

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

WHO BELONGS TO THE NATION?

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BY

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For my parents, Jinsook and Hochol

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Who Belongs to the Nation?

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By using a unique combination of survey data (International Social Survey Program 2003) and qualitative case study, this dissertation investigates how much importance individuals and states place on descent (or ethnic identity) as a determinant of national membership. Through multi-level analysis across twenty-nine countries, the first part of the dissertation (Chapter 2) shows that the negative effects of income and education on nativism are stronger in countries with greater levels of group threat (i.e., a higher percentage of foreign-born) and greater skill abundance (i.e., a higher percentage of college graduates and high GDP per capita). In contrast with the general pattern, higher income leads to stronger nativist attitudes in countries with low GDP per capita or a low percentage of foreign-born. To further investigate this reversed pattern, particularly in countries with a low percentage of foreign-born, the second part of the dissertation turns to a qualitative case study of selective dual citizenship policy in South Korea. In Chapter 3, the Korean dual citizenship policy is not merely a coethnic policy but a comprehensive tool to administer human resources, ranging from resident (dual) citizens to overseas diaspora and non-Korean migrants, to tackle demographic challenges and fulfill material and symbolic state

interests. Economic and geopolitical interests have led to the preferential treatment of Korean Americans over Koreans in China. Dual citizenship was also extended to groups with less visible economic utility (e.g., return migrants over 65 and marriage migrants) to strengthen ethnic national identity and boost fertility. Chapter 4 shows that the Korean state uses dual citizenship to regulate resident and non-resident citizens regarding their choices in family formation, citizenship, and military service. In addition to draft evasion by dual citizens from elite backgrounds, non-resident (dual) citizens' access to social welfare benefits has raised new tensions, inviting the public to question the definition of citizenship and the rights and obligations tied to citizenship. This study offers new insights into the field of citizenship studies by constructing a holistic approach to dual citizenship as part of a larger citizenship and immigration system to manage human resources and by drawing attention to the rise of extraterritorial citizenship.

Key words: ethnic nationalism, national identity, dual citizenship, conscription, national membership

(353 words)

INTRODUCTION

What is the boundary between “us” and “them,” citizens and non-citizens? How do people define a person as an American or German? This question of citizenship or who belongs to the state is invariably linked to national and, in many cases, ethnoracial identity. With the rise of nationalism, states started to increasingly imagine themselves as bounded ethnocultural communities that share language, history, culture, and traditions, (Anderson 1983). As states and nations were thought to be congruent, the notion of citizenship or national membership became intertwined with a specific national, ethnocultural identity.

However, large-scale migration has dismantled the link between consanguinity and legal citizenship in many industrialized societies, raising the question of who truly belongs to a country. The presence of large groups of migrants from diverse ethnic, cultural, and religious backgrounds has revealed a deep gap between the actual resident population and the constructed image of nation as an ethnocultural community. Despite the rapid growth in migrant population, some countries have maintained a strict descent-based citizenship policy (*jus sanguinis*), excluding ethnic or religious minorities from becoming formal members—citizens—of the society, in some cases even after generations. Citizenship has functioned as a tool for social closure, restricting resident aliens’ access to public goods and social welfare benefits.

For countries that experience out-migration and in-migration simultaneously, the discussion on descent-based citizenship has become more complex, involving emigrants as well as immigrants. In countries with a large diaspora overseas, descent-based citizenship, often

coupled with dual nationality policy, allows states to keep their ties with emigrants abroad. To secure investments, remittances, taxes, and human resources flowing from overseas residents, many sending states introduce policies to keep emigrants and their descendants as legal citizens and invent new legal categories of membership, as seen in India (e.g., Overseas Citizen of India). Ultimately, as more people cross borders back and forth, the distinction between resident and non-resident citizen becomes less meaningful.

How do states and individuals respond to the growing incongruence between the resident population and a nationally bounded citizenship system based on ethnic identity or descent? To understand the changes in citizenship policies, we need to look at how both state actors and public opinion influence the process of policy formation. As the face of the nation changes, the public's understanding of who belongs to the nation often diverges greatly from the state's legal conception of citizenship as well. At the individual-level, one's support for descent-based national membership may differ by social structural variables, such as education and income, and country-level contexts, such as the level of group threat (i.e., economic conditions and relative size of out-group) and natives-to-immigrants skill composition. At the state level, states may externally reconfigure their legal citizenship systems to reflect the changes in the population and the popular understanding of national membership but internally keep their cultural models of citizenship intact.

By using a unique combination of survey data (International Social Survey Program 2003) and qualitative case study, this dissertation investigates the connection between ethnic national identity and legal citizenship. Specifically, I examine how much importance states and individuals place on descent (or ethnic identity) as a core component of national membership. In

the first part of the dissertation, I analyze the impact of group threat and relative skill composition on the individual-level effects of education and household income on nativism across twenty-nine countries using multi-level analysis. In the second part of the dissertation, I turn to a qualitative case study of selective dual citizenship policy in South Korea (hereafter Korea) to investigate how countries with a low percentage of foreign-born and a large overseas diaspora use descent-based citizenship policies to fulfill both material and symbolic interests of the state and regulate citizens and non-citizens.¹

Literature Review

Under the modern nation-state system, citizenship has been regarded as tied to not only a political but an ethnocultural community. After World War II, however, international migration exploded to an unparalleled level with advances in mass transportation technologies and increased labor demands in booming economies of the industrialized first world. A large population of labor migrants ended up settling down as permanent residents resulting in a deep gap between a nationally bounded citizenship system and a growing diversity in the actual resident population.

Two strands of studies have explored how nation-states respond to the growth of migrant populations in their citizenship policies. *The nationhood citizenship* approach has examined the effect of long-standing cultural understandings and institutional arrangements on states' legal definition of citizenship, i.e., the type of membership allowed for migrants. In other words, the

¹ In this dissertation, I use the term “dual citizenship” interchangeably with “dual nationality,” “plural nationality,” “plural citizenship,” and “multiple nationalities.”

state's self-understanding significantly affects the ways in which migrant populations are incorporated into mainstream society (Brubaker 1992; Koopmans and Statham 1999; Favell 2001). For instance, countries with a civic notion of membership (e.g., France) developed *jus soli* or birthright citizenship laws, while countries with an ethnic understanding of nationhood (e.g., Germany) introduced *jus sanguinis* or citizenship by descent (Brubaker 1992; Bauböck 1994).

The post-national citizenship approach has focused on the erosion of citizenship as based on nationality with the prominence of the international human rights regime and supranational organizations, such as the UN or the EU (Soysal 1994; Jacobson 1996; Sassen 1998). European guest workers have achieved a relatively wide range of rights and benefits without becoming formal citizens in host societies (Soysal 1994). A new form of membership, i.e., “post-national citizenship,” has developed, anchored within the global discourse of human rights.

In short, *the nationhood citizenship* perspective has focused on “citizenship as legal status” while *the postnational citizenship* perspective has specifically addressed “citizenship as rights” or the expansion of rights for non-citizens. Rights and identities, which were formerly fused in the form of national citizenship, have become decoupled (Soysal 1994). The rights component of citizenship is now reconfigured as part of the universal right of personhood, while the identity component is still largely bounded within the nation-state (Soysal 1994).

In addition to rights and identity, citizenship can further be divided into four dimensions: 1) legal status, 2) rights and obligations, 3) political participation, and 4) sense of belonging or identity. Each of the four dimensions of citizenship can further reinforce or undermine others (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008). The exclusionary aspect of “citizenship as identity or belonging” may impede the allocation of rights and status to migrants and their participation

in the host society. On the other hand, the expansion of “citizenship as rights” to all residents (e.g., political equality and participation in society) may undermine the notion of “citizenship as identity or belonging” (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008).

Citizenship functions as a tool for social closure, protecting wealthy states from people escaping war, political unrest, and famine (Brubaker 1992). Those who endorse a restrictive model of descent-based citizenship (i.e., “citizenship as identity”) would be more likely to demand cutting off migrants’ access to collective goods (i.e., “citizenship as rights”). In this sense, individual’s support for descent-based citizenship may function as a proxy for exclusionary attitudes toward minority or out-group members. Some quantitative studies of national identification have found that those who support ethnic forms of nationalism are more likely to hold negative attitudes toward immigrants (Ceobanu and Escandell 2008). Individuals who prefer civic forms of national identity are less likely to endorse restrictive policies for immigration, citizenship, and assimilation whereas those who value both ethnic and civic dimensions of nationalism are more likely to support restrictive policies (Kunovich 2009).

If citizenship is not simply a legal status but an identity, how can states reconcile the conflict between citizenship as a political membership and citizenship as a distinct ethnocultural identity? One of the responses at the empirical level to this ethnic dilemma is dual citizenship. In recent decades, an increasing number of states began to either formally allow or tolerate plural nationality. However, previous studies on citizenship ignore how dual citizenship changes the existing order constructed by national citizenship, introducing political inequality among citizens and non-citizens.

First, dual citizenship amplifies the difference between mononationals and dual nationals.

While citizenship is “internally inclusive” and “externally exclusive” at the same time (Brubaker 1992; Joppke 2010), dual citizenship disrupts this internal equality among citizens. On one hand, dual citizens seem to enjoy more political power and freedom. Dual nationals can vote in two different electoral systems and enjoy the possibility of exit—an advantage not available to mononationals (FitzGerald 2006:107). It is difficult for states to enforce duties on non-resident dual citizens. Thus, plural citizens can claim rights of citizenship without carrying out obligations—enjoying voluntaristic, rights-centered “citizenship à la carte” (FitzGerald 2008, 2012)—and make policies they are not directly subject to (FitzGerald 2006:116).

On the other hand, dual citizens are more restricted in terms of eligibility and exercising their rights. In many countries, only qualified citizens (e.g., natural citizens or emigrants in specific countries) can acquire plural nationality.² In terms of citizenship rights, dual nationals are often not allowed to vote, run for office, or hold military and government positions (FitzGerald 2006:111). As seen in the denaturalization cases of European citizens involved in terrorist activities, states may impose stricter qualifications on dual nationals (e.g., restricting citizens of enemy states from holding multiple citizenship) and even revoke citizenship of dual citizens (and citizens from migrant backgrounds) for national security reasons.

Second, for non-citizens, access to dual citizenship is often divided along lines of race, ethnicity, or class. Coethnics face a better chance of obtaining legal citizenship and plural

² India restricts its *de facto* dual citizenship to Indians in specific countries, excluding those in Pakistan and Bangladesh (FitzGerald 2006:111). Similarly, Korea only allows dual nationality to certain emigrant groups (e.g. Korean Americans) while excluding others (e.g. Koreans in China). Such discrimination by region is not only associated with emigrant group’s economic utility (e.g. tendency to have more highly skilled workers) but geopolitical factors (e.g. rivalry between India and Pakistan) (Barry 2006; FitzGerald 2006:111).

nationality, particularly in countries with a history of mass emigration. Most countries have special provisions in nationality laws for coethnics or specific emigrant groups who are viewed as more eligible members of the national community than other migrants. Dual nationality is also selectively extended to high-skilled migrants based on their market position, expressed through “remittances, investment, and consumption” (Goldring 2002; see also Schild 1998). Not only does plural nationality produce inequality among citizens, but it reveals unequal access to dual citizenship among non-citizens by race, ethnicity, or economic utility.

The existing literature on dual citizenship policies lacks a comprehensive approach to understanding dual citizenship as part of a larger citizenship system to manage human resources. Even though most states today experience out-migration and in-migration as simultaneous processes, previous studies on dual citizenship are sharply divided by a country’s position in the international migration system as an immigration or emigration state. Research on receiving states has mostly viewed dual citizenship as a part of a social integration policy for migrants (e.g., dual citizenship for naturalized citizens) rather than as emigrant policies (e.g., dual citizenship for emigrants).³

The growing literature on sending states, specifically outside the Western hemisphere, has discussed dual citizenship as part of diaspora (or emigrant) policies to control overseas populations (e.g., ethnic return policies) and have noted the rise of emigrant citizenship (Bauböck 2003; Barry 2006; FitzGerald 2006, 2012). Through dual citizenship, sending states can secure remittances and political support, upgrade human capital, and exert political influence

³ For studies on non-resident European citizenship, see Harpaz (2013, 2015).

in host societies via emigrant groups (Bauböck 2003; FitzGerald 2006). For emigrants, dual citizenship allows them to maintain ties with origin countries while protecting emigrants' rights in host societies, such as anti-immigration laws in the U.S. (Escobar 2007).

Previous studies on dual citizenship and diaspora policies in sending states have neglected how states differentiate even among emigrant groups in granting access to dual citizenship. Without further analyzing different treatment across coethnic groups, migration scholars have entirely attributed preferential ethnic return migration policies to either ethnic affinity (Triandafyllidou and Veikou 2002) or instrumentally economic goals (Skrentny et al. 2007).

More recent studies in political science have brought the focus back to varying emigrant policies in Egypt and Greece. Mylonas (2013a, 2013b) and Tsourapas (2015) argue that states construct different policies for coethnic groups based on economic interests, such as a group's utility back home versus abroad and geopolitical reasons related to foreign policy, national security, and domestic political economy. However, states extend citizenship not only for political or economic reasons, but also for symbolic reasons tied to national identity, which will be discussed in the sections that follow.

To explicate why countries with a large diaspora overseas maintain descent-based citizenship and introduce dual citizenship, we need to view dual citizenship and diaspora management policies as part of a larger immigration and citizenship system. Immigration policy is a collective decision regarding the collective identity of a polity, stating who we are as a community and what we choose to become as people (Fitzgerald 1996:24). Thus, citizenship policy, including dual citizenship and diaspora policy, is closely linked to immigration policy,

determining who we are as a nation and who should be admitted as potential members of the community. To further analyze whose interests are served through descent-based citizenship policy, we need a state's perspective in citizenship policy formation.

Previous studies on immigration policies are divided into four strands. Class-conflict theorists and pluralists attribute policy changes to forces outside politics, such as economic elites or dominant classes, while neo-institutionalists focus on the role of liberal political institutions. In their view, the state is a mere broker, passively responding to various organized interests. In contrast, state-as-an-actor theorists bring attention back to the state itself. The state, both collectively as an actor and disparately as one of its many underlying departments, pursues its own interests, which may be distinctively different from organized social interests. The state as an administration may strive to confirm legitimacy and win electoral support, while the various state departments and agencies may follow their own organizational dynamics and interests (Fitzgerald 1996; Boswell 2007).

State-centered theorists (Fitzgerald 1996; Massey 1999; Zolberg 1999, 2006; Boswell 2007) look for the hidden goals of immigration or citizenship policies, such as political, economic, or cultural motives. Zolberg (1999, 2006) argues that two axes exist in immigration policies: political economy and national identity. States consider not only the material costs or benefits of accepting immigrants but their impact on the host society's cohesiveness or national identity. Immigration policies are built on the premise of who should be accepted to enter the country in accordance with the image of the nation as an ethnocultural community (Zolberg 2006). At the same time, geopolitical or economic interests also matter, as seen in the prominence of refugee policies among U.S. immigration policies—especially after World War

II—tied to American foreign policy interests during the Cold War period (Fitzgerald 1996).

In her analysis of the transformation of family-based conscription exemptions in France, Geva (2011:121) notes that the French state has regulated men's familial positions through conscription, thereby showing how familial ideologies have shaped state policy. Conscription policy was a family policy, and policymakers were aware of its effect on men and women's family roles (Geva 2014). Under the "depopulation crisis," pronatalists viewed imposing military obligations on men as a disincentive toward marriage and procreation and a means of eroding men's declining authority in the household, further exacerbating low marriage and fertility rates (Geva 2011:121). The French state not only rewarded fathers for fulfilling their procreative obligation to the state, but lowered the age for conscription exemption to encourage starting families early (Geva 2014). Family-based exemptions were later reduced as the state's security needs became more important than maintaining men's household authority (Geva 2014:16).

Like conscription policy, citizenship policy can also function as family policy, regulating citizens' choices in family formation, military service, and citizenship. As "pedagogical, corrective, and ideological organizations" (Gorski 2003:165–66), states can regulate or alter citizens' and potential citizens' actions through citizenship policy, achieving symbolic goals other than strengthening national identity. Early modern states have built schools, prisons, workhouses, and other institutions to reshape individuals into "obedient, productive subjects" (Gorski 2003:165–66). Modern states continue to socialize, regulate, and normalize individuals through social institutions such as conscription or citizenship policies.

As the power and the legitimacy of states rest on popular consent, states choose citizenship and immigration policies that would help secure electoral support. Policymakers

weigh public opinion on national membership when making policy decisions. Therefore, if the public has strong resentments or concerns regarding certain issues such as draft evasion or fertility decline, the state may use citizenship policy as an incentive to steer citizens and future citizens in preferred directions, revealing its familial and patriarchal ideologies in the process.

Research Questions, Data, and Method

In the previous section, I have reviewed how citizenship became intertwined with national identity, or ethnoracial identity. Many states face an ethnic dilemma in keeping descent-based citizenship as the population becomes more ethnically, racially, and religiously diverse. Citizenship is not only a legal status, but entails a sense of belonging, rights and obligations, and political participation. Legal citizenship functions as a tool for social closure, keeping non-citizens from accessing public services and goods. Thus, those who support descent-based citizenship, or the exclusionary aspect of “citizenship as identity,” are more likely to exhibit exclusionary attitudes toward out-group members.

For states with large diasporas overseas, descent-based citizenship, together with dual citizenship, helps them keep their ties with emigrants overseas. Dual citizenship can be an option for states struggling with a mismatch between nationally bounded citizenship and an increasingly diverse population. However, dual nationality creates political inequality among citizens—mononationals versus dual nationals—as well as among non-citizens as access to dual citizenship is mostly divided by class, race, and ethnicity. Many states even discriminate within coethnic groups in granting access to dual citizenship, which is less discussed in the previous studies. To understand why states continue to maintain descent-based citizenship systems and extend dual citizenship, we need a state-centered approach, one that views citizenship policy as part of a

larger system to administer human resources.

This brings us back to my original research question: How much importance do individuals and states place on descent or ethnic identity in determining one's national membership? Does an individual's support for descent-based national membership vary by country-level contexts? What do states achieve by maintaining a descent-based citizenship policy and allowing dual nationality? Does public opinion on national membership influence the process of citizenship policy formation?

To answer these questions, I first embark on a multi-level analysis of cross-national survey data on national identification in Chapter 2. My main research question is to find out whether the individual-level effects of education and household income on nativism differ by social contexts, such as the level of group threat (e.g., the relative size of out-group population and economic condition) or relative skill composition across twenty-nine countries. Next, to further explicate the reverse patterns found in Chapter 2 among countries with small foreign-born populations, I move on to a qualitative case study of a single country, Korea. In Chapters 3 and 4, I focus on how the Korean state uses selective dual citizenship policy as a tool for administering human resources, ranging from resident and non-resident citizens and non-citizens (e.g., overseas Koreans, the highly skilled, and marriage migrants). Through dual citizenship policy, the Korean state fulfills both material and symbolic interests and regulates citizens regarding their choices in family formation, military service, and citizenship.

In Chapter 2, I use multi-level analysis to investigate the impact of group threat (i.e., the size of out-group population and economic conditions) and natives-to-immigrants skill composition (measured by percentage of college graduates and GDP per capita) on the

individual-level predictors (i.e., education and household income) of nativism across twenty-nine countries. Group threat theory predicts that the association between social structural variables and nativism will be stronger in countries with a greater group threat. On the other hand, the economic theory of trade (i.e., Heckscher-Ohlin trade models) and the effect of immigration on wages and attitudes (i.e., factor-proportions analysis) posits that the effect of being high-skilled on anti-immigrant attitudes will vary by the relative skill composition (e.g., proportion of skilled natives versus migrants) in a country. Based on these predictions, I test whether the individual-level effects of family income and education on nativism are modified by contextual factors (e.g., group threat or skill composition) by using cross-level interactions.

To focus on the exclusivist or nativist attitudes expressed in national identification, I create a new dependent variable “ancestry,” which measures nativism or the extent of support for ancestry as an important criterion of national membership. By drawing attention to the exclusionary aspect of national identity, I bridge the gap between the literature on national identification and the literature on anti-immigrant attitudes. To test the economic theory of trade, I introduce percentage of college graduates as an indirect measure of skill composition at the societal level, in addition to GDP per capita. For data, I use the 2003 National Identity module of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP).

In Chapter 2, I find two general patterns. First, the negative effect of education on nativism is stronger in countries with greater levels of group threat (i.e., higher percentage of foreign-born) and high percentages of college graduates (i.e., higher ratio of skilled natives), corroborating both group threat theory and the economic theory of trade. Second, the negative effects of absolute and relative household income on nativism are stronger in countries with a

greater group threat (i.e., high percentage of foreign-born)—in line with group threat theory—and high GDP per capita (i.e., less competition or higher proportion of skilled natives), as predicted by the economic theory of trade but in opposition to group threat theory.

However, this negative association between family income—both in absolute and relative terms—and nativism is reversed in countries with low GDP per capita and low percentage of foreign-born, calling for more in-depth research. Among individuals with high household income, those living in countries with low percentages of foreign-born or low GDP per capita are even more likely to support nativism compared to those with low household incomes. I turn to qualitative case study to further explicate why the negative association between family income and nativism is reversed in countries with low GDP per capita and low percentage of foreign-born. Among the two country-level factors, I choose to investigate countries with relatively small foreign-born populations, which is an understudied subject in the literature on citizenship and national identity. I also note that countries with low percentages of foreign-born not only exhibit stronger support for nativism, on average, but tend to have a large diaspora overseas, which may further complicate the association between household income and nativism.

In Chapters 3 and 4, I embark on a qualitative case study of Korea's selective dual nationality policy. Korea is one of the countries that has shown a reverse pattern, i.e., a positive association between family income and nativism, as seen in Chapter 2. By conducting a qualitative case study of a single country and its citizenship policies, I aim to gain a deeper understanding on the state's perspective on descent-based citizenship. Specifically, I focus on how states use dual citizenship policy as a tool to control a wide array of human resources, such as resident and non-resident citizens, overseas diaspora, and incoming migrants, to tackle

population crises and fulfill symbolic as well as economic and geopolitical interests of the state.

Korea is an interesting case to study citizenship policy for four reasons. First, Korea has a relatively small foreign-born population—which accounts for 4 percent of its total population of 50 million—and a large overseas diaspora of approximately 7 million. As the migrant population, both of Korean and non-Korean descent, continues to grow rapidly, native Koreans show mixed attitudes toward descent-based national membership. On average, Koreans have a slightly higher level of support for nativism while Koreans with high household income are slightly more likely to value ancestry as an important criterion of national membership.

Second, Korea is one of the few countries that still maintains compulsory military service; thus, military duty is regarded as an integral part of Korean citizenship for male citizens. Selective dual citizenship policy was introduced in 2010 despite the Korean public's strong feelings against draft-dodging plural citizens. Third, dual citizenship is tied to class inequality in Korea. For the past few decades, many dual citizens have come from elite family backgrounds who had the resources to give their children foreign citizenship. Fourth, dual citizenship policy in Korea not only targets ethnic Koreans overseas, albeit selectively, but heavily focuses on administering resident dual citizens.

In Chapters 3 and 4, I investigate how the Korean state, with a relatively small but growing foreign-born population and a large diaspora overseas, manages its descent-based citizenship system, using selective dual nationality policy as a tool to administer human resources, including resident and non-resident citizens, ethnic Koreans, marriage migrants, and high-skilled migrants. I look at dual citizenship policy as part of a larger immigration system based on the two axes, political economy and national identity (Zolberg 1999, 2006). Instead of

relying on ethnic nationalism, I investigate how the state uses descent-based citizenship policies, including dual citizenship and coethnic policies, to fulfill both material and symbolic interests of the state. I also analyze how the state uses citizenship and conscription as tools to regulate citizens and potential citizens in their family formation, military service, and citizenship choices.

To investigate the transition to a selective dual nationality policy in Korea, I have conducted archival research and interviews with key informants. For archival data, I collected parliamentary records on the 2010 Nationality Act Amendment at the National Assembly Library in Korea. In addition to collecting laws and regulations related to plural nationality introduced between 2009 and 2018, I also gathered various written materials, such as government publications, conference and public hearing reports, annual audit reports, newspaper interviews, and newsletters of NGOs to reveal different perspectives and points of contention regarding the nationality law reform.

During two months of field work in 2012, I interviewed former government officials from the Ministry of Justice as well as immigration experts and representatives of NGOs who had participated in the public hearings, advisory boards, and naturalization review committees. Through direct interviews with key participants, I have gained detailed information on the historical development of the dual citizenship policy including the aftermath, both internal and external concerns and conflicts during the policymaking process, and specific interests and goals of government branches and President Lee Myung-Bak's administration.

Plan of the Dissertation

The plan of the dissertation is as follows. In Chapter 2, I investigate the impact of group threat (i.e., relative size of out-group and economic condition) and relative skill composition on

the individual-level effects of education and household income on nativism across twenty-nine countries using multi-level analysis. Based on group threat theory and the economic theory of trade and the impact of immigration on wages, I use cross-level interaction effects to test whether contextual factors, such as group threat or natives-to-immigrants skill composition, modify the individual-level association between social structural variables (i.e., education and household income) and support for descent-based citizenship.

To further investigate the reverse patterns of association between family income and nativism in countries with a low percentage of foreign-born, I move on to a qualitative case study of Korea's selective dual nationality policy in Chapters 3 and 4. In Chapter 3, I examine how the Korean state uses dual citizenship policy not only as an emigrant policy, but as a tool to administer a broad range of human resources, from resident and non-resident citizens to coethnic and non-coethnic migrants. I discuss dual citizenship as part of a larger diaspora management policy (e.g., "Overseas Korean [F-4 visa] policy"), which has consistently favored Korean Americans over ethnic Koreans in China and CIS countries for geopolitical and economic reasons. I investigate how Lee Myung-Bak's administration has promoted dual citizenship policy as a solution to brain drain, with the hidden goal of recruiting skilled workers, particularly among overseas Koreans. Lastly, I point out that the Korean state fulfills both material (e.g., recruiting skilled workers) and symbolic (e.g., strengthening ethnic national identity and boosting fertility) interests through selective dual citizenship policy by extending dual nationality to groups with less visible economic utility (e.g., return migrants over age sixty-five and marriage migrants).

In Chapter 4, I focus on how the Korean state controls and alters the actions of citizens

and citizens-to-be regarding their family formation, military service, and citizenship by selectively approving naturalization, plural citizenship, and military service deferment. I first investigate how the selective dual citizenship policy in Korea aims to stop (dual) citizens from giving up Korean nationality, taking advantage of so-called “birth tourism,” and shirking military duties. Next, I examine how the selective dual citizenship policy has incorporated Korean Americans into the potential pool of conscripts, resulting in protests through Constitutional Court appeals and renunciation of Korean citizenship. I draw attention to how the state regulates male dual citizens by using military service deferment and citizenship as incentives, revealing the state’s familial and patriarchal ideologies embedded in both conscription and dual citizenship policies. Lastly, I focus on how dual citizenship policy has influenced other social welfare policies by changing the eligibility requirement to domestic residence, starting a public debate on what citizenship entails and who should be eligible for social welfare benefits.

In the conclusion, I first summarize the findings from each chapter and discuss the contributions and limitations of quantitative and qualitative research. I investigate what role public opinion and elites play in the making of citizenship policies, drawing from the qualitative case study of Korea’s selective dual citizenship policy. Lastly, I provide direction for future research on popular understanding of national membership, nativism, and descent-based citizen policies, particularly in countries with large overseas diasporas and low income.

CHAPTER 2

The Impact of Group Threat and Skill Composition on the Individual-Level Association between Social Structural Position and Support for Nativism

With the rise of far-right political parties in Europe and alternative right groups in the U.S., many scholars have endeavored to explain the individual- and contextual-level factors that lead to stronger support for ethnic exclusionism or nativism.¹ Not much attention has been paid to the exclusionary aspect of national identification itself as the scholarship is largely split into two strands of studies on national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes. However, when one proclaims descent or ancestry as a crucial component of national membership, it not only represents an ethnic model of national identity but an exclusionary attitude toward out-group populations, such as migrants and racial or ethnic minority groups.

Two distinct lines of studies have advanced to understand nativist attitudes: the literature on nationalism and national identification and the literature on attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. The former has focused on the ethnic versus civic divide in nationalism and national identity, pointing to the restrictive nature of ethnic nationalism (Ceobanu and Escandell 2008; Kunovich 2009). The latter has attributed the rise of ethnic prejudice and antagonism to socioeconomic positions and self-interests, identities and values, contact with out-group members, and group threat—both in material interests and collective identity (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010). Both strands of studies view competition as the key mechanism to explain

¹ For the purpose of this study, I define nativism as a political belief that shared lineage or ancestry is an important criterion for national membership.

preference for ethnic national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes.

In this study, I focus on the exclusionary aspect in national identity attitudes by creating a new dependent variable to measure nativism, or support for ancestry, as an important criterion of national membership. This study bridges the two fields—literature on nationalism and national identification and the literature on attitudes toward immigrants and immigration—by extending theoretical models from the latter to predict national identity attitudes. Using predictions from group threat theory and the economic theory of trade (i.e., Heckscher-Ohlin trade models) and the effect of immigration on wages and attitudes (i.e., factor-proportions analysis), I test the impact of contextual factors (i.e., group threat and skill composition) on the individual-level association between social structural variables (i.e., education and household income) and nativism by using cross-level interactions.

The theory of group threat, which has been most widely used, contends that the fear of competition—whether perceived or real—leads to natives’ hostile attitudes toward out-groups when their collective economic, cultural, or religious interests are under threat (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010:317–18). Individuals belonging to the majority population hold a zero-sum view of the intergroup competition, i.e., “us versus them” (Semyonov, Raijiman, and Gorodzeisky 2006). While negative attitudes toward out-group populations are shaped by actual or perceived group conflict, the perception of threat may change over time as the relative size of the out-group population or economic condition changes (Quillian 1995; Semyonov, Raijiman, and Gorodzeisky 2006; Ceobanu and Escandell 2010:317–18).

Another line of research uses the economic theory of trade (i.e., Heckscher-Ohlin trade models) and the effect of immigration on wages and attitudes (i.e., factor-proportions analysis) to

predict natives' attitudes toward immigration by individual labor market skills and the skill composition of natives versus migrants at the societal level (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Mayda 2006). Based on the rational choice perspective, this theory assumes that low-skilled natives will be more opposed to immigration in countries where migrant workers are disproportionately unskilled. The high-skilled are expected to be more opposed to immigration in countries where migrants are high-skilled (Mayda 2006).

Due to limitations in previous data, few studies have been able to test the impact of contextual factors on individual-level effects on anti-minority attitudes using full models with cross-level interactions. In this study, I use cross-level interaction terms in multi-level analysis to examine whether the individual-level effects of education and household income on nativism are modified by the level of group threat (i.e., the size of out-group population and economic conditions) and relative skill composition in a society, testing both group threat theory and the economic theory of trade.

Pre-existing studies show that education and income are among the most powerful predictors of nativism. Instead of only using individual's objective socioeconomic status (e.g., being a high school dropout) to predict nativist attitudes, I draw attention to contextual forces (e.g., being a high school dropout in a country with a high percentage of foreign-born or college graduates). Does the magnitude of these individual-level effects change in certain contexts, such as countries with greater group threat (i.e., larger out-group population) or greater skill abundance (i.e., higher ratio of skilled natives relative to migrants)? As an indirect measure of skill composition, I introduce a new country-level predictor—percentage of college graduates—in addition to GDP per capita.

The plan of this chapter is as follows. In the next section, I briefly review the two strands of literature on national identification and anti-immigrant attitudes with a focus on theoretical framework and empirical findings. I build hypotheses to test the impact of contextual factors on the individual-level association between social structural variables (i.e., education and household income) and nativism based on group threat theory and the economic theory of trade. I describe the data set (International Social Survey Program 2003 National Identity module), dependent variable (i.e., “ancestry”), and individual- and country-level explanatory variables. Then, I introduce results from multi-level analysis models using cross-level interactions. In the final section, I discuss implications for group threat theory, the economic theory of trade, and the larger literature on nationalism, ethnic exclusionism and intergroup conflict. Finally, I discuss the limitations of this study and make suggestions for subsequent research.

Theoretical Background

To bridge the two strands of studies on national identification and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration, I first briefly review the theoretical discussions in the literature on national identity and national identification and introduce theories (e.g., rational choice perspective, cognitive skills theory, and split labor market theory) used to predict an individual’s preference for ethnic, civic, or other forms of national identity. In this study, I focus on individual support for ethnic national identity as a form of exclusionary attitude toward out-groups. I then review theoretical perspectives frequently used in the literature on anti-immigrant attitudes: group threat theory and the economic theory of trade and the impact of immigration on wages.

National Identification and Nativism

Much of the preexisting research on nationalism and national identity has centered upon the theoretical construction of “ethnic” and “civic” forms of national identity (Kohn 1944). Scholars have used an ethnic and civic dichotomy to organize the components of national identity categories, which include “perceptions of shared ancestry, language, territory, religion, mass culture, legal rights and duties, a common economy, myths and historical memories, and attitudes, perceptions, and sentiments such as respecting political institutions or ‘feeling’ American (Kunovich 2009:574).” However, recent studies using cross-national survey data have found weak support for the ethnic-civic dichotomy between the East and the West. Ethnic and civic nationalists coexist in most nation-states without a clear regional pattern (Shulman 2002; Ceobanu and Escandell 2008; Reeskens and Hooghe 2010). Individuals may also range from “credentialists,” who value all components of national identity, to “postnationalists,” who support a republican model of citizenship (Medrano 2005).

To account for an individual’s preference for ethnic, civic, or other forms of national identity, scholars of national identity and national identification have relied on the rational choice perspective, cognitive skills theory, and split labor market theory (Kunovich 2009). Socioeconomic status and majority or minority status are the two most frequently used individual traits to explain one’s preference for ethnic or civic national identity. On one hand, cognitive skills theory predicts that highly educated individuals are better able to imagine belonging to a greater, supranational unit (e.g., being European versus German) and are less likely to endorse ethnic national identity (Jones and Smith 2001).

On the other hand, based on split labor market theory (Bonacich 1972), researchers

expect that those who are more vulnerable to competition with out-group members (e.g., the low-skilled and the less-educated) would be more likely to support an ethnic model of national identity. In their view, ethnic conception of national membership will limit minority groups' access to public resources, such as public education, health care, political representation, and job opportunities in the labor market (Kunovich 2009). Similarly, the rational choice perspective posits that those in the majority group are in favor of restricting the access of minority groups to state resources, leading to support of an ethnic form of national identity (Kunovich 2009, citing Hechter 2000; Chai 2001, 2005; Brubaker 1992).

In short, much of the literature on national identification treats competition over material interests as an important motivation for developing ethnic national identity. Despite its focus on national identity attitudes, this emphasis on the role of competition overlaps with the theoretical perspectives used in the literature on attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. In the following section, I review the literature on anti-immigrant sentiments with a focus on group threat theory and the economic theory on trade and the effect of immigration on wages.

Public Attitudes toward Immigrants and Immigration

The theoretical foundation of the literature on attitudes toward out-group members can be divided into individual-level theories, such as social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979) and contact theory (Pettigrew 1998), and contextual-level theories, such as group threat theory (Cosser 1956; Blumer 1958) and the economic theory of trade (i.e., Heckscher-Ohlin trade models) and the effect of immigration on wages and attitudes (i.e., factor-proportions analysis).

At the individual-level, social identity theory suggests that individuals develop positive attitudes toward in-groups while attempting to differentiate themselves from outsiders (Tajfel and

Turner 1979; Tajfel 1982). This theoretical model has led to a large stream of research on the relationship between feelings of national attachment (e.g., chauvinism, patriotism, or national pride) and attitudes toward out-group members (Hjerm 2001; Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Gijssberts, Hagendoorn, and Scheepers 2004; Raijman et al. 2008). However, the direction of causal relationship is unclear as to whether identities shape attitudes or the other way around (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010:317). Contact theory, on the other hand, suggests that greater contact facilitates more positive attitudes toward out-group members (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998).

Contextual-level theories focus on the competition between groups, particularly in the labor market, and how individuals in more vulnerable positions, such as those with low income and low education, are more prone to harbor negative feelings against migrants. Group threat theory postulates that in-group members perceive individuals different from them as a threat to their material self-interests (e.g., labor and housing market competition) and collective identity, leading to prejudice or hostile attitudes toward out-group members (Coser 1956; Blumer 1958; Blalock 1967; Bobo 1988; Quillian 1995; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Scheepers, Gijssberts, and Coenders 2002; Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006). In this zero-sum scenario, the nature of threat or competition can be real or perceived. Perceived group deprivation as well as actual group deprivation triggers negative attitudes toward minorities, which escalates with an increase in the size of out-group population or worsening economic conditions (Quillian 1995; Scheepers et al. 2002; Kunovich 2004).

Based on the rational choice perspective, the economic theory of trade focuses on the impact of immigration on wages and, subsequently, attitudes toward immigration (Scheve and

Slaughter 2001; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Mayda 2006). Drawing from Heckscher-Ohlin trade models and labor economics literature on immigration (i.e., factor-proportions analysis model), this theory predicts that natives' attitudes toward immigration are shaped by an individual's labor market skills and the skill composition of natives versus migrants at the societal level.

By assuming that capital, skilled labor, and unskilled labor are mobile across sectors and countries, the economic theory of trade posits that skilled individuals should favor immigration in countries where natives are more skilled than immigrants. In such countries, immigration would bring in more unskilled migrant workers, reduce the relative supply of skilled labor compared to unskilled labor, and raise the wage for skilled workers themselves (Mayda 2006). In contrast, skilled workers are expected to oppose immigration in countries where natives are less skilled than immigrants. In short, low-skilled native workers will be more likely to oppose immigration in countries where migrant workers are disproportionately unskilled. The high-skilled will be more likely to oppose immigration in countries where migrants are high-skilled (Mayda 2006).

Empirical Evidence

Increased access to comparable data from large-scale survey projects, such as the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), has driven an exponential growth in the literature on anti-immigrant attitudes examining the micro- and macro-level factors shaping the public's attitudes toward immigrants and immigration (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010). It has also prompted quantitative scholars of nationalism and national identification to explore the individual and contextual bases of national identity using cross-national survey data (Jones and

Smith 2001; Shulman 2002; Kunovich 2009). Much of the findings on individual- and contextual-level determinants of anti-immigrant attitudes largely overlaps with findings from the literature on national identification.

Individual-level Predictors of National Identity and Anti-immigrant Sentiments

At the individual level, education is the single most powerful predictor of one's preference for national identity and attitude toward immigrants and immigration. Education has a consistent negative effect on exclusionary attitudes, which persists even after controlling for other individual-level variables (Hello, Scheepers, and Gijsberts 2002; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). Individuals with higher educational attainment are less likely to support ethnic national identity (Jones and Smith 2001; Kunovich 2009) and less likely to hold negative views of immigrants and immigration. This negative effect of education is known as "the liberalizing effect" of education.

The effect of education on nativist attitudes is twofold. First, from a cultural aspect, the education system instills democratic values and norms, cultivating tolerance. A European study found that individuals with higher levels of education and occupational skills were more in favor of immigration for all types of immigrants regardless of skill level (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). Second, from a structural point of view, education largely shapes individuals' position in the labor market. Those with a higher level of education are in more advantageous positions and face less threat in terms of competition (Hello, Scheepers, and Gijsberts 2002; Kunovich 2002). In this sense, some scholars have used educational attainment strictly as a measure of labor market skills (Mayda 2006). Alternative explanations of the education effect point to the possibility that the highly educated may be more prone to select socially desirable answers in

surveys (Hjerm 2001).

Occupational position, or labor market status, is another strong predictor of national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes. In high-income countries, migrants tend to be disproportionately unskilled and are generally concentrated in occupations with lower status and income. Increased competition leads natives in lower economic strata or more vulnerable position in the labor market (e.g., manual workers or the unemployed) to express hostility toward out-group members (Kunovich 2004) and support an ethnic form of national identity over a civic form (Kunovich 2009).

In a similar vein, personal or household income is also frequently used to predict national identification and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. Low-income earners and individuals with low family income are more likely to exhibit negative attitudes toward migrants (Kunovich 2002, 2004) and support an ethnic national identity in order to protect their material resources from increased competition with immigrants (Kunovich 2009).

As both strands of literature on national identification and anti-immigrant attitudes have used competition as a key mechanism shaping natives' attitudes, many studies have included measures of socioeconomic status, such as education, occupational position, labor market status, and household or individual income. It is important to note, however, that it becomes difficult to disentangle the effect of a single variable as education, income, occupational position, and labor market status are all interrelated.

Apart from demographic variables (e.g., age, gender, living in urban areas, citizenship status), other frequently used individual-level predictors of national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes include ideology-related variables (e.g., political and religious affiliations) and

measures of social contact with out-group members (e.g., having immigrant friends or colleagues and living in neighborhoods with immigrants). While some studies use attitudinal variables—such as policy preferences for immigration and citizenship, different forms of national attachment (e.g., patriotism, chauvinism), and regional, national, or supranational identity—to predict preference for national identity or anti-immigrant attitudes, it is difficult to ascertain the direction of causality.

