

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

ON MASS KILLINGS GENERALLY
AND CONSOLIDATIVE MASS KILLINGS SPECIFICALLY

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

BY

JOSEPH A. KARAS

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

AUGUST 2022

Copyright © 2022 by Joseph Karas
All Rights Reserved

Table of Contents

LIST OF FIGURES	v
LIST OF TABLES	vi
LIST OF MAPS	vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	viii
ABSTRACT	xi
CHAPTER 1: MASS KILLINGS IN CONCEPTUAL SPACE AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE	1
Mass Killing as Dependent Variable	1
The Consequences of Our Questions	4
The Ambitions of this Dissertation	33
CHAPTER 2: CLASSIFYING MASS KILLINGS	38
The Problems	38
My Approach	39
Existing Approaches and Their Problems	41
Strategic Logics of Conflict and Mass Killing	54
A New Classification of Mass Killings	58
On the Differences and Similarities Amongst Mass Killings	74
Thinking Beyond Mass Killings: Method and Preliminary Evidence	81
CHAPTER 3: THEORIZING CONSOLIDATIVE MASS KILLINGS	91
Defining Features of Consolidative Mass Killing	94
What is a 'Theory' of Consolidative Mass Killing, Anyways?	95
Consolidative Mass Killing in the Shorter-Term	100
Consolidative Mass Killing in the Long-Term	114
A Note on International Environment. Or, Some Scope Conditions	124
Comparative Implications. Or, Returning to the Classification Scheme.....	126

CHAPTER 4: THE EVOLUTION OF CONFLICT IN INDONESIA.....	129
Preface to the Empirical Chapters. Or, Research Designs and Presentation ...	129
The Evolution of Conflict in Indonesia in Comparative Perspective.....	141
The Evolution of Conflict in Indonesia	143
CHAPTER 5 THE EVOLUTION OF CONFLICT IN RWANDA.....	170
A Bird’s Eye Perspective on the Rwandan Case and the Theory	170
Evolution of Conflict in Rwanda	183
CHAPTER 6: EVOLUTION OF CONFLICT IN ETHIOPIA AND BURUNDI.....	218
The Evolution of the Conflict in Ethiopia.....	221
The Evolution of Conflict in Burundi	229
CHAPTER 7: HORIZONS.....	240
Contributions and Lessons	240
Policy Recommendations	245
Limits and Failures	249
Research Recommendations	251
APPENDIX 1: A LINK BETWEEN POLITICALLY MOTIVATED COGNITION AND VENTRAL NETWORK ACTIVITY?: EVIDENCE FROM SOCIAL SCIENCE AND NEURSOCIENCE.....	255
WORKS CITED	281

List of Figures

FIGURE 2.1: Kalyvas' Typology of Mass Political Violence.....	42
FIGURE 2.2: Tilly's Conceptualization of Collective Violence.....	43
FIGURE 2.3: Valentino's Typology of Mass Killings.....	47
FIGURE 2.4: Van der Maat Classification of Mass Killings.....	50
FIGURE 2.5: Karas Classification of Mass Killings.....	59
FIGURE 3.1: Mass Killings and Patterns of Violence.....	95
FIGURE 3.2: General Schematic of Theoretical Interactions.....	102
FIGURE 3.3: Illustration of Network Insularity.....	107
FIGURE 3.4: Flow Chart of Long-Term Co-Evolution of Economics, Political Conflicts, and Organizations.....	115
FIGURE 3.5: Another Conceptual Space for Thinking About Mass Killing Types.....	128
FIGURE 5.1: Flow Chart of Long-Term Co-Evolution of Economics, Political Conflicts, and Organizations.....	177
FIGURE 5.2: Flow-Chart of Rwandan Specifics.....	181

List of Tables

TABLE 1.1: Forms of Local Violence.....	13
TABLE 1.2: Suggested Causal Factors Forms of Local Violence.....	14
TABLE 1.3: General Correlates of Mass Killings.....	18
TABLE 2.1: Mass Killings and Leadership Tenure.....	77
TABLE 2.2: Preliminary Typology of Coups.....	86
TABLE 4.1: Economic Ecology.....	138
TABLE 4.2: Prior Histories of Political Violence.....	139
TABLE 4.3: Description of Organizations.....	140
TABLE 4.4: Organizational Structure of State.....	141
TABLE 5.1: Theory's Variables in the Rwandan Case.....	176
TABLE 5.2: Regional Distribution of Owners of Major Companies	194
TABLE 5.3: Prefecture Data Prior to Violence.....	216
TABLE 5.4: Prefecture Patterns of Violence.....	217
TABLE 6.1: The Theory Within the Cases.....	219
TABLE 6.2: Evolutionary Scheme in Ethiopia.....	220
TABLE 6.3: Evolutionary Scheme in Ethiopia.....	221

List of Maps

MAP 4.1: Indonesia	145
MAP 5.1 Rwanda	185
MAP 6.1 Burundi	229

Acknowledgements

I liked reading peoples' acknowledgements. Most of the time, because I have more reference points, I focus on the academic mentions. So, I will begin here and try to be specific. From the University of Chicago's faculty, I was influenced in the following ways by the following people.

- the co-evolution of states and markets thinking follows directly from John Padgett's work, as does the emphasis on the origins and evolutions of different actors.
 - the dual politico-economic use of violence, as a threat-reducing but also support-building mechanism, was further reinforced by the work and classes of Michael Albertus.
- the emphasis on relations between different organizational structures and political violence follows from Paul Staniland, both in his work and classes. some of thinking on our various 'analytical lenses' (dependent variable, classification schemes, levels of analysis) continues some of his work and assigned readings as well.
- the emphasis on 'logics of violence' as well as thinking more about whether or not actors compete over 'a pie' (and what might happen if they do not) derives from Benjamin Lessing's classes.
- the attention to international politics and potential links between agriculture and mass killings owes largely to Paul Poast. as does whatever clarity in organization and presentation this dissertation possesses.

Beyond the faculty, Ramzy Mardini listened to many rough, sometimes incoherent versions of these and other ideas. As did Anjali Anand, Jonathan DePoyster, Mariya Grinberg, Isaac Hock, Fahad Sajid, and Ram Sabaratnam. And, essentially, everyone else in the department during my time there. All of whom, whether it seemed this way or not, captured my attention and imagination.

Beyond UChicago, Joseph Parent deserves much more than acknowledgement. I was surprised when thinking about influences, except for some of the thinking in the appendix, I did not recognize many ideas as Joe's. Anyways, there's a scene somewhere where, to some surprise, a double agent is attacked mid-sentence by the person he is trying to fool. And after, to no one in particular, the attacker mutters "syntax."

Beyond academia, you likely have no idea who I am talking about. But, for some context, I was raised on the Southside of Chicago. Many people, from St. Jane de Chantal, to the Mike White School of Basketball family, to De La Salle Institute, to the University of Miami, helped along the way. But, more specifically, from the Southside,

Bill Dinon, Mark Golebiowski, Jon Jesse, Todd Libet, Rainier Lumibao, Joshua Narvaez, Ben and Ana Vallone, and Kyle White deserve note. As do, from UMiami, Scott Joffe, DJ Miller, and Trey Watson. But the deepest intellectual and personal debts are owed to Ben Masterson, Dylan Jurow, Jessica Robbins, and Jennifer Gaudettee. Particularly Benny, though I hope I have paid that particular debt.

The Golebiowski's, the Schreiner's, the Kast's, The Larson's, and the Karas's also deserve mention. And, by far, my heaviest debts and deepest acknowledgements owe to my parents and my sister. Now does not possess the time, the space, or the audience to thank them appropriately. But, perhaps, we have some time for some stories. I will begin with my mother. My mother has had aphasia for over a decade now. She was an editor prior to her injury and regrets she cannot read this dissertation as thoroughly as she once could. But we had enough time for that. I remember as a child happily calling her at work after school and constantly sending her drafts all the way through my freshman year in college. But more than this I just remember being happy a lot of the time hanging around amidst errands, games, car rides, and everything else.

My father has provided more for me than anyone could ever be expected to. Anyways, I remember being at a family dinner when I was probably thirteen. I am the youngest and was, by most measures, the worst thinker at the table. But, a debate began and my father liked what I had to say. And I remember him talking after, among other things, about how time changes when you travel really fast. But I remember more a story about an alien who wants to leave the planet. Many have tried and failed to build ships to leave and most think the gravity is too much. But this person, built stone by stone, day by day, a pyramid to the end of the atmosphere (or whatever). And, eventually, he left. I asked where the alien went. And, my dad smiled (probably) and said, the book ends.

My sister was a medical student at the University of Chicago. She passed the spring before I began the program. I have already spoken, and felt inadequate speaking, about her. I don't know. I am not as religious as she was. But, there's a lyric I like. 'Jesus Christ, I'm alone again, so what did you do those three days you were dead?' Anyways, I like to think he spent some of that first day really studying something.

But this work is not dedicated to these people. I skip acknowledgements more than I used to because they can seem a little presumptuous about the quality of the work, a little rose-colored about its origins, sometimes rife with ulterior motives, and, often, as stock as this acknowledgement has been. Frankly, I do think this dissertation is good and makes several contributions. But, the ambitions I had for it have yet to be

achieved. Its fate, as an academic contribution, has yet to be determined. And, given this is a dissertation about mass killings, its influences were rarely purely loving and insightful or bad-intentioned and worthless. Anyways, I would like to dedicate this dissertation to Richard Fisher, who was a good friend, for a good while.

Joseph A. Karas

Chicago, 2022

Abstract

This dissertation has two main parts. The first attempts to sort the many different kinds of mass killings we have observed. It traces their differences, similarities, and relationships to one another and other forms of political violence. This yields several different broad types of mass killing – coercive, repressive, developmental, expansionary, reconfigurative, and consolidative – each with different kinds of organizations competing for different kinds of political aims with different uses and patterns of mass killing.

The second develops a theory of consolidative mass killing. This implies a short-term explanation for why actors competed and why their competition resulted in consolidative mass killings as well as a longer-term theory for where these actors and their conflicts came from. The short-term theory explains conflict through the nationalized, particular economic structure and explains mass killing through the organization structures of the competitors. The longer-term theory explains the evolution of these actors and their conflicts through a co-evolution of the economics, politics, and organizations.

In the short-term, I argue insular elite politico-military-economic networks and mass-based political organizations found themselves competing for control of the state and economy. Because of the nature of the economy, all sides had few options for wealth and security beyond controlling the state. Because of the nature of their organizations, neither side could coopt or compel the other without drastic action. When mass-based political organizations' attempts to overthrow these networks failed, these networks used one of their few available tools – mass killing – to consolidate their power.

In the longer-term, I argue these actors and their conflicts evolved from a particular politico-economic context. Specifically, networks within the military ousted existing colonial or colonially sponsored powers. On the economic side, they inherited a relatively poor, largely agricultural economy with a few profitable exports. On the political side, they lacked strong organizational infrastructure or even informal network ties to a socially and regionally divided polity. To solve these challenges, these military networks pursued several political and economic policies simultaneously. Specifically, they

- sought to create national identities, rituals and practices, and sometimes one-party organizations. if this was unavailable, they sought to coopt existing political organizations in their state-building attempts.
- seized control of profitable export sectors, sought foreign investment, and pursued land reforms. All of this corresponded to their state-building projects: collecting

resources for re-investment or patronage, weakening rivals, and attracting new supporters.

On the one hand, these policies achieved many of their aims. Their economies often became larger, more efficient, and developed. These networks increased their own wealth and power as well as their organizational reach. On the other hand, they failed to solve some underlying problems and created some new ones. Economically, these countries remained relatively poor, highly agricultural, and highly dependent on select exports. It also became increasingly linked – as different regions' investments, profits, and taxes became tied to the nationalized economy and its decision-makers. Further, locally, flows of people and resources remained largely the same which prevented any transformation of local politics and identities.

Politically, this created an insular politico-military-economic network with strong organizational ties throughout the territory. However, it also generated resistance to this increasing power. Often, this involved counter-maneuvers by counter-elites – mutinies, separatist movements, coup attempts – none of which succeeded but all of which drove purges and exacerbated the already insular and military nature of these networks. More problematic, however, were mass-based resistance movements which flourished as economic crises increased popular discontent, decreased regimes' patronage power, and increased their dependency on external patrons.

To resist these movements, which increasingly contested local control (sometimes violently) and national viability (through elections, mass demonstrations, infiltration of the state and military), these networks invested in youth groups to mobilize support as well establish or defend local control. Where possible, counter-movements responded in kind. This created the context for the short-term competition which eventually yielded consolidative mass killing.

Chapter I: Mass Killings in Conceptual Space and Comparative Perspective

Abstract: This chapter has three goals. First, it reviews how scholars have approached mass killing as a dependent variable. This includes the cases selected, the classifications used, and the questions asked. Second, it demonstrates how confusion about mass killing as a dependent variable has created problems in existing causal arguments and inferences. Specifically, we see confusion about which cases theories apply to, which aspects of mass killing they explain, and how different theories relate to each other. Third, it responds by organizing some of existing findings and sketching potential solutions to outstanding problems.

I. Mass Killing as Dependent Variable¹

The study of 'mass killings' is becoming a distinct subfield within the political violence literature. It possesses dedicated journals, conference panels, historiographical and theoretical debates, comparative empirical and theoretical approaches, dozens of awarded authors, and meta-reviews of itself. Like all subfields, the mass killing literature has missing data, unresolved theoretical competition, some conceptual

¹ I would refer to the literature on conceptualizing dependent variables (or, the epistemology of questions) but my search suggested it does not really exist. For present purposes, note questions (even those about things which happen) do not create themselves. Instead, all dependent variables involve *selection* (focus on some things rather than all things) and/or *imagination* (asking about the 'outcome of some set counterfactuals', the 'absence of some counterfactual outcome(s)', or situating events within some created conceptual space.) For exceptions, see Riker, William H. "Events and situations." *The Journal of Philosophy* 54, no. 3 (1957): 57-70. and Gardenfors, Peter. "Conceptual spaces as a framework for knowledge representation." *Mind and matter* 2, no. 2 (2004): 9-27.

disagreements, and many open questions. Despite these disagreements, mass killing is often agreed to involve the intentional targeting of 50,000 unarmed non-combatants.² Scholars can relax this arbitrary threshold to include liminal cases (40,000 deaths), but still agree the intentionality, scale, and targets of violence define mass killing.

Because mass killing is an unfolding, complex, and multidimensional phenomena scholars have asked many distinct questions about it. Consequently, many scholars mean different things when attempting to 'explain mass killings.' From my reading, the questions most commonly asked and answered are:

1. why did attackers choose mass killing rather than other means (economic coercion, detainment, lesser violence, etc.)?
2. what explains subnational variation in the timing, extent, and conduct of violence?
3. how could people attack others whom they had previously peaceful, often friendly relationships? What explains individual variation in behavior before and during violence?
4. what explains the 'lines' of conflict? why were people divided by ethnic or other differences?
5. who coordinated violence? How were actors capable of mass killing? How were they able to orchestrate violence so effectively?

² Valentino, Benjamin A. *Final solutions*. Cornell University Press, 2013.

6. what was the role of international actors in preventing, allowing, or creating mass killing? Could international actors have prevented these mass killings? How?
7. does mass killing 'work'? is it 'strategic' or 'counterproductive'?

These are all fair, important questions. However, they are neither 'self-evident' nor exhaustive. They derive from scholars' particular interests and expectations. There are many more (perhaps infinite), equally important but less frequently asked questions.

Specifically:

- where did actors, both of attackers and victims, come from? how did their organization influence their interests and alternatives?
- from a strategic perspective, how and why are targets simultaneously threatening and unable to defend themselves? And, perhaps, did actors miscalculate? Why?
- what was the conflict about? was it driven by risk, economic, ideology, some combination of these, or something else?
- why did actors fight rather than a bargain? Did a bargain exist which was preferable to all parties involved?
- what was the behavior of eventual targets? Why, in some cases, did eventual victims attack their eventual attackers? In other cases, why didn't eventual victims attack earlier?
- what explains the timing of violence? Why did mass killing occur in Rwanda in 1994 rather than earlier or later?

- how are different instances of mass killing alike or different? What drives these similarities or differences? how should we think about aggregating and disaggregating mass killings?

II. The Consequences of Our Questions

For better and worse, the questions scholars have and have not asked shaped the subfield in three ways. *First, they have created a wide but unwieldy variety of case comparisons.* The subfield of mass killings has many different classifications and little conversation about how we should classify mass killings. This applies at the macro-level dynamics as well as those at other levels of analysis. On the positive side, this has created many new questions, prompted considerable theoretical innovation, and revealed some shared dynamics across cases. For examples,

- Midlarsky compared the Ottoman Empire, the Holocaust, and the Rwandan Genocide.³ At first glance, these cases possess some striking differences. The Holocaust involved an international war for regional hegemony, expansions into new territories, and highly organized, industrialized methods of violence. The Ottoman Empire was declining, featured continuous leadership turnover and separatist movements, and featured more ad-hoc violent attacks and relocation campaigns. The Rwandan Genocide featured an armed refugee movement,

³ Midlarsky, Manus I. *The killing trap: Genocide in the twentieth century*. Cambridge University Press, 2005.

international mediation, multi-party and militia politics, and coup attempts.

Nevertheless, Midlarsky hypothesizes a conflagration of *realpolitik* concerns interacting with *histories of loss* which create desperation, an overreaction to potential loss, and tolerance for extreme measures across all these cases.

- Kiernan's *Blood and Soil* adopted a historical perspective, explaining various kinds of mass violence since Sparta.⁴ He found (though others have disputed) a consistent linkages between agricultural producers, cults of expansion, and racism embedded in these agricultural networks across centuries of violence. This extended from Sparta, through the Holocaust, Pol Pot's regime, and many other contexts.
- Valentino's *Final Solutions* remained confined to the 20th and 21st centuries but examined a wide universe of cases. He found mass killing represents a last resort, following many alternative methods, of leaders attempting to solve particularly intractable problems. In his view, mass killings – even seemingly incomprehensible instances such as the Holocaust – represent strategic rather than irrational or strictly ideologically driven decisions.

On the negative side, we have no accepted classification scheme of mass killings nor any which relates them to other forms of political violence. This has created some confusion about which theories should apply to which cases. I discuss different

⁴ Kiernan, Ben. *Blood and soil: A world history of genocide and extermination from Sparta to Darfur*. Yale University Press, 2008.

proposed classifications and my own approach in the next chapter but, for now, consider the Rwandan Genocide. Some authors have compared and theorized this genocide alongside the 1972 violence in its neighbor Burundi.⁵ Some have compared and theorized it alongside more 'ethnic' genocides such as the Holocaust and Ottoman Empire.⁶⁷ Others have included Pol Pot's violence in Cambodia.⁸ Still others include it in general datasets of all mass killings. None, to my knowledge, compare it to Indonesia, Iraq's coup-related purges in the early 1960's, or Ethiopia's Red Terror.

Why does this matter? For the theorist, this creates some confusion both in crafting their theory and locating its scope conditions. Agricultural interests and societies, for example, may feature prominently in some cases but not all. Or, perhaps these agricultural interests represent a subset of a particular kind of economic logic (rent-seeking, protectionism) which applies to a wider set of cases. Or, perhaps they remain confined to only one case.

⁵ Lemarchand, R. "Part II: Rwanda and Burundi: The Genocidal Twins." *The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa* (2008).

⁶ Lemarchand, René. "Disconnecting the threads: Rwanda and the Holocaust reconsidered." *Journal of Genocide Research* 4, no. 4 (2002): 499-518.

⁷ Valentino, *Final Solutions*, p. 31

⁸ Cook, Susan E. *Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda: new perspectives*. Routledge, 2017.

For the methodologist, classification schemes may 'lump' causally heterogeneous outcomes, 'miss' causally similar outcomes, or 'bias' their 'set' of outcomes. For examples:

- scholars may not see differences between causal contexts which they 'lump together.' The problem is causal heterogeneity: the causes of 'variable Y' operate differently across contexts which create 'variable Y.' for example, scholars of 'mass killings' may find interstate rivalry insignificant across cases. However, different conflicts may respond differently to different interstate rivalries creating different 'types' of mass killing. This could confound causal inference even in experimental designs. Specifically, causal heterogeneity confounds interpretation of 'average treatment effects' by creating a multitude of possible scenarios for the same 'average treatment effect.'
- scholars may not see similarities amongst phenomena which they categorize as distinct. The problem is multifinality: definitions of Y limit our understanding of the power of X and causal similarities across cases. For example, Roesler's argument regarding the coup/civil war trap which envisions coups and civil wars as 'two sides of the same coin' in weak African states.⁹ Arguments only about the cause of 'civil war' will ignore coups theoretically and methodology. In this context, mass killings

⁹ Roesler, Philip. *Ethnic politics and state power in Africa: The logic of the coup-civil war trap*. Cambridge University Press, 2016.

are often only compared to other mass killings. However, many mass killings possess other features which may invite useful comparisons. This potential reservoir for comparative methods remains relatively untapped. The Rwandan Genocide, for example, is also an instance of coup-counter coup dynamics. In the long-term, it also represents an instance of postcolonial state-building, economic nationalization projects, and refugee politics.

- or, scholars may suffer from some combination of the above and create skewed ‘sets’:
 - definitions of Y create biased interpretations of effects of X. Scholars of ‘civil war’ find ‘low state strength’ is causally significant.¹⁰ However, their definition of civil war involves competition between two organized actors with violence by both sides. Cases of coups, purges, mass killings, and other forms of violence possess ‘high state strength’ but are not analyzed.
 - definitions or operationalizations of Y assume outcomes other than Y provide reliable information on relationship between X and Y. For example, a study on civil wars does not acknowledge interstate wars or coups as ‘competing risks’ which create ‘missing data’ on the relationship between X and Y.

¹⁰ Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. "Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war." *American political science review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 75-90.

In any case, these problems create theoretical confusions and methodological problems which undermine our ability to develop and test our theories properly.

Second, they have created many different research designs with different findings at different levels of analysis. Some focus on international dynamics, some focus on 'elite' or 'macro' dynamics, some focus on subnational or 'meso' dynamics, and some focus on individual or 'micro' dynamics. Some scholars conduct cross-case, medium to large-n analyses of many mass killings. Others study single cases, cases within a region, or some combination of cases. Most focus on short and medium-term dynamics, a few have more 'long-durée' approaches.

On the positive side, we have learned about many different dynamics at different levels of analysis. **At the micro-level, many have found significant variation in the conduct, motivation, and demography of violence.** While military and paramilitary forces with backgrounds of violence conducted and spear-headed campaigns, many participants lacked prior histories of violence. Perpetrators are fairly representative demographically. These participants were not especially uneducated, poor, or violent and vary considerably in biography (education, occupation, etc).¹¹ Upper classes are

¹¹ Browning, Christopher R. "Ordinary Men and Beyond: Reflections on an Historiographical Journey." In *Beyond "Ordinary Men"*, pp. 287-305. Brill Schöningh, 2019.

under-represented but present amongst perpetrators. Further, sometimes wealthier individuals can use money to avoid conducting violence.¹²

Different individuals also behaved differently before and after violence. Some actively organize others before and during collective violence, some attack many individuals, some participate only some of the time, some help some individuals and attack others, some do not kill but provide information or 'patrol' areas. Afterwards, many express and display different motivations toward violence. Some cite economic opportunism or grievances, career concerns, ethnic or out-group hatred, obedience, personal disputes, and fear. In retrospect, different individuals variously reported pride, denial, cowardice, vomiting, sickness, post-traumatic stress disorders, confusion, fear.¹³

For some, this heterogeneity suggests micro-level variables lack explanatory power and, relatedly, 'hatred' or other psychological variables do not matter for explaining mass killings. I find this inference misguided. Empirically, we still see some extremism, 'appetitive aggression', and killing beyond any incentive structure.¹⁴

Further, many of these studies focus on the immediate term. Other dynamics, such as

¹² Luft, Aliza. "Toward a dynamic theory of action at the micro level of genocide: Killing, desistance, and saving in 1994 Rwanda." *Sociological Theory* 33, no. 2 (2015): 148-172.

¹³ Finkel, Evgeny, and Scott Straus. "Macro, meso, and micro research on genocide: gains, shortcomings, and future areas of inquiry." *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 7, no. 1 (2012): 56-67.

¹⁴ Hecker, Tobias, Katharin Hermenau, Anna Maedl, Thomas Elbert, and Maggie Schauer. "Appetitive aggression in former combatants—Derived from the ongoing conflict in DR Congo." *International journal of law and psychiatry* 35, no. 3 (2012): 244-249.

election or participation in extremist organizations, intimidations and violence at the local level, and avoidance of creating strong network or kinship ties may increase the potential for mass killings but operate across longer timescales in more subtle ways. Further still, if we think about psychological factors as variables, the presence of some belief or emotion implies the absence of some other belief or emotion. The question is then not 'did psychology X drive mass killings?' but rather 'did the difference between psychology X and Y, Z, or B increase the potential for mass killings?' We could then see solidarity or rebellion rather than the local dynamics we see.

Still, this evidence suggests the necessity of other forces to create and prevent mass killings. Often, scholars have invoked meso-level variables, such as one's network ties, local political organizations, local conflicts, or ties to the state to explain the conduct of mass killings. Here, we see different kinds of dynamics across different cases. McDoom and Fujii, for example, hypothesized contagion models in the Rwandan context.¹⁵¹⁶ They find perpetrators tended to have ties with other perpetrators in the Rwandan context. Harris and Fox, in the Russian and Cambodian contexts, found victims tended to have ties with another but not perpetrators.¹⁷¹⁸ But, to my knowledge,

¹⁵ McDoom, Omar Shahabudin. "Predicting violence within genocide: A model of elite competition and ethnic segregation from Rwanda." *Political Geography* 42 (2014): 34-45.

¹⁶ Fujii, Lee Ann. *Killing neighbors*. Cornell University Press, 2010.

¹⁷ Fox, Andrew. "Strings of Traitors: Social Networks and the Organizational Trajectory of the Khmer Rouge." (2019).

¹⁸ Harris, James, ed. *The anatomy of terror: political violence under Stalin*. OUP Oxford, 2013.

this knowledge remains somewhat disorganized. I have attempted to organize what we know about these meso-dynamics below.

Table 1 provides a (preliminary) disaggregation of forms of local violence. Note these forms can co-occur within the same collective event ('the Rwandan genocide, 'The Holocaust') or possess varying levels of intensity (Stalin's 'purges' killed more people than Mao's 'revolutions'). Table 2 provides a (preliminary) review of the suggested causal dynamics of these forms of local violence. **Despite different dynamics across these types, many of these arguments stress some combination of the kind of state actor organizing violence, local ties to these organizing actors, local conflicts, or social network structures.**

Table 1.1: Forms of Local Violence

Type	Attacker	Pattern of Violence	Cases
Concentrated	Military Forces	Systematic violence against collected disarmed populations	Holocaust, American-Native American violence
Invasive	Military and Military-Sponsored Forces	Raids of population centers by armed forces (often accompanied by sexual violence and looting)	Bangladesh 1971, former Yugoslavia, South Sudan, Japan-China 1930's-1940's, Ottoman 'genocides', some communes of Rwanda
Collaborative	Military and Military-sponsored Forces with aid of civilian population	Intimidation and recruitment of local population, followed by 'hunting' and 'execution' of 'targets'.	Rwanda 1994, Nazi Germany – Eastern Europe
Purging	Secret Police, Military Networks, and Party 'Loyalists'	'Raids' and 'executions' of Saboteurs	Stalin, Mao, Khmer Rouge
Spontaneous	Civilians and/or Locally Organized 'Groups'	'Hunting' and 'Execution' of Targets (often accompanied by sexual violence and looting)	Rwanda 1994, Indonesia 1965, Kenya 1982, Mexico 1911

Table 1.2: Suggested Causal Factors Forms of Local Violence

Type	Elite Politics	Local Dynamics	Suggested Causes of Individual Participation	Suggested Causes of Subnational Variation
Concentrated	Territorial Expansion or Preservation	Soldiers following orders, sometimes with added brutality.	Following orders, difficult wartime conditions, hatred	Local leadership of armed forces
Purging	Preservation of State Control and Pursuit of Economic Development	Loyalists following orders, sometimes with added 'score-settling' or 'opportunism' from below. State seeking information, sometimes from local news outlets, union officials, etc.	'Score-settling', 'opportunism', 'loyalty', 'denunciation-dynamics'	Local network structures or conflicts. More segregated networks yielding 'strings of traitors'
Collaborative	Territorial Expansion or Preservation	Non-combatants aiding invading forces in 'hunt' for 'enemies.'	Avoiding punishment, opportunism, hatred	Presence of military or militia forces, degree of prior conflict with targeted groups, alignment/ties of local power holders to state

Table 1.2: Suggested Causal Factors Forms of Local Violence (continued)

Invasive	Repression of Separatist Movements or Territorial Expansion	'Looting' or 'excessive' brutality by soldiers. Or, operations intended to 'clear' areas to ease further expansion and occupation.	Difficulties of urban raids, undisciplined forces, hatred	Professionalism of soldiers, how 'over-stretched forces' are
Spontaneous	Variable. Not always necessary, sometimes unrelated to violence below.	Civilian 'mobs', 'gatherings', 'patrol groups' hunting others.	hatred, fear, obedience, opportunism, etc.	Prior histories of violence or loss, economic incentives for looting, degree of local organization.

Like the micro-level, most meso-level studies focus on short-term dynamics and patterns of violence. Moving forward, however, I think we should consider longer-term meso dynamics. What explains variation in local conflicts or network structures? What explains relations to the state? Exceptions to this trend, in my view, have been particularly compelling. For examples,

- In the Rwandan genocide, the Butare prefecture resisted violence from organizing forces and featured less 'bottom-up' instances of mass killings. Some, perhaps correctly, have cited Butare's historical links to the old Tutsi-dominated kingdom

and present-day connections to the RPF.¹⁹ But, in addition to this, Butare presented a different economic ecology with universities, hospitals, commerce, and more urban (though still poor) economic arrangements and ties.

- a study in Germany found remarkable geographical correspondences between antisemitism during the Black Death (1348-50) and interwar Germany (1920's through 30's). This was documented through public displays of anti-Semitism, political and street violence, letter-writing to antisemitic publications, and voting results. The exceptions to these parallels occurred in cities and other trading areas with high levels of immigration and departure.²⁰

At the macro-level, Finkel and Straus identified six trends in the research: intergroup relations, regime type, hardship and upheaval, ideology, leaders' strategy, and modernity and development. Rather than review the respective findings and merits of the approach, they noted state the macro-level featured the most dynamic theorizing and research. Given this diversity, summarizing these findings is somewhat difficult. From my reading, however, I see several empirical trends.

¹⁹ Kimonyo, Jean-Paul. *Rwanda's popular genocide: A perfect storm*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2016.

²⁰ Voigtländer, Nico, and Hans-Joachim Voth. "Persecution perpetuated: the medieval origins of anti-Semitic violence in Nazi Germany." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 127, no. 3 (2012): 1339-1392.

Specifically, **most mass killings feature coordinated and purposeful action by some set of national elites.** These attempts receive differential feedback from below, but nearly all mass killings required some 'top-down' force to occur. **Further, in most cases, these national elites face some kind of political threat – either from external states, internal counter-organizations, members of their organization, or some combination of the above.** Scholars disagree on where these threats come from, whether leaders overreact to these threats, or whether mass killing is counterproductive but most cases feature political turbulence and often violence before mass killings. Beyond this, we see some imperfect trends at the macro-level.

- Many cases feature 'authoritarian' regimes and military leadership holding political power, but some feature democracies or more regionalized organization.
- Many feature deep involvement of the state within the economy, but not all do.
- Many feature histories with ethnic or ideological programs for nation-building, but again there are exceptions.
- Many mass killings occur in relatively new states or under new leaders, but not all do.
- Many mass killings feature undisciplined, overstretched, or overworked forces, but not all do.

Table 1.3: General Correlates of Mass Killings

Case	Top-Down?	Threat?	Authoritarian Regime?	State Command of the Economy?
Angola	Yes	Internal, with external patrons.	Yes.	High. With Regional Difference
Burundi	Yes	External and Internal	Yes.	High.
Cambodia	Yes	External and Internal.	Yes.	High.
China	Yes	External and Internal.	Yes.	High.
Ethiopia	Yes	External and Internal.	Yes.	High.
Germany	Yes	External.	Yes.	High.
Guatemala	Yes	Internal.	Yes.	Medium, with competition around this issue.
Indonesia	Yes	Internal, with external patrons.	Yes.	High.
Iraq	Yes	External.	Yes.	High.
Japan	Yes	External, with internal divisions.	Yes.	Medium.
Myanmar	Yes	Internal, some external.	Yes, although some liberalization.	Highly involved, with some liberalization
Nigeria	Yes	Internal, with external patrons.	Yes.	High. With Regional Difference

Table 1.3: General Correlates of Mass Killings (continued)

Pakistan	Yes	Internal, with external patrons.	Yes, although some liberalization.	Involved, but nationalization occurs after '71 separatism.
Rwanda	Yes	External and internal.	Yes, although some liberalization.	High.
Soviet Union	Yes	External and internal.	Yes.	High.
Sudan	Yes	Internal, with external patrons.	Yes	High, with some liberalization.
United States	Yes	External long-term?	No	Low.
WWII bombings, all sides	Yes	External.	Not always.	Low.
Yugoslavia	Yes	Internal, with external patrons.	Yes.	High.

In my view, like our meso-level theories, our macro-level theories require disaggregation. The macro-level politics of Mao's Cultural Revolution, for example, diverge from those of 1960's Indonesia, those during United States' expansion, or those witnessed in the Ottoman Empire. While we see some trends – authoritarian, arguably 'top-heavy' regimes facing serious threats – progress likely requires considering differences amongst these contexts. Further, reflecting on Straus and Finkel's observation about theoretical diversity, we should begin thinking about how theories might fit together rather than which is 'best.' I return to this later in the chapter.

At the international level, scholars have hypothesized many ways international actors or forces have influenced many mass killings. Some of these arguments were generalized, some were case-specific, some were specific to a certain alleged type of mass killing, some did not identify scope conditions. From my reading, we have roughly a dozen hypotheses about how international politics can facilitate or prevent mass killings.

1. International actors intervene or fail to intervene. Some cite potential punishment or intervention by international actors (typically the US or United States) as preventing mass killings. Empirically, we have some support from this ranging from peacekeeping deployment, to international criminal tribunals, to stated 'red lines', to deterred actors. Even Saddam, for example, wondered about the international response to using chemical weapons. Others cite US or UN failure to intervene in many cases, especially more recent ones such as Darfur, Rwanda, or the former Yugoslavia. None of these bodies, for example, punished Saddam directly when he eventually used chemical weapons.

2. International actors create uncertainty about balances of power. At a minimum, in Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, and South Sudan some have argued international actors have created confusion about relative strength. This may involve one or several actors with unclear amounts of external support. This can also occur before or during fighting. In any case, it distorts expectations of the costs of war and peace,

which can distort the costs of war or bargaining. In some cases, external actors have incentives to withhold their true commitments. In others, they themselves do not anticipate the externalities of these conflicts or their own commitments to actors.

3. International actors somehow magnify the problems posed by domestic actors.

This takes several forms. In some cases, such as American expansion or Stalin's purges, actors cite the hazards of international anarchy as incentivizing some form of mass killing. In others, actors fear collusion between domestic and international actors and use mass killing to mitigate these threats. In still others, actors fear the loss of strategic territory occupied by eventual targets.

4. International environments, particularly regional politics, spark domestic

upheavals. Here, scholars adopt longer time-scales and broader contexts to understand why actors exacerbate each other's domestic conflicts. Postcolonial Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia are often cited as possessing many new states with contested boundaries, cross-border identity politics, and thwarted development all of which increase the chances of mass killing. Some authors become more specific, citing particular series of wars, migration flows and armed movements, or other factors which drive mass killings. However, particularly during the Cold War, international communism is cited as creating new organizations, new threats, new kinds of domestic conflicts, and new external interventions across the globe.

- 5. International actors support and/or encourage perpetrators.** In these cases, external actors might supply the arms, intelligence, or idea for mass killing. In Indonesia, for example, the CIA provided lists of individuals suspected of communist loyalty. In Mao's China, Soviet advisors relayed their experiences with using violence to solve problems associated with communist state-building. Or, foreign actors directly or inadvertently stoke the flames of domestic conflicts.
- 6. International actors serve as reliable brokers to facilitate bargains.** In cases which do not produce mass killings, states or international institutions provide the monitoring and enforcement necessary for actors to solve commitment problems which would otherwise yield violence.
- 7. International economic forces somehow increase or decrease the likelihood of mass killing.** In these cases, international markets somehow drive economic declines which exacerbate domestic conflicts. In Rwanda., for example, some cite declines in coffee prices weaken regimes which foster domestic instability. In many of these cases, actors' 'dependent' positions within international economies exacerbate these external shocks.
- 8. International economic institutions or actors facilitate or prevent escalation of conflicts.** In some cases, the World Bank or IMF impose conditions for economic aid which somehow exacerbate domestic conflicts. Typically, authors cite austerity measures, the imposition of certain electoral institutions, or market 'restructuring' as

imposed and unfit on domestic contexts. In others, the collapse or withdrawal of external actors' support creates or exacerbates conflicts. The collapse of the Soviet Union, for example, is cited as weakening the Yugoslav economy and political system.

9. International histories, particularly colonialism, create risky situations. This takes several forms. In some arguments, colonial powers create ethnic or religious distinctions which divide people. In others, colonial powers create artificial borders and foreign institutions ill-fitted for domestic contexts which exacerbate conflicts. In still others, colonial economic regimes render new states incapable of the self-sustaining, independent, and intra-country economic activities necessary to avoid conflict.

10. International actors influence how domestic actors think. This takes several forms. In some cases, actors believe some economic or political arrangement will best ensure their prosperity. This might involve democracy, autocracy, economic nationalization, capitalism, or any number of arrangements depending on the author. In other cases, domestic actors might believe history guards against or promotes escalation. Some communist parties, for example, hesitated from using violence given the Indonesian experience.

11. International norms, typically regarding the nation-state, influence what actors pursue. Here, actors perceive international recognition or aid as contingent upon

their conformity with norms associated with statehood. In particular, control of the capital city and other territories. This imposed framework limits alternative bargaining schemes and incentives conflict for control of certain issues which. Would otherwise not exist.

12. Evolutionary changes in international politics correspond to the incidence and

forms of mass killing. In these arguments, certain forms of mass killing involving territory, colonialism, or even ethnicity fade across time as a world of territorially-bound and/or nuclear armed nation states emerges. In other words, the international system eliminates the kinds of actors and situations which might yield at least certain kinds of mass killings.

Most, if not all, of these arguments appear plausible in some contexts. Most possess strong evidence in at least some cases supporting their claims. At a minimum, no domestic context appears immune from all these potential influences. However, none of these arguments appear sufficient to produce mass killings. Many states possess colonial histories, face international threats, live in dangerous neighborhoods, aspire for international recognition, or suffer during international market downturns. Few witness mass killing. This does prove these arguments wrong but suggests, at a minimum, they require other factors do produce mass killing. In other words, while no domestic politics occur in a vacuum, international politics do not 'bulldoze' across other factors or one another.

But aside from the strengths and limits suggested, **perhaps the most serious resulting problem in the literature is the lack of cross-level research.** To be fair, collecting this range of data and theorizing cross-level interactions remains difficult and rare for much of political science. But, especially across longer time scales, we do not have much research and even less theory about how different variables at different levels of analysis interact to prevent or create the potential for mass killings. To my knowledge, we even lack sustained debates about to conceptualize cross-level interactions within and across cases. This is unfortunate, as this approach assumes the world works inside these boxes we have created. So while we work within these frames, the true causal story may involve interactions amongst them.

