implications for a variety of international and transnational non-anthropomorphous security issues, such as public health crises, environmental disasters, food insecurity, poverty, immigration, and energy management.

Introduction

Constructing an external threat has long been a useful political tool for state leaders to garner public support for emergency policies that broaden the scope of their authority, because in times of national emergency and survival, the public can support extraordinary measures that would not be acceptable during relatively peaceful, orderly, and healthy times. When a nation collectively faces a life-or-death situation, the public may not only permit but also urge the political leadership to assume an expanded role — albeit temporarily — to mitigate harm against citizens, thwart the threat, and restore order and "normality." However, emergency policies are justified in the eyes of the public when the political leadership's response to the threat is proportional to the harm posed by the threat. Thus, the public's perception of the magnitude of a threat and their assessment of a proportional response determine the level of support for the government's proposed emergency policies. In line with this reasoning, securitization theory claims that, for the public to accept the existence of — and means to combat — a threat, people in power must carefully construct the threat through rhetoric. Under this theory, the "objective" existence or *nature* of the threat does not matter as much as *how* the political leadership portrays the threat to achieve intersubjective understanding with the public and "securitize" an issue.

The extant international and domestic security literature predominantly focuses on the threat of physical warfare. On the contrary, the current global pandemic and other threats like global warming constitute a categorically divergent "enemy." Unlike a conventional military threat that relatively easily paints a vivid picture of the adversary — whether it be a state or a terrorist organization — COVID-19, for example, is an inherently non-anthropomorphous threat. However, non-anthropomorphous issues may also become securitized and viewed as a threat that requires extraordinary measures to be defeated.

The global response to HIV/AIDS in the early 2000s serves as a historical example of a non-anthropomorphous issue — a disease — that was securitized by individual countries and the international community alike (McInnes and Rushton, 2011). The successful securitization of HIV/AIDS was due to an "explicit attempt to change the status of the disease, moving it from the realm of 'normal' politics to that of an exceptional issue posing an existential threat to states" (121). For example, the Security Council's deliberate linkage between HIV/AIDS and the security realm rested on three arguments: "(1) That uniformed militaries (including peacekeepers) were especially vulnerable to HIV and might act as agents in the spread of the disease; (2) That state stability was at risk in high-prevalence areas; (3) That conflict (including the post-conflict phase) created significant risks for the spread of the HIV virus" (122). Consequently, the disease soon became one of the top priorities of the global agenda and brought forth emergency measures such as the "Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria," and the Bush administration's "President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)" in 2003, "possibly the largest single issue development aid programme in history and one which, through the inclusion of the term 'emergency' in its title, carried clear echoes of security arguments" (123).

Although both anthropomorphous and non-anthropomorphous threats can be securitized, there is a dearth of research — if at all — that probes whether one is easier to securitize than the other. Whereas the construction of an anthropomorphous threat may have proven to yield public approval of emergency measures, non-anthropomorphous threats may not produce similar effects. Accordingly, this study conducts survey experiments in the US, South Korea, and Egypt to measure the level of public support for emergency policies against anthropomorphous versus non-anthropomorphous threats, capturing the difference in the success of securitization across regime types, as well as unique histories and cultures. The threat of biological weapons is

presented as an anthropomorphous threat, and the threat of bacterial infections is presented as a non-anthropomorphous threat. Moreover, the control group introduces traffic congestion to capture the baseline public support for emergency policies.

Drawing from the in-group out-group theory prominent in the field of social psychology, I argue that anthropomorphous threats yield a higher level of public support for emergency policies than non-anthropomorphous threats because it is easier to hate more passionately when a clear face to which evil can be attributed exists. Aside from the in-group out-group theory, people may be less willing to support emergency policies that curb their civil liberties if they believe the harm from non-anthropomorphous threats is unavoidable even with extraordinary measures. Based on these two assumptions, I hypothesize that anthropomorphous threats are easier to securitize than non-anthropomorphous threats. Despite some mixed results (most likely due to the saliency of the current pandemic), the findings present preliminary support for the hypothesis. However, a further investigation with a bigger sample size is needed to make a definitive conclusion. Furthermore, a mixed methods approach employing both a quantitative analysis and qualitative assessment of the reasons behind people's approval or disapproval of emergency policies in each treatment condition seems especially promising.

This research offers an innovative approach to security studies and international relations by not only demarcating threats into original categories of anthropomorphous versus non-anthropomorphous but also comparing the success of securitization between the two types of threats. Also, the findings hold significant implications for a variety of international and transnational non-anthropomorphous issues, such as public health crises, environmental disasters, food insecurity, poverty, immigration, and energy management. If anthropomorphous issues are indeed easier to securitize than non-anthropomorphous issues, this finding may explain why some leaders seek to anthropomorphize an inherently non-anthropomorphous issue.

Definitions and Concepts

In this research, anthropomorphous threats refer to a menace that is deliberately created, disseminated, and/or deployed by humans with a malign intention (i.e., to be used as a weapon). Conversely, non-anthropomorphous threats refer to a menace that is *not* deliberately created, disseminated, and/or deployed by humans with a malign intention. Anthropomorphous threats can be human in form (e.g., a terrorist, a soldier) or non-human in form (e.g., a bomb). Also, anthropomorphous threats can be visible (e.g., people, objects) or invisible (e.g., nerve gas). Thus, the distinguishing feature of an anthropomorphous threat is a malign human intention, rather than the human form. On the other hand, non-anthropomorphous threats are largely non-human in form (e.g., global warming, Ebola), although the *disseminating agents* of non-anthropomorphous threats can be human in form (e.g., people carrying and spreading COVID-19). Moreover, non-anthropomorphous threats can be visible (e.g., hurricane, volcano eruption) or invisible (e.g., COVID-19). Therefore, the distinguishing feature of a non-anthropomorphous threat is the lack of a malign human intention, rather than invisibility.

To further establish a concrete understanding of the differences between the two types of threats, it is prudent to examine some ambiguous examples. To start, COVID-19 is a non-anthropomorphous threat under the given definitions, though its disseminating agents are mostly human in form (however, some animals have been found to carry and spread the virus as well). Whereas Trump has previously called COVID-19 a “Chinese Virus” — thus embodying an invisible threat — COVID-19 as “any of a large group of submicroscopic infectious agents that are usually regarded as nonliving extremely complex molecules" (Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary) is non-human in form, invisible (to the naked eye), and most importantly, does not hold a malign human intention in and of itself.

As another example, some may consider the threat of Islamic extremism a non-anthropomorphous threat by understanding the phenomenon as an ideology manifested in the form of humans (thus, treating Islamic extremists as mere embodied agents of a non-anthropomorphous threat). However, given the definitions, Islamic extremism is an anthropomorphous threat because it was created, disseminated, and deployed by humans with a malign intention. Here, the "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" dilemma arises, as one may argue that, to some, Islamic extremism is an altruistic cause. Regardless, because Islamic extremists intend to harm others in their "noble" pursuit (malign human intentions), the phenomenon qualifies as an anthropomorphous threat.

Lastly, many people may readily assume that immigration is an anthropomorphous threat. Yet, the co-constitutive nature of immigration and immigrants creates a space that permits the non-anthropomorphous interpretation of the threat. To elaborate, the phenomenon of immigration cannot be constituted without the human agents, just as immigrants as human agents lose their ontological meaning without the phenomenon of immigration. If one focuses on the latter constitution and acknowledges immigrants' lack of malign intentions, then immigration can be understood as a non-anthropomorphous threat.

This last example is notable because it demonstrates the potential heterogeneity in the anthropomorphous versus non-anthropomorphous understanding of threats. Precisely due to this flexibility in the portrayal and understanding of the nature of threats, non-anthropomorphous threats may be presented as anthropomorphous threats and vice versa; but these arguments often require political elites' deliberate framing and rhetorical strategies to push the boundaries of the nature of threats. Lastly, all three of these examples highlight the spectrum in which ideologies, belief systems, and phenomena — both natural and social — can be simultaneously embodied and disembodied.

Literature Review

1. SECURITIZATION THEORY

What is an existential threat? Are all threats objectively verifiable or are they socially constructed? Why do some threats appear static while others appear fluid? Security scholars and practitioners alike have grappled with an inexhaustible list of questions concerning security since long before the inception of its academic discipline. As old menaces loom and new threats emerge, the security field has been expanding both theoretically and empirically. Among numerous security theories, a distinct school of thought emerged in the early 1990s: the Copenhagen School of security studies. The Copenhagen School's securitization theory signals a drastic departure from the prior understanding of security. Antithetical to the previously well-established notion that some security issues are inherently threatening, securitization theory posits that leaders purposefully designate a threat and convince the public of the existence of the threat through persuasive rhetoric. Although the Copenhagen School's conception of securitization theory is still influential today, subsequent scholars have built upon and/or challenged a portion of the original theory.

2.1. The "Older" School

Before delving into the details and nuances of the Copenhagen School's securitization theory, defining the central terminology is necessary. The "securitizing actor" is the agent who holds the authority and legitimacy to present an issue as a threat through rhetoric and persuasion. The "referent *subject*" is the threaten-*ing* entity, and the "referent *object*" is the threaten-*ed* entity. The "audience" is from whom the securitizing actor needs to solicit an agreement to

bestow an intersubjective status to the referent subject and to implement extraordinary measures (Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka 2016, 495).

Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde (1998) postulate that language is performative: the capacity to induce changes in the previous state of affairs through the mere utterance of the term "security" betrays the constitutive rules of a speech act. Therefore, a successful securitization depends on the securitizing actor's ability to associate with the audience's emotions, beliefs, needs, and interests through language (Edelman 1988; Burke 1955, 55). Furthermore, although the audience may have a difficult time deciphering the securitizing actor's true intentions (Cavell 2002; Doty 1998), due to the asymmetric access to information, political capital, and constitutional legitimacy, the audience often relies on political officials' discourses (Risse 2000, 22; Foucault 1980; Herman and Chomsky 1989). Consequently, because securitization is largely contingent upon persuasive speech acts and the authority and legitimacy of the securitizing actor, the "objective" existence of a threat is not necessary (Knudsen 2001).

Despite the evident power imbalance between the securitizing actor and the audience, securitization theory highlights the significance of the audience's assent in securitization. Although the securitizing actor may initiate the process by rhetorically appointing a threat, the ultimate success or failure of securitizing moves rests on the audience's belief that the referent subject is plausible, referent object is worth saving, and that a delay or inaction may seriously endanger the referent object's survival (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, 21). Therefore, securitization includes both a subjective component (discursive ability of securitizing actors) and an intersubjective component (acceptance of securitization by the relevant audience) (Salter 2008). Moreover, the sense of urgency during the securitization process stems from the fear that "if we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here or free to deal with it in our own way)" (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, 24). In accordance

with this existential fear, the securitizing actor introduces "extraordinary means" (i.e., emergency policies) to thwart the referent subject (26).

2.2. The "Newer" School

While securitization theory purports to value intersubjectivity, some scholars have criticized the theory's curtailment of the audience's active role and the dismissal of the context. Notably, whereas Balzacq (2005) acknowledges the necessity of the securitizing actor's authority, he posits that the Copenhagen School's theory denotes "self-referentiality," not intersubjectivity (173, 179). The former concept refers to the idea that the mere utterance of the term "security" by authoritative figures has the capacity to shape security conditions, which points to the performative nature of securitization. However, newer securitization scholars challenge the illocutionary logic (speech act by the speaker) since language itself is incapable of generating objective reality and linguistic rules of speech acts are not always deterministic.

2.2.1. The Context

Language does not possess the power to construct or shift reality; it simply influences people's perception of it. Therefore, securitizing actors must resonate with the context in which the relevant audience resides. In other words, security statements must reflect an external reality to some extent, as successful securitization depends on the audience's perceptive environment wherein they attempt to identify the presumed threat (Balzacq 2005, 182). Security statements that are devoid of contextual awareness are susceptible to a "boomerang effect": securitizing moves may be "perceived as excessive or as an expression of helplessness, spinning out of their speakers' control and damaging their reputations" (Abulof 2014, 401). Therefore, a problem arises when one rejects the possibility for the context to influence the security discourse —

securitizing actors must acknowledge that the context is independent of the speech act (Balzacq, Leonard, and Ruzicka 2016, 504). Moreover, the mere utterance of the term "security" does not guarantee securitization nor is it required for all securitizing moves. A successful construction of an existential threat must be rooted in the relevant context and external reality to some extent.

2.2.2. The Audience

Securitization comprises two stages: a "stage of identification" and a "stage of mobilization." The former constitutes rhetorical securitization, and the latter, active securitization:

> Although a given audience may well agree with the securitizing actor as to the 'securityness' of a given issue, this self-same audience may also disagree over the 'extraordinaryness' of the measures proposed. Such a situation is not an example of failed securitization (as the audience did not reject the issue as 'security'), but nor is it a successful securitization, as the means necessary to deal with the issue are not also intersubjectively established. (Roe 2008, 616)

This articulation suggests that the audience's agreement on the extraordinary nature of the threat does not always translate into support for emergency measures, and thus, rhetorical securitization may or may not be followed by active securitization (621). Consequently, a successful securitization requires "the development of policy" in response to the audience's agreement on the identity of an existential threat (Jackson 2006, 313). One potential implication of this understanding is that securitizing actors may "sometimes need to rearticulate threats in such a way that, over and above the audience's acceptance of the danger, proposed policy responses also achieve the required level of [intersubjective] agreement" (Roe 2008, 622).

2. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SECURITIZING NON-ANTHROPOMORPHOUS ISSUES

Despite the newer school of securitization scholars critiquing and building onto the original theory, even the new additions have largely focused on elite framing, intersubjectivity, and implementation of emergency policies concerning *anthropomorphous* threats (i.e., conventional warfare, insurgency, and terrorism), while neglecting non-anthropomorphous threats like environmental or public health crises. However, over the past three decades, the confines of what constitutes security have expanded considerably. While some of the developments continue to concern military threats, others less so, as food, energy, and environmental crises now similarly qualify for a security label. Notably, public health matters — one of the subcategories of non-anthropomorphous issues — reveal crucial insights on the current state of security affairs not only because it was previously not recognized as a security issue but also because the securitization of some health issues appears largely unrelated to measures of lethality. For example:

> The potential use of pathogens by terrorists (bioterrorism) features prominently despite accounting for a statistically insignificant percentage of deaths over the past two decades and despite doubts over the potential of such attacks to kill large numbers of people . . . [while] other health issues, including tobacco, obesity and infant diarrhoeal diseases, account for very large numbers of premature deaths each year yet fail to appear on security agendas. (McInnes and Rushton 2011, 116)

In this example, one of the distinguishing features of bioterrorism is its anthropomorphous nature of the threat: it is created, disseminated, and deployed by humans with a malign intention. However, unlike bioterrorism, which is carried out by human agents with the intention to harm, the torment from tobacco, obesity, and infant diarrhoeal diseases cannot be traced back to nefarious human beings. Therefore, this example further demonstrates the difference between anthropomorphous and non-anthropomorphous threats, as well as the varying levels of securitization correlated with the nature of the threat.

Furthermore, some of the securitized public health issues have revealed potential negative side effects of securitization that the existing literature fails to address. For instance, HIV/AIDS epidemic captures several ramifications of the securitization of non-anthropomorphous threats:

> Although ‘‘securitizing’’ the AIDS pandemic could bolster international AIDS initiatives by raising awareness and resources, the language of security simultaneously pushes responses to the disease away from civil society toward military and intelligence organizations . . . The security framework, moreover, brings into play a ‘‘threat defense’’ logic that could undermine international efforts to address the pandemic because it makes such efforts a function of narrow national interest rather than of altruism, because it allows states to prioritize AIDS funding for their elites and armed forces who play a crucial role in maintaining security, and because portraying the illness as an overwhelming ‘‘threat’’ works against ongoing efforts to normalize social perceptions regarding HIV/AIDS. These overlooked dangers give rise to a profound ethical dilemma as to whether or not the global AIDS pandemic should be portrayed as a security issue. (Elbe 2006, 119)

In addition to mobilizing inappropriate security institutions, the securitization of health issues, in general, can inadvertently lead states to neglect other pressing security matters by devoting a disproportionate number of resources — both material and human — to combat the given health issue. In other words, a narrow prioritization of a single health issue may not attenuate — or worse, aggravate — a state's vulnerability against a range of threats (Youde 2008). Given these potentially unique and largely overlooked dynamics at play with non-anthropomorphous issue securitization, distinguishing between anthropomorphous and non-anthropomorphous threats, as well as investigating the implications of each on the domestic approval of emergency measures, warrant an examination.

Theoretical Framework & Argument

The notion that an external conflict increases the level of internal cohesion — also known as the in-group out-group theory — is an enduring and widely accepted proposition (Stein 1976, 143). Since its inception in the field of sociology, prominent scholars like Coser and Simmel

have reinforced the theoretical relationship between aggressive external stimuli and social mobilization (144). Often, the perception of an external threat by a group of people yields distrust of and hostility toward the adversary, while strengthening — or creating, if previously nonexistent — the bond between individual members of the group: “Although antagonism in itself alone does not constitute socialization, no more is it likely to be lacking as a sociological element in the formation of societies" (Simmel 1904a, 498). This bond, or cohesion, within a group consolidates during an active hostility, as times of attack require “centralized energizing of the group-form” (Simmel 1904b, 673). Therefore, when a nation engages in military warfare, unlimited unity becomes possible through the mobilization of “the total energies of the elements” (684). Notably, “the antithesis between violent antagonism and momentary comradeship in struggle may, under particular circumstances, reach such refinement that, for the parties concerned, the very absoluteness of their enmity may constitute the direct cause of their coalition” (685). However, after the state of military affairs returns to “normal,” the members of the previously united group return to their former separate existence, and accordingly, the bond falters (683).

In line with these psychosocial effects of active hostilities, I argue that anthropomorphous threats yield a higher level of domestic approval of emergency measures than non-anthropomorphous threats because the audience can hate more easily and passionately when a clear face to which they can attribute evil exists. Relatedly, the public may deem extraordinary means that infringe upon their civil rights less justifiable against an inadvertent harm as opposed to harm deliberately inflicted by a wicked enemy. In addition to psychosocial reasoning, people may be more willing to support emergency policies against an anthropomorphous threat if they believe non-anthropomorphous threats like natural disasters are unavoidable. Non-anthropomorphous threats not only lack malign human intentions but also are insentient,

incapable of feeling or understanding. Due to this nature, people may believe non-anthropomorphous threats are simply unappeasable. Because humans cannot placate, negotiate with, plead with, convince, or coerce an earthquake, for example, the public may deem emergency policies futile. Even if some measures may mitigate the harm caused by non-anthropomorphous threats, the perceived inevitability of such harm and the inability for humans to prevent it from occurring may render emergency policies unhelpful, especially if the loss of civil liberties is the cost of emergency policies. Therefore, I argue that anthropomorphous issues are easier to securitize than non-anthropomorphous issues.