Contextual-level Predictors of National Identity and Anti-immigrant Sentiments

Using comparative historical analyses on the development of nationalism as the theoretical foundation, quantitative scholars of nationalism and national identification have employed economic (e.g., development, globalization), political (e.g., militarism, democratic governance), and cultural variables, such as internal cultural diversity (e.g., linguistic diversity and relative strength of regional or national identity) as country-level predictors of individual's preference for ethnic, civic, or other forms of national identity (Jones and Smith 2001; Kunovich 2009). Kunovich (2009) finds that individuals are less committed to either form of national identity and more likely to support a civic over an ethnic form of national identity in countries with greater development (e.g., GDP per capita), higher levels of economic and cultural globalization, and stronger political institutions (e.g., represented by voice and accountability, stability, effectiveness, and control of corruption).

The literature on attitudes toward immigrants and immigration, on the other hand, has mostly relied on group threat theory, using relative size of out-group population and economic conditions to measure the level of perceived or actual group threat. The theoretical expectation is that increase in size of minority groups and worsening of economic conditions can lead to greater

hostility toward out-group members as competition for scarce resources increases and political mobilization becomes more likely (Blalock 1967). In addition to measures of group threat, some studies have also tested the effect of other country-level variables, such as voting for a right-wing party (Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006, 2007), religious heterogeneity, and liberal-democratic traditions (Hello, Scheepers, and Gijsberts 2002; Coenders and Scheepers 2003), on anti-immigrant attitudes.

Previous studies have corroborated that the size of out-group population measured by the percentage of foreign-born (or non-EU migrants in the case of European countries) is associated with higher levels of hostility toward immigrants and immigration (Quillian 1995; Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006). Some studies have found that this effect of out-group presence decreases after adding measures of contact with out-group members (Schneider 2008) while others argue that the size of a minority group does not have a significant effect on anti-immigrant attitudes (Hello, Scheepers, and Gijsberts 2002; Hjerm 2007; Sides and Citrin 2007).

Another important country-level predictor of attitudes toward immigrants is economic condition, which is measured by GDP per capita or unemployment rate. Many studies have found that individuals living in countries with better economic conditions are less likely to show negative feelings toward immigrants (Quillian 1995; Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006, 2008; Ceobanu and Escandell 2010:316–18). As migrants are more likely to move to wealthier economies, it is crucial to control for a country's level of prosperity to accurately measure the effect of relative size of out-group on anti-immigrant attitudes (Schneider 2008).

Based on the economic theory of trade and the impact of immigration on wages, some studies have used GDP per capita as an indirect measure of the relative skill composition of

natives versus immigrants in a country (Mayda 2006; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006). Mayda (2006) postulates that countries with higher GDP per capita are more likely to have a larger skilled native workforce and import unskilled labor from low-income countries, resulting in negative attitudes toward immigrants, particularly among unskilled workers.

To summarize, both strands of literature on national identification and anti-immigrant attitudes use economic condition and internal diversity as important country-level predictors of public attitudes toward national identity or immigrants. As this study focuses on the exclusionary aspect of ethnic national identity (i.e., support for “ancestry” as an important component of national membership), I extend the theoretical framework of group threat theory and the economic theory of trade to predict individual’s attitudes toward descent-based citizenship.

Cross-level Interaction Effects

Based on group threat theory, we may question whether contextual-level factors, particularly indicators of group threat, shift the magnitude of the individual-level effects on attitudes toward immigrants or national identity. The theoretical expectation is that the effects of individual-level predictors (e.g., socioeconomic status) on anti-immigrant attitudes may intensify with the increase in levels of group threat (e.g., the relative size of out-group and economic condition) at the country-level. However, as previous cross-national survey projects (e.g., ISSP 1995) were based on a relatively small number of European countries, few studies were able to test group threat theory using full models with cross-level interactions. To my knowledge, among the quantitative studies of national identification, few have focused on explicating individuals’ preference for ethnic or civic national identity using multi-level analysis while none have employed cross-level interaction effects.

Some studies have reported evidence that the individual-level relationship between social structural variables and anti-minority attitudes is stronger in countries with higher levels of group threat. Quillian (1995) has found that the negative effect of education on prejudice is stronger in countries with a higher proportion of out-group members (i.e., non-EEC immigrants), by adding interaction between education, percentage of non-EEC immigrants, and economic condition (i.e., inverse of average GDP per capita). With a limited number of countries in their data, Sides and Citrin (2007) used a two-stage estimation procedure instead of multi-level analysis to plot the country-specific intercepts by country-level variables. They found that the negative effect of evaluations of the economy on anti-immigrant attitudes was stronger in poorer countries with low GDP per capita.

After Quillian's (1995) first use of multi-level analysis, scholars of anti-immigrant attitudes have found only partial or weak support for cross-level interaction effects (Scheepers, Gijssberts, and Coenders 2002; Sides and Citrin 2007). Kunovich (2004) has reported that relative group size intensifies the effects of social structural variables on prejudice while poor economic conditions weaken their effects. His alternative explanation to group threat theory is that contextual-level group threat, such as economic recession, may dampen the individual-level effects of social structural variables on attitudes. For example, with the increase in the level of collective threat, advantaged groups may express greater prejudice whereas disadvantaged groups—who are already in despair—may express less prejudice (Kunovich 2004).

On the other hand, education scholars have found that the individual-level effect of education on anti-immigrant attitudes varies by country-level factors, such as democratic traditions of a country (e.g., prolonged, interrupted, or recent democracies) and religious

heterogeneity, but not by unemployment rate or relative size of out-group. While evidence is mixed on the effect of religious heterogeneity, the negative effect of education on ethnic prejudice is weaker or less negative in recently established democracies or former state socialist countries compared to longstanding democracies (Hello, Scheepers, and Gijsberts 2002; Coenders and Scheepers 2003). The “liberalizing effect” of education is not universal across countries, which adds support to the cultural, rather than structural, perspective on education.

Another line of research based on the economic theory of trade has used cross-level interactions in probit models to test whether the country’s immigrant-to-native skill composition and the level of economic inequality modify the effect of individual characteristics (e.g., occupational skill level) on attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. Using education as a measure of labor market skill and GDP per capita as an indirect measure of immigrant-native skill ratio, Mayda (2006) finds that the positive effect of being high-skilled (e.g., high occupational position or education) on pro-immigration sentiments increases with GDP per capita and the relative skill composition of natives to immigrants at the country level. In other words, skilled individuals are more likely to favor immigration in countries with a larger proportion of skilled natives compared to migrants. The opposite is true for the highly skilled in countries with a smaller proportion of skilled native workers or the unskilled in countries with a larger proportion of skilled natives (Mayda 2006).

O'Rourke and Sinnott (2006) draw a similar conclusion by using GDP per capita and Gini coefficient as proxies for relative skill composition of natives versus immigrants. The negative effect of occupational skill on anti-immigrant attitude is stronger in richer (i.e., skill-abundant) countries than in poorer (i.e., unskilled-labor-abundant) countries and in more

economically equal countries than in more unequal countries. In other words, in richer countries, being highly skilled has a negative effect on attitudes toward immigrants. In poorer countries, however, being highly skilled has a positive effect on attitudes toward immigrants (O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006).

In summary, previous research finds mixed evidence on whether individual-level effects on anti-immigrant attitudes are modified by contextual factors, such as group threat (i.e., relative size of out-group population and economic conditions) and skill composition (indirectly measured by the level of prosperity or economic inequality). Data limitations with a small number of countries have also made it difficult to use multi-level models with cross-level interaction terms. In this study, with twenty-nine countries or level-2 units in the final data set (from ISSP 2003), I introduce cross-level interactions to test whether the effect of individual-level variables (i.e., household income and education) on nativism varies by the level of group threat (i.e., the relative size of foreign-born population and economic conditions) and the relative skill composition in a society (i.e., percentage of college graduates and GDP per capita).

Hypotheses

This study focuses on the impact of contextual factors on the individual-level association between socioeconomic variables and nativism and uses cross-level interactions to test models based on group threat theory as well as the economic theory of trade and the relationship between immigration and wages. On one hand, group threat theory posits that the effect of individual characteristics will be stronger in countries with a greater group threat. On the other hand, the economic theory of trade predicts that the effect of skill on anti-immigrant attitudes will be stronger in richer countries (i.e., higher ratio of skilled natives) than in poorer countries.

The opposite will be true in poorer countries (i.e., higher ratio of unskilled natives) where the highly skilled will be more opposed to immigration.

The two theories provide opposite predictions regarding the effect of GDP per capita on individual-level effects. In group threat theory, high GDP per capita indicates less competition in the country, leading to less negative attitudes toward migrants. In other words, the individual-level association between socioeconomic status and attitudes is supposed to be weaker in countries with a high GDP per capita. In contrast, for proponents of the economic theory of trade and impact of immigration on wages, high GDP per capita represents greater skill abundance. Thus, the effect of being high-skilled on anti-immigrant attitudes is expected to be stronger in richer countries (i.e., high proportion of skilled natives). Based on both group threat theory and the economic theory of trade, I develop the following eight hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: At the individual-level, persons with low household income and low educational attainment are more likely to view ancestry as an important criterion of citizenship.

Hypothesis 2a: At the country-level, countries with high percentage of foreign-born (i.e., greater group threat) are more likely to endorse ancestry-based national membership.

Hypothesis 2b: At the country-level, countries with high GDP per capita (i.e., less competition) are less likely to endorse ancestry-based national membership.

Hypothesis 3: Among individuals with less than university degree, those living in countries with a high percentage of college graduates (i.e., higher proportion of skilled native workers) are even more likely to support ancestry-based national membership.

Hypothesis 4: Among individuals with *less than university degree*, those living in countries with a *high percentage of foreign-born population* are even *more likely* to endorse ancestry-based national membership.

Hypothesis 5a: Among individuals with *high household income*, those living in countries with *high GDP per capita* are even *more likely* to endorse ancestry-based national membership.

Hypothesis 5b: Among individuals with *high household income*, those living in countries with *high GDP per capita* are even *less likely* to endorse ancestry-based national membership.

Hypothesis 6: Among individuals with *high household income*, those living in countries with a *high percentage of foreign-born population* are even *less likely* to endorse ancestry-based national membership.

Data and Methods

Data

The individual-level data for this study derive from the 2003 National Identity module of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). ISSP 2003 has a unique set of questions on national belonging, including items on each component of national identity. Whereas some of the previous analyses using ISSP 2003 data have focused on mostly English-speaking settler societies and European countries, I extend the scope of analysis to most of the participating countries, including countries in Latin America, Asia, and South Africa. The final dataset used

for this paper consists of 27,402 individuals in twenty-nine countries,² and I use the internal weight supplied with the data for the analysis.

Dependent Variable

In this study, I create a new dependent variable “ancestry” to measure one’s support for ancestry as an important component of national membership, i.e., nativism. Among the various national identity items (e.g., “language,” “respect for political institutions and laws,” and “belief as a citizen”),³ “ancestry” is relatively easy to understand, leaving less room for misinterpretation across countries. While previous research has treated “ancestry” as a component of ethnic national identity, here I use it to gauge respondents’ exclusionary attitudes toward out-groups.

The question used asks how important it is to have (e.g., German) ancestry in order to be considered as a true national of a country (e.g., Germany). Individual responses reflect disagreement or agreement with the statement and are measured on a four-point Likert scale. The order of the responses for these questions was reversed so that a higher score indicates stronger support for nativism: (1) not important at all; (2) not very important; (3) fairly important; (4) very important.

² East Germany and West Germany are treated as separate countries in this dataset. The following countries are excluded due to data limitations: Bulgaria, Chile, Israel Arabs, Israel-Jews, Latvia, South Africa, and Taiwan.

³ Other national identity items can be interpreted differently across countries. ISSP 2003 National Identity module includes “long-time residence,” “birth,” “legal citizenship,” “respect for political institutions and laws,” “religion,” “language” and “one’s belief as a citizen.”

Country-level Independent Variables

This study investigates the impact of group threat and relative skill composition on the individual-level predictors of nativism. I use two predictors of group threat at the country level. First, I use GDP per capita to measure each country's economic wealth or prosperity. GDP per capita is calculated as a five-year average between 1998 and 2002 based on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) and current international dollars. The data for GDP per capita for twenty-nine countries are drawn from the World Bank for years 1998–2002 before the survey year 2003.

Second, percentage of foreign-born in the total population measures the relative size of out-group population in each country. The data on the rate of foreign-born residents pertains to the year 2003 in most cases. As the immigration policy differs by country, certain countries gather information on the size of the “foreign” population while others focus on the size of the “foreign-born” population. In this study, I use the percentage of foreign residents as a proxy for the rate of foreign-born residents for countries where there is no data on the foreign-born population.⁴ Most of the data come from the Eurostat and the OECD databases. I used the UN database for countries that are not covered by these sources.⁵ Multiple sources were consulted to retrieve the data on the size of foreign residents and foreign-born residents in each country.

To estimate relative skill composition in a society, I introduce a new country-level

⁴ As these countries tend to have very small numbers of foreign-born residents, the size of alien population will provide the lower bound for estimating the foreign-born population. However, this may pose the problem of underestimating the contextual effect of living in a country with relatively fewer foreign-born residents on one's attitudes toward nativist thinking or a particular type of national identity.

⁵ Substituting the foreign-resident population data from one source to another does not seem to have any significant effects on the model estimations.

predictor, percentage of 4-year college graduates in the total population (age 25–64) in addition to GDP per capita. As education is a measure of labor market skills, the proportion of college graduates in a country is a measure of the expansion of college education, or an indirect measure of the proportion of high-skilled in the country. The data on population with tertiary education are retrieved from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) *Education at a Glance 2005* database. For most countries, it shows the percentage of 4-year college graduates in the total population between ages 25–64 for the year 2002.⁶

Individual-level Independent Variables

At the individual level, I use education and household income as measures of one’s socioeconomic status. Educational attainment is measured by indicator variables, “less than high school education,” “high school graduate,” and “4-year college graduate (reference category).” As the education system differs by country, I focus on explicating the discrepancy in support for nativism between those with and without college degrees and how this gap varies by contextual factors (e.g., levels of group threat and relative skill composition).

As for income, I use household income to analyze the impact of one’s family economic position rather than one’s own economic standing on nativist attitudes.⁷ I employ both absolute

⁶ For Slovenia, I used the 2002 National Census data for the total population over age 15. For Venezuela, I used the 2001 National Census for data on the total adult population over age 25.

⁷ As individuals tend to associate their own economic standing with their family’s socioeconomic status, I expect to find the same negative effect of household income on one’s support for nativism. Those with higher family income, including housewives, are less likely to feel threatened by competition with out-group members and are less likely to endorse nativism. To check the possible association between being a housewife and nativism, I added marital status (1= married, including those who are separated) as a control variable in a separate analysis. After adding the dummy variable for being married, the magnitude

and relative measures of household earnings to analyze linear and non-linear effects of household income on one's support for nativism. First, to investigate the impact of absolute level of income on nativism, I use "log household income (PPP, international dollar)," which is the respondent's log-transformed monthly household income adjusted for purchasing power parity based on the international dollar. Secondly, I divide household income into quintiles for each country separately to examine the effect of relative economic position on support for nativism. By using the bottom quintile as the baseline category, I focus on the effects of being in the upper family income quintiles on nativism.

For control variables, I use age, sex (1= female), rightist party affiliation (1= support rightist party),⁸ religious attendance (1= attend church regularly, more than once a week), no religious affiliation (1= no religion), and occupational prestige (1= having high occupational position).⁹ I used dummy variables to control for individuals' labor-market status (e.g., part-time employed and unemployed), with full-time employed being the reference category.

Multi-level Analysis Results

Results from Table 1 suggest that the effect of education on support for "ancestry" as an important component of national membership (or nativism) is strengthened by the level of group

of the effect of log family income on nativism has slightly increased from -0.041, as shown in Models 1 and 2 of Table 1, to -.050. Other results did not change significantly.

⁸ Rightist party affiliation includes those supporting "right, conservative (N = 6,191)" and "far-right (N = 700)."

⁹ I classified the first 4 major groups of ISCO-88 (International Standard Classification of Occupations) as having high occupational prestige: legislators, senior officials and managers (major group 1), professionals (major group 2), technicians and associate professionals (major group 3), and clerks (major group 4).

threat and relative skill composition in the society, adding support to group threat theory and the economic theory of trade. In Model 1, individuals with less than high school ($b = .367$) and high school ($b = .214$) education are much more likely to support nativism than 4-year college graduates, which is the reference category (Hypothesis 1 is supported). Individuals with high household incomes ($b = -.04$), measured by log family income, are also less likely to be nativist (Hypothesis 1 is supported). As for control variables at the individual level, those with no religion and high occupational positions are less likely to support nativism. Individuals with rightist party affiliation and older respondents are more likely to support descent-based national membership.

Table 1. Estimated multi-level regression coefficients for education effects and cross-level interactions with percentage of college graduates and foreign-born on the support for ancestry

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
<i>Individual-level</i>						
<i>Education</i>						
Less than high school	0.367**	(0.049)	0.046	(0.137)	0.234**	(0.068)
High school	0.214**	(0.032)	-0.107	(0.092)	0.143**	(0.04)
College graduate (reference group)						
<i>Religion</i>						
No religion (0-1)	-0.195**	(0.025)	-0.194**	(0.025)	-0.194**	(0.026)
Attend regularly (0-1)	0.001	(0.032)	0.003	(0.032)	0.001	(0.032)
<i>Political affiliation</i>						
Rightist party (0-1)	0.161**	(0.028)	0.162**	(0.027)	0.162**	(0.028)
<i>Employment</i>						
High occupational prestige (0-1)	-0.124**	(0.017)	-0.123**	(0.017)	-0.127**	(0.017)
Log family income (PPP)	-0.041**	(0.015)	-0.041**	(0.014)	-0.042**	(0.015)
Unemployed (0-1)	-0.030	(0.034)	-0.030	(0.033)	-0.029	(0.033)
Part-time (0-1)	-0.016	(0.027)	-0.017	(0.026)	-0.014	(0.026)
Age	0.010**	(0.001)	0.010**	(0.001)	0.010**	(0.001)
Female (0-1)	0.006	(0.017)	0.005	(0.017)	0.005	(0.017)
<i>Country-level</i>						
GDP per capita × 1000	-0.023**	(0.007)	-0.023**	(0.007)	-0.022**	(0.007)
% Foreign-born (0-100)	-0.023**	(0.005)	-0.023**	(0.005)	-0.032**	(0.006)
% College graduates (0-100)	0.004	(0.008)	-0.010	(0.009)		
% College × less than high school			0.018*	(0.007)		
% College × high school			0.017**	(0.004)		
% Foreign-born × less than high school					0.014**	(0.005)
% Foreign-born × high school					0.007*	(0.003)
Constant	3.067**	(0.176)	3.343**	(0.214)	3.202**	(0.153)
Number of countries	29		29		29	
Level 1 variance	0.845		0.844		0.844	
Level 2 variance	0.072		0.074		0.073	
Intraclass correlation	0.079		0.081		0.079	
Chi-square	72534		72490		72500	
N	27402		27402		27402	

Robust standard errors in parentheses. The variance components from the fully unconditional model are: country-level u_{0j} (.170) and individual-level r_{ij} (.928).

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

In Model 1, both measures of group threat at the country-level—GDP per capita and the percentage of foreign-born—are negatively associated with nativism while the percentage of college graduates (i.e., indirect measure of skill composition) does not have a statistically significant effect on nativism. In line with group threat theory, individuals living in countries with high GDP per capita (i.e., better economic conditions or less competition) are less likely to endorse descent-based national membership (Hypothesis 2b is supported). In contrast with the prediction from group threat theory, the effect of relative size of out-group on one’s support for “ancestry” is negative. Individuals living in countries with high percentage of foreign-born (i.e., greater group threat) are less likely to support nativism (Hypothesis 2a is not supported).

Models 2 and 3 introduce cross-level interactions between education and percentage of foreign-born or college graduates to find out whether the magnitude of educational effects on nativism varies by contextual factors. Group threat theory predicts that the individual-level effect of education on nativism will intensify in countries with greater group threat (e.g., larger out-group population or worsening economic conditions). Economic trade models (i.e., Heckscher-Ohlin trade models) and the economic theory on the effect of immigration on wages and attitudes (i.e., factor-proportions analysis) expect that the unskilled (i.e., those with less education) will be more nativist in countries with a high percentage of college graduates (i.e., higher proportion of skilled native workers relative to migrants).

Model 2 in Table 1 shows that, as predicted by the economic theory of trade, the effects of education (i.e., less than high school and high school education) on nativism are stronger in countries with higher levels of tertiary education or greater skill abundance. The cross-level interaction terms between the percentage of college graduates and having less than high school

and high school education are both statistically significant, at the 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. On average, high school graduates and those with less than high school education (i.e., the unskilled) are more likely to support nativism than college graduates (i.e., the skilled). Among individuals with no high school degree, those living in countries with higher percentages of college graduates ($b = .018$) are much more likely to endorse a restrictive descent-based citizenship. Similarly, among high school graduates, those living in countries with a higher level of tertiary education ($b = .017$) are much more likely to support ancestry-based citizenship (Hypothesis 3 is supported).

In other words, in countries with high levels of tertiary education attainment, the gap widens between college graduates and non-graduates (i.e., those with less than high school education and high school graduates) in their support for nativism. The growing discrepancy between college graduates and non-graduates may result from both the structural and cultural effects of education. On one hand, as predicted by the economic theory of trade, among less educated individuals (i.e., the unskilled), those living in countries with large numbers of college graduates (i.e., large proportion of skilled native workers) may be particularly more vulnerable to competition with unskilled migrant workers in the labor market, leading to stronger support for ancestry-based national membership. On the other hand, college graduates may have more liberal views toward migrants and national membership compared to those with less education due to their prolonged exposure to the liberalizing effect of education.

Results from Model 3 show that in line with group threat theory, the positive effects of having less than high school or high school education on nativism intensifies in countries with a high percentage of foreign-born population, i.e., greater group threat. The cross-level interaction

terms between the percentage of foreign-born and education (i.e., less than high school and high school education) are significant at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels. While individuals with less than high school degree are, on average, more likely to support nativism than college graduates, those living in countries with a higher percentage of foreign-born populations ($b = .014$) are even more likely to endorse ancestry as an important component of national membership. Among high school graduates, those living in countries with a high percentage of foreign-born residents ($b = .007$) are far more likely to support descent-based citizenship compared to college graduates (Hypothesis 4 is supported).

In Model 3, my findings corroborate group threat theory. Individual-level effects of education have a stronger impact on nativism in countries with greater group threat (i.e., relative size of out-group population). In other words, the discrepancy in support for nativism grows much larger between college graduates and those without college degrees in societies with a high percentage of foreign-born in the total population. Among individuals with lower levels of education, those living in countries with a relatively large population of foreign-born residents (i.e., greater group threat) are much more likely to feel threatened in their labor market status and in protecting ethnic or cultural group identity.

In short, Table 1 shows that the effects of education (e.g., less than high school and high school degree) on nativism are even stronger in countries with higher levels of group threat (i.e., high percentage of foreign-born) and a higher proportion of skilled native workers (i.e., high percentage of college graduate), which is in line with predictions from the group threat theory and the economic theory of trade and the impact of immigration on wages. The results in Table 1 did not change after substituting missing cases of household income with country mean and

adding country-specific dummy variables for such missing cases (see Table A2 for results).

In the sections to follow, results from Tables 2, 3, and 5 find mixed evidence for group threat theory. Individual-level effects of household income on nativism intensify as the level of group threat (i.e., percentage of foreign-born) increases in a country. In contrast with the prediction from group threat theory, household income effects are also stronger in countries with higher GDP per capita, which indicates less competition. These results are better explained by the economic theory of trade and the impact of immigration on wages. If we interpret high per capita GDP as an indirect measure of skill composition at the societal level (i.e., higher proportion of skilled natives), my findings confirm that individuals with high household income (i.e., the skilled) are much less likely to endorse nativism in richer (i.e., skilled-labor-abundant) countries than in poorer countries.

Table 2 investigates the effect of absolute household income on nativism using log household income (PPP), an absolute measure of family income comparable across twenty-nine countries. I test whether the magnitude of household income effect on one's support for nativism varies by the country-level indicators of group threat (i.e., GDP per capita and percentage of foreign-born). As shown in Model 1, individuals with high household incomes, on average, are less likely to endorse ancestry as an important component of national membership ($b = -.041$), which is the same result from Table 1. Both GDP per capita and percentage of foreign-born have negative effects on nativism, statistically significant at the 1 percent level, as seen in Table 1 (Hypothesis 2b is supported, but Hypothesis 2a is not supported).

Table 2. Estimated multi-level regression coefficients for log household income effects and cross-level interactions with GDP per capita and percentage of foreign-born on ancestry

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
<i>Individual-level</i>						
<i>Education</i>						
Less than high school	0.367**	(0.049)	0.366**	(0.049)	0.368**	(0.049)
High school	0.214**	(0.032)	0.209**	(0.031)	0.211**	(0.032)
College graduate (reference group)						
<i>Religion</i>						
No religion (0-1)	-0.195**	(0.025)	-0.195**	(0.025)	-0.195**	(0.025)
Attend regularly (0-1)	0.001	(0.032)	-0.000	(0.032)	0.000	(0.032)
<i>Political affiliation</i>						
Rightist party (0-1)	0.161**	(0.028)	0.164**	(0.027)	0.163**	(0.027)
<i>Employment</i>						
High occupational prestige (0-1)	-0.124**	(0.017)	-0.121**	(0.017)	-0.123**	(0.017)
Unemployed (0-1)	-0.031	(0.034)	-0.026	(0.034)	-0.028	(0.033)
Part-time (0-1)	-0.016	(0.027)	-0.014	(0.026)	-0.013	(0.027)
Age	0.010**	(0.001)	0.010**	(0.001)	0.010**	(0.001)
Female (0-1)	0.006	(0.017)	0.005	(0.017)	0.005	(0.017)
<i>Household Income</i>						
Log family income	-0.041**	(0.015)	0.042	(0.038)	0.013	(0.023)
<i>Country-level</i>						
GDP per capita × 1000	-0.021**	(0.007)	0.007	(0.010)	-0.025**	(0.007)
% Foreign-born (0-100)	-0.023**	(0.005)	-0.022**	(0.005)	0.028+	(0.016)
% College graduates (0-100)			0.010	(0.009)	0.006	(0.008)
GDP per capita × Log family income × 1000			-0.004**	(0.002)		
% Foreign-born × Log family income					-0.006**	(0.002)
Constant	3.102**	(0.135)	2.377**	(0.325)	2.648**	(0.177)
Number of countries	29		29		29	
Level 1 variance	0.845		0.844		0.844	
Level 2 variance	0.073		0.069		0.071	
Intraclass correlation	0.079		0.076		0.077	
Chi-square	72534		72500		72500	
N	27402		27402		27402	


Robust standard errors in parentheses.

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

In Models 2 and 3 of Table 2, the cross-level interaction effects between group threat indicators (i.e., GDP per capita and percentage of foreign-born) and log household income (PPP) are both significant at the 1 percent level, only partially corroborating group threat theory. Model 2 shows that, in opposition to group threat theory, the effects of household income are even stronger in countries with higher GDP per capita ($b = .042 - .004 \times \text{GDP per capita [in thousands]}$), indicating less economic threat (Hypothesis 5a is not supported). An alternative explanation based on economic trade models fits better here. As predicted by the economic theory of trade, Model 2 shows that among individuals with high family income (i.e., high-skilled), those living in countries with higher GDP per capita (i.e., higher proportion of skilled natives) are far less likely to support nativism (Hypothesis 5b is supported). As in Table 1, the percentage of college graduates does not have a significant effect on nativism.¹⁰

¹⁰ To compare Model 2 with a model with percentage of college graduates and without cross-level interactions, go to Model 1 in Table 1.

Graph 1. The individual-level effect (slope) of log household income on nativism becomes negative as the GDP per capita increases at the country level




Based on results from Model 2, Graph 1 presents the slope of log household income on support for “ancestry.” The linear effect of absolute household income (i.e., log household income [PPP]) on nativism turns negative in countries where the GDP per capita is greater than \$10,500. This finding corroborates the economic theory on immigration and wages by showing that the state of a country’s national economy, GDP (as an indirect measure of skill composition), modifies the effect of being high-skilled (as measured by family income) on nativism. In as many as 24 out of 29 countries with high GDP per capita (i.e., greater skill abundance), higher household income (i.e., being high-skilled) is associated with weaker support for nativism.

In contrast, individuals with high household incomes are slightly more likely to support ancestry-based citizenship in the Philippines, Russia, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Poland, with GDP

per capita less than \$10,500. Again, this is in line with the economic theory of trade, which predicts that among skilled workers (i.e., those with high household incomes), those living in poorer countries (i.e., unskilled-labor-abundant countries) will be more nativist. To protect their wages, the skilled may exhibit more nativist attitudes as immigration will likely bring in more skilled labor from abroad. These five countries also have higher levels of support for “ancestry” as an important item in national membership compared to the grand mean of twenty-nine countries (see Appendix, Table A5).

Graph 2. The individual-level effect (slope) of log household income on nativism becomes negative as the percentage of foreign-born increases at the country level



Model 3 shows that in line with group threat theory, the individual-level effect of absolute household income (i.e., log household income) on nativism is stronger in countries with a high percentage of foreign-born ($b = .013 - .006 \times \% \text{ Foreign-born}$) or greater group threat (Hypothesis 6 is partly supported). In Graph 2, the effect of log household income on nativism becomes negative in countries where the percentage of foreign-born is greater than 2.17 percent. Among individuals with high household incomes, those living in 25 out of 29 countries with a relatively high percentage of foreign-born (i.e., greater group threat) are even less likely to support nativism, corroborating group threat theory.

Again, this pattern is reversed in the Philippines, South Korea, Japan, and Poland where the percentage of foreign-born is 0.5 percent, 1 percent, 1.5 percent, and 1.6 percent respectively. Among individuals with high household incomes, those living in these countries with a relatively low percentage of foreign-born are slightly more likely to value ancestry as an important criterion of national membership. As we will see in Table A5 in the Appendix, these four countries not only have greater ethnic homogeneity and smaller foreign-born populations, but also show a higher level support for “ancestry” as an important criterion of national membership.

In short, Table 2 shows that those with high household incomes (i.e., log household income [PPP]) are, on average, less likely to support ancestry-based national membership. In line with group threat theory, the negative association between household income and nativism is further intensified in countries with a higher percentage of foreign born (i.e., greater group threat). Contrary to the prediction by group threat theory, GDP per capita (i.e., less competition) also strengthens the individual-level effects of family income on nativism. This finding adds support to the economic theory of trade, which predicts that the effect of being highly skilled is

even greater in richer countries (i.e., countries with greater skill abundance) than poorer countries. However, the association between high household income and nativism is reversed in four to five countries with low GDP per capita or low percentages of foreign-born. Among individuals with high household incomes, those residing in countries with a low GDP per capita or low percentage of foreign-born are even more likely to be nativist.

Results from Table 2 have shown that absolute household income (i.e., log household income [PPP]) has a negative effect on one's support for nativism. In other words, individuals with high household incomes are less likely to view ancestry as an important component of national membership. Depending on the income distribution of each country, persons with the exact same amount of household income (in international dollars) may belong to a different social class in another country. As the standard of high family income may differ by country, I introduce relative measures of family income, i.e., household income quintiles in the subsequent analyses. In place of log household income as a measure of absolute family income, Tables 3 and 5 use household income quintiles in each country to investigate the effect of relative family income on nativism. In Tables 3 and 5, I also add cross-level interactions between household income quintile groups and indicators of group threat: GDP per capita and percentage of foreign-born.

In Table 3, Model 1 explores the non-linear relationship between household income and nativism by introducing household income quintile groups as a measure of relative family income. In Model 1, those in the 4th ($b = -.083$) and the 5th quintile ($b = -.115$) are less likely to endorse descent-based national membership than those in the lowest quintile, the reference category. Thus, individuals with relatively higher family income in one's country (i.e., the top

two quintiles) are less likely to support “ancestry” compared to those in the poorest quintile (Hypothesis 1 is supported). At the country-level, the negative effects of GDP per capita and the percentage of foreign-born on one’s support for ancestry-based national membership are statistically significant at the 1 percent level (Hypothesis 2b is supported, but Hypothesis 2a is not supported). Again, the percentage of tertiary education attainment has no statistically significant effect on nativism.

Table 3. Estimated multi-level regression coefficients for the income quintile effects and cross-level interactions with GDP per capita on the support for ancestry

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
<i>Individual-level</i>						
<i>Education</i>						
Less than high school	0.359**	(0.049)	0.358**	(0.048)	0.358**	(0.049)
High school	0.209**	(0.033)	0.203**	(0.032)	0.203**	(0.032)
College graduate (reference group)						
<i>Religion</i>						
No religion (0-1)	-0.193**	(0.025)	-0.194**	(0.025)	-0.194**	(0.025)
Attend regularly (0-1)	0.001	(0.032)	-0.001	(0.032)	-0.001	(0.032)
<i>Political affiliation</i>						
Rightist Party (0-1)	0.163**	(0.028)	0.166**	(0.027)	0.166**	(0.027)
<i>Employment</i>						
High occupational prestige (0-1)	-0.120**	(0.017)	-0.117**	(0.017)	-0.117**	(0.017)
Unemployed (0-1)	-0.033	(0.033)	-0.027	(0.033)	-0.027	(0.033)
Part-time (0-1)	-0.017	(0.027)	-0.016	(0.026)	-0.016	(0.026)
<i>Age</i>						
Female (0-1)	0.010**	(0.001)	0.010**	(0.001)	0.010**	(0.001)
<i>Household Income</i>						
1 st quintile (reference group)						
2 nd quintile	-0.016	(0.024)	0.021	(0.058)	0.021	(0.058)
3 rd quintile	-0.041	(0.026)	0.032	(0.066)	0.032	(0.066)
4 th quintile	-0.083**	(0.026)	0.050	(0.078)	0.050	(0.078)
5 th quintile	-0.115**	(0.033)	0.131	(0.097)	0.131	(0.097)
<i>Country-level</i>						
GDP per capita × 1000	-0.025**	(0.007)	-0.017*	(0.007)	-0.021**	(0.006)
% Foreign-born (0-100)	-0.023**	(0.005)	-0.024**	(0.005)	-0.023**	(0.005)
% College graduates (0-100)	0.008	(0.008)			0.009	(0.008)
<i>GDP per capita × income quintile interactions</i>						
GDP per capita × 1 st quintile × 1000 (reference group)						
GDP per capita × 2 nd quintile × 1000			-0.002	(0.003)	-0.002	(0.003)
GDP per capita × 3 rd quintile × 1000			-0.004	(0.003)	-0.004	(0.003)
GDP per capita × 4 th quintile × 1000			-0.006*	(0.003)	-0.006*	(0.003)
GDP per capita × 5 th quintile × 1000			-0.012**	(0.004)	-0.012**	(0.004)

Table 3 (continued). Estimated multi-level regression coefficients for the income quintile effects and cross-level interactions with GDP per capita on the support for ancestry

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
Constant	2.766**	(0.192)	2.744**	(0.155)	2.670**	(0.191)
Number of countries	29		29		29	
Level 1 variance	0.845		0.844		0.844	
Level 2 variance	0.070		0.071		0.070	
Intraclass correlation	0.076		0.078		0.076	
Chi-square	72518		72476		72476	
N	27402		27402		27402	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Models 2 and 3 investigate whether a country's economic condition (i.e., GDP per capita) alters the effect of relative family income (i.e., household income quintiles in each country) on nativism by using cross-level interaction terms. Model 3 adds the percentage of college graduates, which does not have a significant effect on nativism. In both Models 2 and 3, the interaction effects between GDP per capita and being in the 4th and 5th quintiles are statistically significant at the 1 percent or 5 percent levels. Again, in opposition to group threat theory, the individual-level effects of having a relatively high household income (i.e., being in the 4th and 5th quintiles) on nativism are stronger in countries with higher GDP per capita, i.e., where there is less competition (Hypothesis 5a is not supported). This result is better explained by the economic theory of trade, which predicts that among those with high family incomes (i.e., high-skilled), those in richer countries (i.e., high proportion of skilled natives) are even less likely to support nativism compared to their counterparts in poorer countries (Hypothesis 5b is supported).

Table 4. Individual-level effects of household income quintiles (2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th quintiles) on nativism in comparison to the poorest quintile for selected countries with low GDP per capita

	GDP per capita	The level of support for “ancestry” compared to the poorest quintile (1 st quintile)			
		2 nd quintile	3 rd quintile	4 th quintile	5 th quintile
Philippines	2386.58	+ (higher)	+	+	+
Russia	6733.39	+	+	+	+
Uruguay	8378.21	+	+	- (lower)	+
Venezuela	8435.93	+	+	-	+
Poland	10460.40	+	-	-	+
Slovak Republic	11355.46	-	-	-	-
Hungary	12328.97	-	-	-	-

Reference category: the poorest quintile (1st quintile)

However, this general pattern is reversed in countries with relatively lower GDP per capita where those with relatively high family incomes are more nativist than the bottom quintile. Table 4 summarizes the effect of each family income quintile on nativism separately, compared to the bottom quintile (reference category) in countries with lower GDP per capita. Results from Model 3 in Table 3 show that among individuals in the 4th quintile, those living in as many as 27 out of the 29 countries with GDP per capita greater than \$8,300 are significantly less likely to support nativism ($b = .050 - .006 \text{ GDP per capita [in thousands]}$), compared to their counterparts in the poorest quintile. Exceptions apply to the Philippines and Russia. Among respondents in the 4th quintile, those in the Philippines and Russia are even slightly more likely to endorse ancestry-based national membership than the bottom quintile. This reversed pattern also corroborates the economic theory of trade, which predicts that among those with higher

family incomes (i.e., the skilled), those in poorer countries (i.e., lower proportion of skilled natives) will be more nativist.

In Model 3 of Table 3, among those in the highest 5th quintile, those living in 24 out of 29 countries with GDP per capita above \$10,900 are less likely to endorse nativism ($b = .131 - .012$ GDP per capita [in thousands]) than the poorest quintile. In other words, among individuals in the top household income quintile, those in richer countries (i.e., higher ratio of skilled natives relative to migrants) are much less likely to support ancestry as an important component of national membership compared to the poorest quintile. In contrast, among those in the highest family income quintile, those living in countries with lower GDP per capita (e.g., the Philippines, Russia, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Poland) are even slightly more likely to support nativism than their counterparts in the lowest quintile, again in line with the economic theory of trade.

In summary, results from Table 3 show that relative measures of family income (i.e., household income quintiles within each country) also have negative effects on nativism. Individuals with relatively high household incomes (e.g., the 4th and 5th quintiles) are much less likely to support ancestry-based national membership than those at the bottom income quintile. Again, in opposition to group threat theory, the negative effect of relative family income on nativism at the individual level is even stronger in countries with high GDP per capita (i.e., less competition). This finding is in line with the economic theory of trade, which predicts that being high-skilled (measured by household income) has more of an effect on nativism in countries with higher GDP per capita (i.e., high proportion of skilled native worker) than it does in poor countries. Exceptions apply in countries with low GDP per capita. Among individuals with high household incomes, those living in the Philippines, Russia, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Poland are

slightly more likely to support nativism than the poorest quintile. This reversed pattern is also explained by the economic theory of trade, which posits that the high-skilled in poorer countries (i.e., unskilled-labor-abundant countries) will be more nativist to protect their jobs and wages from potential competition with skilled migrants.

Table 5 investigates whether relative size of out-group population in a country modifies the magnitude of the relative family income effects on nativism. Model 1 is repeated from Table 3. To briefly reiterate, individuals with relatively high household incomes (e.g., 4th and 5th quintiles) are less likely to support ancestry as an important component of national membership compared to those in the bottom quintile (i.e., the reference category). At the country level, the negative effects of GDP per capita and the relative size of the foreign-born population on nativism are statistically significant at the 1 percent level, whereas the percentage of college graduates does not have a significant effect on nativism.