Third, our theories often talk past each other. Again, the wide variety of cases and questions which 'theories of mass killing' have attempted to explain has created a proliferation of good ideas which have struggled to talk with one another. We have hundreds of different explanations, but summarizing, I see six general kinds of explanations.

1. International Approaches:

- Author(s) and Works: Stevenson's *Capitol Gains*²¹, Powers' *A Problem From Hell*²²

²¹ Stevenson, John Allen. "Capitol gains: How foreign military intervention and the elite quest for international recognition cause mass killing in new states." PhD diss., The University of Chicago, 2014.

²² Power, Samantha. " *A Problem from Hell*": *America and the Age of Genocide*. Basic Books, 2013.

- Dependent Variables: strategic context of action (origin or extent of threat), absence of intervention, patterns of violence, positions and tactics of eventual targets
- Argument(s): reviewed above. in the short-term, international actors create perverse incentives by increasing threats, the potential benefits of mass killing, or create uncertainty about relative strength. across the long-term, external powers might shape the ideas, societies, or economies of other states which predispose them toward violence.
- Timescale: Near-term and long-term.
- Case(s) Analyzed: All, though often separately.
- Critiques: Messy and insufficient causal arguments. International factors must interact with domestic politics, different domestic politics likely interact differently with different international politics.

2. Historical Approaches.

- Author(s) and Works: Midlarsky's *The Killing Trap*²³, Mamdani's *When Victims Become Killers*²⁴, Strauss's *Making and Unmaking Nations*²⁵
- Dependent Variables: social the boundaries of conflict, the intensity of conflict and/or ideology.

²³ Midlarsky, Manus I. *The killing trap: Genocide in the twentieth century*. Cambridge University Press, 2005.

²⁴ Mamdani, Mahmood. *When victims become killers*. Princeton University Press, 2020.

²⁵ Straus, Scott. *Making and unmaking nations*. Cornell University Press, 2015.

- Argument(s): Historical approaches often interpret mass killings as legacies of previous conflicts. Previous conflicts somehow shape inter-group boundaries and collective emotions. Often, this is rooted in loss, violence, or imposed inequality. Sometimes, however, this is rooted in colonial rule or earlier attempts at state-building which shaped the economic and ideational boundaries of the society. These approaches often explain ‘part of the story.’
- Timescale: Long-term
- Case(s) Analyzed: Rwanda, the Holocaust, the Ottoman Empire, Cambodia.
- Critiques: Historical legacies of ethnic differences or trauma do not always create violence, historical explanations struggle with explaining timing and short-term dynamics, sometimes atheoretical or monocausal.

3. Ideational or Psychological Approaches

- Author(s) and Works: Kiernan’s *Blood and Soil*²⁶, Arendt’s *Origins of Totalitarianism*²⁷. Laitin’s *Hegemony and Culture*²⁸
- Dependent Variables: intergroup relations – particularly social categories and stereotypes, popularity of totalitarianism.

²⁶ Kiernan, Ben. *Blood and soil: A world history of genocide and extermination from Sparta to Darfur*. Yale University Press, 2008.

²⁷ Arendt, Hannah. *The origins of totalitarianism*. Vol. 244. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1973.

²⁸ Laitin, David D., and James T. Watkins IV. *Hegemony and culture: Politics and religious change among the Yoruba*. University of Chicago Press, 1986.

- Argument(s): There's a wide variety of ideational arguments, many of which are also historical. In many cases, some historical experience (colonial amplification of Tutsi/Hutu boundaries), campaign (school systems, media, misinformation or hate speech), large-scale system (capitalism, colonialism) shapes how people think about one another. Others, such as Arendt, ask about peoples' relation to authority or violence. For Arendt at least, loneliness serves as a precondition for totalitarianism. Still others attempt to explain why people can hate each other at all or whether these are evolutionarily inherited behaviors.
- Timescale: Mostly longer-term.
- Case(s) Analyzed: Often the more 'ethnic' conflicts – Rwanda, Burundi, Yugoslavia, the Holocaust, the Ottoman Empire – which, in my view, makes some assumptions about how 'ethnic' conflicts diverge from more 'ideational' (red/blue, communist/anti-communist) ones.
- Critiques: Many contexts have ideological divisions, few have mass killings. Further, dynamics of ideology remain murky and often static. How do ideas change? Why do they 'take' and 'stick'?

4. Organizational Approaches

- Author(s) and Works: Straus's *Order of Genocide*²⁹, Rummel's *Death by Government*³⁰, Fox's *Strings of Traitors*³¹
- Dependent Variables: The regime's ability to choose and implement genocide.
- Argument(s): These tend to focus on perpetrators and cite their organizational structure as creating their capacity for mass killing, Rummel argues more authoritarian regimes possess less veto points or internal negative feedback mechanisms to prevent genocide. Strauss is more case-specific, arguing the Rwandan government's nation-spanning, penetrative organization was easily repurposed for violence.
- Timescale: Shorter-term, perhaps medium term when discussing development.
- Case(s) Analyzed: Rummel has a large data-set of cases, Strauss remained confined to Rwanda.
- Critiques: Explanations remain too aggregate and one-sided. On the one hand, empirically, authoritarian regimes display organizational variation. Rwanda's akazu and MRND, for example, does not look like Hitler's Nazi Party and military organization. On the other, we have less work on eventual targets' organization influences their strategies, vulnerabilities, and the eventual patterns of violence.

²⁹ Straus, Scott. *The order of genocide*. Cornell University Press, 2013.

³⁰ Rummel, Rudolph J. *Death by government*. Transaction Publishers, 1997.

³¹ Fox, Andrew. "Strings of Traitors: Social Networks and the Organizational Trajectory of the Khmer Rouge." (2019).

5. Economic Approaches

- Author(s) and Works: Verwimp *Peasants in Power*³², Siollun's *Oil, Politics, and Violence*³³, Tilly's *The Politics of Collective Violence*³⁴, Padgett's "Politics of Communist Economic Reforms"³⁵
- Dependent Variable(s): interests of ruling regime in maintaining power or acquiring territory, participation in violence, sometimes ideational 'blaming' of others, choice of mass killing.
- Argument(s): There's a variety of economic arguments at various levels of analysis. Some stress 'rent-seeking' elites, some stress economic declines or difficulties creating discontent and political turbulence, some stress poverty as incentivizing looting alongside killing or participation in violent movements. Others, such as Padgett, stress the continuous interaction between political and economic variables in shaping actors and their choices across time.
- Timescale: Longer-term and near term at macro, mostly near-term at micro.
- Case(s) Analyzed: Rwanda, the Holocaust, Soviet Union, Mao's China, Cambodia

³² Verwimp, Philip. *Peasants in power*. Springer, 2013.

³³ Siollun, Max. *Oil, politics and violence: Nigeria's military coup culture (1966-1976)*. Algora Publishing, 2009.

³⁴ Tilly, Charles. *The politics of collective violence*. Cambridge University Press, 2003.

³⁵ Padgett, John. "The politics of Communist economic reform." *The emergence of organizations and markets* (2012): 271-315.

- Critiques: “Economics without politics is bad economics and politics without economics is bad politics.” Economic explanations rarely explain organizations or networks, political strategies, or ideational programs or divides. So while economic approaches may provide some insights into the origins of conflict and actors, they remain static and divorced from political dynamics.

Strategic Approaches

- Author(s) and Works: Valentino’s *Final Solutions*, Fearon’s “Rationalist Explanations for War”³⁶. van der Maat’s “Genocidal Consolidation: Final Solutions to Elite Rivalry”³⁷
- Dependent Variables: choice of mass killing rather than other means, whether mass killings require bottom-up or society-wide hatreds, the utility of mass killing
- Argument(s): Mass killings represent continuations of extreme politics by extreme means. Leaders attempt other means to solve these problems, but when these continue to fail, they eventually opt for mass killing. These mass killings are then ‘top-down’ events which neither require nor reflect popular hatreds. However, other strategic explanations argue wars’ risks and costs create mutually beneficial

³⁶ Fearon, James D. "Rationalist explanations for war." *International organization* 49, no. 3 (1995): 379-414.

³⁷ Van der Maat, Eelco. "Genocidal consolidation: final solutions to elite rivalry." *International Organization* 74, no. 4 (2020): 773-809.

bargains. Strategic explanations must then explain why actors fight rather than bargain – which Valentino neither asks nor answers.

- Timescale: Mostly near-term.
- Case(s) Analyzed: All mass killings. Although Valentino cites Indonesia as beyond his scope, others have threat-based rational actor models of that conflict. However, we have fewer works on the ‘bargaining question’ as applied to mass killings.
- Critiques: These read as descriptions rather than explanations, often only of short-term behaviors. They do not explain where conflicts come from, how and why they might vary, and even why they yield mass killings. Little conversation about ‘game structures’: players, stakes, alternatives, and evolution. Little discussion of target or third-party strategy, including bargaining questions. Little discussion of miscalculation also.

On the dependent variable side, these different theories look at different contexts and ask different questions. Often, they do not acknowledge which specific questions they are asking and, to be fair, cannot be expected to know all the questions they are not asking. Nevertheless, this creates some confusion about if, how, and where theories disagree one another. Perhaps the most prominent and misguided debate involves ‘strategic’ versus ‘ideological’ explanations, often depicted as mutually exclusive explanations. I see this, however, as an issue of timescale. In the short-term, elites seem guided by organizational constraints and strategic imperatives. The reports we have on

Bagasora, for example, suggest a calculating somewhat resigned person rather than a crazed, excited ideologue. But across the long-term, and especially the medium-term, ideology seems crucial to understanding the shape of social network structures, the mobilization of discontent, patterns of local intimidation and violence, and perceptions of the conflict. So the question is not should we use more material, rational actor approaches or more cultural, psychological, or ideational ones but rather identifying when and how these forces operated.

On the causal side, I have listed some common and straightforward critiques of all these approaches. There exist other, often more case-specific critiques as well. Nevertheless, I find value in all these approaches. Precisely because of this, I doubt any of them have or could acquire a monopoly on truth. So aside from specifying which theories apply to which cases and answer which questions, I submit we should begin thinking about how these different domains may constrain or interact with one another. The question, of course, is what this might look like. Some may argue this introduces too much theoretical complexity, but others such as Padgett and Powell (2012) have effectively done this in other domains. I discuss my approach in Chapter III.

III. The Ambitions of This Dissertation

Summarizing this discussion, I locate four problems with the literature.

1. We ask some questions about mass killing but not others. Further, we are not reflexive or explicit about our questions.

2. Our classifications of mass killing are 'all over the place.' This creates confusion for theorists, critics, and methodologists.
3. Our research designs and theories often focus on particular levels of analysis but rarely consider interactions amongst them.
4. We have many useful theories (often explaining different aspects of some cases of mass killings). But we have too little discussion about where they actually disagree or, more importantly, how we might integrate their insights

This dissertation aimed to begin solving some of these problems. *First, before doing anything else, I found it necessary to reclassify mass killings.* This involved considering how we might relate mass killings to other forms of political violence, but more so focused on distinguishing different mass killings by their respective logics and patterns of violence. This effort, as well as a review of previous efforts, comprises Chapter II. This yielded several distinct types of mass killings, some trends across mass killings, some considerations for how we might relate different mass killings to other forms of political violence, and some considerations about which existing arguments might apply to which types. But, for present purposes, I identified a new type of mass killing, which I labelled consolidative and argue occurred in 1965-67 Indonesia, 1972 Burundi, 1977 Ethiopia, and 1994 Rwanda. The rest of the dissertation focuses on this type of mass killing.

Second, on the dependent variable side, I sought to answer some common but several new questions about consolidative mass killings. I italicized the less commonly asked questions. In the short-term, I ask:

- why did actors choose mass killing rather than any other means? how and why are targets simultaneously worth targeting and unable to defend themselves?
- what explains the patterns of violence? this includes the choice of targets as well as subnational variation in violence.
- how were actors capable of mass killing? how were they able to orchestrate violence so effectively?
- *why did actors avoid bargaining? why, in many cases, did eventual targets or allies of targets attack eventual perpetrators?*

However, the dissertation focuses more on the longer-term origins and evolutions of these conflict. I ask,

- *where did actors come from? why did they possess certain organizational structures and network relations?*
- *what was their conflict about? what were the stakes? why did this conflict generate such intense conflict?*
- *why did these conflicts possess such similar, escalating trajectories? why did we not see any other outcomes ranging anywhere from liberalization to a different form of authoritarianism to a separatist insurgency?*

Third, on the theoretical side, I attempted to integrate several theoretical approaches. Of course, the question is how to do this. And, of course, different scholars may have different ways of thinking about this. I developed the following approach, which in some ways echoes Padgett and Powell's dictum that "*in the short-run actors make relations, in the long-run relations make actors.*" In the short-term, I focused on the kinds of actors competing, what they were competing over, and how this yielded mass killing. In theoretical terms, this essentially involved a combination of the 'strategic' and 'organizational' approaches. In the longer-term, however, I focused on how economics, politics, and networks co-evolved across time. Or, in theoretical terms, I attempted to integrate 'economic', 'organizational', and, to a lesser extent, 'historical' approaches. This involved first sketching a politico-economic structure of these four cases which diverges from other contexts, then tracing how and why this structure evolved into a particular kind of conflict with particular kinds of organizations creating particular eventual patterns of violence.

Note I am not solving all the problems in the literature. First, I am thoroughly theorizing one rather all kinds of mass killing. Second, this dissertation sketches and emphasizes a particular structure of macro-meso-micro relations. However, thorough theory and evidence across levels of analysis – involving insights about individuals, meso-level organizations, elite politics, and their interactions – remains a promissory note. In other words, this dissertation dents but does not dismantle existing macro-

meso-micro boundaries in research and theory. Second, psychological and ideational approaches are not well-integrated into my theorizing. This owes to my limitations rather than some conviction they do not matter or matter only on the margins. My future work will attempt to integrate what we know about psychological extremism into more dynamic, interactive macro-meso-micro frameworks to contextualize and understand how psychology and ideology shapes these contexts. But this again remains a promissory note.

Chapter II: Classifying Mass Killings

Abstract: This chapter wants you to think about how we should classify political violence and how we have classified mass killings. It makes three specific arguments. First, it critiques existing attempts to classifying mass killings and offers a novel classification of mass killings. Second, and most importantly for this dissertation, I argue for a new distinct type of 'consolidative mass killing' which occurred in 1965-66 Indonesia, 1972 Burundi, 1977 Ethiopia, and 1994 Rwanda. Third, it explores how we might connect mass killings to other forms of political violence and reports some preliminary findings of this probe.

1. The Problem

How should we classify mass killings? The Holocaust, the nuclear strikes on Hiroshima, Ethiopia's Red Terror, and the Ottoman attacks on the Armenians, Assyrians, and Greeks, occurred in different political contexts with different patterns of violence. Most people agree these and other mass killings are not identical. Few agree on what to do about it. Some conceptualize or code mass killings as a unitary phenomena, some have equated two or three genocides, some have posited a specific type of mass killing, and several have offered more comprehensive, yet conflicting typologies.

But beyond this, how should we think about mass killings' relationship to other forms of political violence? Within cases, should we consider mass killings 'flip sides of the same coin' as Roesler suggests coups and civil wars are? How might we think

about or know this? Comparatively, are mass killings completely unique forms of political violence or do they share dynamics with other cases? Does it make sense to compare the Holocaust to the repression of the Iraqi communists in the late 1950's and early 1960's? How about Indonesia's repression of the PKI?

How we answer these questions shapes how we code dependent variables and compare cases. This, in turn, influences the theories we develop and the causal inferences we make. **Often, scholars anchor these classifications in effects.** In other words, scholars select feature(s) which define phenomena. 'Mass killings', for example, represent instances where a) states b) intentionally target c) 50,000 or more d) non-combatants. This approach allows scholars' concerns to guide their concept formation. Scholars may care about 'mass killings' rather than other forms of political violence, for example, because of how many non-combatants die.

As discussed in Chapter I, classifying phenomena by effects, however, ignores causes. Inadvertently, these classification schemes may 'lump' causally heterogeneous outcomes, 'miss' causally similar outcomes, or 'bias' their 'set' of outcomes. To avoid these problems, scholars can derive categorizations which reflect causal relations. This, however, raises a conundrum: we need to classify to locate knowledge and we need knowledge to avoid problems classifications can cause. In other words, research designs require the knowledge they seek to work.

II. My Approach

Given these stakes and this confusion, what should be done? My approach was essentially twofold. **First, when thinking about differences amongst mass killings, like others I viewed mass killings as a continuation of extreme politics by extreme means.** In the short-term, at the macro-level, I find actors chose mass killings to solve particularly intractable problems. Mass killing, then, is a tool which we have no reason to believe will always be used in the same way for the same reason. While strategic approaches have suggested some differences amongst mass killings, I argue they have not accurately, thoroughly, or comprehensively linked these differences to strategic contexts and ‘logics of violence.’

Surveying mass killings over the last hundred years, **I identified six general types of mass killing: coercive, expansionary, repressive, developmental, reconfigurative, and consolidative.** While never identical, I found these types occurring in similar political contexts with similar patterns of targeting. **I found these differences resulted from differences in actor organizations. Amongst both perpetrators and victims, different kinds of organizations possessed different strengths, needs, and vulnerabilities which created different dynamics of violent competition.**

Second, when thinking about how mass killings might relate to other forms of political violence, I recommend situating cases within multiple comparative typologies or ‘cross-tabling.’ These typologies can involve witnessed effects or suggested causes. For example, Rwanda 1994 is a case of postcolonial state-building, a

nationalized economy, a coup attempt, a response to a coup attempt, mass killing, and ethnic violence. As another example, the formation of Bangladesh represents an instance of postcolonial state-building, mass killing, an attempt at separatism, and violent repression. Given the wide range of cases and potential comparison, I have only begun this process. Nevertheless, I discuss the advantages of this method as well as some preliminary insights gained through comparing consolidative mass killings with other coup-counter coup dynamics which they have rarely been compared to. It also serves a further plausibility probe for my approach to disaggregating political violence by its respective actors and logics of violence.

III. Existing Approaches and Their Problems

Much of the early research on mass killings derived from works on genocide. The term genocide carries moral and legal implications, and consequently many have argued whether or not actions qualify as genocides rather than how causes of mass killings might vary from case to case.³⁸³⁹ As the subfield expanded, we witnessed attempts to distinguish mass killings as a unique form of political violence, include cases beyond 'traditional' genocides such as the Holocaust which witnessed

³⁸ Fein, Helen. "Genocide: A sociological perspective." (1993).

³⁹ Melvin, Jess, and Annie Pohlman. "A case for genocide: Indonesia, 1965–1966." In *The Indonesian Genocide of 1965*, pp. 27-47. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2018.

extermination of an ‘other’, and develop distinctions between different ‘types’ of mass killings.

Figure 2.1: Kalyvas’ Typology of Mass Political Violence

TABLE I.1. *A Typology of Mass Political Violence*

Production of Violence	Aims of Violence: Political Actor Intends to Govern the Population Targeted	
	Yes	No
Unilateral	State terror	Genocide and mass deportation
Bilateral (or multilateral)	Civil war violence	Reciprocal extermination

This process, however, has been disjointed and haphazard. Some, notably Kalyvas, have simply conceptualized ‘collective violence’ as a unitary phenomena defined by its indiscriminate targeting of noncombatants.⁴⁰ Still others, such as Tilly, have situated mass killing alongside other forms of collective violence (riots, brawls, etc.) rather than search for macro-level differences within mass killings.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Kalyvas, Stathis N. *The logic of violence in civil war*. Cambridge University Press, 2006.

⁴¹ Tilly, Charles. *The politics of collective violence*. Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Figure 2.2: Tilly's Conceptualization of Collective Violence




Figure 1.1 A Typology of Interpersonal Violence.

Those who have attempted to develop macro-level differences amongst mass killings have yielded conflicting classifications. None of these possess universal acceptance, few authors have directly addressed each other, and many of these schemes contradict one another. Some group the Holocaust and Rwanda, whereas others do not. Some group Mao's Cultural Revolution and Pol Pot's violence, whereas others group Cambodia with Rwanda. Alos, none are comprehensive. Many focus on a specific type or limited number of cases. None describe the universe of potential cases. Beyond this,

most anchor their classifications in features (whether violence was partial, ethnic, etc.) rather than causal dynamics.

To my knowledge, three authors have attempted classifications anchored in causal dynamics: Valentino, Van der Maat, and de Swaan.⁴² None of these authors engage each other's classification schemes or classify the universe of mass killings. I describe and discuss each other schemes below. Valentino crafted a nested typology, reproduced below. It possesses two general kinds of mass killing (dispossessive and coercive), each with three types (communist, ethnic, territorial and counter guerrilla, terrorist, imperialist), with some of these types possessing subtypes (colonial versus expansionist territorial mass killings, for example). I find considerable value in Valentino's typology and some of my classifications echo his. Nevertheless, I see three problems with his classification:

IV. It does not cover all kinds of mass killings. By his own admission, the Indonesian mass killings and violence in Uganda do not fit within his framework. Other cases, such as the Nigerian violence in the 1960's also do not fit neatly within his framework.

⁴² Others have other typologies with other feature-based claims. Or, they explore different outcomes, such as how mass killings end. See, for example, Conley, Bridget, and Chad Hazlett. "How very massive atrocities end: A dataset and typology." *Journal of Peace Research* 58, no. 3 (2021): 612-620.

- V. He neglects some of the 'logics of violence' in his cases. For example, he does not mention the information problems and collusive dynamics the communist purges intended to solve.
- VI. His approach to classification is unclear. Some of his classifications (such as 'ethnic' mass killings) describe features rather than causal dynamics. Some, such as considering Ethiopia's Red Terror alongside Russia's counterinsurgency tactics in Afghanistan, lack explanation.
- VII. Where he does describe causal dynamics, they often remain underspecified. In Desch's words, "it is not clear whether Valentino actually has a "theory" of mass killing (for example, a certain level of necessity makes it more likely that a leader will advocate mass killing) or just a framework or typology (that is, mass killing seems to be purposive rather than an end in itself)."⁴³ Even in his typology, though, the distinctions between motive, type, and scenario are unclear, as is his decision to group communist and ethnic violence. Other strategically minded authors, such as Barnes, have created different schemes centered on whether regimes seek expansion, maintenance, consolidation, or a hybridization of these core motives.
- a. Further, in his elaboration of the typology, Valentino does not offer specific claims but rather conditions where these types are more likely. For examples,

⁴³ Desch, Michael C. "A "Final Solution" to a Recurrent Tragedy?." *Security Studies* 13, no. 3 (2004): 145-159., p. 150

Valentino writes that “communist mass killing is more likely... the higher the priority the communist leaders assign to the radical transformation of society” and that “ethnic mass killing is more likely... the greater the threat that racist or nationalist leaders believe is posed by their ethnic, national, or religious adversaries.”

These problems, as I argue later, lead to some misclassifications of mass killings.

Figure 2.3: Valentino's Typology of Mass Killings

A Typology of Mass Killing

Motive/Type	Scenario	Examples*
DISPOSSESSIVE MASS KILLING		
Communist	Agricultural collectivization and political terror	Soviet Union (1917–53) China (1950–76) Cambodia (1975–79) Turkish Armenia (1915–18)
Ethnic	Ethnic cleansing	The Holocaust (1939–45) Rwanda (1994)
Territorial	Colonial enlargement	European colonies in North and South America Genocide of the Herero in German South-West Africa (1904–7)
	Expansionist wars	German annexation of western Poland (1939–45)
COERCIVE MASS KILLING		
Counter guerrilla	Guerrilla wars	Algerian war of independence from France (1954–62) Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979–88) Ethiopian civil war (1970s and 1980s) Guatemalan civil war (1980s)
Terrorist	Terror bombing	Allied bombings of Germany and Japan (1940–45)
	Starvation blockades/siege warfare	Allied naval blockade of Germany (1914–19) Nigerian land blockade of Biafra (1967–70)
	Sub-state/insurgent terrorism	FLN terrorism in Algerian war of independence against France (1954–62) Viet Cong terrorism in South Vietnam (1957–75) RENAMO terrorism in Mozambique (1976–92)
Imperialist	Imperial conquests and rebellions	German occupation of Western Europe (1940–45) Japan's empire in East Asia (1910–45)

Van der Maat sees four kinds of mass killings: conventional between group-conflict, irregular between group conflict, diversionary violence, or consolidatory violence.⁴⁴ He explains their logics as follows.

- **Conventional between-group violence** “may be explained by information or commitment problems that preclude the conclusion of a peaceful bargain. In conventional between-group conflict, the goal of the violence is to break enemy resistance or the rival war machine in order to win a political bargain. As both parties exercise control over territory, both have clearly identifiable bases of support within their respective territories. In order to arrive at the best bargaining outcome both parties aim to destroy the rival’s military capacity or will to resist. Still, violence may be no less extreme and indiscriminate. However, indiscriminate violence in conventional war differs from indiscriminate violence in irregular war because the rival support base is identified. Because both parties exercise almost full control in their territories, their respective populations have no real option to switch sides. Indiscriminate violence may therefore break resistance through coercion, but does not risk the support of the rival population as it is already firmly under control of the rival camp.”

⁴⁴ van der Maat, Eelco. "A typology of mass political violence." *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy* 20, no. 4 (2014): 685-695.

- **Diversionsary violence** “forces rivals within the military to either pre-occupy itself with the planning and execution of the conflict, or to openly demonstrate their disloyalty. Moreover, the conflict may help the leader and generals to reliably commit to not violently remove each other. Alternatively, because the costs of losing office are truncated and emerging victorious from conflict may provide a leader with immediate security gains, leaders may opt to gamble for survival.”
- **Irregular conflict** is also a bargaining process between competing groups but groups face identification problems. “Irregular conflicts are characterized by a lack of front lines, a patchwork of zones of control, and the inability to identify support within the local population. Moreover, in irregular conflicts multiple rival factions compete for public support, which leaves individuals with the choice which party to support.” In this context, “indiscriminate violence can be strategic in irregular between-group conflict under conditions of guerilla war, in which the incumbent has coercive power, but limited information. Factions with superior repressive capacity may rely on a scorched earth strategy of uprooting or killing the population and thereby “draining the sea” of the civilian support (popular or forced) on which guerillas rely.”
- **Consolidatory violence** aims at populations within areas of secure territorial control that have no real guerrilla presence. Indiscriminate violence against outgroups under consolidatory genocide is accompanied by selective violence against ingroup

defectors as well as the removal of local ingroup elites. The violence is demonstrative and signals broad support for the violent actor within the ingroup population even if this support is absent. In these consolidatory genocides the identification problem is of a different nature as the violent actor seeks to identify support within the ingroup population.

Figure 2.4: Van der Maat Classification of Mass Killings

Technology of violence	Elite politics	
	Between-group competition	Within-group competition
Conventional conflict (no identification problem)	<i>Conventional between-group conflict:</i> Allied Bombing of Germany Second World War 1942–1945 Arab Israeli Wars 1948; 1967; and 1973 American Indian Wars and Resettlement 16th–19th century	<i>Diversionsary violence:</i> Iraqi invasion Kuwait 1990–1991 Gulf war Falklands War 1982 Nazi invasion Poland Second World War 1939
Irregular conflict (identification problem)	<i>Irregular between-group conflict:</i> Spanish Civil War Violence 1936–1939 Boer War Civillian Internment 1900–1902 Guatemalan Counter-Guerrilla Genocide 1981–1983	<i>Consolidatory genocide:</i> Cambodian Killing Fields 1975–1979 Rwandan Genocide 1994 Stalin's Collectivization Campaign 1928–1940

de Swaan provides an alternative 'four modes of mass annihilation': conquerors' frenzy, rule by terror, megapogroms, and loser's triumph.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ De Swaan, Abram. *The killing compartments*. Yale University Press, 2015

Conquerors' Frenzy: "Victorious armies operate far from the home front in a temporary moral void, where anything can happen. And it often does happen. They confront defeated enemies and a defenseless population. The troops have been brutalized by battle, and often they have endured a period of intense fighting with all the anxiety and rage that evoked. Now is the time to get back at these aliens, with whom they seem to have nothing in common." Like Valentino, this takes two essential forms: imperialist and expansionary.

- Cited Cases: Belgian massacres in the Congo, German massacres in Namibia, Japan violence in China, American expansion west, Nazi 'bloodlands', violence during Mexican revolution.

Rule by terror "is launched by established regimes and is carried out by specialists in violence from the military, the police, and the party's ranks. Death squads generally operate in the context of state terrorism, i.e., the regular use of violence, particularly homicide, by state agents against political opponents for the primary purpose of intimidation."

- Cited Cases: Stalin, Mao, Indonesia, Guatemala, North Korea over extended timeframes.

Loser's Triumph: "This particular mode of mass annihilation may occur in times of war against an armed and organized foreign enemy when an unarmed and unorganized

group within the regime's sphere of power has been identified as the target people. The target group is suspected of secretly collaborating with the enemy, operating as a fifth column and recruiting spies and saboteurs. At some point, the struggle against the target group comes to seem even more urgent than the battle against the approaching foreign enemy." This, to some extent, echoes some of Midlarsky's thinking.

- **Cited Cases:** Holocaust, Ottoman Empire, Rwanda, Pakistan, Cambodia, Yugoslavia.

Megapogrom: "In this instance, the role of the central state is much less visible. The initiators are local notables, politicians, gangsters, clerics. The perpetrators are not in the service of the regime, and they, too, are local men. Because there is little organization and minimal logistic support, the killing episodes in any given location last only a few days or weeks at most. What turns these pogroms into instances of mass annihilation is that they occur more or less simultaneously in dozens of locations, apparently spontaneously and without visible coordination. Megapogroms are concatenated local riots, synchronized by a major crisis on a supralocal, national, or even supranational level. In the absence of coordinated leadership and mutual communication, an event perceived by all, and perceived by everyone to be perceived by all, functions instead as a central coordination mechanism and thus as a "precipitant" of mob initiatives."

- Cited Cases: communal massacres in Pakistan and Bangladesh following independence and partition, reprisals across Europe following Nazi collapse.

Thinking about van der Maat's and de Swaan's classifications together reveals some of my concerns. On the one hand, I was relatively unaware of mega-pogroms empirically and appreciate van der Maat's emphasis on meso-level identification problems informing macro-level strategies. On the other, I have several hesitations with these classification schemes.

1. again, none of these classifications appear exhaustive and do not engage in sustained debate with one another. some classifications directly echo Valentino, while others do mention his classification at all.
2. neither discusses how similar or dissimilar types need be. or, none discuss when should we 'start' or 'stop' disaggregating. for example, let us concede Indonesia and China are both cases of 'consolidative violence.' nevertheless, they possessed different economic, international, organizational, and violent dynamics. but why is this feature, rather than all the other features they do not share, sufficient to create a 'type' of mass killings?
3. neither explicitly states their approach to classification. van der Maat possesses, essentially, a top-down rational actor approach to disaggregation. different strategic problems, which he (in my view mistakenly) anchors around Fearon (1995) and Kalyvas (2006) de Swaan, however, discusses irrational motivations, local

motivations, and certain environments which can 'trigger' these kinds of dynamics. this is, of course, an empirical question but neither author engages much with the alternative explanations. even within these frameworks, they are somewhat inconsistent in what factors they cite. sometimes, we see mass killings designated sometimes by their macro-level motive, other times by the kinds of perpetrators, other times by their meso-level dynamics.

IV. Strategic Logics of Conflict and Mass Killing

Altogether, many authors have provided many classifications anchored in many kinds of distinctions between mass killings. So, how should we move forward? If we want to classify by causes rather than features, our classifications necessarily reflect causal arguments. Because mass killings have many different dynamics, we can still get multiple classifications organized by different causal factors. So, again, how should we classify mass killings?

I submit we should anchor our classifications in specific logics of violence following from specific logics of conflict. What does this mean? *Logics of violence refer to how and why actors use mass killing.* What kind of mass killing do actors employ? Some hunt anyone deemed 'other' wherever possible, some only attack population centers, some attack select elites and pockets of resistance, some attempt to rout informal networks of collusion. What kinds of problem(s) does mass killing attempt to solve? Some use mass killing to coerce others into surrender, some use mass killings to

repress nascent separatist movements, some use mass killing to 'clear' unwanted populations from territory they desire, some use mass killing to eliminate threatening political opposition organizations and consolidate their control of the state.

Logics of conflict refer to the particular reasons actors have particular kinds of conflicts. What are the stakes of the conflict? What forces allow for and escalate these conflicts? Some mass killings involve competition for control of nationalized economies between political organizations, some involve international disputes over relative power, some involve attempts to develop more efficient, more loyal state structures, some involve attempts to acquire territories and populations in civil wars. Some occur in the shadow of great or regional power competition, some occur in the shadow of competing international forces, some occur in the shadow of potential third party intervention.

Further, mass killings are asymmetric conflicts with disturbing consequences. Consequently, for theoretical and moral reasons, scholars have often neglected victims' (more often, political opposition rather than the civilian victims) agency. Empirically, however, counter-organizations have attacked their eventual attackers or refused less violent bargains. Understanding mass killings (or at least some percentage of them), requires understanding their incentives and decision-making as well.

Note this approach diverges from other scholars in several ways. First, contra Midlarsky and de Swaan, 'logics of violence' imply at least some rough rationality. This, of course, is a causal claim. Note I do not believe rational actor theories explain everything about mass killings or anything else. I admit some of these actors may have suffered from loss aversion (in gambling terms, 'been on tilt'), irrationality (I do not really know why Hitler did everything he did), or otherwise been driven toward mass killing by non-rational factors. But, like Valentino and others, across most of these cases I see purposeful, coordinated weighing of costs and benefits. Nevertheless, beyond thoroughness, including logics of conflict lessens the classification schemes' reliance on short-term decision-making.

Second, scholars of civil wars will note this departs somewhat from Kalyvas's logics of violence. In his argument, logics of macro-conflict and micro-violence diverge. A civil war, for example, may be about divisions of resource flows, the structure of political institutions, or any number of issues. Dynamics of violence, however, may be driven by local patterns of territorial control which yield distinct information flows which allow for different kinds of targeting. To some extent, this holds true for many mass killings. Meso- or micro-level actors' reasons for violence may diverge from macro-level actors'. Rwandan micro-level perpetrators, for example, variously attacked Tutsis and Hutu moderates because they wanted spoils, feared punishment by military

and militias, hated Tutsis, feared an RPF invasion, or even wanted to hide their hiding of Tutsi people they cared about. So why do I focus exclusively on macro-logics?

I have three reasons for focusing on macro-level logics. First, some mass killings feature subnational variation in violence but they represent top-down coordinated attacks with specific violent directives. Most feature military, paramilitary, or militia organizations with directives from the highest levels. Second, mass killings are asymmetric conflicts where 'battlefield' dynamics do not influence patterns of violence as much. In contrast to other political conflicts. Often, mass killing is the purpose of military operations rather than a consequence of wartime dynamics. Third, although meso-level dynamics may shape actors' alternatives (for example, their ability to locate enemies or supporters or whether violence will receive negative or positive feedback from below), macro-level decisions often calculate meso and micro-level motivations into their decisions. In other words, actors choose mass killing because they believe enough meso and micro-level actors' responses will improve their own fates.

Third, scholars of civil war may also note logics of conflict are often considered separately from logics of violence. This occurs for some of the reasons stated above, but also because understanding conflicts requires more and often different explanations than explanations of violence. In most intra and inter-state conflicts, I believe separating of our theories about conflict and violence is a mistake. Theoretically, I find what is being fought over and who is fighting influences if and how violence is used.

Empirically, as I will demonstrate, I find specific kinds of mass killing corresponded to specific kinds of actors competing over specific kinds of stakes in specific of contexts. In other words, specific logics of violence followed from specific logics of violence.


V. A New Classification of Mass Killings

I took three steps in developing these logics of conflict and violence. First, again, I focused exclusively on macro-level dynamics. While the Rwandan Genocide and the Holocaust, for example, appear to share micro-level (ethnic hatred, propaganda) but not macro-level (threat environment, organization, etc.) dynamics. Second, I examined the patterns of violence. Mass killings vary in who organizes and conducts violence, how violence unfolds, why violence is used, what percentage of the 'targets' die, and across many other dimensions. I sorted them by their similarities and differences. Third, I attempted to define the specific strategic logics of mass killing. In other words, I attempted to identify the political problem mass killing was supposed to remedy. This corresponded well (though not perfectly) to the observed patterns of violence. Fourth, I reviewed the medium and short-term trajectories of these cases. I found similar logics and patterns of violence emerging from similar kinds of actors with similar kinds of conflicts.

This yielded the classification scheme below. Using multiple case histories and deductive theories about separate cases, I then decided how 'isomorphic' types were.

Relatively isomorphic types comprise single boxes (see consolidative mass killing) while cases with significant differences sub-divide (see repressive mass killings) or form 'loose' types (see reconfigurative mass killings). Some of these classifications resemble others. I echo Valentino's coercive and counter guerrilla logic. Some possess similar groupings but provide different logics of violence. My developmental classification echoes Valentino's communist type but departs somewhat in its rationale for violence. Others, such as my consolidative classification, contradict existing classifications.

Figure 2.5: Karas Classification of Mass Killings



I describe these types in detail below. Note 'logics of mass killing' apply to one actor (why did this actor choose mass killing and what did they expect it do?) Strategic contexts, or the nature of the conflict, applies to two or more actors. Explaining this

involves understanding the stakes (what the actors are fighting over) but also the dynamics (how actors compete) of conflict. Because mass killings are typically asymmetric affairs and always involve devastating violence, many do not theorize or focus on eventual victims' behavior. I do not know of many applications of Fearon's 'puzzle of war' and bargaining theory to mass killings, for example.⁴ In some cases, such as the Holocaust, I struggle to see how victims' behaviors influenced the nature and trajectory of conflict. In others, however, actors attempt to bargain and eventual victims even attack their attackers. Consequently, I found it necessary (at least in some subtypes) to discuss eventual victims' strategies as well.

Coercive Mass Killings

- **Actors:** Coercive mass killings involved relatively consolidated, organized actors with separate territories. Essentially, two or more nation-states or well-organized insurgent movements. These actors may or may not be asymmetric in strength, but one or more actors must possess some technology with allows
- **Nature of the Conflict:** These are more 'classic' international conflicts, with actors competing over relative strength, autonomy, or security. Of course, many international conflicts do not yield mass killing, so what is special about these cases? Essentially, technology. Rarely do states or insurgents fight actors who can devastate their population centers. In these cases, some technology – nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, or aerial assaults – allow actors to attack population

centers despite lacking territorial military dominance. Often, these technologies are either secret, still developing, or possess unclear potentials. Further, the presence of these technologies also threatens the possibility the opponent will develop them before surrender.

- **Bargaining Failure:** Information problems (though not necessarily private information). Actors do not know each other's capabilities, the timescales of technological development, or the power of technologies. Once war unfolds, however, it is unclear actors do not desire the increases in relative power attacks bring (Saddam continues attacks after submission of Kurds on certain strongholds, America drops multiple nuclear weapons).
- **Logic of Mass Killing:** Compelling the opponent into submission. Often, at as low a cost as possible.
- **Conduct of Mass Killing:** Attacks on population centers coordinated by military forces (often 'special' military forces). These attacks stop upon surrender and do not become 'total.' for example, did not kill Kurds living within Baghdad or continue 'hunting' Kurds everywhere following his chemical attacks.
- **Cases:** United States nuclear bombing of Japan. Allied bombing of German cities. German bombing of Britain. Saddam's chemical strikes on Kurdish populations.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Karsh, Efraim. *The Iran–Iraq War 1980–1988*. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014.