> *H1: The domestic approval of emergency measures against non-anthropomorphous threats is lower than that against anthropomorphous threats*
>
> *H2: The domestic approval of emergency measures when no threat is detected (control group) is lower than that against both anthropomorphous and non-anthropomorphous threats*

Moreover, according to the in-group out-group theory, the process of internal cohesion and external aggression frequently involves "depersonalization, dehumanization, and social stereotyping, which tend to increase in scope as and when intergroup relations deteriorate" (Tajfel 1982, 13). When this process takes place, the in-group perceives the out-group as homogeneous — or members of the out-group as "undifferentiated" — lumping them together as an invariably nefarious group. One step further, when a group anticipates an intergroup competition or an external threat, in-group identification increases, and the group members' readiness to accept a more centralized leadership similarly enhances (Duckitt 1989, 70). Accordingly, I argue that people are more cautious and distrusting of foreigners (out-group) than fellow citizens (in-group) regardless of the nature of the threat they face, and because of the malign human intentions present, people are more suspicious of foreigners when facing an

anthropomorphous threat than when facing a non-anthropomorphous threat. Also, congruent with the notion that an external threat nurtures people's willingness to submit to a more centralized leadership, I argue that people facing an anthropomorphous threat are less tolerant of an insult to the national honor and more supportive of following the political leadership without question in times of emergency than people facing a non-anthropomorphous threat. Lastly, I argue that people feel more anxious about and threatened by an anthropomorphous threat than a non-anthropomorphous threat.

H3: People are more suspicious of foreigners than fellow citizens regardless of the nature of the threat they face

H4: People are more suspicious of foreigners when facing an anthropomorphous threat than when facing a non-anthropomorphous threat

H5: People not facing any threats (control) are less suspicious of foreigners than people facing an anthropomorphous or a non-anthropomorphous threat

H6: People facing an anthropomorphous threat are more intolerant of an insult to national honor than people facing a non-anthropomorphous threat

H7: People not facing any threats (control) are less intolerant of an insult to national honor than people facing an anthropomorphous or a non-anthropomorphous threat

H8: People facing an anthropomorphous threat are more willing to follow the political leadership without question than people facing a non-anthropomorphous threat

H9: People not facing any threats (control) are less willing to follow the political leadership without question than people facing an anthropomorphous or a non-anthropomorphous threat

H10: People feel more anxious about an anthropomorphous threat than a non-anthropomorphous threat

H11: People feel more threatened by an anthropomorphous threat than a non-anthropomorphous threat

Furthermore, when insecure social groups perceive a threat to group identification (real or imagined), members are compelled to not only display hostilities toward the out-group but

also impose authoritarianism within the in-group to police and shame non-compliers. In such cases, a "compulsive demand for cohesion and solidarity at the expense of individual autonomy and self-regulation . . . [as well as] self-righteous conformity and coercive intolerance" emerge (77). For example, fascism is likely to emerge "after humiliating military defeats or during crises seriously threatening the integrity or status of the nation or society" (78). Following this proposition, I argue that people facing an anthropomorphous threat more strongly believe that violators of emergency policies should be shamed and punished than people facing a non-anthropomorphous threat. Similarly, I argue that people facing an anthropomorphous threat more strongly support increasing the amount of funding for policing and law enforcement than people facing a non-anthropomorphous threat.

H12: People facing an anthropomorphous threat more strongly believe that violators of emergency policies should be shamed than people facing a non-anthropomorphous threat

H13: People not facing any threats (control) do not believe that violators of emergency policies should be shamed as much as people facing an anthropomorphous or a non-anthropomorphous threat

H14: People facing an anthropomorphous threat more strongly believe that violators of emergency policies should be punished than people facing a non-anthropomorphous threat

H15: People not facing any threats (control) do not believe that violators of emergency policies should be punished as much as people facing an anthropomorphous or a non-anthropomorphous threat

H16: People facing an anthropomorphous threat more strongly support increasing the amount of funding for policing and law enforcement than people facing a non-anthropomorphous threat

H17: People not facing any threats (control) do not support increasing the amount of funding for policing and law enforcement as much as people facing an anthropomorphous or a non-anthropomorphous threat

Alternative Explanations

In contrast to *H1*, the major rival explanation would argue that there exists no significant difference in the level of domestic support for emergency measures between anthropomorphous and non-anthropomorphous threats. Put differently, a competing hypothesis would assume that external threats induce a similar level of domestic support for emergency measures regardless of the nature of the threat. On the other hand, if the non-anthropomorphous threat yields a higher dependent variable value than the anthropomorphous threat, a contradictory hypothesis is supported. One possible explanation concerns the issue of salience. As will be discussed in detail in the methods section below, this study's survey experiments introduce biological weapons as the anthropomorphous threat and bacterial infections as the non-anthropomorphous threat. Although the experimental design deliberately designates bacterial — not viral — infections as the non-anthropomorphous threat, bacterial infections may not appear distinctly different from the coronavirus pandemic in the eyes of the public. Thus, the salience of COVID-19 may influence people's perception of the bacterial infections in the non-anthropomorphous threat treatment, as well as their assessment of the proposed emergency policies.

Methodology: Survey Experiments

This study employs survey experiments to test its hypotheses in Egypt, an authoritarian regime, South Korea, a democratic republic, and the United States, a liberal democracy. The survey experiment is the most suitable methodology for this research because its key dependent variable measures public reactions (support for emergency policies), and *surveys* allow researchers to collect data on personal attitudes and opinions. Moreover, survey *experiments* promise internal validity — or strong causal inferences — by only varying experimental treatments while holding others constant (McDermott 2002, 32). Notably, random assignments

of subjects to treatment conditions "ensure that no unrelated or spurious factors vary consistently within a given population and therefore bias the results . . . background differences cancel each other out in the course of random assignment, since each individual is as likely to be placed in one condition as in another. Thus, no systematic differences in subjects can bias the results of the study" (33). With all spurious factors held constant, the researcher can confidently attribute the cause of the differences in outcome to the differences in treatments. In short, survey experiments offer beyond mere correlations; they offer causal relationships.

Accordingly, I can isolate and compare the effects of anthropomorphous versus non-anthropomorphous threats on public support for emergency policies. The different treatments of this study's survey experiments comprise (1) bacterial infections as the non-anthropomorphous threat, (2) biological weapons as the anthropomorphous threat, and (3) traffic congestion as the control treatment. There are three major reasons why this study assigns bacterial diseases as both the anthropomorphous and non-anthropomorphous threats. First, bacterial diseases can be created, disseminated, and deployed by humans with a malign intention as a biological weapon, and thus, qualify as an anthropomorphous threat. On the other hand, bacterial diseases can originate from rodents and spread with no malign human intentions, and thus, also qualify as a non-anthropomorphous threat. Second, some anthropomorphous threats like bombs often carry certain connotations that trigger an emotional response that may bias the results and damage the causal claims by failing to hold all other variables constant. Third, survey experiments require standardization to ensure that "the same stimuli, procedures, responses, and variables are coded and analyzed" (McDermott 2002, 33). Standardization must take place both within each treatment (across individual survey responses conducted under each treatment) and across treatments (standardized language with only a few key phrases altered to vary treatments).

Standardizing within each treatment increases the reliability of the responses and standardizing across treatments reduces the effect of spurious variables. Thus, assigning bacterial diseases as both the anthropomorphous and non-anthropomorphous threats has homogenizing benefits (see Appendix C for the non-anthropomorphous threat treatment script and Appendix D for the anthropomorphous threat treatment script). The bacterial disease in both treatments is equally invisible, odorless, and lethal (deliberately engineered as so). Homogenizing the *form* of the threats across treatments while varying the presence of malign human intentions aids in the standardization of treatments and measures precisely what the study seeks to measure.

Furthermore, to make the malign human intention behind biological weapons salient, the anthropomorphous threat treatment clearly identifies a hostile nation culpable for the expected civilian casualties. Doing so paints a vivid picture of the adversary, increasing the salience of the anthropomorphous nature of biological weapons. As for the control treatment, a non-threatening scenario — traffic congestion — is presented to measure the baseline public support for emergency policies. Establishing a baseline is crucial in analyzing and comparing the effects of the anthropomorphous and non-anthropomorphous treatments (see Appendix E for the control treatment script).

The primary questionnaire of this study surveys each respondent's approval of nine proposed emergency policies in the context of the corresponding treatment. The emergency policy questions are thematically divided into five groups for analysis, but the survey respondents cannot see the thematic codification of each question. The themes of the primary questionnaire are freedom of speech, freedom of movement, freedom of association, privacy, and fair criminal sentences (see Appendix F for the primary questionnaire). Each survey has identical emergency policy questions regardless of the treatment, and the order of questions is randomized

for each respondent to minimize the possibility of a certain order of questions spuriously affecting the dependent variable value.

To mitigate any potential psychological harm during the study, each treatment script and the debriefing statement emphasize the hypothetical nature of the threat proposed in the survey (see Appendix H for the debriefing statement). The recruiting and consent scripts include information about the voluntary nature of the participation, purpose of the study, expected time commitment, minimal harm posed by the study, benefits to scholarship, researcher's contact information, as well as the IRB's contact information (see Appendix A and B for the recruitment and consent scripts).

<Figure 1>

Respondent ("N") Breakdown

	Anthro	Non-Anthro	Control	
United States	**105**	**107**	**105**	**317**
South Korea	**106**	**108**	**116**	**330**
Egypt	**119**	**108**	**116**	**343**
	330	**323**	**337**	**990**

The subjects of this study are Egyptian, South Korean, and American citizens of voting age. A comprehensive breakdown of the respondents is presented in Figure 1. This study records participants' responses on a numerical scale. For example, the dependent variable values of the

primary questionnaire span between “very likely” (1 point) and “very unlikely” (5 points). The surveys are translated into Arabic for Egyptian respondents and Korean for South Korean respondents.