Table 5. Estimated multi-level regression coefficients for the income quintile effects and cross-level interactions with percentage of foreign-born on the support for ancestry

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
<i>Individual-level</i>						
<i>Education</i>						
Less than high school	0.359**	(0.049)	0.359**	(0.048)	0.359**	(0.048)
High school	0.209**	(0.033)	0.205**	(0.032)	0.205**	(0.032)
College graduate (reference)						
<i>Religion</i>						
No religion (0-1)	-0.193**	(0.025)	-0.194**	(0.025)	-0.194**	(0.025)
Attend regularly (0-1)	0.001	(0.032)	-0.001	(0.032)	-0.001	(0.032)
<i>Political affiliation</i>						
Rightist Party (0-1)	0.163**	(0.028)	0.165**	(0.027)	0.165**	(0.027)
<i>Employment</i>						
High Occupational Prestige (0-1)	-0.120**	(0.017)	-0.119**	(0.017)	-0.119**	(0.017)
Unemployed (0-1)	-0.033	(0.033)	-0.030	(0.033)	-0.030	(0.033)
Part-time (0-1)	-0.017	(0.027)	-0.014	(0.027)	-0.015	(0.027)
<i>Age</i>						
Age	0.010**	(0.001)	0.010**	(0.001)	0.010**	(0.001)
Female (0-1)	0.004	(0.017)	0.003	(0.017)	0.003	(0.017)
<i>Household Income</i>						
1st quintile (reference group)						
2nd quintile	-0.016	(0.024)	0.040	(0.036)	0.040	(0.036)
3rd quintile	-0.041	(0.026)	0.018	(0.040)	0.018	(0.040)
4th quintile	-0.083**	(0.026)	0.036	(0.032)	0.036	(0.032)
5th quintile	-0.115**	(0.033)	-0.007	(0.060)	-0.006	(0.060)
<i>Country-level</i>						
GDP per capita	-0.025**	(0.007)	-0.021**	(0.007)	-0.025**	(0.007)
% Foreign-born (0-100)	-0.023**	(0.005)	-0.017**	(0.005)	-0.016**	(0.005)
% College graduates (0-100)	0.008	(0.008)			0.008	(0.008)
% Foreign-born × 1st quintile (reference)						
% Foreign-born × 2nd quintile			-0.007*	(0.003)	-0.007*	(0.003)

Table 5 (continued). Estimated multi-level regression coefficients for the income quintile effects and cross-level interactions with percentage of foreign-born on the support for ancestry


	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
% Foreign-born × 3rd quintile			-0.007*	(0.003)	-0.007*	(0.003)
% Foreign-born × 4th quintile			-0.014**	(0.003)	-0.014**	(0.003)
% Foreign-born × 5th quintile			-0.013**	(0.005)	-0.013**	(0.005)
Constant	2.766**	(0.192)	2.775**	(0.151)	2.704**	(0.186)
Number of countries	29		29		29	
Level 1 variance	0.845		0.844		0.844	
Level 2 variance	0.0699		0.0715		0.0699	
Intraclass correlation	0.0764		0.0781		0.0765	
Chi-square	72518		72486		72486	
N	27402		27402		27402	

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

In Models 2 and 3, the individual-level effects of relative family income (i.e., household income quintile groups) on nativism intensify in countries with a high percentage of foreign-born (i.e., greater group threat), corroborating group threat theory. The cross-level interaction effects between household income quintiles and the percentage of foreign-born are all negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Individuals in higher family income quintiles (i.e., the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th quintile) are far less likely to support “ancestry” compared to those in the poorest quintile. As predicted by group threat theory, this negative effect of relative family income on nativism is particularly strong in countries with a high percentage of foreign-born residents or greater group threat (Hypothesis 6 is supported).

Graph 3. The individual-level effects of household income quintiles (2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th quintiles) on nativism vary by the percentage of foreign-born at the country level



Reference category: the poorest quintile (1st quintile)

However, this general pattern is reversed in countries with relatively low percentage of foreign-born. Among individuals with high household incomes, those living in countries with a relatively low percentage of foreign-born are even slightly more nativist than the bottom quintile. Graph 3 shows the slope of relative family income effects on nativism for each household income quintile group. Table 6 summarizes the effects of each household income quintile on nativism separately compared to the poorest quintile (reference category) in countries with a low percentage of foreign-born in the total population.

Table 6. Individual-level effects of household income quintiles (2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th quintiles) on nativism in comparison to the poorest quintile for selected countries with low percentage of foreign-born population

	% Foreign-born in the total population	The level of support for “ancestry” compared to the poorest quintile (1 st quintile)			
		2 nd quintile	3 rd quintile	4 th quintile	5 th quintile
Philippines	0.5	+ (higher)	+	+	-
Korea	1.0	+	+	+	-
Japan	1.5	+	+	+	-
Poland	1.6	+	+	+	-
Uruguay	2.4	+	+	+	-
Finland	2.9	+	-	-	-
Hungary	3.0	+	-	-	-
Slovak Rep.	3.2	+	-	-	-
Venezuela	3.8	+	-	-	-
Czech Rep.	4.7	+	-	-	-
Denmark	6.3	-	-	-	-
Portugal	6.7	-	-	-	-

Models 2 and 3 show that in all twenty-nine countries, those in the highest family income quintile in each country are far less likely to support nativism ($b = -0.007 - 0.013$ % Foreign-born) than the lowest quintile group. In Graph 3, the slope of being in the top household income quintile on nativism is negative for all twenty-nine countries. Table 6 shows that individuals in the 5th quintile are less likely to support “ancestry” than the bottom quintile in all countries regardless of the percentage of foreign-born. Regardless of the size of out-group population (i.e., level of group threat), those in the highest family income quintile in each of the twenty-nine countries are much less likely to support “ancestry” as an important criterion of national membership.

In Model 3 of Table 5 and Graph 3, the effects of being in the 3rd ($b = .018 - .007$ %

Foreign-born) and the 4th ($b = .036 -.014 \% \text{ Foreign-born}$) quintiles on nativism turn negative, in 24 out of 29 countries with the percentage of foreign-born above 2.57 percent. In other words, among individuals in the middle-to-upper household income quintiles (i.e., the 3rd and 4th quintiles), those living in countries with relatively large foreign-born populations (i.e., greater group threat) are far less likely to endorse “ancestry” compared to their counterparts in the poorest quintile. Greater group threat intensifies the relative family income effect on nativism, widening the gap between individuals with high household incomes and those with low household incomes. In contrast, this general pattern is reversed in 5 out of 29 countries, where the percentage of foreign-born is lower than 2.57 percent. Table 6 shows that among respondents in the 3rd and 4th quintiles, those living in countries with a lower percentage of foreign-born (e.g., the Philippines, Korea, Japan, Poland, and Uruguay) are slightly more likely to support nativism than the bottom quintile.

Model 3 in Table 5 shows that among individuals in the 2nd quintile, those living in 21 out of 29 countries with percentages of foreign born higher than 5.71 percent are less likely to support nativism ($b = .040 -.007 \% \text{ Foreign-born}$) than the lowest quintile. Graph 3 shows that the slope for being in the 2nd quintile on nativism turns negative for countries with percentages of foreign-born above 5.7 percent. Again, in line with group threat theory, the negative effect of income (in relative measures) on nativism is even stronger in countries with higher percentages of foreign-born (i.e., greater group threat). However, exceptional patterns emerge in the Philippines, Korea, Japan, Poland, Uruguay, Finland, Hungary, Slovak Republic, Venezuela, and the Czech Republic where the percentage of foreign-born is lower than 5.71 percent. Table 6 shows that among respondents in the 2nd quintile, those living in these ten countries are even more likely to be nativist than their counterparts in the lowest quintile.

In summary, results from Table 5 confirm that relative family income (i.e., household income quintiles within each country) has a negative effect on nativism, as already shown by Table 3. Individuals with relatively high family incomes (e.g., the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th quintiles) are less likely to endorse ancestry as an important component of national membership than those at the lowest income quintile. In line with group threat theory, the individual-level effects of household income quintiles on nativism are even greater in countries with high percentages of foreign-born (i.e., greater group threat). The gap between individuals with high family incomes and those with low family incomes in nativism grows much wider in countries with a larger out-group population, or higher level of group threat. However, this general pattern is reversed in countries with low percentages of foreign-born. Among individuals with high family incomes, those living in countries with low percentages of foreign-born are slightly more likely to be nativist than their counterparts with low family incomes.

Conclusion

In this study, I have shown that support for nativism is not only shaped by individual's socioeconomic status, but further intensified by contextual factors, such as group threat (particularly relative size of out-group population) and relative skill composition of native workers. By focusing on the exclusionary aspect in national identity attitudes, I bridge the two separate bodies of literature: the scholarship on nationalism and national identification and the scholarship on public attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. I have created a new dependent variable, "ancestry," to measure nativist attitudes in national identification or the extent of support for ancestry as an important criterion of national membership rather than using ethnic or civic national identity.

This study is among the few studies to test the impact of contextual forces on the individual-level association between socioeconomic variables and nativism by using cross-level interaction terms in multi-level analysis. Drawing from group threat theory and the economic theory of trade (i.e., Heckscher-Ohlin trade models) and the effect of immigration on wages and attitudes (i.e., factor-proportions analysis), I look at whether the magnitude of individual-level effects varies by country-level factors, such as group threat and skill composition. In this way, we can better understand not only the effect of education (e.g., being a high school dropout) or family income on nativism at the individual level, but how these effects change in certain settings (e.g., being a high school dropout in a country with a high percentage of foreign-born or college graduates). To test the impact of skill composition on nativist attitudes, I have introduced a new country-level predictor, percentage of college graduates, in addition to GDP per capita as indirect measures of the proportion of skilled natives relative to migrants.

Results from multi-level analysis lead to two general conclusions. First, in line with group threat theory and the economic theory of trade, the negative effects of education on nativism are much stronger in countries with greater levels of group threat (i.e., relatively large population of foreign-born) and greater abundance in skilled labor (i.e., higher levels of tertiary education attainment). Compared to college graduates, less-educated individuals (i.e., less than high school or high school education) are more likely to support nativism, on average. Among individuals with the same lower levels of education (i.e., less than high school or high school education), those living in countries with high percentages of foreign-born and college graduates are far more likely to endorse nativism.

In other words, the gap between college graduates and non-graduates in nativism grows

even wider in countries with greater group threat (i.e., high percentage of foreign-born) and higher proportion of skilled natives (i.e., high percentage of college graduates). From a structural perspective of educational effect, individuals with lower education (i.e., the unskilled) are generally more likely to be in precarious positions in the labor market. In countries with high percentages of foreign-born or college graduates, individuals with lower levels of education may face much fiercer competition with unskilled migrant workers in the labor market and develop stronger nativist attitudes. From a cultural perspective, less-educated individuals may be more likely to view their ethnic or cultural group identity as under threat compared to college graduates who had longer exposure to the “liberalizing effect of education.” In countries with high percentages of foreign-born (i.e., greater group threat), the less-educated may perceive even greater threat and exhibit hostility toward out-groups, which will set them apart from the rest of the population.

Second, the individual-level effects of both absolute (i.e., log household income) and relative (i.e., household income quintiles within each country) family income on nativism intensify in countries with high GDP per capita (i.e., less competition or greater skill abundance) and high percentages of foreign-born (i.e., greater group threat). This finding provides mixed evidence for group threat theory while corroborating the economic theory of trade. Individuals with high family incomes, on average, are less nativist than those with low family incomes. This negative effect of household income is stronger in countries with greater group threat (i.e., high percentage of foreign-born), in line with group threat theory. In opposition to group threat theory, however, these individual-level associations between household income and nativism are also strengthened in countries with high GDP per capita (i.e., less competition). This result is better explained by the economic theory of trade, which predicts the negative effect of labor market

skills (measured by household income) on nativism to be greater in countries with high GDP per capita (i.e., high proportion of skilled native workers).

In countries with high percentages of foreign-born (i.e., greater group threat) or high GDP per capita (i.e., higher proportion of skilled natives), the gap becomes wider between those with high family incomes and those with low family incomes in their support for nativism. On one hand, individuals with a high household income may view themselves as either shielded from competition with migrants in the labor market or even benefiting from cheap migrant labor. As the economic theory of trade predicts, those with high family income (i.e., the skilled) in rich countries are less likely to be nativist because they are not adversely affected by immigration. In these skilled-labor-abundant countries, immigration cuts the unskilled wage by importing more unskilled labor from other countries. Thus, in contrast with the unskilled, the skilled are less likely to exhibit nativist attitudes. On the other hand, individuals with high family incomes may be less nativist as they share a more cosmopolitan view and liberal attitude toward citizenship. Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) have reported that Europeans with higher levels of education and occupational skills are more likely to favor immigration for all types of immigrants regardless of skill level.

The general pattern, in most of the twenty-nine countries, is that individuals with high family incomes are less likely to support ancestry as an important component of national membership. However, this pattern is reversed in countries with low GDP per capita or low percentages of foreign-born residents. Among respondents with high household incomes, those living in countries with low GDP per capita (e.g., the Philippines, Russia, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Poland) or low percentages of foreign-born (e.g., the Philippines, Korea, Japan, Poland, and

Uruguay) are even slightly more likely to be nativist than those with low household incomes. The reversed pattern in low GDP per capita countries is well explained by the economic theory of trade, which predicts the high-skilled (i.e., those with higher family incomes) in poorer countries (i.e., lower proportion of skilled natives) to be more nativist. As immigration will increase the supply of skilled workers and bring down the skilled wage, the high-skilled in poorer countries are expected to be more nativist to protect their wages.

Then, how can we explain the reversed pattern in countries with low percentages of foreign-born, i.e., a positive association between household income and nativism? I draw attention to two factors. First, countries with smaller populations of foreign-born residents tend to have greater ethnic homogeneity and stronger support for nativism compared to other countries. Second, many of these countries also have large diasporas overseas, which may partly explain higher levels of support for ancestry as an important criterion of national membership. In the following chapters, I turn to a qualitative case study to further explicate the relationship between family income and nativism in countries with smaller foreign-born populations and a larger diaspora overseas.

Despite its contributions, this study also faces three limitations. First, with cross-sectional data, it is difficult to follow the changes in nativist attitudes over time. Second, due to data restrictions, most of the participating countries in ISSP 2003 are European or English-speaking countries with better economic conditions and relatively large foreign-born populations. Even within high-income countries, the data on foreign-born populations are highly limited. In countries such as Korea and Japan, there are no official data on foreign-born residents. Moreover, the term “foreign-born” may also include non-resident citizens, such as emigrants or

coethnics, in certain countries.

Third, another important issue of cross-national survey data is that respondents may interpret survey questions differently across countries. To reduce such risks, this study has used a new dependent variable, “ancestry.” However, even among those who endorse “ancestry” as an important criterion of national membership, each respondent may have a conflicting view of citizenship. For some, ancestry-based national membership may mean an ethnic model of citizenship, excluding all non-coethnics. By contrast, others may want to exclude all migrants—both coethnics and non-coethnics—from accessing legal citizenship. Yet, others may demand extending legal citizenship to overseas diasporas on a selective basis, by family ties or by income or skill level.

Subsequent studies should expand to include a wider range of countries with lower GDP per capita and large overseas populations, preferably outside the OECD member states. Although detailed data on parents’ country of birth or respondents’ migration background are currently only available in a limited number of countries, it is necessary to broaden the scope to collect data on traditional sending states. As migration is a two-way process, it is crucial to analyze the relationship between socioeconomic variables and nativism from both sides of the migration cycle. Even in traditional receiving states, the presence of a large population of return migrants and their descendants, as seen in Spain, may shape the public’s attitudes toward national identity as well as immigration. Longitudinal data would allow researchers to analyze the changes in nativist attitudes over time. To reduce risk of misinterpretation of survey items across countries, survey questions must be constructed more carefully with follow-up questions or interviews, if necessary.

To conclude, the theoretical framework of group threat theory alone is too narrow to explain the impact of contextual factors on individual-level effects of family income and education on nativism. In line with group threat theory, both education and household income effects on nativism are stronger in countries with a high percentage of foreign-born (i.e., greater group threat). In opposition to group threat theory, however, these individual-level associations are also stronger in countries with high GDP per capita (i.e., less competition). This finding corroborates the economic theory of trade, which predicts the effect of being high-skilled (measured by education or high family income) to vary according to the skill composition at the societal level. As predicted by the economic theory of trade, the negative effect of labor market skills (measured by education or household income) on nativism intensifies in countries with high GDP per capita and a high percentage of college graduates (i.e., high proportion of skilled native workers).

CHAPTER 3

Dual Nationality and Preferential Diaspora Management in Korea

Transition from a Quantitative Multilevel Analysis to a Qualitative Case Study

In the previous chapter, I looked at how the magnitude of individual-level effects of education and household income on nativism are modified by country-level factors, such as group threat and relative skill composition. Although I find mixed evidence for group threat theory, results are well explained by the economic theory of trade and the impact of immigration on wages. Two general patterns are observed. First, the negative effect of education on nativism is even stronger in countries with higher percentages of foreign-born (i.e., greater group threat) and college graduates (i.e., greater skill abundance). Second, in most of the twenty-nine countries, the negative effect of income on nativism is far greater in countries with high GDP per capita (i.e., less competition or greater skill abundance) and high percentage of foreign-born (i.e., greater group threat).

In Chapter 2, I find that the negative association between household income, both in absolute and relative terms, and nativism may even be reversed according to country-level factors. Two country-level variables lead to reverse patterns: low GDP per capita and low percentages of foreign-born residents. In contrast with the general pattern, among individuals with high household incomes, those living in countries with low GDP per capita (e.g., the Philippines, Russia, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Poland) and a lower percentage of foreign-born (e.g., the Philippines, Korea, Japan, Poland, and Uruguay) tend to show even greater support for ancestry-based national membership. The reversed pattern for countries with low GDP per capita is predicted by the economic theory of trade. Among the skilled (i.e., those with high family

incomes), those living in poorer countries (i.e., higher proportion of unskilled natives) may be more nativist or support a restrictive model of national membership as immigration will likely cut skilled wages by importing more skilled workers from abroad.

What leads high-income earners in countries with smaller foreign-born populations to show stronger support for nativism? In this section, I explore possible explanations for these reverse patterns of stronger nationalist attitudes among individuals with high family incomes and discuss why a qualitative case study is needed. On one hand, it is important to note that these countries (e.g., the Philippines, Russia, Uruguay, Venezuela, Poland, Korea, and Japan), on average, also have a much higher level of support for “ancestry” as an important criterion for national membership (see Table A5). Stronger nationalist attitudes may be associated with the low percentages of foreign-born residents and greater ethnic homogeneity in such countries.

Another important factor is that countries with low GDP per capita or low percentage of foreign-born also tend to be countries with a large diaspora overseas (see Appendix, Table A6, Table A7-1, and Table A7-2).¹ Among the countries with low GDP per capita or low percentage of foreign-born (e.g., the Philippines, Russia, Uruguay, Venezuela, Poland, Korea, and Japan), the Philippines, Russia, Poland, and Korea are listed as one of the top twenty major migrant-

¹ Due to limited availability of reliable data on emigration, I use the OECD data to compare the size of emigrant populations across countries. Appendix Table A6 shows the size of diasporas and migration flows to the OECD for main migrant groups in OECD countries. Tables A7-1 and A7-2 (Appendix) draw data from the OECD’s Database on Immigrants in OECD and non-OECD Countries Extended (DIOC-E, release 3.0) for the twenty-nine countries used in Chapter 2. Table A7-1 shows the size of emigrant population and emigration rates by skill levels for year 2000, which is closer to the survey year 2003. For ease of comparison, Table A7-2 sorts the same data of twenty-nine countries by the number of emigrants and total emigration rates to OECD states.

sending countries to OECD member states in the Appendix, Table A6. In Table A7-2,² Russia, the Philippines, and Poland are again among the top five countries with the largest number of emigrants living in OECD states while Uruguay, Poland, and Russia have remarkably high total emigration rates to OECD countries. Korea also has a significantly large number of overseas residents,³ slightly over 1 million after combining two categories, “Korea-South and North” with “Korea-South.”⁴ After excluding the countries geographically close to Europe, the Philippines and Korea stand out with significantly large numbers of emigrants residing in OECD states.

The size of overseas diaspora is a factor that has been largely overlooked in the literature on national identification and nationalism, which has heavily centered on migrant-receiving countries. How does having a large emigrant population overseas impact the native-born citizens’ views toward nativism or ancestry-based citizenship? Large diasporas and high emigration rates may partly explain why such countries have a higher level of support for nativism on average and show reverse patterns of stronger nationalist attitudes among individuals with high family

² DIOC-E (release 3.0) contains information on demographic and labor market characteristics of the population of 32 OECD member countries and 68 non-members around the year 2000 by detailed country of birth. The 32 OECD countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

³ Although the Republic of Korea joined the OECD on December 12, 1996, it is not included in the data set. The data on Korea and Russia in the DIOC-E come from Barro and Lee (2013).

⁴ As the coding scheme varies across countries, there are three categories for Korean emigrants. In the United States, for example, people born in Korea have a choice of three ways to indicate their country of birth: Korea, North Korea or South Korea. More than 80 percent of them indicated they were born in Korea, without further specification. In the Japanese census data, it is not possible to identify which part of the Korean peninsula a person was born; the place of birth for people born on the current territories of the Republic of Korea or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is therefore noted “Korea unspecified.”

income.

Depending on the history of migration in these countries, support for ancestry-based national membership may take on different meanings, an important caveat of cross-national surveys discussed in Chapter 2. First, some may support an ethnic national model of citizenship, which excludes all non-coethnic migrants from accessing legal citizenship. By contrast, others may endorse a more nativist model, excluding all migrants, regardless of ethnicity, from accessing legal citizenship. Yet, others may find a middle ground, extending legal citizenship to diaspora overseas and sorting various coethnic groups into more and less eligible candidates of citizenship. As observed in countries such as Korea, not only non-coethnics, but also coethnics (e.g., ethnic Koreans from China and North Korean refugees) and internal minority groups often become targets of discrimination.

To fully understand the association between individual-level structural variables (e.g., family income and education) and support for nativism, we need to further investigate nativism in countries with low GDP per capita or a low percentage of foreign-born. Among the two country-level variables, I choose to examine countries with a low percentage of foreign-born, which is a less studied topic in the literature on national identity and citizenship. As seen in the case of the Philippines, Russia, Poland, and Korea, countries with smaller foreign-born populations not only exhibit higher support for nativism, but also tend to have large diasporas overseas.

In the chapters that follow, I turn to a qualitative case study of Korea's selective dual nationality policy to investigate how the state fulfills both material and symbolic interests by using dual citizenship policy as a tool to administer a wide range of human resources and

regulate citizens and potential citizens. Korea is one of the countries with a very low percentage of foreign-born (see Table A4 in the Appendix) and a sizable diaspora overseas despite its middle-to-high GDP per capita (see Table A3). Koreans also show higher support for ancestry-based national membership compared to the grand mean for all twenty-nine countries (see Table A5). Approximately 73 percent of Korean respondents' view "ancestry" as an "important" or a "very important" component of national membership, compared to 61.7 percent of all respondents from twenty-nine countries. In addition to a large diaspora overseas, Korea has a rapidly growing population of migrant workers and marriage migrants. While the country still clings to an ethnic model of citizenship, the Korean state has to recruit high-skilled and low-skilled workers through citizenship and migrant labor policies to tackle an imminent population crisis and labor shortages.

By focusing on a single case, I aim to show how descent-based citizenship policy is part of a larger immigration system, linked to coethnic and dual citizenship policies. In the following two chapters, Chapters 3 and 4, I draw attention to how the Korean state uses dual citizenship policy to administer a wide array of human resources to fulfill its material and symbolic interests and control its citizens and potential citizens regarding their choices in family formation, citizenship, and military service. The Korean state juggles between preserving an ethnic national model of citizenship and selecting would-be-citizens based on economic and geopolitical interests.

Dual Citizenship as a Site for Investigation

Dual citizenship has become increasingly prevalent within the last two decades with more than half of the world now permitting dual citizenship (Sejersen 2008).⁵ Dual citizenship is ultimately the question of *who* belongs to the nation; in other words, how states define its membership. Citizenship scholars also note that dual citizenship serves different goals in sending and receiving states. Dual citizenship has two faces: it is often used as a means to facilitate integration of immigrants in receiving countries as well as a tool to keep ties with emigrants in many sending countries (Joppke 2003).

The preexisting literature on dual citizenship faces four limitations. First, the literature largely overlooks the process of selecting (worthy) candidates for dual citizenship, or the question of defining “who is what” (Brubaker 1992:182; Kim, Jaeun 2009:134), presupposing that there are already clear-cut categories of “emigrants/diaspora” or “immigrants” eligible for dual citizenship. Thus, it fails to discuss how states further differentiate among emigrants in granting access to dual citizenship, often favoring business elites and emigrants in advanced economies over others.

Second, by sharply distinguishing between sending states and receiving states, the current literature lacks a holistic approach to dual citizenship policies, particularly as tools for nation-building and social closure. Traditional theories of state rest on the assumption that states exercise sovereignty on populations within its territory. In contrast, countries of mass emigration

⁵ In this paper, I focus on the role of citizenship as a legal status. In this sense, “citizenship” is interchangeably used with “nationality.”

struggle to incorporate overseas populations without changing state borders for various reasons, such as economic need, ethnic lobbying, internal politics, demographic deficit, and search for prestige (FitzGerald 2009). However, in countries where out-migration and in-migration occur simultaneously, such as Korea, dual citizenship policies can function as a strategy to administer a wider range of human resources, from return migrants (e.g., coethnics) and citizens to non-coethnic migrants. We need a larger framework that views dual citizenship in the context of overarching immigration policies composed of two axes: national identity and political economy (Zolberg 1999, 2006).

Third, this dualistic approach in existing studies leaves out the role of resident citizens (e.g., mononationals and plural nationals) in shaping dual citizenship policies and practices. Expanding the legal boundary of citizenship to plural nationality may set off alarms for citizens concerned about sharing social welfare benefits as well as military duties. Resentment toward those seen as free-riders (e.g., plural citizens or non-resident citizens), fueled by class inequality, can lead to discussions on what citizenship entails and who qualifies for social rights. At the same time, resident plural citizens, in addition to returning migrants and incoming migrants, may well be one of the major beneficiaries of dual citizenship policies. With the increased number of people crossing borders back and forth, the distinction between resident and non-resident citizens (e.g., emigrants) becomes often blurry. The role of resident citizens in the Korean dual citizenship policy is discussed in Chapter 4.

Fourth, previous studies also neglect to address that dual citizenship creates inequality among resident citizens (i.e., mononationals versus dual nationals), as well as between resident and non-resident citizens, which is in many cases linked to economic inequality. While emigrants

often enjoy “citizenship à la carte” with regard to their homeland (FitzGerald 2006, 2008, 2012), resident plural citizens may also use their foreign citizenship to shirk obligations, such as military duties, as shown in Korea. Not everyone has equal access to plural citizenship, and in Korea’s case, dual citizenship is a class issue as most resident dual citizens are from a class of privilege (see Chapter 4).

In this qualitative case study, I construct a holistic approach that views dual citizenship as part of a larger citizenship and immigration system to manage human resources based on two axes of political economy and national identity (Zolberg 1999, 2006). By focusing on the demographic challenges of the Korean state, I demonstrate how both material and symbolic interests of the state shape the legal boundaries of national membership. In the Korean case, material concerns regarding brain drain and population decline have ignited the shift to a selective dual nationality policy in order to recruit and retain high-skilled workers, particularly from a specific coethnic group (i.e., Korean Americans). Among coethnic groups, those from high-income countries, such as Korean Americans, have easier access to dual citizenship while most ethnic Koreans in China and CIS countries cannot obtain dual nationality.⁶ At the same time, symbolic interests of the state, such as maintaining ethnic national identity and raising fertility, were important reasons for extending dual nationality to selected groups (e.g., Korean return migrants over age sixty-five and female marriage migrants).

In this chapter, I focus on Korea’s dual citizenship policy as a measure for administering

⁶ In the case of Koreans from China, only those who meet strict qualifications can apply for “Overseas Korean (F-4)” visas or “Permanent Residence (F-5)” visas, which give more freedom in entering and exiting the country and employment.

human resources (e.g., in-migrants, out-migrants, and resident and non-resident citizens) rather than only as a coethnic policy. In the sections to follow, I first highlight the demographic challenges the Korean state faces: fertility decline, aging population, and a shortage in skilled labor. Then, I discuss how geopolitical and economic interests have led to the preferential treatment of Korean Americans in dual citizenship policy as well as coethnic policies, e.g., Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans (hereafter “The 1999 Overseas Korean Act”). I also reveal that the hidden goal of the Korean dual citizenship policy was to recruit skilled labor, particularly among overseas Koreans. Lastly, I point out that symbolic interests of the state have shaped dual citizenship policy as much as economic interests. To strengthen ethnic national identity, plural citizenship was also extended to groups with less economic utility, such as return migrants over age sixty-five and Korean adoptees overseas. To boost fertility, access to faster naturalization and dual citizenship was extended to female marriage migrants who stay in marriages.

The Puzzle: Korea’s Transition from Mono to Dual Nationality Policy

In 2010, the Korean state introduced a selective dual citizenship policy (also known as the 2010 Amendment) allowing persons in specific categories (e.g., high-skilled, dual citizens by birth, returning Korean migrants over age sixty-five, and marriage migrants) to maintain plural nationality. This sudden transition to a formal dual citizenship system is in direct contrast with Japan, which still maintains a strict mononationality policy, which is discussed in the section below. In contrast with most countries that allow or tolerate dual citizenship, Korea also has a strict system of national military service for male citizens, which further complicates the day-to-day operations of dual citizenship policy (see footnote 14 in Chapter 4).

Why did the Korean state choose to introduce a selective dual citizenship policy in 2010? As shown in the previous section (see Appendix, Table A5), Koreans not only exhibit stronger support for “ancestry” as an important component of national membership, but they have a sizable overseas diaspora population. Thus, one may expect that Korea’s transition to a dual citizenship system was to mainly accommodate its coethnic population overseas. However, ethnic nationalism alone cannot explain the development of Korea’s coethnic policy (e.g., “The 1999 Overseas Korean Act”) and the subsequent selective dual citizenship policy. In the process of constructing “*who is what*” or which groups are eligible for special legal status (i.e., “Overseas Korean [F-4]” visa) and dual citizenship, the Korean state has continued to preferentially treat a specific coethnic group (i.e., Korean Americans) over others (e.g., Koreans in China and CIS countries).

A closer look reveals that the selective dual citizenship policy in Korea is not merely a coethnic policy, but a tool for administering a wide range of human resources, from resident and non-resident citizens to coethnics and non-coethnic incoming migrants. The Korean state faces a serious demographic deficit with “lowest-low” fertility, i.e., total fertility rate below 1.3, and a rapidly aging population. To resolve this population crisis, the state actors in Korea have decided to use dual citizenship policy to recruit and retain specific groups that fulfill material (e.g., recruitment of high-skilled workers) and non-material (e.g., strengthening ethnic national identity) state interests.

Korea’s citizenship policy, as part of a larger immigration system, is built on two axes: political economy and national identity (Zolberg 1999, 2006). On one hand, economic and geopolitical interests (i.e., Korea’s close relationship with the U.S. during and after the Cold War

era) have led to the preferential treatment of Korean Americans in coethnic policy and dual citizenship policy as potential investors and employers. In contrast, Koreans in China and CIS countries were viewed as a source of labor market disruption. To tackle the shortage of skilled labor, easier access to naturalization and dual citizenship was offered to both Korean and non-Korean high-skilled workers, another category dominated by Korean Americans.

On the other hand, this economic utility perspective fails to explain why dual citizenship was also extended to groups with less visible economic utility. To strengthen ethnic national identity, the selective dual citizenship policy has allowed return migrants over sixty-five and overseas Korean adoptees to restore Korean nationality and maintain plural citizen status. To incentivize female marriage migrants to stay married and procreate, access to faster naturalization and plural citizenship was restricted to marriage migrants who are married and live in marital unions.

In the section that follows, I first review the legal system of citizenship in Korea based on descent and “one nationality only principle.” Then, I briefly give an overview of the demographic landscape that Korean state actors face. Korea not only has a large overseas diaspora, but it also has a rapidly growing population of labor migrants and marriage migrants, both of Korean and non-Korean descent. In the last section, I summarize the selective dual citizenship policy introduced in 2010 and place this in the broader context of preferential coethnic policy for Korean Americans.

“One Nationality only Policy”

The legal system of citizenship in Korea is based on *jus sanguinis*, where passage of citizenship is only through blood. Strict rules for naturalization and permanent residency—such

as five-year residency requirements, financial proof of being able to support oneself and one's family (e.g., a bank balance of 30 million won, which is equivalent to 25,000 US dollars), and naturalization tests⁷—make it difficult for non-citizens to become full members of Korean society. Exceptions apply for spouses and children of citizens, former Korean citizens, and highly-skilled individuals who have reduced or no residency requirements and exemptions from naturalization tests.

Until 2010, another feature of the legal citizenship system in Korea was a strict “one nationality only” policy, not allowing citizens to hold plural nationality. This policy generated increasing strain as Korea switched to a bilineal system of passing down citizenship in response to a shift in global legal norms concerning citizenship and gender equality. Prompted by the 1979 United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Korea (like many other countries) changed from a patrilineal to a bilineal system of citizenship transmission in 1997, which produced a greater number of dual citizens. However, to keep the “principle of mononationality,” the Korean government required dual citizens to choose only one nationality upon reaching age twenty-two and renounce the other, following Japan's 1984 nationality law amendment as a reference. Compared to Japan,⁸ Korea adopted a more

⁷ To become a naturalized citizen in Korea, one must pass screening (of documents), a written test, interviews, and an investigation on actual conditions. The written test evaluates one's Korean language proficiency and knowledge in Korean culture and society. Marriage migrants who meet marriage and cohabitation practices are exempt from written tests and must pass interviews that evaluate their language proficiency (Danuri 2020).

⁸ In contrast to Korea, Japan has externally maintained a “one nationality only” policy; yet, in practice, tolerates the presence of dual nationals. The Ministry of Justice has officially acknowledged its administrative-level *de facto* tolerance policy of dual nationality by testifying at the National Diet. In principle, the Minister of Justice can send written notices to dual citizens to order a choice of citizenship and eventually take away their Japanese citizenship in case of inaction within a month. However, not a single written notice has been ever issued since the nationality law was amended in 1985 (Showa 60),

powerful policy, enabling the state to automatically strip plural citizens of Korean nationality if no choice of nationality was made. Dual nationality was also not allowed for naturalized citizens, who had to renounce their other citizenship(s) within six months and submit documentary evidence.

An Overview of Korea's Demographic Landscape

Korea's transition to a selective dual citizenship system is closely linked to the state's current demographic challenges, which will be discussed later in the chapter. Korea has shifted its position from a migrant-sending country to a migrant-receiving country. The net migration rate has turned from negative in 2000–2005 to positive in 2005–2010 (United Nations 2013). As Table 7 shows, foreign residents in Korea account for approximately 4 percent of the total population, exceeding 2 million for the first time in 2016 (Yi, Po-bae 2017). Since the late 1980s, Korea has attracted many migrant workers from neighboring countries.

which has been questioned repeatedly during the Judicial Affairs committee meetings of the National Diet (Terada, Itsurō 2005; Kurayoshi, Kei 2008, 2009a, 2009b). Both Terada and Kurayoshi were directors of the Bureau of Civil Affairs in the Ministry of Justice [Hōmushō Minjikyokuchō, 法務省民事局長].

Table 7. Annual trend of foreign resident population in Korea (1999-2018)

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Foreign residents	381,116	491,324	566,835	629,006	678,687	750,873	747,467	910,149	1,066,273	1,158,866
Total population	47,335,678	47,732,558	48,021,543	48,229,948	48,386,823	48,583,805	48,782,274	48,991,779	49,268,928	49,540,367
% of foreign residents	0.8	1.0	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.9	2.2	2.3
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Foreign residents	1,168,477	1,261,415	1,395,077	1,445,103	1,576,034	1,797,618	1,899,519	2,049,441	2,180,498	2,367,607
Total population	49,773,145	50,515,666	50,734,284	50,948,272	51,141,463	51,327,916	51,529,338	51,696,216	51,778,544	51,826,059
% of foreign residents	2.3	2.5	2.7	2.8	3.1	3.5	3.7	4.0	4.2	4.6

Sources:

1. Statistics Korea. 2019. "The Current Status of Foreign Residents (1998-2018)." Accessed January 24, 2020. http://www.index.go.kr/potal/stts/idxMain/selectPoSttsIdxSearch.do?idx_cd=2756&clas_div=&idx_sys_cd=542&idx_clas_cd=1.
2. Korea Statistical Information Service (KOSIS). 2019. "Population Statistics Based on Resident Registration (1992-2019)." Accessed January 24, 2020. http://kosis.kr/statHtml/statHtml.do?orgId=101&tblId=DT_1YL20651E&conn_path=I2.

Table 8. Foreign residents in Korea from major origin countries by nationality (2006–2018)

Year	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total	910,149	1,066,273	1,158,866	1,168,477	1,261,415	1,395,077	1,445,103	1,576,034	1,797,618	1,899,519	2,049,441	2,180,498	2,367,607
China (including ethnic Koreans)	382,237	503,427	556,517	555,082	608,881	677,954	698,444	778,113	898,654	955,871	1,016,607	1,018,074	1,070,566
<i>Ethnic Koreans from China</i>	236,854	328,621	376,563	377,560	415,004	477,163	447,877	512,120	606,964	647,717	652,028	702,932	728,539
United States	108,091	112,268	117,986	122,659	127,140	132,133	130,562	134,711	136,663	138,660	140,222	143,568	151,018
Vietnam	54,698	71,074	84,763	90,931	103,306	116,219	120,254	120,069	129,973	136,758	149,384	169,738	196,633
Thailand	43,307	47,813	45,198	44,701	44,250	45,634	45,945	55,110	94,314	93,348	100,860	153,259	197,764
Philippines	48,164	50,873	46,894	45,913	47,241	47,542	42,219	47,514	53,538	54,977	56,980	58,480	60,139
Uzbekistan	15,380	17,163	21,569	21,249	25,895	29,742	34,688	38,515	43,852	47,103	54,490	62,870	68,433
Japan	43,207	41,053	51,763	47,718	48,905	58,169	57,174	56,081	49,152	47,909	51,297	53,670	60,878
Other	215,065	222,602	234,176	240,224	255,797	287,684	315,817	345,921	391,472	424,893	479,601	520,839	562,176

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Sources:

1. Statistics Korea. 2019c. “The Current Status of Foreign Residents (1998-2018).” Accessed January 24, 2020. http://www.index.go.kr/potal/stts/idxMain/selectPoSttsIdxSearch.do?idx_cd=2756&clas_div=&idx_sys_cd=542&idx_clas_cd=1.
2. Korea Statistical Information Service (KOSIS). 2019. “Population Statistics Based on Resident Registration (1992-2019).” Accessed January 24, 2020. http://kosis.kr/statHtml/statHtml.do?orgId=101&tblId=DT_1YL20651E&conn_path=I2.
3. Statistics Korea. 2019b. “Ethnic Koreans with Foreign Nationality Residing in Korea by Year, Nationality and Visa Type (2006-2018).” Accessed January 24, 2020. http://www.index.go.kr/potal/stts/idxMain/selectPoSttsIdxSearch.do?idx_cd=2821&stts_cd=282101&freq=Y.

Table 9. Foreign spouses of Korean citizens by sex and nationality (2006-2018)

		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total		93,786	110,362	122,552	125,087	141,654	144,681	148,498	150,865	150,994	151,608	152,374	155,457	159,206
Sex	Men	10,958	13,126	14,753	15,876	18,561	19,650	20,958	22,039	22,801	23,272	23,856	25,230	26,815
	Women	82,828	97,236	107,799	109,211	123,093	125,031	127,540	128,826	128,193	128,336	128,518	130,227	132,391
Nationality	China	56,286	63,203	67,787	65,992	66,687	64,173	63,035	62,400	60,663	58,788	56,930	57,644	58,706
	Vietnam	14,831	21,614	27,092	30,173	35,355	37,516	39,352	39,854	39,725	40,847	41,803	42,205	42,460
	Japan	6,546	5,823	5,223	5,074	10,451	11,162	11,746	12,220	12,603	12,861	13,110	13,400	13,738
	Philippines	4,324	5,033	5,819	6,321	7,476	8,367	9,611	10,383	11,052	11,367	11,606	11,783	11,836
	Other	11,799	14,689	16,631	17,527	21,685	23,463	24,754	26,008	26,951	27,745	28,925	30,425	32,466


98 Source: Statistics Korea. 2019d. “The Current Status of Foreign Spouses of Korean Citizens by Year, Gender, Region, and Nationality (2006-2018).” Accessed January 24, 2020.

https://www.index.go.kr/potal/stts/idxMain/selectPoSttsIdxMainPrint.do?idx_cd=2819&board_cd=INDX_001.

As shown in Table 8, China sends the largest number of migrants to Korea, comprising approximately half of all foreign residents between 2006 and 2018. Among Chinese nationals in Korea, more than 60 to 70 percent are ethnic Koreans, comprising one-third of the total foreign resident population. In addition to labor migrants, the shortage of Korean women in rural regions has resulted in bringing in “foreign brides” through international marriage agencies, often funded by local governments. The number of female marriage migrants from China and Southeast Asian countries has soared since the early 2000s. In Table 9, a vast majority of marriage migrants are women, accounting for 84.9 percent of visa holders.⁹

⁹ An important caveat for the official statistics on marriage migrants is that it does not include those who have acquired Korean citizenship (e.g., naturalized citizens).

Figure 1. Koreans across the globe



Source: Korea Joongang Daily. 2013. "World's Widest Diaspora born over 100 Years Ago." *Korea Joongang Daily* [Chungang Ilbo], Oct 2, 2013.

In addition to the rapidly growing migrant population, Korea also has a sizable diaspora overseas, which has led to the development of coethnic policy and a selective dual citizenship policy. Approximately 7.5 million Korean citizens and foreign nationals of Korean descent reside overseas in 176 countries, with approximately 80 percent of the population concentrated in China, United States, Japan, Russia, and CIS countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2019). As shown in Figure 1, the two largest Korean diaspora communities are in the United States and China, with 2.55 million and 2.46 million Koreans, respectively (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2019:14). The ethnic return migration of Korean Americans began in the 1980s. Ethnic Koreans

from China and CIS countries joined after the end of the Cold War in 1991, mostly in the form of labor migration.