Expansionist Mass Killings

- **Actors:** Expansionist mass killings involve strong, consolidated organizations (essentially 'great' or 'regional' powers). Targets vary from weaker bordering states, weaker bordering states with divided polities, to non-state actors (such as populations without centralized leadership).
- **Nature of the Conflict:** Expansionist powers desire territory to acquire resources or strategic locations. This desire occurs within the context of great power competition, where this expansion can improve their present and future security and power. Targets complicate this by occupying this area and potentially making settlement more expensive or less attractive.
- **Bargaining Failure:** Unclear there is a mutually beneficial bargain. However, no one controls or represents all these populations which complicates any bargaining scenario.
- **Logic of Mass Killing:** Acquiring and ruling territory as quickly and cheaply as possible. This involves taking territory and resources from these populations, removing any threat or inconvenience they might pose. Note, this provides actors with mobilization potential as their own populations can acquire wealth through expansion.
- **Conduct of Mass Killing:** Expansionist mass killings possess several forms depending on the technology and time horizons of attackers as well as the

organization of the victims. Often, they first involve military takeovers of central areas, then mobilizations of militias to hunt and attack peripheral populations, and can coalesce into concentration camps which involve deadly experimentations.

- **Cases:** United States formation and expansion at the expense of native populations, Nazi Germany's expansions and murders of Jewish and other populations, and Japanese invasions into China during World War II.⁴⁷⁴⁸

Developmental Mass Killings

- **Actors:** Developmental mass killings involve communist organizations who win civil wars attempting to build their states and economy. Their first targets include potential political opponents (members of the 'old guard' or other rebel organizations) and landholders (who represent what they fought against and block potential redistribution). Their second targets include suspected coup plotters at the elite level as well as informal, collusive networks all across the territory. Note in Cambodia, these groups are targeted nearly simultaneously and constantly through Pol Pot's reign.

⁴⁷ Giaccaria, Paolo, and Claudio Minca, eds. *Hitler's geographies: the spatialities of the Third Reich*. University of Chicago Press, 2016.

⁴⁸ Lindsay, Brendan C. *Murder State: California's Native American Genocide, 1846-1873*. U of Nebraska Press, 2012.

- **Nature of the Conflict:** Both these stages of mass killing presented security and economic problems simultaneously. In the first stage, newly victorious organizations faced the challenge of preventing further fighting and developing war-torn economies formerly controlled by their previous opponents. In the second stage, struggling leaders faced internal threats from within their own organization as well as problems of informal collusion which corrupted information flows, central planning, and economic production all across their territory. All of this occurred in threatening international contexts. In Stalin's words, "we are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it or we shall go under."⁴⁹
- **Bargaining Failure:** These are not organizations competing, but rather many different networks of individuals at different levels of the state variously colluding, competing, and cooperating for various reasons.
- **Logics of Mass Killing:** Violence served a dual function: elimination and mobilization. Elimination involved removing threats or obstacles to the construction and growth of the state-economy. In the first 'wave' of mass killing, this involved political opponents and landowners. In the second, it involved threats from within the communist party as well as collusive networks which frustrated economic functions. In other words, problems related to lying,

⁴⁹ Padgett, John. "The politics of Communist economic reform", p. 282

stealing, redirecting, and otherwise complicating production from below.

Mobilization involved using now vacant property or posts to mobilize individuals into loyalty to the forming state-economy.

- **Conduct of Mass Killing:** In the first 'wave', organizers relied on their own military forces to eliminate opponents. In the second, they relied on 'special forces' with tight ties to leadership. They used informants, loyalists, and torture at lower levels to identify alleged 'saboteurs' or 'anti-communists.'
- **Cases:** Stalin's purges, Mao's Cultural Revolution, Pol Pot's violence.⁵⁰

Repressive Mass Killings

Repressive mass killings share the same essential strategic logic: repress a threat which could exacerbate across time. However, the organization being repressed, their political goals and behaviors, and to some extent the resulting patterns of violence vary.

Consequently, we have three subtypes of repressive mass killings: foot-hold seeking, separatist seeking, and transfer-seeking. Nevertheless, as the lop-sided results of these conflicts suggest, these movements do not operate in isolation. Instead, perpetrators fear collaboration with or loss of territory to other more powerful actors.

1. Repressive – Separatist Subtype

⁵⁰ Kiernan, Ben. *The Pol Pot regime: Race, power, and genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-79*. Yale University Press, 2002.

- **Actors:** Repressive mass killings involve a consolidated, organized actor and nascent armed movements embedded in a relatively supportive population. In the separatist context, these nascent armed movements involve territorial-bound political organizations with ties to existing police, paramilitary, or military forces and/or nascent insurgent organizations.
- **Nature of Conflict:** Essentially, one organization desires its own sovereignty. This may owe to one or several reasons, but typically involves exploitative or unproductive economic schemes, discriminatory state policies, or even repression or cruelty by the state. Separatist movements rarely yield mass killings because the power asymmetries necessary for mass killings rarely allow viable separatist movements. Consequently, these conflicts usually occur under the shadow of potential third party intervention which could tilt the balance of power.
- **Bargaining Failure:** Uncertainty regarding third party intervention. Sometimes actors themselves do not know whether they will intervene. India, for example, only intervenes following extensive diplomacy with Western powers and refugee crisis on its border.
- **Logics of Mass Killing:** Repress and/or destroy a political movement which, if let alone, could grow in viability. Mass killing results for two reasons. First, the opposition is popular and embedded within a territory. Decapitation is not

necessarily productive across the long-term and locating supporters is difficult without knowledge or territorial control. Second, the attackers often are mobilized ad-hoc as state institutions are challenged and potential interventions loom.

- **Conduct of Mass Killing:** Two waves. First, coordinated attacks on opposition elites often through explicit lists and secret operations. Second, sweeping repressions by both military and recently mobilized paramilitary forces into population centers or strategic areas.
- **Cases:** Pakistan repression of what eventually became Bangladesh (1971)⁵¹

2. Repressive – Foot-Hold Seeking Subtype

- **Actors:** This foot-hold seeking subtype involves competition between regimes embattled in civil conflicts with more powerful organized resistance movements. In these contexts, peripheral populations and organizations attempt to maximize on this conflict through organization and small scale attacks on outposts.
- **Nature of Conflict:** Marginalized populations on the periphery lack access to the state which does not invest in their territories. Often, these populations occupy a border with a potential external rival. Within the state, more classical civil wars unfold (regime versus insurgency with some territorial control). Actors on the periphery attempt to carve their own autonomy and possibly acquire the

⁵¹ Bass, Gary J. *The Blood Telegram*. Random House India, 2013.

capacity to sway wartime outcomes. The potential continuation or growth of this movement would increase potential threats and introduce another player these regimes would have to deal with.

- **Bargaining Failure:** Miscalculation regarding the strength and brutality of the regime. In Darfur, at least, this is aided by Chinese arms which tilt domestic balance of power.
- **Logics of Mass Killing:** Repress and/or destroy a political movement which, if let alone, could grow in viability. Mass killing results for two reasons. First, actors remain 'hidden' within supportive populations which regimes struggle to extract information from. Second, actors mobilize non-military personnel who tend toward malice and looting.
- **Conduct of Mass Killing:** Where possible, leadership and centers of resistance are targeted by military strikes. Then, actors mobilize paramilitary forces and even civilians to conduct violence. Violence begins by targeting whatever organization these nascent movements possess, then proceeds into 'raids' of populations.
- **Cases: Darfur 2002-05, Guatemala 1981-83, Myanmar 2017**⁻⁵²⁵³⁵⁴

⁵² Wade, Francis. *Myanmar's enemy within: Buddhist violence and the making of a Muslim 'other'*. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019.

⁵³ Garrard-Burnett, Virginia, and Virginia Garrard. *Terror in the land of the holy spirit: Guatemala under general Efraín Ríos Montt 1982-1983*. Vol. 7. Oxford University Press on Demand, 2010.

⁵⁴ Prunier, Gérard. *Darfur: A 21st century genocide*. Cornell University Press, 2008.

3. Repressive – Transfer-Seeking Subtype

- **Actors:** This transfer-seeking subtype involves at least three actors. One, a regime threatened by external and internal threats. Second, populations living on the periphery which lack access to the state, do not receive much investment from the state, and often possess different 'cultures' than the state. Third, external states with historical ties to these populations.
- **Nature of Conflict:** Populations of the periphery desire to leave one regime to join another state. They possess more cultural ties and believe their interests would be better served within these states. The existing regime fears losing these territories as well as the increases in power these transfers would endow their neighbors. As existing regimes find themselves embattled in international conflicts, peripheral groups begin organizing and conducting small-scale violence to advance their cause.
- **Bargaining Failure:** Miscalculations regarding third party support and relative strength and response of the regime.
- **Logics of Mass Killing:** Repress and/or destroy a political movement which, if let alone, could further threaten regime interests. Mass killing occurs for two reasons. First, forces are spread thin and more sweeping attacks (often in combination with paramilitary forces) are more efficient for the regime. Second,

attempts to relocate populations are done swiftly and as cheaply as possible, forcing the deaths of many more.

- **Conduct of Mass Killing:** Two types. First, sweeping attacks against population centers by military and paramilitary forces. Second, forced relocations which claim many lives.
- **Cases:** Ottoman Empire's killings of Greeks, Armenians, and Assyrians.⁵⁵

Reconfigurative Mass Killings

- **Actors:** Reconfigurative cases involve two or more armed organizations with their own respective territorial bases as well as contested territories with populations of divided loyalties. The number and nature of these organizations varies across these cases. Some were rebels against colonial powers, some represent splits within military, some represent socioeconomic differences, some reflect some combination of the above. Sometimes conflict involved two actors, sometimes three, sometimes more. This variation in actors makes this a softer type with some variation in patterns of violence.
- **Nature of Conflict:** Actors cannot agree on the territorial contours of sovereignty. Actors compete for increased control of the state or sovereignty within some section of the state. Empirically, this occurs in contexts where the

⁵⁵ Erickson, Edward J. *Ottomans and Armenians: A Study in Counterinsurgency*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

state greatly influences economic prospects and we see regional imbalances in representation

- **Bargaining Failure:** The extent of external party support for all sides, as well as some miscalculations about battlefield strength.
- **Logics of Mass Killing:** There are two intersecting goals of violence: acquiring territorial control and war-fighting. Civilian populations become targets because all combatants do not wear uniforms, both sides seek to move across territory quickly, and populations represent potential sources of support and mobilization. The logic of violence is twofold. First, actors seek to 'consolidate' territories which they can effectively claim and rule as their own. Second, actors seek to weaken the other side's capacity to harm them.
- **Conduct of Mass Killing:** In contrast to many other mass killings, the two or more actors in these cases have roughly similar capabilities. This creates several dynamics. First, while we may see some urban warfare, purges of armed forces, and assassinations we do not witness the full-scale purges of any side's leadership. Second, mass killing is often multi-sided, with both actors engaging in some civilian targeting through the war. Third, we see more conventional battles alongside this mass killing. Fourth, and related to all the above, these events tend to unfold over longer time-scales.

- **Cases:** Angola 1975-83, Nigeria 1966-71, Burundi 1993-2001, Yugoslavia early 90's.⁵⁶⁵⁷

Consolidative Mass Killings

- **Actors:** Consolidative mass killings involve uniquely insular networks of political, military, and economic elites (with individuals often possessing dual roles in the state, military, and economy) competing against mass-based political organizations with -with some local territorial control and military ties.
- **Nature of Conflict:** Actors compete over a nationalized economy with few options for advancement beyond the state. By themselves or in combination with external support, these organizations present threats to the functioning of the state-economy and the survival of these insular networks. In these contexts, insular politico-military-economic networks possessed military superiority, elite organizational cohesion, and network ties across the territory. However, they lack cooptive capacity, control of either the economy of the state, and remain vulnerable to coup attempts. By contrast, their political opponents possess strong local organization, some ties to military leadership, and large numbers.

However, they lack conventional military strength. They cannot secede from the

⁵⁶ Bundervoet, Tom. "Livestock, land and political power: The 1993 killings in Burundi." *Journal of Peace Research* 46, no. 3 (2009): 357-376.

⁵⁷ Bennett, Christopher. *Yugoslavia's bloody collapse: causes, course and consequences*. NYU Press, 1995.

state or invade the capital. Instead, some of their members eventually gambled on a coup decapitating their opponents – presumably fostering both the formation of a new government and some local swelling of support.

- **Bargaining Failure:** Unclear there is a mutually beneficial bargain. In three of the four cases, attackers claim control of the state for long periods of time. In the fourth, the Rwandan Patriotic Front suffers minimal casualties and acquires all of Rwanda. But, these cases feature the perhaps unavoidable uncertainty which surrounds coups and their outcomes.
- **Logics of Mass Killing:** Following these failed coup attempts, the logic of mass killing is two-fold. First, violence is used to eliminate existing and potential future threats to these vulnerable networks. Second, eliminating these powerful local, regional, and national actors creates opportunities to entice people into supporting the regime through land grabs, newly open positions, and settling of local 'scores.'
- **Conduct of Mass Killing:** These mass killings have three dynamics of violence. First, military or militia members with strong ties target leading political opposition. Note these members may represent 'moderates' or other political rivals not directly associated with civilian targets of violence. The akazu in Rwanda, for example, targeted Hutu moderate politicians as well as Tutsis. Second, in some areas, locals or militias operated in certain areas begin violence

against designated 'others' independently. Third, and more often, military and militia members mobilize civilian populations and work closely with them to conduct violence.

- **Cases:** Indonesia 1965-67, Burundi 1972, Ethiopia 1977, Rwanda 1994-97.

VI. On the Differences and Similarities Amongst Mass Killings

I want to note three things about these classifications. First, acquiring expertise of one case, let alone twenty-two cases, is extremely difficult. Most mass killings are well-studied, and I have read thoroughly and widely, but I anticipate some gaps in my case knowledge. Further, there three other suggested types of mass killing which I have not included: colonial, counter guerrilla, and megapogroms. Colonial mass killings, such as the violence in Namibia in the early 1900s, involved repressing groups which resisted colonial powers or local powers supported by colonizers. Counter guerrilla mass killings, such as the Soviet violence in Afghanistan, involve indiscriminate violence against guerillas who 'hide' within civilian populations. In these contexts, attackers use mass killing to kill potential guerillas and weaken their communal support. Megapogroms echo de Swaan's description of them (series of connected local instances of collective violence. I did not include these because I do not have working knowledge about these cases yet. What I have learned thus far essentially echoes the logics and scope conditions provided by Valentino and de Swaan.

Second, Desch and others have critiqued Valentino for lacking theory. I echoed this critique somewhat by arguing strategic-centric classifications tended to focus on the features of violence rather than the strategic logics producing them. But these classifications, while anchored in causal dynamics, do not represent theories of these mass killings by most understandings of the term.⁷ Elsewhere, for example, I have developed theories about how economic and network structures coevolved across time to create the similar actors, stakes, and dynamics we witnessed in the consolidative mass killings which this classification scheme does not provide. I am submitting, however, these different types possessed different causal dynamics and, counterfactually, would have responded differently to different variables. For example, powerful potential third party support for eventual targets mattered greatly in the repressive cases but less so in coercive or developmental cases. Economic depressions feature prominently in many causal stories about consolidative violence and, to lesser extent, developmental mass killings but less so in coercive, expansionary, or counterinsurgency cases.

I am also specifically submitting these distinctions resulted from differences in the organization of the actors involved. Sometimes perpetrators were industrial, powerful nation-states, sometimes they were small, insular networks of military, political, and economic elites, sometimes they were armed insurgencies which recently acquired control of the state, sometimes they were regimes emerged from recently

fractured states with divided militaries and police forces. Sometimes their political opposition were well-organized insurgencies, sometimes they were other nation-states, sometimes they lacked any cohesive organization, and sometimes they resembled political parties. These different organizations possessed different strengths, needs, and vulnerabilities which yield distinct kinds of violent competition.⁸ Coups, for example, provided little plausible benefit for eventual victims in repressive, expansionary, coercive, or reconfigurative cases where attackers had large numbers and strong organizations.

Generally speaking, I try to avoid speaking generally. But the differences between these cases do not negate any potential similarities. First, none of these cases occurred in an international vacuum. Which kinds of international factors matter varies across type, but international wars, external threats, or potential or actual external interventions feature in all cases. Second, all cases receive feedback from below. Subnational variation is the rule not the exception in mass killings. Nevertheless, who attacks, how they attack, and why they attack tends to vary by type. In other words, each macro logic of mass killings shapes meso and micro methods and logics of participation. Second, most perpetrators were new to power. al-Bashir of Sudan is the elder statesman of this cohort, being in power thirteen years before the Cultural Revolution.

Table 2.1: Mass Killings and Leadership Tenure

Type	Leader	Years in Power before Mass Killing
Expansionary	Hitler, Nazi Germany	8-9 years, although planning and ghetto-ization occur earlier
Expansionary	USA (American Indians)	Not Applicable, violence is continuous across many leaders with imposed turnovers.
Expansionary	Japan, many leaders	Leadership turnover and internal divisions are high throughout
Developmental	Mao, China	11 years, although violence associated with collectivization begins earlier
Developmental	Stalin, USSR	9-10 years, although violence associated with collectivization begins earlier
Developmental	Pol Pot, Cambodia	Nearly immediately
Coercive	USA (World War II)	Not really applicable
Coercive	Allies and German bombings	Not really applicable
Coercive	Saddam, Iraq-Kurds	8-9 years
Consolidative	Akuza, Rwanda	Simultaneously
Consolidative	Micombero, Burundi (1972)	6 years, although the 'Bururi Group' which he belonged to captures the state simultaneously
Consolidative	Suharto, Indonesia	Simultaneously
Consolidative	Derg faction, Ethiopia	Simultaneously
Reconfigurative	Gowon, Nigeria	Simultaneously
Reconfigurative	Milosevic, Serbia	1-2 years
Reconfigurative	Angola	Leadership never established

Table 2.1 Continued

Reconfigurative	Extensive Turnover, Burundi (1993)	Near simultaneously
Repressive – Separatist	Pakistan	There’s a contested transfer of power, but Yahya Khan had in power for two years.
Repressive – Transfer Seeking	Military Triumvirate, Ottoman Empire	1 year
Repressive – Foot-Hold Seeking	Darfur, al-Bashir	13 years
Repressive – Foot-Hold Seeking	Guatemala	Begins under one leader who had been in power to two years, escalates with arrival of new leadership
Repressive – Foot-Hold Seeking	Myanmar	1 year, but there’s turnover within this time frame

Third, *most perpetrators belonged to relatively insular, small elite networks*. In other words, leaders and their allies rarely herald from ‘all walks of life’ but rather represent ‘clusters’ within society. I do not believe this is coincidence. These structures face two constraints which could create situations where targets might be simultaneously unable to defend themselves and incapable of being handled by alternative means. On the one hand, these structures are particularly vulnerable. Their small and insular nature makes decapitation or incapacitation plausible. Targeting a diffuse set of many elites is much more difficult than an insular network of a small number of individuals. For example, a coup in the United States would presumably involve decapitating elites from political parties, members of the military with various

loyalties, and possibly some economic elites. This is not impossible. This is both practically difficult to coordinate as well as politically difficult to mobilize people who want to target all these actors. This does not mean it is impossible – business elites plotted against FDR – but it is difficult.

On the other hand, these organizations have few means outside of violence. their dense economic and social ties (often by marriage) made defection of any one member unimportant and defection of any large number unlikely. This owes to practical perhaps affective reasons. These people traveled in the same circles, often belonged to the same kinship networks, and possessed long histories with one other. None of these cases, despite all the political intrigue, witnessed serious defection from within these networks. Further, incorporating such a dense network, especially one with military ties, into another organization would threaten existing power structures and introduce a formidable 'bloc' within the organization. Further still, their cohesiveness made cooptation difficult. For starters, their small number and command of resources made sharing costly. They were not brokers, merchants, or inventors – they simply controlled resources. Further, any member incorporated would have to contend with entrenched, thick social networks. 'Breaking in' would be difficult and unlikely to result in any serious power.

Fourth, *many of the cases feature nationalized or nearly nationalized economies.* Specifically, Rwanda, China, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Nigeria, Indonesia, Burundi,

Ethiopia, North Korea, and Nazi Germany. Of course, politics without economics is bad politics as much as economics without politics is bad economics. Consequently, almost every conflict, especially civil conflicts, will possess some economic dimension.

Nevertheless, if this correlation testifies to causation, I see two potential logics. First, as others and myself have argued, nationalizing an economy creates massive incentives for controlling the state and massive losses for lacking any influence. In other words, it raises the stakes. Second, actors do not 'fall from the sky' but are constructed by flows and networks. These kinds of economic arrangements may be more likely to produce the kinds of insular organizations which seem to commit these atrocities. At this point, however, these remain hypotheses.

Fifth, some cases appear more alike than others. Coercive mass killings, for example, do not look much like consolidative ones. Reconfigurative and consolidative mass killings, however, sometimes share coup dynamics, nationalized economies, and bottom-up 'ethnic' mobilization and violence. Likewise, developmental and consolidative mass killings feature nationalized economies as well 'purge and mass mobilization' logics of action. Future work might consider 'clustering' different types with some conceptual space (a 2 x 2, x-y axis, Venn Diagram) or developing 'nesting typologies.' For examples, we might think of types clustered around:

- general motives of expansion, maintenance, or consolidation.
- goals related to coercing versus eliminating the opposition.

- political problems related to nationalized economies versus those related to more traditional security concerns.
- those related to commitment problems, indivisible issues, third party uncertainty, or some other mechanism.

But, given the variety of dimensions and causal dynamics involved in all these cases, at least at present, I do not see any particularly useful conceptual framework to situate these types within.

VII. Thinking Beyond Mass Killings – Method and Preliminary Evidence.

Some may remain skeptical of this classification scheme and its causal arguments. Van der Maat and de Swaan, for example, had other designs. So, again, we may ask whether (or at least when) we should anchor our classifications in differences amongst actors and logics of violence? Even if you accept this classification scheme and its causal arguments, several questions remain unanswered. How should we think about how mass killings relate to other forms of political violence? In the short-term, do mass killings share dynamics with other kinds of political violence? Or, comparatively, can we learn more about mass killings or other cases by studying them together? Across the longer-term, do mass killings and other forms of political violence herald from similar structural variables (late development internationally, colonialism, etc.?) Or, do mass killings represent one of possibly several potential outcomes ‘structures’ or

'dilemmas' create for actors at earlier time periods (like Roessler's 'civil war/coup' trap?) How we explore and answer these questions shapes how we understand mass killings but also how the world works beyond these cases.

I submit a 'cross-tabbing' approach can potentially increase our confidence in this approach to classification and begin answering some of these questions. To repeat, multi-dimensional phenomena are rarely 'instances' of one thing exclusively. The Ethiopian Red Terror, is an instance of coup-counter coup dynamics, postcolonial state-building, economic nationalization, as well as mass killing. For the most part, most mass killings are only compared to other contexts to support causal arguments. Strauss, for example, examined many other African contexts where mass killings did not occur to suggest 'carrier movements' created the potential for mass killing. Fewer, however, have employed comparisons to seek similarities or discover causal differences.

'Cross-tabbing' introduces multiple comparative perspectives to the same event. In time, for example, we would compare and classify the Ethiopian Red Terror within 'instances' of coup-counter coup dynamics, mass killings, economic nationalization attempts, etc. This avoids allowing your pre-existing concepts to restrict your research design. From a humanistic perspective, it also provides different comparisons which can prompt new questions and hypotheses. For example, the cases of Burundi, Rwanda, Indonesia, and Ethiopia feature elite support for previously non-aligned militias or populations. In 1963 Iraq, however, Prime Minister Qasim declined to arm potential

communist allies. Within the following weeks, Qasim, his allies, and large numbers of the communist party were killed. This raises the question of when and why leaders decide to arm aligned but uncontrolled actors (which they do and often attempt to later 'reign in' other cases of mass killings).

A Plausibility Probe

Of course, no one can conduct all these 'cross-tabs' nor does any holistic classification of political violence seem imminent. Nevertheless, across time and with many scholars working, we might witness more dialogue across subfields, better classification schemes, new questions and comparisons, and newly detected casual patterns. To demonstrate the potential of this approach, I compared consolidative mass killings with other instances of coup-counter coup dynamics. From a comparative perspective, most coups – whether failed or successful – featured subsequent repression (purges, arrests, local violence, etc. So, why do consolidative mass killings feature such extensive violence while other counter coups do not? Or, more modestly, can we learn anything about mass killings or other counter coups by comparing them to each other?

'Coups' refer to violent, illegal seizures of power against existing leadership. There have been over many hundreds of coups, thwarted coup plots, coup attempts, and counter-coups in the last hundred years. These events have varied widely in their prelude, conduct, and aftermath. For examples,

- In 1958, De Gaulle and his allies within the army deployed troops and paratroops across France to seize control of the state. De Gaulle himself would survive a coup attempt spearheaded by retired army generals three years later. These generals were eventually pardoned and some had their positions restored. Under De Gaulle, France would change constitutions and enter the democratic 'Fifth Republic' which continues today.
- In 1963, a group of Ecuadorian military leaders overthrew President Arosemena. The junta then arrested many of the communist leaders, pursued land and other economic reforms, and reorganized the nation's two leading universities. Following poor economic performance, civil unrest, and violent repressions of some demonstrations the junta would cede power in 1966.
- In 1973 Rwanda, Juvenal Habyarimana seized power from his political sponsor and godson's father Grégoire Kayibanda. This coup would effectively transfer power from the Southern and Central Hutu networks to Northern ones Economic downturns, social unrest, and accusations by Kayibanda against General Habyarimana prompted a military coup which resulted in the permanent house arrest of Kayibanda and punishment of about a hundred leaders of the former government and Kayibanda loyalists in the civilian sphere.. Habyarimana would install a one-party government, survive a military coup attempt in 1980, and rule

until 1994 when he was killed by political opponents an event which precipitated the Rwandan Genocide.

- In January 1966 Nigeria, a network military officers from both the North and South killed the Prime Minister along with many senior political and military officers and some members of their families. Northern military members, citing fears on an Igbo coup and revenge for their murdered leaders, overthrew this new government, killing their leadership, Igbo military members in their barracks, and Igbo civilians living in Northern territories. This prompted a secessionist movement by the South, resulting in the prolonged, bloody Nigerian-Biafran Civil War.
- In 1958 Iraq, a military group representing a spectrum of factions overthrew the existing monarchy by killing the King as well as his son and some of his political allies. During the next five years, General Qasim attempted to balance competing political interests, namely the communist, Ba'ath parties, and external influences. In 1963, the Ba'ath Party attempted to overthrow Qasim. This involved days of armed struggle between Qasim's forces and a combination of military generals and Ba'ath loyalists. Communist members asked Qasim for arms but he withheld them. Qasim, his loyalists, and thousands of communist party members were eventually killed. General Arif, the emerging new leader, would purge Ba'ath elements months afterward.

Like the mass killings literature, no one agrees on how to classify coups. We read of military coups, palace coups, revolutionary coups, coups from below, veto coups, putsches, etc. Like the mass killings literature, I attempted to classify coups according to the organizations of the actors involved. I did not review all coups I restricted myself to the last hundred years and looked to expand the dependent variation by examining cases with divergences in patterns of violence. The Table below represents a rough cut of my thinking.

Table 2.2: Preliminary Typology of Coups

Type	Target?	Attacker?	Military's Political Orientations ?	Counter-coup Dynamics ?	Case
Assassination	Single Leader	Single Citizen	Indeterminate	Arrest, Death Penalty of Individuals	Lincoln, Kennedy, Reagan, McKinley
Incitement	Single Leader or Select Group of Elites	Network of Private Citizens	not necessarily, but less political military	Arrest of Individuals, Crackdown on Associations	Bulgaria 1965

Table 2.2 Continued

Deposition by Insiders	Single Leader	'Within-Network' Military Elites	Consolidated at Elite Level	Targeting of Military Elites (killing, arrest, exile)	Ecuador 1963
Deposition by Consolidated Military	Leadership and Close Allies ('King, His Court, His Guard')	'Outside-Network' of Elite Military Members	Consolidated	Targeting of this network	Ghana 1966, Turkey 1960, 1971, Ottoman Empire 1909
Deposition by Fragmented Military	Leadership and Close Allies ('King, His Court, His Guard')	'Outside-Network' of Elite Military Members	Divided	Targeting of this network (upon failure), Military Coup from Across (upon success)	Nigeria 1966
Depositions Within Mass Protests	Leader of State (often peaceful)	Elite Coalitions	Relatively Consolidated . (note cooperative ties with external patrons)	Mass arrests and firings of previous regime, often with some constitutional changes	Egypt 2011, Ukraine 2014

Table 2.2 Continued

Military Coups from Below	Elite State and Military Networks	Divisions or Networks within the Military (non-leadership)	Divided (across strata or columns)	Targeting of perpetrators and their sponsors and allies (especially within the state administration)	Kenya 1982, Iraq 1958, Burundi 1965*, Turkey 2016
Military Coups from Across	Civilian State Leaders, Military Networks across Elite and Rank Levels	Network of Military Members across Elite and Rank Levels	Divided at Elite and Rank Levels	Elimination of Military Conspirators and their potential allies	Nigeria 'Counter-coup' of 1966
Party-Military Alliance Coups	State Leader and Other Political Party Organization ('purges')	Network of Elite Military Members + Political Party with 'Street Presence'	Divided at Elite and Rank Levels	Targeting of Politico-Military Leadership (political acupuncture), Street Violence against opposition	Iraq 1963 (Ramadan Revolution), Nigeria 1966 (July Rematch)
Political Party-Led Coups	Insular Network of Politico-Economic-Military Elites	Political Party Members	Consolidated (at elite level)	Collective Violence	Ethiopia, Rwanda, Indonesia, Burundi 1972*

This, of course, remains provisional and incomplete. So, why is in this dissertation? For three reasons. First, it lends credence to the actor-centric approach to classification which emerged from classifying mass killings. As in mass killings, we see a reliable correlation between patterns of organization and violence. Different kinds of actors used different kinds of violence – in both coup attempts and countercoups. We also see further evidence for the importance of organizational forms driving consolidative mass killings. On the one hand, we do not see similar patterns of violence occurring within coups amongst different organizational forms. On the other, those which most closely resemble consolidative mass killings (Iraq 1962, Nigeria 1966) also more closely resemble the consolidative cases organizational structures.

Second, it recognizes and testifies to the potential of comparing mass killings to other forms of political violence. On the humanistic side, new questions derived from comparison. For examples, despite many striking similarities in the Iraqi case, we see

- a consistent 'reigning in' of communist street forces (potential militias) including a refusal to arm them during the coup attempt. the opposite occurs in the consolidative cases.
- the absence of nationalization, despite land reforms and state acquisition of unused oil fields, of many international industries, private businesses, and large estates. again, the opposite occurs in the other four cases.

Given the similarities in political contexts and eventual fates observed here and, say, in Indonesia, what accounts for these differences? What determines postcolonial regimes approaches to nationalization? How about their relations to 'youth groups' or 'militias'? On the empirical side, we see partial extensions of theoretical arguments witnessed in mass killing cases. For examples, we see initially popular revolutionary networks of military members confronting problems of state-building. further, we see some parallels across these different instances of political violence. for examples, economic changes (land reform, developmental schemes) and organizational forms (military-centric regimes, mass-based political organizations).

Chapter III: Theorizing Consolidative Mass Killing

abstract:

I attempt to explain consolidative mass killings across the short- and long-term. In the short-term, I ask why actors had conflict, why this conflict persisted and intensified, and why it resulted in failed coup attempts followed by consolidative mass killings. I argue the particular economic ecology of these contexts combined with the particular organization of these actors created particular opportunities and vulnerabilities which prevented de-escalation and incentivized these patterns of violent competition. In the long-term, I ask where these actors and conflicts came from. I argue economics, political conflicts, and organizational forms co-evolved as actors attempted to construct and resist the construction of new states, economies, and nations.

extended abstract. or, the theory in a about page:

This chapter develops a theory of consolidative mass killing. This implies a short-term explanation for why actors competed and why their competition resulted in consolidative mass killings as well as a longer-term theory for where these actors and their conflicts came from. The short-term theory explains conflict through the nationalized, particular economic structure and explains mass killing through the organization structures of the competitors. The longer-term theory explains the evolution of these actors and their conflicts through a co-evolution of the economics, politics, and organizations.

In the short-term, I argue insular elite politico-military-economic networks and mass-based political organizations found themselves competing for control of the state and economy. Because of the nature of the economy, all sides had few options for wealth and security beyond controlling the state. Because of the nature of their organizations, neither side could coopt or compel the other without drastic action. When mass-based political organizations' attempts to overthrow these networks failed, these networks used one of their few available tools – mass killing – to consolidate their power.

In the longer-term, I argue these actors and their conflicts evolved from a particular politico-economic context. Specifically, networks within the military ousted existing colonial or colonially sponsored powers. On the economic side, they inherited a relatively poor, largely agricultural economy with a few profitable exports. On the political side, they lacked strong organizational infrastructure or even informal network ties to a socially and regionally divided polity. To solve these challenges, these military networks pursued several political and economic policies simultaneously. Specifically, they

- *sought to create national identities, rituals and practices, and sometimes one-party organizations. if this was unavailable, they sought to coopt existing political organizations in their state-building attempts.*
- *seized control of profitable export sectors, sought foreign investment, and pursued land reforms. all of this corresponded to their state-building projects: collecting resources for re-investment or patronage, weakening rivals, and attracting new supporters.*

On the one hand, these policies achieved many of their aims. Their economies often became larger, more efficient, and developed. These networks increased their own wealth and power as well as their organizational reach. On the other hand, they failed to solve some underlying problems and created some new ones. Economically, these countries remained relatively poor, highly agricultural, and highly dependent on select exports. It also became increasingly linked – as different regions' investments, profits, and taxes became tied to the nationalized economy and its decision-makers. Further, locally, flows of people and resources remained largely the same which prevented any transformation of local politics and identities.

Politically, this created an insular politico-military-economic network with strong organizational ties throughout the territory. However, it also generated resistance to this increasing power. Often, this involved counter-maneuvers by counter-elites – mutinies, separatist movements, coup attempts – none of which succeeded but all of which drove purges and exacerbated the already insular and military nature of these networks. More problematic, however, were mass-based resistance movements which flourished as economic crises increased popular discontent, decreased regimes' patronage power, and increased their dependency on external patrons.

To resist these movements, which increasingly contested local control (sometimes violently) and national viability (through elections, mass demonstrations, infiltration of the state and military), these networks invested in youth groups to mobilize support as well establish or

defend local control. Where possible, counter-movements responded in kind. This created the context for the short-term competition which eventually yielded consolidative mass killing.


I. The Defining Features of Consolidative Mass Killing

Consolidative mass killings involve specific patterns of escalation and eventual violence. Specifically, they feature

- a particular pattern of escalation featuring:
 - increasing local contests for territorial control and assassinations or arrests of political leadership
 - followed by coup attempts against insular politico-military-economic networks.
- three types of targets and corresponding, sequential ‘waves’ of violence.
 - first, military-led assassinations of leadership of counter political organizations. these do not necessarily ‘match’ with the mass targets. for example, targeting moderates or unaffiliated leaders of other organizations.
 - second, military and local militia maneuvers to secure control over the capital city. this includes assassination, but also street-level raids and mass killings.
 - third, ‘hunting’ of anyone designated as belonging to the opposition wherever possible. this involves military, militia, and civilian organizations which indiscriminately kill men, women, and even children.

This, as reviewed, departs from other kinds of mass killing in many ways – the escalation of conflict, the aim of violence, the totality of violence, the conduct of violence. For the reader, however, I think conceptualizing these along two dimensions – the participation and totality of violence – provides a useful way of thinking about their variation. The totality of violence refers to the selectivity of violence – was violence focused on certain areas or networks or did it extend to entire ‘groups’ of people. The conduct of violence refers to whether violence was specialized (conducted by militaries or paramilitaries) or popular (involving civilians). Table 6 presents this below.

Figure 3.1: Mass Killings and Patterns of Violence



II. What is a ‘Theory of Consolidative Mass Killing’ Anyways? Or, A Brief Perspective on Theories of Conflict and Violence.

Before discussing the theory's mechanics thoroughly, I want to discuss the literature's approach to theories of conflict and theories of violence. If this does not interest you, feel free to skip ahead. I have three hesitations with how we have approached conflict.

1. *Some in the intrastate war literature have recommended separating our explanations from conflict from those of violence.* In this view, conflicts do not always create violence, military dynamics are separable from conflict dynamics, and fighting often involves quasi-independent local dynamics. *I see this is a mistake.* *While we might agree what actors are competing over does not strictly determine if or how they fight, I do not see how what actors compete over does not influence if or they fight.* This applies to war aims which guide deployments as well macro-level actors interactions with different meso- or even micro-level actions. Kalyvas's defection dynamics, for example, do not work as well in these consolidative mass killings.
2. *We do not really have theories about the nature of conflicts, where they come from, or how they might vary.* In formal theory, we see different potential games – zero-sum games, Prisoner's Dilemmas, Stag Hunts, Battle of the Sexes, 'Go' games, etc. In the civil war literature, we read of 'indivisible versus divisible' issues, different kinds of wars (separatist versus center-seeking, urban versus rural), resource wars, and even the 'nationalization' or 'localization' of land conflicts. Likely, there does

not exist 'one game to rule them all' but rather different 'games' for different contexts. Fearon's popular bargaining theory, for example, represents as a specific game with a specific set of actors competing over specific kinds of issues within a specific set of parameters. But, again, we have little theory about why we see particular 'games', what the important differences between games are, and how they might create different conflict dynamics.

3. Related to the above, *we also do not have a clear concept about what theories of conflict should look like*. Should it explain why actors compete rather than cooperate? What the particular stakes are? How this relates to if and why we might see some particular mode of violence? All of the above? When we do see this kind of theorizing, *we tend to have short-term rather than longer-term theories of political violence. And, when we see longer-term theories, they rarely connect directly to short-term dynamics*. Instead, we read of culminations of pre-existing trends, progressively deteriorating circumstances, or some series of unfortunate events. In some sense, this understandable because you have to know what matters in the short-term to know what requires explaining across the longer-term. Nevertheless, I see potential for thinking first about what causes consolidative violence in the short-term and then reflecting on what created this situation in the first place to develop a more holistic understanding of these events.

How is this relevant? Why does this matter? Because we do not have a clear idea about what ‘explaining consolidative mass killing’ implies and, consequently, do not have clear visions about what a ‘theory of consolidative mass killing’ should involve. This, as Chapter I demonstrated, is not an idle observation – the questions we ask influence the theories we develop, the conversations we have, and the knowledge we accumulate. So, what do I mean by ‘a theory of consolidative mass killing?’

On the empirical side, to my mind, this implies explaining two ‘sets’ of questions. In the short-term,

- *Why were actors competing so intensely? Why were they not cooperating, bargaining, ‘opting out’ of conflict, or otherwise deescalating conflict?*
- *Why did eventual attackers choose consolidative mass killing? Why not bargaining, coercion, or any other means? How were they capable of executing this?*
- *What explains eventual victims’ behavior prior to violence? Why did they resist bargains and attack their eventual attackers?*

On the theoretical side, then, we must meet several demands. In the short-term, we must develop frameworks which can explain (or at least illuminate):

- the stakes of conflict: the issues involved, the plausible bargaining ranges of actors.
- the behavior of targets: why did they challenge their eventual attackers? why did they challenge them in the particular ways they did?