This research design has been approved by the IRB. The determined status of this study is “exempt,” as it poses minimal harm to respondents, does not collect any identifiable information, and “any disclosure of the human subjects' responses outside the research would not reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, employability, educational advancement, or reputation.”

Empirical Results

1. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OVERVIEW

In this study, the unit of analysis is individual participant’s responses to a series of questions. The data from this study is divided into three sections: participants’ responses to emergency policy questions, miscellaneous questions, and demographic questions. The first section measures each respondent’s support for emergency policies that curb freedom of speech, freedom of movement, freedom of association, privacy, and just and proportionate criminal sentences given a treatment condition. The second section measures participants’ psychological responses, in-group out-group dynamics, obedience to authority tendencies, trust in government, as well as attitude toward order and law enforcement (see Appendix G for the secondary questionnaire). The final section collects respondents’ demographic information, such as gender, religiosity, education, marital status, and income.

To test if the difference between the means of treatment groups is statistically significant, the threat scenarios are grouped into three different pairs (anthropomorphous and non-anthropomorphous, anthropomorphous and control, non-anthropomorphous and control), and t-

tests are conducted. A total of twenty-five t-tests are conducted for each treatment pair for twenty-five dependent variables. Nine emergency policy questions (labeled "Q1," "Q2," . . ., "Q9") are tested separately to capture potential differences between support for five types of civil liberty violations. Moreover, the aggregate mean of all nine emergency policy questions (labeled "AverageQ") is tested to capture overall public support for emergency policies. The remaining fifteen dependent variables correspond with fifteen miscellaneous questions (labeled "O1," "O2," . . ., "O15"), for which t-tests were also conducted separately. The aggregate mean of the miscellaneous questions is not tested, as the fifteen questions — unlike the emergency policy questions — comprise thematically incongruent questions with no overarching subject matter. For all t-tests, the independent variable is the threat scenario (labeled "Treatment").

Next, linear regressions are run to model statistically significant relationships. However, because the independent variable is a categorical variable ("anthropomorphous," "non-anthropomorphous," "control") rather than a continuous variable, dummy variables are created to model significant relationships. Therefore, linear models are presented in box plots instead of scatter plots, as the values on the x-axis are discontinuous. The linear regressions are run in pairs to correspond with the t-tests, since t-tests can only be conducted between two groups.

All linear models display the dependent variable on the y-axis and the independent variable on the x-axis. The y-axis scale ranges from values 1 to 5 for all emergency policy questions, which measure the likelihood of respondents' support (1 = "very likely", 2 = "somewhat likely", 3 = "neither likely nor unlikely", 4 = "somewhat unlikely", 5 = "very unlikely"). Because 1 indicates the highest likelihood of support and 5 indicates the lowest likelihood of support, a *lower* value signifies *stronger* support for emergency policies ("Q1" through "Q9," and "AverageQ"). In contrast, the y-axis scale ranges from 0 to 100 for all miscellaneous questions. For questions "O1" through "O7," as well as "O13" and "O14," 0

indicates “not at all,” 25 “mildly,” 50 “moderately,” 75 “very,” and 100 “extremely.” For questions “O8” through “O12,” 0 indicates “strongly disagree,” 25 “somewhat disagree,” 50 “neither agree nor disagree,” 75 “somewhat agree,” and 100 “strongly agree.” Lastly, for question “O15,” which measures respondents’ assessment of appropriate funding for policing and law enforcement, 0 indicates “decrease substantially,” 25 “decrease somewhat,” 50 “stay the same,” 75 “increase somewhat,” and 100 “increase substantially.”

For all regression models in this study, the significance codes are as follows: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’. P-values of 0.1 and higher are not considered statistically significant.

2. UNITED STATES

The survey experiment was fielded in the United States through MTurk. A total of 317 respondents participated in the survey, 107 of whom were randomly assigned to the non-anthropomorphous threat treatment group, 105 to the anthropomorphous, and 105 to the control.

2.1. Anthropomorphous vs. Non-Anthropomorphous

<MODEL 1>



Of all nine emergency policies, the mean in the anthropomorphous group (2.171429) differs significantly from the mean in the non-anthropomorphous group (2.542056) only in "Q8," which surveys respondents' support for an emergency policy that allows the government to surveil citizens in public settings around the clock to identify and eliminate potential threats (see Appendix F for the codification of all nine emergency policy questions). According to **MODEL 1**, people facing an anthropomorphous threat more strongly support public surveillance measures than people facing a non-anthropomorphous threat (p-value = 0.03661). The finding that only public surveillance measures show a significant difference warrants a discussion. Compared to the rest of the emergency policy questions, many people may consider "Q8" the least intrusive one. Even during "normal" times, many are aware that security cameras are everywhere — parking lots, shopping malls, clubs, supermarkets, and the list is endless. Thus, many Americans today are inured to being watched in public spaces. Consequently, it is possible that people in the anthropomorphous treatment were only willing to support the least intrusive measures more than people in the non-anthropomorphous treatment, because even if they agreed on the extraordinary nature of biological weapons (successful rhetorical securitization), they might not have deemed

extraordinary means to combat the threat necessary (unsuccessful active securitization). Therefore, this finding offers limited support for *H1*.

<MODEL 2>



Although the anthropomorphous and non-anthropomorphous groups' support for public surveillance policies differs significantly, the difference in mean is not statistically significant for levels of anxiety, perceived threat, nor the likelihood of — and concerns about — exposure to the given threats. Thus, the difference in mean between the two groups regarding "Q8" cannot be explained by higher levels of anxiety or perceived threat, and *H10* and *H11* are not supported.

Moreover, the mean in the two groups differs significantly for "O10" (69.04762 for anthropomorphous, 62.85047 for non-anthropomorphous), which asks if respondents believe that the political leadership has access to information about the given threat that the public does not (see Appendix G for the codification of all miscellaneous questions). The people in the anthropomorphous threat treatment group believe more strongly that the political leadership has privileged access to threat-relevant information than those in the non-anthropomorphous threat treatment group (**MODEL 2**, p-value = 0.0819). However, the difference in means is not

statistically significant for “O11” and “O12,” which respectively ask if respondents believe that the political leadership has the *expertise* to handle the given threat and if the political leadership can *effectively handle* the given threat. Therefore, the results suggest that a stronger belief in the political leadership’s privileged access to threat-relevant information does not necessarily translate into more confidence in the government’s ability to combat the given threat.

<MODEL 3>



Lastly, the difference in mean is significant for “O14” (62.14286 for anthropomorphous and 56.07477 for non-anthropomorphous), which asks how severely those who violate emergency policies should be punished. The observation that people in the anthropomorphous group are more intolerant of emergency policy violations than those in the non-anthropomorphous group (**MODEL 3**, p-value = 0.08993) supports *H14*. This model further suggests that although people facing an anthropomorphous threat do not necessarily support emergency policies more strongly than those facing a non-anthropomorphous threat (apart from public surveillance measures), they are more committed to punishing violators of established emergency policies than those facing a non-anthropomorphous threat. Yet, people in the anthropomorphous treatment do not believe more strongly than those in the non-

anthropomorphous treatment that violators should be severely shamed (*H12* not supported). Put differently, when facing a threat with malign human intentions, people are more intolerant of emergency policy violations, but they do not believe that violators should be severely shamed. This implies that the reason behind people's intolerance of emergency policy violations is because they are concerned with efficacy, not with a compulsive demand for cohesion. If the latter were the case, people facing an anthropomorphous threat would believe more strongly that violators of emergency policies should be both severely punished *and* shamed.

Aside from "O10" and "O14," the difference in mean between the two groups is statistically insignificant for all other miscellaneous questions. Americans are not more suspicious of foreigners in the anthropomorphous treatment than in the non-anthropomorphous treatment (*H4* not supported), as in both cases, they are on average moderately to very suspicious of foreigners. Furthermore, people in the anthropomorphous group are not less tolerant of an insult to national honor than people in the non-anthropomorphous group (*H6* not supported) and are not more willing to follow the political leadership without question than those in the non-anthropomorphous group (*H8* not supported), indicating that malign human intentions do not necessarily generate a stronger "rally-round-the-flag" effect than do inadvertent catastrophes. Finally, people do not support a more drastic increase in funding for policing and law enforcement when facing an anthropomorphous threat than when facing a non-anthropomorphous threat (*H16* not supported). This may be due to the complicated dynamic between law enforcement, criminal justice system, and systemic oppression particular to American history.

2.2. Anthropomorphous vs. Control

<MODEL 4>



To test if the anthropomorphous threat treatment indeed presents a more threatening scenario than the control treatment (which is intended to measure the baseline public support for emergency policies), "O2" measures the level of threat respondents perceive from their assigned treatment group. The mean of the anthropomorphous group for "O2" (65.71429) differs significantly from that of the control group (56.90476), signifying that respondents perceived biological weapons to be more threatening than a traffic congestion (**MODEL 4**, p-value = 0.01777).

The only other miscellaneous question with a statistically significant difference in means between the anthropomorphous (69.04762) and control (63.33333) treatments is "O10." Similar to the regression model on anthropomorphous and non-anthropomorphous threats, because the difference in means is not statistically significant for "O11" (political leadership's expertise to handle) or "O12" (political leadership's ability to effectively handle), people's belief that politicians have more privileged access to biological weapons related information than traffic congestion related information is not accompanied by a higher public confidence in the leadership's competence in combating biological weapons (**MODEL 5**, p-value = 0.0953).