Table 10. Ethnic Koreans with foreign nationality residing in Korea by nationality and visa type (2006-2018)

		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total		267,436	365,732	421,155	430,104	477,029	550,931	538,277	602,226	704,536	754,427	775,715	841,308	878,665
Nationality	China	236,854	328,621	376,563	377,560	415,004	477,163	447,877	512,120	606,964	647,717	652,028	702,932	728,539
	United States	21,118	24,544	27,513	31,903	35,822	40,786	44,567	45,253	46,426	46,737	46,050	45,177	45,011
	Canada	4,441	5,596	6,694	8,019	9,502	11,351	12,988	13,586	14,598	15,397	15,959	15,947	15,933
	Other	5,023	6,971	10,385	12,622	16,701	21,631	32,845	31,267	36,548	44,576	61,678	77,252	89,182
Visa Type	Residence (F-2)	35,746	36,592	35,688	32,573	32,205	31,111	13,374	11,409	11,791	11,639	10,867	10,733	10,488
	Overseas Korean (F-4)	29,574	34,695	41,732	50,664	84,912	136,702	189,508	235,953	289,427	328,187	372,533	415,121	444,880
	Permanent Residence (F-5)	44	131	311	1,007	20,692	36,162	49,716	65,699	74,870	82,360	86,549	89,426	92,245
	Working Visit (H-2)	0	228,686	299,332	306,283	286,586	303,368	238,765	240,178	282,670	285,342	254,950	238,880	250,381
	Other	202,072	65,628	44,092	39,577	52,634	43,588	46,914	48,987	45,778	46,899	50,816	87,148	80,671

Source: Statistics Korea. 2019b. "Ethnic Koreans with Foreign Nationality Residing in Korea by Year, Nationality and Visa Type (2006-2018)." Accessed January 24, 2020.

http://www.index.go.kr/potal/stts/idxMain/selectPoSttsIdxSearch.do?idx_cd=2821&stts_cd=282101&freq=Y.

Among foreign residents in Korea, the number of ethnic Koreans with foreign nationality has almost tripled between 2006 and 2018. In Table 10, Koreans from China account for approximately 90 percent of all ethnic Koreans residing in Korea. In comparison, Korean Americans represent only 6–8 percent of all coethnic residents despite being the second largest group. In addition to emigrants and coethnic groups, there are 167,547 Korean adoptees in the United States, Canada, and Western European countries (Ministry of Health and Welfare 2019:8).

Selective Dual Nationality Policy

To understand the sudden transition to a selective dual citizenship policy in Korea, we need to view citizenship policies as part of the larger immigration system, including diaspora and migrant labor policies. Table 11 summarizes the major legislative changes for the Korean nationality law and coethnic policies. As discussed above, the Nationality Act was amended in 1997 to allow bilinear transmission of nationality, producing a greater number of dual citizens. Although dual citizenship was formally acknowledged in law for the first time, plural citizens had to make a choice of citizenship within two years (after involuntarily acquiring foreign citizenship) or before age twenty-two.

Table 11. Timeline of major legislative changes regarding citizenship in Korea

Nationality Act	Overseas Korean Policies
<p>1997 Amendment of the Nationality Act:</p> <p>Korean nationality is now passed through both father and mother. Dual citizenship is formally recognized for the first time</p>	<p>1997 Overseas Koreans Foundation Act</p> <p>The first legislation enacted to maintain ties with overseas Koreans by establishing the Overseas Koreans Foundation</p>
<p>2005 Amendment of the Nationality Act:</p> <p>Dual citizen men must fulfill military duties before renouncing Korean citizenship</p>	<p>1999 Overseas Korean Act (so-called <i>de facto</i> dual citizenship):</p> <p>Qualified overseas Koreans can enter and exit the 8country freely, enjoy equal rights in economic transactions and health care benefits, and stay for up to three years</p>
	<p>2001 Constitutional Court Ruling:</p> <p>A revision to the 1999 Overseas Korean Act ordered to include ethnic Koreans in China and CIS countries</p>
	<p>2004 Amendment of the Overseas Korean Act:</p> <p>The definition of “Overseas Koreans” revised to include ethnic Koreans in China and CIS countries</p>
<p>2008 Amendment of the Overseas Korean Act:</p> <p>The Overseas Korean (F-4) visa is extended to qualified ethnic Koreans from China and CIS countries in qualified occupations (e.g. caregivers)</p>	<p>2005 Amendment of the Nationality Act:</p> <p>Dual citizen men must fulfill military duties before renouncing Korean citizenship</p>
	<p>2010 Amendment of the Nationality Act:</p> <p>Qualified dual citizens can maintain plural nationality after signing the vow not to exercise foreign citizenship within the Republic of Korea</p>

In 1999, the Overseas Korean Act was enacted to create a special visa (i.e., “Overseas Korean [F-4]” visa) for qualified coethnic groups, mostly Korean Americans, allowing easier access to territory, employment, long-term stay, and equal rights in health care, economic transactions, and veterans’ benefits. In 2001, the Constitutional Court ordered a revision to include ethnic Koreans in China and CIS countries who were initially excluded from this coethnic policy. As I will show later in this chapter, Koreans in China and former Soviet Union countries continue to face barriers in acquiring the “Overseas Korean (F-4)” visa even after subsequent amendments to the Overseas Korean Act in 2004 and 2008.

In 2005, the Nationality Act was amended to require dual citizen men to fulfill military duties before giving up Korean citizenship, resulting in hundreds of dual citizens rushing to renounce citizenship before its enactment (see Chapter 4). In 2010, the Korean state introduced a formal dual citizenship system through the 2010 Amendment of the Nationality Act for selective groups: high-skilled, individuals who obtained plural nationality involuntarily (e.g., by birth or marriage), overseas Korean adoptees, returning Korean migrants over age sixty-five, and marriage migrants. Like the U.S. policy on dual citizenship, the 2010 Amendment specifies that Korean citizens with foreign citizenship are only treated as Korean nationals within Korean territory. For example, all Korean citizens, including dual nationals, must use a Korean passport to enter and exit the country. To maintain a plural national status, qualified individuals must submit a vow not to exercise foreign citizenship within Korea (e.g., attending schools or working as a foreign national).

Table 12. Comparison of those included and excluded from the selective dual citizenship policy in Korea by citizenship, ethnicity, and resident status

	Citizen		Non-citizen		
Ethnicity	Korean		Korean	Non-Korean	
Resident status	Resident citizens	Non-resident citizens	Non-resident	Resident	Non-resident
<i>Included in the dual nationality policy</i>	Plural citizens by birth (e.g. children of marriage migrants and children of Korean nationals born overseas), Persons who have involuntarily acquired foreign citizenship (e.g. through marriage or parents)		High-skilled professionals, Permanent returnees over age 65 (e.g. Korean Americans), Overseas Korean adoptees	Marriage migrants in marriages	High-skilled professionals (“global talent,” such as Canadian ice hockey players recruited for the 2018 Winter Olympics)
<i>Excluded from the dual nationality policy</i>	Persons who acquired foreign citizenship through “birth tourism”	Persons who have voluntarily obtained foreign citizenship	Koreans in China and the CIS countries, Overseas Koreans under age 65 (e.g. Korean Americans)	The ethnic Chinese who have lived in Korea for three to four generations, Low-skilled migrant workers, Marriage migrants who are divorced, separated or widowed	

Table 12 summarizes which groups are included and excluded in the selective dual citizenship policy in Korea by ethnicity, citizenship, and resident status. As shown in Table 12, the Korean state's main intention for introducing a dual citizenship policy was not only to recruit coethnics to tackle brain drain and population decline, but to specifically bring in high-skilled Koreans from high-income countries, such as the U.S. In contrast, most ethnic Koreans from China and CIS countries cannot attain plural national status as China and some CIS countries do not allow dual nationality.

In addition to high-skilled coethnics (e.g., Korean Americans and Korean citizens born with plural nationality), dual citizenship is allowed for high-skilled non-Koreans, such as the Canadian ice hockey players recruited for the 2018 Winter Olympics hosted in PyeongChang. However, geopolitical and economic interests alone cannot explain the Korean state's transition to dual citizenship policy. Dual nationality was also extended to groups with less visible economic utility, such as returning Korean migrants over age sixty-five, overseas Korean adoptees, and marriage migrants, to either strengthen ethnic national identity or raise the declining fertility rate through marriage migrants.

Korea's Preferential Treatment of Korean Americans in Coethnic Policies Based on Geopolitical and Economic Interests

The selective dual citizenship policy in Korea is not merely a coethnic policy but a tool to control a wide range of human resources—resident and non-resident citizens (see Chapter 4) and migrants of Korean and non-Korean descent—to tackle demographic challenges and fulfill both material and non-material state interests. To understand the motives behind the preferential treatment of Korean Americans in the dual nationality policy, it is necessary to first review the

development of Korea's coethnic policies, particularly the 1999 Overseas Korean Act. I draw attention to the impact of geopolitical and economic interests on building coethnic policies that led to the exclusion of ethnic Koreans in China and CIS countries in the 1999 Overseas Korean Act and the subsequent dual citizenship policy.

In the following sections, I briefly compare Korea's two largest coethnic groups, Korean Americans and ethnic Koreans in China and former Soviet Union countries. After persistent requests from the Korean American community for dual citizenship, the Korean government launched the Overseas Korean Act in 1999, catering to the demands of Korean Americans. With the 1997 East Asian financial crisis, the Korean state needed to secure investment from affluent Korean emigrants. Next, I focus on geopolitical and economic factors that have led to the discrimination against ethnic Koreans in China and CIS countries in coethnic policies, which has continued in the selective dual citizenship policy.


Korean Americans versus Koreans in China and CIS Countries

As shown in Table 13, ethnic Koreans can be largely divided into two categories by the timing of their departure from the Korean peninsula. The first group are ethnic Koreans in China and CIS countries, who are descendants of the precolonial and colonial-era migrants from Chosŏn or Korea under Japanese colonial rule. As most had left Korea between the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, it is difficult to produce official family registry records in many cases. Ethnic Koreans from China and CIS states began to migrate in the 1990s after diplomatic relations resumed. Those who are currently working in Korea as migrant laborers are third or fourth generation ethnic Koreans from China and CIS countries.

Table 13. Comparison of Korean Americans and Ethnic Koreans in China and CIS countries

	Korean Americans	Koreans in China and CIS countries
Departure from Korea	Emigration to the U.S. (mostly after the 1965 U.S. immigration reform)	Precolonial and colonial-era migration
Generations	1 st generation: retirees 2 nd and 3 rd generations: seeking jobs	2 nd generation: in retirement age, and seeking jobs 3 rd and 4 th generations: seeking jobs and education
Access to Korean Citizenship	Former nationals of Republic of Korea	No formal Korean citizenship. Emigrated before the Republic of Korea was established in 1948
Visas	“Overseas Korean (F-4)” visas Investment visas	Work visit visas, “Overseas Korean (F-4)” visas and “Permanent residency (F-2)” visas (Since 2008, the latter two visas have been extended to those in qualified occupations (e.g. caregivers))
Occupations	Small business owners, English instructors, professionals	Service sector, care takers, manufacture, construction
Overseas Korean Act	Korean Americans have consistently requested dual citizenship since the early 1990s, which has led to the enactment of 1999 Overseas Korean Act.	Ethnic Koreans in China and CIS countries had been initially excluded from the 1999 Overseas Korean Act. Through revisions after the Constitutional court’s ruling in 2001, they could apply for the “Overseas Korean (F-4)” visas

Figure 2. Annual trend of out-migration from South Korea (1962-2014) and Korean Immigrants to the U.S. (1965-2013)



Sources: Statistics Korea. 2015a. “The Current Status of Reported Cases of Emigration.”
 Min, Pyong Gap. 2015. “Korean and Asian Immigration Data: Recent Trends (Statistical Report 7),” p. 3.

Original sources: Immigration and Naturalization Service, Annual Report, 1965-1978 and Statistical Yearbook, 1979-2001; Office of Immigration Statistics, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2002-2013.

Note: The number of Korean emigrants to the U.S. is based on official emigration statistics.

The second group are Korean Americans who left the Republic of Korea in the 1970s as citizens of the South Korean state. Figure 2 shows three different statistics: the annual trend of out-migration from Korea (1962–2014), the officially reported number of Koreans emigrating to the U.S. (1962–2014), and the annual number of Koreans obtaining permanent resident status in the U.S., categorized by country of birth (1965–2013) (Statistics Korea 2015; Min 2015).

Emigration of South Koreans dramatically increased in the 1970s; more than 40,000 Koreans left the country each year between 1974 and 1977. The number of Korean permanent residents in the U.S. also quickly grew in the 1980s, reaching a peak of 35,849 in 1987. The number of emigrants gradually declined with rapid economic development and democratization in South

Korea.

Return migration of Korean emigrants started increasing in the 1980s particularly among Korean Americans. Korea's democratization in 1987 and economic development brought the standard of living roughly on par with advanced economies (and the hosting of the 1988 Seoul Olympics conveyed a positive image of the country to overseas Koreans). By 1996, more than 5,000 emigrants per year had come back to Korea.¹⁰ A large share of returnees was made up of first-generation Korean emigrants (e.g., Korean Americans) who, now at retirement age, want to spend their later years back home. In contrast, ethnic Koreans from China and CIS countries were only able to join the flow of return migration after the end of the Cold War in 1991, mostly in the form of labor migration.

Korean Americans' Constant Request for Dual Citizenship and the 1999 Overseas Korean Act

The 1999 Overseas Korean Act was primarily introduced on behalf of Korean Americans. Postwar Korean emigrants, particularly Korean Americans, persistently requested dual citizenship since the 1980s (Kim, P. 1998; Jung 2004).¹¹ During the Kim Young Sam administration (1993–98), the Korean government started to show interest in keeping friendly ties with Korean emigrants, specifically those residing in wealthier states, such as the U.S. or Canada. After the 1997 East Asian financial crisis, the Kim Dae Jung administration (1998–

¹⁰ The official statistics on permanently returning migrants has combined the number of return migrants and those who gave up emigration before departure. Separate statistics on returnees is available annually from 1995 and separately for 1992. In 1992, 6,258 emigrants came back to resettle in Korea (The breakdown of returnees by region or country is available from 2004 and separately for year 2002).

¹¹ In 1984, the president of the Korean-American Chamber of Commerce in Los Angeles made the first request for dual citizenship was 1984 in Los Angeles (Kim, P. 1998).

2003) decided to actively recruit investments from affluent Korean emigrants by creating new formal policies for overseas Koreans (Constitutional Court 2001; Kim, N. 2013).¹²

Korean Americans' request for plural citizenship was first met with a special visa giving *de facto* dual citizen status before introducing a selective dual citizenship policy in 2010. The "Overseas Korean (F-4)" visa was introduced by the Kim Dae Jung administration (1998–2003) after the 1997 East Asian financial crisis. Through the 1999 Overseas Korean Act, qualifying ethnic Koreans could enjoy advantages in entering and exiting the country, long-term stays (up to three years), employment, equal rights as Korean nationals in economic transactions (e.g., real estate, finance, foreign exchange), health insurance, and patriots and veterans benefits. The goal was to provide a *de facto* dual citizen status for overseas Koreans to satisfy the long-standing demands from the diasporic communities, yet circumvent problems of military conscription and taxation and diplomatic conflicts as well as negative national sentiments that may have arisen from allowing legal dual citizenship (*Kwanbo* 1999).

However, the 1999 Overseas Korean Act had formally excluded ethnic Koreans in China and CIS countries by restricting eligibility to former South Korean nationals. During the Cold War, the Korean state's relationship with emigrants mainly centered upon diasporic communities in North America and Japan rather than those in China or the Soviet Union. However, after renewing diplomatic relations with China in 1992 and the end of the Cold War, large populations of ethnic Koreans in China and former Soviet Union countries had to be also considered in

¹² New legislations were enacted to specify a separate legal status for "Overseas Koreans," such as the 1997 Overseas Koreans Foundation Act and the 1999 Overseas Korean Act (Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans).

building government policies on overseas Koreans (or *chaeoe tongp'o*, “overseas brethren”). The conflict between these two groups, postwar emigrants (mainly Korean Americans) and prewar emigrants (mainly ethnic Koreans in China), culminated during the process of introducing the 1999 Overseas Korean Act.

The 1999 Overseas Korean Act Excludes Koreans in China and CIS Countries

In the 1999 Overseas Korean Act, the main point of contention was defining membership, or *who* could be identified as overseas Koreans. At first, overseas Koreans were defined by “the former possession of South Korean citizenship” or “time of departure,” i.e., leaving the country after 1948 as a citizen of the new Republic of Korea. This definition by period of departure (and “the former possession of South Korean citizenship”) is invariably tied to their current country of residence. Immediately, the proposal met strong criticism for excluding the larger Korean diaspora in China (and Russia), many of whom left the Korean peninsula during the Japanese colonial period, well before the South Korean state was established in 1948. In 2001, the Constitutional Court ruled the act as unconstitutional and discriminatory, calling for a subsequent revision in 2004, which expanded the definition of “Overseas Koreans” to include colonial-era emigrants who left before 1948 without South Korean citizenship (Constitutional Court 2001).

Despite the amendment in 2004 and another revision in 2008, Koreans from China and CIS countries continue to face additional barriers in getting the “Overseas Korean (F-4)” visa. First, by requiring colonial family registry records to prove their membership, migrants who had emigrated before 1922 or had difficulty getting this documentation were formally excluded (Lee,

J. 2010:29; Chŏng, J. 2014; also see Kim, Jaeun 2009:155).¹³ Second, the state effectively ruled out low-skilled emigrants from obtaining the “Overseas Korean (F-4)” status by prohibiting F-4 visa holders from engaging in “simple labor activities.”¹⁴ Additional documentation is required for persons from “countries with many illegal immigrants,” such as China and CIS countries, making it harder for these groups to acquire the visa (Kim, Jaeun 2009:155; Kwak 2011:66).¹⁵

It is important to note that none of these additional requirements apply to ethnic Koreans from other advanced economies as they only need to prove they have a parent or a grandparent with South Korean nationality. It is only those from China and CIS countries that are barred from acquiring the “Overseas Korean (F-4)” visa through various obstacles to screen out low-skilled migrants.¹⁶ In other words, the state divides emigrants by their current nationality (or the economic status of their originating countries) and restricts the type of occupations that the “less desirable” emigrants can hold by controlling their access to this *de facto* dual citizen status.

¹³ The Family Registration System was introduced in colonial Korea in 1922. Many migrants these days have no knowledge of their family lineage and are unable to obtain relevant documents.

¹⁴ Enforcement Decree of the Immigration Act (English Translation). Presidential Decree No. 28244, August 16, 2017. Accessed January 24, 2020. http://elaw.klri.re.kr/kor_service/lawView.do?hseq=44667&lang=ENG.
Immigration Act (English Translation). Act No. 15159, December 12, 2017. Accessed January 24, 2020. http://elaw.klri.re.kr/kor_service/lawView.do?hseq=46316&lang=ENG.

¹⁵ Out of 91,062 “Overseas Korean (F-4)” visa holders between 2000 and 2003, only sixteen of them were from China. After the revision of the Overseas Korean Act in March 2004, not a single Korean-Chinese was able to get the visa (Kwak 2011:66).

¹⁶ For instance, those from non-OECD countries, must either have an Associate degree, work as a CEO or own a company with a revenue of over 100,000 dollars to apply for the “Overseas Korean (F-4)” visa. Those with or more than 2 years of work experience in manufacture or a state-certified technical license in Korea can apply for F-4 visa (Chŏng, J. 2014).

Reasons for Separate Treatment of Ethnic Koreans from China and CIS countries

The Korean government has listed two reasons for the separate treatment of ethnic Koreans from China and CIS countries in emigrant policies. First, the prominent wage gap between Korea and these countries may entice large numbers of ethnic Koreans to work in low-wage jobs, causing a disruption in the Korean labor market.¹⁷ Second, diplomatic friction may arise with China and Russia as both states view ethnic Koreans as part of their citizenry. Li Bin, China's Ambassador to the Republic of Korea in 2002, warned that the Korean-Chinese are Chinese citizens who are part of China, a country with fifty-six ethnic groups, right after the 2001 Constitutional Court ruling (Chi 2001; Cho, P. 2002). As China does not allow dual citizenship, the Overseas Korean Act—which gives *de facto* dual citizen status to overseas Koreans—may conflict with Chinese law.

Thus, geopolitical interests of the state, such as national security and diplomatic relations, as well as concerns regarding disruption in the labor market have created a two-tiered coethnic policy in Korea. Korea's coethnic policy is currently divided between a migrant labor policy for ethnic Koreans in China and CIS countries and an overseas Korean policy for Koreans in other regions. As part of this larger multi-tiered coethnic policy, the selective dual citizenship policy continues to favorably treat Korean Americans while discriminating against ethnic Koreans from China and CIS countries.

¹⁷ A Ministry of Labor official expressed concern that only 500,000 out of 2.4 million ethnic Koreans in China and Russia would suffice to throw the labor market into confusion (Yi and Yi 2001).

Korean Americans' Request for Formal Dual Nationality after the Overseas Korean Act

Even after introducing the Overseas Korean (F-4) visa, Korean Americans have continuously asked for formal recognition of dual citizenship. Korean presidents and presidential candidates have frequently addressed the issue to win the support of overseas Koreans, mainly Korean Americans. It became even more important to secure their support with the start of overseas citizen voting in 2012 for the legislative election for the 19th National Assembly.¹⁸

Before introducing the 2010 Amendment, President Lee Myung-Bak hinted that dual nationality would be allowed during a meeting with Korean Americans in New York on April 15, 2008. As a response to Korean Americans' request to expand job opportunities for second-generation Korean Americans in Korea, he presented a plan to scout young second-generation Koreans in the field of education, finance, science, and technology.¹⁹

Demographic Challenges and Dual Nationality as a Policy for Managing Human Resources Based on Geopolitical and Economic Interests

Roughly a decade after the launch of the 1999 Overseas Korean Act, which gave *de facto* dual citizen status (i.e., "Overseas Korean [F-4] visa") to qualified coethnic groups, Korea introduced a selective dual citizenship policy in 2010. With a rapidly aging population and extremely low fertility rates, Korea has continued to lose many of its skilled labor to other

¹⁸ Following a Constitutional Court ruling in 2007 (Constitutional Court Decision 2007), overseas Korean citizens started to vote in both presidential elections and legislative elections, but not for local elections. Those without a registered address in Korea (e.g., mostly Koreans who are permanent residents in another country) cannot vote for the parliamentary district elections, but can vote for proportionate representation and presidential elections.

¹⁹ Sin, *Sisa Magazine*, June 5, 2008.

advanced economies. While competition for skilled workers has intensified between countries over the recent decades, Korea has faced much difficulty in both retaining and recruiting skilled workers. Thus, one of the main goals of the dual citizenship policy was to tackle demographic challenges by recruiting specific groups that fulfill material and symbolic interests of the state.

In the sections to follow, I focus on how the Korean state has created a selective dual citizenship policy to meet its material (e.g., recruiting skilled workers) and non-material (e.g., strengthening ethnic national identity and boosting fertility) needs. As part of a larger immigration system, the dual citizenship policy is also based on two axes: “national identity” and “political economy” (Zolberg 1999, 2006). On one hand, geopolitical and economic interests have led the state to extend dual citizenship for high-skilled workers and favorably treat Korean Americans over ethnic Koreans in China and CIS countries in dual citizenship policy. On the other hand, the Korean state has used dual citizenship policy to strengthen ethnic national identity and tackle fertility decline by extending dual citizenship to groups with less visible economic utility, such as return migrants over age sixty-five and marriage migrants.

In the sections that follow, I first review the demographic challenges that the Korean state faces: low fertility, aging population, brain drain, and a shortage of skilled labor. Next, I use the economic utility perspective to explain the Korean state’s use of dual citizenship policy to recruit high-skilled workers. I reveal that the high-skilled category of dual citizenship policy also favorably treats Korean Americans and those of Korean descent over other non-Korean applicants. Therefore, while the selective dual citizenship policy also functions as a coethnic policy, it has continued to exclude Koreans in China and CIS countries based on economic and geopolitical interests of the state. In the last section of this chapter, I argue that symbolic interests

of the state, such as strengthening ethnic national identity, were also important factors shaping dual citizenship policies. Korean adoptees, marriage migrants, and return migrants over age sixty-five were also included in the plural nationality policy despite having less visible economic utility.

Dual Nationality as a Solution to Net Population Loss

According to the Vice Minister of Justice, Hwang Hŭi-ch'öl (2010:5), there were two primary reasons for introducing the 2010 Amendment: to reduce net population loss and to facilitate a smoother recruitment of skilled workers. He added that Korea's strict "one nationality only" policy has led as many as 95 percent of (mostly resident) dual nationals by birth to renounce or lose Korean citizenship, resulting in a serious negative balance in citizen population (Hwang 2010:5).²⁰ In addition to recruiting high-skilled labor, another important goal of the dual citizenship policy was to retain resident plural citizens, which will be discussed in Chapter 4.

The Korean state's concern with brain drain and a dwindling labor force is based on empirical grounds. First, Korea is losing a greater number of citizens than gaining new members in nationality statistics. Second, a consistent number of skilled Korean workers with college education has moved to other OECD countries, resulting in a shortage of high-skilled labor. Third, the Korean government has failed to recruit skilled workers from overseas. The migrant labor policy in Korea has been largely structured around the need for semi-skilled and low-skilled workers rather than high-skilled workers.

²⁰ Hwang, Hŭi-ch'öl 황 희철. 2010. *Che 287-hoe Kukhoe Pŏpche Sabŏp Wiwŏnhoe hoeŭirok, che 2-ho* 제 287회 국회 법제 사법 위원회 회의록 제 2호 [287th National Assembly, Minutes of the Legislation and Judiciary Committee, No. 2], February 23, 2010, specific quote on page 5.


Korea's Population Crisis: An Aging Population, Lowest-low Fertility Rates, and Brain Drain

With a rapidly aging population and lowest-low fertility rate well below replacement-level,²¹ Korea currently faces a population crisis (Statistics Korea 2019f). The size of working-age population between ages 15 and 64 is projected to decrease after reaching its peak, 3,7574,000 in 2017, resulting in serious labor shortages and high old-age dependency ratios (Statistics Korea 2019f).²² Korea is also losing its skilled labor to other developed countries, as indicated by the steady stream of out-migration, especially among college graduates. The number of Korean emigrants has declined after reaching its peak in the 1970s and 1980s with 30,000–40,000 leaving the country each year. However, in recent years, an increasing number of Korean students choose to settle overseas after finishing their studies.

²¹ The percentage of population aged sixty-five and over was 13.1 percent in 2015 and is expected to increase up to 37.1 percent in 2060 (United Nations 2015). The average total fertility rate (2010–15) was as low as 1.26 (United Nations 2015).

²² The percentage of working-age population was predicted to peak in 2017 (73.2 percent) and gradually decrease (Statistics Korea 2019f). In 1970, the old-age dependency ratio was six seniors for every 100 working-age people. This has increased to eighteen seniors in 2015 and is projected to further increase up to fifty-four seniors for every 100 workers in 2040 (United Nations 2015).

Figure 3. Cumulative number of naturalizations and reinstatements compared to loss and renunciation of Korean nationality (1969-2007)




Source: President's Council on National Competitiveness (PCNC). 2008. "Policy for Recruiting Global High-skilled Labor Force." Presented at the 2nd Meeting for the Enhancement of National Competitiveness, April 29, 2008.

Official statistics show that the number of Koreans renouncing Korean nationality is far greater than the number of newly minted citizens. As Figure 3 shows, the cumulative gap between the number of naturalizations and reinstatements combined (shown in blue) and the number of renunciation and loss of nationality cases (shown in red) has dramatically increased over the last four decades from 1969 to 2007. Between 1998 and 2007, as many as 171,552 have given up or lost Korean citizenship, while 62,579 have acquired Korean nationality.²³ Figure 4 shows the annual trend in numbers of those who acquired or reclaimed Korean citizenship, in comparison with those who renounced or lost Korean nationality between 2008 and 2012. Again, the number of naturalized Koreans only makes up two-thirds or three-quarters of the number of those renouncing citizenship in most years, except 2009 when the number of international marriages tripled.

²³ The numbers slightly differ from the most recent statistics released, which is given in Table 20 (Ministry of Justice 2018, *Korea Immigration Service Statistics*).

Figure 4. Number of naturalizations and reinstatements compared to loss and renunciation of Korean nationality (By year, 1991-2018)



Source: Ministry of Justice. 2008-2018b. *Korea Immigration Service Statistics*.

Brain Drain in Korea

South Korea’s on-going brain drain is documented by steady emigration rates, a high proportion of tertiary educated among its emigrant stock, a substantially large population of students studying overseas, and consistently high scores on the brain drain index (see Table 18).²⁴

²⁴ The brain drain score, developed by the International Institute of Management Development (IMD), is calculated based on the executive opinion survey data. Each year a survey is sent to executives in top and middle management in all of the economies covered by the World Competitiveness Yearbook, which asks respondents to assess the situation in their own country (IMD World Competitiveness Center 2019:5).

First, between 2000 and 2010, Korea’s total emigration rate to OECD countries and the size of emigrant population in OECD countries (for persons over age fifteen) have slightly increased from 3.8 percent to 4.1 percent and from 1,446,700 to 1,773,200, respectively (OECD 2015:226).²⁵ Approximately half of Korean emigrants living in OECD countries aged fifteen and over had tertiary education (see Appendix, Table A8).

Table 14. Top countries of origin of international students in OECD

	Number of international students in 2012	Share of all international students in 2012	Change between 2008 and 2012
China	625,100	24%	53%
India	168,410	6%	3%
Germany	120,220	5%	49%
Korea	119,930	5%	9%
France	59,550	2%	38%
Saudi Arabia	54,700	2%	218%
Vietnam	48,240	2%	61%
United States	46,260	2%	5%
Malaysia	45,360	2%	5%
Italy	44 880	2%	52%

Source: OECD Education Database. (OECD 2015:31). StatLink accessed January 24, 2020. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933271121>.

²⁵ Korea’s emigration rate is close to the total emigration rate of OECD countries. The total emigration rate of persons aged fifteen and over born in OECD countries and living in the OECD area was 4 percent in 2010–11 (OECD 2015:174). In the OECD DIOC 2011 data, emigration rate is calculated by dividing the emigrant population by the total population residing in the country of origin (including non-native migrant populations).

Table 15. The number of Korean students in the U.S. by major (2007-2012)

	Undergraduate						Graduate					
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
All fields	31,527 (100)	32,840 (100)	36,520 (100)	38,700 (100)	37,110 (100)	40,670 (100)	25,725 (100)	23,620 (100)	25,060 (100)	23,500 (100)	21,310 (100)	21,200 (100)
S&E	7,044 (22.3)	7,950 (24.2)	8,940 (24.5)	10,410 (26.9)	10,210 (27.5)	11,360 (27.9)	10,068 (39.1)	9,830 (41.6)	10,120 (40.4)	9,210 (39.2)	8,200 (38.5)	7,810 (36.8)
Non S&E	24,483 (77.7)	24,890 (75.8)	27,580 (75.5)	28,290 (73.1)	26,900 (72.5)	29,300 (72.1)	15,657 (60.1)	13,790 (58.4)	14,940 (59.6)	14,290 (60.8)	13,110 (61.5)	13,390 (63.2)

Note: S&E stands for “Science and Engineering” fields, including psychology and social sciences. Percentages in parentheses.
 Source: NSF (2007-2012), Science and Engineering Indicators. Cited as the source in (Kim, Jin-yong 2015:43).

Second, Korea has a particularly large population of students studying overseas (see Appendix, Table A9 for the annual trend of students studying overseas).²⁶ Table 14 shows that Korea ranks fourth for the total number of students in OECD countries with 119,930 students in 2012.²⁷ In Table 15, 40,670 undergraduate and 21,200 graduate students from Korea were in the U.S in 2012, with a majority of them studying in non-science and engineering fields.²⁸

²⁶ In Table A9, the total number of Korean students studying overseas (including short-term language programs) has rapidly increased by 1.8 times from 149,933 in 2001 to 262,465 in 2012, but has been on the decline since 2012.

²⁷ While China and India account for 30 percent of all international students, Germany and Korea each account for 5 percent (OECD 2015:31).

²⁸ Table 15 shows the distribution of Korean undergraduate and graduate students in the U.S. with temporary visas by field of study between 2007 and 2012.

Table 16. Korean doctorate recipients with temporary visas intending to stay in the United States after doctorate receipt (2002–2014)

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
% of Korean recipients in the total	11.4	11.6	11.6	11.2	10.9	9.5	9.4	10.4	10.1	10.2	10	8.8	8.1
All temporary visa holders	9,747	10,595	11,622	12,847	14,213	15,170	15,261	14,737	13,636	14,235	14,784	15,684	15,852
% Staying	67.1	65.7	66.4	70.1	72.9	74.1	73.5	70.7	69.1	70.1	70.7	70.1	71.1
Number of Koreans	1,109	1,229	1,351	1,442	1,545	1,437	1,442	1,526	1,381	1,445	1,472	1,384	1,286
% of Koreans staying	65	61	64.8	63.6	63.2	66.7	66.6	64.9	62.1	60	60.6	59.1	60.7

Note: Percentages based on all doctorate recipients on temporary visas who indicated where they intended to stay after graduation (United States versus foreign location), not just those with definite commitments for employment or postdoctoral study.

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Sources: NSF, NIH, USED, USDA, NEH, NASA, Survey of Earned Doctorates 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014. NSF 2016 & 2012 Science and Engineering Indicators.

Table 17. Plans of foreign recipients of U.S. doctorates to stay in the U.S., by field of doctorate and place of origin (1998–2013)

Field and place of origin	Foreign S&E doctorate recipients				Plans to stay (%)				Definite plans to stay (%)			
	1998-2001	2002-2005	2006-2009	2010-2013	1998-2001	2002-2005	2006-2009	2010-2013	1998-2001	2002-2005	2006-2009	2010-2013
All S&E fields	38,430	41,723	56,111	56,294	71.6	73.6	77.3	74.8	49.4	49.3	51.5	47.5
China*	9,992	11,525	17,233	16,299	90.8	91.8	89.1	84.4	62.0	60.3	57.8	52.8
India	3,867	3,624	8,265	8,865	88.2	88.3	88.6	85.9	66.5	62.9	60.2	54.9
South Korea	3,308	4,166	4,976	4,683	61.3	69.5	69.6	65.1	41.1	42.9	45.4	41.9
Taiwan	3,072	1,919	2,115	2,429	63.4	65.1	67.3	71.4	38.1	38.5	40.7	41.5
Turkey	958	1,428	1,794	1,775	58.2	60.4	70.5	64.7	40.5	42.2	48.7	43.0
Canada	1,286	1,496	1,745	1,597	68.4	66.6	66.4	66.3	52.4	50.9	47.4	47.3
Korean doctorate recipients by field												
Physical and earth sciences	451	514	600	526	71.4	83.3	77.7	69.6	54.5	62.3	57.0	50.4
Biological sciences	578	493	644	578	79.4	92.7	86.6	86.2	60.2	69.4	63.7	58.5
Health sciences	107	116	190	174	57.0	76.7	77.9	72.4	38.3	37.9	48.9	37.9
Mathematics and computer science	306	362	489	488	66.7	77.3	74.0	68.2	39.9	49.7	46.0	42.8
Social science	677	731	853	861	32.9	44.6	48.1	45.5	18.9	27.5	30.5	28.0
Engineering	1,189	1,782	2,052	1,925	63.9	66.2	68.1	64.6	39.9	34.6	41.6	40.7

* Includes Hong Kong.

Notes: S&E stands for “Science and Engineering” fields, including psychology and social sciences. For each broad field of doctorate, data are presented for the source countries with the largest numbers of U.S. doctorate recipients in that field in 2010–13. Data include foreign doctorate recipients who are on permanent or temporary visas and also those whose visa status is unknown. The information on a plan to stay or a

Table 17 (continued). Plans of foreign recipients of U.S. doctorates to stay in the U.S., by field of doctorate and place of origin (1998–2013)

definite plan to stay reflects intentions within the year after graduation as reported by the doctoral recipient around the graduation date. Recipients who plan to stay think they will locate in the United States; those with definite plans have a postdoctoral research appointment or a definite employment plan in the United States. Percentages are based on the total number of foreign S&E doctorate recipients, including those who did not report their postgraduate location plans or employment plans. The percentage of foreign S&E doctorate recipients who did not report postgraduate location plans ranged from 2.0 percent to 4.1 percent over the 2002–13 period, and the percentage who either did not report postgraduate location plans or did not report employment plans ranged from 3.3 percent to 6.7 percent over that period.

Source: National Science Foundation, National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics, special tabulations of Survey of Earned Doctorates (1998–13).

National Science Board (NSB). 2016. Science and Engineering Indicators 2016. Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation (NSB 2016-1). Available at <http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2016/nsb20161/>.

Third, many Korean students choose to stay overseas after finishing their studies. In Table 16, between 2002 and 2014, 60–67 percent of Korean doctorate recipients wanted to remain in the U.S.²⁹ As Table 17 shows, among all science and engineering doctorate recipients (including psychology and social sciences), the percentage of Koreans with a definite commitment for employment or postdoctoral study in the U.S. has hovered around 41–45 percent between 1998 and 2013. This figure was particularly higher for those in physical and biological sciences, ranging 50–62 percent and 59–69 percent, respectively. As a result, a substantial number of Korean students settle in the U.S. each year. Korea is the third largest provider of international scholars in the U.S. after China and India (see Appendix, Table A10).³⁰ As more Korean doctorate recipients settle in the U.S., the number of those returning to Korea seems to have declined (see Tables A11 and A12).^{31, 32}

²⁹ Table 16 shows the annual number and percentage of U.S. doctoral recipients from Korea in all fields with temporary visas and the percentage of those with the intention to stay in the U.S. from 2002 to 2014.

³⁰ Table A10 shows that Koreans accounted for 5.9 percent (7,415) of all scholars in the U.S. in 2014–15.

³¹ In Table A11, the number of Koreans registering foreign doctorate degrees has decreased by half from 1,202 in 2000 to 651 in 2013, and the rate of reduction was greater in science and engineering fields (Kim, Jin-yong 2015:44).

³² In Table A12, the actual number of Koreans with foreign doctorate degrees seems to differ from the official statistics based on self-registration. In accordance with Article 27 of the Higher Education Act (Reporting Foreign Doctorate Degrees), the National Research Foundation (NRF) of Korea collects the data on foreign doctoral degree recipients with Korean nationality.

Table 18. The annual trend of brain drain index (2004-2019)

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Korea	4.50 (44)	5.91 (25)	4.91 (40)	5.89 (19)	5.11 (27)	3.44 (48)	3.69 (42)	3.68 (44)	3.40 (49)	4.63 (37)	3.74 (46)	3.98 (44)	3.60 (46)	3.57 (54)	4.00 (43)	4.81 (30)
United States	8.19 (3)	7.88 (3)	7.84 (4)	7.22 (5)	7.07 (4)	6.64 (7)	6.84 (5)	7.15 (5)	7.21 (4)	7.11 (5)	7.28 (4)	6.82 (4)	7.33 (3)	6.64 (6)	6.83 (6)	6.86 (8)
Japan	6.77 (13)	6.53 (15)	6.75 (16)	5.70 (21)	6.24 (11)	6.39 (10)	5.78 (18)	5.89 (17)	4.87 (35)	4.90 (32)	4.76 (32)	4.49 (34)	4.42 (35)	4.85 (30)	5.20 (27)	4.13 (44)
Singapore	7.14 (7)	6.59 (14)	6.93 (13)	7.08 (8)	6.62 (8)	5.78 (15)	6.13 (11)	6.01 (16)	6.59 (11)	5.78 (17)	5.70 (19)	5.73 (18)	6.49 (11)	6.36 (10)	6.18 (12)	6.84 (9)
Finland	6.71 (16)	7.34 (6)	7.59 (6)	6.92 (11)	6.52 (9)	7.27 (2)	6.79 (6)	6.84 (7)	6.96 (11)	7.28 (4)	7.76 (3)	6.83 (3)	6.54 (10)	6.04 (16)	6.17 (13)	5.88 (21)
Sweden	6.41 (21)	6.29 (19)	6.51 (18)	6.56 (12)	6.68 (7)	6.62 (9)	6.77 (7)	7.25 (3)	7.03 (5)	7.51 (3)	6.78 (7)	6.82 (4)	7.30 (4)	6.42 (8)	6.60 (8)	6.89 (7)
India	6.97 (10)	6.25 (21)	6.76 (15)	5.50 (25)	5.11 (26)	5.73 (16)	5.89 (16)	6.29 (12)	6.03 (18)	5.89 (15)	5.54 (22)	4.87 (29)	4.91 (30)	5.52 (22)	5.03 (31)	4.75 (31)
China	3.13 (55)	3.51 (54)	3.22 (57)	3.48 (46)	3.66 (42)	2.93 (52)	3.46 (45)	3.49 (48)	3.52 (47)	3.04 (51)	3.79 (45)	4.07 (41)	3.95 (42)	4.20 (41)	4.23 (40)	4.71 (32)

Note: The index ranges from 0 to 10. A score of 10 indicates that brain drain does not negatively impact country's economy, and 0 means that brain drain hinders competitiveness in country's economy. Ranking of each country is given in parentheses.

Sources: Institute for Management Development (IMD). 2004-2014. *World Competitiveness Yearbook*.
 IMD World Competitiveness Center. 2015-2016. *IMD World Talent Report*.
 IMD World Competitiveness Center. 2017-2019. *IMD World Talent Ranking*.