- the behavior of attackers: why could they orchestrate violence? why did they choose consolidative mass killings rather than any other means?

Note, while these questions do necessarily require separate answers. In other words, we are not necessarily looking for a ‘theory of stakes’, ‘theory of attackers’, and a ‘theory of targets.’ The stakes of conflict, for example, might derive from material factors – resources, kinds of economic activity, etc. At the same time, they might also owe to how actors’ mobilize themselves, their ability to influence one another, and the kinds of agreements they can survive and thrive within. Meanwhile, actors themselves may derive, indirectly or directly, from the stakes of conflict (control of the state, certain kinds of resource flows, etc.) All the while, how conflicts could be fought might influence the risks actors preemptively take or do not take. Instead, we are searching for a theory which can explain the interplay of these dynamics.

In the longer-term, I submit a theory of consolidative mass killing should explain:

- *Where did the actors come from? Why did we not witness alternative actors? How did this insular network of politico-economic-military elites (with the eventual capacity to organize a consolidative mass killing) form and acquire power. Few contexts feature this level of concentration. Military, political, economic, and social ‘elites’ rarely all interact with each other, possess kinship ties, and possess dual roles in the economy and military.*

- *Why did conflict possess the form it did? Why was conflict nationalized and so intense? Why not a more contained conflict or a less emotional, violent one? Why was competition so intense? Many other regimes do not encounter such crises. How and why were power structures so vulnerable to disruptions?*

Theoretically, then, we need some framework which can explain the origins (or at least evolution) of actors and their resulting, evolving conflicts across time. Note this framework need not converge or diverge from any short-term theory, but it should connect to whatever short-term dynamics found important.

III. Consolidative Mass Killing in the Short-Term (~ two years leading to violence)

Again, I submit understanding consolidative mass killings in the short-term requires answering the following questions:

- *Why were actors competing so intensely? Why were they not cooperating, bargaining, 'opting out' of conflict, or otherwise deescalating conflict?*
- *Why did eventual attackers choose consolidative mass killing? Why not bargaining, coercion, or any other means? How were they capable of executing this?*
- *What explains eventual victims' behavior prior to violence? Why did they resist bargains and attack their eventual attackers?*


These may seem like separate questions with distinct answers, but I argue they owe to a particular set of factors and dynamics. Specifically, I argue particular organizational forms competing within a particular economic ecology drove these conflicts toward

consolidative mass killings. *Specifically, insular politico-economic networks competed with mass-based political organizations for control of a highly agricultural, nationalized economy with a few profitable exports.* This context created a situation where:

- *the benefits of winning were high, the costs of losing were high, and 'exit options' did not pay much.* stakes were extremely high for almost anyone working in any sector. controlling the state implied both economic power and freedom from another's rule.
- *neither side could change the others' behavior.* they did not have much to offer or withhold from each other.
- *insular networks could be potentially eliminated and orchestrate consolidative mass killings.*

When mass-based political organizations attempted to overthrow these insular networks and failed, these networks mobilized their military and militia ties to conduct extensive violence. This violence first targeted the elites of counter-political organizations, then aimed to claim or recapture control of the capital city. Then, to consolidate their rule and protect themselves against any reprisals, they targeted likely opposition supporters indiscriminately throughout the territory. Subnational variation in the timing, extent, and conduct of violence resulted from intersections of force deployments and local politics.

Figure 3.2: General Schematic of Theoretical Interactions



- **Economic Ecology** → High Benefits of Capturing Power, High Costs of Losing for Power for All Actors
- **Elite Network Structure** → Added Costs/Benefits of Losing/Possessing Power
- **Counter-organizations** → Added Potential Costs of Losing Power (through political program)
- **Elite Network Structure** → Potential Low Cost Coup + Potential Massive Repression Given Inaction
- **Counter-organizations** → Difficulties of Cooptation, Reassertion of Territorial Control, or Competing Electorally for Insular Networks

Again, these factors interacted and reinforced one another to create a particular kind of conflict with a particular pattern of escalation and eventual violence. Across the long-

term, they cannot be understood separately from one another. Nevertheless, for clarity, I discuss their quasi-independent dynamics separately.

Setting the Stage: The Background of Conflict

These organized actors competed over highly agricultural, nationalized economies with a few lucrative exports and some foreign investment. In this system, the state was essentially the 'only game in town.' Few means of acquiring and securing land, jobs, education, or security existed beyond controlling the state or acquiring its favor. Further, if one lacked access to the state, one likely worked extremely hard to remain poor and insecure. Consequently, nearly everyone had incentives to attempt to control the state and possessed few options beyond political competition to do so.

As the longer-term theory will demonstrate, by the time of consolidative mass killings, these conflicts had escalated into high mobilization and spirals of violence. At the elite level, from presidents to military elites to party leaders, could be – and in many cases were – targets of violence. At the local level, flares of indiscriminate violence or intimidation increased, but mobilization by competing organizations often had transformed local economies and administrations into new arenas of conflict. Consequently, these conflicts had acquired a security dimension and nation-wide reach when consolidative mass killings occurred.

Note, *these stakes did not 'fall from sky.'* They were, to some extent, influenced by economic programs, political conflicts, and informal elite politics and choices. How

this particular structure developed is explained by the longer-term theory, but why actors could not change it requires some further thinking. Even in the short-term, actors arguably could have moderated their bargaining positions, their offensive capabilities, and their tactics. Together, they could have sought and discovered new kinds of authority structures, economic relations, social preferences, or 'common grounds' to change the stakes of conflict. They could have, hypothetically, created a less interventionist state, a more meritocratic state, or a more equal wealth distribution which would have relaxed pressures to control the state by all sides.

I will return to why this did not occur when discussing the actors involved, but for now, note *these conflicts also did not occur in a vacuum. Actors occupy certain environments with specific kinds of limits and opportunities.* Two factors, I argue, structured these conflicts. *First, they occurred in anarchy*⁵⁸, meaning there was no reliable third-party guarantor of basic rights or any agreements. Consequently, there were no limits to potential conflicts nor any guarantees to potential solutions. Whether this is framed as a commitment problem or 'Knightian' risk one, this alone does not explain the conflict. My father and I, for example, cannot guarantee we will not harm

⁵⁸ In contrast to neorealist theories of 'great power politics', these actors operated under the shadow of more powerful actors who could overpower any resistance (although, arguably, the European fights in the World Wars also do not meet this conception). However, anarchy persisted for two reasons. First, these more powerful actors were not heavily invested or deployed in these areas. Second, and more importantly, there were multiple powerful actors with competing agendas which limited any actors' dominance.

each other but this does not prevent our mutual cooperation or exposure. Nevertheless, it remained an important barrier to certain forms of cooperation.

Second, they occurred within a particular economic ecology. Economic activity, of course, involves both material realities and social dynamics. For instance, agriculture requires certain kinds of work but can possess several kinds of social organization (cooperatives, patron-client relations, slavery, etc.). In this sense, then, the economic ecology is not strictly 'given.' However, different kinds of economic activity introduce different limits and incentives for economic organization. It is not an accident Habyarimana and his adversary and eventual successor Kagame both emphasized communal activities, controlling the coffee trade, and glorifying the hard work of the peasant farmer. And, it is worth noting, Verwimp does not find Habyarimana's regime particularly exploitative of peasants, but rather occupying a particularly challenging economic situation.

So, what specifically about this ecology limited actors' ability to change the stakes of conflict? In short, this context

- Relatively poor and internationally dependent economic situations. Difficulties in competing with industrialized powers, using military or economic leverage for advancement, and reliant on international raw materials and markets.


- Few 'roles' to acquire wealth within. You essentially either held significant amounts of land, controlled some aspect of coffee exports, or occupied some position with the state. Professional classes – ranging from lawyers, doctors, merchants, etc. – were present but limited. Further, education opportunities were limited and often required access to international schools.
- At the macro-level, this relatively poor, highly agricultural economy required a certain kind of workforce. Specifically, lots of labor working consistently for long time periods within the same location. Further, it implies limits to tax collection – which often have to rely on collective labor rather than cash collections
- And, especially in the short-term, high costs of adjustments. Disruptions to production, underlying distributions of skills, and all the transactions costs required which would correspond with economic changes raises the costs of any transition to all parties.

The Organization of Attackers and Its Consequences

Consolidative mass killings are conducted by insular elite politico-military-economic networks possessing wide-ranging ties but shallow ties. What does this mean? Insularity refers to many ties with another with fewer and less dense ties to other networks. The network on the left, for example is highly insular. Note insular networks can live in many network settings—they might represent a spoke in a 'hub and spoke'

system, live amongst scattered, diffuse networks, simply be one of many other insular networks, etc.

Figure 3.3: Illustration of Network Insularity



But, what does politico-military-economic imply? At the elite-level, imagine three 'domains' of activity – economic, political, and social. These domains possess different content across contexts. Generally, however,

- economic roles refer to positions within an economy – typically firms, finance, estates, tax collection and spending, etc. – while ties refer to flows of resources between people.
- political roles refer to positions within the state, a political organization, or the military. ties, in this domain, refer to membership and relations within these organizations ('chains of command', separations of powers, etc.)

- social roles refer to positions within social networks. this might involve a clan, a neighborhood, a university, etc. in this domain, ties refer to friendship, kinship, marriage, etc.

In many cases, these roles and ties across or even within these domains remain relatively separate. In the United States, for example, our business leaders (Jeff Bezos, the Walton family, etc.), political elites (Supreme Court justices, Donald Trump, Barack Obama), military generals, and social leaders (activists, church leaders, celebrities of various kinds, etc.) lack economic, kinship, biographical, or organizational ties. In many cases, they do not even know each other. Even within domains, elite members of the military and Congress do not possess strong social or even political ties. And, with some exceptions, our economic industries and their regulators do not possess strong organizational, economic, or social ties.

In these cases, however, we see elite networks of neighborhood, biographical, and kinship ties occupying major positions within the state, economy, and military (sometimes with multiple roles in several domains simultaneously). These networks are, of course, influential. They possess independent wealth, high cohesion, dominance of the state, and dominance of the military. *At the same time, these networks remained highly insular – meaning they possess dense ties with another but fewer, weaker ties to other networks.* They lacked economic, political, or kinship ties with other regional elite networks, local institutions, or any mass organizations. These shallow ties persisted

despite relatively major and successful land reforms, significant outreach and mobilization campaigns, relatively strong state presence throughout the territory, and, in some cases, cooptation of social institutions such as churches. Nevertheless, precisely because of these state-building endeavors, *these insular elites possessed many ties to many local leaders they had either appointed or coopted. But these 'made-men' themselves were not well-integrated within regional or local networks.* Sometimes, these networks work closely with local elites who themselves encountering popular resistance or strong political opposition. In many other cases, local surrogates encountered resistance ranged from 'weapons of the weak' tactics to overthrow through non-violent or sometimes violent means.

How does this particular network structure relate to mass killings? *These networks have strong incentives to retain power, serious risks of losing power, the capacity for mass killing, and few means other than mass killing for dealing with threats.* To elaborate:

- 1. These networks have strong interests for maintaining their positions and few opportunities to protect these interests without retaining control of the state.**

Economically, there's little space for these actors to enrich themselves outside of their current positions. There is little private enterprise, small domestic markets, and little investment opportunities. They also face risks of dispossession or execution by

potential successors. Politically, the costs of losing power are high and likely irreversible for this network. Most basically, groups would prefer to have power rather than not, and it is easier to maintain power than regain it. Relatedly, the scenarios in which a small group were to lose power are virtually all prohibitive of that group regaining power at a later date, as the two basic options are losing power through violent overthrow or to a more popular group. Also, almost by definition, any other group that were to gain power would be dissimilar in its character and composition from the reigning regime.

2. These networks are vulnerable.

Simply, their organizational qualities – relatively small numbers, ‘top-heavy’ leadership structure, and insularity – makes decapitation plausible and effective. Dismantling this network – although still difficult – does not require conventional wars or the repression of thousands. Instead, it requires ‘knocking out’ as many key figures within this network as possible. Further, once the network is decapitated, the victor is unlikely to encounter ‘mass resistance’ without this leadership. In practice, these attempts have failed – but note these attempts targeted anywhere from a few to a couple dozen individuals.

3. These networks struggle to coopt.

Cooptation is always a relational concept. For example, Group A may easily coopt Group B but not Group C. Nevertheless, these insular networks generally struggle to coopt more than others. First, cooptation would hurt their strength. These are dense, tight-knit networks occupying high-level roles in multiple domains. Cooptation would necessarily involve sacrificing some of these positions as well as diluting their ranks and likely network density. Further, their members' strengths owe to their positions within the state rather than their independent resources or connections. Second and relatedly, they cannot guarantee cooperation following cooptation. As discussed, they are relatively small in numbers relying on their tight coordination and sprawling ties to act effectively. Once others acquire positions and similar ties, they could be deposed or sidelined without effective recourse. Third, and again relatedly, they do not have much offer. They do not have independent resources or plenty of profitable opportunities within their organizations.

4. They have the capacity for violence.

Through their ties within the military, their later attempts at militia-formation, their economic resources, and their ties throughout the territory they can, if necessary, mobilize consolidative mass killings. This capacity is not absolute – in some cases these networks struggle to mobilize forces or effectively locate targets – but nevertheless remains substantial and accumulative. As certain territories are 'consolidated', they can redeploy forces to 'resisting' areas. Further, their relative lack of ties outside their

network weakens potential constraints on the use of violence. Harming people outside their network, for example, poses little risk of defection or disruption of their power.

The Organization and Incentives of Opposition Movements

Strategic explanations often focus on how mass killing ‘works’ for attackers.

They rarely ask about or explain how eventual targets’ alternatives and choices relate to mass killings. However, in many cases, targets continuously mobilize, refuse bargains, and even attack their eventual attackers. In the context of consolidative mass killings, then, what do we need to understand about these opposition movements? I argue two factors matter: their organizational structure and the calculus of their available options.

1. The Organization of the Opposition

The targets of consolidative mass killing include elites tied to political opposition, civilians expected to support the opposition, and moderates at all levels who might thwart these consolidative movements. The political opposition preceded consolidative mass killings, however, are mass-based political organizations. They often represent themselves as political parties, but in contrast to say the Republican Party, they possess strong grassroots and elite organization coupled with local territorial control as well as youth wings and even paramilitary forces. They are also well-embedded across a variety of spaces and institutions. They often possess direct ties or the sympathies of many people in many positions within the state or economy. In many

cases, they are popular amongst universities and trade unions. They also actively seek ties and membership within the military and the state apparatus.

So, how does the nature of these opposition movements relate to consolidative mass killings? These organizations were widely embedded and generally popular. This meant elections, free assembly, and inclusion dangerous for their opposition. It also made cooptation – which would presumably involve many organizations in many domains – difficult.⁵⁹ Further, it made repression difficult. Targeting leaders, for example, might only invite new leadership or backlash rather than disable these organizations. This matters especially when we consider how coup threats might persist through other forms of repression.

2. The Political Calculus

Some of this calculus has already been discussed by the nature of conflict. But, essentially, these organizations lacked good options in a high-stakes situation. Opting-out, or adopting conciliatory positions, could not guarantee good living or even security. In other cases, such as Iraq, the communist counter-organization split over the issue of confronting existing regimes with violence and adopt relatively softer positions. They faced extensive violent repression, nonetheless. Beyond this, coup attempts

⁵⁹ Note, these opposition movements (for whatever reason – mobilization dynamics, economic context, ideological belief) tended toward ‘radical’ (used non-pejoratively) platforms which would require large shifts in the economy, society, and political institutions. This was not always the case, but tended to exacerbate problems of cooptation.

represented an uncertain but potentially costless option. If successful, these organizations would inherit the state with little to no cost to themselves. Coups, in general, remain highly contingent affairs. This uncertainty was sometimes exacerbated by potential external support.

IV. Consolidative Mass Killing across the Long-Term (~two years prior to independence to two years prior to consolidative mass killings)

The short-term story focused on why actors' had particular conflicts, why these conflicts escalated rather than moderated, and why they possessed a particular coup-counter coup violent dynamic. This required focusing on attackers' organizations and, to a lesser extent, the economic situation. Again, accordingly, the longer-term story asks:

- *Where did the actors come from? Why did we not witness alternative actors? How did this insular network of politico-economic-military elites (with the eventual capacity to organize a consolidative mass killing) form and acquire power. Few contexts feature this level of concentration. Military, political, economic, and social 'elites' rarely all interact with each other, possess kinship ties, and possess dual roles in the economy and military.*
- *Why was conflict nationalized and so intense? Why not a more contained conflict or a less emotional, violent one? How and why were power structures so vulnerable to disruptions? Why were elites unable to avoid increasingly dire situations?*

Answering these questions, I argue, requires a slightly different framework with different theoretical emphases. I submit it requires understanding the co-evolution of economics, political problems, and network structures. I will review how this works in more detail, but the 'flow chart' below tracks temporally the changes in economics on the left, organizations in the middle, and political conflicts on the right.

Figure 3.4: Flow Chart of Long-Term Co-Evolution of Economics, Political Conflicts, and Organizations

Indirect colonial or colonially sponsored rule centered around few profitable export industries. This owing, somewhat, to region's economic ecology and precolonial economic history.

Figure 3.4 Continued




Figure 3.4 Continued




Figure 3.4 Continued





Figure 3.4 Continued



Before independence, these contexts represented indirectly ruled territories largely geared toward a few profitable export sectors. What does this mean? It means these contexts possessed systems of local rule selected and sponsored by colonial powers. These systems were designed to facilitate production and acquisition of

whatever profitable exports existed. Organizationally, these systems are sometimes described as 'empire-kingdoms', with strong centers stretching outward to control semi-autonomous regions. Historically, different regions within the territory were ruled for longer periods or more directly than others.

Eventually, for a variety of international and domestic reasons beyond present concerns, independence movements gained momentum. Often, these movements possessed widespread or 'popular' characters – large-scale strikes, mass demonstrations, the formation of political identities and organizations. In these cases, however, the eventual deponents of the existing regime were military networks who possessed the means and access to do so. While initially quite popular, these networks inherited relatively poor, highly agricultural economies with a few profitable exports as well as regionalized social, economic, and political network structures.

To survive domestically and internationally, the new leadership had to expedite economic development and limit military challenges to their rule. To accomplish this, leaders chose to nationalize their economies. This was not driven solely by economics. Politically, it dispossessed their leading political rivals from the previous regime, provided themselves with control of valuable exports and foreign investment, and created opportunities for mobilizing loyalists. At the same time, these networks attempted to 'nation-build', crafting national identities and stories as well as some communal rituals and practices which were not particularly salient (if they existed at

all) at the time. These policies, to their credit, generated moderate economic growth and some enthusiasm from below.

But nationalizing failed to resolve many other problems and created some new ones. Socially, flows of people and resources remained highly regional and nearly all forms of mobility – economically, politically, educationally, and geographically – went through the state. Both elites and non-elites remained ‘tied to the land.’ Across time, then, kinship networks tended to branch locally rather than disperse. At the same time, urbanization remained comparatively limited. These countries did not experience internal migration either to cities or other areas because they lacked much economic reason to do so. Indonesia, for example, would attempt to build lower-income housing projects but these remained relatively vacant by 1965. And while Rwanda’s urban center Kigali attracted some flows of people, capital, and business these workings seemed distant to much of the country and would acquire an ethnic disdain (Radio Rwanda speaking of ‘loose Tutsi women’ and their exploits with traitorous politicians). Further, the primarily agricultural economy did not require functional differentiation or strong ‘cross-sectional’ ties. For this reason, ‘old’ more regional and ethnic identities remained stronger than the national ones.

Economically, despite progress, these countries did not change their essential situation – they remained highly agricultural, highly dependent on a select few profitable exports and foreign investment, and relatively poor. Politically, this

increasing centralization generated some pushback. State-builders faced autonomous movements from the periphery and/or coup threats from counter-elites. To suppress these threats, existing rulers successfully purged their ranks, deployed military forces to the periphery, or empowered political organizations which opposed these movements.

Consequently, directly and indirectly, nationalization had created and eliminated some organizations. Most prominently, it embedded these military networks within the economy. Many military leaders owned stakes within major businesses, developed ties with business leaders, or simply possessed social ties with those appointed to lead positions. They also developed organizational ties with individuals within the state apparatus, either by appointing them or simply working with them. This was perhaps intended. However, political counter-movements forced purges within existing ranks as well as deployments and involvement in local economics and politics by military forces and networks (including smuggling and countering local resistance movements). Consequently, these military networks became embedded within the national state-economy as well as local politics.

Together, these political and economic developments indirectly 'nationalized' the political scene. Economically, everything was 'tied together.' Trade policy, which sometimes influenced regions differently, ran through the state. Prices of exports, for example, now dictated salaries, local farming directives, and development packages. Flows of these profits back into territories and any international investment ran through

the state. Because of this, as well as this networks' organization increasing presence in local politics, also created a recognizable and tactile target for protest.

Consequently, when economic crises hit, it rippled throughout the system. Simultaneously, it decreased the regimes' popularity, limited their resource flows, encouraged disobedience of economic directives (toward more subsistence activities), and in some cases forced the 'political opening' of multi-party parties. In this context, these counter-organizations thrived. They possessed a clear target, a population with few 'thick' ties to the state, and plenty of desperation and discontent. These organizations embedded themselves across many institutions in many areas – often, labor unions, peasant associations, universities, and parts of the military. At the same time, while still powerful, existing elites' suffered declines in resources and positions available for patronage and cooptation.

This heralded a new era of political competition. For their part, the insular elite network did whatever it could to stall their opposition. This included attempts to split parties, prop-up rival parties to divide their bases, and increase their political messaging (in many cases, this descended into propaganda, slander, and sometimes hate speech). At the same time, organizationally, these networks formed 'youth wing' to their parties. These individuals – often poor though not always so – acquired uniforms, meals, special treatment by local officials, access to funded social events, etc. The

opposition reciprocated with their own demonstrations, labor strikes, and 'youth wing' formation.

This escalated into small-scale forms of political violence. This included intimidation of officials, seizures of land or local businesses, some 'pogroms' against opposition populations, and eventually, cycles of assassination and revenge amongst members of different political organizations. Throughout this time, these youth wings – particularly but not exclusively those affiliated with the army – became increasingly armed and often radicalized. All the while, the economy, along with anyone's capacity to enact any economic reform, continued to decline. All together, this set the stage for the short-term dynamics which resulted in consolidative mass killing.

V. A Note on International Environment. Or, Some Scope Conditions.

International relations thinkers, scholars of these cases, and even I bristle somewhat at this exclusively domestic story. Where is the international politics? Where is the RPF, the Malaysia confrontation, the United States, the Eritrea-Tigray autonomous movements, or even the United States? I submit two justifications for this exclusion.

First, while no domestic politics occur in a vacuum. no international politics 'erase' domestic politics completely. If and when international politics did influence these cases, they had to work within the constraints and opportunities generated by these particular domestic systems. Even if one sees a more active role for international politics than I

present below, I doubt we could understand how they worked without first understanding the dynamics I described above.

Second, these consolidative mass killings did occur in roughly similar international contexts. However, I argue these contexts worked more as permissive and exacerbating rather than transformative forces. Specifically, consolidative mass killings occurred on the periphery of great power politics, with regional contests of power, and featured roughly equal international support for all sides in the conflict. Why does this matter?

1. Being on the periphery of great power politics prevented any power which could overwhelm the situation from intervening as conflicts escalated or turned violent. Simply, those with the power to transform these contexts did not care enough to do so.
2. Regional contests of power implied uncertainty about near-term conflicts for both existing regimes and potential adversaries. This heightened both fears and hopes (depending on particular regions) of international threats and their potential combination with domestic forces.
3. Roughly equal international support prevented any side from dominating the other. It also created plausible international recognition and post-war survival for multiple parties. In other words, it created a permissive environment for these conflicts.

Beyond this, support – either by arms or intelligence – tended to heighten conflicts as well.

VI. Comparative Implications. Or, Returning to the Classification Scheme.

How does this theoretical framework relate to the other mass killings and coup-counter coup dynamics we discuss? To be clear, I argue this theory can explain consolidative mass killings rather than all these kinds of political violence. Or, state more formally, the dependent variable is an object – meaning the constitutive processes which created these events. Understanding the theory's mechanics, we can 'add' some 'counterfactual spaces' to the dependent variation – for examples, why do we see coup attempts rather than insurgencies, why do we see bargaining failures, why do we see nationalized rather than localized conflicts, etc. At this moment, however, I do not find we can 'add' these other forms of political violence to these 'counterfactual spaces.' In other words, changing the 'values' of the different variables will not predict or explain all these forms of political violence. These other forms can involve different variables – different international environments, numbers and kinds of actors, novel economic dynamics, etc.

Nevertheless, I want to note two things about the comparative implications of the theoretical framework. First, some absent competing risks or confounding intervention, we should not see these identical co-evolutionary dynamics in other contexts which produced different outcomes. And we do not. None of the other cases feature an identical


economic or elite structure. Second, as discussed in Chapter 2, we see some themes across some types of mass killing and coup-counter coup dynamics. Consequently, the theory might extend in some ways beyond consolidative mass killings.

Imagine a 3-D box as our conceptual space (or look at the figure below). Now, the theory's variables do not lend themselves perfectly to linear dimensions (economic ecology, for example, does not fit a neat 'more or less' continuum). But, for the sake of thinking, let us consider three 'more or less' dimension.

- On the x-axis, consider 'economic concentration' which would involve combinations of state involvement in the economy and distribution of economic activities. High concentration would signify high state involvement and control of the few profitable economic avenues.
- On the y axis, consider 'elite insularity' which would involve how dense, domain-spanning, and insulated elite networks are. High insularity would signify regionalized networks with ties across domains with few ties beyond themselves.
- On the z axis, consider 'depth of opposition' which would involve combinations of how vertically integrated and horizontally spread opposition movements are.

As you can see, consolidative mass killings represent an extremity on all these axes which corresponds to the thoroughness of its eventual violence.

Figure 3.5: Another Conceptual Space for Thinking About Mass Killing Types



Chapter IV: The Evolution of Conflict in Indonesia

I. Preface to the Empirical Chapters. Or, Research Design(s) and Presentation.

We rarely *prove* things in social science. This is neither a Popperian ‘theories are never proven they only survive falsification’ nor a ‘social science is particularly flimsy’ statement. Rather, creating foolproof research designs is difficult. Selecting cases, forming concepts, measuring variables, manipulating variables, observing mechanisms, exploring counterfactuals, locating and eliminating alternative explanations, and everything else required for causal understanding and inference all obstruct proof. Accordingly, I am not arguing I have *proved* my theory. Instead, *I argue my theory has more supporting evidence and less counterevidence than any other theory I know of. More importantly, I submit this theory testifies to something true and non-trivial about these contexts future theorists must consider.*

Why do I believe this? I submit two kinds of evidence: logical and observational. I supported my argument through a variety of logical and observational means. These logical means work by reducing the likelihood of spurious correlations. Some of this I already, discussed in the first two chapters. To review, I argued:

1. *There were many opportunities for this argument to be falsified as I examined other mass killings and coup-counter coup dynamics. We did not see consolidative mass killings in contexts without these variables, including contexts which produced*

other kinds of mass killings or countercoups. Yet, we observed a reliable correspondence between organizational forms and patterns of violent competition across mass killings and coup-countercoup dynamics. Further, we saw some correspondence between more insular, top-heavy organizational forms and mass killings generally. Further still, outcomes which most resembled consolidative mass killing dynamics tended to resemble their organizational and economic dynamics.

Further work, of course, could search across all cases for instances where the theory's stated dynamics exist and consolidative mass killing does not. To my knowledge, none exist. Directly, I looked for cases which resembled my causal story – ranging from works from Afro-Marxist one-party regimes to other postcolonial contexts, to nationalized economies (such as Cuba). In all cases, I failed to locate similar patterns of organization and/or economic structures. Indirectly, I have been exposed to many cases across many times and places throughout my education. Nevertheless, this search process remains imperfect. There was no comprehensive data set of all potentially relevant contexts and I did not endeavor to create one. But, even if we do find similar dynamics but different outcomes elsewhere, we might still consider whether this owes to 'competing risks' or some confounding variable (revealing an unknown 'scope condition) rather than any fundamental violation of the theory.

The following chapters, however, pursue a different strategy. *Inferentially, I submit the parallels observed four separate times in different places at different times*

provide considerable support for my argument. In other words, what are the odds these four contexts, occurring in time periods in different places with different individuals with different cultural, demographic, and international circumstances yielded such similar, multi-faceted outcomes without some shared underlying causal dynamics? *Further, these are not 'coarse-grained' causal stories or outcomes likely possessing different causal pathways.* Instead, on the causal side, we see a highly specific and complex interaction. On the effect side, we see an extended progression of specific kinds of events leading to specific kind of outcome. Padgett (2011) expanded on this thinking, writing

“Stinchcombe’s (1968, pp. 18-22) [argument is] the main reason that verified predictions of a single mechanism across a variety of diverse phenomena are so impressive (besides just elegance) is that implicitly one has greatly reduced the likelihood that any alternative candidate mechanism can do better, through the very diversity of the predictions. This is different from mere replication of the same finding across similar designs. The volume of replications builds confidence in the correlation A – B, but it is the diversity of predictions that builds confidence in M.”

Observational evidence, by contrast, works more directly by providing resolution on causal processes. Because processes in social science are often nearly invisible, complex, and act ‘at distances’, reliable observations are often elusive.

Contributions often involve novel data collection or organization, new tools of observation or measurement, perhaps inventive ‘proxies’, varieties of ‘process tracing’, or some systematic sorting, triangulation, or interpretation of events. *This dissertation does not provide independent contributions on this front.* I did not observe these events directly, collect or discover new data, or develop any new method of observation. And, I confess, I wish it could have done more.

Nevertheless, I have three defenses of this shortcoming. First, while many (including myself) prioritize observing and understanding mechanisms as best as possible, we can still learn without it. The above inferential strategies, while imperfect, do provide some confidence. Second, many of these mass killings are well-studied already. Evidence has accumulated from many sources on many dimensions of phenomena. This includes, but is not limited to,

- I. demographic statistics regarding age, population density, intermarriage, migration.
- II. macro-economic indicators as well as records of business ownership, high ranking officials, luxury property ownership.
- III. local reports, by both the state and observers, of local crime rates and political violence.
- IV. sustained efforts at counting death tolls accurately.
- V. international efforts before, during, and after genocide to trace the behaviors of actors.

- VI. real-time assessments of these states' politics and economics by other states.
- VII. interviews with perpetrators and survivors. as well as testimony in international criminal tribunals.
- VIII. internal documents by perpetrating regimes.
- IX. records, albeit incomplete, of network connections (through marriage, kinship, biography, or schooling) of major players.
- X. meso-level election results or records of local organizations' membership and activities.
- XI. the political affiliation, and sometimes genocidal behavior, of local leaders.

Given this groundwork, I found detecting and tracing mechanisms possible given the existing data collection. For my part, the task was to cover and integrate diverse works on diverse topics at different levels of analysis. In particular, linking economic with political accounts as well as macro-politics with meso-level dynamics.

Third, I tried. On the one hand, I attempted to construct (as much as possible) the general structure of elite networks as well as their connections to meso-level actors. On the 'consolidator' side, I was able to demonstrate an insular nature to these networks, regional skews in economic ownership, and kinship/social ties between many relevant actors. However, I did not acquire enough 'missing data' to reveal anything systematic or profoundly novel about these networks. On the challenger side, I was able to

demonstrate regional and historical aspects of these organizations, but again, their complete network structure and ties beyond the organization eluded me.

On the other hand, I invested heavily in neuroscience. The goal was move us beyond assumptions, reified visions, and incomplete accounts of individuals (they were rational actors, they were racist, they were traumatized) into dynamic, mechanistic accounts of brain function. At present, I believe I can contribute to our mechanistic understanding of the political extremisms we see in and beyond these cases. Disciplinary boundaries and some fumbling on my part, however, have relegated this to the appendix. Nevertheless, these findings do not approach anything we might describe as a 'theory of political extremism' nor do they yet interact meaningfully with the politico-economic theory provided

The Purpose of the Case Studies

I present my findings through narrative case studies. During my graduate career, I began lamenting the kinds of case studies which often appear in journal articles. I recognized their function, but they often read as selective, hurried interpretations of cases. Understanding any case enough to evaluate any argument, I found, required investing in many authors with different sources and different theoretical perspectives. Given I am neither presenting new data nor writing an extended history of any of these

cases, what is the difference between what I have done and what I dislike about these kinds of cases?

Two things. First, these case studies attempt to draw parallels (and note divergences) across four cases rarely compared. To my knowledge, no one has compared Indonesia and Rwanda or Burundi, Ethiopia and Burundi, or all four of these cases simultaneously. The strength of these studies, then, does not rely exclusively on their depth and novelty but also their illumination of hidden parallel dynamics across these contexts. Second, these case studies synthesize various 'lines' of research. Specifically, they attempt to link the political, economic, and organizational approaches within a dynamic theory. Many studies stress networks, strategic logics, political economies, or organizational structures but few examine or report on their co-evolution across time.

A Disclaimer on 'Selecting on the Dependent Variable'

This research design is imperfect. Beyond problems of the thoroughness and resolution of the data collection, some I suspect would argue I have selected on the dependent variable. I will begin by reiterating further work should look for contexts (if they exist) where my causal mechanisms exist and my potential outcomes do not. But I proceed now more defensively. Specifically,

- I. Selecting correctly on a dependent variable is not easy.* If we selected on cases of 'mass killing', for example, we would encounter tremendous causal heterogeneity which would decrease rather than improve the odds of developing generalizable claims.
- II. I did not exactly select on the dependent variable.* When I began this research, I did not expect to locate a 'consolidative mass killing type.' Instead, I investigated and (incorrectly) theorized mass killings generally. Further, I developed the theory with knowledge of Rwanda and Ethiopia (neither of which I knew much about economically prior to research). I learned about Burundi generally and Indonesia economically afterwards. I also, as discussed, searched across other cases with similar outcomes as well as causal structures.
- III. The cases present variation on the dependent variable.* For example, Rwanda, before and after mass killings, does not witness consolidative mass killings despite many opportunities to. For examples, Anti-Tutsi violence at smaller scales occurred during the mid-60's through the early 70's and the RPF invaded several times (nearly reaching the capital) prior to consolidative violence.
- IV. Selecting on the dependent variable is not always fatal.* On the one hand, as discussed, if you have similar outcomes despite divergent conditions, you can have some confidence if you locate some shared mechanism. For example, if you saw three highly different people and an animal displaying slurred speech,

heavy sleep, and decreased inhibitions which they never display and then learned they all drank alcohol, you would have some confidence (though not proof) alcohol caused these symptoms. On the other, you can learn much mechanistically even by selecting on the dependent variable. Given the proper tools, for example, you can learn a tremendous amount about cells, cell division, or many other processes by looking at cells directly rather than relying exclusively on experiments or other inferential methods.

The Presentation of the Findings

I present the findings in two parts. In the subsequent two chapters I discuss the four cases. Chapter Four centers the Indonesia case, then discusses the Ethiopian case more concisely. Chapter Five centers the Rwandan case, then discusses the Burundian one more concisely. I centered the Indonesian and Rwandan cases because we have more information about them. Further, their paths to consolidative mass killing feature more complex dynamics across longer timescales. I discuss Rwanda and Burundi together because they share borders and some 'ethnic divisions', while Indonesia and Burundi possess more (though not exclusively) economic-centric ('communist') divisions.

As the case studies will show, these cases present some differences in time-scale, actor origins and evolution, the nationalization of the economy, meso-level patterns of

violence, and international involvement, Nevertheless, we should not neglect their striking similarities outlined in the table below. The point, again, is the range and depth of these parallels cannot be attributed to chance.

Table 4.1: Economic Ecology

Case	Economic Ecology	Development of Nationalization?	Economic Recession?
Indonesia	Oil, rubber, cotton and some industries.	Yes. Early land reform and control of internal trade. Nationalization of foreign companies occurs progressively and haphazardly in early 1960's.	Yes. Inflation, declining export prices, spiraling national debt. '60-65, if not earlier.
Burundi	Largely agricultural, exports of coffee and tea	Yes. Takeover and reform of kingdom's resource flows, with expansion into periphery.	Yes, albeit less drastic. Declines in coffee prices as well as disrupted production, combined with domestic turmoil.
Ethiopia	Largely agricultural, exports of coffee , tea, and cotton	Yes. Top-down land reform, nationalization of all economic activity rapidly.	Yes, albeit less drastic. Declines in export prices but disruptions to production as well.
Rwanda	Largely agricultural, exports of coffee and tea	Yes. Land 'reform' (mostly takeovers from Tutsis in First Republic), but complete nationalization of economy during early Second Republic.	Yes. Decline in international coffee prices, structural adjustment programs, steady decline.

Table 4.2: Prior Histories of Political Violence

Case	Prior Challenge(s)
Indonesia	Assassination attempt by extremists, and more importantly, separatist movements, particularly in Sumatra.
Burundi	Hutu members of the military, The Tutsi-Banyaruguru (Tutsi traditionally linked to the monarchy). Series of intrigues and purges.
Ethiopia	conflicts with Army Corp of Engineers, old landed classes and aristocracy which formed weak resistance movements, Eritrean and Tigrean separatist movements,
Rwanda	eventually invasion by the RPF, but Habyarimana had to expel elites from Ruhengeri following a coup attempt in 1980.

Table 4.3: Description of Organizations

Case	Elite Network	Origin of Elite Network	Opposition Organization(s)	Economic Structure and Crisis
Indonesia	Suharto, other military elites, and their ties to economic elites. Anchored in Java.	Military history during independence movement combined with takeover of previously owned Dutch industries.	PKI (communist party), Muhammadiyah	Largely agricultural economy with profitable rubber and oil prices. Declines in oil prices and Western removal of aid.
Burundi	Group de Bururi, politico-economic-military heralding from Bururi province.	Military history combined with control of nationalized economy.	King Ntare V and his loyalists + Hutu opposition parties	Largely agricultural economy with profitable coffee exports. Decline in coffee prices and famine.
Ethiopia	The Derg	Military history during independence movement, combined with nationalization of the economy.	EPRP, MEISON	Largely agricultural economy with profitable coffee and cotton exports. Decline in coffee prices but mainly disruption of activity through nationalization.
Rwanda	The 'Akuza', anchored in Northern Gisenyi	Long-standing regional economic control combined with military history of revolution. Amplified through control of state.	moderate factions of MDR, MRND, and the PL. external RPF.	Largely agricultural economy with profitable coffee exports. Decline in coffee prices.

Table 4.4: Organizational Structure of State

Case	Authority Structure?	Challenges?
Burundi	Military Elites Creating Hierarchically Structured Mass Organizations Implementing Support and Land Reform	Struggles to Expand South or Penetrate some areas of urban North.
Indonesia	Military, rather than state, with hierarchical regional commands and bureaucracies created during martial law	Confrontation with PKI all across the country.
Ethiopia	Derg creating National Peasants Association with Regional Branches and Local Outreach	EPRP infiltration and intimidation, particularly in urban areas.
Rwanda	Hierarchical One-Party State (MRND from national to prefecture to commune)	Multipartyism keeps structure intact, but the local and national representation changes with multipartyism.