<MODEL 5>



Surprisingly, people in the anthropomorphous group are *not* more suspicious of foreigners, more intolerant of an insult to national honor, more willing to follow the political leadership without question, less tolerant of emergency policy violators, nor do they believe more strongly that the funding for policing and law enforcement should increase drastically than people in the control group. This finding is interesting because it demonstrates that even if Americans perceive more threat by biological weapons than traffic congestion, they may not display a stronger in-group cohesion, out-group hostilities, nor authoritarianism.

Notwithstanding the observation that respondents perceive more threat from biological weapons than traffic congestion, statistically significant differences in support for emergency policies do not exist between the anthropomorphous and control treatments except for "Q1," which surveys respondents' approval of a measure that allows the government to police and suspend online and offline communications to combat misinformation that may cause civilian casualties. This observation implies that the increase in threat perception does not necessarily translate into higher support for emergency policies that aim to minimize the harm posed by the given threat. This mirrors an earlier postulation that even if people agree with the extraordinary nature of anthropomorphous threats (successful rhetorical securitization), they may not agree

with the extraordinary means to deal with them (unsuccessful active securitization). In this case, although respondents perceive more threat from biological weapons than traffic congestion, they are not willing to support intrusive emergency policies, because American respondents prioritize their civil liberties over security and protection. Furthermore, contrary to *H2*, respondents in the control treatment (mean = 2.038095) more strongly support "Q1" than those in the anthropomorphous group (mean = 2.352381) (**MODEL 6**, p-value = 0.07884).

<MODEL 6>



This may be because Americans suspect malicious intentions by their political leadership, using biological weapons either as an excuse or as a contrived scenario to exercise unbridled government control over citizens' right to freedom of speech, suspending dissents and circulating pro-government propaganda. It is also possible that people simply prefer variety and quantity of information over accuracy and quality when facing a threat. If people's information-seeking behavior prioritizes availability and quick-access over reliability of information, such behavioral tendencies may explain why people facing the threat of biological weapons display less support for information-control than people facing traffic congestion.

2.3. Non-Anthropomorphous vs. Control

_____<MODEL 7>



Comparable to **MODEL 4** and **MODEL 6**, respondents perceive bacterial infections (mean = 63.55140) to be more threatening than traffic congestion (mean = 56.90476) (**MODEL 7**, p-value = 0.06788), and respondents in the control treatment (mean = 2.038095) more strongly support online and offline communications monitoring measures than those in the non-anthropomorphous treatment (mean = 2.336449) (**MODEL 8,** p-value = 0.08732). Given these similar findings, insights from the models on biological weapons and traffic congestion apply here as well. People in the non-anthropomorphous group are *not* more suspicious of foreigners, more intolerant of an insult to national honor, more willing to follow the political leadership without question, less tolerant of emergency policy violators, nor do they believe more strongly that the funding for policing and law enforcement should increase drastically than people in the control group. This finding further corroborates the postulation that even if Americans perceive more threat by one issue than another, they may not display a stronger in-group cohesion, out-

group hostilities, nor authoritarianism when facing a more threatening issue. Consequently, contrary to the expectations, *H2, H5, H7, H9, H13, H15,* and *H17* are not supported.

<MODEL 8>



Similarly, the observation that although people feel more threatened by bacterial infections than traffic congestion, they do not support emergency policies more strongly in the former condition, indicates that people's perception of threat (rhetorical securitization) does not guarantee people's support for extreme protective measures (active securitization).

3. SOUTH KOREA

The survey experiment was fielded in South Korea through Qualtrics. A total of 330 respondents participated in the survey, 108 of whom were randomly assigned to the non-anthropomorphous threat treatment group, 106 to the anthropomorphous, and 116 to the control.

3.1. Anthropomorphous vs. Non-Anthropomorphous

<MODEL 9>



The mean of the anthropomorphous group differs significantly from that of the non-anthropomorphous group on "Q5" (**MODEL 9**, p-value = 0.006801), which surveys respondents' support for an emergency policy that allows the government to surveil citizens in *private* settings around the clock to identify and eliminate potential threats, and "Q8" (**MODEL 10**, p-value = 0.01772), which measures support for the same policy but in *public* settings. Contrary to *H1*, people in the non-anthropomorphous threat treatment (Q5 mean = 2.777778, Q8 mean = 2.444444) support both emergency policies *more* than people in the anthropomorphous threat treatment (Q5 mean = 3.301887, Q8 mean = 2.877358).

<MODEL 10>



First, the unexpected finding is most likely due to the salience problem. Although the experimental design deliberately designates bacterial infections (instead of viral infections) as the non-anthropomorphous threat (to prevent respondents' attitude toward the current pandemic from influencing their responses to the emergency policy questions in this study), to medical laypeople, bacteria may not appear distinctly different from virus. Thus, in this case, the salience of COVID-19 has most likely influenced people's perception of bacterial infections in the non-anthropomorphous threat treatment, as well as their judgment of the plausibility of proposed emergency policies.

Second, the reason why the non-anthropomorphous and anthropomorphous treatments differ significantly only on the surveillance measures is likely due to the South Korean historical precedent on another medical crisis as well as their current response to COVID-19. Following the MERS-CoV outbreak, South Korea established a system-wide epidemic response mechanism as well as a legal structure that empowers public institutions to respond to emergency public health crises in a timely manner (Kim 2020, 3). One of the key initiatives in this effort was the collection and use of South Korean citizens' personal data for public health needs. Thanks to this legal precedent, South Korea was equipped to respond to COVID-19 in a coordinated and timely

manner, which garnered much international praise at the outset of the coronavirus outbreak. More specifically, an emergency policy authorized under South Korea's Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act (IDCPA) awarded the minister of health the legal authority to collect private data on both confirmed and *potential* patients without a warrant. Under this article, South Korean telecommunications companies are required to disclose information on the location of citizens at the request of health authorities (Ryan 2020). Because South Koreans were previously exposed to this privacy-infringing digital-contact tracing method against another public health threat (and because this method is similarly in effect against the current pandemic), the observation that South Koreans are more supportive of surveillance measures in the non-anthropomorphous threat treatment than the anthropomorphous threat treatment is unsurprising. Therefore, although these models do not support *H1*, neither do they definitively reject it, given the contextual factors specific to South Korea that may have overwhelmingly influenced the dependent measures.

Moreover, the observation that respondents' stronger support for surveillance measures in the non-anthropomorphous group is not accompanied by stronger support for any other emergency policies suggests that despite the salience of COVID-19, South Koreans are not willing to support any other extraordinary measures with which they are not already familiar through a similar prior non-anthropomorphous threat encounter. Thus, though South Koreans' support for surveillance measures is stronger in the non-anthropomorphous treatment than in the anthropomorphous treatment, the lack of other statistically significant differences between the two groups demonstrates that non-anthropomorphous threats are not necessarily easier to securitize than anthropomorphous threats.

Although the anthropomorphous and non-anthropomorphous groups' support for surveillance measures differs significantly, the difference in mean is not statistically significant

for levels of anxiety (“O1”), perceived threat (“O2”), nor the likelihood of (“O3”) — and concerns about (“O4”) — exposure to the given threats (see Appendix G for the codification of miscellaneous questions). Thus, the difference in mean between the two groups regarding the surveillance measures cannot be explained by higher levels of anxiety or perceived threat (*H10* and *H11* not supported).

<MODEL 11>



Among the miscellaneous questions, the mean in the two groups differs significantly for “O5” (50.23585 for anthropomorphous, 62.26852 for non-anthropomorphous), which asks how often respondents would look at news sources about the given threats (**MODEL 11**, upper-left corner, p-value = 0.001769). The people in the non-anthropomorphous threat treatment on average would consult the news more often than those in the anthropomorphous threat treatment. This observation is possibly due to the salience issue unique to South Korea (the ongoing pandemic response). South Korea has developed a rigorous network of news media platforms that update citizens on the most up-to-hour information on COVID-19 cases. For example,

President Moon claimed in his speech at the G-20 Leaders Side-Event "Pandemic Preparedness and Response" that in addition to the extensive covering of all-things-COVID-19 on news channels, South Korean citizens have developed a habit of consulting "a 'Corona Map' that spots the location of infection and a 'Mask Map' that indicates where you can purchase masks to self-quarantine and epidemiological investigation apps, various mobile applications developed by engineers" (2020). Therefore, turning to news sources has become an ingrained practice for the majority of South Koreans since 2020, which corroborates the observation that people would consult news sources about bacterial infections more often than those about biological weapons.

Moreover, the difference in mean is significant for "O6" (36.32075 for anthropomorphous, 46. 99074 for non-anthropomorphous), which asks how suspicious respondents would be of *fellow citizens*, and "O7" (50.47170 for anthropomorphous, 59.25926 for non-anthropomorphous), which asks how suspicious they would be of *foreigners* (**MODEL 11**, upper-right corner, p-value = 0.002559; lower-left corner, p-value = 0.02879; respectively). In both questions, people in the non-anthropomorphous threat treatment are more suspicious of others than those in the anthropomorphous threat treatment (*H4* not supported). Notably, between the two questions, people are more suspicious of foreigners than fellow citizens regardless of the threat scenario (*H3* supported). In "O6," people are only mildly to moderately suspicious of fellow citizens on average. In "O7," people are moderately to very suspicious of foreigners on average. This finding is consistent with the widespread understanding in social psychology that a common threat — regardless of the nature of the threat — may increase both in-group cohesion and out-group hostilities. However, the models also suggest that there are no statistically significant differences between the two groups related to intolerance of insults to national honor and blind obedience to political leadership (*H6* and *H8* not supported). This entails that, though respondents are more suspicious of foreigners when facing bacterial

infections than when facing biological weapons (internal cohesion and external hostilities), such discrepancy in levels of trust does not necessitate a difference in levels of authoritarianism.