Table 19. The percentage of skilled workers among foreign workforce in Korea (2004-2018)

Year	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total number of foreign workers (A)	241,401	198,334	260,784	476,179	548,553	551,858	557,941	595,098	529,690	549,202	617,145	625,129	597,783	581,480	594,991
Skilled foreign workers (B)	17,916	20,333	24,501	29,081	32,473	36,393	39,446	42,849	45,359	44,766	43,748	42,998	43,438	41,981	41,916
% of skilled foreign workers (B/A)	7.4%	10.3%	9.4%	6.1%	5.9%	6.6%	7.1%	7.2%	8.6%	8.2%	7.1%	6.9%	7.3%	7.2%	7.0%
Language instructors (C)	11,516	12,439	15,001	17,721	19,771	22,642	23,317	22,541	21,603	20,030	17,949	16,144	15,450	14,352	13,749
% of lang. instructors among skilled foreign workers (C/B)	64.3%	61.2%	61.2%	60.9%	60.9%	62.2%	59.1%	52.6%	47.6%	44.7%	41.0%	37.5%	35.6%	34.2%	32.8%
% of skilled workers excluding lang. instructors ((B-C)/A)	2.70%	4.00%	3.60%	2.40%	2.30%	2.50%	2.90%	3.40%	4.50%	4.50%	4.20%	4.3%	4.7%	4.8%	4.7%

Note: The total number of foreign workers is the sum of all foreign residents holding following visas: E-1 (Professor), E-2 (Foreign language instructor), E-3 (Research), E-4 (Technology transfer), E-5 (Professional employment), E-6 (Artistic performer), E-7 (Designated activities), E-8 (Training employment), E-9 (Non-professional employment), E-10 (Crew employee), and H-2 (Working visit). The H-2 (Working visit) visa was created in 2007 to replace the E-8 (Training employment) visa program. The number of skilled foreign workers includes those holding professional work visas, ranging from E-1 (Professor) through E-5 (Professional employment) and E-7 (Designated activities).

Sources:

1. Ministry of Justice 2010. “‘Amendment to the Immigration Control Act’ Passed at the National Assembly Including Providing Fingerprints and Facial Information of Foreigners Entering the Country.” *Press Release*, April 21, 2010.
2. Ministry of Justice. 2008-2018b. *Korea Immigration Service Statistics*.

Fourth, brain drain in Korea is less severe than China, but much worse than other countries, such as Japan, India, Singapore, and the United States (IMD 2016). In Table 18, the brain drain index of Korea ranges from 3.40 in 2012 to 5.91 in 2005 between the years 2004 and 2019. A score of 0 means that brain drain hinders a country's competitiveness in the economy while a score of 10 indicates the opposite.³³

Korea Falls Behind in Recruiting Skilled Workers

In addition to a constant outflow of highly educated Koreans to OECD destinations, Korea has not been successful in recruiting high-skilled workers from abroad. Compared to other countries with a larger size of skilled migrant workers, Korea's migrant labor policies are still heavily centered on importing semi-skilled manual labor for short-term use. In Table 19, high-skilled migrant workers account for only 5–10 percent of the entire pool of registered migrant workers in Korea between 2004 and 2019. The percentage of high-skilled non-Korean workers further drops to 2 to 4 percent after excluding language instructors, who comprise 40 to 60 percent of the entire skilled foreign workforce. Korea lags behind other countries in attracting researchers and scientists as well as high-skilled foreign labor (see Tables A13 and A14).³⁴

³³ In Table 18, Korea fares worse than Japan, which has scored between 4.13 (2019) and 6.77 (2004), but better than China, which has ranged between 2.93 (2009) and 4.71 (2019). In comparison, the United States has scored between 6.64 (2009) and 8.19 (2004) (Shin and Choi 2015:65).

³⁴ Both indices shown in Tables A13 and A14 in the Appendix are developed by the IMD and calculated based on the executive opinion survey data. A score of 10 means that foreign high-skilled workers or researchers and scientists are very much attracted to the country. In Table A13, Korea fluctuates between 3.78 (2007) and 5.29 (2012) in attracting foreign high-skilled workers. In Table A14, Korea ranges between 4.38 (2014) and 4.69 (2010) for attracting researchers and scientists. In contrast, the U.S. and Singapore, the two top ranking countries, have scores ranging between 7 and 8.

Dual Nationality for Recruiting the Highly Skilled

As seen in the previous section, Korea has continued to lose much of its skilled labor to other countries while failing to attract high-skilled workers from abroad. Thus, one of the rationales for introducing dual nationality has been the need to recruit skilled workers from overseas. From the state's perspective, dual citizenship policy (as part of a greater immigration system) is expected to fulfill its economic interests by recruiting skilled workers.

Immediately after President Lee Myung-Bak took office in 2008, a new council was created with a goal to boost the economic potential of the country: the President's Council on National Competitiveness (*Kukka Kyōngjaengnyōk Kanghwa Wiwōnhoe*, hereafter PCNC).³⁵ PCNC started to push for the 2010 Nationality Act Amendment, emphasizing that dual nationality policy would raise the country's international competitiveness by recruiting the best and brightest minds from overseas (PCNC 2008).³⁶

Special Naturalization for Skilled Workers

With the goal of attracting high-skilled workers through dual citizenship policy, the Korean government created a fast track to plural citizenship for skilled workers. Each category of skilled talent was carefully chosen based on their usefulness for "national interests" (Nationality Act 2010, "Reasons for Amendment"). For instance, highly-skilled professionals are

³⁵ Previous administrations have also considered allowing dual citizenship. The Kim Young Sam administration (1993–98), in the process of pursuing *segzehwa* (globalization) and *sin kyo-p'o* (new overseas Korean) policies, has considered allowing dual citizenship (Lee, C. 2008:161). The first draft of the 2010 Amendment (to allow dual citizenship for highly skilled and dual citizens who fulfilled military service) was created under the Roh Moo Hyun administration (2003–2008).

³⁶ PCNC's (2008) presentation slides at the 2nd Meeting on the Enhancement of National Competitiveness on April 29, 2008.

selected for their “projected contribution to science, economy, culture, and sports, raising the country’s competitiveness” (National Act 2010, “Reasons for Amendment”). A high-skilled talent is defined as “a person acknowledged to contribute to the national interests of Korea, who has very excellent ability in a specific field, such as science, economy, culture, sport, etc.” (Nationality Act, Article 7).³⁷

Through the 2010 Nationality Act Amendment, the government has enabled skilled workers to obtain Korean citizenship instantly without meeting the five-year residency requirement. “Special naturalization,” an expedited path to citizenship with fewer requirements (originally created for children of Korean citizens), has become available for the highly skilled as well as for individuals who have made special contributions to the Korean state.³⁸ After going through “special naturalization,” high-skilled workers can keep plural nationality by submitting a vow not to exercise foreign citizenship within Korea (e.g., attending schools or working as a foreign citizen). In order to acquire Korean nationality and maintain plural citizen status, high-skilled applicants must first pass a review process conducted by the Naturalization Deliberation Committee. Although applicants for the “special naturalization” do not have to be of Korean descent, most of them are of Korean descent, as I will show in the following section.

³⁷ Nationality Act [*Kukchŏkpŏp*] 국적법 (English Translation). Act No. 15752, September 18, 2018, Article 7. Accessed January 24, 2020.
http://elaw.klri.re.kr/kor_service/lawView.do?hseq=48862&lang=ENG.

³⁸ Applicants for “special naturalization” do not need to meet the five-year residency requirement, or be an adult (i.e., age nineteen and over), or provide financial proof of being able to support oneself. They still need to pass the Korean language test.

The Hidden Focus: Recruiting Skilled Workers among Overseas Koreans

Despite the state's emphasis on recruiting skilled workers, the hidden goal of the dual citizenship policy was to import skilled workers among Koreans overseas, particularly from the U.S. In a media interview,³⁹ Kang Man-su, the director of President's Council on National Competitiveness, urged the need to actively recruit the 7 million overseas Koreans, including non-resident citizens and foreign nationals of Korean descent, to combat declining fertility rates and labor shortages. As stated by director Kang:

Advanced economies have solved the low fertility problem with immigration. We should also consider opening doors to immigration. Rather than opening doors without any plan, we should think of overseas Koreans and allow them to come and live in Korea if necessary... We can't do anything if their country of residence does not allow plural nationality, but there is no need for us to prohibit dual nationality. If it is impossible, we can at least give them permanent residency and make them live in Korea. Then, the problems of labor [shortage] and fertility decline will be solved. We shouldn't just permit [dual nationality] but actively recruit these people (Chōn 2009).

The Korean government's ulterior motive to recruit high-skilled Koreans through dual citizenship policy is further revealed through the preferential treatment of Koreans in the "special naturalization" category. In a personal interview in 2012,⁴⁰ a member of the Naturalization Deliberation Committee confirmed that applicants for "special naturalization" reviews are predominantly of Korean descent. In 2013, the Ministry of Justice reduced the eligibility requirements of "special naturalization" by a half for persons of Korean descent. The government's decision to lower the bar for ethnic Koreans was a response to consistent requests

³⁹ Chōn, *Financial Times*, September 21, 2009.

⁴⁰ Personal interview, June 2012.

from overseas Korean American communities to relax the conditions for obtaining plural nationality (Korea Immigration Service 2013:92).⁴¹

Although the Korean state has repeatedly advertised dual citizenship policy as a necessary measure to recruit skilled workers, the hidden intention was to bring in skilled Koreans, such as Korean Americans, from overseas. In the section below, I discuss how the selective dual citizenship policy functions as a coethnic policy and continues to exclude Koreans in China and CIS countries based on geopolitical and economic interests.

Dual Citizenship Policy as a Coethnic Policy and the Geopolitical and Economic Interests of the State

While the selective dual citizenship policy in Korea is a tool for managing a wide range of human resources (e.g., resident and non-resident citizens, coethnics, and non-coethnic migrants), it also functions as a coethnic policy in many ways. First, access to dual citizenship is preferentially given to ethnic Koreans, as often observed in countries with large diasporas. As many as three out of five categories are open to ethnic Koreans only (e.g., dual citizens by birth, including those who have involuntarily acquired foreign nationality; returning migrants over age sixty-five; and Korean adoptees overseas) while the other two categories (e.g., marriage migrants and the highly-skilled) are open to both Koreans and non-Koreans (Nationality Act, Article 10).

Secondly, among coethnic groups, the Korean dual citizenship policy reveals a clear

⁴¹ Other requests included lowering the age limit for plural citizenship for return migrants; in other words, extending dual citizenship to returning migrants under age sixty-five, but this was not immediately taken up by the Korean government (Ministry of Justice. 2013. *Annual Report Korea Immigration Service*, p. 92).

preference for a specific group, Korean Americans. Ethnic Koreans in China and some CIS countries, on the other hand, are automatically excluded from the dual nationality policy for two reasons. In the case of non-citizens, one must first either restore South Korean nationality or naturalize in order to enjoy plural national status. However, as descendants of the colonial-era emigrants, ethnic Koreans in China and CIS countries have never held South Korean citizenship. Therefore, it is difficult for them to acquire Korean nationality in the first place. Even if they naturalize to acquire Korean citizenship, their host states—China and some of the CIS countries—do not allow dual citizenship.

In contrast, many Korean Americans can reap the benefits of the Korean dual nationality policy. Not only does the United States tolerate dual citizenship, but as postwar emigrants, most Korean Americans are either former South Korean nationals themselves (in the case of returning emigrants) or children of a (former) Korean citizen.⁴² Korean Americans, mostly over age sixty-five, actively took advantage of the new dual citizenship policy. Table 20 shows a two-fold increase in the number of those restoring Korean nationality in 2011 and 2018.⁴³

⁴² While children born to a Korean citizen in a country with *jus soli* system (e.g., Korean Americans) can become a dual citizen, those residing in countries with deferred *jus soli*, such as France or the U.K., are excluded under the current law. For instance, in the U.K., children of permanent residents can claim citizenship at the age of majority, but in such cases Korean children would have to make a choice between two nationalities. In contrast, Korean Americans can maintain plural nationalities by making a pledge not to exercise their rights as foreign citizens within Korea.

⁴³ In Table 20, the number of reinstatements of Korean citizenship increased from 1,010 in 2010 to 2,264 in 2011 and 2,886 in 2014, which is partly due to Korean Americans over age sixty-five restoring Korean nationality to acquire plural citizen status. This category, however, also includes ethnic Koreans in China and CIS countries who have restored their Korean nationality.

Table 20. Nationality Statistics (1991-2018)

Year	Total	Naturalization	Reinstatement of nationality	Loss of nationality	Renunciation of nationality	Choice of (Korean) nationality	Other
1991	12,937	49	489	12,348	51	0	0
1992	9,467	82	505	8,831	49	0	0
1993	15,047	75	608	14,305	59	0	0
1994	6,967	108	962	5,857	40	0	0
1995	1,841	91	898	811	41	0	0
1996	1,905	131	1,308	400	66	0	0
1997	3,416	218	1,851	1,263	84	0	0
1998	4,329	169	1,267	2,364	191	0	338
1999	7,566	156	919	5,904	285	0	302
2000	18,611	199	444	16,168	586	0	1,214
2001	13,269	717	898	10,589	651	2	412
2002	19,070	2,801	817	14,508	708	7	229
2003	38,091	5,966	1,548	29,557	802	38	180
2004	32,601	6,670	1,892	22,070	1,418	148	403
2005	41,892	11,878	4,617	21,996	2,921	35	445
2006	29,340	7,095	557	20,464	683	49	492
2007	34,756	8,475	1,780	22,802	726	69	904
2008	36,134	11,506	3,738	20,163	276	116	335
2009	49,749	25,008	1,707	21,136	886	144	868
2010	42,756	16,286	1,009	22,131	733	1,110	1,487
2011	43,836	16,074	2,263	21,472	1,324	1,308	1,395
2012	33,242	10,533	1,985	17,641	823	1,258	1,002
2013	35,870	11,263	2,685	19,413	677	1,257	575
2014	35,488	11,309	2,886	18,150	1,322	1,326	495
2015	32,996	10,920	2,608	16,595	934	1,358	581
2016	50,929	10,107	2,300	35,257	1,147	1,500	618
2017	36,183	10,082	2,773	19,363	1,905	1,531	529
2018	50,193	11,556	2,698	26,607	6,986	1,719	627

Note: “Loss of nationality” applies to those who acquired foreign citizenship and plural citizens who did not make a formal choice of citizenship. “Renunciation of nationality” represents plural citizens who gave up Korean citizenship to select other foreign citizenship(s). “Choice of (Korean) citizenship” shows the number of plural citizens who have chosen Korean citizenship (and maintain other foreign citizenship). The sudden spikes in “loss of nationality” cases in 2016 and 2018 are a result of processing the accumulated files before the 20th National Assembly election—which allows overseas voting—and the 2018 nationwide simultaneous local elections.

Source: Ministry of Justice. 2018. *Korea Immigration Service Statistics 2018*.

In the section that follows, I show how discrimination against ethnic Koreans in China and CIS countries has continued not only in coethnic policies even after subsequent revisions and

expansion of long-term visa programs, but also in the selective dual citizenship policy introduced in 2010. While geopolitical and economic interests have shaped the dual citizenship policy to prefer skilled workers and Korean Americans over others, material interests alone do not explain the extension of dual citizenship to groups with less visible economic utility.

Dual Nationality Policy Leaves Out Ethnic Koreans in China and CIS Countries

Like the 1999 Overseas Korean Act, the selective dual nationality policy introduced by the 2010 Amendment discriminates against ethnic Koreans in China and CIS countries. For ethnic Koreans in China, it is legally impossible to obtain Korean nationality and maintain dual citizen status as the Chinese government does not recognize plural nationality. Unlike Korean Americans, many ethnic Koreans from China must either acquire Korean citizenship through—paper or real—marriages with a Korean citizen or restore Korean nationality through their parents' or grandparents' family registry records. Recently, as the eligible categories of “Overseas Korean (F-4)” visa has expanded to include more occupations, many ethnic Koreans also choose to acquire this *de facto* dual citizen status instead of going through the hassle of renouncing their Chinese nationality and acquiring Korean citizenship.

For ethnic Koreans in some CIS countries that do allow plural nationality, the only way to become a dual national is to prove that they are “highly-skilled” or marry a Korean national. As descendants of colonial-era and pre-colonial era migrants, most of them have never held South Korean citizenship. Therefore, most ethnic Koreans in CIS countries are left with similar options as the ethnic Koreans in China. They can either restore Korean nationality (if they can prove being first, second, or third-generation of pre-colonial or colonial-era Korean migrants), acquire Korean citizenship by marriage, or obtain an “Overseas Korean (F-4)” visa for selective

occupations and those over age sixty.

Since 2008, the Korean government has gradually extended the “Overseas Korean (F-4)” visa to ethnic Koreans from China and CIS countries on a selective basis. As shown in Table 10, the number of “Overseas Korean (F-4)” visa holders has rapidly increased from 2008 and quadrupled in 2012. Table 10 also shows that the number of “Permanent Residence (F-5)” visa holders has increased since 2012, reflecting the changes in policies to extend long-term visas (i.e., “Overseas Korean [F-4]” and “Permanent Residence [F-5]”) to qualified ethnic Koreans from China and CIS countries in specific occupations. In addition to the highly educated and high-skilled, persons working in specific industries with dire labor shortages (e.g., caregivers) can apply for the “Overseas Korean (F-4)” visa, thereby making exceptions among the “simple laborers.” In particular, ethnic Koreans who have worked in manufacturing, domestic work, or care work for a long time can switch from a “working visit (H-2)” to an “Overseas Korean (F-4)” visa (Lee, J. 2011:16). Moreover, since September 2013, all ethnic Koreans over age sixty can apply for this visa regardless of their current nationality, while restrictions remain for those under age sixty.

Despite the expansion of long-term visas, including the “Overseas Korean (F-4)” visa, to a greater number of ethnic Koreans from China and CIS countries, the selective dual citizenship policy continues to exclude Koreans from China and CIS countries. The preferential treatment of Korean Americans in the dual citizenship law has been repeatedly criticized by immigration experts and representatives from migrant communities (such as the ethnic Chinese in Korea) and various overseas Korean organizations. Kim Pong-sŏp, the president of the Association for Commemoration of the March 1st Movement, has pointed out that the main targets of the revised

nationality law are Korean Americans and people aged sixty-five and over. Kim suggested that the policy needs to provide special measures for the *Zainichi* Koreans in Japan who have either chosen South Korean nationality (*Mindan*) or are practically stateless by keeping their old *Chosŏn* nationality (*Ch'ongryŏn* or *Chōsen Sōren*) and Koreans in China who cannot choose plural nationality (Hong, T. 2010).

In contrast, Korean Americans were not satisfied with the age restriction in the 2010 Amendment. Dual nationality is limited to those over sixty-five, which makes it impossible for many Korean Americans to enjoy *de jure* plural nationality.⁴⁴ After the 2010 Amendment was introduced by the Lee Myung-Bak administration, the subsequent president, Park Geun-Hye (2013–17) mentioned expanding plural nationality to those over age fifty-five (instead of age sixty-five) during her presidential campaign of 2012⁴⁵ and promised to change the age limit during her visit to the U.S. in 2013.⁴⁶

Economic Utility Perspective and the Preferential Treatment of Korean Americans

Preexisting studies on diaspora management have attributed to the differential treatment of coethnic emigrant groups to geopolitical and economic interests of the state. The economic utility perspective can partly explain the reasons for preferential treatment of Korean Americans and the exclusion of Koreans in China and CIS countries in dual citizenship policy. First, Korea maintains a close relationship with the U.S., while its relationships with China, Russia, and CIS

⁴⁴ O, *Dongpo News*, April 23, 2010.

⁴⁵ Kim, H., *Boston Korea*, November 19, 2012.

⁴⁶ Kim, Ch'öl-su, *LA Korea Times*, December 5, 2014.

countries vary by the geopolitical situation in Northeast Asia. Moreover, the U.S. tolerates plural citizenship while China and some CIS countries do not. As ethnic Koreans constitute one of China's official ethnic groups, the Chinese government is strongly opposed to allowing plural nationality to ethnic Koreans in China, which was already shown by Ambassador Li Bin's statement (Chi 2001; Cho, P. 2002).

Second, the wage gap between countries serves as a marker of emigrant's relative economic standing. Korean Americans with higher average income are sought after as potential investors and are included in the dual citizenship and coethnic policies, such as the Overseas Korean Act issuing special visas. In contrast, Koreans in China and CIS countries are viewed as potential sources of labor market disruption. They are included in migrant labor policies, but excluded from dual citizenship and Overseas Korean visas (F-4), with the exception of those over age sixty who can apply for this visa.

The economic utility perspective explains why the Korean state favors Korean Americans over Koreans in China and CIS countries in granting dual citizenship and special visas for overseas Koreans. However, it fails to explain why coethnic groups with less visible economic utility were also included in the dual citizenship policy, such as Korean adoptees overseas, return migrants over age sixty-five, and marriage migrants. Although a majority of Korean adoptees and return migrants sixty-five years and older are from more developed countries in the Western hemisphere, the primary purpose of granting them national membership seems to lie in fortifying ethnic national identity. For marriage migrants, dual citizenship functions as an incentive to stay in marital unions and procreate. In the section to follow, I discuss how dual citizenship policy fulfills the symbolic interests of the state, such as strengthening ethnic national identity and

resolving fertility decline.

Dual Nationality Policy and Symbolic Interests of the State

In the previous sections, I have shown that the selective dual nationality policy has aimed to recruit skilled workers and Korean Americans. The selective dual citizenship policy also functions as a coethnic policy in Korea, favoring Korean Americans over ethnic Koreans from China and CIS countries for geopolitical and economic reasons. While material interests have influenced the development of overseas Korean policies and dual citizenship policy, symbolic interests of the state have also shaped the making of selective dual citizenship policy in Korea. Plural nationality was also extended to groups with less visible economic utility (e.g., returning Korean migrants over age sixty-five and overseas Korean adoptees) to strengthen ethnic national identity and raise fertility (e.g., marriage migrants who stay in marital unions).

The original draft of the 2010 amendment had strictly focused on recruiting “global talents” by allowing them plural nationality. In the final bill, however, dual citizenship was also extended to marriage migrants, Korean adoptees, and returning Korean migrants over age sixty-five in addition to Korean citizens who have involuntarily acquired foreign citizenship (e.g., by birth or marriage). The Ministry of Justice stated that a wide array of relevant groups was added “to protect the rights and interests of social minority groups, such as coethnics and marriage migrants” (Hwang 2010:5) and “to promote social integration” (Lee, K. 2010:3). However, a closer look reveals that each group is selected for specific reasons.

In the sections to follow, I focus on how the Korean state has used the selective dual citizenship policy to fulfill its symbolic interests. First, I show that dual citizenship was extended to coethnic groups with less visible economic utility (i.e., overseas Korean adoptees and

returning migrants over age sixty-five) to strengthen ethnic national identity and mend the state's past mistakes. Next, I discuss how dual citizenship was selectively extended to marriage migrants as a reward for their reproductive contribution to Korean society. Among marriage migrants, only those who stay in marriages have access to faster naturalization and plural nationality.

Dual Nationality Strengthens Ethnic National Identity: Overseas Korean Adoptees and Returning Korean Migrants over Age Sixty-five

The 2010 Amendment allowed overseas adoptees to acquire Korean citizenship as a symbol of belonging while maintaining plural nationality.⁴⁷ As most overseas adoptees did not have a choice to keep their Korean nationality upon adoption, this was seen as a corrective measure to mend the government's past mistake (Yi, Ch'ang-su 2009: 88). Under the previous law, overseas Korean adoptees had to give up their current nationality within six months if they wanted to reclaim Korean nationality, but this was virtually impossible for many as their lives were mostly based in these countries (Seok 2010:14). Since the 2010 Amendment, overseas adoptees can now reacquire Korean nationality without having to give up their adoptive country's citizenship. They simply need to submit the vow to not exercise foreign citizenship within Korea. Another pragmatic reason for including Korean adoptees may be conscription. Most Korean adoptees are exempt from military service even after restoring their Korean nationality as they are listed as orphans in a separate family registry.

⁴⁷ It is notable that overseas Korean adoptees organizations had a strong voice in the public hearing, and eventually succeeded in securing a spot in the new dual citizenship law. One of the Korean adoptee organizations, Global Overseas Adoptees' Link (G.O.A.L), had launched a campaign for dual nationality in 2007 and conducted surveys on adoptees regarding their intention to acquire Korean citizenship.

By extending dual nationality to returning Korean migrants over age sixty-five, the state can fortify its ethnoracial model of citizenship, but may face additional social expenditures, such as an increase in medical care. Many of these returnees, however, already had equal access to health care benefits as “Overseas Koreans” in Korea under the 1999 Overseas Korean Act. As seen in Table 20, the number of Koreans restoring citizenship, including Korean American returnees and Koreans in China and CIS countries, has increased to roughly 2,000 cases per year after introduction of the 2010 Amendment. Therefore, the increase in social welfare burden may not be greater than expected.

By allowing dual citizenship to return migrants over age sixty-five, the Korean state may save possible welfare expenditures by enabling migrants to receive pension benefits from other countries, such as the U.S. In the past, while many elderly Korean migrants permanently returned to Korea to settle, they could not reacquire Korean citizenship as the previous nationality law required giving up foreign citizenship within six months. In the case of Korean American returnees, keeping their U.S. citizenship was important as U.S. citizens can receive their retirement, disability, or survivor’s payments while residing abroad as long as they are eligible (Social Security Administration 2018). Thus, for many Korean returnees, giving up foreign citizenship meant losing social security and pension benefits they had earned over a long period (Seok 2010:14). Since 2001, Korean citizens without American citizenship can also receive their U.S. social security payments in Korea as they are protected by the U.S.-Korea Social Security Agreement (Social Security Administration 2004).

The return migrants may also bring their financial assets or investments back to the country. As these return migrants are predominantly retirees from North America, they may be

less of an economic burden than coethnics from less economically developed regions. The inclusion of returning senior migrants may have economic benefits, not only securing social pension benefits but the transfer of assets and investments from other countries. Thus, while the influx of senior return migrants may result in additional social welfare costs for the Korean state, it may also be lessened by their transfer of financial resources.

To summarize, the selective dual citizenship policy in Korea has also served the symbolic interests of the state by extending dual citizenship to returning Korean migrants over age sixty-five (e.g., Korean Americans) and Korean adoptees overseas. By allowing these two groups to reclaim Korean citizenship and maintain their foreign citizenship, the Korean state can strengthen its ethnic national identity while lessening the financial burden for providing social welfare benefits. In addition to overseas Korean adoptees and return migrants, another important target group of the selective dual citizenship policy in Korea was marriage migrants, which will be discussed in the next section.

Dual Nationality as a Reward for Marriage Migrants' Reproductive Contribution

Externally, “social integration” and “protection of minorities’ rights” are the stated reason for extending plural nationality to marriage migrants (Lee, K. 2010:3; Son, P. 2010:11). However, as seen in the previous sections, one of the main reasons for introducing plural nationality was the state’s concerns regarding fertility decline and the “depopulation crisis” (Geva 2014:14). To resolve the population crisis—another important symbolic interest of the state—the Korean state has used dual citizenship as an incentive for marriage migrants, who are mostly female, to stay in marriages and have children.

Marriage migrants have tiered access to plural citizenship and naturalization by their

current marital status and reproductive contribution to Korean society. First, plural citizenship is only allowed for current spouses of Korean citizens.⁴⁸ Second, “facilitated naturalization” with reduced residency requirements is allowed for current foreign spouses of Korean citizens,⁴⁹ but restrictions apply to those who are divorced, separated, or widowed. Among the latter, “facilitated naturalization” is only open to those who are raising a minor child (born within a marriage with a Korean national) or those who were unable to sustain marriages due to death or disappearance of his or her spouse or other causes not attributable to oneself.⁵⁰

Many marriage migrants fail to acquire Korean nationality through “facilitated naturalization” because it is not only difficult to gain custody of children after divorce, but also difficult to prove whether a spouse is at fault when a marriage ends (e.g., domestic assault), (Seok, 2010; Lee, H. 2009:70).⁵¹ Even if they successfully obtain Korean citizenship, dual citizenship is not allowed, and they must renounce their original citizenship within a year after acquiring Korean citizenship.⁵² This may jeopardize marriage migrants’ status if they choose to return to their country of origin (Lee, H. 2009:71). The mother’s unstable legal status also affects children. Some children of marriage migrants remain stateless because they were unable to

⁴⁸ Nationality Act [*Kukchǒkpǒp*] 국적법 (English Translation). Act No. 15752, September 18, 2018, Article 10, Paragraph 2, Subparagraph 1.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, Article 6, Paragraph 2, Subparagraphs 1 and 2.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, Article 6, Paragraph 2, Subparagraphs 3 and 4.

⁵¹ In such cases, one must meet the five-year residency requirement for general naturalization and give up one’s foreign citizenship within a year after naturalization.

⁵² *Ibid.*, Article 10, Paragraph 1.

register birth in their mother's country after returning (Ko 2018).

For the Korean state, dual nationality is an effective tool to fulfill the goal of boosting fertility and promoting patriarchal family forms and gender roles among marriage migrant families. First, plural citizenship is used to encourage marriage migrants to stay in marriages by restricting plural nationality to only marriage migrants maintaining marital unions. Policymakers claimed that extending plural nationality to all marriage migrants may further increase divorce rates,⁵³ which are already high among marriage migrant families (Lee, K. 2010:3). Despite dissenting opinions, the 2010 Amendment did not extend dual citizenship for divorced, widowed, or separated marriage migrants as it was seen as a disincentive to marriage and procreation.

Second, access to Korean citizenship and plural nationality is used as a reward for marriage migrants' reproductive contribution to Korean society. It is important to note that the state's concerns regarding population decline was one of the driving forces behind introducing a selective dual nationality system. Regardless of having children, marriage migrants currently in marriages can apply for both "facilitated naturalization" and plural nationality. However, among widowed, divorced, or separated marriage migrants, only those rearing minor children—born within marriage to the Korean spouse—and those who can prove they were not responsible for the termination of their marriage can apply for "facilitated naturalization."

Third, the Korean state strives to uphold men's household authority by tying a spouse's

⁵³ Marriage migrant families have disproportionately high rates of divorce, compared to its share among all marriages. Between 2008 and 2018, marriages between a Korean citizen and a marriage migrant or naturalized citizen have accounted for 7.4 percent to 11.2 percent of total marriages. For the same period, the proportion of divorce between a Korean citizen and a marriage migrant or a naturalized citizen has ranged from 9.4 percent to 12.6 percent of all divorce cases (Statistics Korea 2019a).

sponsorship as a precondition for naturalization as well as visa renewals. Marriage migrants, who are mostly female, must first maintain a lawful status in order to qualify for “facilitated naturalization” or plural nationality. To apply for “facilitated naturalization” or even to renew visa status as a spouse of a Korean citizen, it is essential to obtain Korean spouses’ sponsorship (Lee, H. 2009:64). Marriage migrants may lose their legal status if their Korean spouse refuses to help, even if they have fulfilled other requirements, such as the three-year residency in Korea requirement. As their lawful status ultimately depends on Korean husbands and their families’ assistance, many female marriage migrants find themselves in vulnerable positions within the household, even in cases of domestic violence or abuse.

To summarize, the Korean state has used the selective dual citizenship policy to fulfill its goal of resolving fertility decline. Dual citizenship is only allowed for marriage migrants who stay in marriages. “Facilitated naturalization” with shorter residency requirements is open to current spouses of Korean citizens and those who are separated or divorced, only if they are rearing minor children or can prove they were not responsible for the termination of the marriage. In a sense, dual citizenship is used as a reward for marriage migrants who procreate and help resolve the fertility crisis in Korea. By requiring a Korean spouse’s sponsor to secure legal status and process naturalization, the dual citizenship policy also strengthens the household authority of the Korean citizen husband.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have shown that the dual nationality policy in Korea is not just a coethnic policy but functions as a comprehensive tool for administering human resources, ranging from resident (dual) citizens, overseas diaspora, and incoming migrants. One of the

major goals of the dual citizenship policy was to resolve net population loss by recruiting high-skilled workers, particularly among Koreans overseas. Both material and symbolic interests have shaped the selective dual citizenship policy in Korea. Based on geopolitical and economic interests of the state, Korean Americans are preferentially treated over other emigrant groups, e.g., ethnic Koreans in China and CIS countries. To strengthen ethnic national identity and raise fertility, dual nationality was extended to groups with less visible economic utility, such as overseas Korean adoptees, returning migrants aged sixty-five and older, and marriage migrants.

This study offers new insights into the field of citizenship studies. First, by conducting a case study of a country with a large diaspora and sizable migrant population, I call for a comprehensive, state-centered approach in studying dual citizenship policies. Rather than a policy only for migrants or coethnics, the selective dual citizenship policy in Korea functions as a tool for managing a wide range of human resources, from citizens to coethnic and non-coethnic migrants. I argue that dual citizenship policy should be viewed as part of a larger immigration and citizenship system that includes diaspora management and migrant labor policies and controls various human resources. For the Korean state, one of the important goals of the dual citizenship policy was tackling labor shortages by recruiting high-skilled workers, particularly among Koreans overseas. With the fertility decline and constant outflux of the highly skilled, the Korean government uses selective dual nationality to recruit skilled workers, particularly among overseas Koreans.

Second, I argue that the selective dual citizenship policy has fulfilled both material and symbolic interests of the Korean state. I focus on two axes in citizenship policy: political economy and national identity (Zolberg 1999, 2006). On one hand, economic and geopolitical

interests have largely shaped the Korean state's decision regarding extending national membership. Among naturalized citizens, only high-skilled workers and marriage migrants can apply for plural nationality. Even among coethnic groups, the Korean state selectively chooses candidates for dual citizenship based on economic utility, favoring Korean Americans over others. Since the launch of the Overseas Korean Act in 1999, ethnic Koreans in China and CIS countries who are mostly descendants of precolonial and colonial-era emigrants have been excluded for economic (e.g., labor market disruption) and geopolitical (e.g., diplomatic ties with China) reasons.

On the other hand, the selective dual citizenship policy has served non-material interests of the state, such as fortifying ethnic national identity and boosting fertility. To fulfill the goal of preserving ethnic national identity, plural citizenship was extended to Korean adoptees overseas and returning Korean emigrants over age sixty-five. As a coethnic policy, ethnic Koreans, particularly Korean Americans, are favored over non-Koreans. Only two of the five categories of plural citizenship are open to non-Koreans (e.g., high-skilled and marriage migrants). The government has even lowered the qualification for the highly skilled category only for ethnic Koreans, who account for a majority of the applicants.

To resolve fertility decline, dual citizenship was extended to marriage migrants as an incentive to stay in marriages and have children. The state also strengthens men's household authority by requiring spouse sponsorship to secure a stable legal status and apply for naturalization. Marriage migrants have tiered access to citizenship, e.g., naturalization and plural nationality, depending on their reproductive contribution to Korean society. Plural citizenship is only allowed for marriage migrants currently married to Korean citizens. "Facilitated

naturalization” with shorter residency requirements is open to only marriage migrants in marriages and divorced, separated, or widowed marriage migrants who are either rearing minor children or can prove they were not responsible for the termination of the marriage. Allowing plural citizenship to separated, divorced, or widowed marriage migrants was seen as a disincentive, which will further increase high divorce rates.

Lastly, I have called attention to a need for state-centered perspective in citizenship policies by addressing both state interests and societal interests. Compared to immigration policies, organized interests have less influence on citizenship policies. Employers seeking cheap labor do not necessarily demand legal citizenship for migrant workers. In countries with growing migrant populations, migrant groups are still less organized and have limited power. Similarly, in Korea, an ethnic constituency composed of earlier immigrants had minimal impact on immigration and citizenship policies. As for dual citizenship policy, dual citizens were less likely to voice their opinions publicly because of negative attitudes toward themselves (see Chapter 4).

While organized interests had less influence in Korean citizenship policy, the development of dual citizenship policy was partly shaped by demands from the Korean American communities and previous coethnic policies. Policies for overseas Koreans (e.g., the creation of “Overseas Korean” [F-4] visa category”) have been built around the needs of Korean Americans, who have demanded dual citizenship since the 1980s. This has led to the favorable treatment of Korean Americans in the subsequent dual citizenship policy. In contrast, Koreans from China and CIS countries were initially excluded from the Overseas Korean policy and incorporated in migrant labor policies, targeting semi- or low-skilled workers mostly from China, South East Asia, and other neighboring countries.

In the next chapter, I examine how the Korean government uses the selective dual nationality policy to control the choices of citizens and citizens-to-be regarding citizenship, family formation, military duties, and living arrangements. Chapter 4 also addresses the extension of the Korean state's bureaucratic control over overseas Koreans, the incorporation of potential citizens (e.g., Korean Americans) into national citizenry, the potential pool of military reserves, and the backlash from the Korean American communities after the 2010 Amendment.

CHAPTER 4
**Dual Nationality as a Tool for Controlling Citizens:
Conscription, Birth Tourism, and Draft Evasion**

* * *

Mr. A was born to Korean national parents while they were studying in the U.S. Mr. A's parents registered his birth at the Korean embassy. By birthright citizenship or *jus soli*, Mr. A became a U.S. citizen by birth and was also issued a U.S. passport. At the age of three, Mr. A returned to Korea as his parents finished their studies. Upon his return, he used a Korean passport to enter Korea which was issued by the Korean embassy in the U.S. Mr. A finished elementary school, middle school, high school and college in Korea. After his graduation from college, he entered the military and finished his compulsory service in 2002. From 2004 to the present year, 2008, Mr. A entered and exited the country several times using a Korean passport. He even participated in the reserve forces training as he had naturally thought he had a Korean nationality as well. However, Mr. A did not select Korean nationality during the 2-year period specified by the law to make a choice of citizenship, and had lost his Korean nationality. He has also received a notification of impending fine for not registering as a foreign resident. (Ministry of Justice and the President's Council on National Competitiveness 2008: 20)

* * *

In 2013, Ms. Cho Hyön-a gave birth to twin boys in Hawaii,¹ entitling them to U.S. citizenship. Korean Air had sent Ms. Cho to work in the U.S. two months before her due date. But within South Korea there was anger that U.S. citizenship meant her sons would be able to avoid South Korea's two years of compulsory military

¹ Cho Hyön-a is the former executive vice president of Korean Air and the eldest daughter of the airline's chairman, Cho Yang-ho. She is also famous for the so-called "nut rage" incident of December 2014 where she had "ordered a senior crew member off the plane, forcing it to return to the gate at John F. Kennedy airport in New York" for serving a bag of macadamia nuts in the cabin (Lee Youk Yung, *The Independent*, December 12, 2014).

service. (Lee Youk Yung, *The Independent*, December 12, 2014)

However, the fact that a 39-year old pregnant woman had given birth overseas after taking a long flight during the final months of her pregnancy is raising doubts and suspicions of attempting “*wŏnjŏng ch’ulsan* (overseas childbirth).”² Critics point out that Korean Air had assisted Ms. Cho’s childbirth overseas at the corporate level. Ms. Cho, who is the executive vice president, was not on a maternity leave, but was officially appointed to a position by Korean Air to work in Hawaii. (Kim, Yun-gu, *Yonhap News*, May 28, 2013)

* * *

As shown in the examples above, compulsory military service takes a central position in Korean citizenship policy. As military duty is seen as one of the main obligations of citizenship, many Koreans have held animosity toward draft dodgers, many of whom are dual nationals from upper-middle class backgrounds.³ Frequently reported cases of draft evasion using foreign citizenship—in some cases through so-called “birth tourism”—have built negative images of dual citizens in Korea. Thus, much of the 2010 Amendment has, in fact, focused on imposing mandatory military duties on dual nationals in order to prevent backlash against introducing the dual citizenship policy.

As seen in Chapter 3, the dual nationality policy in Korea is not just an emigrant policy but functions as a comprehensive tool for administering human resources, ranging from resident

² *Wŏnjŏng ch’ulsan* (“maternity trip” or “overseas childbirth”) refers to the act of traveling overseas to give birth, usually to give the child foreign citizenship.

³ In Korea, anathema toward dual citizens was partly fueled by the strong belief in class homogeneity and obligations of citizens (e.g., military service, paying tax, education, and employment), which had been emphasized by Park Chung Hee’s (박정희) military regime (Jung 2004:39; Kim, N. 2013).

(dual) citizens, the overseas diaspora, and incoming migrants. One of the major goals of the dual citizenship policy was to resolve net population loss by recruiting high-skilled workers, mostly Koreans overseas. Dual nationality was extended to Korean Americans rather than ethnic Koreans in China based on geopolitical and economic interests of the state. Senior return migrants over age sixty-five and Korean adoptees overseas were also included to strengthen ethnic national identity. To boost fertility, dual citizenship was extended to marriage migrants as an incentive to stay married to Korean citizen spouses and have children.

In this chapter, I show that the selective dual citizenship policy in Korea has also heavily focused on controlling the actions of citizens and citizens-to-be regarding their family formation, military service, and citizenship. By restricting access to plural citizenship, the Korean state pushes male dual citizens to fulfill military duties and middle- to upper-class individuals to stop taking advantage of so-called “birth tourism.” Both conscription and citizenship policies, built on familial and patriarchal ideologies of the state, prioritize specific family forms in granting deferment from military service and access to plural nationality. Non-resident Korean men with plural citizenship cannot receive *de facto* exemption from military service unless they live with a parent(s) abroad or have lived overseas for more than ten years.