II. The Evolution of Conflict in Indonesia in Comparative Perspective

This chapter traces the evolution of conflict in Indonesia. However, before doing so, I want to note some of the similarities and differences it possesses with the other ‘communist’ case, Ethiopia. I trace the evolution of conflict into consolidative mass killings in Indonesia and Ethiopia. These cases possess remarkable similarities I argue are not coincidences. Both cases feature:

- overthrow of colonial (or colonially sponsored) rule by military forces.
- resistance movements in the periphery as well as international confrontations within the region.

- domestically, a particular ecology involving highly agricultural, relatively poor economies with select profitable exports.
- internationally, weak dependency positions in world markets combined with need for foreign aid or investment.
- competition between insular politico-military-economic networks and mass-based political parties. involving local violence, mass demonstration, and eventually coup attempts.
- consolidative violence which featured both targets within other elite circles and counter-organizations, contests over controlling the capital, and 'hunts' for civilian opposition across the territory.
- violence against political organizations anchored in urban and peasant working classes, advocating some form of communism.

But, the cases also feature some differences.

- I. The Ethiopian economic nationalization was top-down and extremely rapid. Indonesia's economic nationalization involved bottom-up dynamics and proceeded in stages.
- II. Indonesia witnessed more evolution of its actors. The Derg evolved in-between independence and violence. We see purges, new ties to political parties, and new allegiances within the organization. However, the politico-economic-military

network which Suharto was embedded did not really exist during Indonesia's independence.

III. Ethiopia's urban violence was more intense and 'terror-like' than Indonesia's.

However, Indonesian violence was more diffuse and more popular locally than Ethiopia's.

IV. Both cases technically featured 'anti-communist' violence. However, all political parties in Ethiopia endorsed (at least on paper) some Marxist ideology and state scheme. Indonesia, however, possessed strong anti-Communist ideology and visions for the state from both 'below' and 'above.'

III. The Evolution of Conflict in Indonesia, 1949-67.

In 1965, a dense network of politico-economic-military elites led by Suharto would overthrow Sukarno and murder hundreds of thousands of suspected PKI members and supporters. Indonesians in 1949 would have had many questions about this situation. They would likely have no idea who Suharto was. Nor would they understand where this dense and collusive military-politico-economic network came from, how they managed to become so powerful, and how the PKI had swelled and outmaneuvered all the other political organizations of their day. Looking back, we might still wonder how this happened. Or, relatedly, why we did not see any number of alternative political outcomes – a more democratic regime, a more traditional civil war, a more externally oriented economy, etc. Understanding these developments, I argue,

requires understanding the co-evolutionary dynamics between economics and politics outlined by the theory.

Indonesia's Experiences with Colonialism and Independence Movements: Colonial Experience and Economic Ecology Drives Highly Agricultural, Export Dependent Economy With Regionalized Socio-Political Networks

Indonesia is an archipelago. Originally colonized by the Dutch, it was later occupied by Japan until its defeat in World War II, when the Dutch attempted to reassert their position with Indonesia. Indonesia would acquire a negotiated independence in 1949, with the Dutch retaining many economic interests and positions within Indonesia. Throughout both its colonial and revolutionary histories, different islands, and different areas of islands, had different and quasi-independent social, economic, and political histories prior to independence.

Socially, different islands practiced different religions or denominations of religions. For examples, Bali combined indigenous and Hindu beliefs while Java combined Islamic beliefs and Hindu practices. Sumatra and Sulawesi were more traditionally Islamic. With the exception of Aceh, much of Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Borneo also possessed significant Christian minorities. They also possessed different kinds of local conflicts which persisted beyond independence. For example, Dutch rule (like Belgian rule in Rwanda) reified 'Dayak' as an ethnicity on Borneo. Further, they

expelled ethnic Chinese which created lands (and some businesses) over which the Dayak and Madurese would later compete. The nuances of these politics extend beyond present concerns, but within Indonesia this particular ethnic struggle existed only in West Kalimantan.

Map 4.1: Indonesia [SOURCE: https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/indonesia_map2.htm]



Economically, upon independence Indonesia remained a ‘colonial economy.’ The more ‘modern’ sector, which included oil, rubber and palm oil, manufacturing, large-scale plantations, finance and banking, and international trade remained largely

foreign-dominated. The Dutch, along with the Americans, the British, and the Malaysians controlled nearly all profitable export industries. Chinese expatriates then dominated intermediary trade and rural finance. Meanwhile, most Indonesians remained involved in small-scale agriculture, fishing, or handicraft production. Within the country, economic integration amongst the islands remained weak. The more scarcely populated outer islands were less 'modern' (especially in manufacturing) and remained more export-oriented and commercial, trading directly to the international market often via Singapore. The more densely populated Java (which represented 60% of the total population), by contrast, was in one sense more 'modern' (especially in manufacturing) but also possessed a fairly hierarchical rice-based agricultural sector. Within trade between the islands and the international market, Java was a net importer while the outer islands were net exporters.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ For a review of the colonial economy and its transitions see Lindblad, J. Thomas. "The economic decolonisation of Indonesia: A bird's-eye view." *Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities* 4 (2012): 1-20. For review on some of the regional economic differences, see Robinson, Geoffrey. "The Economic Foundations of Political Conflict in Bali, 1950-1965." *Indonesia* 54 (1992): 59-93. The early chapters of Redfern, William A. *Sukarno's Guided Democracy and the Takeovers of Foreign Companies in Indonesia in the 1960s*. University of Michigan, 2010. discuss both these in tandem.

Politically, the struggle for independence was more protracted and involved more mass organization than the other three cases.⁶¹ This struggle yielded several organized, often armed forces which had fought amongst themselves even in their battle for independence. The Communist Party of Indonesia, for example, had revolted against and been subsequently repressed by the newly proclaimed Republic within the last year. West Irian, which was alleged as culturally distinct from the rest of Indonesia, temporally remained under Dutch supervision. But it also yielded some integration between the military and society at the local level. The military had fought and survived through local collaboration and relied significantly on decentralized funding, meaning local military leaders would 'fundraise' locally. The character of these operations varied, ranging from militaries to providing more 'public goods' to graft. Suharto, the eventual leader of the consolidative movement, was himself heavily involved in Java 'fundraising' and himself accused of corruption informally and formally during his military career.⁶²

⁶¹ See Kahin, Audrey. *STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE: WEST SUMATRA IN THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL REVOLUTION: 1945-1950*. Diss. Cornell University, 1979. and Amal, Ichlasul. *Regional and central government in Indonesian politics: West Sumatra and South Sulawesi, 1949-1979*. Gadjah Mada University Press, 1992.

⁶² See Lenkins, David. "One reasonably capable man: Soeharto's early fundraising." *Soeharto's New Order and its Legacy* (2010): 17.

Across Indonesia this involved military connections to local businesses, social leaders, and even criminals as well as investment in their local conflicts. But, at this time, we cannot speak clearly about the 'military' as a consolidated actor. Regional and even local leaders possessed considerable autonomy and perhaps more importantly, many note divisions within the military emerging from differences between Dutch educated KNIL officers (generally more 'Outer Island centric, led by Nasution) and Japanese educated PERA and Permuda officers (generally more Java-centric, led by Sudirman and later Yani). Others note differences between Sukarno's inner circle and the rest of the military establishment. And still others stress generational differences, with younger, technocratic classes essentially selected and sponsored by the early Indonesian state programs for Western education with older, more aristocratic Dutch-educated generations.⁶³

Consequently, upon independence, Indonesia possessed many cross-cutting regional, economic, military, and religious loyalties. Sukarno, the emergent leader of the revolution (Javanese and Balinese parentage, Japanese rather than Dutch military educated), neither belonged to nor controlled any mass political organization. Instead, over the next sixteen years, symbolically, Sukarno would attempt to inspire a national

⁶³ See especially Fakih, Farabi. *Authoritarian Modernization in Indonesia's Early Independence Period: The Foundation of the New Order State (1950-1965)*. Brill, 2020.

Indonesian identity and, whenever possible, a 'revolutionary' spirit. Practically, however, these cross-cutting and orthogonal divides prevented any consolidation of national identity and created ongoing localized political violence. At the same time, these conflicts provided Sukarno with power as both a third party to and agenda-setter for conflicts between these different organizations.

At the time of independence, the major political organizations included:

- The PNI was a relatively loose organization anchored in Java. These were largely government bureaucrats, fairly loyal to Sukarno.
- Masyumi was the more liberal Islamic party, which was trained and developed moreso under the Japanese.
- The NU was the more traditionalist Islamic party, anchored in the clerics with strong presence in Eastern and Central Java as well as some appeal in the outer islands.
- The PKI, which was the leading communist organization. They had effectively been wiped out twice (in 1926 and 1948), but despite and perhaps because of this, were highly organized and disciplined.⁶⁴

⁶⁴ Farram, Steven. "Revolution, religion and magic: The PKI in West Timor, 1924-1966." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde* 158, no. 1 (2002): 21-48.

- Then there were smaller parties, which mattered most because of their relations to Sukarno. The PSI, which was comprised of Javanese military, bureaucratic, and economic players who Sukarno maintained hostile but non-violent relations. And the Murba, a small non-PKI communist organization which Sukarno would provide outsized (though still small) representation in early governments.⁶⁵
- The military was the most powerful institution but was forged somewhat ad-hoc through the revolutionary struggle. It remained political divided along regional and political fault-lines, remained bloated, and relatively undisciplined.

From Independence to a Nationalized Economy Controlled by Increasing Insular Military-Economy Networks.

Predictably, but in contrast to the other cases, no one immediately pursued nationalization of the economy, a one-party state, or any revolutionary governance.⁶⁶ At this moment, international presence combined with the fragmented military, economy, and polity, combined with Sukarno's lack of a personal organizational following prevented this possibility even if he desired it. Instead, politically, Sukarno created

⁶⁵ Niwandhono, Pradipto. "The Making of Modern Indonesian Intellectuals: The Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) and Democratic Socialist Ideas, 1930s to mid-1970s." PhD diss., 2021.

⁶⁶ I found William A. Redfern's dissertation, *Sukarno's Guided Democracy and the Takeovers of Foreign Companies in Indonesia in the 1960s*, the most thorough analysis of the Indonesia economy from independence to the New Order.

cabinets largely comprised of the PNI and Masyumi. He also tried to streamline and professionalize both the civil service and military, all the while avoiding creating powerful networks within them. This had some success in some sectors, but the political scene continued to be dominated by gridlock, competition by political organizations through informal jockeying for administrative and military power, and continuous shuffling of cabinets. This competition even extended into army repression of PKI, sometimes with Sukarno's assent, in certain areas.⁶⁷

Again, at this time foreign influence – primarily from Dutch and Chinese – remained extensive. Shipping between the islands, for example, remained dominated by the Dutch. In 1951, Indonesia adopted the ambitious Economic Urgency Plan. This plan had two essential initiatives. First, some enterprises including the Java bank, the airlines, many businesses and estates of people leaving Indonesia, were nationalized. These were relatively minor nationalizations, but because of a lack of trained and/or loyal public servants, this marked an entry of army officers into the economic domains. Second, it attempted to build private, Indonesian industry through import substitute industrialization for small, medium, and large industrial enterprises. In particular, small establishments would be organized through central management associations

⁶⁷ See Hindley, Donald. *The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1963*. Univ of California Press, 1964 for an extended discussion of communist early organization and evolution, as well as interactions with the military.

which coordinated and distributed equipment, skills, and access to finance. Further, Indonesia attempted to create its own business class by restricting certain imports and wresting control of intermediary trade from Dutch and Chinese.

All of these attempts were beset by slow, disorganized, and often conflicting administration. This was further compounded by rent-seeking and corruption as well as maneuvers by Chinese and Dutch actors subverting these attempts through front organizations. In response, several high-ranking ministers and many subordinates were dismissed or resigned. Then, Indonesia embarked on its First Five Year Plan in 1956 which resulted extensive research by National Planning Bureau. It emphasized developing and establishing individual large-scale but essential industrial projects in public sector. The private sector, by contrast, was left more alone. Despite sophisticated planning, this scheme never possessed real data collection and became beset by partial implementation and then tanked by political conflict/takeovers. However, in the long-term, these early economic schemes helped create a new, technocratic class drawn from the youth across the islands (some of which would become coopted by Suharto's 'New Order'). In the short-term, through the import substitution scheme, the net exporting outer islands suffered more and, in some sense, disproportionately 'subsidized' Java and the nascent state.

Politically, little improved and some dynamics worsened. In particular, the growth of the state created increased formal and informal competition for influence

within it. Sukarno shuffled and promoted military officers to prevent the coalescing of any particular faction. At this time, the army felt increasingly sidelined from politics. Meanwhile, the PKI invested in recruiting from and infiltrating from both the civil service and the military (particularly the nascent Air Force). But, perhaps more importantly, conflicts between Java and the outer islands exacerbated. Power and opportunities increasing went toward the Javanese. Further, 'anti-corruption' campaigns (which in fairness targeted individuals across affiliations) struck some as consolidative attempts against certain parts of the Outer Islands. In late 1956, in response to increasing unrest and perceived encroachment, army factions in North, Central, and South Sumatra took control of local governments in a series of non-violent maneuvers. In early 1957, Sukarno would survive an assassination attempt by an extremist network allegedly affiliated with Masyumi.

So Sukarno faced an increasingly desperate political and economic situation. In 1957, Indonesia began taking over or otherwise pressuring Dutch industries. Some of this was directed by the state, but sometimes (such as in North Sumatra), army factions pursued these courses independently. At the same time, many Chinese were forcibly relocated to certain cities and towns and over 100,000 left for China. In the short-term, at least, this created personnel problems driving chaos in some industries and plantations. Despite some successes, inflation worsened and growth slackened. This culminated with a number of prominent, and increasingly sidelined, Masyumi leaders from

working with regionalist leaders and military members from creating an independence (or at least autonomy-seeking) armed movement in West Sumatra, North Sumatra, and Sulawesi. Labelled the PRRI/Permesta rebellion, this movement was quickly repressed with relatively few battle deaths.⁶⁸ A lack of coordination and expectation of deeper domestic and United States' support seems responsible.

In one sense, then, this was a mild rebellion with few casualties and relatively lenient punishments for its organizers. *But, politically, quelling this crisis transformed rather than solved Indonesia's conflicts. Specifically, externally, it effectively ended any regionalist ambitions within and outside of the military.* It also ruined, temporarily, the Muslim political organizations which supported or were perceived as supporting these rebellions who were largely expelled and repressed. *Internally, the army eliminated rebellious elements and others accused of rebellion from itself.* Note, however, rebellious army members avoided death, sometimes retained their economic assets, and some eventually even recouped some positions. *But, especially in the short-term, this created a more unified military at the elite level, with still further penetration into the economies and administrations of these outer islands.*

⁶⁸ See Amal, Ichlasul. *Regional and central government in Indonesian politics: West Sumatra and South Sulawesi, 1949-1979*. Gadjah Mada University Press, 1992 and Harvey, Barbara Sillars. *Permesta: half a rebellion*. No. 57. Cornell Univ Modern Indonesia, 1977.

Recession Leads to Cross-Level Political Turmoil and Mass-Based Political Opposition

At the same, Indonesia's economy began recessing. Seizures had increased administrative problems and dampened foreign direct investment. International loans, while available, continued to compound the growing national debt and inflation problems. Rubber production slowed. International oil prices continued their sluggish performance, harming both revenue and foreign currency holdings. As we have seen, Sukarno undertook many reforms, none of which yielded a a) prosperous, b) coordinated, or c) self-sufficient economy. This raises several questions which provide opportunity to zoom out and discuss Indonesia's economic policies. Namely, why did these policies fail? What other policies might have worked better? Third, would alternative economic policies have created better political outcomes?

We will begin with the failure of the economy. Hayek (and many others) might simply cite the peril of centralized economies – prices become distorted, creativity and initiative are suppressed, creative destruction does not occur, corruption triumphs over meritocracy and need, interventions become incompetent, etc. To some extent, many of these critiques hold. The Indonesian economic planners, despite their sophistication, never possessed reliable data collection or even professional data collection agencies. Control of the economy by Java tended to favor policies which favored importation and

drove inflation. And, many positions were assigned because of political, rather than meritocratic, considerations.

But, I suspect there is more to the story. On the one hand, these problems are likely a matter of degree rather than kind. Price distortion, waste of human capital, corruption and nepotism, protection of maladaptive industries or practices, and incompetent interventions occur in all economies at some scale. On the other hand, other centralized economies (such as Singapore or China) have performed relatively well. Further, Indonesia succeeded in creating many domestic industries, controlling its own natural resources and internal trade, a generation of technocrats. So, what else might explain this variation?

Perhaps most importantly, and aligning with the theory, Indonesia had a 'bad hand.' Their workforce lacked training and experience. They were dependent on international actors for finance, education, technology. Much of their resources and infrastructure was controlled by international actors. Their currency was weak. Agriculture was organized by local politics rather than national or international markets. They relied on select profitable exports, some of which (especially oil) declined in price.

So, could Indonesia have performed better, in terms of both economic and political outcomes? Of course, there are infinite counterfactuals. Likely, at least some of

them would have created better outcomes, especially given the severity recession and mass killing. At present, I do not have a definitive answer. However, some writers note Sukarno displayed little interest in institutions, decentralization, or rule of law.⁶⁹ In rhetoric, he often relied and recapitulated themes of ‘revolution’ which remained antithetical. In practice, partially owing to his position, Sukarno tended to ‘broker’ and ‘maneuver’ between political organizations rather than create institutions, practices, or arenas from them to compete within. The Indonesian court system, for example, scarcely appears in most accounts of the period. Where it does, we see regional battles for Sharia law or shifts into labor law following land reform.

Sukarno responded to this political and economic unrest by declaring martial law over the entire country (which would hold until 1963). Politically, this simultaneously empowered and transformed both the army and PKI. *Although the army had inserted itself into economic ownership and administration in the rounds of nationalizations, martial law marked a deep and lasting expansion of military involvement in the economy and administrative domains.* From 1957-65, the army would co-evolve alongside the PKI. *The military became owners, employers, police, bureaucracy, and political organizers.* Intervention varied from region to region, but the military remain both the judge and police in these contexts. It banned political

⁶⁹ See especially, Legge, John David. *Sukarno: a political biography*. Editions Didier Millet, 2003.

parties (particularly the PKI), outlawed strikes, limited demonstrations, in some cases claimed ownership of businesses, creating social and sometimes marriage ties with local business leaders, and participated in smuggling and other illegal activities.

At the higher echelons, the military was assigned and, in some cases, seized themselves control of newly nationalized companies. Why? From the military's perspective, they possessed the most qualified 'technocrats', needed to prevent PKI takeovers, and sometimes, were 'invited' by existing management or ownership. From their critics perspective, the military was greedy or insecure in its position, and leveraged whatever national and local power wherever it could to amass wealth. In any case, military leaders acquired wealth as well as stakes as employers within these companies. Military schools increasingly stressed 'technocratic' education and recruitment into these companies. Whatever tensions between the PKI and army existed, were exacerbated by the army's new roles as employers of firms which the PKI was acting against.

At the ground level, the military essentially became local police and bureaucrats. They designed top-down, hierarchical systems of command. As witnessed during the revolutionary period, the military became increasingly involved in local businesses and even illicit activities (often smuggling). Sometimes the military simply coerced itself into these roles, but often they operated against PKI conflicts with these local businesses or local tensions against Chinese businesspeople. As conflict between the PKI and

military intensified, the military would even attempt to create its own unions and associations to compete against PKI-sponsored ones. This had little success beyond veterans, but nevertheless displayed the army's involvement in local politics.

All the while, military members themselves developed new social networks. Newly acquired wealth, involvement in businesses and schools, and deployments across the territory expanded the military's connections to Indonesia's upper classes.⁷⁰ Suharto himself, a man of poverty and unclear parentage, was able to marry into a highly regarded (albeit economically declining) lineage. In his role as organizer of youth groups, he would train and befriend future religious and business leaders. And, perhaps most importantly, he would establish business connections with elites which would fund his early takeover attempts and sustain his regime for decades afterwards. This was not unique to Suharto, but rather represented a transition into the military's network ties within society.

Sukarno recognized this situation as undesirable and perhaps dangerous to himself. From 1960 until 1965, then Sukarno adopted several tactics. Organizationally, he attempted another round of 'anticorruption' (which demoted his eventual ouster Suharto) within the military and bureaucracy. Sukarno also attempted to circumvent

⁷⁰ For example, see McIntyre, Angus. "Divisions and Power in the Indonesian National Party, 1965-1966." *Indonesia* 13 (1972): 183-210.

existing power structures, working with labor unions and attempting to organize his own mass demonstrations. Economically, Indonesia attempted similar but expanded versions of earlier ideas. 1960 witnessed agrarian reforms which set minimums and maximums for land ownership amongst Indonesians and limited the landowning abilities of foreigners. Indonesia also attempted to increase domestic production of basic industries, consumer goods, finished goods, and daily necessities. Similar to the early 1950's, it also attempted to expand domestic control of importing and exporting. All together, Sukarno packaged this as anti-colonial, anti-Western push for Indonesian self-sufficiency.

Politically, he sought increased ties with China (which remained fraught because Indonesian treatment of their expatriates), confront Malaysia, organize newly free states into international institutions, and distance Indonesia from the West (culminating in its departure from the United Nations). Interpretations for Sukarno's confrontation with Malaysia, which his successors would quickly end, vary. Some cite Sukarno's desire for control of army deployments and their relocation away from Java. Some cite his desire for a unifying, or at least popular, rallying fact. Some allude to genuine international security concerns. Some even allude to a collusion between Indonesian and Malaysian communists. Whatever the case, this 'confrontation' remained tense but did not escalate into sustained, total warfare.

But, above all else, Sukarno increasingly empowered and when possible protected the PKI.⁷¹ This should not be overstated – Sukarno did not appoint all-communist cabinets, ban anticommunist newspapers, or attempt purges of anticommunist military leaders. Nevertheless, in this period, the PKI would expand its ranks, formal positions within the state, informal support within the military, and seize ownership of some firms. Understanding the evolution of the PKI is essential, both as a test of the theory and to understand the eventual use of violence. Like any organization, understanding the PKI requires understanding its organization and its environment. Organizationally, the PKI was disciplined and purposeful. It had clear leadership, chains of commands, and internal procedures. Especially in its earlier years, the PKI also desired disciplined members well-versed in its ideology. It banned drug use, philandering, gambling, and other ‘vices.’ Further, it pursued members from all across society – peasants in rural areas, workers in urban ones, and soldiers (especially within the Air Force) wherever possible. It competed for influence in essentially every arena – legal institutions, trade unions, universities, veterans’ associations, artist guilds, the media, public companies, the private sector, etc.

But many well-organized movements (even other socialist ones) do not expand and penetrate as extensively as the PKI did. What accounts for their popularity?

⁷¹ Mortimer, Rex. *Indonesian communism under Sukarno: Ideology and politics, 1959-1965*. Equinox Publishing, 2006

According to the theory, the economic ecology explains much of their popularity. *In the simplest terms, the structure of work and resource flows created many people who found the PKI's programs appealing or lacked other good options for advancing themselves economically.* Most simply, Indonesia was relatively poor with considerable inequalities. Even services some might consider 'public goods', such as use of buses or access to pools, were sometimes restricted based on employment. But beyond this, in the urban areas, following independence, we see migration into the cities owing both to rising populations and some sense of opportunity deriving from new independence. This created significant joblessness and migrant worker populations to recruit. Even within more technocratic or 'educated' circles, economic crises and state control of most opportunities created many disaffected or 'thwarted' individuals also ripe for recruitment.

Yet, in contrast to the development of the Iraqi communist party, the PKI also became powerful in the countryside. Some of this flowed from the PKI's desire for stronger membership and larger electoral shares, but PKI rural expansion rose significantly once martial law was declared and the military began informally suppressing PKI activity in urban areas. As in urban areas, the economic ecology created many opportunities for growth. Large-scale agriculture or oil extraction often possessed a few owners with many, many workers as well as some pre-existing unionization the PKI could coopt. Yet, the PKI did not succeed always and everywhere

in its recruitment. This is reflected in its departures from strict Marxist ideology. For examples, the PKI conceded belief in 'One God', work with and attempt to protect Chinese merchants and businesses threatened by the military, and coopted members of 'middle' or 'upper classes' whenever possible. And, the PKI was not beyond force and fraud. In some areas, the PKI sometimes promised luxuries, no taxes or communal labor, or other misinformation to attract recruits. In others, the PKI would 'spare' local businesses from strikes or other disruptions in exchange for support.

Even with these compromises and tactics, however, the PKI did not always establish itself. In Aceh and other parts of Sumatra, the 1960's witnessed a revival (especially amongst younger generations) in Muslim belief rather than upsurge of communism. And, in late 1964-early 1965, the PNI effectively split over the PKI issue. Why did this occur? I, to be clear, cannot definitively explain variation in the PKI's successes. However, most analyses tend to treat the poorer and richer classes as static entities with given interests (the poor should want to overthrow the rich, the rich should want to dominate the poor). The question then becomes, why did the poor not pursue their interests. Some authors write of traditional, deferential social relations within these areas. Others cite the clash between local religions and communism ideologically. Still others could cite the region's different economics (oil and export-producers) which might allow for more 'buying off' (directly or through 'public goods') of the population.

All of these explanations remain plausible. Yet, they ignore the flows and ties amongst people in different economic positions. Specifically, they do not trace the PKI's local embeddedness within social networks or institutions. Given the PKI coopted non-peasants, non-labor, and non-poor individuals elsewhere it seems plausible they needed more than a good campaign to establish themselves. Further, they do not trace social or temporal relations between the poorer and richer individuals. Was there any social or economic mobility which might drive commitment to existing systems? Were there network ties – through friendship, kinship, or some other relation – which crosscut economic positions? In many cases, again, the PKI did not simply 'mobilize the poor' but rather capitalized on longstanding (say, between ethnic groups) or recent (say, between migrant and 'local' populations).

In any case, conflict between the PKI and the army (to more locally, Muslim landholders and business elites) fed on itself. The PKI and army increasingly penetrated local and national institutions. From 1963 to 1965, the seizure of at least 90 British, American, Belgian, and Malaysian companies, plantations, plants, and other businesses provided even more flashpoints to their conflict. Some of these seizures were officially directed (beginning with Sukarno's confrontation with Malaysian), some were locally organized or forced by the PKI or army factions, and collectively they were ad-hoc, sorted affairs. The army, which had always possessed some anticommunist elements (owing to PKI 'betrayal' during the revolution, religious or class differences, or

whatever other reasons), now confronted the PKI as employer, police, national political opponent, and 'infiltrator' of its own organization.

Coup Attempt and Consolidative Violence

At this point, we arrive at a scenario we will see in the other cases. We see an entrenched, insular network of military-politico-economic elites forged through increasing state involvement in a particular kind of nationalized economy with conflicts with mass-based political organizations. We see well-organized political parties competing effectively locally and nationally for control of administrations, representative status, and even military loyalty. We see intimidation and low levels of local political violence. We see increased social conflicts, occurring in high schools, universities, and social arenas. Eventually, we witnessed a coup attempt against this military-politico-economic network. In this case, the conspirators appear to have heralded from within the PKI though not necessarily from its highest ranks. In any case, their coup attempt claimed the lives of six leading generals (as well as some members of their families). Other battalions seized control of areas within the capital and the state radio station. Leading PKI officials met these forces there, and smaller takeovers in Central Java and elsewhere also occurred. But these forces were routed quickly by General Suharto's Jakarta-based forces.

Suharto did not, however, immediately wrest control from Sukarno. In the following weeks, although Suharto and local forces would begin attack the PKI, Sukarno would attempt to downplay the PKI's involvement.⁷² He would even present himself publicly and dither on Suharto-proposed changes. Suharto, for his part, was neither the most recognizable (which was likely Nasution who survived but lost a child in the coup attempt) nor universally liked (the Sultan disapproved of his ascendancy) military leader. However, Suharto worked methodically to vanquish the PKI and displace Sukarno. Attacks on the PKI, where they did not emerge locally, continued through Suharto's commands and contacts.⁷³ In particular, Suharto created a 'special police force' which reported directly to him. Much of this was funded through the army's own finances or through its associates'. Suharto would also 'fan the flames' of Muslim and other anticommunist student movements, which had already adopted hardline positions and massive demonstrations against the PKI. Eventually, Suharto would effectively threaten Sukarno and Sukarno would formally surrender power.

Consequently, consolidative violence unfolded over longer timescales in Indonesia. Continued flares of violence would continue into 1966. Some PKI members

⁷² See Elson, Robert Edward. *Suharto: a political biography*. Cambridge University Press, 2001 for thorough description of Suharto's life before and actions during his time.

⁷³ Melvin, Jess. *The army and the Indonesian genocide: Mechanics of mass murder*. Routledge, 2018.

even fled and regroup in hard to reach areas but were ultimately repressed in 1967.

When violence occurred, who committed it, and how it was conducted varied widely across Indonesia (as it did in other consolidative mass killings). Scholars of the Indonesia cases (and the other cases) unanimously cite the 'interplay between national and local politics' in explaining this variation. The kinds of interactions and variation explained varies somewhat by author. Some focus on timing, conduct, extent, or the relative 'bottom-up' or 'top-down' contributions to violence. Some emphasize kinds of local organizations, ties between consolidative and local elites, distance from the capital, presence of militias, recent histories of local violence, etc. I do not attempt any comprehensive theory or summarizing of subnational violence. Essentially, I agree this variation resulted from some combination of the consolidating actors' reach and immediate concerns as well as local political organizations' connection to the consolidating power and conflict with the targeted group. But I want to note three things about the violence.

First, the military was heavily involved in the organization of violence. It spread propaganda (which centered on the mutilation and alleged sexual deviance of the PKI's attack), incentivized and organized local actors, and deployed its own forces. Where violence did not occur 'spontaneously', the military deployed its own troops. Counterfactually, then, while some level of local participation was likely necessary for their campaign and local dynamics may help us understand some of the observed

variation, many of these areas would likely have experienced purges without grassroots violence.

Second, violence was relatively popular. Many areas started purges on their own and some areas required army deployments to quell the ‘anarchic violence’ rather than promote it.⁷⁴ Micro-level studies, which indicate complicated and negative emotions by perpetrators, also indicate some wartime mentality (‘we won’) by participants. This contrasts, as we will see, with Ethiopia where violence remained largely urban and some attempts to mobilize ‘shock troops’ failed. This owes, likely, to the PKI’s widespread presence and disruptive tactics all across the country. As Robinson writes,

“In Aceh, the party’s followers were loathed as infidels by the local Muslim community; in North Sumatra they were hated by sections of the indigenous Batak community for promoting the interests of the Javanese settlers who worked on the state plantations [...]. In the cities of the archipelago, many Chinese fell victim to the PKI’s close association with the People’s Republic of China. In Bali, the PKI had attacked the practice of Hinduism [...]. In the

⁷⁴ See, for examples, Reid, Anthony. "Verandah of violence." *The Background to the Aceh Problem*. Singapore (2006), Robinson, Geoffrey. *The dark side of paradise: Political violence in Bali*. Cornell University Press, 1995 Robinson, Geoffrey. *The dark side of paradise: Political violence in Bali*. Cornell University Press, 1995, and Roosa, John. *Buried Histories: The Anticommunist Massacres of 1965-1966 in Indonesia*. Critical Human Rights, 2020.

countryside of Central and East Java [...] the PKI's promotion of land reform won it bitter enemies, but here it was especially detested by orthodox traditional Muslims."⁷⁵

Third, PKI members did not have ID cards or any distinguishing physical characteristics. Consequently, attacks required local knowledge or some intelligence. The CIA, infamously, provided its Indonesia military contacts with lists of suspected communists. However, Suharto's regime did not really struggle to identify the national leadership. At the meso-level, however, some reports stress the compliance PKI members showed toward their eventual executors (allegedly, marching in their white funeral clothes). But, other accounts (and census data) suggest fleeing and hiding (sometimes as vagabonds). And, on the consolidator side, we see more mass detentions and interrogations which testify to this identification problem.

⁷⁵ Robinson, p. 20

Chapter V: The Evolution of Conflict in Rwanda

I. A Bird's Eye Perspective on the Rwandan Case and the Theory

On the surface, Rwanda does not fit as neatly with the theory as the other cases.

Two factors – the RPF and the Tutsi-Hutu relations – seem to separate Rwanda from other cases. Perhaps for this reason, people rarely compare Rwanda with Indonesia or Ethiopia. In contrast to these cases,

- Consolidative violence in Rwanda targeted an 'ethnic' Tutsi group rather than members of a political party anchored around economics (such as the PKI and EPRP).
- Rwanda's violence does not target the strongest counter-organization within the country (the MRD) which splits and eventually attacks Tutsis along with the akuza.
- The RPF – an organized military force of Tutsi refugees and other supporters anchored in Uganda – features more directly in this case than any international actor in the other cases.
- Because of this, we witness some 'two-sided' violence and consolidative violence does not consolidate power.

On a defensive note, these differences deserve some examination and contextualizing.

Namely,

- All cases feature some international involvement. Burundi even features refugee populations supporting domestic upheavals.
- The RPF is largely composed of Rwandan refugees, largely fighting for land and businesses they lost during prior upheavals. In this sense, this ‘international’ force is inextricably tied with Rwanda’s domestic political economy.
- It was not strictly a Tutsi genocide. Hutu moderates, nationally and locally, represented early targets of violence.
- ‘Ethnic’ and ‘economic’ differences blur in all cases. Tutsi/Hutu distinctions (like many ‘ethnic’ categorizations) overlapped with economic differences and the PKI/EPRP derived from and built upon existing social cleavages.
- While the evolution of the political opposition is complicated by RPF presence and behaviors, at the moment of violence, a moderate domestic coalition represented the most viable domestic threat to the organizers of violence.

Nevertheless, *I agree these factors (Hutu and Tutsi ‘identities’ and the RPF) introduce dynamics absent in other contexts. Consequently, I want to clarify what I am and am not claiming about this case. First, I do not ask or explore counterfactuals related to the variables beyond my theory.* For examples, I do not ask ‘what would have happened had the RPF somehow disappeared in 1988?’ or ‘would Rwanda have witnessed consolidative violence if Hutu-Tutsi relations were somehow better?’ I like counterfactual thinking, but it has limits. I, of course, cannot observe or somehow

estimate these counterfactuals. But beyond this, counterfactuals are not always straightforward or informative. Sometimes, counterfactuals are simple and their results illuminating. Asking whether taking this medicine or doing nothing, for example, might reveal something essential about how the medicine works. But other times, counterfactuals may not be decomposable (moving one part moves many parts), closed (their 'spot' requires some value besides 'no value'), or finite (many rather than one potential alternatives). Further, counterfactuals are not always revealing. Knowing, for example, whether the absence of a role player did or did not change a game's outcome does not tell you why this occurred. And, perhaps more importantly, it may not tell you anything about what specifically makes that team good or bad.

In this context, decomposability seems suspect. Removing the RPF would shift many other variables – the short-term international politics of the Congo and Uganda, the Second Republic's relations with its neighbors during the 70's and 80's, the domestic hopes and alignments of the Tutsi population, etc. And, a Rwanda without Hutu-Tutsi relations is more of an alternative universe rather than a control condition. So does the 'null' value of any counterfactual. The Tutsi refugee population would likely create *some* alternative political force. Or, as alluded to above, Rwanda's regional politics would possess *some* alternative dynamics. Likewise, every context features *some* social or ethnic conflict. And, perhaps most importantly, I am unsure what information these counterfactuals would provide. If we did not see consolidative violence without an RPF,

for example, this would not necessarily mean the theory did not reveal something important about the case. Further, attempting to 'remove' these other dynamics limits our ability to learn about how they do or do not interact with the theory's dynamics, which can provide opportunity for leaning more from or otherwise improving the theory.

But, for what it's worth, the RPF invaded several times during the early 1990's. None of these incursions, despite their seriousness, prompted consolidative violence until the assassination of Habyarimana. And, comparatively, the other cases did not require as powerful an international force to generate consolidative violence.

Nevertheless, I do not really know what would have happened if the RPF had somehow disappeared in the late 1980's or early 1990's. Presumably, we would have witnessed similar balancing against the MRND by a divided MRD party and a more liberal PL party. We would likely have also witnessed local militia development. But the existence, extremism, and militarization of the CDR remains unclear. As does the eventual consolidation of a 'Hutu Power' movement.

Second, empirically, I submit the Rwandan case presents some additional dynamics which require explanation. In Chapter I, I outlined questions I believe a theory of consolidative mass killing should answer – among other things, where the actors came from, the nature of their conflict, the escalation of their conflict, and the potential and choice of consolidative mass killing over alternative means. But, the

Rwandan case raises other case-specific questions which warrant investigation.

Specifically, Rwanda's transition from colonialism to self-rule during the late 50's through the 1960's witnessed significant political, economic, and social turmoil. And, again from 1990 until 1997, conflict would kill hundreds of thousands of people within and beyond its borders. This violence, largely though not exclusively, reflected the regional and ethnic antagonisms and cleavages crystallized during colonialism. But, from 1973 to the late 1980's, many viewed Rwanda as an exception to the region's economic struggles and political violence. Habyarimana's regime was relatively tolerant of minority Tutsis, economic growth was moderate but steady, and Habyarimana's wife had even founded associations for women's advancement. This raises three related questions.

- *What drove the ebb and flow of political violence across time? And, perhaps, why did this political violence tend toward a Hutu/Tutsi axis?*
- *Why did the Second Republic fail to transform the general cleavages within Rwanda? Why do the politics of early 1990's Rwanda resemble postcolonial Rwanda?*
- *Why did early 1990's Rwanda eventually yield a 'Hutu-Power coalition' rather than some other 'axis of conflict'? Why do we need see the moderate, anti-MRND coalitions which dominated previously? Or any other, less extreme version of these multi-party politics or even some kind of bargain?*

I argue the theory can illuminate, though not fully answer, many of the more case-specific questions. Specifically

- *Regarding the first question, the theory's emphasis on organizational change answers (and empirically correlates with) why we see different kinds of political violence at different stages of the Rwandan conflict. In some sense then, the theory considers organizations as nexuses between historical processes and current events.*
- *Regarding the second question, the theory explains the continuity of the Rwandan conflict through emphasize the continuity of Rwanda's political economy. Despite all of Habyarimana's economic policies, Rwanda remained a highly agricultural, relatively poor country relying on a few profitable exports. Further, this land-centric and regionally skewed system tended to reinforce rather than transform the flows and roles people possessed. From this perspective, despite elite shuffling and regional shifts in power, we see the reproduction of existing roles, networks, and local conflicts at the meso-level.*
- *Regarding the third question, while the theory does not speak much toward the social or psychological, I argue the theory's organizational dynamics and economic logics can explain some of the constraints which shaped elite and non-elite decisions. Specifically, organizational structure illuminates why the akuza struggled to locate bargains and coopt competitors, culminating in their attempts to mobilize 'shock troops' from below.*

Third, and perhaps most importantly, I argue none of these dynamics occurred separately from or could have yielded consolidative mass killing without the theorized

dynamics. Understanding the theory is necessary for understanding the case. Consider again the theory's variables and the theoretical flowchart below.