Lastly, the non-anthropomorphous treatment and anthropomorphous treatment differ significantly in "O10" (59.19811 for anthropomorphous, 69.21296 for non-anthropomorphous). The people in the non-anthropomorphous threat treatment believe more strongly that the political leadership has privileged access to threat-relevant information than those in the anthropomorphous threat treatment (**MODEL 11**, lower-right corner, p-value = 0.005162). However, the difference in means is not statistically significant for "O11" (expertise to handle) and "O12" (effective handling), which implies that a stronger belief in the political leadership's privileged access to threat-relevant information does not necessarily translate into more confidence in the government's ability to combat the given threat.

3.2. Anthropomorphous vs. Control

The mean of the anthropomorphous threat treatment is significantly higher than that of the baseline (control treatment) in nine out of fifteen miscellaneous questions, and all nine models are congruent with this study's expected outcomes. People in the anthropomorphous treatment feel more anxiety ("O1," p-value = 2.08e-5), perceive more threat ("O2," p-value = 9.167e-11), sense a higher likelihood of exposure to the given threat ("O3," p-value = 0.001776), are more concerned about exposure to the given threat ("O4," p-value = 0.0005553), are more suspicious of foreigners ("O7," p-value = 0.004589), are less tolerant of any insult to the national honor ("O8," p-value = 0.002608), believe more strongly that citizens should follow the political leadership without question in times of emergency ("O9," p-value = 0.0006065), believe more strongly that the political leadership has the expertise to handle the given threat ("O11," p-value = 0.06377), and are less tolerant of emergency policy violations ("O14," p-value = 0.00155) than

people in the control treatment (**MODEL 12**, from left to right and top to bottom starting with the upper-left corner, respectively).

<MODEL 12>



Even though the anthropomorphous treatment has a significantly higher mean than the control treatment in most of the miscellaneous questions, these differences do not translate into more support for emergency policies in the biological weapons threat scenario compared to the traffic congestion scenario (for all nine emergency policy questions). On the one hand, this may be because South Koreans prioritize the full exercise of civil liberties (especially soon after the impeachment of former president Park Geun-hye on corruption charges) more than security and protection from their government against an external threat. On the other hand, this may be due to the salience issue. Because South Korea has neither experienced a biological weapons threat in the past nor is the threat imminent, it is possible that the description of the biological weapons

threat scenario fails to depict a realistic picture compared to traffic congestion, which most South Koreans experience daily.

3.3. Non-Anthropomorphous vs. Control

Among the emergency policy questions, the mean of the non-anthropomorphous group differs significantly from that of the control group on "Q3" (**MODEL 13**, upper-left corner, p-value = 0.03853), which measures respondents' support for an emergency policy that allows the government to limit and control the movement of people both within and across the border to minimize civilian casualties. As expected, people in the non-anthropomorphous threat treatment (mean = 2.120370) support "Q3" more than those in the control treatment (mean = 2.448276). The two groups also diverge on "Q5" (private surveillance, **MODEL 13**, upper-right corner, p-value = 0.002424), "Q8" (public surveillance, **MODEL 13**, middle-right, p-value = 0.002532), and "Q7" (**MODEL 13**, middle-left, p-value = 0.002593), which surveys how strongly respondents would support an emergency policy that would allow the government to limit and control private gatherings of people to minimize civilian casualties. People in the non-anthropomorphous treatment support "Q5," "Q7," and "Q8" more strongly than people in the control treatment. Lastly, the aggregate mean of all emergency policies ("AverageQ," **MODEL 13**, far down, p-value = 0.008457) suggests that the overall support for emergency policies is greater in the non-anthropomorphous threat treatment than the control treatment (*H2* supported).

<MODEL 13>



Furthermore, the mean of the non-anthropomorphous threat treatment is significantly higher than that of the baseline (control treatment) in fourteen out of fifteen miscellaneous questions, and all fourteen models are congruent with expected outcomes. People in the non-anthropomorphous treatment feel more anxiety ("O1," p-value = 8.42e-5), perceive more threat ("O2," p-value = 2.544e-9), sense a higher likelihood of exposure to the given threat ("O3," p-

value = 8.157e-5), are more concerned about exposure to the given threat ("O4," p-value = 2.32e-6), consult news sources more often ("O5," p-value = 2.41e-6), are more suspicious of fellow citizens ("O6," p-value = 1.09e-5), are more suspicious of foreigners ("O7," p-value = 3.289e-7), are less tolerant of any insult to the national honor ("O8," p-value = 0.001357), believe more strongly that citizens should follow the political leadership without question in times of emergency ("O9," p-value = 2.222e-5), believe more strongly that the political leadership has privileged access to threat-relevant information ("O10," p-value = 2.179e-5), believe more strongly that the political leadership has the expertise to handle the given threat ("O11," p-value = 0.03323), believe more strongly that the political leadership can effectively handle the given threat ("O12," p-value = 0.07731), are less tolerant of emergency policy violations ("O14," p-value = 0.002896), and believe more strongly that the funding for policing and law enforcement should be increased ("O15," p-value = 0.005413) than people in the control treatment (**MODEL 14**, from left to right and top to bottom starting with the upper-left corner, respectively). Therefore, these findings support *H5, H7, H9,* and *H15*.

Unlike the regression models on anthropomorphous and control treatments, the models on non-anthropomorphous and control treatments suggest that the differences in mean between the two groups do translate into more support for emergency policies in the bacterial infections threat scenario compared to the traffic congestion scenario. Again, this may be due to the salience of the current pandemic, as well as the resemblance between bacterial infections and COVID-19.

<MODEL 14>



4. EGYPT

The survey experiment was fielded in Egypt through Qualtrics. A total of 343 respondents participated in the survey, 108 of whom were randomly assigned to the non-anthropomorphous threat treatment, 119 to the anthropomorphous, and 116 to the control.

4.1. Anthropomorphous vs. Non-Anthropomorphous

<MODEL 15>



The data from Egypt present mixed findings that offer interesting insights. First, no statistically significant difference in public support for emergency policies is identified between the anthropomorphous and non-anthropomorphous groups, except for "Q6," which asks how likely respondents would support an emergency policy that allows the government to enforce a life sentence for people responsible for involuntary manslaughter resulting from negligence (**MODEL 15**, p-value = 0.01103). As expected, people in the anthropomorphous treatment (mean = 2.3109) support "Q6" more than people in the non-anthropomorphous treatment (mean = 2.7407).

On the other hand, contrary to the expectations, people believe that the likelihood of being exposed to bacterial infections (mean = 53.241) is greater than that of being exposed to biological weapons (mean = 45.588) ("O3," **MODEL 16**, left, p-value = 0.03372). Moreover, people are more suspicious of fellow citizens when facing bacterial infections (mean = 55.092) than when facing biological weapons (mean = 43.067) ("O6," **MODEL 16**, right, p-value =

0.001288). As seen in the case of South Korea, this observation is most likely due to the issue of salience. Because COVID-19 infections are rampant today and highly contagious, Egyptians may have associated bacterial infections with the current pandemic, thus overestimating their likelihood of exposure and displaying more distrust toward fellow citizens in the non-anthropomorphous treatment than the anthropomorphous treatment (*H4* not supported).

<MODEL 16>



However, people in the anthropomorphous treatment are more intolerant of insults to national honor ("O8," **MODEL 17**, upper-left, p-value = 0.01669), more strongly believe that the political leadership has privileged access to threat relevant information ("O10," **MODEL 17**, upper-right, p-value = 0.07242), and more strongly believe that the political leadership has the expertise to handle the threat ("O11," **MODEL 17**, lower, p-value = 0.04377) than people in the non-anthropomorphous treatment. These findings suggest that Egyptians facing an anthropomorphous threat may display stronger authoritarian tendencies than those facing a non-anthropomorphous threat (*H6* supported). Regardless of the treatment, however, Egyptians' intolerance of insults to national honor is much stronger than the United States and South Korea. Furthermore, the fact that Egyptian respondents believe their political leadership has more access to privileged information and expertise to handle biological weapons than bacterial infections may be either due to Egyptian citizens' trust in their government's ability to ward off hostile

enemies or, paradoxically, because they lack confidence in their government's current COVID-19 response.

<MODEL 17>



Lastly, the difference in mean is not statistically significant for levels of anxiety ("O1"), perceived threat ("O2"), nor concerns about exposure to the given threats ("O4") (see Appendix G for the codification of miscellaneous questions). Thus, the difference in mean between the two groups regarding the life-sentence-for-involuntary-manslaughter measure cannot be explained by higher levels of anxiety or perceived threat (*H10* and *H11* not supported).

4.2. Anthropomorphous vs. Control

The mean of the anthropomorphous threat treatment is significantly different from that of the baseline (control treatment) in seven out of nine emergency policy questions, and all seven are congruent with this study's expected outcomes. People in the anthropomorphous treatment more strongly support emergency policies that control and limit public gatherings ("Q2," p-value

= 0.0009861), control and limit people's movement across and within borders ("Q3," p-value = 0.0002561), impose curfews and confine citizens to their homes ("Q4," p-value = 0.0001806), surveil citizens in private places ("Q5," p-value = 0.01424), enforce life sentences for people responsible for involuntary manslaughter ("Q6," p-value = 0.003811), control and limit private gatherings ("Q7," p-value = 0.0001096), and that enforce life sentences for people responsible for voluntary manslaughter ("Q9," p-value = 0.07667) than people in the control treatment (**MODEL 18**, from left to right, and top to bottom, respectively, starting with the upper-left corner). Overall, people facing biological weapons are more supportive of emergency policies than people facing traffic congestion ("AverageQ," p-value = 0.0001132).