This chapter proceeds in the following order: First, I discuss how dual nationality is closely linked to class inequality and conscription in Korea and review the parliamentary debates on the 2010 Amendment. Next, I emphasize that one of the main goals of selective dual citizenship was to deter resident dual nationals from renouncing Korean citizenship and evading military service while cracking down on “birth tourism.” Although the state claims to exclude

children of “birth tourists” from enjoying plural nationality, in reality, it is difficult to detect them. Third, I show that the 2010 Amendment has incorporated Korean Americans into national citizenry and a potential pool of conscripts, which has resulted in protests from the Korean American community. Lastly, I argue that the Korean state uses selective dual nationality policy, along with conscription, as a tool to exert control over citizens’ family formation and choices regarding citizenship and military duties.

Resident Plural Nationals and Class Inequality in Korea

Male Plural Citizens in Korea and U.S. Citizenship

The issue of dual nationality revolves around two keywords in Korea: class inequality and military service. Dual nationality became a class-based phenomenon in Korea for a couple of reasons. First, as overseas travel was strictly controlled by the authoritarian regime until 1989, only those with specified purposes—such as business, employment, public affairs, or study—could go abroad (Chang 2009; Son and Ch'oe 2014). This implies that Koreans who obtained foreign citizenship overseas (and became dual citizens) had generally belonged to the middle to upper class with proper means and resources to qualify for overseas travel. Second, some upper-class Korean families intentionally gave birth in U.S. territory in order to make their children dual citizens. The disproportionate number of boys born from these “birth tours” testifies that the main purpose is to avoid the military draft. In most cases, dual citizen men renounce Korean citizenship before age eighteen to avoid military duties entirely.

Dual citizenship has been long regarded as a marker of class privilege in Korea. Parliamentary hearings and news reports consistently show that many plural nationals come from

upper class backgrounds. A 2015 National Assembly hearing revealed that as many as thirty high-profile government officials of the Park Geun-Hye administration had dual national sons who had given up Korean citizenship and were exempt from mandatory military service (Son, T. 2015). In 2005, 40 percent of those who had relinquished Korean nationality were from affluent neighborhoods in Seoul, such as the *Kangnam* district, including three grandsons of former Ministers (Hwang and Yi 2005).

Table 21. Dual nationals residing in Korea, by nationality and type (as of July 2009)

Other nationality	Dual nationals registered as Korean citizens	Dual nationals registered as foreign residents	Total
United States	29,238	2,400	31,638
Japan	14,760	305	15,065
Canada	1,865	50	1,915
Vietnam	1,567	143	1,710
Australia	537	18	555
Taiwan	463	10	473
New Zealand	462	8	470
Philippines	451	41	492
China (Korean)	61	335	396
China	205	121	326
Others	2,720	342	3,062
All dual nationals	52,329	3,773	56,102

Source: Ministry of Justice. 2009. *Public Hearing for the Amendment of the Nationality Act*, 29.

Table 22. Dual citizens, by sex and choice of nationality (2002-2007)

		Sex	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Dual citizens who renounced Korean citizenship		Male	683	709	1270	2711	530	552
		Female	87	117	137	230	143	174
		Total	770	826	1407	2941	673	726
		Ratio of male	0.89	0.86	0.9	0.92	0.79	0.76
Dual citizens who chose Korean citizenship		Male	3	21	76	21	19	32
		Female	3	18	78	23	29	31
		Total	6	39	154	44	48	63
		Ratio of male	0.5	0.54	0.49	0.48	0.4	0.51

Source: Ministry of Justice and the President's Council on National Competitiveness, ed. 2008. *An Improvement Plan for the Nationality Policy: A Focus on Relaxation of the Rigid Mono-Nationality Principle and a Systematic Management Plan for Dual Nationality*, 20.

Statistics on resident dual citizens in Korea, despite limitations,⁴ show that plural nationals are predominantly Korean Americans. A majority of plural nationals who had renounced Korean nationality were men and those with U.S. citizenship. In Table 21, more than half of registered dual nationals residing in Korea as of July 2009 were U.S. citizens. Out of 56,102 dual citizens residing in Korea, 31,638 had U.S. citizenship, while 15,065 had Japanese nationality. Table 22 shows that men accounted for 70 to 90 percent of plural nationals who had renounced Korean nationality between 2002 and 2007. In short, dual citizen men were far more likely than women to renounce Korean nationality, which reflects the impact of military

⁴ Data on plural citizens in Korea are limited for several reasons. First, some plural citizens do not register their births in the Korean system. Even if they do register, the Korean government does not codify or administer data by each country. Also, incorrect information may be given in the birth registration record. The Ministry of Justice can obtain information on plural citizens during the process of immigration inspection and granting permission for lawful stay, but it is limited to plural citizens currently residing in Korea (Ministry of Justice and the President's Council on National Competitiveness, ed. 2008:9).

conscription.

Birth Tourism and the 2005 Amendment

The Korean public's negative feelings toward plural citizens not only stems from cases of draft evasion, but also from the widespread practice of "birth tourism" among upper middle-class families (e.g., the Korean Air's heiress). *Wŏnjŏng ch'ulsan*, ("maternity trips" or "overseas childbirth," literally translated as "expedition childbirth") is a term frequently used in the media, referring to the act of traveling to a foreign country (e.g., U.S. or Canada) to give birth. For most, the purpose is to give their children, particularly sons, foreign citizenship to avoid military conscription. Under the previous law, all dual citizen men in Korea had to choose one nationality either before being enlisted (on the year they turn eighteen years of age) or after finishing their military obligations within two years. Thus, many choose to avoid conscription by renouncing Korean nationality before reaching age eighteen.⁵

Consistent concerns regarding dual nationals and draft evasion has led to the 2005 Amendment of the Nationality Act (the so-called "Hong Chun-p'yo Act"),⁶ which targeted the issue of "*wŏnjŏng ch'ulsan* (overseas childbirth)." The 2005 amendment has made it impossible for any person who was born while his parent(s) stayed abroad "without the intention of permanently residing in any foreign country (Article 12, Paragraph 3)" to give up Korean

⁵ Military Service Act (English Translation). Act No. 14611, March 21, 2017. Article 8 (Enlistment for First Citizen Service).

⁶ The 2005 Amendment was proposed by Assemblyman Hong Chun-p'yo of the Grand National Party (GNP).

citizenship before fulfilling military duties.⁷

Table 23. Dual citizens by choice of nationality and current nationality (2004- July 2009)

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	July 2009
Current nationality	Dual citizens who renounced Korean citizenship					
United States	1,301	2,707	563	592	236	422
Canada	34	93	41	36	18	37
Japan	33	33	29	30	11	33
Australia	8	54	22	34	8	19
New Zealand	1	8	3	4	1	3
Germany	0	2	1	6	0	1
Sweden	1	1	0	0	0	0
Others	29	43	14	24	2	20
Total	1,407	2,941	673	726	276	535
Other nationality	Dual citizens who chose Korean citizenship					
China	95	2	23	30	46	52
Japan	8	4	7	11	13	16
United States	3	15	20	7	5	5
Taiwan	14	2	18	0	6	5
Paraguay	4	2	10	6	1	1
Others	7	9	15	9	8	14
Total	131	34	93	63	79	93

Source: Ministry of Justice. 2009. *Public Hearing for the Amendment of the Nationality Act*, 29.

As a result, an unprecedented number of dual citizen men rushed to local immigration offices to renounce Korean citizenship in the final months before the law was enacted. Table 23

⁷ The 2005 Amendment of the Nationality Act (English Translation). Act No. 7499, May 24, 2005. Article 12 Paragraph 3. This article remains unchanged in the 2010 Amendment as well.

shows the surge of dual nationals giving up Korean citizenship to select U.S. citizenship between years 2004 and 2005. The Ministry of Justice reported that 1,306 renounced Korean nationality after the 2005 amendment was passed in the National Assembly and before its enforcement (May 6–23, 2005). This is close to a two-fold increase from 773, which is the total number of renunciations taken place after the 2005 amendment was proposed and right before it was passed in the National Assembly (i.e., between November 12, 2004 and May 4, 2005). In particular, the percentage of renunciations by those under sixteen years old has markedly increased from a mere 23 percent of all cases, before the Amendment was passed, to 73 percent after its passage. This shows that many gave up their nationality to avoid conscription before the 2005 amendment took effect (Kim, T. 2005).

Despite the changes made in the 2005 Amendment to curb draft-dodging, many plural citizen men have continued to give up Korean citizenship before turning eighteen to avoid military duties. While children of “birth tourists” cannot renounce Korean nationality until fulfilling their military duties (due to the 2005 amendment), it is very difficult to differentiate them from other plural citizens. Therefore, strong public sentiment against plural citizens had remained one of the major obstacles for introducing dual nationality in 2010.

Discussions on the 2010 Amendment Center around Class Inequality at the National Assembly

As dual citizenship is currently tied to class inequality in Korea, the political debates at the National Assembly have also concentrated on whether the 2010 Amendment will unfairly benefit the resident plural citizens from privileged backgrounds. The ruling party, Grand National Party (GNP), pushed for introducing a selective dual nationality policy, while opposing

parties have focused on issues of inequality, e.g., whether to give former dual citizens a second chance to reacquire Korean citizenship.

In the 18th National Assembly (2008–12), GNP, as the ruling party, had more than half of the seats. As the dual nationality law was a bill proposed by the government, GNP held favorable views toward the amendment. The 2010 Nationality Act Amendment was approved on a vote of 156 in favor to 19 against with 17 abstentions. Members of the National Assembly were most concerned about the possibility of draft evasion by dual citizens. However, much of this issue had already been cleared by previous nationality law reform in 2005.

At the National Assembly, objection came from two members of the opposing parties: the Democratic Party (DP), the main opposition of the 18th Assembly, and the Democratic Labor Party (DLP), a progressive Leftist party. The contention mainly centered on the Addendum, which allowed former plural citizens who had already lost Korean nationality to enjoy plural nationality.⁸ The main argument was that it was not fair for them to get a second chance to reacquire Korean citizenship and become plural nationals when there are law-abiding dual citizens who had already given up foreign citizenship to choose Korean nationality.

Seok Dong Hyeon (2010:42), the Commissioner of the Korea Immigration Service, explained that it was only a provisional measure for two years, and that among men only those

⁸ The Addendum (Article 2, Paragraph 1) allowed former plural citizens—who had lost their Korean nationality by not making a choice of citizenship within two years after finishing the military duty or by age 22—to reacquire Korean nationality and maintain multiple nationalities by submitting a vow not to exercise foreign citizenship within Korea. This provisional measure is not available for dual citizens who had actively selected foreign citizenship and relinquished Korean citizenship.

who completed military service can apply to reacquire Korean nationality. He added that approximately 4,000 former dual nationals had their Korean citizenship revoked because they did not know they had to select one nationality by a deadline (42).⁹

At the Legislative and Judiciary Committee, Assemblyman Yi Ch'un-sök (DP) pointed out two problems in the Addendum. First, the provision was giving special favors to the privileged class, such as high-ranking officials or *chaebol* who need dual nationality (Yi Ch'un-sök 2010:44). Second, the Ministry of Justice did not follow the normal legislative procedures and suddenly added provisions that were absent in the original proposal presented at the public hearing. In the original proposal, former dual citizens who wanted to reacquire Korean nationality had to give up foreign citizenship (41).¹⁰ Yi Ch'un-sök noted that the highly skilled among former nationals can acquire dual nationality through other provisions without the addendum and questioned whether this addendum was actually necessary (43). Regardless of his opposition, the bill was sent to the floor.

At the plenary session, assembly member Yi Chöng-hŭi (DLP) gave an open opposition before the vote, criticizing the Addendum. She argued that it was preferential treatment of those who had given up Korean nationality and accused the Ministry of Justice of ignoring the normal

⁹ Seok, Dong Hyeon. 2010. *Che289-hoe Kukhoe Pöpch'e Saböp Wiwönhoe hoeüirok, che 2-ho* 제 289회 국회 법제 사법 위원회 회의록 제 2호 [289th National Assembly, Minutes of the Legislation and Judiciary Committee, No. 2], April 14, 2010, specific quote on page 42.

¹⁰ Yi, Ch'un-sök 이 춘석. 2010. *Che 289-hoe Kukhoe Pöpch'e Saböp Wiwönhoe hoeüirok, che 2-ho* 제 289회 국회 법제 사법 위원회 회의록 제 2호 [289th National Assembly, Minutes of the Legislation and Judiciary Committee, No. 2], April 14, 2010, specific quote on page 41.

legislative procedures.¹¹ As stated by Yi, Chǒng-hŭi (2010):

Those dual nationals with U.S. citizenship who did not select Korean nationality ... probably wanted to enjoy the benefits of U.S. citizenship.... At the parliamentary confirmation hearing of September 2009, Prime Minister Chung Un-chan admitted that he had persuaded his dual national son not to give up American citizenship as there may be benefits, such as tuition reduction when studying in the U.S... [H]is son renounce[d] U.S. citizenship only five days before the hearing after his dual nationality caused a controversy... (10)

The provision allows Korean citizens who had formerly given up foreign citizenship to retain Korean nationality to enjoy a plural national status if they reacquire foreign citizenship within five years (Article 2, Paragraph 2). However, as Yi Chǒng-hŭi has rightfully pointed out, it is virtually impossible to regain U.S. citizenship in five years. Thus, she has argued that while second chances may be given, those who gave up Korean citizenship must first renounce foreign citizenship to reacquire Korean nationality, and that chances for obtaining a foreign citizenship and maintaining plural citizenship should also be given for the other law-abiding (former plural) citizens who had already given up foreign citizenship (10).¹²

The last remark before the vote came from a ruling party member, Son Pǒm-gyu (GNP),

¹¹ Before submitting a government bill to the National Assembly, a bill has to go through various procedures, such as advance publication of legislation, examination by the Ministry of Government Legislation, and deliberations in Vice-Ministerial meetings and State council. However, the government simply switched the proposal without going through these review processes. Yi Chǒng-hŭi (2010:10) claims that in the original proposal submitted by the Ministry on December 29, 2009, former dual nationals had to renounce foreign citizenship in order to reacquire Korean citizenship. On February 23, 2010, the Ministry of Justice submitted a revised proposal that does not require renunciation of foreign citizenship during the examination process at the Legislation and Judiciary Committee.

¹² Yi, Chǒng-hŭi 이 정희. 2010. *Che 289-hoe kukhoe ponhoeŭi hoeŭirok, che 8-ho* 제 289회 국회 본회의 회의록 제 8호 [289th National Assembly, Minutes of the Plenary Session, No. 8], April 21, 2010, specific quote on page 10.

who defended the government's position. Son (2010:11) claimed that not all plural nationals by birth are from the privileged class and that the majority include children of overseas students and expatriates as well as “multicultural families” in Korea.¹³ He concluded that the new amendment will contribute to social integration of minorities such as marriage migrants. Despite opposition parties questioning the linkage between the 2010 Amendment and high-profile officials or economic elites, the bill for introducing selective dual nationality was passed by a majority vote.

Dual Nationality as a Solution to Retaining the Military Resource Pool¹⁴

Centrality of Military Service in Korean Citizenship

The dual citizenship policy in Korea has focused on administering resident plural citizens in addition to recruiting high-skilled workers and coethnics from overseas. As noted in Chapter 3, the strict mononationality principle of the Korean nationality law has led 95 percent of dual

¹³ Son, Pöm-gyu 손 범규. 2010. *Che 289-hoe kukhoe ponhoeüi hoeüirok, che 8-ho* 제 289회 국회 본회의 회의록 제 8호 [289th National Assembly, Minutes of the Plenary Session, No. 8], April 21, 2010, specific quote on page 11.

¹⁴ In most cases, countries that allow dual citizenship do not have mandatory military service. Of 191 countries (including Crimea), for which the Pew Research Center has found reliable information, only sixty countries maintain some form of active conscription (DeSilver 2019). As of January 1, 2020, among those sixty countries with active conscription, forty-eight countries either tolerate or allow dual citizenship for expatriates, according to the MACIMIDE Global Expatriate Dual Citizenship Dataset v4.00 (Vink, De Groot, and Luk 2015). In twelve countries (including Korea), expatriates automatically lose their origin country's citizenship if they voluntarily acquire foreign citizenship. However, in this database, Korea is coded as a country that does not allow dual citizenship despite the selective dual citizenship policy introduced in 2010. The MACIMIDE Global Expatriate Dual Citizenship Dataset is limited in that it only focuses on whether a country allows dual citizenship to “all expatriates.” A country is coded as “allowing or tolerating dual citizenship” if 1) expatriates do not automatically lose origin country's citizenship and can renounce citizenship or 2) expatriates do not face automatic loss of citizenship but cannot renounce origin country's citizenship either.

nationals by birth to give up Korean citizenship (Hwang 2010:5). One of the important goals of the 2010 Amendment was to discourage plural citizens, particularly men who had finished military duties, from giving up Korean citizenship and to reverse the trend of expatriation.

Another goal was to secure a military manpower pool and curb draft evasion by plural citizens. Military duties take a central place in defining Korean nationality. All Korean men between ages 18 and 38 are required to serve in the military for 18–22 months. However, the pool of draft age men has gradually decreased due to low fertility. Vice Minister of Justice, Hwang Hŭi-ch'öl (2010:5), has noted, “With the population decline, the military manpower pool is also on the decrease. It is necessary to secure military manpower and make draft evasion impossible for plural citizens.”

As policy-makers were extremely wary of the public’s anathema toward plural nationals as potential draft-dodgers, completion of military duties served as an important criterion for extending dual citizenship. First, in the earlier drafts of the dual nationality law, the government had even considered limiting plural citizenship to only two groups: the highly skilled and dual citizen men who had fulfilled military duties (Ministry of Justice and the President’s Council on National Competitiveness 2008:26). The intention was to minimize conflict regarding dual nationality policy, as public opinion may be more favorable toward these groups. However, these plans were retracted after being criticized for violating the principle of equality and excluding women and persons who are not subject to military service due to disability or economic

hardship.¹⁵ Experts argued that it was not fair to force a choice of nationality to plural national men, even after having fulfilled military duties.

Second, the ethnic Chinese, who have lived in Korea for over three generations, were excluded from the dual nationality policy for the very reason that naturalized citizens are virtually exempt from the compulsory military service.¹⁶ Although the ethnic Chinese—described as “persons born in Korea to a parent who was also born in Korea (i.e., double *jus soli*)”—were one of the main policy targets in the draft proposal, the Ministry of Justice decided that “it was too early” to include them in the final draft (Hwang 2010:16). Vice Minister of Justice, Hwang (2010:15) added that “allowing plural nationality to those who are exempt from military service seemed to run against the public sentiments” and that “while some ethnic Chinese are willing to fulfill military duties, it would be meaningless to impose mandatory military service on people who do not regard Korea as their native country.”¹⁷

While much of the concern regarding dual citizenship policy has revolved around draft evasion, the 2005 Amendment of the Nationality Act had already cleared up the issue, particularly for “birth tourists.” Since the 2005 amendment, male plural citizens born to Korean

¹⁵ Lee, Keum Ro 이 금로. 2010. *Che 287-hoe Kukhoe Pöpche Saböp Wiwönhoe hoeüirok, che 2-ho* 제 287회 국회 법제 사법 위원회 회의록 제 2호 [287th National Assembly, Minutes of the Legislation and Judiciary Committee, No. 2], February 23, 2010, pp. 3-4.

¹⁶ Military Service Act (English Translation). Act No. 14611, March 21, 2017. Article 65, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 3.

¹⁷ Hwang, Hüi-ch'öl 황 희철. 2010. *Che 287-hoe Kukhoe Pöpche Saböp Wiwönhoe hoeüirok, che 2-ho* 제 287회 국회 법제 사법 위원회 회의록 제 2호 [287th National Assembly, Minutes of the Legislation and Judiciary Committee, No. 2], February 23, 2010, pp. 15-16.

citizens during their temporary stay overseas have to first fulfil military duties before renouncing or choosing Korean citizenship. As these measures did not completely curb draft evasion or the use of “birth tourism,” the Ministry of Justice set out to include additional measures in the 2010 Amendment to effectively block plural citizens from taking advantage of their foreign citizenship.

The 2010 Amendment: Breaking the Link between Plural Nationality, Birth Tourism, and Draft Evasion

With the goal of preventing plural citizens from avoiding military duties and giving up Korean citizenship, the Korean government introduced three new measures to effectively break the connection between draft evasion and plural nationality.¹⁸ First, plural citizens are treated as if they had only Korean citizenship in applying Korean laws and statutes (Article 11-2).¹⁹ As there were no exact provisions on the legal status of plural citizens in the past law, the 2010 Amendment set clear rules to treat plural nationals as Korean citizens only (Hwang 2010:6). A similar stance is taken by the U.S. and other countries where plural citizens are only treated as their own citizens. Instead of issuing visas to dual citizens, passports are required to enter and exit the country.

Second, resident citizens with plural nationality can no longer renounce Korean

¹⁸ The legal term was also changed from “dual nationals” to “persons with multiple nationalities” to avoid the negative stereotypes associated with dual citizenship.

¹⁹ The 2010 Amendment of the Nationality Act (English Translation). Act No. 10275, May 4, 2010. Article 11-2.

citizenship within Korea. Plural nationals can renounce Korean nationality at overseas diplomatic missions “only if the person has overseas domicile” (Article 14). Third, a person “whose mother is deemed to have resided in a foreign country for the purpose of having the person attain the nationality of the foreign country at the time of his or her birth” may choose Korean nationality only after renouncing his or her foreign citizenship (Article 13, Paragraph 3).

In other words, children of “birth tourists” must either renounce foreign citizenship and live as Korean citizens only or give up Korean nationality to exercise their full rights as a foreign national. One of the major changes in the 2010 Amendment was allowing plural nationality for selected groups if they submit a vow not to exercise their foreign nationality, such as attending schools or working as foreign nationals, in Korea (Article 13, Paragraph 1). However, persons born from so-called “birth tourism,” are excluded from this provision and are not allowed to maintain plural nationality.

Difficulty in Detecting Children of “Birth Tourists”

Clearly, one of the goals of the dual citizenship policy was to make it difficult for plural citizens—especially those who have attained foreign citizenship through “birth tourism”—to give up Korean nationality and evade military conscription. The main problem is that it is practically impossible to detect “birth tourists.” Despite restrictions imposed on children of “birth tourists,” exceptions also applied to plural nationals whose parents had stayed overseas for “legitimate” reasons.²⁰ To complicate matters further, some upper-class parents often create

²⁰ According to the Enforcement Decree of the Nationality Act (Article 17), a person whose father or mother falls under any of the following are excluded and can maintain plural nationality: 1) where he/she

“legitimate” reasons to stay overseas before giving birth, as seen in the case of the Korean Air heiress. Thus, it is difficult to conclude that those born from “birth tourism” are completely barred from enjoying plural nationality.

The Nationality Act specified two different definitions of “*wŏnjŏng ch'ulsan* (overseas childbirth).” First, the broad definition includes any person who was born while his or her parent(s) stayed abroad “without the intention of permanently residing in any foreign country (Article 12, Paragraph 3).” By the 2005 Amendment, all men in this broad category (e.g., sons of Korean students and workers residing overseas) were required to fulfil their military duties before choosing or renouncing Korean nationality. Many plural citizens, such as children of international students and expatriates, fall under this broad definition of “overseas childbirth.” Plural citizen men in this category can choose Korean nationality and maintain a plural national status by submitting the vow, a provision not extended to children of “birth tourists.”

Second, a narrow definition of “overseas childbirth (*wŏnjŏng ch'ulsan*)” refers to “a person whose mother is deemed to have resided in a foreign country for the purpose of having the person acquire the nationality of the foreign country at the time of his/her birth” (Article 13, Paragraph 3). This definition, introduced by the 2010 Amendment, is closer to the conventional

has lived in a foreign country for at least two years consecutively adding up the periods before and after birth of the person; 2) where he/she has acquired the permanent residence right or nationality of the foreign country before or after the birth of the person; 3) where he/she has been staying in a foreign country at the time of birth of the person for a period determined by the Minister of Justice due to considerable grounds in view of the prevailing social norms, such as studying abroad, dispatch for public services, sojourn abroad, employment, etc. (The Enforcement Decree of the Nationality Act (English Translation). Presidential Decree No. 22750, March 29, 2011).

understanding of persons born from “birth tourism.” In addition to the sanctions imposed by the 2005 Amendment (e.g., requirement to fulfill military duties prior to renouncing Korean citizenship), plural citizens, whose parents seem to have intentionally travelled overseas to give foreign citizenship to their children, cannot hold multiple nationalities and must choose only one nationality. In contrast, other plural citizens can maintain plural nationality by submitting the pledge not to exercise foreign citizenship within Korea.

The 2010 Amendment has given government officials new authority to investigate and request related documentation (e.g., immigration records). However, in many cases, it is difficult to find out whether a person’s true intent of staying overseas was to have their children acquire foreign nationalities. The lawmakers have also indicated this problem during the review process at the National Assembly.²¹ As stated by Chang Yun-sök (2010), chairman of the First Bill Examination Subcommittee (under the Legislation and Judiciary Committee):

It must be very hard to tell apart whether one gave birth while studying abroad or whether one was a birth tourist after nearly two decades; but it is necessary to express the state’s will to conscript those who have abused the law. (9)²²

²¹ Assemblywoman Pak Yöng-sön (DP) has raised a critique that it may be unconstitutional to hold children accountable for their overseas birth or restrict their rights to renounce citizenship. She pointed out that it was the will of the parents, not children, to give birth overseas and that children had no choice or control over their place of birth or citizenship.

Pak, Yöng-sön 박 영선. 2010. *Che 287-hoe Kukhoe Pöpche Saböp Wiwönhoe hoeüirok, che 2-ho* 제 287회 국회 법제 사법 위원회 회의록 제 2호 [287th National Assembly, Minutes of the Legislation and Judiciary Committee, No. 2], February 23, 2010, specific quote on page 9.

²² Chang, Yun-sök 장 윤석. 2010. *Che 287-hoe Kukhoe Pöpche Saböp Wiwönhoe hoeüirok, che 2-ho* 제 287회 국회 법제 사법 위원회 회의록 제 2호 [287th National Assembly, Minutes of the Legislation and Judiciary Committee, No. 2], February 23, 2010, specific quote on page 9.

To summarize, one of the major goals of the 2010 Amendment was to control resident plural citizens' choices in citizenship and military duties. In order to solve net population loss and secure a military manpower pool, the Korean government specifically aimed to break the linkage between plural citizenship, "birth tourism," and draft evasion. The 2010 Amendment, by setting the principle to treat plural citizens as Korean citizens only, had broadened the pool of potential citizens and conscripts to include Korean emigrants overseas, which will be discussed in the sections that follow.

The 2010 Amendment and the Overseas Koreans as a Potential Pool of Conscripts

Through the 2010 Amendment, the Korean government essentially expanded their institutional control over overseas Koreans by incorporating them into the national citizenry. Under the new dual nationality system, all plural citizens—regardless of their current place of residence—are treated as Korean citizens only in applying the Acts and Statutes of Korea (Article 11-2). Those who are entitled to Korean citizenship are also treated as Korean citizens even if they did not register their birth in Korea (including its diplomatic missions overseas).²³ Korean citizens and potential citizens residing overseas with foreign nationality could no longer apply for South Korean visas and were instructed to apply for Korean passports instead.²⁴

²³ A similar stance is taken by the U.S. government, which does not issue visas to its own citizens, including those who are born abroad and are entitled to citizenship. "Such persons are as U.S. citizens at birth even before being documented as a U.S. citizen" (Embassy of the United States of America in Tashkent, Uzbekistan 2020).

²⁴ In the past, it was up to the choice of overseas Koreans and their parents to decide whether to register birth in the Korean system and whether to use a Korean or a foreign passport. After the 2010 Amendment was enacted, some Korean American students gave up government scholarships due to difficulties in

Among overseas Koreans, those with Korean citizenship also became part of the potential pool of military conscripts. In principle, all overseas dual national men are automatically enlisted at age eighteen and can be drafted for compulsory military service for 18–22 months. Incorporation of overseas Koreans into citizenry and the military manpower pool seem to be an expected result of the 2010 Amendment. In a personal interview,²⁵ a key official in the Ministry of Justice stated two potential goals of introducing the partial dual citizenship system. One was, in fact, to give the overseas Koreans a sense of belonging by formally recognizing their dual citizen status, and the other was to reach out to the diasporic communities for potential military resources.

Korean American Communities' Request for Revision of the Nationality Law

With the passing of the 2010 Amendment, overseas Korean men with plural nationality now became subject to compulsory military service. Two choices were given: one could either give up Korean citizenship before age eighteen or postpone military service through “overseas travel permit (or *de facto* exemption from military duties)” by submitting relevant materials before age twenty-five (or by separate deadlines specified for various categories). If a person does not renounce Korean nationality by age eighteen, he is unable to relinquish it until age thirty-seven when the military obligation is lifted. As will be discussed in the section to follow, the conditions for obtaining *de facto* exemption differed for plural nationals and other overseas

getting student visas (Kim, I., *The Vancouver Chosun Ilbo*, September 13, 2013).

²⁵ Personal interview with a Ministry of Justice official in June 2012.

Koreans (e.g., permanent residents in foreign countries), revealing the state's preference for specific family types and intention to control citizens' choices in citizenship, family formation, and military service.

This policy change had immediate repercussions within the Korean American communities. In September 2013, an alliance of Korean American associations was created to petition for revision of the Nationality Act.²⁶ On September 3, 2013, the first constitutional appeal was filed at the Constitutional Court of Korea by a Korean American attorney, Jong-Joon Chun, followed by four additional appeals. Two days later, the Ministry of Justice responded by distributing an online guide named "The Nationality Act and Military Service," via the official websites of the overseas Korean consulates and embassies (Kim, M. 2013).

In October 2014, Chun and representatives of the Korean American communities attended an open discussion forum at the National Assembly regarding the plural nationality law (Ch'oe 2014).²⁷ The main complaint of the Korean American leaders was that many second-generation Korean Americans will be subject to disadvantages in running for public office and seeking careers in the military or national security positions in the U.S. because of their dual

²⁶ The alliance, named *Chŏn Miju Sŏnch'ŏnchŏk Poksu Kukchŏkpŏp Kaechŏng Ch'ujin Wiwŏnhoe* (Pan America Promotion Committee for Revision of Korean Nationality Law), is co-chaired by Yŏng Jin Kim, president of the Korean American Business Council of New York and Mr. Chun (Kim, Yŏng-nam, *Toronto Korea Daily*, September 19, 2014).

²⁷ Attendees include two lawmakers, Kim Sŏng-gon (DP) and Yang Chang-yŏng (GNP), president of the Federation of Korean Associations, USA, and government officials from related ministries: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Overseas Koreans and Consular Affairs Bureau), Military Manpower Administration (Resources Management Division), and Ministry of Justice (Nationality Division).

national status. Another complaint was that without formal procedures to notify each individual, many Korean Americans were unaware of their dual citizen status and likely to miss the deadline to renounce citizenship. Even if they had no intention of avoiding military service, their freedom to renounce citizenship is restricted for a long period until age thirty-seven, or forty with the revised Overseas Korean Act (see footnote 59).

While Korean government officials understood the inconveniences for Korean Americans, they emphasized that it was necessary to build national consensus on the issue before revising the system. As the Korean public holds negative views toward dual national men who renounce citizenship, they argued that strong measures must be introduced to prevent draft evasion by second-generation overseas Koreans.²⁸ As stated by two government officials:

Renunciation of citizenship by dual nationals is directly related to securing military manpower. As military duty is an absolute obligation needed by our society, it is important to build a national consensus on the issue. National sentiments and the principle of equality in military obligations must be considered before improving the policy to allow more freedom in relinquishing nationality (Kim Jin-sōng of the Ministry of Justice and Lee Yeon Woo of the Military Manpower Administration).²⁹

Chun (2016a) pointed out that in the past, plural nationals without a Korean family registry were not subject to mandatory military service according to the Enforcement Decree of the Nationality Act of 1998,³⁰ but that this provision was deleted after the 2005 amendment.³¹

²⁸ Ch'oe, *San Francisco Korea Daily*, October 7, 2014.

²⁹ Hong, N., *LA Korea Times*, October 7, 2014.

³⁰ Enforcement Decree of the Nationality Act. Presidential Decree No. 15807, June 5, 1998. Article 16 Paragraph 3. This article was wholly amended by Presidential Decree No. 20465, December 28, 2007.

³¹ Chun, Jong-Joon. 2016a. "Back from the National Assembly Discussion Forum." *Law Firm News*.

Thus, he suggested automatically revoking Korean nationality in case of plural nationals whose birth is not registered in the Korean system.³² Chun (2016a) also emphasized that draft exemption was not the main problem as most Korean Americans were essentially exempt from military service as they can postpone their military duties until age thirty-seven.

2015 Constitutional Court Ruling

After three rejections, the Constitutional Court of Korea finally reviewed the fourth case submitted by Chun.³³ On November 26, 2015, this appeal was dismissed in a 5-4 ruling.³⁴ Five justices concluded that the current nationality law does not overly violate the freedom of persons with multiple nationalities to give up citizenship. The first reason was that it was more important to prevent draft evasion than protect the individual rights to renounce nationality. As the justices stated by citing the conclusion of a precedent:

The disadvantages caused by the renunciation of nationality are not enough to prevent the avoidance of the military service duty through the renunciation, so that without the regulation..., it will be much easier to evade the duty of military service ... with the result that, first, it will bring about some loss of military manpower resources, and

Chun & Associates, LLC Website. October 14, 2016.

³² Hong, N., *LA Korea Times*, October 7, 2014.

³³ The main argument of the complainant was that it was a violation of due process to restrict the freedom of overseas plural citizens to renounce Korean citizenship. In the absence of individual notification procedures, most overseas Koreans do not know that they have military duties and need to select or renounce Korean nationality by a certain deadline. Moreover, the current nationality law discriminates on the basis of gender as women with multiple nationalities automatically lose Korean citizenship if no choice is made by age twenty-three. Lastly, the complainant claimed that non-resident dual nationals with no intention of draft evasion should not be treated the same as resident dual citizens in Korea.

³⁴ Constitutional Court Decision. 2015b. Unconstitutional Confirmation of the Nationality Act, Article 12, Paragraph 2. 2013 Hun-Ma 805, November 26, 2015.

secondly, it will seriously hurt the principle of equality in the burden of military service duty because it can allow a person with dual nationality to enjoy the benefits as a Korean living in this country and then opportunistically to give up the nationality when he has to perform his duty as a citizen. (Constitutional Court Decision 2006)³⁵

Second, they concluded that the current law does not discriminate on the basis of gender.

As all Korean men must perform mandatory military service under the Constitution and the Military Service Act, it was deemed reasonable to specify a different time limit for men renouncing nationality to prevent draft evasion. Moreover, the five justices argued that information regarding the Korean nationality law and related deadlines can be obtained overseas,³⁶ and that disadvantages in running for public office apply to only exceptional cases.³⁷

Dissenting opinion was submitted by four justices:

Currently, men with plural nationality residing overseas do not receive individual notifications from the Military Manpower Administration or the diplomatic missions about the procedure of selecting nationality. Thus, they may have no idea about their military duties or the time limit for renouncing Korean nationality. Yet, the current law may have undue effects on these individuals by ignoring their special circumstances. For instance, overseas plural citizens cannot work in public offices in their country of main residence if they miss the deadline for renouncing Korean nationality. (Constitutional Court Decision 2015b)

The opposing four justices argued that exceptions should be allowed for plural nationals renouncing citizenship past the deadline if they can prove having inevitable circumstances. The

³⁵ Constitutional Court Decision. 2006. Performance of the Duty of Military Service before the Renunciation of Nationality Case (English Summary of the Decision). 2005 Hun-Ma 739. November 30, 2006.

³⁶ “For overseas plural citizens who are unaware of such policies—by reason of having no connections to Korea—it is reasonable to assume that Korean nationality does not matter for his or her legal status” (Constitutional Court Decision 2015b:1840).

³⁷ Yi, Ch'ang-yŏl, *DC Korea Times*, April 19, 2016.

four justices claimed that draft dodging can be effectively curbed by a strict examination of submitted documents and restricting entry, employment, or visa statuses of former plural citizens who have renounced Korean nationality.

After the dismissal of the fourth claim, Chun and leaders of the Korean American community submitted a fifth appeal to the Constitutional Court in October of 2016.³⁸ By using President Obama and the Republican presidential candidate, Ted Cruz, as examples, Chun (2016b) argued that Korean Americans will face controversies regarding plural nationality,³⁹ even if they successfully give up Korean citizenship. He also pointed out that the number of overseas Koreans with plural nationality will expand soon as bilinear transmission of nationality applies to those born after June 14, 1998 (Chun 2016b).⁴⁰ Among these plural citizens turning eighteen in 2016, those born from intermarriages between a Korean mother and a non-Korean father may be much less likely to know about their obligation to select a nationality.

Shaping Male Citizens' Life Choices through Dual Citizenship and Conscription Policies

Through policies on dual nationality and conscription, the Korean state accomplishes a larger goal of controlling the actions of citizens and citizens-to-be regarding family, citizenship, and military duties. By specifying conditions for maintaining plural citizenship and imposing

³⁸ Yi, Ch'ang-yŏl, *DC Korea Times*, April 19, 2016; Im, *Yonhap News*, October 18, 2016.

³⁹ Chun, Jong-Joon. 2016b. "Controversy over the U.S. presidential candidate's nationality," *DC Korea Times*, January 13, 2016. <http://dc.koreatimes.com/article/20160113/964114>.

⁴⁰ Since the 1998 Amendment of the Nationality Act, a Korean mother as well as a father can transmit Korean citizenship to his or her child.

military conscription, the government shapes non-resident male citizens' choices on citizenship, education, employment, military duties, and family.

Both citizenship and conscription policies reflect the state's familial and patriarchal ideologies, which confine citizens' life choices. Conscription is also a family policy (Geva 2011: 122) in that it provides deferments for specific family forms, revealing the state's familial and patriarchal ideologies. Although the basic principle is to conscript only citizens based in Korea,⁴¹ it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish between resident and non-resident citizens. To determine whether a non-resident male citizen is subject to military duties, the government may even take into account whether or for how long a parent or spouse has stayed in Korea in addition to one's own length of stay or parents' nationality. As the state's original goal is to stop plural citizens from giving up Korean citizenship and deter draft evasion, stricter rules apply for plural citizens compared to other overseas Koreans.

Non-Resident Male Citizens and Military Service: Two Choices

With more people moving back and forth across the border, the distinction between resident citizens and non-resident citizens or emigrants becomes ambiguous in many cases. The *de facto* exemption from military service (through "overseas travel permits" up to age thirty-seven) was originally designed for Korean emigrants who are permanently residing in foreign

⁴¹ Seok, Dong Hyeon. 2010. *Che 287-hoe Kukhoe Pöpche Saböp Wiwōnhoe hoeüirok, che 2-ho* 제 287회 국회 법제 사법 위원회 회의록 제 2호 [287th National Assembly, Minutes of the Legislation and Judiciary Committee, No. 2], February 23, 2010, specific quote on page 10.

countries, such as *Zainichi* Koreans in Japan.⁴² However, in recent years, many Korean migrants often return to Korea after their children acquire citizenship or permanent residency in a foreign country. Some parents stay behind in Korea to financially support their dual national children residing overseas.

As a result, in order to prevent draft evasion, the government not only imposes military service on resident citizens but also on non-resident citizens and emigrants under certain conditions. There are two choices for non-resident dual national men to handle military conscription. First, they can renounce Korean citizenship before the end of March of the year they become eighteen years old. This option is not available for persons born abroad to parents with “no intent of permanently residing in a foreign country” or “birth tourists.” Second, emigrants who meet certain qualifications can obtain “permission for overseas travel” until age thirty-seven,⁴³ which means *de facto* exemption from military service. However, in the latter case, military service may be imposed again under certain conditions.⁴⁴ In general, short visits and stays of less than ninety days in Korea in a year do not affect the deferment whereas engaging in activities for profit for sixty days or more in Korea will cancel the exemption.

⁴² *Zainichi* Koreans refer to ethnic Koreans who have lived in Japan for three or four generations. Most of them hold special permanent residency and are descendants of colonial Korean subjects who moved to Japan during Japan’s occupation of Korea.

⁴³ Management Rules for Overseas Travel of Persons with Military Service Obligation, Military Manpower Administration Rule No. 1525, May 29, 2018, Appendix Table 2. Accessed January 24, 2020. <http://www.law.go.kr/LSW/admRulLsInfoP.do?admRulSeq=2100000127631>.

⁴⁴ Enforcement Decree of the Military Service Act, Presidential Decree No. 28905, May 5, 2018, Article 147-2, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 1.

For second-generation Korean men who want to visit Korea, two special policies allow them to work or study for more than six months without being subject to military service: “*Moguk suhak chedo* (Policy for studying in the motherland)”⁴⁵ and “*Chaeoe kungmin 2-se chedo* (Policy for second-generation South Korean nationals residing abroad).”⁴⁶ However, even in these two cases, deferments can be revoked. In the former, “the permission for overseas travel” is cancelled if one overstays in educational institutions,⁴⁷ or if one’s spouse or parent lives in Korea for more than six months in a year.⁴⁸ In the latter, military duties are imposed if one stays in Korea for more than three years after age eighteen.⁴⁹

Conscription and Deferment Policies Reflect State’s Familial Ideologies

The exact conditions for deferment reveal the Korean state’s deeply-held familial and patriarchal ideologies. The requirements for obtaining military deferment are more lenient for

⁴⁵ Military Manpower Administration. 2020a. “Overseas Koreans Studying in the Motherland.” Accessed January 24, 2020. <http://www.mma.go.kr/contents.do?mc=mma0000803>.