Table 5.1: Theory's Variables in the Rwandan Case

Colonial Legacy of Relatively Indirect Rule, Centered on Export Economies?	Yes, Germany then Belgium.
Highly Agricultural Economy with Select Profitable Exports?	Yes, nearly 90% of workforce in agriculture, majority of revenues deriving from coffee exports.
Economic Downturn?	Yes, recession following decline in coffee prices in late 1980's.
Mass-Based Political Opposition?	Yes, the MRD, PSD, CDR, and PL following multipartyism.
Insular Politico-Military-Social Networks?	Yes, the so-called 'akuza.'
Militia Formation?	Yes, by MRND as well as the other political parties.
Coup Attempt?	Yes, assassination of President Habyarimana.

Figure 5.1: Flow Chart of Long-Term Co-Evolution of Economics, Political Conflicts, and Organizations




Figure 5.1 Continued




Figure 5.1 Continued





Figure 5.1 Continued



Now let us 'fill-in' these boxes with the Rwandan specifics.

Figure 5.2: Flow-Chart of Rwandan Specifics




Figure 5.2 Continued





Figure 5.2 Continued




II. Rwanda: Colonialism Until 1950's. Precolonial History + Economic Ecology Create Highly Agricultural, Export Dependent State with Regionalized Socio-Political Structures

Above, I reviewed abstractly the theory's fit with and claims about the Rwandan case. Below, I discuss more thoroughly Rwanda's background and evolution. Aside from tracing the theory's mechanisms, the goals of this are to provide those unfamiliar with the case a holistic sense of what happened and those familiar with the case my interpretation of some outstanding questions about the Rwandan case: namely, how the

akuza evolved, why we see the consolidation of the Hutu Power axis, and why bargaining repeatedly failed.

Bordered by Burundi, Uganda, and the Congo, Rwanda is a landlocked, small mountainous country with a temperate climate, fertile soil, and few mineral resources. In 1994, Rwanda had a relatively high population density with eight million inhabitants in 26,338 sq kilometers. The urban population was around 400,000 – 300,000 of which lived in the capital Kigali. *Ninety percent of the population worked in agriculture* with an average lifespan of around 32 years. *Much of this was subsistence farming, with some producing bananas, beans, sorghum and coffee and tea for export.*

Map 5.1: Rwanda



Rwanda was a colony of Germany and later Belgium. *Under their rule, existing yet still cross-cutting socio-economic cleavages became increasingly formalized and crystallized, as the Tutsi minority had hegemony over the Hutus (representing the pastoralists rather than herders). In the earlier conquered Butare and surrounding Southern areas, these ethnic divisions corresponded with economic differences.*⁷⁶ In stereotype at least, Hutus and Tutsis possessed different physical features (with Tutsis

⁷⁶ Guichaoua, André. *Rwanda 1994: les politiques du génocide à Butare*. KARTHALA Editions, 2005.

possessing more lean builds and narrower noses). In the later conquered North however, more land-holding, clan-based Hutu elites persisted.

Like elsewhere in the world, in the late 1950's, independence movements began gaining traction in Rwanda. The mwami (king) made some concessions (such as collectivizing cattle use and profits within the patron-client relationship), some cooptation of Hutu elites, and plans for post-independence governance. The king, however, would die under care of a Belgian doctor and his younger brother would inherit an increasingly complicated and violent situation as Rwanda moved toward independence. At this time, the primary organizations were⁷⁷:

- RADER: Belgian-backed attempt to unite progressive Tutsis (mainly from Butare) and Hutus. Alleged intellectual brilliance amongst leadership, platform anchored around democracy. Never acquired much grassroots support.
- APROSOMA: a moderate Hutu organization anchored in Butare which also had some Tutsi members. Butare was the headquarters for the former kingdom and possessed the university, hospitals, and other urban economic activities.

⁷⁷ See Childress, Stephen E. *From revolution to ruin: A preliminary look at Rwanda's first two presidents, Grégoire Kayibanda and Juvénal Habyarimana, and their administrations*. University of Missouri-Kansas City, 2015. and Kimonyo, Jean-Paul. *Rwanda's popular genocide: A perfect storm*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2016 for reviews both of the political parties as well as the their competition during this time.

- The PARMEHUTU: anchored in Gitarama and Ruhengeri, particularly amongst the Hutu intelligentsia. Many of these were educated by Belgian Catholic missionaries. Many recount the PARMEHUTU as a socialist but deeply anti-Tutsi organization. Now and later, many would cite divergences between the elites of this party and the peasants they claimed to present. Some have recently questioned how anti-Tutsi rank and file were, but nevertheless the published anti-Tutsi propaganda, organized violence against Tutsis, and would exclude them from power when acquiring it.
- UNAR: the monarchy's party, anchored in Kigali. Often described as Tutsi-centric and conservative. However, its leader was Hutu and Tutsi and contemporaries noted the party's "national socialism" as well as some anticlerical and Muslim tendencies.

Competition between these groups quickly became violent. Allegedly, a UNAR member publicly slapped a high-ranking PARMEHUTU. This created an escalated series of bottom-up and top-down assassinations and pogroms (even what some described as pogroms in Gikongoro). Eventually the UNAR would repress the PARMEHUTU, only to have the Belgians intervene to halt violence. This situation, and UNAR's decision to boycott the 1961 election, essentially sidelined the UNAR's prospects for controlling the post-independence state. In this context, PARMEHUTU would acquire electoral victories and continue local attacks against both Tutsis as well

as members of APROSOMA. This violence was often encouraged and conducted under the rationale of acquiring land, cattle, housing, and wealth for peasants.

Note competition did not follow strictly Tutsi-Hutu lines. Regional cleavages presented themselves amongst and within organizations, some organizations had cross-ethnic memberships and outlooks, and political violence eventually targeted moderates as well as Tutsis. Relatedly, economics cross-cut and sometimes reinforced this competition. The UNAR-PARMEHUTU divide reflected differences between the long-standing monarchical, land and cattle-holding classes and an intellectual movement anchored in peasant support. the more moderate actors heralded from a different regional political economy. PARMEHUTU mobilization was anchored in poverty and prospects for acquiring land. Divisions within the PARMEHUTU, which would harden later, centered on regional differences in the land-holding wealth of Hutus in different regions. *Nevertheless, as it would later, violence acquired a distinct Tutsi-Hutu flavor and the consolidating power developed a Hutu-Power ideology.*

In any case, politically, the PARMEHUTU's usurpation of power and corresponding violence led tens of thousands of Tutsis to flee. The PARMEHUTU would institute ID cards citing Hutu or Tutsi background which remained employed through the Second Republic. In this 'First Republic', political conflicts with Burundi and Congo closed borders to the originally more prosperous southern prefectures. This benefitted the northern Gitarama and Kigali. In 1963, these refugee populations would

use Burundi as base for launching attacks which led to near loss of capital, further attacks against Tutsi populations, and increased evacuations by Tutsi populations. Attacks resumed in 1966 and 1967 with more Anti-Tutsi attacks and refugee flows. The violence in Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, and Uganda throughout the 60's and 70's had created significant refugee populations and problems in the region.

Much Tutsi land was redistributed by the PARMEHUTU to peasants and many would later levee claims on Habyarimana for re-entry and reparation. Rwanda consistently disagreed and dithered, fearing eventual insurrections and citing existing problems of overpopulation and land use. Tutsi populations were scattered throughout the region, but over 70,000 relocated to Uganda. In Uganda, many were enlisted by the ruling regime as soldiers training, fighting, and commanding high ranks within the military. This became the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), who would later expand its ranks by recruiting amongst Tutsi populations within Uganda (particularly in its refugee camps) but also from other countries (including Rwanda).

Back in Rwanda, economically, several trends had emerged. As stated, dispossessed Tutsi land largely went to PARMEHUTU loyalists or peasants the PARMEHUTU wanted to mobilize. This included expansion into previously unoccupied lands. The Gitamara-centric TRAFIPRO, became increasingly controlling of the domestic and international coffee trade (which was resented by Northerners). At the same time, officials attempted to reorganize the education sector in 1966. School

buildings constructed with state subsidies were nationalized. Hiring, firing, and curriculum was under state control, as were admissions and expulsions of students. This was done to curb Tutsi influence within education (where they retained power and at times, expressed anti-Hutu sentiments) as well as Tutsis academic 'overperformance' (owing, arguably, to preferential treatment, selection effects, or 'corporate knowledge' generated through historical experiences).

Together, these represented attempts to create a source of power and control over the state and economy. However, the economy continued to falter. Violence, migration, and chaos had weakened the state's administrative capacity and efficiency. Coffee production declined and many ongoing projects stalled. International funds declined and, as stated, violence at the borders hampered trade. Socially, schools and universities smoldered with racial divisions, sometimes escalating into violence. Politically, Kayibanda's PARMEHUTU was also struggling. Externally, it had never garnered a national following and attacked Tutsis and moderates to claim power. Economic declines, accusations of corruption, and continued violence exacerbated this problem. Internally, cleavages between local rural peasants and party intellectuals surfaced, as did cleavages between the land-holding Ruhengeri faction and more reform-centric Gitarama network. Kayibanda continued to shuffle and demote rivals and critics, but found himself increasingly surrounded by loyalists with few connections beyond their own circle.

In 1972, anti-Hutu violence in Burundi would simultaneously increase refugee flows of Hutus and cement a Tutsi-centric power on Rwanda's border. Rwanda itself would witness some flares of anti-Tutsi violence, as well as some political violence between Northern, Central, and Southern political operatives. It was within this chaos that Juvenal Habyarimana would usurp control of the state in 1973. Who was Habyarimana? Habyarimana heralded from a 'middle-class' family in Gisenyi (his education was funded anonymously). At the time of Rwandan independence movements, he was finishing schools and deciding between career paths. He enlisted in the military (which was a Northern dominated institution). By 1965, Habyarimana simultaneously was commander of the army, director of the police, and head of national security, as Defense Minister. During this time, he also married Agatha Kazinga, a member of a long-standing, formerly ruling lineage in Gisenyi. Kayibanda also became godfather to one of Habyarimana's sons and Habyarimana's sister became godmother to Kayibanda's youngest child.

During this time, Habyarimana was known as a professional, somewhat apolitical character. During the anti-Tutsi violence of 1972, he spoke against perpetrators, sometimes personally asking them under whose authority they acted. As open criticism of Kayibanda increased within the PAREMHUTU and elite circles, Habyarimana did not to my knowledge engage. Nevertheless, rumors swirled and Kayibanda confronted Habyarimana with some documents alleging his involvement in

a coup plot. Habyarimana fled this situation and responded with a coup against Kayibanda, killing around 50 elites connecting to the regime and placing Kayibanda under house arrest where he died a few years later.

From the First to the Second Republic. The Creation of the One-Party State and Nationalized Economy and its Political Conflicts

At this point, we see many of the theory's expectations satisfied. *We see limited colonial rule, a fractionated macro-social network structure, and a largely agricultural economy with select profitable exports. But we do not see a nationalized economy, an insular network of politico-economic-military elites, or any mass-based political opposition.* These, I argue, would only emerge from the co-evolution of state and economy during Habyarimana's Second Republic.

In contrast to Suharto, political fights weakened many of the domestic and international political organizations by the time he assumed power. Consequently, we see less 'flip-flopping' and 'brokering' by Habyarimana. Instead, like the Derg in Ethiopia. Habyarimana sought to create a national party (MRND) and economy. Habyarimana made appeals to communalism (the farmer as 'hero') and instituted local MRND rallies and parties. Everyone was a member and was enforced pay dues, participate in 'community works', political rallies, and occasionally some donations.

Economically, favorable international coffee prices, decreased tensions with regional neighbors, and increased international financial support (often French) and investment created a relatively prosperous decade. Further, the flight or death of many Tutsis created land and property for redistribution available for patronage. The MRND succeeded in lowering the national debt, creating infrastructure, budget balances, currency stability, and increased food self-sufficiency. Habyarimana maintained quotas on Tutsis across all state institutions ranging from the military, education, and the coffee sector. He also coordinated relocation programs which sent Hutus to Tutsi-dominated and border areas. But Tutsis enjoyed a more hands-off approach. Many Tutsi sought work outside the state in the clergy, working with international companies, and more 'liberal' professions, and Habyarimana himself maintained some ties with Tutsi business elites.

Nevertheless, the MRND faced some turbulence. Habyarimana in his closest circles were anchored in Gisenyi, but Ruhengeri circles represented another pillar upon which Kayibanda was overthrown and the regime was founded. As the 1970's unfolded, the state displayed favoritism toward Habyarimana's 'home turf' (Kigali, Gisenyi, and to a lesser extent Ruhengeri). Habyarimana's personal network (eventually labelled the *akuza*, meaning 'little house') became increasingly powerful with high positions in financial, religious, military, administrative, and political offices.

Table 5.2: Regional Distribution of Owners of Major Companies

INSTITUTION	DIRECTOR	REGION
Crete Zaire Nil	Gallican Hategeka	Gisenyi
BCR	Claver Mvuyekure	Gisenyi
BK	Viateur Mvuyekure	Gisenyi
BACAR	Pasteur Musabe	Gisenyi
SOPROTEL	Martin Ayirwanda	Gisenyi
TRAFIPRO	Ngororabanga	Gisenyi
PNAP	Pierre Tegera	Gisenyi
Chambre de Commerce	Aloys Bizimana	Gisenyi
ISAAR Léopold	Gahamanyi	Gisenyi
Caisse Hypothécaire	Antoine Libanje	Gisenyi
Musée National	Simon Ntigashira	Gisenyi
OCIR-Thé	Michel Bagaragaza	Gisenyi
ORTPN	Juvenal Uwilingiyimana	Gisenyi
COOPIMAR	Jean Mburanumwe	Gisenyi
GBK	Jean Bagiramenshi	Gisenyi
SORWAL	Mathieu Ngirira	Gisenyi
Usine à Thé	Shagasha Callixte	Gisenyi
Usine à Thé	Pfunda Munyeshuli	Gisenyi
Usine à Thé	Murindi Jaribu	Gisenyi
Caisse sociale	Damascène Hategekimana	Ruhengeri
Electrogaz	Donat Munyanganizi	Ruhengeri
Ocir-Café	Fabien Neretse	Ruhengeri
BNR	Denis Ntirugirimbabazi	Ruhengeri
Rwandex	Baragahoranye	Ruhengeri
ONAPO	Gaudence Nyirasafari	Ruhengeri
ORINFOR	Ferdinand Nahimana	Ruhengeri
CID	Daniel Rwananiye	Ruhengeri
Laiterie du Rwanda	Callixte Mirasano	Ruhengeri
RAR	Lt Colonel Nyirimanzi	Ruhengeri
Redemi	J.B Bicomumpaka	Ruhengeri
Sodeparal	Michel Bakuzakundi	Ruhengeri
Cimerwa	Callixte	Ruhengeri

Many analysts attribute this to self-interest and exploitation by Habyarimana and his wife's informal network of highly-placed and wealthy individuals (the 'akazu'). Many histories cite preferential rewards for Northerners and continuous protest against placement of non-Northerners and Tutsi to positions of power within the state, church, and military. At the micro-level, at least some also report greedy and exploitive behaviors by those within Habyarimana's circle (leveraging positions for sex and drug

smuggling, for example). However, a political logic cohabitated with this economic self-interest: Habyarimana had to build an organization and retaining control of it.

From the North, Habyarimana had to avoid coup or overthrow. This threat presented itself in 1979 and 1980, as the intelligentsia began to lament the MRND's corruption and Rwandan bishops complained on behalf of the 'little people.' Habyarimana began reshuffles and expulsions of First Republic remnants, elites from Bugoyi (a competitor network near Gisenyi), and Ruhengeri. In response, allegedly, some military members planned a coup attempt against Habyarimana which was thwarted. As a result, the MRND became increasingly insular and Gisenyi-centric, relying on younger generation of bureaucrats through clientelism.

At the same time, the MRND struggled somewhat to politically coopt and economically mobilize Butare and the South of the country. Politically, both formerly possessed well-organized centers of power with few Northern ties. Consequently, coopting without surrendering control was difficult. Economically, the South and Central had poorer soils while Butare (the capital and intellectual center of the former kingdom) bordered the Tutsi-dominated Burundi. In any case, Butare, Kibuye, Gitarama, and Gikongoro suffered economically in the Second Republic and sometimes labelled themselves as 'forgotten' prefectures.

Yet, despite these political problems, Rwanda grew economically during this time. Verwimp found, despite its insular network structure and corruption, Habyarimana's regime did not exploit peasants. Many disliked communal work, which did not earn them money. And, with some justification, would cite preferential treatment for some who could buy or leverage themselves out of this. However, because much of Rwanda lacked income or wealth to tax, this was one of the few ways the government could tax or generate revenue.

But, the World Bank reports from the early 1980's cited two essential problems the Habyarimana regime had not overcome. First, they lacked enough 'technocrats' or any meritocratic system for producing reliable institutions. Many, according to their accounts, lacked the training or interest to manage effectively. This may reflect some 'Western bias' (most institutions I encounter have these problems), but given the novelty of the enterprises and exclusion of the Tutsi workforce likely possesses some truth. Second, both the regime, economy, upper classes, and lower classes remained highly dependent on coffee markets.

Rwanda, Crisis and Mutlipartyism. Economic Recession and the Birth of Mass-Based Political Opposition

At this point, then, we see many of our theoretical expectations realized. Specifically, we see a nationalized economy and an increasingly insular and far-

reaching network of politico-economic-military elites. At this time, however, no opposition possessed widespread and/or grassroots support. Consequently, the MRND repressed whatever threats arose and 'nay-saying' the MRND publicly was rare. Once more, as the theory suggests, understanding the evolution of this opposition requires understanding how economics intersected with political organization.

Beginning in 1986, changes in weather and the international market for its exports (particularly coffee) created problems. *Food shortages, increasing landlessness, inflation, decreasing standards of living, job prospects, and decreases in the state's discretionary income drove increasingly vocal dissidence within and outside the MRND as well local resistance to state authority and planning.* These downturns were not confined to Rwanda. They also increased domestic antagonism toward Tutsi populations and military figures in Uganda. *Unsurprisingly, this drastic economic downturn had wide-ranging political consequences.*

In 1990, this pressure combined with the perceived weakness in Habyarimana's regime contributed to a RPF attack on Rwanda. Their attack was a surprising success and French forces were instrumental in stopping their capture of the capital Kigali. Further, this invasion freed some of the former (mostly Northern) generals and officials accused of plotting against Habyarimana's regime who would join the RPF. Further still, the RPF leader would die during these attacks prompting the ascension of Paul Kagame (the highest-ranking leader in Rwanda still today). Nevertheless, despite these

successes, many in the Southern prefectures regarded this war as a 'Northern Affair' and no organizations moved against Habyarimana and no pogroms against Tutsis occurred. Nevertheless, these attacks further increased Habyarimana's reliance on international powers for military and economic aid. The conditions for this aid were 'structural readjustment' and movements toward democracy.

So, in April 1990, Habyarimana legalized political parties, which proliferated quickly and mainly included the MRD, PL, PSD, CL, and MRND. All these parties had different social, economic, and regional bases and often some internal conflicts. I will not trace all these here, but will cite the most important consequences of their proliferation.¹

- The MRD (a rebirth of the hardline Hutu PARMEHUTU) established local control in many of the southern provinces. Itself divided by hardline and more moderate elements, the party rebranded as party defending the 'little guy' – with mixed messages regarding Tutsis presented to urban and rural audiences. At district level, the MRD displayed violence at demonstrations, violence and intimidation against MRND (leading to counterviolence by MRND), stealing, looting, bullying, raping, public humiliations, and burning of forests. By 1994, MRD parties and militias had established effective control over much of the central and southern provinces. At the national level, Habyarimana tried to form coalitions without them or divide them

(by strictly promoting their moderate members) which he effectively did in 1992 leading to more moderate and extremist branches of the MRD.

- In the northern prefectures most affected by RPF invasion, the CDR consolidated power. This occurred through radicalization through violence, but also through opportunistic seizures of land from Tutsis and militia formation. The CDR's leadership largely was foreign-educated and it possessed ties to the President's wife circle. The CDR was openly anti-RPF and anti-Tutsi. The RPF would continuously protest inclusion of the CDR into any power-sharing agreement.
- The PL (Liberal Party) attracted businesspeople and many Tutsis identified with. Its leader and founder was jailed and acquitted in 1975 for the alleged murder of his wife (whose family possessed strong ties to Habyarimana). Habyarimana kept him in prison for six years anyways, creating a lasting bitterness. The PSD (Social Democrat Party) which attracted intellectuals, Tutsis, and many Hutu from the South. These parties became increasingly accused of collaborating the RPF. Likely, some collaboration occurred and both parties would 'join' the RPF's government following genocide. But, they were neither 'puppets' nor 'apostles' of the RPF.

Note, despite these social differences, none of the parties advanced truly different visions for Rwanda's future. *In particular, we do not see any different economic visions. Instead, the parties essentially fought, to a lesser extent, on the shape of the state (institutional design, levels of democracy) and to a greater extent, for power*

within the state. This tracks with the Ethiopian case (in which all parties were Marxist on paper) and more importantly, the theory which predicts a specific kind of conflict over a specific kind of economy.

In any case, as a result of this multipartyism, Habyarimana and his circle's power decreased. For examples, in 1992, none of his appointments for military positions were accepted. In the same year, Gasana – a civilian – forced retirement of Colonels Serubaga (Gisenyi) Rwagafilita (Kibungo), Bagosora (Gisenyi), Sagatwa (Gisenyi), and Nshizirungu (Kigali-rural). This testified to a decrease in Habyarimana's sway but also to the increasing politicization of the military which the MRD and other parties attempted to detach from Habyarimana's networks.² Outside the capital, accusations against the 'little house' of corruption (and worse) began swirling and some MRND members defected to other parties. All the while, the RPF began successful guerrilla operations in the northern provinces of Byumba and Ruhengeri.

This led to negotiations (under French, Belgian, and American guidance) and the signing of the Arusha Accords – effectively a power-sharing agreement allowing for reintegration of the Tutsi refugees into Rwanda.⁷⁸ The agreement would have

⁷⁸ On the politics from the negotiations through eventual violence, see especially Guichaoua, André. *From war to genocide: Criminal politics in Rwanda, 1990–1994*. University of Wisconsin Press, 2015. Prunier, Gérard. *The Rwanda crisis: History of a genocide*. Columbia University Press, 1997, and Rawson, David. *Prelude to genocide: Arusha, Rwanda, and the failure of diplomacy*. Ohio University Press, 2018

guaranteed the RPF, MRD, CDP, and PL representation in both the government and regulated Habyarimana's presidential power. The RPF, by most accounts, 'won' this bargain with a guaranteed, disproportionate 50% share of the military hierarchy and 40% of the armed forces, as well as the exclusion of the CDR. Habyarimana signed the agreement but dithered in its implementation (which was to be completed in 22 months). In the meantime, the RPF continued low-level guerrilla attacks as well as assassinations of MRD and other political leaders.

During this time, at the macro-level, economically, nothing really changed or improved. Coffee prices remained low, local resistance to communal work and state directives (especially the growth of sustenance rather than coffee or tea) continued, and Rwanda remained highly dependent on foreign aid. Politically, in 1991, Habyarimana attempted to create an MRND-dominated cabinet and government. In response, the PSD, PL, and MRD would coalesce against the MRND. This involved, among other things, mass demonstrations in Butare (a PL/PSD area), Gitarama (a MRD area), and Kigali (the nation's capital). Habyarimana capitulated, and a more broad-based government was formed. This government abolished the quota system, fired some suspected of hate speech and violence, and checked some of Habyarimana's actions as unconstitutional.

At the meso-level, the political parties – especially the MRND, CDR, and MRD began developing and funding militias and youth wings. These organizations were

designed to simultaneously prevent incursions by rivals and mobilize local support. The MRND founded the Interahamwe first, which originally possessed some Tutsi members and lacked any explicit extremist ideology. Members enjoyed freedom of movement within Rwanda, access to beer and events, work and contracts, clothing, and in some cases arms and military training. This was largely financed through akuza members and business contacts. The MDR countered with their *Inkuba* (who often intimidated rural MRND support in the south), while even the PL and PSD formed their own youth groups. Meanwhile, the CDR's Impuzamugambi facilitated both protection from other parties but, more explicitly, worked to protect against the RPF and 'enemies within.' Further, while nominally associated with CDR, these groups received some funding from army and 'akuza' as well. These forces, while nominally loyal to specific parties, sometimes operated independently and generated some intra-party friction (at least within the MRND and MDR).

The Rise of the Akuza and Hutu Power

At this point, we see several developments which correspond with the theory. *Namely, we see an economic recession simultaneously weakening patronage resources and driving mass discontent. This weakened insular politico-economic-military networks' reach across the country. Within this new political 'space', we see meso-level contests for economic and political control which yield new organizations – namely*

militias attached to political parties. This frustrated any attempts at economic action, political reform, or even repression of an escalating situation.

However, at this point, the eventual actors and the axis of conflict had not consolidated. Specifically, at this point, both the akuza and the 'Hutu Power' movement did not exist in their eventual more organized forms. Let us begin with the akuza. There are two open questions. First, how organized and purposeful was this network? Especially in comparative context, the range of high positions and depth of ties within this network remains remarkable. However, some view the akuza as a loose collection of individuals surrounding Habyarimana who shared social ties and personal histories as well as certain political and economic interests. Others see a coordinated, plotting collection of individuals working however possible to retain their power and, arguably, eliminate Tutsi populations from Rwanda.

Empirically, within the Second Republic, we see clear favoritism and corruption by members within this network. We also see the promotion of individuals to regional and other command positions all across the country based on the endorsement of akuza figures. Whether this derived some conscious plotting, an informal, unplanned system of favors, or some combination remains unclear to me. The 'akuza' label, after all, originated as opposition rhetoric and Bagasora himself would dispute the term in international criminal tribunals. Further, in the longer-term, we see some akuza members funding CDR enterprises while others remained more MRND specific. And,

following Habyarimana's assassination, we see intra-'akuza' fighting and the rise and fall of individuals (including Bagasora).

Second, what was Habyarimana's relation to this network? During the multiparty period, Habyarimana adopted many proposals (including the Arusha Accords and the forced retirement of some generals including Bagasora) and condemned anti-Tutsi actions in many cases. Further, some allege the death of one of his chosen successors (younger and from outside the alleged circle) in a car accident testifies to his distance from them. On the other hand, he possessed long-standing and multidimensional ties with many of these individuals. He never pursued an 'anti-corruption' purge of them nor did we witness any attempts to 'split' their ranks in the same way he attempted with the MDR.

So, at this time, I submit the network ties and resource flows which underlaid the akuza existed.⁷⁹ And, we see various actions intended to prevent challenges to their positions as well as continued permissiveness if not encouragement from Habyarimana himself. Exactly how consolidated and purposeful 'they' were remains an open question. But, I suspect, the increasing escalation of domestic and international threats,

⁷⁹ As discussed the exact composition and nature of this network remains debated, as reflected in the international trials and testimonies. For a pessimistic view of a sprawling organization, see Wallis, Andrew. *Stepp'd in Blood: Akazu and the Architects of the Rwandan Genocide against the Tutsi*. John Hunt Publishing, 2019.

combined with Habyarimana's assassination in particular, likely further reinforced and entrenched ties within this network. *From the theory's perspective, the akuza's rise and existence is explained by the co-evolution of economics and politics. But, whether political escalation and violence was necessary to consolidate and coordinate this network remains unanswered.*

At this time, we also see a cross-cutting, multi-party, fluid political conflict. We do not see a clear 'Hutu' versus 'Tutsi' divide at the macro-level (coalitional politics) or at the meso-level (local political violence or mobilization campaigns). Many early works on the Rwandan violence view this divide as long-standing and perpetrators as plotting violence well before 1994. But, recent work (especially by Omar McDoom) and my reading suggests this ignores a puzzle: namely, how and why do we see a rise and consolidation of a 'Hutu Power' movement which effectively 'polarized' the conflict?⁸⁰ Much rhetoric and even political violence operated against the MRND and akuza. Why did we not see a moderate coalition or several of them? Why did this not occur immediately upon multipartyism?

The theory, of course, does not explain much about psychology or 'culture.' And, comparatively, we see political organizations possessing different platforms, depictions

⁸⁰ McDoom, Omar Shahabudin. *The path to genocide in Rwanda: security, opportunity, and authority in an ethnocratic state*. Vol. 152. Cambridge University Press, 2021.

of threats, etc. So before discussing the empirics and the theory's explanatory relevance, *I first want to describe what we know about Hutu-Tutsi relations during this time in Rwanda.* Many have commented on the Hutu-Tutsi relations during Habyarimana's regime. Some describe peace and progress, evidenced by higher intermarriage rates (or affairs in Kigali), low political violence, and reported memories of soccer games, marriage ceremonies, or more casual nights drinking. Compared to the organized action and violence of the First Republic, this holds. But, until its final years, Habyarimana's Second Republic was a complex sometimes contradictory place. Quotas and ID cards persisted, the appointment of Tutsi bishops was fought, and the reintegration of Tutsi refugees was rejected.

Perhaps, then, discussing these relations at different levels of analysis is most helpful. At the macro-level, because Tutsi lineages had received more education, worked beyond the agricultural hills, and occupied the state (by most accounts) they possessed more qualifications and skills per capita than Hutus. Habyarimana's regime instituted quotas and other policies which effectively limited their advancement within the army, the school system, the bureaucracy, business enterprises, and especially Habyarimana's inner circle. And, as discussed, people near Habyarimana's circle would eventually fund hate radio and sponsor the CDR. He also would keep the ID cards created during the First Republic. Most Tutsis did not, however, become peasants or pursue revolution. Instead, many worked whatever land they possessed, carved

themselves spaces outside of the state (as merchants, within the church, or through international opportunities), used whatever connections and wealth they had to form partnerships with Habyarimana's regime, or (sometimes) married into Hutu lineages or concealed their Tutsi lineages.

At the meso-level, we see spatial variation in Hutu-Tutsi relations. Some areas simply had more Tutsis than others. Others had different historical experiences with colonialism and Hutu-Tutsi relations. Butare, which would 'hold-out' against genocide the longest, possessed the old capital of the kingdom and, from a political economy perspective, possessed a less agricultural economy with the university, hospitals, urban merchants, etc. The South and Central areas, were conquered earlier and reflected the stereotypical vision of Tutsi wealth and Hutu peasants. Unsurprisingly, these areas birthed the original mass-based, Hutu-socialist PARMEHUTU party. But the North was conquered later, possessed less Tutsis generally, and did not neatly reflect this political economy. Habyarimana's wife's Hutu family lineage, after all, represented many landholders from Gisenyi.

At the micro-level, we see some cross-cutting trends. We see contradiction. Many people, let alone their immediate circles, possessed mixed ancestries or current family trees. Many accounts, and some explanations for participation, discuss attempts to save someone's somebody who was Tutsi or part-Tutsi. We also see cohabitation. Some perpetrators even would discuss dreams of playing soccer with Tutsi they eventually

killed. But, we also see hatred. Most of this literature focuses on Hutu treatment toward Tutsis. We read of schoolteachers bullying Tutsi students, local businessmen intimidating a young woman by touching her thinner, 'Tutsi' nose, and some humiliations occurring during political party rallies. I have found less written about Tutsi animosity toward Hutus during this time.

All together then, many reasonably argue the Habyarimana regime and essentially everyone involved could have created institutions, incentives, and norms to 'break through' these existing social structures across the long-term. I think, wherever possible, this would have helped. However, like all ideas, 'race' was embedded in social networks and lives. For example, racial identification necessarily correlated strongly within kinship networks. And, mathematically, integration is harder than it looks. If we accept the numbers and ignore the population with mixed ancestry, Hutu represented 85% of the population and Tutsis represented 14%. If *half* the Tutsi population married a Hutu (ignoring existing marriages and age considerations), less than 9% of Hutus would have intermarried. A similar logic extends to social networks, whereby even if 75% of Tutsis and Hutus made ties without considering race, more than 90% of Hutu social ties would involve other Hutus.

So, we return to a fluid, cross-cutting multiparty situation which would eventually consolidate into a 'Hutu Power' axis compromised of the akuza, CDR, the

MDR-Power faction, a PL faction, and MRND faction. How and why did this happen?

Empirically, the following factors are often cited.

- *Intra-party and intra-militia violence.* During this time, we see much local violence. In particular, we see assassinations of PSD and CDR leadership. We see some violence against Tutsis following unfavorable national developments or driven by local political or economic circumstances. We also see looting and riots within Kigali by many political parties (including the PSD), CDR attacks on police in Kigali, MRD arson of state-run forests and companies, clashes between MRND and MRD youth groups in South and Central Rwanda (and other groups elsewhere), and a general ‘militarization’ of daily life within and beyond the capital.
- *The political violence in Burundi.* In 1993, a newly elected Hutu leader was assassinated by Tutsi military and political actors. This descended into two-sided violence and civil war. This drove more Hutu refugees to Rwanda’s southern border but also drove fears of Tutsi domination within Rwanda to come.
- *The RPF.*⁸¹ The RPF could not dominate in elections. This was clear from the start, they possessed few ties within Rwanda, had invaded the country, and largely

⁸¹ The motives and actions of the RPF remain controversial and somewhat blurry. More negative assessments include Davenport, Christian, and Allan C. Stam. "What really happened in Rwanda?." *Miller-McCune*, October 6 (2009): 2009 and Rever, Judi. *In praise of blood: The crimes of the Rwandan Patriotic Front*. Vintage Canada, 2020. Others include Verwimp, Philip. "Testing

represented Tutsis within a majority Hutu context. But, following the removal of several local and regional leaders on corruption charges in the 1990's, the MRND and MRD won elections handily. The RPF resorted to violence. This began with 'terror tactics' – raids and assassinations, sometimes anonymously – to destabilize the domestic politics and, also, in response to CDR or other attacks on Tutsi populations. But, the RPF's breaking of the ceasefire and re-invasion (stopped only with French assistance) in 1993 is more oft-cited as dividing the domestic political parties into pro- and anti-RPF factions and otherwise scaring people within and outside the political apparatus. This also drove some defections to the RPF by Tutsis and approximately 800,000 internally displaced refugees (many of whom were coopted by youth groups). Whether any of these tactics (and those pursued during and following the 1994 genocide) escalated into anything resembling a 'double genocide' remains a debated question. But, it seems at least some actions in some places possessed some pogrom-like actions.

- ***Habyarimana and the akuza.*** Some argue Habyarimana could have done more to curb local violence and escalation. Others cite the funding of Radio Rwanda's hate content (which some argue did not reach most of the country and varied in its

the double-genocide thesis for central and southern Rwanda." *Journal of conflict resolution* 47, no. 4 (2003): 423-442.

extremism), the purchase of large numbers of machetes and small arms, and the military training and incitement of militias. Less cite the attempts to split opposition movements (the MRND's Interahamwe militia was present at the vote which split the MDR), but these too likely further polarized the conflict.

The point, for present purposes, is not to weigh if or how these different factors contributed to the consolidation of the Hutu Power movement. For what it's worth, I think you need a model which encompasses and connects dynamics across levels of analysis (micro, meso, macro, and international) to understand this causally as well as a dependent variable. *But the point, for present purposes, is to evaluate what they theory can and cannot say about this.* Again, the theory does not have much to say about Hutu or Tutsi identity or any of the dynamics induced by smaller-scale 'ethnic' violence. The theory can say the following, however.

- *The economic structure shaped both the stakes and possible participants.* At the elite level, again, no parties articulated transformative visions for Rwanda. Instead, they fought for 'shares of power' which essentially represented the only path to wealth. At the micro-level, we see poverty, displacement, and little opportunity. This facilitated mobilization for political parties ('youth wings' or otherwise) as well as violence (which often involved some 'looting').
- *By 1992, party and militia formation restricted options available to anyone.* Political and economic reforms, even if passed, would lack any reliable organization

to implement them. Demobilization, or exclusion of parties, also seemed unrealistic and attempts to weaken these organizations yielded violence. Further, this created few real 'brakes' on local violence (whether through police or outright repression). Consequently, it is unsurprising Rwanda remained 'deadlocked' for years.

- *The organizational structure of the akuza presented distinct constraints and opportunities.*
 - Regarding capabilities, the akuza was difficult to dislodge (even the internationally mediated and RPF influenced Arusha Accords failed to do so) and could mobilize violence effectively through its military, militia, political, and economic resources. This eventually allowed for genocidal planning, but in the short-term allowed them to pressure other parties and made them an attractive ally.
 - Regarding constraints, they lacked strong co-optive capacity. They could not realistically coopt all other parties (because of declining funds as well as the 'rent-seeking' structure of elite economics) and, because their long-term power owed to their state positions, they faced commitment problems. Worries about prosecution, for crimes against the First Republic and during the multiparty era, reappear within the case. Consequently, it's unsurprising they mobilized 'from below' (amongst the young, displaced, and poor) and attempted to split whatever organizations they faced.

So, while the theory cannot tell us everything about the multiparty period, it still provides some insights into its eventual course.

Habyarimana's Assassination and the Consolidative Violence

At this point, most of the theory's conditions for consolidative violence are satisfied. The final ingredient, a coup attempt, came in April 1994. Unknown assailments (my reading leans toward the RPF) attacked a plane carrying President Habyarimana and much of his cabinet including the army chief. In this context, no one really attained possess control of political organizations, militias, or the military. In the immediate aftermath (in terms of hours and days), several trends emerged.⁸²

1. Violence against Tutsis, especially in areas controlled by MRND or CDR militias, began. Further, roadblocks, monitoring of opponents, and some killings began in the capital Kigali by these forces. However, at this point, MRD and MRND militias often conflicted rather than acted together.
2. People associated with the akuzas met and strategized. General Bagasora failed, originally, to create a ruling body favorable to their interests. *From this point, this network worked to create an interim government which could receive international recognition (many in the MRD and MRND still believed in their electoral promise),*

⁸² See Des Forges, Alison. "Leave none to tell the story." *New York: Human Rights Watch* (1999).

purge their moderate and RPF-affiliated competition from this government, and prevent an invasion by the RPF.

3. Two days after the assassination, the RPF resumed hostilities. Moderate members continued negotiations and many others urged for ceasefire, but affiliates of the akuza were rarely among them.

At this point, killings of Hutu moderates (including leaders of the PSD, MRD-moderate factions, and PL moderate factions) and continued murders of Tutsi 'affiliates' ramped. Arms were acquired and given to many militia members. Some locally organized killings occurred, but the akuza had not yet coopted or organized sufficient MRD-Power or regional contacts. They were never quite successful in establishing legitimacy within and outside the military. Few party members outside the MDR joined the new movement and many military generals and members defected home during the violence. They were also not successful in stopping the RPF, whose strategic maneuvers suggest they prioritized capturing the country rather than saving their co-ethnic. They would also continue hunting MRND and MRD Hutus across borders following their victory.

They were, however, successful in mobilizing local forces and populations against the Tutsi population of which over roughly 80% died. Near the capital, Hutu moderates were also targeted and some resistant and intermarried Hutu faced violence across the country. The timing of violence and pattern of participation varied by region,

but many non-combatants provided information, participated in violence, and worked to prevent Tutsis escaping violence. MRD strongholds and MRND militia areas witnessed extensive violence relatively quickly. Further, MRD organizations and MRND militias represent the most frequent and mobile attackers across all prefectures. Where violence did not occur, in many communes as well as the Butare prefectures, these groups often attempted to invade and coerce these areas. Tragically, they often attacked areas such as stadiums or churches where Tutsis had gathered for safety by local authorities or priests.