<MODEL 18>





Moreover, as expected, the mean of the anthropomorphous treatment is significantly higher than that of the control treatment on questions “O7” (suspicion toward foreigners), “O9” (obedience to political leadership without question), “O10” (political leadership’s privileged access to information), “O14” (punishment of emergency policy violators), and “O15” (funding for policing and law enforcement) (**MODEL 19**, from left to right, and top to bottom, respectively, starting from the upper-left corner).

<MODEL 19>



Although the anthropomorphous and control groups' overall support for emergency policies differs significantly, the difference in mean is not statistically significant for levels of anxiety ("O1"), perceived threat ("O2"), nor concerns about exposure to the given threats ("O4"). Thus, the difference in mean between the two groups cannot be explained by higher levels of anxiety or perceived threat (*H10* and *H11* not supported).

4.3. Non-Anthropomorphous vs. Control

<MODEL 20>



Similar to the regression models on the anthropomorphous and control treatments, people in the non-anthropomorphous group are overall more supportive of emergency policies than those in the control group ("AverageQ," p-value = 0.006408). Thus, this finding supports *H2*. In particular, people in the former group are more supportive of emergency policies that control and limit public gatherings ("Q2," p-value = 0.002277), regulate people's movement across and within borders ("Q3," p-value = 0.00283), impose curfews and confine citizens to their homes ("Q4," p-value = 0.001986), surveil citizens in private places("Q5," p-value = 0.05714), and that control and limit private gatherings ("Q7," p-value = 0.03455) than those in the latter (**MODEL 20**, from left to right, and top to bottom, respectively, starting with the upper-left corner).

In comparison, the non-anthropomorphous and control groups have significant differences in only two of the miscellaneous questions: "Q6" (suspicion toward fellow citizens)

and “Q7” (suspicion toward foreigners). People facing bacterial infections are more suspicious of fellow citizens and foreigners than people in the control treatment (*H5* supported, **MODEL 21**). Furthermore, the gap between the non-anthropomorphous and control groups is bigger for foreigners than fellow citizens. However, the two groups do not differ significantly on other miscellaneous measures (*H7, H13* not supported). This observation implies that although Egyptians do not perceive more threat or anxiety by bacterial infections than by traffic congestion, they are more likely to support emergency policies when facing a non-anthropomorphous threat. In other words, a heightened perception of threat is not a prerequisite for active securitization.

<MODEL 21>



Discussion

Through survey experiments, this study investigates whether malign human intentions behind any given threat influence the success of securitization. To be more specific, this research examines if anthropomorphous threats yield higher public support for emergency policies than non-anthropomorphous threats. The table below summarizes (for all three countries) which of the seventeen hypotheses are supported by the data (**TABLE 1**). *H1* and *H2* are the hypotheses concerning the primary dependent variable of this study: public support for emergency policies.

H3 through *H17* relate to the secondary dependent variable measures, such as in-group cohesion, external hostilities and distrust, and authoritarianism.

<TABLE 1>

	The US	South Korea	Egypt
H1	Limited Support	Not Supported	Limited Support
H2	Not Supported	Limited Support	Supported
H3	Supported	Supported	Limited Support
H4	Not Supported	Not Supported	Not Supported
H5	Not Supported	Supported	Supported
H6	Not Supported	Not Supported	Supported
H7	Not Supported	Supported	Not Supported
H8	Not Supported	Not Supported	Not Supported
H9	Not Supported	Supported	Limited Support
H10	Not Supported	Not Supported	Not Supported
H11	Not Supported	Not Supported	Not Supported
H12	Not Supported	Not Supported	Not Supported
H13	Not Supported	Not Supported	Not Supported
H14	Supported	Not Supported	Not Supported
H15	Not Supported	Supported	Limited Support
H16	Not Supported	Not Supported	Not Supported
H17	Not Supported	Limited Support	Limited Support

The linear regression analyses identify some patterns common across all three countries and others unique to a specific country. Although the statistically different levels of public support between the anthropomorphous and non-anthropomorphous treatments are associated with distinct emergency policies for each country (e.g. public surveillance measure for the United States, both public and private surveillance measures for South Korea, and life sentencing of involuntary manslaughter policy for Egypt), the discrepancy between the anthropomorphous and non-anthropomorphous threats cannot be attributed to perceived levels of anxiety or threat. To elaborate, across all three countries, respondents' level of anxiety and perceived threat are not

statistically different between the two treatments even when their support for certain emergency policies is significantly different. Therefore, contrary to securitization theory, people may not need to perceive an extraordinary threat to support securitization efforts.

Relatedly, it is evident in all three countries that a higher threat perception does not necessarily equal more support for emergency policies. In the US sample, people in both anthropomorphous and non-anthropomorphous treatments feel more threatened than those in the control treatment. Yet, respondents in anthropomorphous and non-anthropomorphous groups do not support emergency policies any more than those in the control treatment. This observation is notable because it highlights the distinction between rhetorical securitization and active securitization. An issue is rhetorically securitized if the audience accepts the extraordinary nature of the threat (heightened anxiety and perception of threat) and actively securitized if the audience also accepts the extraordinary means to combat the threat (support for emergency policies). Although active securitization may accompany rhetorical securitization, the latter does not guarantee the former.

Because this study's experimental design does not distinguish between nor incorporate survey questions to separately measure and analyze these two levels of securitization, determining the effects of treatments on the success of securitization is difficult. Despite this difficulty and mixed findings, the data presents preliminary support for the main argument of this research: anthropomorphous threats yield higher level of public support for emergency policies than non-anthropomorphous threats. Whereas the disparity in support for emergency policies between anthropomorphous and non-anthropomorphous threats is not significant for all nine emergency policies, within the US, people facing biological weapons display more support for public surveillance measures than people facing bacterial infections. Moreover, people in the non-anthropomorphous treatment do not display stronger support than people in the

anthropomorphous treatment for any of the nine emergency policies. Likewise, in Egypt, people facing biological weapons display stronger support for an emergency policy that imposes life sentences for people responsible for involuntary manslaughter than those facing bacterial infections. Also, though not statistically significant, people in the anthropomorphous treatment support most of the remaining emergency policies more strongly than people in the non-anthropomorphous treatment for both the US and Egypt. Therefore, had the sample size been bigger, the statistical analyses may have identified more significant relationships supporting the main argument.

In contrast, data from South Korea supports the contradictory argument: non-anthropomorphous threats yield higher public support for emergency policies than anthropomorphous threats. However, as discussed in detail in the empirical results section, this is most likely due to the issue of salience. Although the experimental design deliberately designates bacterial infections (instead of viral infections) as the non-anthropomorphous threat (to prevent respondents' attitude toward the current pandemic from influencing their responses to the emergency policy questions in this study), to medical laypeople, bacteria may not appear distinctly different from virus. Thus, in this case, the salience of COVID-19 has most likely influenced people's perception of bacterial infections in the non-anthropomorphous threat treatment, as well as their judgment of the plausibility of proposed emergency policies. Furthermore, this issue of salience is not unique to South Korea. Although Egyptian respondents in the non-anthropomorphous treatment do not display stronger support for emergency policies than those in the anthropomorphous treatment for any of the nine proposed emergency policies, respondents have expressed not only that the likelihood of exposure to bacterial infections is greater than exposure to biological weapons but also that they are more suspicious of fellow

citizens in the non-anthropomorphous treatment than in the anthropomorphous treatment. These observations are most likely due to the salience problem as well.

Lastly, another pattern of results is common to all three countries. In the US and Egypt, respondents believe that their corresponding political leadership has more privileged access to biological weapons than bacterial infections (vice versa for South Korea). However, regardless of which information respondents believe their government has more access to, respondents do not believe that their leaders have the necessary expertise nor the ability to effectively combat the threat. In other words, a stronger belief in the political leadership's privileged access to threat-relevant information does not necessarily translate into more confidence in the government's ability to combat the given threat. This observation is important because this may explain why active securitization is a lot more difficult to achieve than rhetorical securitization. Even if people believe in the extraordinary nature of a given threat, if they do not believe the government can successfully protect its citizens, the public will most likely not sacrifice their civil liberties to support futile emergency policies.

In summary, notwithstanding mixed results, the findings present preliminary support for the argument that anthropomorphous threats yield stronger public support for emergency policies than non-anthropomorphous threats.

Conclusion

This study employs survey experiments to test if anthropomorphous issues are easier to securitize than non-anthropomorphous threats in Egypt, an authoritarian regime, South Korea, a democratic republic, and the United States, a liberal democracy. Conducting survey experiments in three countries assists in mitigating hurdles to external validity. Because this study identifies several patterns that hold despite the regime and cultural differences between the three countries,

the findings' external validity is strengthened. However, despite the enhanced generalizability of the findings and strong cause-and-effect relationships this experimental design offers, a future investigation should address a few hurdles from this study to produce more robust results.

First, given the findings that support the overarching argument but fail to meet the significance level, a future study should include a much bigger sample ("n"). Moreover, this study is only designed to find if a significant difference in support for emergency policies exists between anthropomorphous and non-anthropomorphous threats. To build upon this study, one can employ mixed methods with both quantitative analyses and qualitative assessments (e.g., open-ended questions, interviews) to not only confirm causal relationships but also explore the reasoning behind respondents' decisions, delving deeper into psychosocial factors apparent in the in-group out-group theory.