⁴⁶ The status of “*Chaeoe kungmin 2-se* (Second-generation Korean national residing abroad)” is selectively given to persons with foreign citizenship, permanent residency or indefinite stay status in a foreign country who meet the following qualifications. A person should have either lived overseas since birth with his parents until age seventeen or emigrated before age six; he must have stayed in Korea for less than ninety days per year and attended a school in Korea for less than three years before age seventeen (Enforcement Decree of the Military Service Act, Presidential Decree No. 28905, May 5, 2018, Article 128, Paragraphs 5 and 7).

⁴⁷ Management Rules for Overseas Travel of Persons with Military Service Obligation, Military Manpower Administration Rule No. 1525, May 29, 2018, Article 20.

⁴⁸ Military Manpower Administration 2020a. “Overseas Koreans Studying in the Motherland.” (See also Enforcement Decree of the Military Service Act, Presidential Decree No. 28905, May 5, 2018, Article 147-2)

⁴⁹ Enforcement Decree of the Military Service Act, Presidential Decree No. 28905, May 5, 2018, Article 128, Paragraph 7.

those residing with family overseas compared to those living alone overseas. It is mostly emigrants, preferably in family units, residing in a foreign country who receive “the permission for overseas travel” until age thirty-seven (see Table 24 in the section below for lenient requirements on emigrants living with families overseas). This includes non-resident plural citizens (under strict conditions) and permanent residents (excluding those with a conditional permanent resident status) and children of foreign citizens or long-term or permanent residents in a foreign country.⁵⁰

In general, for non-resident citizens, the *de facto* exemption from military service can be revoked by staying in Korea for more than six months per year, by working or engaging in profit-making activities in Korea, or by reporting the “permanent return”⁵¹ of oneself or parent(s).⁵² While there is no set definition of “overseas residence,” these two conditions (e.g., residing overseas for more than six months a year and working or engaging in profit-generating activities overseas) seem to be crucial (Lee, Yeon Woo 2013:93).

As the conscription policy is based on the state’s patriarchal model of family, receiving exemption from military service also depends on family arrangements in certain cases. First, if an emigrant has received “the permission for overseas travel” under the condition of living with

⁵⁰ Ibid., Article 149.

⁵¹ Emigrants who have permanently returned from overseas to Korea must report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Emigration Act, Act No. 15430, March 13, 2018, Article 12).

⁵² Enforcement Decree of the Military Service Act, Presidential Decree No. 28905, May 5, 2018, Article 147-2.

either of his parents, deferment can be revoked by changes in parents' place of residence, legal status, or length of stay or employment in Korea. For instance, if a parent decides to return and permanently live in Korea, military service is imposed again on children living overseas unless they have already obtained permanent resident status in a foreign country. Second, for second-generation overseas Korean students studying in Korea through “*Moguk suhak chedo* (policy for studying in the motherland),” deferment from military service can be revoked if a spouse or parent stays in Korea for more than six months per year.⁵³

Plural Nationals Need to Meet Stricter Qualifications for Deferment

In order to prevent draft evasion through birth tourism, the government applies particularly strict qualifications for plural nationals in granting deferment from military service.⁵⁴ First, in contrast with other non-resident citizens, plural citizens must meet additional conditions in order to qualify for deferment.⁵⁵ Table 24 compares the requirements for plural citizens and other non-resident citizens to get the *de facto* exemption from military service, particularly for those in the preliminary military service and social work personnel. Plural nationals need to have

⁵³ Military Manpower Administration 2020a. “Overseas Koreans Studying in the Motherland.”

⁵⁴ For plural nationals, the permission for overseas travel is given in the following three cases: (1) a person who resides in a foreign country with a father or a mother who has permanent residency or citizenship of a foreign country, (2) a person who has been living abroad with both parents before age 24, (3) a person who has lived overseas for more than ten years. For conditions (1) and (2), persons living in a third country, different from the parent's country of residence, are also regarded as living with their parent(s) overseas (Management Rules for Overseas Travel of Persons with Military Service Obligation, Military Manpower Administration Rule No. 1525, May 29, 2018, Article 23).

⁵⁵ Military Manpower Administration. 2020b. “Permission (of *De Facto* Exemption) for Persons with Permanent Residency or Citizenship (of a Foreign Country).” Accessed January 24, 2020. <http://www.mma.go.kr/contents.do?mc=mma0000801>.

continuously resided overseas and satisfy one of the three conditions: overseas residence for ten years or more, living with a parent who has foreign citizenship or permanent resident status, or having resided overseas with parents before age twenty-four. The length of minimum overseas residence for plural citizens is ten years, which is particularly longer than the three-year requirement for those with permanent resident status in a foreign country. Unlike other non-resident citizens living with parents overseas, there is an age limit for plural nationals: they must have left Korea before age twenty-four.

Second, for most plural nationals, deferment is not only determined by one's place of residence, but more importantly, by the parents' country of residence. Having a parent living in Korea is sufficient enough to cancel the *de facto* exemption from military service, with the exception of plural citizens who have lived overseas for more than ten years. Before the revision in 2016, among non-resident plural citizens, only those with one or both parents living in a foreign country could postpone military service up to age thirty-seven.

Table 24. Comparison of requirements for plural citizens and other non-resident citizens to receive the “permission for overseas travel” or *de facto* exemption from military service

	Non-resident plural citizens	Other non-resident citizens
Living with one or both parents overseas	i) A person who has <i>continuously</i> lived overseas with a mother or a father who has foreign citizenship or a permanent resident status in a foreign country	iv) A person living overseas with parents on the grounds that either his mother or father has obtained permanent resident status in a foreign country
		v) A person living overseas with parents who have foreign citizenship
	ii) A person who has <i>continuously</i> lived overseas with both parents before age 24	vi) A person who has <i>continuously</i> resided overseas with parents for more than 5 years (excluding cases where a parent is a public official or resident employee dispatched overseas)
Living alone overseas	iii) A person who has <i>continuously</i> lived overseas for more than 10 years	vii) A person who has obtained a permanent resident status in a foreign country and has <i>continuously</i> resided there for more than 3 years.
		viii) A person who has reported emigration (to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and has <i>continuously</i> lived in the migrated country for more than 3 years, including the waiting period for immigration.
		ix) Despite conditions vii) and viii), a person who has either reported emigration (to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and left Korea before age 24 or has obtained a permanent resident status in a foreign country and has <i>continuously</i> lived there before age 24

Note: These rules apply to those in the preliminary military service and social work personnel.
 Source: Military Manpower Administration. 2020b. “Permission (of *De Facto* Exemption) for Persons with Permanent Residency or Citizenship (of a Foreign Country).”

Revoking *de facto* exemption from military service based on parent's place of residence (e.g., residing in Korea for more than six months in a year) applies to plural citizens and other non-resident citizens who have received deferment under the condition of living with parents overseas. However, in the case of other emigrants, many will eventually obtain permanent residency and receive *de facto* exemption from military service even if a parent resides in Korea (Lee, Yeon Woo 2013: 99-100). In contrast, for plural citizens living with parents overseas, the chances of reapplying for deferment is slim if a parent moves back to Korea.

While citizenship represents a stronger connection between an individual and a state compared to permanent residency, plural nationals are unfairly treated with regard to getting the *de facto* exemption from military service (Lee, Yeon Woo 2013:96). As the 2010 amendment allows Korean return migrants over age sixty-five to maintain plural nationality, Lee Yeon Woo (2013:100) suggests that the deferment system should be revised accordingly. Those who will be hit the hardest by the parents' return migration to Korea will be plural citizens living overseas. Unless they have already lived abroad for more than ten years, any change in parents' place of residence or legal status would result in automatic revocation of the deferment, requiring them to fulfill the compulsory military service.

The disadvantageous rules of conscription for plural citizens signal that the Korean state holds certain assumptions for family forms, e.g., traditional, male breadwinner models where men provide for their family financially while wives do domestic work and care for family members. In essence, all plural citizens with one or both parents living in Korea are either regarded as dependents who are economically supported by their parents or persons whose

livelihood is based in Korea. Whether one is actually economically independent does not matter as long as their parents are currently based in Korea. At the same time, as conscription and citizenship policies are based on familial and patriarchal ideologies of the state, non-conforming individuals without traditional forms of family cannot apply for deferment.

In short, despite its original intent to only conscript “resident citizens,” the Korean government imposes military obligations to a wider range of “resident” and “non-resident citizens.” In order to prevent draft evasion through birth tourism, the government applies particularly stricter qualifications for plural nationals (e.g., overseas residence of ten years or more, having one or both parents living overseas) in granting *de facto* exemption from military service. In contrast, the conditions for receiving a deferment is less stringent for non-resident citizens who are permanent residents of a foreign country or who have stayed overseas for an extended period without foreign citizenship (Lee, Yeon Woo 2013:96).

Plural Citizens Continue to Renounce Korean Citizenship Even after the 2010 Amendment

One of the goals of the Korean government was to deter dual citizens from giving up Korean citizenship to reverse the negative balance in the statistics for naturalization and renunciation. With the lowest-low fertility rate and consistent outflux of skilled Koreans, it was important for the Korean state to retain its citizens. Initially, as shown earlier in Table 20, the number of dual citizens by birth choosing Korean citizenship has increased gradually, surpassing the number of renunciations right after the passing of 2010 amendment.

Table 25. Distribution of plural citizens by type in 2013

Total	Plural citizens by birth	Naturalized citizens by marriage	Return migrants over age 65	Highly skilled	Others
40,442	17,446 (43.1%)	16,301 (40.3%)	3,660 (9.0%)	46 (0.1%)	2989 (7.4%)

Source: Ministry of Justice. 2013. *Annual Report Korea Immigration Service*, p. 90.

The number of plural citizens has increased from 26,846 in 2012 to 40,442 in 2013, which is roughly a 50 percent increase (Ministry of Justice 2013:90). As Table 25 shows, plural citizens by birth (43.1 percent) and naturalized citizens by marriage (40.3 percent) accounted for over 80 percent of all plural nationals in 2013. In contrast, only a few cases were return migrants over age sixty-five (9.0 percent) and the highly skilled (0.1 percent).

However, even the 2010 Amendment could not stop male citizens from upper class backgrounds from avoiding conscription and renouncing Korean citizenship. In the sections below, I show how both Korean American men and male resident citizens, including dual nationals and mononationals, have resisted by staying overseas and renouncing Korean citizenship to remove themselves from military duties

Increase in the Number of Korean Americans Giving Up Korean Citizenship

As a result of frequent media reports on the revised nationality law, increasing numbers of second-generation Korean Americans have renounced Korean nationality to avoid military conscription. In 2014, as many as 1,078 men with multiple nationalities, including Korean

Americans and (resident) dual citizens, relinquished Korean citizenship, and as of October 2015, 626 men have given up Korean citizenship.⁵⁶ The number of renunciations submitted by plural citizens to the Korean Consulate General in Los Angeles rose quickly from 206 in 2013 and 266 in 2014, to 381 in 2015; the Consulate General in New York also handled 270 cases of renunciation of nationality in 2015, a 32 percent increase from 2014.⁵⁷

A number of Korean Americans have rushed to the diplomatic missions to relinquish Korean citizenship only to find out that additional paperwork is needed (e.g., parents' marriage registration, parents' report of renunciation of Korean nationality, and birth registration) and that the whole process may take from six months to a year.⁵⁸ Chun (2016b) has pointed out that the number of Korean Americans renouncing Korean citizenship is relatively small, remaining at thousands despite the sudden increase. He has emphasized that the majority of Korean Americans with plural nationality do not know that they have to make a choice of nationality.

Male Dual Citizens Continue to Avoid Conscription and Renounce Korean Citizenship

Despite the changes made in nationality laws and conscription policies, men from the middle or upper class have continued to shirk mandatory military service. For instance, some male mononationals and dual nationals have stayed overseas until the age military duties are

⁵⁶ Kim, Ch'öl-su, *LA Korea Times*. January 11, 2016.

⁵⁷ In 2015, the annual number of renunciation and loss of nationality cases exceeded 2,000 for the first time in the jurisdiction of the Korean Consulate General in Los Angeles (Kim, Chong-u, *Yonhap News*, January 11, 2016).

⁵⁸ Kim, Ch'öl-su, *San Francisco Korea Times*, March 7, 2015.

lifted. Approximately 5,000 to 7,000 men each year have evaded military service by staying overseas until age thirty-seven between 2010 and 2013 (Cho, M. 2015). As many as 139 men have even stayed overseas undocumented in order to avoid conscription, including a son of a current government official at the Ministry of Justice (Cho, M. 2015).

Even after the 2010 Amendment, a greater number of male dual citizens chose to give up Korean citizenship. In Table 20, between 2011 and 2018, a total of 15,118 plural citizens by birth renounced Korean nationality while 11,257 chose to keep Korean nationality and enjoy plural national status (Ministry of Justice 2018). The sudden increase in the number of renunciation cases in 2018 is due to the revision of the Overseas Korean Act, enforced in May 2018.⁵⁹ With the new amendment, former citizen men who have renounced Korean nationality without fulfilling military obligations cannot apply for “Overseas Korean (F-4)” visas until age forty (Article 5). In the previous law, military duties were lifted at age thirty-seven.

The official statistics by the Ministry of Justice make it difficult to read the continuing trend of giving up Korean citizenship among male dual nationals for two reasons. First, although fewer numbers of dual citizens by birth actively renounce Korean citizenship, dual citizens continue to automatically lose Korean citizenship by not making a choice of nationality. The government report does not include dual citizens who had their Korean citizenship revoked by

⁵⁹ Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans (also known as “the Overseas Korean Act”). Act No. 14973, October 31, 2017, Article 5.

Aside from the 2018 revision of the Overseas Korean Act, the sudden spikes in number of “loss of nationality” cases in 2016 and 2018 are also due to processing the accumulated cases before the 20th National Assembly election and the 2018 nationwide simultaneous local elections, respectively.

not making a choice of nationality. Despite improvements made in the 2010 Amendment,⁶⁰ plural citizens by birth continue to lose Korean nationality by not making a choice as it is simply impossible to track down and notify all dual citizens to make a choice of citizenship.

Second, as noted in the previous section, an increasing number of Korean Americans are renouncing Korean citizenship to avoid military conscription since 2013. With the 2010 Amendment, Korean citizenship can only be relinquished at overseas diplomatic missions. Thus, the number of renunciation cases received in the U.S. not only represents Korean Americans but may also include resident dual citizens who have travelled to renounce Korean citizenship. As shown in Table 20, a greater number of dual citizens have given up Korean nationality after the recent revision to the Overseas Korean Act in 2018.

To summarize, despite the state's efforts to retain Korean citizens, plural citizens continue to renounce Korean nationality even after the introduction of selective dual citizenship. Imposing military duties on non-resident (dual) citizens, such as Korean Americans, has resulted in protests from Korean American communities who have rushed to give up Korean citizenship. Among male resident citizens, some mononationals and dual nationals have shirked military duties by staying overseas. As seen in the past after the 2005 amendment, male plural citizens rushed to give up Korean nationality in massive numbers after the 2010 Amendment of the

⁶⁰ The 2010 amendment introduced an additional procedure to prevent automatic revocation of citizenship, which has been pointed out as a possible human rights violation within the Ministry of Justice. A final notice is sent if a plural citizen by birth does not make a choice of citizenship within two years or by age twenty-two. In this case, one cannot maintain plural nationality by submitting the pledge, but must select only one nationality within a year. Korean citizenship is automatically revoked if no choice is made even after a year.

Nationality Act. At the same time, a steady number of plural citizens continue to lose Korean citizenship by not actively making a choice between Korean and foreign nationalities.

Dual Nationality Policy Brings Revisions to Old-Age Pension and Child Care Benefits

Non-resident Citizens Excluded from Social Welfare Benefits

After passing of the dual nationality law in 2010, controversies arose regarding the provision of welfare benefits to non-resident citizens, such as child care benefits and old-age pension. Both old-age pension and child care benefits were initially expanded to all senior citizens (in the lower 70th percentile) and children ages 0–5 between 2012 and 2013. However, the requirements for eligibility were tightened to exclude non-resident citizens in 2014 and 2015, after backlash against providing welfare benefits to plural citizens abroad (Kim, Ch'öl-su 2014a).

In case of the basic old-age pension, senior citizens over age sixty-five in the lower 70th percentile of income distribution have received approximately 100 to 200 U.S. dollars a month. When the old-age pension was first introduced in 2007, less than 60 percent of senior citizens received the benefit, excluding those who stayed overseas for more than 180 days a year. In 2012, President Park Geun-Hye expanded the policy to cover up to 70 percent of the elderly population, and Korean embassies actively advertised ways to apply for old-age pension on their websites for overseas Koreans. After backlash arose against giving welfare to plural citizens who live overseas and may not have paid taxes, the Ministry of Health and Welfare decided to exclude citizens who have lived overseas for more than sixty days a year from eligibility since

July 2014 (Basic Pension Act).⁶¹

Child care benefits, in the form of child home-care allowances and vouchers for child care centers and kindergartens, were expanded to include all children between ages 0 and 5 as part of the “Free Child Care policy (*musang boyuk*)” since March, 2013 (Child Care Act, Article 34).⁶² Child home-care allowance was originally introduced for low-income families with children aged 0–2, and those who stayed overseas for more than ninety days a year were excluded.

With the new expansion, all children including non-resident citizens, received child home-care allowances, ranging from 100 to 200 U.S. dollars a month. In practice, however, children whose births were registered in overseas Korean embassies could not apply for child care benefits.⁶³ Although many children born overseas could not benefit from child home-care subsidies, a total of 5.4 billion won (4.7 million U.S. dollars) were spent on non-resident, plural national children during the first half of year 2014. (Yi, Se-jöng 2014).⁶⁴

⁶¹ Basic Pension Act (English Translation). Act No. 12617, May 20, 2014. Article 16.

⁶² Child Care Act (English Translation). Act No. 13321, May 18, 2015. Article 34.

⁶³ In order to apply for child care allowances, at least one parent and the child must have Korean nationality and have a valid resident registration number with a domestic address. Children born overseas do not receive full resident registration numbers unless they return to Korea to reside for more than thirty days and register under a domestic address. It was also not possible to receive child care subsidies retrospectively (Chöng, T., *LA Korea Times*, Mar 19, 2013; Pak S., *Dongpo News*, Oct 14, 2013).

⁶⁴ The three districts in the Kangnam area, the wealthiest neighborhood in Seoul, gave the highest amount of subsidies to children overseas, accounting for 25 percent of the total expense (Yi, Se-jöng, *OhmyNews*, Aug 5, 2014).

Backlash arose against providing child home-care allowances to non-resident children, many of whom have plural nationality. In May 2015, through the Amendment of the Child Welfare Act, children residing overseas continuously for more than ninety days a year were excluded from child care benefits.^{65, 66}

Other social welfare benefits have also been retracted for non-resident citizens. Through an amendment in May 2014, persons with disabilities can no longer receive a pension if they stay overseas for more than sixty days, a tightened standard compared to 180 days in the past.⁶⁷ In 2015, the National Basic Security System was revised to clearly state that “Overseas Koreans” are excluded, although they had never been a part of this welfare policy for low-income individuals (Kim, Ye-na 2015).⁶⁸ After the 2014 amendment of the Resident Registration Act (see footnote 70), resident registration numbers were issued to “Korean nationals residing abroad.” As a response to this change, the Enforcement Decree of the National Basic Living Security Act was amended in 2015 to specify that “Korean nationals living overseas” are not counted as “individual households” eligible for the Korean Basic Security System. Earlier in 2011, the

⁶⁵ Child Care Act (English Translation). Act No. 13321, May 18, 2015. Article 34-2.

⁶⁶ Without a system to track immigration records of children, approximately 97 billion won (86 million US dollars) was spent on children who stayed overseas for more than ninety days as home-care allowance between 2012 and 2017. Again, among the three districts—Kangnam, Söcho, and Songpa—the Kangnam area had the largest expenditures, ranging from 2.3 to 2.6 million US dollars, spent on home-care subsidies for children residing overseas for a long term (Chöng, C., *The Hankook Ilbo*, July 6, 2017).

⁶⁷ Pension for Persons with Disabilities Act. Act No. 12620, May 29, 2014. Article 15.

⁶⁸ Enforcement Decree of the National Basic Living Security Act. Presidential Decree No. 26843, December 31, 2015. Article 2-1.

eligibility requirement for the National Basic Security System was changed to disqualify those who stay overseas for more than ninety days total in a six-month period, a stricter requirement compared to a three months' stay overseas in the previous decree.⁶⁹

“Overseas Korean” Children Receive Vouchers for Child Care Centers while Living in Korea

A contrasting case is the expansion of vouchers for child care centers to “Overseas Korean” children currently living in Korea for over thirty days. While child home-care allowance has disqualified non-resident children based on their length of stay overseas, vouchers for using child care centers or kindergartens has continuously excluded children of “Korean nationals living abroad”—mostly permanent residents in other countries—even if they currently reside in Korea. Since March 2013, all Korean children ages 0–5 received subsidies, ranging from 220 to 400 U.S. dollars, for attending child care centers or kindergartens as the “Free-of-Charge Education” policy expanded.

Initially “Overseas Korean” children were rejected for not having a resident registration number. They were still excluded from childcare subsidies even after the Resident Registration Act was amended in 2014 to allow resident registration for “Korean nationals living abroad” if they reside in Korea for over thirty days.⁷⁰ This case was taken to the Constitutional Court in November 2015 by third-generation *Zainichi* Korean women living in Korea —Koreans with

⁶⁹ Enforcement Decree of the National Basic Living Security Act. Presidential Decree No. 23128, September 8, 2011. Article 2-2.

⁷⁰ Resident Registration Act (English Translation). Act No. 12279, January 21, 2014. Article 6.

Special Permanent Resident status in Japan.⁷¹ Exclusion was not based on official regulations or legislation (e.g., Early Childhood Education Act or Infant Care Act), but mere guidelines issued by the Ministry of Health and Welfare (Yi, Pöm-jun 2015, 2017).

The turn of events came suddenly in September 2017, four months after the launch of the new Moon Jae-In administration. The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health and Welfare declared that “Overseas Korean children” residing in Korea for more than thirty days with valid resident registration will receive child care subsidies for attending kindergarten or child care centers in Korea. According to the new measure, if a child stays overseas more than ninety days (for child care centers) or thirty days (for kindergartens), the child care subsidies are suspended (Yi, I. 2017). This decision was unexpected as both ministries had initially declined to follow the National Human Rights Commission’s (NHRC) recommendation to extend child care subsidies to “Overseas Korean” children living in Korea.⁷² In June 2017, the Social Security Committee had also advised that all Korean citizens residing in Korea should receive universal

⁷¹ Constitutional Court Decision. 2015a. Unconstitutional Confirmation of the 2015 Ministry of Health and Welfare Guideline of Childcare Project, Addendum 2. 2015Hun-Ma1047. January 25, 2018.

⁷² In October 2015, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) had issued a policy recommendation to the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health and Welfare to extend child care vouchers to “Overseas Korean” children living in Korea. The NHRC had stated that such discrimination was against the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (National Human Rights Commission 2015). However, in August 2016, the NHRC announced that both ministries had refused to extend child care vouchers to “Overseas Korean” children. The Minister of Health and Welfare stated that social consensus is needed to provide child care subsidies to “Overseas Koreans” as it is unclear whether they intend to permanently reside in Korea. The Minister of Education declined on the grounds that the Ministry of Health and Welfare does not reimburse child care expenses for “Overseas Korean” children, and that it will only add confusion if the Ministry of Education provides subsidies for kindergarten costs of “Overseas Koreans” (Pak K., *Yonhap News*, Aug 23, 2016).

benefits and services that do not require investigation of income and wealth (Yi I. 2017).

In summary, the 2010 Amendment has raised questions about the very definition of citizenship and what it entails regarding rights and obligations. The selective dual citizenship policy has brought an influx of return migrants over age sixty-five who have restored Korean citizenship and became eligible for social welfare benefits, such as old-age pension, from Korea. At the same time, non-resident citizens, such as dual national children living abroad, also became more visible as potential recipients of social security benefits, such as child care allowances and vouchers.

While the Korean government has currently decided to restrict eligibility for various social benefits based on the length of residence within the country, it still has not fully resolved the issue by clearly laying out what constitutes citizenship, who is eligible for social benefits, and who is subject to obligations of citizenship. As more people cross borders back and forth, the distinction between resident and non-resident citizens will only become less meaningful, such as seen in the case of “Overseas Korean” children residing in Korea for the long term and receiving vouchers for attending child care facilities.

Conclusion

By conducting a case study of a country with a sizable overseas diaspora and an expanding migrant population, I argue that dual citizenship policy must be examined in the larger context of immigration, including coethnic and labor migration policies, based on the two axes of national identity and political economy (Zolberg 1999, 2006). Rather than as a policy for coethnics or migrants only, selective dual citizenship in Korea is an effective means for

managing human resources, ranging from resident (dual) citizens to overseas diasporic groups, marriage migrants, and skilled workers. In Chapter 3, I have shown that the Korean state uses dual nationality to fulfill both material (e.g., recruiting potential investors and a high-skilled workforce) and symbolic interests (e.g., preserving ethnic national identity and raising fertility) of the state.

In this chapter, I have shown that the Korean state controls and alters the actions of citizens and citizens-to-be through plural citizenship policy, encouraging male plural citizens to fulfill military duties and maintain Korean nationality and other citizens to refrain from using “birth tourism.” Both conscription and citizenship policies reveal the state’s familial ideologies, pushing citizens and potential citizens toward patriarchal family forms in granting deferment from military service and approving plural nationality. With the digitization of immigration records and resident population data (and exchange of naturalization records between states), the Korean government has effectively incorporated non-resident citizens into the national citizenry, imposing Korean citizenship and military duties on potential citizens. This has led Korean American communities to protest by renouncing citizenship and appealing to the Constitutional Court.

This chapter illuminates new aspects of plural citizenship that has been neglected in previous studies. First, dual citizenship not only creates inequality among citizens but is tied to class inequality in Korea. With the prevalent use of “birth tourism” among middle- to upper-class families, plural citizenship has become a marker of class privilege and a means to give children foreign citizenship and avoid military service. The Korean public’s negative sentiment toward

dual citizens stems from two factors: the disproportionate number of plural citizens from high-income families—in some cases as a result of “birth tourism”—and the publicized use of foreign citizenship to avoid compulsory military service among resident male plural citizens. As dual citizenship is currently tied to class inequality in Korea, the political debates at the National Assembly have centered upon whether to allow former dual citizens to regain Korean nationality and enjoy plural citizenship.

Second, unlike other countries with plural nationality, military service is a central component of citizenship in Korea for men. One of the goals of the 2010 Amendment was to ensure male plural citizens fulfill their military duties. Plural nationality was thus only allowed for men who have finished military duties, excluding persons born from “maternity trips.” Ethnic Chinese were also excluded on the grounds that naturalized citizens are virtually exempt from military duties, and this may further exacerbate the public’s sentiment toward dual citizens.

Third, dual citizenship policy in Korea serves as a tool to exert the “pedagogical power” of the state (Gorski 2003), controlling family formation and choices regarding citizenship and military duties of citizens and citizens-to-be. The Korean state shapes male citizens’ life choices by setting conditions for maintaining dual citizenship and receiving *de facto* exemption from military service. Once enlisted at age eighteen, male plural citizens cannot renounce Korean nationality until military duties are fulfilled. Plural citizen men also face stricter requirements to get a deferment from military service (e.g., requirement of parents’ residence overseas or ten-year residence overseas), compared to other non-resident citizens with permanent or long-term resident status in a foreign country.

Fourth, the dual citizenship policy brings attention to extraterritorial citizenship. With the 2010 Amendment, the Korean state has extended its institutional control over citizens overseas—including those entitled to Korean citizenship—treating them only as Korean citizens in applying Korean laws (e.g., issuing passports instead of visas). The state was able to secure potential military manpower through imposing military duties on non-resident male citizens, such as Korean Americans. Immediate opposition arose from Korean American communities leading to constitutional appeals and a sudden increase in the number of those renouncing Korean citizenship at Korean embassies. Despite the fact most non-resident citizens can receive *de facto* exemption from military duties, many Korean Americans view plural nationality itself as an obstacle in pursuing careers in public office, the military, and related sectors in the U.S.

From a state-centered perspective, I have examined the distinct goals of disparate departments and the political regimes to show how state interests shaped the dual citizenship policy and related policies (e.g., social welfare policies) in Korea. While the Lee Myung-Bak administration and the PCNC wanted to introduce dual citizenship policy to boost the country's competitiveness in the global market, the Ministry of Justice, the department overseeing the execution of actual citizenship policies, had a different goal. In a personal interview,⁷³ a formal government official stated that the previous law had raised concerns regarding human rights' violations. Dual citizens were stripped of Korean citizenship without notification if they had not made a formal choice of citizenship within two years.

⁷³ Personal interview with a Ministry of Justice official in June 2012.

The persistent volatility and repeated revisions of dual citizenship policy and its related social policies reveal the clashing state interests within different departments and the administration, as seen in the case of old-age pension. The Park Geun-Hye administration wanted to use old-age pension to win electoral support from senior non-resident citizens (e.g., Korean Americans) who are eligible for dual nationality. However, the Ministry of Health and Welfare eventually decided to restrict all social benefits based on length of residency in Korea after immediate backlash arose from resident citizens.

Lastly, I focused on how the selective dual citizenship policy brought changes in the social welfare policies toward reconstructing eligibility requirements around domestic residence, starting a debate on the definition of citizenship as separate from ethnic national identity, and the rights and obligations tied to citizenship. In addition to the strong feelings against draft-dodging dual citizens from elite backgrounds, non-resident (dual) citizens' access to social welfare benefits raised new tensions. Negative sentiments toward plural citizens—who are seen as “free riders”—has led to retraction of universal welfare benefits for non-resident citizens and plural citizens, as seen in the case of child home-care allowance or old-age pensions. In contrast, resident registration and vouchers for child care centers are now extended for “Overseas Koreans” (e.g., those with permanent residency in other countries) who stay in Korea for over thirty days. With the increase in number of plural nationals and population moving across borders, Korean society has to find a solution for readjusting obligations (e.g., conscription) and entitlements (e.g., welfare benefits) of citizenship.

As the history of large-scale migration is relatively short in Korea, it is still too early to

discuss the consequences of dual citizenship. As more people cross borders more frequently, the distinction between resident and non-resident citizens becomes more ambiguous, leading to the question of what it means to be a citizen, what citizenship entails, and the linkage between ethnic national identity (or “citizenship as belonging”) and “citizenship as rights.”

Another important prospect is the diversification of the plural citizen population in Korea. Although plural nationality is currently viewed as mainly an issue of middle-to-upper-class Koreans with American citizenships, most plural citizens by birth will soon be children of marriage migrants or marriage migrants themselves. As discussed earlier, marriage migrants actively take advantage of the new dual citizenship system and account for a substantial portion of the plural citizen population.

Despite the state’s effort to control the actions of citizens and potential citizens, people find ways to go around the system to fulfill their own interests. Even after introducing the 2010 Amendment, many Koreans with foreign nationality continue to give up Korean citizenship, as seen in the case of Korean Americans. Families from elite backgrounds continue to take “maternity trips,” which are difficult to detect, as seen in the case of Korean Air’s heiress, Cho Hyŏn-a, and her sons. Plural citizens and monationals use loopholes in the system to shirk military duties, such as not returning to Korea until their military duties are lifted. The Korean state, in response, raised the respective age to forty to ensure fulfillment of military duties.

Lastly, the nationality law in Korea continues to change to reflect state interests as well as demands from organized interests, such as overseas Koreans. On one hand, the age limit for plural nationality is still under debate. Korean Americans continue to demand lowering the age

limit for dual nationality from age sixty-five to fifty-five for returning Korean migrants. On the other hand, through a recent amendment enacted in December 2018, migrants are now required to have a permanent resident status and five-year residency before applying for naturalization. In the past, anyone could file for naturalization after fulfilling a five-year residency requirement, although citizenship was rarely granted in the case of migrant workers. With the deliberate purpose of preventing naturalization, work permits for migrant workers are currently renewable up to four years and ten months, with the exception of ethnic Koreans under “Overseas Korean” visa categories. With the recent change in naturalization requirement, it has become even more difficult to obtain Korean nationality, particularly for labor migrants.

CONCLUSION

In this dissertation, I have investigated the linkage between ethnoracial identity and citizenship both on the ground level—through large-scale survey data—and on the state level—through qualitative case study. How much importance do individuals and states place on descent in determining one’s national membership? To answer this question, I have used both cross-national survey data and qualitative case study to explore both the public’s understanding of national membership and the state’s perspective on descent-based citizenship policies, including dual citizenship. In Chapter 2, I examined the impact of group threat and relative skill composition at the societal level on the individual-level association between social structural variables (i.e., education and family income) and support for nativism. To better understand the reverse patterns in countries with low percentages of foreign-born, I turn to a qualitative case study of South Korea’s selective dual nationality policy in the larger context of its overarching immigration policies in Chapters 3 and 4.

In Chapter 2, I found that the individual-level effects of education and household income on nativism are strengthened by contextual factors, such as the level of group threat—particularly relative size of out-group population—and natives-to-immigrants skill composition (measured by percentage of college graduates and GDP per capita). Results only partially support group threat theory which predicts the individual-level effects to be greater in countries with greater group threat (i.e., relative size of out-group and economic condition). In line with group threat theory, the individual-level association between social structural variables (i.e., education and family income) and nativism is stronger in countries with a high percentage of

foreign-born. However, effects of education and household income also intensify in countries with high GDP per capita. This result is better explained by the economic theory of trade, which posits that the skill effect (measured by education or family income) will be greater in richer countries (i.e., high proportion of skilled natives) than in poorer countries. As predicted by the economic theory of trade, the individual-level effects of education are greater in countries with a high percentage of college graduates (i.e., greater skill abundance).

Through a multi-level analysis using cross-level interactions, I have found two general patterns of education and household income effects on nativism. First, the negative effect of education on nativism is stronger in countries with greater levels of group threat (i.e., higher percentage of foreign-born) and greater skill abundance (i.e., high percentage of college graduates), corroborating group threat theory and the economic theory of trade. On average, those with less than high school or high school education are generally more likely to support ancestry-based national membership compared to college graduates. Among those with high school or less than high school education, those living in countries with a higher percentage of foreign-born or college graduates are much more likely to endorse nativism.

Education not only culturally inculcates individuals but structurally shapes one's position in the labor market. From a structural perspective, being a high school dropout or a high school graduate in a country with many university graduates may entail more precarious work conditions and increased competition with out-group members in the labor market, leading to greater support for nativism. In countries with a large population of foreign-born residents, individuals with lower levels of education may face fiercer competition in the labor market and view their ethnic or cultural group identity as under threat. From a cultural perspective,

compared to non-college graduates, college graduates generally have more liberal values and beliefs as they have been exposed to the liberalizing effect of education for an extended period. Thus, the gap in support for nativism grows wider between college graduates and non-graduates in countries with a greater share of college graduates in the population.

Second, the negative effects of absolute (i.e., log household income) and relative (i.e., household income quintiles within each country) family income on nativism are more pronounced in countries with a high GDP per capita (i.e., less competition or greater skill abundance) or a high percentage of foreign-born (i.e., greater group threat). These results partially support group threat theory while corroborating the economic theory of trade. In line with group threat theory, the effect of household income on nativism is stronger in countries with a high percentage of foreign-born or greater group threat. The effect of household income is also stronger in countries with a high GDP per capita (i.e., less competition), which is better explained by the economic theory of trade. The effect of being high-skilled, (i.e., high family income or education) on nativism is expected to be stronger in richer countries (i.e., higher ratio of skilled natives) than in poorer countries.

The general pattern, shown in most of the twenty-nine countries is that individuals with high family income are less likely to be nativist than those with low family income, on average. The gap between those with high household income and those with low household income in nativism grows even wider in countries with high GDP per capita or high percentage of foreign-born. Individuals with high family income, both in absolute and relative terms, are less likely to face labor market competition with out-group members or feel threatened by them. Some studies have refuted the explanation based on labor market competition by showing that high-skilled and

highly educated individuals in Europe are in favor of immigration regardless of immigrants' skill level (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). Thus, those with high occupational skills and education may share more liberal or cosmopolitan values regarding citizenship and national membership.

In contrast with the general pattern, among individuals with high household income, those living in countries with low GDP per capita (e.g., the Philippines, Russia, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Poland) or a low percentage of foreign-born (e.g., the Philippines, Korea, Japan, Poland, and Uruguay) are even more likely to be nativist compared to their counterparts with low household incomes. The reversed pattern in countries with low GDP per capita is well explained by the economic theory of trade. The high-skilled (i.e., those with high family income) are expected to be more nativist in poorer countries (i.e., high proportion of unskilled natives relative to migrants) as immigration may cut skilled wages by importing more skilled workers from abroad. Unlike their counterparts in countries with abundance in skilled labor, skilled workers in countries with low GDP per capita may feel threatened by the advance of foreign skilled workers and endorse restrictive national membership.

The reversed association between family income and nativism in countries with low percentage of foreign-born is not explained by group threat theory, which only postulates a weaker individual-level association in countries with less group threat. I focus on two factors to explain why high-income earners are more nativist in such countries. First, countries with low percentages of foreign-born residents tend to have greater ethnic homogeneity and stronger support for nativism. Second, stronger nationalist attitudes in such countries may be associated with the presence of a large diaspora overseas, an important factor largely overlooked in the literature. To better explicate the relationship between household income and nativism in

countries with smaller foreign-born populations, I turned to a qualitative case study of Korea's selective dual citizenship policy in Chapters 3 and 4.

The findings from multi-level analysis in Chapter 2 face three limitations. First, it is difficult to trace the changes in nativist attitudes as the cross-sectional data pertain to the year 2003. Second, although the final data set includes as many as twenty-nine countries, a majority of the participating countries are European or English-speaking countries with high GDP per capita and relatively large foreign-born populations, excluding countries with lower GDP per capita and a large overseas population. For future research, it is imperative to expand the data to a wide range of countries outside the OECD member states and analyze the changes in nativist attitudes using the 2013 National Identity module and other recent longitudinal data sets.

Third, one important caveat of cross-national surveys discussed in Chapter 2 is that respondents may interpret survey questions differently according to social contexts. For instance, those who endorse “ancestry” as an important criterion of national membership may have conflicting views of citizenship. For some, ancestry-based national membership may mean an ethnic national model of citizenship, excluding all non-coethnic migrants from accessing legal citizenship. By contrast, others may want to exclude all migrants—both coethnics and non-coethnics—from accessing legal citizenship. Yet again, others may demand extending legal citizenship to overseas diaspora on a selective basis, sorting various coethnic groups into more or less eligible members.

The contrasting results from the multi-level analysis in Chapter 2 using cross-national survey data raise further questions regarding the individual-level association between household income and support for ancestry-based national membership. I have identified two country-level

factors that lead to opposite patterns: low GDP per capita and low percentage of foreign-born. Among the two variables, I focus on countries with a low percentage of foreign-born, an understudied subject in previous studies. Countries with smaller foreign-born populations tend to have a large overseas diaspora, which may have influenced their stronger support for nativism and reverse patterns between high family income and nativism.

To further investigate the association between family income and nativism, particularly in countries with small foreign-born populations and a large diaspora, I turn to a qualitative case study of South Korea and its selective dual nationality policy in Chapters 3 and 4, which addresses the issue of dual citizenship as tied to class inequality. While Korea has medium-to-high GDP per capita, it is one of the countries with a very low percentage of foreign-born and a sizable emigrant population. On average, Koreans show slightly higher support for nativism while Koreans with high household income are even more likely to support ancestry-based national membership. The presence of a large diaspora overseas and a growing population of coethnic and non-coethnic migrants are possible factors that may further complicate native-born Koreans' understanding of citizenship and attitudes toward ancestry-based national membership.

By moving to a more qualitative case study, I draw attention to how state actors use descent-based citizenship policies, including coethnic and dual citizenship policies, not only to strengthen ethnic nationalism, but to juggle between geopolitical and economic interests and symbolic interests. In Chapter 2, I focused on the public's understanding of descent-based national membership on the ground. In Chapters 3 and 4, I investigate how the state uses the selective dual citizenship policy, coethnic policies, and the conscription policy to fulfill both material and symbolic interests of the state, administer a wide range of human resources, and

regulate citizens and potential citizens.

In Chapter 3, I show that the dual nationality policy in Korea is not only an emigrant policy but a comprehensive tool for administering human resources, ranging from resident (dual) citizens to overseas diaspora and non-Korean migrants. I argue that dual citizenship policy should be viewed as part of a larger immigration and citizenship system that includes diaspora management and migrant labor policies, controlling various human resources. For the Korean state, one of the important goals of the dual citizenship policy was tackling labor shortages by recruiting high-skilled workers, particularly among Koreans overseas.

By taking a state-centered approach to citizenship policy, I draw attention to the two axes in citizenship policy: political economy and national identity (Zolberg 1999, 2006). The selective dual citizenship policy has fulfilled both material and symbolic interests of the Korean state. On one hand, economic and geopolitical interests have shaped the boundaries of dual citizenship policy. Among non-Koreans, only high-skilled workers—including those who have made special contributions to the nation—and marriage migrants can apply for plural nationality. Even among ethnic Koreans, Korean Americans are favorably treated for geopolitical and economic reasons.