Butare represented the longest and most thorough resistance to violence. While some MDR southern communes organized violence, much of the North and urban areas remained peaceful until armed intervention by national organizations. Strikingly, this pattern of violence recapitulated by commune their prior political associations during the 1960's. At the local elite level, the urban and Northern communes represented the PSD and PL (reincarnations of the 'class-based' interethnic APROSOMA of the 1960's) who had historic antagonisms with the MDR and few connections with Habyarimana's MRND. The assassination of the former queen, as well as some the deployment of armed forces, eventually overcame this resistance. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 presents a summary of the subnational patterns of violence before and after Habyarimana's assassination.

Table 5.3: Prefecture Data Prior to Violence

Prefecture	Tutsi % of Population	Party Affiliation	Prior Violence
Kigali (rural)	8.8	MRND/PSD/PL/MDR	crime and disobedience, some ethnic tensions from 1992 forward
Kigali (city)	17.9	MRND	ethnic violence during RPF war, inter-militia violence between MDR MRND
Kibungo	7.7	MRND/MDR	some tension between MRND and MDR supporters
Byumba	1.5	MRND	violence against Tutsi's in 1993 during MRND demonstrations and opposition counter-demonstrations
Ruhengeri	0.5	MRND	some violence against Tutsi during RPF war, violence against Tutsi's in 1993 during MRND demonstrations and opposition counter-demonstrations
Cyangugu	10.5	MRND/MDR	violence, arson, attacks on state property following MDR rallies in the 90's
Butare	17.3	PSD/PL/MDR	high crime across prefecture for a decade, MDR intimidation in some Southern communes
Gikongoro	12.8	MDR	arson, rural discontent, eventual high MDR intimidation
Kibuye	14.8	MDR	rural, non ethnic violence and disobedience in late 1980's, eventual fighting between MDR and MRND militias, attacks in some communes against Tutsi during 1992 RPF war
Gitarama	9.2	MDR	MDR intimidation and violence
Gisenyi	2.9	MRND	violence against Tutsi's in 1993 during MRND demonstrations and opposition counter-demonstrations

Table 5.4: Prefecture Patterns of Violence

Prefecture	Timing	Resistance	Perpetrator Type
Kigali	Early	Moderate leaders targeted	Interahamwe, MRND
Kibungo	Early	Burgomaster resistance	MRD
Byumba	Early	Some MRND politician resistance	Interahamwe, military
Ruhengeri	Early	N/A	Interahamwe, military
Cyangugu	Early and Mid	Some Local commune resistance	Military networks, rural MRD
Butare	Late (April 15+)	Sustained, with exception of some Southeastern communes	Outside militias and armed forces
Gikongoro	Early (April 6-8) and Mid (April 9-14 th)	Burgomaster Resistance	MDR
Kibuye	Early and Mid	Limited Burgomaster resistance	MDR
Gitarama	Mid/Variation	Burgomaster Resistance	MDR
Gisenyi	Early	Moderate Leaders Targeted	Interahamwe, armed forces

Chapter 6: Consolidative Mass Killings in Burundi and Ethiopia

The Burundi and Ethiopia cases witnessed parallel dynamics to the Rwandan and Indonesian cases. In both of these cases, mobilization for violence remained less thorough than in Rwanda and Indonesia, resulting in less (though still massive) deaths. In Burundi, violence remained more confined to the North and Hutu professional classes. In Ethiopia, violence remained more confined to urban centers. This owed to both the existing organizational reach of the perpetrators and targets. Together, nonetheless, these cases provide further confirmation of the theory's expectations. Tables 1 provides a summary of the theory's variables in the cases, while Tables 2 and 3 track their dynamics across time. I then review the cases more thoroughly below.

Table 6.1: The Theory Within the Cases

Variable.	Ethiopia.	Burundi.
Colonial Legacy of Relatively Indirect Rule, Centered on Export Economies?	Yes, but more direct. More of a colonial sponsored monarchy.	Yes, Germany than Belgium.
Highly Agricultural Economy with Select Profitable Exports?	Yes, nearly 90% of workforce in agriculture, majority of revenues deriving from coffee exports.	Yes, nearly 90% of workforce in agriculture, majority of revenues deriving from coffee exports.
Economic Downturn?	Yes, accompanying large-scale changes and political turmoil. Less drastic than Rwanda or Indonesia.	Yes, beginning with political turmoil in the 1960's. But less drastic than Rwanda or Indonesia.
Mass-Based Political Opposition?	Yes, EPRP especially, but also MEISON.	Yes, eventual Hutu coalitions in majority Hutu country, but also monarchy affiliated Tutsi vestiges.
Insular Politico-Military-Social Networks?	Yes, the Derg.	Yes, the 'Group from Bururi.'
Militia Formation?	Yes, but more urban-centric and near-term than Rwanda.	Yes, through the JRR in particular. Some regional unevenness, however.
Coup Attempt?	Yes, multiple person shootout within military circles.	Yes, with caveats. Prince returns, insurrection (targeting Bururi especially). But 'preemptive' counterattacks at elite level.

Table 6.2: Evolutionary Scheme in Ethiopia

Time Period	Economics	Political	Organization
Colonial-Postcolonial Period	Highly agricultural, geared toward exports	Kingdom, thought of as 'empire state'	Network of junior officers seizes control amidst protests and defections, few ties outside itself.
State-Building Phase	Massive and quick land reform, nationalization of industries and finance	Initial cooperation and invitation toward civilian groups. All groups, nominally, socialist. And, some movements for autonomy in the periphery	Beginnings of 'outreach' to the rural/periphery. Mixed success generally, with differential success of EPRP, Derg-affiliates, and MEISON geographically.
Conflict Phase	Stagnation. Competition for control of 'associations' in urban areas and rural ones too.	Urban terrorism and reprisals between EPRP and MESION, eventually Derg members as well.	EPRP militarizes, seeks military contacts. Militia counter-formation not as strong as other cases, but begins.
Consolidative Mass Killing	Same as above.	Coup attempt against Derg.	Mobilization of forces for purges, but incomplete and more urban-centric.

Table 6.3: Evolutionary Scheme in Ethiopia

Time Period	Economics	Political	Organization
Colonial-Postcolonial Period	Highly agricultural, geared toward exports.	Kingdom, thought of as 'empire state.'	Network of officers, popular monarchial descendent, and several political parties inherit state after independence.
State-Building Phase	Some land reform, nationalization of industries and finance. Largely through control of sale of coffee as well as agricultural supplies	Series of coups, suspected plots, purges. Initially Hutu and previous Tutsi monarchial class increasingly expelled from government.	Cooptation of many existing organizations and formation of youth groups under JRR umbrella.
Conflict Phase	Stagnation. Regional problems in trade.	Increasing repression, purges, and local political violence in the North.	Hutu paramilitaries begin forming (and cooperating with international rebels and Tutsi monarchists)
Consolidative Mass Killing	Same as above.	Insurrection, coupled with return of monarchy.	Mobilization of forces, widespread killing in the North, particularly against Hutu elite.

I. The Evolution of Conflict in Ethiopia

Of these four cases, Ethiopia had perhaps the most promising beginnings. Junior officers deposing an increasingly unpopular monarchy, greeted with cheers and gifts in the cities. These officers seemed aligned on a socialist vision of the country. They observed they lacked the power to state-build (and economy-build) by themselves.

They invited existing political organizations (peasant unions, trade unions, teachers' unions who would form the EPRP) to the table and even encouraged members of the international community to return home to work to do this (whose networks would form the core of MEISON). All of these actors, in principle, were socialist. So, how and why did things end in such violence?

State-building began in 1941 under Emperor Haile Selassie. Formerly exiled during Italian colonization and challenged by upstart regional leaders who gained power during rebellions, the Emperor saw state-building as necessary to expand his own power and limit his enemies. The major contenders for the throne hailed from Tigre and remained Haile's main concern. Haile attempted to maintain and expand control by eliminating regional leaders through repression, appointments of loyalists (and often close relations) to regional leadership, and controlling resource flows wherever possible. Haile's precarious position and different regional politics drove an uneven pattern of state-building which some have described as a 'empire-state.' Nation-building, in the sense of forming national identities and institutions around these identities, was neither a core idea nor goal of Haile's agenda.⁸³

Resistance movements continued throughout Haile's reign. In 1952, the UN imposed a power-sharing agreement in Eritrea involving a more federalist proposal.

⁸³ For a review of Ethiopia's history during this time, see Clapham, Christopher. *Transformation and continuity in revolutionary Ethiopia*. Vol. 61. CUP Archive, 1990.

Haile disbanded this, engineering a vote and appointing his son-in-law as governor. The Etrian Liberation Front forms almost immediately. In the late 1960's resistance movements would also coalesce in Gojjam and Bale. But the strongest challenges would come in 1970's closer to home. Declines in living standards, military wages, and promotions corresponded with strikes, open criticism, demonstrations, and resignations civil servants, transport workers, municipal services, printing, religious groups, teachers and students. These would combine with limited peasant movements in the South, although industry and many other peasants did not actively protest the regime.

All of this culminated in a 'coup from below', staged by junior officers announcing themselves as the Derg. What was the Derg? Who comprised the Derg? At the time, the Derg hid its names and numbers, leading some to joke the Derg was Haile's newly revealed illegitimate son. Its members diverse backgrounds with different training, experience, and international lives. The centers of power within the Derg remained unclear and contested to its own members. Aman Andom, the Derg's original public leader, represented a more moderate, publicly recognizable, and senior individual occupying somewhat of a broker position within and beyond the Derg. But he was killed by people within the Derg before 1975. His replacement, Bante, represented a similar moderate, broker position. He too would be deposed before 1977.

In any case, the Derg were not heroes of the poor and disenfranchised. The Derg possessed roughly 100 members, dominated by noncommissioned officers with middle

level officers representing a third of total membership but most of the leadership. Army officers as a class were main beneficiaries of land-grant policy which gave them vested interests in the south and many drawn from settler or neftenya families. Mengistu Haile-Mariam, an eventual leader within the Derg, was raised in the second highest household of Dajazmatch (second highest after Ras, of the old titles of nobility) which was closely linked with the Court.

Nevertheless, the Derg's coup was greeted with some enthusiasm, with demonstrations and flowers being left on tanks in major cities. But practically, the Derg possessed several potential enemies and few connections to social, economic, or regional networks. In particular, the Derg viewed the landed wealth and former aristocracy as threats as well members of the air force and Army Corp of Engineers who possessed different generational, regional, and career trajectories as threats. These networks formed three separate, weakly organized groups which failed to coordinate amongst themselves:

- resistance movements in the south. Shoa and Sidamo. Arssi and Wollega.
- outlaws of 200 or so, conducting limited guerrilla warfare in Northern Shoa from the highlands.

- a more modern style EDU insurgency in Sudan.⁸⁴

The Derg surprised some with their violent approach to these threats. They killed 57 members of the King's old guard, repressed Eritrea, and killed several leaders within the Army Corp of Engineers. At the same time, however, the Derg appeared more accommodating to civic organizations and peasant grievances. The major civilian organizations were the EPRP and MEISON.⁸⁵ Both these organizations, and eventually the Derg, expressed similar socialist programs. But demographically, who were these organizations?

1. The EPRP tended to have younger membership drawn for those educated locally or in the United States. The North was overrepresented in its ranks, including Tigreans and Eritreans. In other regions, ethnic divisions tended to drive differential loyalties to either MEISON or the EPRP. In southwestern Shoa, for example, Oromos supported MEISON and Guarges supported the EPRP. Perhaps for these reasons, the EPRP was more accommodating to claims for more regional autonomy. But beyond this, the EPRP drew support from students and intelligentsia who disliked

⁸⁴ See Tareke, Gebru. "The Ethiopia-Somalia war of 1977 revisited." *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 33, no. 3 (2000): 635-667.

⁸⁵ On the early state-building attempts, see Ottaway, Marina, ed. *The political economy of Ethiopia*. Greenwood Press, 1990.

and distrusted the military. It also possessed strong ties with trade-union organization CELU and airlines union which had opposed Derg dominance.

- II. MEISON, by contrast, represented individuals educated abroad invited home by the Derg to participate in this new nation-building project. MEISON's membership trended older than EPRP and they MEISON targets Teacher's Association, student youth movements, labor unions. Their primary enemies are feudalism, imperialism, and bureaucratic capitalism.

The Derg would attempt to nation and economy build simultaneously and rapidly alongside these countries. Like our other three contexts, Ethiopia was a largely agricultural economy with a few profitable exports (namely coffee).⁸⁶ The Derg would essentially nationalize the economy as much as possible. This included

- January 1975 – nationalization of banks and insurance companies and major industrial companies. This totaled about seventy companies.
- National land reform through creation of peasant associations. Over 18,000 of these were formed, often alongside literacy and other outreach programs. All

• ⁸⁶ See Ottoway once more for these attempts. But also, Crewett, Wibke, Ayalneh Bogale, and Benedikt Korf. "Land tenure in Ethiopia: Continuity and change, shifting rulers, and the quest for state control." (2008). Dejene, Alemneh. *Peasants, agrarian socialism, and rural development in Ethiopia*. Routledge, 2019., and Getu, Makonen. *Socialism and Development in Ethiopia: A Critical Examination of the Military Regime's Socialist Agricultural Program*. Regnum Books International, 2015

incorporated under the vertically integrated All Ethiopian Peasant Association. Even the Soviet Union would balk at its speed and scale of this program.

- Urban land and housing reform. Similar to land reform with larger estates becoming state-owned and redistributed. Associations named kebeles founded which organized work, housing, and other administrative issues.
- Control of the coffee sector, through set prices and control of export markets. Sesame, sugar, cotton, grain production exempt from redistribution.

Organizationally, these moves required massive coordination and mobilization efforts.⁸⁷ Rurally, peasant associations were organized often by students or party members, who attempted to simultaneously organize and educate peasants into their particular style of thinking. In practice, local peasant associations came to be led by popular peasants, priests, teachers, mid-range connectors rather than large landlords. The reception of these organizers was mixed and some lamented students' superior attitude toward them, interventions in local politics, and emphasis on collective forms of production. In the cities, kebeles organized streets and sanitation, collected rents, and organizing some rationing of provisions for the poor. Perhaps most importantly, the state controlled the overcrowded and increasingly dilapidated housing market.

⁸⁷ See Herrera, Linda. "Youth and Politics in Post 1974 Ethiopia: Intergenerational Analysis." (1974).

Economically, the problems the Derg inherited (inflation, lagging GDP to population growth, agricultural inefficiency, infrastructure development) did not improve. Politically, conflicts escalated quickly. Competition in urban areas over control of kebeles was intense. Originally, this involved large-scale strikes which drove Derg repression. But, eventually this escalated into local violence between the EPRP and MEISON. At first, the EPRP targeted members of MEISON and 'new men' recently recruited into kebele leadership positions. MEISON would respond with its own targeted violence, which only escalated EPRP attacks which involved killing whole families, hanging children, and gunning down husbands in cars waiting for wives and children assassinating young members of families.


The Derg attempted to repress the EPRP and this violence, but remained beset with its own internal contradictions and competing loyalties.⁸⁸ MEISON would call for arming the peasantry, which the Derg largely resisted. By 1976, this "urban warfare" would claim the lives of some within the Derg. This culminated in a shootout amongst Derg members which claimed dozens of Derg officials. Mengistu's faction emerged victorious. They proceeded to organize violence against remaining Derg opponents,

⁸⁸ For reviews of violence, see Wiebel, Jacob. "Atrocities in Revolutionary Ethiopia, 1974-79: Towards a Comparative Analysis." *Journal of Genocide Research* 24, no. 1 (2022): 134-147. and Wiebel, Jacob. "'Let the Red Terror Intensify': Political Violence, Governance and Society in Urban Ethiopia, 1976-78." *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 48, no. 1 (2015): 13-29.

EPRP elites, and EPRP followers (particularly in urban areas). This involved mobilizing local youth groups, arming civilians (some of whom took the guns and went home), and hunting suspected EPRP members (which involved some mistakes). This, of course, resembles the violence witnessed in Indonesia. However, violence remained largely confined to urban areas. Estimates vary, but converge around 100,000 deaths.

II. The Evolution of Conflict in Burundi

Map 6.1: Burundi



Economically, Rwanda and Burundi resembled each other mightily. Both were highly agricultural, largely rural and relatively poor (average of less than one hectare per peasant family), and relied on coffee exports. More than 80% of foreign exchange receipts came from coffee. Like Rwanda, most of these profits went to the sellers rather than growers of coffee. While Burundi nationalized all untenured land in 1960 and pursued some reforms (and land grabs) in the previous decade, Burundi would not nationalize the coffee industry entirely until 1976, four years after violence.

Nevertheless, the state extracted most of the profits from coffee while simultaneously avoiding most of the hardest work. They did so by controlling every available aspect of the trade. Farmers relied on the state for the necessary fertilizers, research, and cleaning. They then sold to the state, which set prices and taxes on coffee and land. The state then packaged, marketed, and sold the coffee internationally to acquire profits which they redistributed to farmers on their terms through the price of crops. This control had existed in some form for a long time, but was expedited in 1948 through new formal administrations and infrastructure projects.

As in Rwanda, this economic scheme ensured two things.⁸⁹ First, control of the state corresponded with the 'only game in town', control of lucrative exports. This

⁸⁹ For a comprehensive look at Ethiopia's political economy and coffee sector see Ngaruko, Floribert, and Janvier D. Nkurunziza. "An economic interpretation of conflict in Burundi." *Journal of African economies* 9, no. 3 (2000): 370-409. But, especially, see Oketch, Johnstone

occurred both because these contexts lacked other large-scale lucrative enterprises, but also because in contrast to other natural resources (such as oil, timber, or diamonds) coffee requires territorial control, sustained work and long harvests, and is otherwise less conducive to smuggling. Second, actors are highly dependent on the international price of coffee which they cannot strongly influence. Consequently, we witness some regular correspondence between price declines and domestic turbulence in Burundi, including and extending beyond the early 1970's.

Socially and politically Rwanda and Burundi diverged more.⁹⁰ Like Rwanda, Burundi was a majority Hutu state with Tutsi possessing economic, educational, and political privileges. Further, colonialism brought administrative centralization and penetration beginning in the 1930's. Hutus largely were purged or side-stepped as this system expanded and the Tutsi aristocracy enjoyed privileged access to education and colonial administrative positions (which yielded some Hutu rebellions in the early 1940's). But these ethnic divisions were not as rigid socially, economically, or politically in colonial Burundi. Some Hutu held prestigious and lucrative positions within the Court

Summit, and Tara Polzer. "Conflict and coffee in Burundi." *Scarcity and Surfeit, The Ecology of Africa's Conflicts*. Institute for Security Studies, South Africa (2002): 85-156.

⁹⁰ For general reviews of this socio-political landscape, see Lemarchand, René. *Burundi: Ethnic conflict and genocide*. Cambridge University Press, 1996. and Ndarubagiye, Léonce. *Burundi: the origins of the Hutu-Tutsi Conflict*. L. Ndarubagiye, 1996.

and intra-Tutsi divisions remained prominent. Some Hutu even married into prestigious Tutsi families and their identities and lineages 'became' Tutsi.

As independence movements began unfolding in the region (Rwanda, etc.), three organizations began to take shape. They included:

- UPRONA, led by Prince Rwagasora. Rwagasora had a Hutu wife and was Western educated. The party still possessed strong ties and privileges associated with King's court, which had moved away from them somewhat in recent somewhat decades. Dominated by those with Catholic rather than state education and attracted Hutu support. Became increasingly populist and anti-colonialist across time. Nevertheless, the JNR, the party's young wing, while possessing both Hutu and Tutsis, remained an elite, largely urban institution.
- PDC. Based in the Batware dynasty and other sections of privileged Tutsi elite. More gradualist in their approach to independence with stronger ties to Belgium.
- Hutu Party of the People, which did not upstart into the mid 1960's and would possess some success in the North.

Underneath and often cutting across these political affiliations were ethnic and regional differences. Within the Tutsis, the Tutsi-Hima (generally from the South) were distinguished from the Tutsi-Banyaruguru (generally) from the North. The Tutsi-Banyaruguru were traditionally understood as closer to the king and higher in social

status. The Tutsi-Hima had strong representation in the military but the climate and soil in the South made the region less prosperous. The North of the country was more Catholic while the South, which retained traditional belief systems and acquired some Protestant followings as well. Hutu identity was not as crystallized as elsewhere and the 'Hutu Party of the People' began as several dispersed movements which initially struggled to gain momentum. Economically, the majority of Hutu were poor farmers while some (mainly urban, mainly Northern) occupied positions within the military, the Court, the university, or elsewhere. And, geographically, the Burundi's north borders Rwanda, creating some historical and commercial ties with Rwandan Hutu.

Consequently, these organizations did not reflect clear economic, social, or political positions. At this time, almost all parties always pledged allegiance to the aristocracy. Faults or shortcomings of the king were attributed to this situation ('the mwami is a prisoner.')

This reflected existing ties of organizations to throne, but also practical necessities of retaining the king as well as Belgium's favor. In contrast to Indonesia, Burundi would transfer into a constitutional monarchy under the acceptance of the international community following Belgium's departure.

In 1961 UPRONA won a landslide victory and Prince Rwagasora proclaimed a relatively progressive, inclusive vision. Shortly thereafter, he was murdered by a combination of Greek nationals with business ties to the PDC as well as ranking members of the PDC. Exactly how involved Belgium and the highest ranking members

of the PDC were remains unclear. But the coup drove some Tutsi-Hutu violence within the capital and created a political vacuum at the centre of the state. UPRONA, the electoral victors, fell into disarray and in-fighting. The Tusti-ganwa (essentially, prior power-holders within the monarchy) emerged from this in-fighting. They would promote Rwagasora's image but little of these policies.

This movement within UPRONA led to discrimination for Tutsis and against Hutus (including some assassinations) within the organization. By 1964, 80 of the 133 high-ranking posts were held by Tutsis. This move drove an increasingly Tutsification of the state as well as increased organization and membership of Hutu counterorganization. But, as the continued history of purges of Hutus, intra-Tutsi intrigues, and regional movements will suggest, Burundi did not possess a unified or dominant Hutu versus Tutsi divide.

At this time, those hoping for a successful, peaceful, and developing Burundi faced four major obstacles: economic, organizational, political, and international. Internationally, the usurpation of power by the PARMEHUTU in Rwanda exacerbated Hutu and Tutsi tensions. On the one hand, Hutu within Burundi (particularly in the North) had a potential ally to overthrow or challenge unfavorable domestic power arrangements. On the other hand, Hutu violence against Tutsis created substantial refugee flows of Tutsis who had recently been dispossessed and attacked. Until 1966,

some of these refugees would use Burundi as a base to launch attacks into Rwanda (none of which seriously threatened Rwanda's First Republic).

Economically, Burundi did not diversify, expand, or otherwise improve its economy which stalled for the next decade. While international coffee prices remained steady, several other factors hurt the economy. Domestically, decolonization and political in-fighting led to the flight and purges of qualified personnel. Industrial production declined and industrial production plummeted, with firm capacity utilization dropping to about 25% in 1962/63. Further, political violence strained the energies, lives, and patronage networks of almost everyone while simultaneously deterring foreign investment. Regionally, Congo's independence in 1960 caused Burundi to lose half of its Eastern Congolese export market which created sizable trade deficits while Rwanda's independence facilitated growth of its own industries which limited its reliance of Burundi. Political gridlock and violence ensured essentially nothing was done about this until after 1972 and really in 1976, when Micombero was dethroned.

Organizationally, state reach, efficiency, and popularity remained limited. However, here, some progress occurred. UPRONA used three pillars in their attempt to state-build – the centralized trade union, the women's movement, and the JRR – of which the JRR was the most important. The JRR was comprised of the JNR but also consolidated several youth organizations UNEBA (a more student-led, socialist

organization and several religious groups.) Originally, it possessed both Tutsi and Hutu membership. The JRR was responsible for organizing compulsory communal labor, adjudicating local disputes, and monitoring rebellious activity. In terms of mobilization, the JRR was relatively successful, acquiring 10,000 members in the Ngozi province alone.

Politically, Burundi had two growing fault-lines which would only exacerbate across time. On the one hand, increasing exclusion and repression of Hutus increased Hutu-centric political mobilization, limited means through which Hutu elites could influence the state, and arguably pushed some toward accepting more drastic measures. In 1965, Hutu-led parties would capture a majority in elections which they believed would yield increased power within the state. But the King attempted to limit the number of elected positions within the state and appointed a *ganwa* with close monarchical ties to lead the state.

Hutu-led organizations would respond with violence. On the one hand, they attempted to overthrow the monarchy. This failed but caused the King to flee and appoint his son (who took the name Ntare V) to the throne. Ad-hoc courts delivered 86 death sentences to suspected conspirators and new prime minister (and former army general) Micombero killed around 50 other Hutu officers in the coming week. On the other, a major Hutu uprising occurred in central and northern Burundi. Around 500 unarmed Hutus were massacred in the Muramvya province. But the South would not

witness this uprising and social ties between Northern and Southern Hutus remained somewhat distant. In 1962, three-fourths of the Anglican Church broke from Northern-based organizations. Nevertheless, Tutsi authorities still suppressed these uprisings in the North as well as Hutu-led organized activities in the South.

But the turmoil did not end there. Micombero would depose Ntare V (who escaped to Uganda) within a year. This army-led coup facilitated a further Tutsification, and specifically a Tutsi-Hima-ification, of the state as well as the military. Sometimes labelled the Bururi-group, elites from Bururi including Micombero would infiltrate high-ranking formal and informal positions within economic, military, and political structures. The next three Burundian presidents, who all overthrew each other, would herald from the same neighborhood in Bururi (and two would be related).

Nevertheless, Micombero's hold on power remained tenuous. He faced Hutu organizations, which while repressed and largely expelled from positions of power, represented over 80% of the country's population. He also faced the Tutsi-Banyaruguru who retained a possible king abroad, long-standing ties, and still some local and national positions of power. All the while, the economy continued its stagnation. Simultaneously, this exacerbated dissatisfaction amongst most sectors, regions, and professions while limiting the patronage capacity of Micombero's nascent regime.

Micombero responded with calls for 'vigilance' and trumped-up charges against perceived political opponents. In 1968, some Hutu, Tutsi and Gwana were arrested and tried for monarchist tracts which attacked the president. In 1969, a number of Hutu military officers and civilian leaders were executed for a suspected coup plot. In response, northern Hutus in Ngozi attempted some violent resistance with little success. In 1970, Micombero would then arrest some central Tutsi-Banyaruguru military and civilian officials as well members of Rwandan Tutsi refugee movements. At this time, Micombero's inner circle leaned leftist ideologically and internationally and would reopen relations with China.

In 1972, the return of King Ntare V corresponded with Hutu-led uprisings (with some refugee population support) targeting Bururi in particular.⁹¹ These attacks briefly established a territorial fiefdom and resulted in the deaths of thousands of Tutsi elites and civilians. They did not, however, overthrow Micombero. Micombero dismissed his cabinet and relied on his Bururi contacts and the JRR. Ntare V was executed (by people close to Micombero, unclear what he wanted) and the military and JRR. Hutu elites (even some Micombero's confidants) as well as some Tutsi-ganwa were targeted immediately. Violence then spread to the Hutu professional classes, students, and

⁹¹ See Russell, Aidan. "Obedience and selective genocide in Burundi." *Africa* 85, no. 3 (2015): 437-456. and Russell, Aidan. "Rebel and rule in Burundi, 1972." *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 48, no. 1 (2015): 73-97 for reviews of this time.

business people were collectively targeted, resulting in the death of approximately 200,000 Hutus. Much of this violence occurred in the North, with some violence spreading into the South.

Chapter 7: Horizons

This conclusion has three goals. First, discuss the dissertation's general and specific contributions and lessons. Second, discuss its limits and failures. Third, contextualize and 'sell' the appendix as a future line of mass killing research. Collectively then, I submit this dissertation contributes to our knowledge of mass killings, these contributions have limits, and I know what to do about at least some of these limitations.

I. Contributions and Lessons

I see two specific contributions of this dissertation: a new approach to classifying of mass killings (and related forms of political violence) and a theory of 'consolidative mass killing.' But I also submit this work reveals several 'themes' or lessons which may advance further work on mass killings and political violence.

I found some wisdom in Padgett and Powell's dictum that 'in the short-term actors make relations, in the long-term relations make actors.' In the short-term, comparatively, I found differences in 'kinds' of mass killings as well as coups corresponded to differences in the organizational structure, and to a lesser extent, economic nature of the organizations involved.⁹² These shaped the interests, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and constraints faced by the actors. Within consolidative

⁹² For what's it worth, I also found this when I looked at gang violence, with prison gangs in California committing different kinds of violence for different reasons than less organized 'street gangs' in Chicago.

mass killings, actors' organizational structures made them simultaneously vulnerable to electoral defeats, coup attempts, and regional disorder but also allowed them to orchestrate massive violence quickly. In the longer-term, understanding these actors requires understanding (co-evolving economic and political) relations. Actors do not 'fall from the sky' nor remain constants, they evolve. From a theoretical perspective, many do not explore where actors come from or how they evolve. Beyond satisfying our curiosity, I submit answering these questions may help us 'connect' our long-term theories and findings with our short-term ones.

In any case, others might have other theories about their evolution (which, frankly, I would be curious about), but I found interactions between economic and political dynamics reliably shaped these actors across the long-term. *In other words, again echoing Padgett specifically and political economists generally, I found 'politics without economics to be bad politics and economics without politics to be bad economics.'* This applied to the theorized co-evolutionary processes, but also to mass killings itself. At elite and local levels, we see in the consolidative cases and in many other types of mass killings (Valentino saw 'dispossessive' and 'coercive' mass killings) economic thinking embedded in perpetration. We see looting, land seizure, and union busting in the consolidative cases. We see collectivization, purges, and mass mobilizations in the developmental cases. We see robbery, at every scale, in the expansionist cases. Whatever the future holds for understanding most mass killings, I

suspect and encourage considering how politics and economics interact to shape actors and incentive structures.

Beyond this, while this is not a methodological dissertation, this research confronted some methodological problems which I will simply note.

- 1. We do not have a philosophy of dependent variables.** Formally, I observed we rarely only explain 'objects' and the mechanisms which yield them. Instead, we focus on aspects of objects and/or situate these objects (or aspects of objects) within counterfactual spaces. Less formally, we rarely ask about everything that happened and often ask about things which did not happen. This is sometimes necessary and often useful, but implies considerable choices for the researcher. Consequently, defining dependent variables (and defending our choices) requires (in my opinion) more discussion than most provide. For examples, scholars often
 - conflate, theoretically and methodologically, explanations of objects with explanations of variation. Fearon's 'Rationalist Explanations for War', for example, attempts to be an explanation of whether or not war occurs rather than an explanation of everything necessary to create a war.
 - suppose 'pin-point' prediction rather 'topologies of possible' as the standard of prediction. in other words, theories can eliminate millions of possibilities and suppose only say a dozen possible outcomes. depending on the state of

knowledge, this may still contribute and, often, represent a more realistic goal for research.

- present ‘puzzles’ or ‘central puzzles.’ when we understand, of course, puzzles do not exist. instead, puzzles either present true mysteries which we have no expectations about or violate our existing expectations. in the latter case, this can sometimes introduce implicit and perhaps incorrect assumptions which reflect the scholar more than anything else.

I confronted this problem in Chapter I when discussing what a ‘theory of consolidative mass killing’ should explain as well as during the case studies when case-specific questions arose. My responses to these dilemmas (which I did solve) were focusing on explaining as much of the object as possible, articulating what variations I was and was not interested in, presenting multiple rather than any single ‘central puzzle’, and allowing for some ‘topology of alternative outcomes’ rather than consolidative mass killings.

2. *We do not have a philosophy of classification.* We have many habits (categories, typologies, grouping certain features) but no prescriptions or philosophy. Chapter 2 dealt with this dilemma. I submitted three arguments.

- ***There is no single conceptual space or framework for classification.*** Often, political scientists default to categories or typologies. But, relations between phenomena may be more complex than these spaces allow. Consequently, we

can consider and explore other spaces including but not limited to 3-D or other multidimensional spaces, Venn Diagrams, family trees, multiple-entry classification schemes, etc.

- Classification serves different purposes at different times. Sometimes we focus on features, sometimes we focus on causes, sometimes we focus on certain features or certain causes. *I submitted, for present purposes, we should classify mass killings by causes rather than features to avoid mixing ‘apples and oranges.’ We should also specify, as much as possible, whether these are shared mechanistic processes or counterfactual dependencies.*
 - *Classifying by causes presents a dilemma, because many methods require causal knowledge to yield proper causal inferences.* In informal terms, bad classifications can cause us to potentially compare apples and oranges, miss the forest through the trees, or some combination of the above. *To mitigate this problem, I recommended a two-pronged approach, one which expands the criteria for similarity (guessing that like causes will yield like effects) and one which allows for cross-tabbing along qualitative markers (allowing for multiple, often novel case comparison for every case).*
3. *Counterfactuals can be useful, but they neither speak for themselves nor define causality.* This presented itself in particular in the Rwandan case study. Some define causality and the ‘fundamental problem of causal inference’ by counterfactual

thinking. I like counterfactuals, but this is untenable. Some assume we can think about counterfactuals in a simple 'treatment' versus 'no treatment' scheme.

Sometimes we can. But, we can also think about a potentially infinite number of 'other treatments', manipulate any number to all number of variables, imagine scenarios where 'no treatment' is implausible, and imagine scenarios where removing the 'treatment' creates alternative universes rather than experimental conditions. Further, counterfactuals do not necessarily reveal mechanisms nor illuminate equifinal conditions. None of this means counterfactuals (or methods which employ them) are bankrupt, but we need to be specific and careful about how we use them.

II. Policy Recommendations

Policy recommendations vary across timescales and depend on the policymaker and their values. Habyarimana's goals likely varied from the United States', the PKI would require different advice than Sukarno or Suharto, etc. I proceed, for better or worse, with policy recommendations for international observers seeking to reduce violence and state-builders attempting to create prosperous rather than extremely violent scenarios. In both cases, I anticipate these actors working within considerable constraints.

My recommendations for international observers include:

1. When assessing risk, attempting to understand the actors involved. In particular, look for vulnerable insular networks with military capabilities and mobilization potential. Further, expect political violence in nationalized economies during recessions or depressions.
2. Do not valorize one side or the other. Or, be extremely careful when doing so. The US and UN, for example, continually misread the RPF and assumed their relative benevolence. This, in part, yielded support for arguably disproportionate bargaining agreements and tolerance for escalatory behavior.
3. Clarify and extend succession arrangements in ways which limit confusion or lopsided power shifts. In other words, remove the 'vacuums of power' or potential 'sea changes' which incentivize coups.
4. Consider economics and politics in these bargains. Often, international bargains focus exclusively on political institutions while economic bargains focus exclusively on economic metrics. Creativity, or at least attention, to these factors simultaneously might yield more sustainable and productive bargains.
5. Act and deploy outside the capital. International actors repeatedly lack information or any enforcement beyond the capital. This makes them easy to fool and contain. Resources are limited, but much of the 'action' in these cases in the medium and short-term happens outside the capital. Further, resistance is often stronger outside the capital and many areas could have 'held out' with some support.

My recommendations for similarly situated state-builders admittedly remain limited and present considerable trade-offs. I assume leaders must contend with the political and economic forces which existed. Nevertheless, in line with the theory, my recommendations involve reducing the insularity of rulers' and opposition organization, decreasing the stakes of state control, and improving economic performance.

1. Sacrifice 'autonomy' for rewards of international economic engagement. All of these countries remain highly dependent on international benefactors or environments, regardless of whether pursued 'autonomous decision-making.' These are desperate situations and many of the developing countries with some economic success engaged with international actors. Further, engaging with international actors can provide leaders with 'alibis' for hiring and firing decisions.
2. Create some institutions beyond the party-state which relate to individuals' economic or social lives. Courts (which rarely feature in these cases), schools, police, certain sectors of the economy, etc. The goal is provide people with opportunities to 'opt-out' of politics, decreasing pressures to organize and overthrow.
3. Create many 'training' institutions or programs – schools, military academies, international scholarships, migration programs. This limits 'capture' of any of these institutions but also, in the long-term, prevents creating 'blocs' anchored in regionalized networks. In these cases, and many other cases of political violence, we

witness military cliques heralding from certain schools or institutions or political movements heralding from certain shared international experiences. In particular, leaders should attempt to undercut or at least divide the bases of their regionalized opposition. This would have been easier in some cases (for example, Rwandan programs targeting Gikongoro or Butare) rather than others (for example, the Indonesian case where the PKI recruited everywhere across all sorts of social boundaries).

4. If you must have a centralized economy, decentralize reward systems. Reward, where possible, individuals and performance rather than empower loyalists. This is easier said than done (although it has been done, 'household responsibility system'), but can flip the incentive structure somewhat from political maneuvering (lying, corruption) to economic performance. If things escalate into multi-partyism, consider decoupling of political party success and economic placements. Further, if you have all your loyalists in top economic positions, economic reform (even for the sake of simple new political support) becomes difficult.
5. If nothing else, have jobs or industries where you can send political loyalists who corrupt or compromise productivity to limit their troublemaking. This includes decommissioning officers engaged in local or regional exploitation. In fact, create local positions under some institutional or discretionary control (preferably which changes) to limit military infiltration.

III. Limits and Failures

I see several (and suspect many more) limits and failures to this dissertation. I classify these as 'sins of commission' and 'sins of omission.' The former referring to violations of theoretical expectations, the latter referring to dynamics or questions left unexplained or unaccounted for. The 'sins of commission', to my knowledge, remain relatively limited. Examples include:

- in the Indonesian case, nationalization is more haphazard and 'bottom-up' than the theory anticipates.
- in the Rwandan case, we see more shuffling and defection within the 'insular politico-economic-military' network than expected. further, the MRND's electoral resilience is somewhat surprising for the theory.
- in the Burundi case, no explicit coup attempt is made. instead, one is expected, accompanied by a regional insurrection, and 'pre-empted.'
- economic downturns and turbulence occurred in all four cases, but Rwanda and Indonesia's seem to exceed those of Burundi and, to a lesser extent, Ethiopia.
- in the Iraqi case, which I did not review in detail, eventually executed leaders choose not to arm communist militias even as coups and resistances escalate. Nothing in the theory expects this.

The 'sins of omission', however, remain vast and consequential. Specifically,

1. The dissertation 'breaks down' mass killings into different types but does not say much about what, if anything, they might share with themselves or other types of seemingly related political violence.
2. The dissertation explains one type of mass killings but does not say much about other forms. If, and how, the theory might extend to these contexts remains underexplored.
3. The dissertation notes international dynamics, but essentially as background, scope, and exacerbating conditions. In the Rwandan case, international dynamics possessed different, more prominent roles. How more 'active' international dynamics could shape these contexts, at any time in their development, remains under-explored.
4. Relatedly, the theory says little about the RPF's tactics nor its impact on Rwandan politics. Nor does it say much (other than that Rwanda did not have much influence), about the decline of the international 'coffee cartel' which lowered coffee prices.
5. Empirically, the dissertation does not explore thoroughly seemingly similar cases (the Nigerian mass killings, the coups and countercoups in 1950's and 60's Iraq) nor non-events ('dogs which did not bark' which others such as Midlarsky and Strauss have attempted). Future work should continue doing this.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the dissertation and theory lack anything what is often labelled ‘culture’, ‘psychology’, or even ‘linguistic autocatalysis.’ I view this as a glaring omission. We see considerable individual variation in thought and behavior before, during, and after genocide. Many of these divisions are explicitly social (Hutu/Tutsi), carry social meanings (‘godless communists’, evil military leaders, ‘fathers of the nations’), and elicit intense emotional responses. We also see similar kinds of thinking and behavior almost everywhere, often in less dire environments. What these phenomena really testify to, and how they might interact with the more organizational, economic, and strategic dynamics identified, remains (to me at least) unclear.