Second, to enrich the analysis of "successful securitization," a future study should differentiate between two levels of securitization: rhetorical and active. If the public only accepts the extraordinary nature of the threat without supporting emergency policies, it may be interpreted as partial securitization. If the public accepts both the extraordinary nature of the threat as well as the extraordinary means to combat the threat, it may be considered full securitization. Adding this nuance to the analysis can more meaningfully compare the effects of anthropomorphous and non-anthropomorphous threats.

Third, this study's non-anthropomorphous treatment suffers from the salience problem due to the resemblance between bacterial infections and the current pandemic. To mitigate this issue, one should appoint different anthropomorphous and non-anthropomorphous threats that can still be easily homogenized in form, and neither of which is more salient at the time of the experiment.

To conclude, this research offers an innovative approach to security studies and international relations by offering a new lens through which scholars may study security issues. Moreover, the findings hold significant implications for a variety of international and transnational non-anthropomorphous issues, such as public health crises, environmental disasters, food insecurity, poverty, immigration, and energy management. If a future study confirms that anthropomorphous issues are more likely to become fully securitized than non-anthropomorphous issues, the findings may explain why some leaders seek to anthropomorphize an inherently non-anthropomorphous issue to garner public support and expand their control over the public.

Appendices

1. APPENDIX A — RECRUITING SCRIPT

Recruiting Script

Hello, my name is Spring Park. I am a graduate student at the University of Chicago in the Social Sciences Department. I am conducting research on public support for emergency policies, and I am inviting you to participate in this study.

Participation in this research is voluntary and includes taking a survey about your support for emergency policies, which will take approximately 10-15 minutes. The survey data that I collect will be kept confidential in a password-protected cloud service and will not include individual information by which you could be identified. There are no known risks involved in this research.

If you have any questions or concerns, I can be reached at springpark@uchicago.edu. To participate, please click the following link: [provide link here when available]. Thank you.

Spring Bomi Park
MA, Committee on International Relations '21
University of Chicago

2. APPENDIX B — CONSENT FORM

University of Chicago Online Consent Form for Research Participation

Study Number: IRB21-0535
Study Title: Emergency Measures

Description: We are researchers at the University of Chicago doing a research study about public support for emergency policies. Participation in this research is voluntary and you must be a voting-age adult to be eligible to participate. This study includes taking a survey about your support for emergency policies, which will take approximately 5-10 minutes.

Risks and Benefits: Your participation in this study does not involve any risk to you beyond that of everyday life. Taking part in this research study may not benefit you personally, but the findings may significantly advance scholarship in the fields of international relations and security studies.

Confidentiality: The survey data that I collect will be kept confidential in a password-protected cloud service. No identifiable information will be collected, such as your name, workplace, contact information, or home address. If you decide to withdraw from this study, any data

already collected will be destroyed. De-identified information from this study may be used for future research studies or shared with other researchers for future research without your additional informed consent.

Contacts & Questions:
If you have questions or concerns about the study, you can contact Spring Park, at +1 (805) 478-2121 or at springpark@uchicago.edu.

If you have any questions about your rights as a participant in this research, feel you have been harmed, or wish to discuss other study-related concerns with someone who is not part of the research team, you can contact the University of Chicago Social & Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board (IRB) Office by phone at (773) 702-2915, or by email at sbs-irb@uchicago.edu.

Consent:
Participation is voluntary. Refusal to participate or withdrawing from the research will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which you might otherwise be entitled.

By clicking "Agree" below, you confirm that you have read the consent form, are at least 18 years old, and agree to participate in the research. Please print or save a copy of this page for your records.

Thank you for your participation and/or consideration.

3. APPENDIX C — NON-ANTHROPOMORPHOUS TREATMENT SCRIPT

Non-Anthropomorphous Treatment

We are going to describe a hypothetical threat that the United States could face in the near future. After reading the description of the threat, you will be asked to answer some questions regarding your support for each of the proposed emergency policies the US government may propose to protect its citizens from the threat.

The Threat: According to the latest intelligence reports, the United States has discovered a new strain of bacteria, which has originated from rats and has traveled through the air and infected humans. This new bacterial strain has been found to be highly lethal, odorless, and invisible to the naked eye, and due to its novelty, no known antibiotics are effective in treating or containing this bacterial infection. The reports have also revealed that this new bacterial strain can kill tens of thousands of people in populated areas. Consequently, the death rate in the United States is expected to rise exponentially in the next year.

4. APPENDIX D — ANTHROPOMORPHOUS TREATMENT SCRIPT

Anthropomorphous Treatment

We are going to describe a hypothetical threat that the United States could face in the near future. After reading the description of the threat, you will be asked to answer some questions regarding your support for each of the proposed emergency policies the US government may propose to protect its citizens from the threat.

The Threat: According to the latest intelligence reports, the United States has discovered a new strain of bacteria, deliberately released in the United States as a biological weapon by a hostile nation, which has traveled through the air and infected humans. This new bacterial strain has been found to be highly lethal, odorless, and invisible to the naked eye, and due to its novelty, no known antibiotics are effective in treating or containing this bacterial infection. The reports have also revealed that this new biological weapon can kill tens of thousands of people in populated areas. Consequently, the death rate in the United States is expected to rise exponentially in the next year.

5. APPENDIX E — CONTROL TREATMENT SCRIPT

Control Treatment

We are going to describe a hypothetical situation that the United States could face in the near future. After reading the description of the situation, you will be asked to answer some questions regarding your support for each of the proposed emergency policies the US government may propose.

The Situation: According to the latest infrastructure reports, the United States has been experiencing a delay in road constructions. This delay is expected to cause traffic congestion throughout the country for the next year.

6. APPENDIX F — PRIMARY QUESTIONNAIRE

POLICY QUESTIONS

Freedom of Speech:
(Q1) “How likely are you to support an emergency policy that allows the government to police and suspend both online and offline communications to combat misinformation campaigns that may cause civilian casualties?”

Freedom of Movement:

(Q3) “How likely are you to support an emergency policy that allows the government to limit and control the movement of people both within and across the border to minimize civilian casualties?”

(Q4) “How likely are you to support an emergency policy that allows the government to enforce curfews and/or confine citizens to their homes to minimize civilian casualties?”

Freedom of Association:
(Q2) “How likely are you to support an emergency policy that allows the government to limit and control public gatherings of people to minimize civilian casualties?”

(Q7) “How likely are you to support an emergency policy that allows the government to limit and control private gatherings of people to minimize civilian casualties?”

Privacy:
(Q8) “How likely are you to support an emergency policy that allows the government to surveil citizens in public settings around the clock to identify and eliminate potential threats?”

(Q5) “How likely are you to support an emergency policy that allows the government to surveil citizens in private settings around the clock to identify and eliminate potential threats?”

Extreme Sentence:
(Q6) “How likely are you to support an emergency policy that allows the government to enforce a life sentence for people responsible for involuntary manslaughter resulting from negligence?”

(Q9) “How likely are you to support an emergency policy that allows the government to enforce a life sentence for people responsible for voluntary manslaughter?”

7. APPENDIX G — SECONDARY QUESTIONNAIRE

MISCELLANEOUS QUESTIONS

(O1) “How anxious does the biological weapon make you feel?”
(O2) “How threatened do you feel by the biological weapon?”
(O3) “How likely do you think you will be directly exposed to the biological weapon?”
(O4) “How concerned would you be about being exposed to the biological weapon?”
(O5) “How often would you look at news sources about the biological weapon?”
(O6) “How suspicious would you be of fellow citizens?”
(O7) “How suspicious would you be of foreigners?”
(O8) “How much would you agree with the following statement: ‘No insult to the national honor should go unpunished in times of emergency, such as the one posed by the biological weapon’?”
(O9) “How much would you agree with the following statement: ‘Citizens should follow the political leader without question in times of emergency, such as the one posed by the biological weapon’?”

(O10) “How much would you agree with the following statement: ‘The political leadership has access to information about the biological weapon that the general public does not’?”
(O11) “How much would you agree with the following statement: ‘The political leadership has the expertise to handle the biological weapon’?”
(O12) “How much would you agree with the following statement: ‘The political leadership can effectively handle the biological weapon’?”
(O13) “How severely should those who violate emergency policies be shamed?”
(O14) “How severely should those who violate emergency policies be punished?”
(O15) “How should the amount of funding for policing and law enforcement change?”

8. APPENDIX H — DEBRIEFING/EXIT SCRIPT

Debriefing Script

Threat Treatments
Thank you for your participation in this survey. The goal of this study is to determine the relationship between threat perception and support for emergency policies. The purpose of this study required presenting a contrived alarming scenario. For example, we had to construct a credible "threatening story" to gauge your support for emergency policies in the event a similar threat emerges — if ever — in the future. To reiterate, the details presented in the threat description of the survey were HYPOTHETICAL. Thank you again for your participation.

Contacts & Questions:
If you have questions or concerns about the study, you can contact Spring Park, at +1 (805) 478-2121 or at springpark@uchicago.edu.

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Control Treatment
“Thank you for your participation in this survey. The goal of this study is to determine the relationship between threat perception and support for emergency policies. The purpose of this study required presenting a contrived scenario — the details presented in the survey were HYPOTHETICAL. Thank you again for your participation.”

Contacts & Questions:
If you have questions or concerns about the study, you can contact Spring Park, at +1 (805) 478-2121 or at springpark@uchicago.edu.

If you have any questions about your rights as a participant in this research, feel you have been harmed, or wish to discuss other study-related concerns with someone who is not part of the research team, you can contact the University of Chicago Social & Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board (IRB) Office by phone at (773) 702-2915, or by email at sbs-irb@uchicago.edu.

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