On the other hand, to strengthen ethnic national identity, dual citizenship was also extended to groups with less visible economic utility, e.g., overseas Korean adoptees and returning migrants ages sixty-five and older. The selective dual citizenship policy functions as a part of a larger diaspora management policy, which has preferentially treated Korean Americans since the launch of the Overseas Korean policy. In addition to the Overseas Korean (F-4) visas issued to former nationals and descendants of earlier Korean migrants, ethnic Koreans can apply for all five categories of dual citizenship policy. In the highly skilled category, the government

has even lowered the qualification standards for overseas Koreans who make up the majority of the applicants.

To raise fertility, dual citizenship was selectively offered to marriage migrants in marital unions. Marriage migrants' access to naturalization and plural nationality depends on their marital status, a Korean spouse's willingness to cooperate, and their reproductive contribution to Korean society. By selectively approving citizenship and requiring a spouse's sponsorship, the state encourages female marriage migrants to stay in marriages while strengthening men's household authority.

In Chapter 4, I argue that the Korean state has used dual citizenship as a tool to regulate citizens and citizens-to-be regarding their choices in family formation, citizenship, and military service. Military service is a core component of citizenship in Korea, a country with a universal conscription system. Dual citizenship is closely tied to class inequality in Korea, shown by the prevalent use of so-called "birth tourism" among elites to give children foreign citizenship and avoid military service. Strong negative sentiments have developed against draft-dodging dual citizens. Therefore, to introduce the dual citizenship policy against the public's negative views toward dual citizens, the Korean government has strived to effectively curb draft evasion or the use of "birth tourism" through the 2010 amendment.

In short, the Korean state has used conscription and citizenship policies to steer citizens and potential citizens' actions in accordance with their patriarchal and familial ideologies. The Korean state regulates male dual citizens' life choices by applying stricter qualifications for military service exemption and linking dual citizenship to fulfilment of military duties. Among dual citizen men, only those who have finished military duties can enjoy plural nationality,

excluding persons born from “maternity trips.” Ethnic Chinese were also excluded from the dual citizenship policy in fear of the backlash as naturalized citizens are virtually exempt from military duties.

As part of an effort to curb draft evasion, the 2010 amendment strengthened the Korean state’s institutional control of non-resident citizens. With the digitization of immigration records and resident population data (and exchange of naturalization records between states), the Korean government has effectively incorporated non-resident citizens into national citizenry, imposing Korean citizenship and military duties on potential citizens, including second-generation Korean Americans. Korean American communities have immediately responded by appealing to the Constitutional Court and rushing to the Korean embassies to renounce Korean citizenship.

By conducting a case study of a country with a sizable diaspora overseas and a growing migrant population, this study offers new insights to the field of citizenship studies. First, I call for a holistic approach to view dual citizenship policies as part of a larger citizenship system to manage a wide range of human resources, from resident and non-resident citizens to coethnics and non-coethnics. Rather than dividing countries by its position in the international migration system, a comprehensive state-centered approach is needed for all countries to fully explicate the role of dual citizenship policies as tools for managing resident citizens as well as immigrants and overseas diasporas.

Second, this study has shown that not only symbolic, but economic and geopolitical interests matter in citizenship policies. The existing literature on nationalism and citizenship has emphasized the impact of national identity on actual citizenship policymaking, such as ethnic nationalism and its impact on German citizenship policy (Brubaker 1992). However, many states

place great importance on economic and geopolitical factors in creating citizenship policies, revealing a preference for the highly skilled even among coethnic groups. Similar cases can be seen in diaspora management policies where sending countries often prioritize business elites and coethnics in advanced economies over others. This emphasis on economic and geopolitical interests is an important aspect often neglected in the literature that heavily emphasizes the role of ethnic nationalism (FitzGerald 2006:111).

Third, through the Korean case study, I have investigated the link between dual citizenship and conscription, revealing how access to dual citizenship is often divided along class lines. Citizenship scholars have also attributed the spread of dual citizenship to the end of the Cold War and universal conscription (Weil 2001). However, in the Korean case, the very existence of mandatory military service and the public's strong negative feelings toward draft-dodging dual citizens have pushed the state to introduce a formal dual citizenship policy to regulate draft evasion and abuse of "birth tourism" among elite families.

Fourth, this study has brought attention to extraterritorial citizenship. As more people cross territorial borders with greater frequency, the distinction between resident and non-resident citizens becomes less clear, raising questions on the definition of citizenship and the rights and obligations tied to citizenship. While the Korean state intends to conscript only male "resident" citizens, it has decided to impose military duties on all citizen men to prevent draft evasion and use of "birth tourism," resulting in strong protests from the Korean American community. As a wide range of non-resident and resident citizens exist, it becomes increasingly complicated to set up a fair principle for approving deferments. At the same time, social welfare benefits have become available and then reduced for non-resident citizens and plural citizens due to a backlash

from fellow citizens. The eligibility requirement of social benefits is newly reconstructed around domestic residence, a concept that invites even more discussion.

As the qualitative case study in Chapters 3 and 4 is only based on one country, the results cannot be generalized. There are also other important limitations to be addressed. First, the relationship between elites and dual citizenship policy has not been fully explicated. From the perspective of class-conflict theorists and pluralist, we may hypothesize that the selective dual citizenship policy was introduced in 2010 to serve the private interests of the elites. Dual citizenship is a marker of class in Korea and many resident dual citizens come from elite backgrounds, including politicians and high-profile government officials. The 2010 amendment was passed with only a few objections in the National Assembly, while some lawmakers have questioned whether the government is introducing the dual citizenship policy as a favor to economic elites or *chaebol*.

However, an alternative hypothesis can also explain why the 2010 amendment to introduce selective dual citizenship was ratified smoothly. On one hand, the 18th National Assembly (2008–12) was controlled by the ruling party, GNP, which had more than half of the seats. As the bill to introduce dual citizenship was proposed by the government, GNP held favorable views toward the amendment. The fact that the Lee Myung-Bak's administration had promoted dual citizenship as a means to recruit skilled workers made the bill seem harmless. On the other hand, a majority of assembly members agreed on the 2010 amendment because it allows dual citizenship to a selective group of coethnics (e.g., natural Korean citizens with foreign citizenship, overseas adoptees, and returning migrants over age sixty-five). Contrary to the German case where the political left and the right were split over de- and re-ethnicization of

citizenship (Jokke 2003), Korean lawmakers were more concerned about the possibility of draft evasion by dual citizens. The leftist parties continued to raise concerns that the 2010 amendment and its addendum would unfairly benefit former dual citizens by allowing them to restore Korean nationality.

Second, I have not fully addressed what role public opinion has played in the making of citizenship policies in the case of Korea. Two general conclusions can be drawn from the relationship between public opinion and citizenship policy formation in Korea. On one hand, as strong negative feelings have developed against dual citizens in Korea, Korean government officials have concentrated on including preventive measures in the 2010 amendment to effectively prevent the use of “birth tourism” and draft evasion. Even though it is difficult to accurately detect persons born abroad using “birth tourism” in practice, the 2010 Amendment of the Nationality Act makes a statement that children of birth tourists are barred from enjoying plural nationality. Dual nationals also face tighter regulations regarding military deferment compared to other non-resident citizens, such as permanent residents in a foreign country.

On the other hand, regardless of negative popular attitudes toward dual citizenship, government officials and political elites still pushed for introducing the selective dual nationality policy for different reasons. For the Ministry of Justice officials, it was a chance to fix the nationality law, which had risked a violation of human rights. In the past, dual citizens had their Korean citizenship revoked without proper notification if they had not made a choice between multiple nationalities within the two-year window. For the PCNC and the Lee Myung-Bak administration, selective dual nationality was a means to raise Korea’s competitiveness by recruiting global talent while building a positive political image of the president and the ruling

party.

By conducting a qualitative case study of Korea, I have only explored one of the two country-level factors (i.e., low percentage of foreign-born) that leads to a positive association between household income and nativism. For future research, we should further analyze the impact of a country's relative skill composition and economic conditions (e.g., GDP per capita) on individual-level support for nativism. To investigate why individuals with high family income are far more likely to support descent-based citizenship in such countries, we need to understand what it means to have a high household income in low-income countries and how this unique position shapes their views on nativism.

Countries with low GDP per capita, such as the Philippines, not only show stronger support for nativism than other countries but also tend to have a large population of citizens working overseas. To deepen our understanding of the association between family income and nativism in countries with a large diaspora, subsequent research should focus on three additional factors, such as the skill level or economic utility of emigrants overseas, the proportion of remittances in the national economy, and the impact of conscription policies. First, the skill level of emigrants may influence individual-level support for nativism. As predicted by the economic theory of trade, the high-skilled may be more nativist in skill-scarce countries to protect themselves from possible competition with foreign skilled workers. Among countries with a large diaspora overseas, those with a substantial number of high-skilled emigrants may be more likely to show higher support for nativism and seek to recruit the highly skilled among coethnics overseas.

Second, countries where remittances account for a large share of the national economy may also show stronger support for nativism. Particularly, remittances may play a much greater role in smaller economies with low GDP per capita. In such cases, states may extend national membership to emigrants regardless of their skill level. Third, the presence of mandatory military service may further intensify support for nativism. Although only a limited number of countries still maintain conscription, states may strengthen their ties with overseas populations to incorporate them into the pool of military reserve.

Lastly, we need more research on the multi-faceted nature of nativism and its impact on ethnic and non-ethnic antagonism, particularly in countries with a growing population of migrants and a large overseas diaspora. In the Korean case, despite the high level of support for descent-based national membership, Korean citizens increasingly show hostility toward both ethnic Koreans—e.g., ethnic Koreans from China and North Korean defectors—and non-Korean migrants. Negative attitudes toward out-group populations, such as refugees, migrant workers, and ethnic Koreans from China, are fueled by deteriorating economic conditions. Subsequent studies should examine what factors contribute to the rise of discriminatory attitudes toward coethnic migrants and whether and how these exclusionist attitudes toward ethnic in-groups differ from anti-immigrant sentiments.

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APPENDIX: TABLES

Table A1. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>Dependent Variable</i>					
Ancestry	27402	2.788	1.058	1	4
<i>Individual-level</i>					
Less than high school (1 = Yes)	27402	0.453	0.498	0	1
High school (1 = Yes)	27402	0.381	0.486	0	1
College graduate (1 = Yes)	27402	0.165	0.371	0	1
No religion (1 = Yes)	27402	0.214	0.410	0	1
Attend regularly (1 = Yes)	27402	0.172	0.378	0	1
Rightist Party (1 = Yes)	27402	0.251	0.434	0	1
High Occupational Prestige (1 = Yes)	27402	0.440	0.496	0	1
Unemployed (1 = Yes)	27402	0.051	0.221	0	1
Part-time (1 = Yes)	27402	0.084	0.278	0	1
Age	27402	46.700	17.135	15	99
Female (1 = Yes)	27402	0.530	0.499	0	1
Log family income	27402	7.918	1.778	2.018	16.467
Family Income 1st quintile (1 = Yes)	27402	0.220	0.414	0	1
2nd quintile (1 = Yes)	27402	0.204	0.403	0	1
3rd quintile (1 = Yes)	27402	0.219	0.414	0	1
4th quintile (1 = Yes)	27402	0.189	0.392	0	1
5th quintile (1 = Yes)	27402	0.167	0.373	0	1
<i>Country-level</i>					
GDP per capita	27402	20789.520	9114.779	2386.584	34566.580
GDP per capita × 1000	27402	20.790	9.115	2.387	34.567
% Foreign-born (0-100)	27402	8.891	6.519	0.5	23.4
% College graduates (0-100)	27402	17.270	6.017	5.9	29.44
<i>Cross-level interactions</i>					
% College × less than high school	27402	6.882	8.424	0	29.44
% College × high school	27402	7.239	9.885	0	29.44
% Foreign-born × less than high school	27402	3.942	6.013	0	23.4
% Foreign-born × high school	27402	3.350	5.956	0	23.4
GDP per capita × Log family income × 1000	27402	165.994	76.729	6.382	370.750
% Foreign-born × Log family income	27402	71.005	53.608	1.337	262.045
GDP per capita × 1Q × 1000	27402	4.479	9.467	0	34.567

Table A1 (continued). Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
GDP per capita \times 2Q \times 1000	27402	4.360	9.491	0	34.567
GDP per capita \times 3Q \times 1000	27402	4.534	9.506	0	34.567
GDP per capita \times 4Q \times 1000	27402	3.983	9.207	0	34.567
GDP per capita \times 5Q \times 1000	27402	3.434	8.555	0	34.567
% Foreign-born \times 1Q	27402	1.929	4.769	0	23.4
% Foreign-born \times 2Q	27402	1.860	4.746	0	23.4
% Foreign-born \times 3Q	27402	1.981	4.855	0	23.4
% Foreign-born \times 4Q	27402	1.721	4.541	0	23.4
% Foreign-born \times 5Q	27402	1.400	4.008	0	23.4

Table A2. Results of Table 1 after substituting missing cases of household income with country-mean and adding country-specific missing dummy variables for missing cases

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
<i>Individual-level</i>						
Education						
Less than high school	0.370**	(0.046)	0.094	(0.138)	0.243**	(0.064)
High school	0.214**	(0.032)	-0.089	(0.095)	0.153**	(0.039)
College graduate (reference category)						
<i>Religion</i>						
No religion (0-1)	-0.195**	(0.024)	-0.195**	(0.024)	-0.195**	(0.024)
Attend regularly (0-1)	0.001	(0.031)	0.0005	(0.031)	0.001	(0.031)
<i>Political affiliation</i>						
Rightist party (0-1)	0.172**	(0.026)	0.172**	(0.026)	0.162**	(0.026)
<i>Employment</i>						
High occupational prestige (0-1)	-0.114**	(0.016)	-0.112**	(0.016)	-0.127**	(0.016)
Log family income (PPP)	-0.042**	(0.015)	-0.042**	(0.015)	-0.042**	(0.015)
Unemployed (0-1)	-0.036	(0.033)	-0.035	(0.032)	-0.029	(0.032)
Part-time (0-1)	-0.024	(0.027)	-0.025	(0.027)	-0.014	(0.027)
<i>Age</i>						
Age	0.01**	(0.001)	0.01**	(0.001)	0.01**	(0.001)
Female (0-1)	0.007	(0.016)	0.006	(0.016)	0.005	(0.016)
<i>Country-level</i>						
GDP per capita × 1000	-0.023**	(0.007)	-0.023**	(0.006)	-0.022**	(0.007)
% Foreign-born (0-100)	-0.023**	(0.005)	-0.023**	(0.005)	-0.032**	(0.006)
% College graduates (0-100)	0.004	(0.008)	-0.009	(0.009)		
% College × less than high school			0.015*	(0.007)		
% College × high school			0.016**	(0.005)		
% Foreign-born × less than high school					0.014**	(0.005)
% Foreign-born × high school					0.007*	(0.003)
<i>Country-specific dummy for missing cases of household income</i>						
Austria	0.064**	(0.007)	0.065**	(0.009)	0.065**	(0.006)
Canada	-0.194**	(0.013)	-0.203**	(0.013)	-0.211**	(0.015)
(Chile omitted)	-		-		-	
Czech Rep.	0.149**	(0.007)	0.142**	(0.008)	0.146**	(0.007)
Denmark	0.266**	(0.012)	0.258**	(0.022)	0.275**	(0.012)
Finland	0.262**	(0.010)	0.263**	(0.010)	0.278**	(0.010)

Table A2 (continued). Results of Table 1 after substituting missing cases of household income with country-mean and adding country-specific missing dummy variables for missing cases

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
France	0.130**	(0.019)	0.135**	(0.020)	0.132**	(0.019)
East Germany	-0.161**	(0.012)	-0.166**	(0.012)	-0.156**	(0.010)
West Germany	0.158**	(0.008)	0.161**	(0.009)	0.157**	(0.009)
Great Britain	0.026**	(0.005)	0.025**	(0.005)	0.027**	(0.005)
Hungary	0.025**	(0.008)	0.026**	(0.008)	0.018+	(0.009)
Ireland	0.159**	(0.006)	0.158**	(0.006)	0.160**	(0.005)
(Israel Arabs omitted)	-		-		-	
(Israel Jews omitted)	-		-		-	
Japan	0.079**	(0.010)	0.074**	(0.013)	0.091**	(0.009)
Netherlands	0.159**	(0.009)	0.156**	(0.011)	0.156**	(0.009)
New Zealand	0.183**	(0.014)	0.184**	(0.014)	0.172**	(0.015)
Norway	0.253**	(0.012)	0.223**	(0.025)	0.258**	(0.012)
Philippines	-0.014	(0.010)	-0.018+	(0.010)	-0.018	(0.011)
Poland	0.03**	(0.006)	0.028**	(0.006)	0.026**	(0.007)
Portugal	0.010	(0.009)	0.010	(0.011)	0.009	(0.009)
Russia	-0.108**	(0.014)	-0.104**	(0.013)	-0.109**	(0.014)
Slovak Rep.	0.192**	(0.006)	0.186**	(0.006)	0.192**	(0.006)
Slovenia	0.067**	(0.006)	0.073**	(0.006)	0.066**	(0.006)
South Africa (omitted)	-		-		-	
South Korea	-0.158**	(0.011)	-0.162**	(0.012)	-0.143**	(0.013)
Spain	-0.009	(0.009)	-0.009	(0.008)	-0.009	(0.009)
Sweden	0.354**	(0.008)	0.352**	(0.008)	0.347**	(0.008)
Switzerland	0.026**	(0.007)	0.026**	(0.007)	0.006	(0.010)
United States	0.335**	(0.009)	0.312**	(0.009)	0.334**	(0.009)
Uruguay	-0.146**	(0.009)	-0.146**	(0.011)	-0.152**	(0.010)
Venezuela	-0.169**	(0.010)	-0.181**	(0.015)	-0.177**	(0.011)
Constant	3.067**	(0.174)	3.307**	(0.209)	3.197**	(0.149)
Number of countries	29		29		29	
Level 1 variance	0.847		0.846		0.846	
Level 2 variance	0.072		0.073		0.073	
Intraclass correlation	0.079		0.080		0.079	
% Within country variance explained	9.5		9.6		9.8	
% Between country variance explained	55		54.4		54.4	
Chi-square	84786		84744		84752	
N	31908		31908		31908	

Table A2 (continued). Results of Table 1 after substituting missing cases of household income with country-mean and adding country-specific missing dummy variables for missing cases

Robust standard errors in parentheses. The variance components from the fully unconditional model are: country-level u_{0j} (.160) and individual-level r_{ij} (.936). ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.1$.

Table A3. GDP per capita by country

	GDP per capita
Philippines	2386.58
Russia	6733.39
Uruguay	8378.21
Venezuela	8435.93
Poland	10460.40
Slovak Rep.	11355.46
Hungary	12328.97
Czech Rep.	15827.36
Korea	16712.48
Portugal	17585.21
Slovenia	17634.25
New Zealand	21054.19
Spain	21337.10
France	25098.41
Finland	25184.82
Japan	25750.18
Germany-East	25816.57
Germany-West	25816.57
Great Britain	26016.94
Australia	26492.45
Sweden	27173.19
Canada	28021.18
Austria	28363.08
Denmark	28413.42
Ireland	28576.01
Netherlands	28906.86
Switzerland	31493.14
Norway	33500.75
United States	34566.58

Table A4. The percentage of foreign-born in the total population by country

	% Foreign-born	N
Philippines	0.5	1,183
Korea	1.0	1,286
Japan	1.5	905
Poland	1.6	1,147
Uruguay	2.4	1,058
Finland	2.9	1,131
Hungary	3.0	947
Slovak Rep.	3.2	1,015
Venezuela	3.8	1,108
Czech Rep.	4.7	1,076
Denmark	6.3	1,183
Portugal	6.7	1,461
Norway	7.6	1,246
France	7.8	1,392
Russia	8.4	1,950
Spain	8.8	1,106
Great Britain	8.9	756
New Zealand	10.7	1,579
Ireland	10.8	987
Slovenia	11.0	1,016
Austria	11.4	870
Sweden	12.0	1,056
United States	12.6	1,118
Germany-East	12.9	378
Germany-West	12.9	682
Canada	19.0	1,070
Netherlands	19.2	878
Switzerland	23.1	881
Australia	23.4	1,939

Table A5. The percentage of respondents who view *ancestry* as “important” or “very important” component of national membership by country

	% of “important” and “very important” (Ancestry)
Philippines	94.93
Venezuela	88.63
Poland	84.39
Portugal	83.30
Ireland	82.57
Spain	79.93
Hungary	78.88
Russia	75.79
Korea	73.02
Japan	70.94
Czech Rep.	69.98
Uruguay	69.38
New Zealand	61.16
Austria	58.85
Germany-East	57.14
Denmark	56.47
United States	55.90
Norway	55.30
Slovenia	54.53
Canada	53.55
Finland	52.43
Slovak Rep.	51.53
Great Britain	51.46
Germany-West	48.83
France	48.64
Switzerland	41.66
Australia	37.29
Sweden	29.64
Netherlands	22.36
All 29 countries	61.67

Table A6. Key indicators on main migrant groups in OECD countries (2012)

	Migration flows to the OECD in 2010 (thousands)	Remittances received in 2010 (USD million)	Total number of international students in 2009 (thousands)	Diaspora ¹ in 2008 (thousands)	Migrant population in 2005/06					Emigration rate ² 2005/06 (%)	Emigration rate of the highly-educated 2005/06 (%)
					Number of people aged 15 and over (thousands)	Growth rate since 2000 (%)	Women (%)	15-25 years old (%)	Highly-educated (%)		
Total ³	4,656	436,944	2 499 ⁴	124,886	90,519	24.2	51.0	14.9	32.8	1.9	5.0
OECD	1,614	132,301	701	59,784	39,545	15.6	50.2	9.4	33.5	3.8	3.8
Asia and Oceania	1,367	174,938	915	18,094	14,902	27.7	52.6	15.7	34.8	0.6	4.1
South and Central America and the Caribbean	489	35,838	118	20,391	13,940	35.8	52.6	12.7	29.8	4.4	10.6
European non-OECD and central Asian countries	580	37,319	161	13,048	11,095	36.9	53.6	16.5	30.3	3.9	5.9
Middle East and North Africa	316	37,859	175	9,169	6,948	22.5	45.5	21.3	35.9	2.8	7.6
Sub-Saharan Africa	290	18,689	151	4,399	4,089	38.7	49.3	17.0	33.4	1.0	13.3
Mexico	157	22,048	25	20,194	10,784	29.4	44.2	16.6	7.4	13.0	7.2
United Kingdom	118	7,399	20	3,628	3,449	6.4	50.8	5.5	40.2	6.5	11.6
Germany	118	11,338	67	4,125	3,039	4.4	56.7	10.8	33.8	4.1	7.3
Poland	226	7,575	29	3,517	2,849	31.0	54.3	13.6	26.8	8.2	15.8
India	253	54,035	180	3,776	2,775	40.8	47.0	9.8	63.3	0.4	4.2

Table A6 (continued). Key indicators on main migrant groups in OECD countries (2012)

	Migration flows to the OECD in 2010 (thousands)	Remittances received in 2010 (USD million)	Total number of international students in 2009 (thousands)	Diaspora ¹ in 2008 (thousands)	Migrant population in 2005/06					Emigration rate ² 2005/06 (%)	Emigration rate of the highly-educated 2005/06 (%)
					Number of people aged 15 and over (thousands)	Growth rate since 2000 (%)	Women (%)	15-25 years old (%)	Highly-educated (%)		
China	509	53,038	448	3,270	2,724	31.9	54.0	15.8	44.7	0.3	1.7
Turkey	64	993	28	3,510	2,627	24.3	47.6	10.3	8.3	4.8	5.2
Philippines	167	21,423	9	3,213	2,502	29.1	61.4	9.5	51.9	4.4	8.0
Russian Federation	69	5,264	27	3,112	2,472	40.2	56.4	17.7	31.2	2.0	4.7
Italy	78	6,803	26	5,200	2,361	0.0	46.5	3.0	15.6	4.5	7.2
Morocco	124	6,423	39	2,967	2,263	35.1	45.1	11.5	15.3	9.6	16.4
Vietnam	88	8,260	36	2,060	1,758	16.0	51.4	8.4	27.7	2.9	15.4
Romania	289	3,952	22	2,089	1,694	75.5	53.5	14.5	23.6	8.5	19.9
Korea	76	8,708	119	208	1,653	14.3	56.6	14.8	45.1	0.6	0.8
Algeria	35	2,044	21	2,572	1,461	10.3	48.2	5.0	19.3	5.9	12.9
Ukraine	81	5,607	13	1,568	1,423	43.8	58.4	11.4	39.7	3.4	3.9
Portugal	44	3,540	11	2,048	1,382	9.6	49.6	6.5	8.6	13.5	11.6
France	92	15,629	50	1,766	1,298	13.4	55.4	8.5	39.4	2.5	5.0

Table A6 (continued). Key indicators on main migrant groups in OECD countries (2012)

	Migration flows to the OECD in 2010 (thousands)	Remittances received in 2010 (USD million)	Total number of international students in 2009 (thousands)	Diaspora ¹ in 2008 (thousands)	Migrant population in 2005/06					Emigration rate ² 2005/06 (%)	Emigration rate of the highly-educated 2005/06 (%)
					Number of people aged 15 and over (thousands)	Growth rate since 2000 (%)	Women (%)	15-25 years old (%)	Highly-educated (%)		
Canada	42	..	44	1,825	1,122	5.0	55.1	9.3	47.1	4.1	6.9
El Salvador	23	3,449	2	1,683	1,107	32.5	47.2	12.3	10.6	20.1	22.7

Notes: 1. Diaspora includes migrants and native-born children of migrants aged 15 and over. OECD destinations include OECD European countries, the United States and Australia.

2. The emigration rates are defined as the share of people born in one country who are currently living in OECD countries (other than their own country of birth).

3. OECD countries are all included in the OECD total but are excluded from the regional groupings.

4. Of which 277 000 students with unspecified country of origin.

Source: OECD. 2012. *Connecting with Emigrants: A Global Profile of Diasporas 2012*. Paris: OECD Publishing.

Original Sources: OECD International Migration Database, World Bank Remittances Data, OECD Education Database, EU-LFS 2008, OECD Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC) 2005/06.

Table A7-1. Emigrant population and emigration rates to OECD countries by education levels in 2000

Country	Emigrant pop (in thousands)	Total Emigration rate	% Primary-educated in the emigrant pop	% Tertiary-educated in the emigrant pop	Emigration rate of primary-educated	Emigration rate of secondary-educated	Emigration rate of tertiary-educated
Australia	322.0	2.1	17.5	41.7	0.8	2.3	4.0
Austria	416.1	5.8	23.8	27.3	3.9	4.9	13.3
Canada	1093.6	4.2	18.3	39.6	2.5	4.7	5.0
Czech Republic	281.1	3.2	23.4	24.4	3.1	2.5	7.2
Denmark	167.1	3.7	20.5	33.3	2.1	3.4	6.0
Finland	262.7	5.8	30.2	23.8	4.4	6.8	6.0
France	1208.6	2.4	31.0	32.8	1.6	2.1	4.5
Germany	3458.2	4.7	25.6	28.4	4.5	3.8	7.0
United Kingdom	3508.8	6.8	25.7	32.5	3.6	8.9	10.0
Hungary	391.8	4.4	25.7	28.3	2.6	4.4	10.6
Ireland	795.7	21.1	37.6	22.6	18.0	18.8	19.6
Japan	698.2	0.6	18.2	44.4	0.5	0.5	1.0
Netherlands	605.5	4.5	25.5	32.0	2.8	4.2	7.3
New Zealand	417.4	12.3	30.4	26.7	13.3	9.9	11.8
Norway	127.6	3.4	21.9	31.7	3.7	2.3	4.6
Philippines	2202.1	4.4	20.3	42.6	1.7	4.6	15.6
Poland	2393.3	7.2	32.6	21.6	7.4	5.5	13.8
Portugal	1558.3	15.4	68.3	6.6	13.7	23.7	12.3
Russia	6592.8	5.2	25.2	37.8	4.9	3.4	11.2
Slovakia	366.2	7.8	40.5	13.1	10.8	5.9	9.5
Slovenia	101.7	5.7	44.1	12.8	7.5	4.4	5.7
Republic of Korea	990.1	2.6	16.3	43.6	2.4	2.0	3.7
Spain	1074.6	3.0	55.0	16.7	2.5	4.8	2.8
Sweden	206.1	2.8	17.9	37.0	1.9	2.0	4.4
Switzerland	444.4	6.9	33.8	24.8	7.8	5.5	8.7
United States	1230.8	0.5	20.2	41.8	0.5	0.4	0.8
Uruguay	230.7	8.4	48.1	16.8	5.6	18.7	11.4
Venezuela	280.7	1.7	29.0	34.6	0.8	2.5	6.3

Table A7-1 (continued). Emigrant population and emigration rates to OECD countries by education levels in 2000

Country	Emigrant pop (in thousands)	Total Emigration rate	% Primary-educated in the emigrant pop	% Tertiary-educated in the emigrant pop	Emigration rate of primary-educated	Emigration rate of secondary-educated	Emigration rate of tertiary-educated
<i>Comparison of three Korean categories</i>							
Dem. People's Republic of Korea (KOREA-NO)	18.0	0.1	21.1	26.8			
Korea, North and South (KOREA-NS)	481.7		24.0	20.0			
Republic of Korea (KOREA-SO)	990.1	2.6	16.3	43.6	2.4	2.0	3.7

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Notes: 1. Total emigration rate is defined as the share of the native population of country i residing abroad at this time. However, due to lack of data on native- and foreign-born, total emigration rate is calculated by dividing the emigrant population overseas, M_i , by the total resident population of origin countries P_i , i.e. including immigrants:

$$m'_i = M_i / (M_i + P_i)$$

2. Emigration rate of primary-educated, including foreign-born persons in the population of the country of origin
3. Emigration rate of secondary-educated, including foreign-born persons in the population of the country of origin
4. Emigration rate of tertiary-educated, including foreign-born persons in the population of the country of origin

Data sources: DIOC-E (Database on Immigrants in OECD and non-OECD Countries extended, release 3.0).

Barro, Robert and Jong-Wha Lee. 2013. "A New Data Set of Educational Attainment in the World, 1950-2010." *Journal of Development Economics*, vol 104, pp.184-198.

Table A7-2. Countries ranked by the size of emigrant population and the total emigration rates to OECD states in 2000

Country	Emigrant population (in thousands)	Country	Total Emigration rate (TER)
Russian Federation	6592.8	Ireland	21.1
United Kingdom	3508.8	Portugal	15.4
Germany-East	3458.2	New Zealand	12.3
Germany-West	3458.2	Uruguay	8.4
Poland	2393.3	Slovakia	7.8
Philippines	2202.1	Poland	7.2
Portugal	1558.3	Switzerland	6.9
United States	1230.8	United Kingdom	6.8
France	1208.6	Austria	5.8
Canada	1093.6	Finland	5.8
Spain	1074.6	Slovenia	5.7
Republic of Korea (KOREA-SO)	990.1	Russian Federation	5.2
Ireland	795.7	Germany-East	4.7
Japan	698.2	Germany-West	4.7
Netherlands	605.5	Netherlands	4.5
Korea, North/South (KOREA-NS)	481.7	Hungary	4.4
Switzerland	444.4	Philippines	4.4
New Zealand	417.4	Canada	4.2
Austria	416.1	Denmark	3.7
Hungary	391.8	Norway	3.4
Slovakia	366.2	Czech Republic	3.2
Australia	322.0	Spain	3.0
Czech Republic	281.1	Sweden	2.8
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	280.7	Republic of Korea (KOREA-SO)	2.6
Finland	262.7	France	2.4
Uruguay	230.7	Australia	2.1
Sweden	206.1	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	1.7
Denmark	167.1	Japan	0.6
Norway	127.6	United States	0.5
Slovenia	101.7	Dem. People's Republic of Korea (KOREA-NO)	0.1

Notes: Total emigration rate is defined as the share of the native population of country i residing abroad at this time. However, due to lack of data on native- and foreign-born, total emigration rate is calculated by dividing the emigrant population overseas, M_i , by the total resident population of origin countries P_i , i.e. including immigrants ($m'_i = M_i/(M_i + P_i)$).

Data sources: DIOC-E (Database on Immigrants in OECD and non-OECD Countries extended, release 3.0); Barro, Robert and Jong-Wha Lee. 2013. "A New Data Set of Educational Attainment in the World, 1950-2010." *Journal of Development Economics* 104:184–98.

Table A8. Emigrant population: Persons born in Korea and living abroad

	2010/11									2000/01
	OECD and selected non-OECD destinations			OECD destinations			Intra-regional			OECD destinations
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Total
Population 15+										
Emigrant population (thousands)	795.9	1,044.9	1,840.8	757.8	1,015.4	1,773.2	757.8	1,015.5	1,773.3	1,446.7
Recent emigrants (thousands)	81.9	102.6	184.6	193.7
15-24 (%)	14.9	12.4	13.5	15.2	12.3	13.5	15.2	12.3	13.5	16.0
25-64 (%)	72.5	74.3	73.5	71.9	74.2	73.3	71.9	74.2	73.3	74.8
65+ (%)	12.6	13.3	13.0	12.9	13.5	13.2	12.9	13.5	13.2	9.2
Low-educated (%)	12.2	14.9	13.7	12.1	14.9	13.7	12.1	14.9	13.7	20.0
Highly educated (%)	51.0	46.4	48.4	50.7	46.0	48.0	50.7	46.0	48.0	37.9
Total emigration rates (%)	3.7	4.8	4.3	3.5	4.7	4.1	3.5	4.7	4.1	3.8
Emigration rates of the highly educated (%)	3.7	6.0	4.6	3.5	5.8	4.5	3.5	5.8	4.5	4.4

OECD. 2015. Connecting with Emigrants: A Global Profile of Diasporas 2015.

Table A9. The number of Korean students studying in universities and colleges overseas (2001-2018)

	Degree and non-degree programs	Degree programs
2001	149,933	109,151
2003	159,903	98,331
2004	187,683	105,893
2005	192,254	100,716
2006	190,364	113,735
2007	217,959	123,965
2008	216,867	127,000
2009	240,949	151,566
2010	251,887	152,852
2011	262,465	164,169
2012	239,213	154,178
2013	227,126	144,087
2014	219,543	140,560
2015	214,696	158,415
2016	223,908	133,178
2017	239,824	142,886
2018	220,930	123,795

Source: Statistics Korea. 2019e. “The Current Status of Students Studying Overseas (2001-2018).”

Table A10. Top ten places of origin of international scholars in the U.S
(2013-14 and 2014-15)

Rank	Place of Origin	2013-2014	2014-2015	% of Total	% Change
	WORLD TOTAL	121,914	124,861	100	2.4
1	China	36,409	40,193	32.2	10.4
2	India	10,506	10,937	8.8	4.1
3	South Korea	7,934	7,415	5.9	-6.5
4	Germany	5,546	5,318	4.3	-4.1
5	Canada	4,551	4,611	3.7	1.3
6	Japan	4,705	4,511	3.6	-4.1
7	Brazil	3,673	4,394	3.5	19.6
8	France	4,525	4,249	3.4	-6.1
9	Italy	3,887	3,866	3.1	-0.5
10	Spain	2,996	2,886	2.3	-3.7

Source: Institute of International Education. 2015. "Top 25 Places of Origin of International Scholars, 2013/14 - 2014/15." Open Doors Report on International Educational Exchange.

Table A11. Korean citizens who have returned with foreign doctorate degrees by field (2000-2013)

	Humanities	Social sciences	Natural sciences	Engineering	Medicine	Agricultural and fisheries sciences	Arts and sports sciences	Interdisciplinary studies	Total
2000	334	322	153	249	41	36	56	11	1,202
2001	299	364	199	322	55	56	85	9	1,489
2002	401	390	179	322	63	55	88	9	1,507
2003	404	391	158	327	69	49	94	20	1,512
2004	223	258	128	242	41	24	58	9	983
2005	236	254	146	249	41	49	64	6	1,045
2006	255	388	168	355	79	52	70	10	1,377
2007	254	405	159	353	62	43	72	4	1,352
2008	257	429	150	292	54	40	81	11	1,314
2009	208	388	133	273	43	29	64	5	1,143
2010	197	356	104	250	44	27	68	9	1,055
2011	209	369	83	223	38	27	66	12	1,027
2012	206	287	56	161	20	26	76	12	844
2013	156	248	40	104	18	9	71	5	651

Source: Korea Research Foundation. 2015. "Foreign Doctorate Degree Registration System." Cited as the source in Kim, Jin-yong. 2015. "Policy for Attracting and Utilizing Post-Doctors Overseas to Enhance National R&D Competitiveness," p. 39.

Table A12. Actual and reported number of Korean citizens with foreign doctorate degrees (2007-2015)

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Foreign doctorate degree recipients	1,358	1,310	1,128	1,041	1,000	802	734	504	190
Reported cases of foreign doctorate degrees	1,505	1,394	1,238	1,143	1,223	1,310	1,151	1,065	1,323

Note: The actual number of Koreans with foreign doctorate degrees may differ from the number of reported cases.

Source: Statistics Korea. 2015b. "The Current Status of the Actual and Reported Number of Foreign Doctorate Degrees Attained."

Table A13. Attracting foreign high-skilled people (2004-2019)

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Korea	4.33	5.14	5.09	3.78	4.46	4.39	4.58	5.04	5.29	5.26	4.34	4.70	3.94	4.19	4.10	4.05
(ranking)	(25)	(27)	(31)	(48)	(32)	(37)	(33)	(32)	(29)	(31)	(43)	(37)	(46)	(48)	(49)	(49)
United States	8.64	8.61	8.74	8.29	8.40	7.80	8.08	8.44	8.21	8.20	8.50	8.31	8.95	8.16	8.05	7.94
	(1)	(1)	(2)	(4)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(2)	(3)	(3)	(2)	(3)	(2)	(4)	(5)	(7)
Japan	4.33	4.33	4.88	4.70	4.18	4.07	4.10	4.13	3.49	3.83	3.93	3.39	3.56	3.83	3.88	3.77
	(34)	(44)	(34)	(32)	(42)	(44)	(42)	(44)	(48)	(48)	(48)	(50)	(52)	(51)	(50)	(51)
Singapore	8.59	8.40	8.41	8.62	8.74	8.22	8.13	8.15	8.56	7.95	8.17	8.12	8.58	8.22	8.24	8.19
	(2)	(2)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(3)	(2)	(4)	(3)	(5)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(2)
Finland	3.97	4.00	4.34	3.91	4.32	4.00	3.98	4.05	4.43	4.21	4.2	4.03	3.85	4.35	4.74	4.93
	(41)	(53)	(47)	(45)	(38)	(46)	(44)	(45)	(41)	(43)	(46)	(48)	(47)	(43)	(40)	(38)
Sweden	3.86	4.19	3.80	4.14	4.34	4.35	4.54	5.38	5.07	5.59	5.3	5.47	5.76	5.78	6.41	5.97
	(43)	(48)	(54)	(42)	(37)	(39)	(34)	(25)	(33)	(28)	(25)	(26)	(23)	(27)	(15)	(21)
India	5.18	4.96	5.33	5.67	5.82	5.34	5.92	5.86	6.06	5.11	4.41	4.73	5.07	4.79	5.02	4.88
	(25)	(32)	(26)	(19)	(13)	(23)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(35)	(39)	(36)	(29)	(36)	(36)	(40)
China	5.24	4.66	5.53	5.92	5.26	6.05	5.83	6.26	6.21	6.05	6.08	6.34	5.63	4.91	5.59	5.79
	(23)	(37)	(22)	(17)	(18)	(13)	(13)	(16)	(10)	(24)	(18)	(18)	(24)	(34)	(28)	(27)

Note: The score ranges from 0 to 10. A score of 10 indicates that foreign high-skilled people are attracted to country's business environment and a score of 0 means the opposite. Ranking of each country is given in parentheses.

Sources: Institute for Management Development (IMD). 2004-2014. *World Competitiveness Yearbook*.
 IMD World Competitiveness Center. 2015-2016. *IMD World Talent Report*.
 IMD World Competitiveness Center. 2017-2019. *IMD World Talent Ranking*.

Table A14. Score for attracting researchers and scientists (2010-2014)

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Korea	4.69 (29)	5.60 (18)	5.25 (23)	5.15 (25)	4.38 (33)
United States	8.63 (2)	8.94 (1)	8.55 (2)	8.51 (2)	8.81 (2)
Japan	5.37 (17)	5.73 (17)	6.97 (6)	5.63 (19)	5.57 (20)
Singapore	7.46 (3)	7.34 (4)	7.6 (5)	7.36 (4)	7.67 (3)
Finland	5.21 (21)	5.48 (21)	5.93 (13)	5.96 (16)	5.88 (16)
Sweden	6.05 (11)	6.46 (9)	6.1 (11)	6.83 (10)	6.67 (11)
India	4.72 (28)	4.32 (32)	4.67 (30)	4.19 (35)	3.60 (41)
China	4.90 (24)	5.15 (24)	4.82 (29)	4.54 (32)	5.12 (27)

Note: The score ranges from 0 to 10. A score of 10 indicates that researchers and scientists are attracted to respondent's country, and 0 means that researchers and scientists are not attracted. Ranking of each country is given in parentheses.

Source: Institute for Management Development (IMD). 2010-2014. *World Competitiveness Yearbook*. Cited as the source in Kim, Jin-yong. 2015. "Policy for Attracting and Utilizing Post-Doctors Overseas to Enhance National R&D Competitiveness," p. 40. Table 4-8.