Placing Interpersonal Interactions at the Center of Justice Theory

This paper challenges John Rawls's claim that the basic structure of society should be considered to be the primary subject of justice. It presents Rawls's arguments in favor of this claim, providing 'reasonable' reconstructions of specific arguments that appear to be incomplete in Rawls's work. The paper then makes two arguments in favor of adopting interpersonal interactions, rather than the basic structure, as the primary subject of justice. The first is that an account of the justice of institutions presupposes an account of the more fundamental justice of individuals and interpersonal interactions. The second is that a theory focused on institutions creates what I call 'gaps' in the realization of justice. The paper concludes by arguing that, while limitations in our knowledge may make it necessary to adopt the basic structure as our primary subject, we have a certain duty to overcome these limitations so that we may work with a primary subject (interpersonal interactions) that is more fundamental and avoids these gaps in the realization of justice.