IV. Research Recommendations.

I have faith future studies will address many of the limits presented. I anticipate further examination of ‘dogs that don’t bark’, theories of different kinds of mass killings or coups, attempts to derive themes across different forms of political violence, and works connecting international and domestic dynamics. Much of this is ‘in vogue’ within political science and many of these areas possess extensive historiographies and reliable data. *I have less faith in theoretical or methodological breakthroughs regarding ‘culture’ or ‘psychology’ in the near-term.* Few political scientists are fluent with neuroscience (and vice versa), reliable data (especially longitudinal data) is scarce, psychology involves tremendous complexity, and we have long struggled to connect micro-level dynamics to more meso- or macro-level dynamics.’

To address this, I invested in neuroscience (brain-based understandings of psychology) and political psychology (essentially, correspondences between social variables and psychological outcomes). Appendix I delivers these findings to 'sell' this investment. In the context of this dissertation, its main preliminary findings include

1. this approaches tautology, but differences in political ideology and behavior correspond to different brain activities. more specifically, we see different areas reliably corresponding with different political leanings. outside of political psychology, these areas often correspond with different attentional, emotional, and content profiles.
2. *categorical thought, which much extremism (often labelled in-group/out-group thinking) seems to exhibit, reliably corresponds with ventral network activities, particularly within the left hemisphere. in other domains, ventral networks are involved in object-centric perception, thought, and behavior. neuroanatomically, and functionally, these networks are tied to networks involved in what we often label 'fear', 'anxiety', and 'stress' or 'wanting/craving.'*
3. *in the short-term, increases in political extremist cognition or behavior – such as conspiracy theory belief, lynching, and mob violence – reliably correspond with downward shifts of fortune. this ranges from economics, to plagues, to victories of political opponents. of course, we still witness tremendous individual variation in response to these 'shocks.'*

4. *across the long-term, we know considerably less.* some professions (which often involves object-centric, analytical activities) seem predisposed to certain kinds of extremism, but this involves selection effects. and, areas which remain insular tend to express more in-group behavior (across centuries), but whether this owes to convergences of thought rather than their total distribution remains unclear. but, whatever these longer-term dynamics, the model suggests interhemispheric, perhaps among other inter-brain network relations, as central to their development.

In the context of these cases and the theories, these findings reinforce some existing ideas and introduce some new ones.

- In the short to medium-term, scholars within and beyond the mass killing subfield have suggested downturns – ranging from trauma, to plagues, to economic anxieties, to political upheavals – as incubators for extremism. This is a population trend rather than a law applying to everyone, but escalating rhetoric, local violence, and mobilization corresponded with increasing political uncertainty and economic downturns in these cases. This held in Rwanda, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and some regions of Burundi (in certain regions we read of religious transitions and movements rather than Hutu-Tutsi antagonisms).
- This raises the second idea, which is flows of people influence spatial distributions of ideas and emotions. This, to some extent, echoes Montesquieu but in the domestic context. In these four cases, the political economy generated limited flows of people,

which were often unidirectional or top-down when they did occur. Politically, we see considerable continuity and some 'reactionary' politics (from PARMEHUTU to MDR-Power in Gitamara, for example) in highly retentive areas. Though we also see urban conflict and violence (often by more organized forces). If true, we still do not know whether this owes to something psychological (flows influencing how people think), organizational (networks and organizations influencing the expression and repression of ideas), topological (more opportunities for like-minds to meet, less influx of other minds), or some combination of the above. But, this focus on flows provides a potential 'bridge' between the macro and micro across the long and medium term.

- And, lastly, the findings from neuroscience as the well as the variation in individual behavior before, during, and after violence suggest the psychological as a quasi-independent domain. In other words, while the psychological might influence the political and economic and the political and economic might influence the psychological, it possesses its own kinds of interactions separate from these domains. So, while we can continue to invest and learn about how organizations, recessions, networks, economic opportunities, etc. influence individual behavior or macro-level outcomes, this knowledge will remain incomplete (and in my view unsatisfactory) without acknowledging and eventually incorporated intra-brain dynamics.

Appendix I: A Link Between Ventral Network Activity and Politically Motivated Cognition?: Evidence from Neuroscience and Social Science.

abstract: I submit politically motivated cognition involve activity of the brain's ventral networks. Political biases often feature object-centric, highly valenced, and resistant modes of cognition. I submit this corresponds with current understandings of ventral network function. I support my argument in three ways. First, current understandings of ventral network function describe an object-centric, externally oriented, highly valenced, and recurrent mode of cognition. I argue this corresponds to the categorization (in-group/out-group), strong emotion, and narrow-mindedness we see amongst highly biased individuals. Second, I review experimental, neuroimaging, and lesion evidence of the neuroscience of biases and prejudice. I find many links to ventral, particularly left hemispheric ventral networks, across various studies with various methods. Third, I review some major and somewhat puzzling findings from social science regarding political biases. I argue understandings of ventral activity can 'make sense' of these findings. I conclude by discussing the limits of this 'localization' approach.

I. Purpose and Argument

Many studies on political biases — ranging from prejudices to pathological forms of thinking to false beliefs — ask what causes these biases and how we might prevent them. Before answering these questions, however, I submit it would help to understand

the nature of these kinds of thinking. How and why can humans sometimes think in these 'modes'? What neural structures and dynamics, if any, are implicated in this kind of thinking? Do these modes share some common substrates or simply some cognitive features? Answering these questions, I submit, can help us imagine and test different hypotheses about what affects political extremism.

I submit considerable evidence suggests ventral network involvement in politically motivated cognition. More specifically, I implicate left hemispheric ventral activity in many forms of politically motivated cognition. I define terms, review this evidence, and discuss its implications. Importantly, I draw inferences from both neuroscientific and social science findings to support my claims and derive novel implications. I conclude by discussing the limits of these findings and some ways this new knowledge might serve future work.

II. Defining Terms

We have many different concepts for describing politically charged cognition. We have in-group/out-group thinking, implicit or explicit ethnic or class-based prejudices, conspiratorial thinking, false beliefs anchored in 'confirmation biases', etc. Because we do not completely understand what these phenomena are, we develop these concepts by features we select rather than mechanisms we understand. Consequently, our concepts may divide phenomena sharing mechanisms, aggregate phenomena with different mechanisms, or some mixture of the above.

Because I also lack comprehensive causal knowledge, I could not avoid this problem. Instead, I developed a range of features which recur across a variety of politically charged individuals. Specifically,

- **Categorization.** These individuals tend to develop categories of people which they assign certain characteristics. I suspect everyone does this, positively and negatively, but these categories tend to persist across time, acquire negative connotations, and often their own vocabularies. Further, they often apply to non-existent or oversimplified entities (the Illuminati, the deep state, some secret Jewish cabal, the Evil Empire, etc.)
- **Selective attention.** These individuals are rarely concerned with all issues equally and few as intensely as the political conflicts which motivate them. This may hold even if other issues more directly influence their economic or daily lives. Further, this mode of cognition remains relatively fixed and repetitive as opposed to more 'flowing' states such as daydreaming, creative cognition, immersion in some activity or art, etc.
- **Negative valence and a tendency toward aggression.** Thinking about these categorizations does not induce positive emotions or prosocial behaviors toward others. Whether this negative valence and aggression extends in their lives generally or predisposes them toward interpreting anyone's behavior as selfish, deceptive,

or otherwise unattractive. However, it tends to extend to their 'others' who are deemed somehow polluted, nefarious, dangerous, hopeless, etc.

- **A-processual thought and resistance to conflicting information.** Extremists do not appear to possess any ex-ante method for evaluating claims and evidence. While few people possess and execute any comprehensive epistemology, extremists are noted for their bias in applying principles and evaluating evidence. This does not mean they never use principles, evidence, or logic, only that they do so unsystematically on certain issues. Beyond this, extremists display resistance to conflicting information and often those with alternative ideas. Extremists tend to dislike those who disagree with them, doubt or discount conflicting information, and comfortable seeking confirmatory evidence.

III. Reviewing the Literature, Part I: What are Ventral Networks and What Do They Do?

Defining the boundaries of brain networks is difficult for several reasons. Most brain networks interact with other networks. Sometimes these interactions involve similar regions, sometimes they involve different regions, sometimes they involve new regions. Further, sometimes the 'function' of a given network varies depending on the activity of other networks. In other words, when the whole is 'greater' or 'different' than the sum of its parts, it becomes difficult to define the 'parts.' For this reason, different people speak about different 'parts' when trying to describe brain function.

Some people speak about regions (right amygdala activity, anterior cingulate cortex activity), some people speak about functional large-scale networks (the default mode network, the salience network), and others speak about different large-scale networks (intra-left hemispheric network activity).

So, what are ventral networks and why am I focusing on them?

Neuroanatomical, neuroimaging, experimental, and lesion evidence implicate a ‘ventral, feedback’ and ‘dorsal, feedforward’ division of ‘function’ within each hemisphere. These functions are not necessarily confined to specific behaviors (hunting, speaking, etc.) Instead, these networks produce different modes of attention, information-processing, and motor behaviors. I begin by discussing the dorsal division. Note this review draws heavily on Tucker and Luu.⁹³ However, we have hundreds of works implicating a dorsal and ventral functional division. Some exemplars include Hickok and Poeppel⁹⁴ and Sedda and Scarpina.⁹⁵

The dorsal, feedforward networks involve distributed attention, cross-modal expectations, and proactive motor control. Regions implicated in dorsal network function include the hippocampus, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, posterior anterior

⁹³ Tucker, Don M. and Phan Luu. (2012) *Cognition and Neural Development*. Oxford University Press.

⁹⁴ Hickok, Gregory and David Poeppel (2014), Dorsal and ventral streams: a framework for understanding aspects of the functional anatomy of language. *Cognition*. 92(1-2):67-99

⁹⁵ Sedda, Anna & Federica Scarpina, (2012) “Dorsal and ventral streams across sensory modalities” *Neuroscience Bulletin*. Volume 28, pp. 291–300

cingulate cortex, precuneus, posterior medial temporal lobes, and dorsal striatum. In the human brain, dorsal networks work 'limbifugally' (from internal states to world) and are primarily visceromotor (involving connections between internal monitoring systems and motor systems). This means they have lots of visceral inputs and their outputs are relatively divorced from present 'environmental' input. The dorsal, 'feedforward' system provides a 'proactive', 'projectional' mode of behavior control whereby 'internal' context models and predictions guide action towards goals. More specifically, it works

- viscerally, by responding to changes in internal states (pain, relief, hunger, thirst, temperature)
- cognitively, by providing 'expectations' or 'contexts' for action. in this sense, memories used to be expectations.
- in the motor domain, with 'proactive' and/or 'procedural' responses

The dorsal system's connections are more distributed and consequently its 'functions' and impairments are less straightforward. In the visual domain, the dorsal stream is often cited as responsible for 'global attention' or 'holistic processing.'

Damage to the dorsal stream can cause hemi-spatial neglect (inattention to contralateral sides of space), deficits in locating objects amongst other objects (a person in the crowd, a toy in a toybox), navigating in complex environments (avoiding bumping into chairs), grasping for an object, and walking over uneven surfaces. In the auditory domain, the

dorsal stream is often cited as responsible for the processing *and* production of sounds. Damage to the 'auditory' dorsal stream in the left (language-dominant) hemisphere is associated with conduction or Broca's aphasia. Conduction aphasia involves an inability to repeat heard speech, while Broca's (expressive) aphasia impairs speech production. Damage to the dorsal stream in the right hemisphere is associated with difficulties perceiving or producing prosody and music.

In the short-term, these feedforward dorsal networks create some independence between an organism and its environment. Neuroscientists often label this disconnect 'expectations' while we often label these disconnects 'memory', 'dreams', perhaps our 'beliefs', or others' 'implicit assumptions'. In any case, this independence provides organisms with relative freedom from their environments. This can allow an organism to 'search' to meet its 'needs' or 'desires.'

In the longer-term, dorsal networks do 'learn' from environments that meet these 'needs' or 'desires' – acquiring 'context models.' The distributed nature of feedforward networks suggest the content of these contexts vary widely and resist simple categorization. In any case, once acquired, organisms become 'familiarized' or 'habituated' to previously unfamiliar contexts. One example may be social relations ('friends' and 'family'), but neuroscientists have also argued addiction involves 'dorsalization.'

Lesion studies support these interpretations. Damage to the cingulate cortex results in contralateral inattention to visual and somatosensory stimuli. Damage to the right cingulate cortex results in neglect of the left hemifield of space and a marked inability to deal with spatial memory in that half of the world. Bilateral lesions result in 'lock-in' – an inability to initiate voluntary responses to sensory stimulation. Smaller lesions to the cingulate cortex result in lack of appreciation of pain. Other damages can yield deficits in discrimination of complex geometric forms or faces, an inability to locate objects in space, and an inability to identify objects from 'unusual' perspectives.

The ventral networks, our present focus, work limbipetally (from the world to the body) and are primarily viscerosensory (involving connections between external sensory perception and fine motor action). Regions implicated in the ventral stream include the orbitofrontal cortex, inferior frontal gyrus, anterior insula, amygdala, and anterior medial temporal lobe. Temporally, these 'feedback' networks can adapt quickly to environmental stimuli and then stably 'store' these representations. The ventral, feedback network works

- in the sensory domain, by responding to changes in external states (presence or absence of rewarding/harmful stimuli)
- cognitively, by providing 'categories' of 'objects' or 'faces' to evaluate the value of environmental stimuli
- in the motor domain, with fine motor action.

In visual, auditory, and linguistic processing the ventral stream is identified as the 'what' pathway, while the dorsal stream is identified as the 'where' and/or 'how' pathway. In visual and auditory domains, the 'ventral' stream specializes in 'object recognition.' Damage to the visual 'ventral' stream (in mammalian and avian species) produces deficits in recognizing objects, words, or faces depending on which hemisphere is damaged. In non-human mammals, damage to the 'ventral' streams impairs speaker recognition as well as the ability to associate 'auditory objects' (tones, discrete sounds) with rewards and punishments. Damage to the auditory 'ventral' streams impairs word comprehension ('Wernicke's aphasia) in the left hemisphere and 'speaker' recognition in the right hemisphere in humans.

Lesion studies support this interpretation. Bilateral lesions to the amygdaloid complex are associated with Kluver-Bucy Syndrome. This syndrome involves hypersexuality (often seeking stimulation from unusual objects), visual agnosia (an inability to recognize familiar people or objects), docility (diminished fear responses and aggression), dietary and oral changes (eating or chewing inappropriate objects) as well as retrograde and anterograde amnesia. Less extreme, unilateral amygdala dysfunction has been associated depression, phobias, post-traumatic stress, and obsessive-compulsive disorders

'Cybernetics' of Dorsal and Ventral Networks

Across several publications Tucker and colleagues⁹⁶ have articulated and defended some potential 'cybernetics' between dorsal and ventral networks. In the short-term, dorsal network control bias involves:

- less direct responsivity to environmental influences
- guidance by predictive context model anchored in long-term memory
- more global focus in space and time
- positive emotional bias
- less urgent, less narrow attention
- slower learning

In the longer-term, Tucker and Luu implicate dorsal dominance with extraversion (egocentric motives discharged into actions). In their words,

“The psychological characteristics of extraversion are thus based in an openness to external stimulation, yet the extravert’s primitive internal control of experience and behavior is manifested in the impulsiveness that leads the extravert to act without careful attention to environmental constraints, or to the needs of others. Even in more extended and adaptive cognitive mediation of behavior, the extravert shows strong intentionality in service of egocentric hedonic goals. In more balanced, intelligent personalities, this self-regulatory mode supports confidence, optimism, and decisiveness. When exaggerated and unbalanced, it leads to impulsiveness, narcissism, and psychopathy.”⁹⁷

⁹⁶ Tops, M., Boksem, M. A., Luu, P., & Tucker, D. M. (2010). Brain substrates of behavioral programs associated with self-regulation. *Frontiers in psychology, 1*, 152.

⁹⁷ Tucker, Don M. and Phan Luu. *Cognition and Neural Development*. p. 215.

By contrast, in the short-term, ventral control bias involves:

- direct sensitivity to positive and negative environmental stimuli
- *reactive guidance* which involves momentary feedback from the environment
- narrow, focused attention on urgent (close in space and time) stimuli
- focus on positive or negative stimuli
- fast associative learning and opportunistic action (a 'yes or no' mode)

Across the longer-term, they cite ventral dominance as driving 'introversion' (external, sensory control of behavior. In their words,

"The cybernetic mode of motor readiness – redundancy – provides powerful capacities when recruited by a mammalian cortex that elaborates sensory objects. Yet when dominant over time the cybernetic mode of the artus leads to introversion, the primordial locus of control of the redundancy bias. The focus on cognitive accommodation supported by the redundancy bias has a primitive basis in aversive motives of motor control – anxiety and hostility – that inherently disengage the individual from hedonic attention to the context, even as they maintain attention to that context. The direct effect of the redundancy bias on working memory is to sustain the internal control over cognition. Yet by recognizing the representational counterpoint and complementarity of temporal span created by mammalian inversion, we can now understand why the introvert manifests a kind of internal control over cognition that is at the same time occupied by external threats. This is the allocentric vector of attention, from world to self. The effect is to cause the introvert to be sensitive, sometimes hypersensitive, to the regard of others. Dominated by anxiety associated with ventral limbic and orbital frontal activity, these personalities manifest cognitive

styles with the restricted impulses, focused attention, and critical attitudes of the obsessive-compulsive and paranoid disorders.”⁹⁸

Discussion of Ventral Networks and Politically Motivated Cognition

I want to note four things about ventral and dorsal networks before discussing their relation to politically motivated cognition. First, ventral and dorsal networks do not necessarily work independently from one another. Communicating, for example, implies coordination between dorsal and ventral networks. Further, we have no reason to believe across time the same individual cannot display dorsal dominance *and* ventral dominance. In the same way we should probably avoid designating people as ‘left-brained’ or ‘right-brained’, we should avoid designating them as ‘top-brained’ or ‘bottom-brained’ (as, for example, Kosslyn does).⁹⁹

Second, humans have two sets of ventral and dorsal networks – one in the right hemisphere and one in the left hemisphere. As most readers understand, we have strong evidence for functional differences amongst these hemispheres in much of what the brain does. This includes, but is not limited to, language, varieties of emotional response and regulation, to bodily interactions, to motor control, to forms of memory, and attention. Consequently, the causes and consequences of ventral activation vary by hemisphere.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.* p. 216

⁹⁹ Kosslyn, S. M. (2013). *Top brain, bottom brain: Surprising insights into how you think*. Simon and Schuster.

Further, split-brain research indicates these networks can attach different valences to the same stimuli (say, an ex-lover).¹⁰⁰ Other neuroimaging research suggest these different ventral networks can yield different behavioral responses. Heller, for example, found anxious apprehension (associated with cognitive worry, verbal rumination) associated with left ventral network activity whereas anxious arousal (more akin to panic) involved greater right ventral network activity.¹⁰¹ Frankly, at present, we lack theory and investigation about how and why these 'sets' of ventral and dorsal networks might interact as well as the different behaviors they might create.

Third, for Tucker and Luu, dorsal activation occurs in 'highly predictable environments' whereas ventral activation occurs in 'low predictable environments.' Predictable environments, in this context, do not refer to static or simple environments but rather those matching existing dorsal stream expectations. Nevertheless, this remains a vague and likely incomplete causal story. Both predictability and environment remain vague terms, especially when we consider multiple sets of interacting dorsal and ventral networks. They also do not seem exhaustive. Learned phobias suggest ventral networks can 'prime' toward specific objects rather than

¹⁰⁰ Gazzaniga, Michael S., James C. Eliassen, Laura Nisenson, C. Mark Wessinger, Robert Fendrich, and Kathleen Baynes. "Collaboration between the hemispheres of a callosotomy patient: Emerging right hemisphere speech and the left hemisphere interpreter." *Brain* 119, no. 4 (1996): 1255-1262.

¹⁰¹ Nitschke, Jack B., Wendy Heller, Patrick A. Palmieri, and Gregory A. Miller. "Contrasting patterns of brain activity in anxious apprehension and anxious arousal." *Psychophysiology* 36, no. 5 (1999): 628-637.

'unpredictable environments.' Further, it remains unclear how much prior experience shapes later experience. Do neurons that have fired together, wire together enough to create ventral or dorsal biases?

Fourth, there is more to psychology than ventral and dorsal networks. This framework, for example, does not include hypothalamic or other neuroendocrine networks. Further, while it suggests some differential 'bodily' inputs into these networks, it does not describe their 'outputs' back into the body. But beyond this, many well-established brain networks, such as the default network, do not fit neatly within and extend beyond this framework.

Nevertheless, the ventral and dorsal divisions represent a well-established division of function across many cognitive and emotional domains. Further, I see clearer parallels between descriptions of ventral network function and the features associated with politically motivated cognition. Specifically,

1. Object-processing corresponds to categorization. The dorsal stream's distributed networks and cognition seem unlikely to yield 'others', for example.
2. Recurrent processing corresponds to resistance to alternative information. In folk psychology, this is often understood as stubbornness, dishonesty, or a lack of objective process. In neural terms, however, this simply suggests a 'closed loop' with narrow 'demands' on the environment which inhibits other networks, which the ventral networks seemed poised to do.

3. Narrow focus on urgent stimuli would correspond to easily activated, relatively automatic responses to some class of stimuli.
4. Focus on positive or negative stimuli corresponds to highly valenced political motivation. In other words, politically charged motivation is well, charged, often coming with high emotions in both directions.

IV. Reviewing the Literature, Pt. II: Neuroscience and Social Science Linking Ventral Networks and Political Bias

This, of course, is only suggestive evidence. Are there any findings from neuroscience which support this linkage? I found considerable evidence linking ventral network activity and politically motivated cognition. Specifically,

1. Gozzi et al found interest in politics generally corresponded with greater activation in the amygdala and the ventral striatum (ventral putamen) when reading political opinions corresponding to their own views.¹⁰²
2. Mitchell et al found making judgments about ideologically similar individuals engages the vmPFC while judging ideologically dissimilar individuals engages the dmPFC.¹⁰³

¹⁰² Gozzi, Marta, Giovanna Zamboni, Frank Krueger, and Jordan Grafman. "Interest in politics modulates neural activity in the amygdala and ventral striatum." *Human Brain Mapping* 31, no. 11 (2010): 1763-1771.

¹⁰³ Mitchell, Jason P., C. Neil Macrae, and Mahzarin R. Banaji. "Dissociable medial prefrontal contributions to judgments of similar and dissimilar others." *Neuron* 50, no. 4 (2006): 655-663.

Further, much of this research suggests involvement of left hemispheric ventral activities.

3. Anger generally involves left hemisphere, often left frontal, activity.¹⁰⁴¹⁰⁵
4. Appetitive aggression, a tendency toward enjoying violence, corresponded with left nucleus accumbens activation.¹⁰⁶
5. Japanese individuals' level of implicit (but not explicit) evaluations of South Korea could be predicted from neural signals in the left amygdala.¹⁰⁷
6. Strong identification or aversion to 'groups' activates the left ventral networks. This extends to 'soccer fanatics.'¹⁰⁸
7. The left fusiform gyrus displays increased activity amongst those with higher xenophobic attitudes.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁴ Harmon-Jones, E. (2007). Trait anger predicts relative left frontal cortical activation to anger-inducing stimuli. *International Journal of Psychophysiology*, 66(2), 154-160.

¹⁰⁵ Zinner, L. R., Brodish, A. B., Devine, P. G., & Harmon-Jones, E. (2008). Anger and asymmetrical frontal cortical activity: Evidence for an anger-withdrawal relationship. *Cognition and Emotion*, 22(6), 1081-1093.

¹⁰⁶ Schöne, M., Seidenbecher, S., Kaufmann, J., Antonucci, L. A., Frodl, T., Koutsouleris, N., & Bogerts, B. (2021). Appetitive aggression is associated with lateralized activation in nucleus accumbens. *Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging*, 111425.

¹⁰⁷ Izuma, K., Aoki, R., Shibata, K., & Nakahara, K. (2019). Neural signals in amygdala predict implicit prejudice toward an ethnic outgroup. *Neuroimage*, 189, 341-352.

¹⁰⁸ Molenberghs, P., & Louis, W. R. (2018). Insights from fMRI studies into ingroup bias. *Frontiers in psychology*, 9, 1868.

¹⁰⁹ Kesner, Ladislav, Iveta Fajnerová, Petr Adámek, Martin Buchtík, Dominika Grygarová, Jaroslav Hlinka, Pavel Kozelka et al. "Fusiform activity distinguishes between subjects with low and high xenophobic attitudes toward refugees." *Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience* (2020): 98.

8. A series of experiments involving participants in various extremists displayed lower dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex activation, higher ventral prefrontal cortex activation, weaker connectivity between dlPFC and vlPFC, and higher activity in the left inferior frontal gyrus.¹¹⁰¹¹¹
9. People with Williams Syndrome, which features compromised left hemisphere functions do not exhibit racism (although they exhibit sexism).¹¹²
10. Perhaps most tellingly, experimental inhibition of left ventral networks reduces prejudice.¹¹³

Although some findings implicate right ventral networks.

11. Some findings suggest right amygdala activity creating fear or implicit bias in response to 'threatening' out-groups.

¹¹⁰ Hamid, N., Pretus, C., Atran, S., Crockett, M. J., Ginges, J., Sheikh, H., ... & Vilarroya, O. (2019). Neuroimaging 'will to fight' for sacred values: an empirical case study with supporters of an Al Qaeda associate. *Royal Society open science*, 6(6), 181585.

¹¹¹ Pretus, Clara, et al. (2019) "Ventromedial and dorsolateral prefrontal interactions underlie will to fight and die for a cause." *Social cognitive and affective neuroscience* 14.6: 569-577.

¹¹² Santos, A., Meyer-Lindenberg, A., & Deruelle, C. (2010). Absence of racial, but not gender, stereotyping in Williams syndrome children. *Current Biology*, 20(7), R307-R308.

¹¹³ Gallate J, Wong C, Ellwood S, Chi R, Snyder A. Noninvasive brain stimulation reduces prejudice scores on an implicit association test. *Neuropsychology*. 2011 Mar;25(2):185-92

12. Right frontotemporal dementia (affecting the right ventral stream) sometimes evinces a shift from conservative to more liberal thinking. Open-mindedness, artfulness increase while self-protection decreases.¹¹⁴

This, of course, does not represent a systematic meta-review of all studies on all forms of politically motivated cognition. Nevertheless, we have many kinds of methods across a range of populations exhibiting various kinds of politically motivated cognition suggesting links between ventral activity and politically motivated cognition.

Further evidence for this linkage, I argue, comes from prominent social science findings. Specifically, Gambetta and Hertog (2016) examined the demographics of extremist groups. They found

- a surprising disproportionate share of Islamic radicals had engineering backgrounds
- left-wing extremists possessed a disproportionate number of social scientists and humanities students.
- among right-wing extremists, although not overrepresented generally, engineers remained clearly present and overrepresented in some examined leadership ranks.

Gambetta and Hertog (2016) acknowledge external factors, such as recruitment styles and economic disappointments, as partially driving this. But, they also conjecture a cognitive story, whereby both engineering and extremism appeal to people who prefer

¹¹⁴ Mendez, Mario F. (2017) "A neurology of the conservative-liberal dimension of political ideology." *The Journal of neuropsychiatry and clinical neurosciences* 29.2: 86-94.

‘cognitive closure’ and simple ‘yes or no’ answers. This, coupled with higher in-group bias and disgust, yield a disproportionate supply of engineers.

I want to note two things about their work. First, their hypotheses about these mindsets match what we know about ventral functions as well as the left hemisphere. What they describe as a ‘need for closure’, ‘simplicity’, and ‘in-group’ thinking all corresponds to ventral network activities. Further, the discipline necessary for engineering requires sustained attention and logic (two other features of the ventral networks and the left hemisphere, respectively). Even disgust displays left anterior insula activation.

Second, as far as I can read, they do not theorize or investigate the left-wing population as deeply. They write “It is likely these types respond differently to frustration and political repression. If specific traits of engineers drive some of them to the radical right, the absence of those traits or opposite ones among humanities and social science students is arguably what causes them to avoid Islamism and right-wing extremism but makes them susceptible to radical politics on the left.” (2016, 127) This may or may not be true, but does not really theorize left-wing extremist cognitive dynamics. Consequently, I struggle to apply neuroscientific frameworks without more descriptive information or theory. However, note left-wing ideologies and social science academics also can possess strong categorizations (‘all cops are bad’, the evil 1%) and simple theories (variable X explains everything, this method is the best and true one,

9/11 Truthers, etc.) So while different extremists may diverge in neural activity of other areas (be this neuroendocrine, hemispheric, or other differences) they may share some ventral activation patterns, particularly in the linguistic left hemisphere.

We find more suggestive evidence from Parent and Uscinski. They found population-level conspiratorial belief corresponded to shifts in power. For examples, during the height of the Cold War, we witnessed conspiratorial beliefs targeting communists and 'Red Scares.' Following the decrease of this threat, we see conspiratorial beliefs targeting domestic actors waxing and waning with transitions of power. For example, 9/11 Truther beliefs targeting George W. Bush and his administration following by 'Birther' movements targeting President Obama. A similar yet distinct finding heralds from work on lynching in the American South and anti-Semitism in Germany. Regarding the American South, some have found an association between cotton prices and the number of lynching (Beck and Tonlay, 1990). Others have found spikes of anti-Semitism during the Black Death and the economic collapse of the Weimer Republic in similar areas separated by hundreds of years with the exception of more trade-oriented areas with more emigration and immigration (Voigtländer and Voth 2012). Together, these works suggest politically charged thinking (at least at the population-level) is, descriptively, for 'losers' (people whose economic or political prospects are suffering).

Before discussing how to think about these dynamics, note the parallels to ventral network activities. Conspiracy theorists create or simplify the world into clear causal stories, with specific villains, possess strong emotions, and often remain resistant and to conflicting information. People attacking 'others' in response to economic and/or pandemic-related losses and uncertainty, create a categorized group, laden with negative emotions, with a clear, corruptive influence on their lives. Further, while we do not completely understand what might cause ventral control biases across time or in any given situation, the ventral stream possesses deep connections with circuits involved in stress, fear, and anxiety.

What does this approach tell us? Hopefully, it could provide individuals a different perspective of their own experiences and problem-solvers in developing and selecting potential interventions. But it may help us rethink our own 'vocabularies of psychology.' Consider the causal explanations often provided for these cases and similar phenomena. Parent and Uscinski provide a functional logic, conspiracy theorists direct attention toward powerful actors who might harm them and mobilize others against these threats. Others, in these works, provide more psychological explanations, people attempt to 'reassert control of their worlds', 'displace their negative feelings about themselves or futures', or some other explanation. Implicitly, all these models assume some actor with some preferences using some means.

The neural network story reads differently. Some submit of the population possesses ventral control biases, particularly in the left hemisphere. This ventral bias creates strong concepts of and reactivity to external stimuli (such as political affiliations, money, or perhaps even status). Once these are challenged, this ventral bias continues, but shifts from focus on these goals to their obstacles. Given its narrow and emotionally charged processing scheme, this produces fairly simple, predictable, and category-based thought patterns. We can speak of preferences, functions, and intended behaviors, but these exist in our minds rather than those behaving.

V. Horizons: Limits to Localization Approaches and Future Work

This work has many limitations. First, I doubt ventral networks explain all politically motivated cognition. Consider some neuroscientific and social science findings in American politics. For examples,

- Many have focused on differences between right-leaning and left-leaning individuals. Haidt (2012) theorizes different 'moral emotions' driving these differences. These different moral emotions involve 'other-condemning' (disgust, anger, contempt), 'self-conscious' (shame, guilt, embarrassment), 'other-suffering' (compassion, sadness'), and 'other-praising' (awe, gratitude). He finds, through survey data, liberals tend to exhibit 'other-suffering' and 'other-praising' emotions which lead to more individualistic principles of care and fairness. In contrast,

conservatives tend to exhibit 'self-conscious' and 'other-condemning' emotions which lead to more group-centered principles of authority, sanctity, and loyalty.

- Oliver and Wood (2018) hypothesized a rationalist – intuitionist continuum to understand political differences. Some individuals, they find, rely on 'rationalism' to understand the world (science, logic, etc). Others rely on their 'intuitions' (gut feelings, emotions) and are prone to attributing events to unobserved forces. Internally, intuitionists tend to experience stronger apprehension, pessimism, and symbolic thinking. Externally, intuitionists tend to have less education, less resources, and stronger religiosity. Politically, intuitionists tend to lean right politically and engage in conspiratorial thinking.
- Neuroscientific studies have found conservatives more sensitive to disgust (which is lateralized to the left hemisphere, centering on the insula) and displaying greater right amygdala activation. In contrast, we find increased ACC activation in liberals.
- Clinical studies revealed individuals with right frontotemporal dementia (affecting the right ventral networks) sometimes evinces a shift from conservative to more liberal thinking. Open-mindedness, artfulness, and exploration increase although self-protection decreases in these individuals.

The greater right amygdala activations witnessed in conservatives, ventral network and behavioral shifts evinced in frontotemporal dementia, and left ventral activities in disgust and anger correspond with ventral-centric understandings of

politically motivated cognition. But many of these other findings complicate this understanding. The neuroscience findings introduce lateralized differences and regions with connectivity with but independence from ventral circuits (such as the anterior cingulate cortex). The social science findings, particularly Oliver and Wood (2018) suggest a more lateralized approach for understanding differences with right hemisphere activities likely driving more 'intuitionist' and the left hemisphere driving more 'rationalist' tendencies. So, while I believe we should always consider ventral networks when thinking about

Second, again, many neuroscientists have problems with localized accounts of brain function. Brain networks have unclear boundaries, multiple scales, and never work alone. We do not know how ventral networks work, but we do know they do not operate alone. Instead, they work with other networks in ways we do not yet fully understand. We have many verbs to describe neural network interactions. In truth, we do not know exactly how neural networks interact or even at what levels they interact. Are they exchanging 'higher-order information' (whatever this might imply) or mutually modelling one another? Or, should we stick to lower-level terms (which we still do not agree on) like inhibition, coactivation, spreading activation, embedding, etc.? Or, some combination of the above?

From the social scientists' perspective, this confounds attempts to directly link social variables to brain activities. Noting some brain region is active when some

response occurs does not tell us why this brain region is active. This does not mean we do not know anything. Stress, fear, anger, and anxiety systems all correspond with ventral – particularly left ventral – activation. There is also evidence suggesting exposure to criticism or discrimination can exacerbate left ventral networks (Clark et al, 2018). Yet while saying someone did something because they were afraid, angry, or anxious tells us something, it leaves many questions unanswered. What, exactly, do we mean by anxiety or any other label? Why were they afraid but someone else was not? Why were they unable to regulate their fear by other means? Again, the neuroscience here remains blurry. But it suggests several things.

We might think about what might inhibit ventral activation (the anterior cingulate cortex, endogenous opioids, prefrontal cortex), facilitate them toward some other pattern of neural activity (stronger pre-existing connectivity with dorsal or contralateral networks), or alter their attention toward and conceptualization of the external world (predictive processing models acquired through development). In other words, we might try to link existing findings or develop new ones which would connect external variables to specific mechanisms with the brain. This, of course, remains fraught but I submit nevertheless worthwhile.

Further, the model preaches *multiple systems with different inputs and outputs*. This counsels against reductive, single variable explanations ('threat' drives extremism). So conceptually, we might think more about combinations of variables. What is anger

combined with a place one has nostalgia for? What is guilt combining someone new and exciting? What is self-loathing meeting danger? This, to my knowledge, has largely been the artists', not the scientists, domain. Thinking more about these combinations, and refining how these combinations would have to work on different brain regions, would provide a promising way to think about combinations of political, personal, and economic in ways seen at other levels of analysis in political science (co-evolution of state and market, etc.)

Works Cited

- Adelman, Howard, and Astri Suhrke, eds. *The path of a genocide: the Rwanda crisis from Uganda to Zaire*. Transaction Publishers, 1999.
- Amal, Ichlasul. *Regional and central government in Indonesian politics: West Sumatra and South Sulawesi, 1949-1979*. Gadjah Mada University Press, 1992.
- Arendt, Hannah. *The origins of totalitarianism*. Vol. 244. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1973.
- Aspinall, Edward. "From Islamism to Nationalism in Aceh, Indonesia." *Nations and Nationalism* 13, no. 2 (2007): 245-263.
- Bass, Gary J. *The Blood Telegram*. Random House India, 2013.
- Beck, E. M. and Stewart E. Tolnay. (1990) The Killing Fields of the Deep South: The Market for Cotton and the Lynching of Blacks, 1882-1930. *American Sociological Review*. Vol. 55, No. 4 pp. 526-539
- Bennett, Christopher. *Yugoslavia's bloody collapse: causes, course and consequences*. NYU Press, 1995.
- Bilgiç, Başar, et al. (2020) "Functional neural substrates of football fanaticism: Different pattern of brain responses and connectivity in fanatics." *Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences* 74.9: 480-487.
- Browning, Christopher R. "Ordinary Men and Beyond: Reflections on an Historiographical Journey." In *Beyond "Ordinary Men"*, pp. 287-305. Brill Schöningh, 2019.
- Bruneau, E., Jacoby, N., Kteily, N., & Saxe, R. (2018). Denying humanity: The distinct neural correlates of blatant dehumanization. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, 147(7), 1078.
- Bundervoet, Tom. "Livestock, land and political power: The 1993 killings in Burundi." *Journal of Peace Research* 46, no. 3 (2009): 357-376.
- Carr, Rosamond Halsey, and Ann Howard Halsey. *Land of a thousand hills: My life in Rwanda*. Penguin, 2000.

- Childress, Stephen E. *From revolution to ruin: A preliminary look at Rwanda's first two presidents, Grégoire Kayibanda and Juvénal Habyarimana, and their administrations*. University of Missouri-Kansas City, 2015.
- Clapham, Christopher. *Transformation and continuity in revolutionary Ethiopia*. Vol. 61. CUP Archive, 1990.
- Conley, Bridget, and Chad Hazlett. "How very massive atrocities end: A dataset and typology." *Journal of Peace Research* 58, no. 3 (2021): 612-620.
- Cook, Susan E. *Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda: new perspectives*. Routledge, 2017.
- Crewett, Wibke, Ayalneh Bogale, and Benedikt Korf. "Land tenure in Ethiopia: Continuity and change, shifting rulers, and the quest for state control." (2008).
- Cribb, Robert. "Genocide in Indonesia, 1965-1966." *Journal of genocide research* 3, no. 2 (2001): 219-239.
- Cribb, Robert Bridson, ed. *The Indonesian killings of 1965-1966: studies from Java and Bali*. Vol. 21. Monash Asia Inst, 1990.
- Cribb, Robert, and Charles A. Coppel. "A genocide that never was: explaining the myth of anti-Chinese massacres in Indonesia, 1965-66." *Journal of Genocide Research* 11, no. 4 (2009): 447-465.
- Cribb, Robert. "Unresolved problems in the Indonesian killings of 1965-1966." *Asian Survey* 42, no. 4 (2002): 550-563.
- Crummey, Donald. "The Political Economy of Ethiopia. Edited by Marina Ottaway. New York: Praeger, 1990
- De Swaan, Abram. *The killing compartments*. Yale University Press, 2015
- Des Forges, Alison. "Leave none to tell the story." *New York: Human Rights Watch* (1999).
- Dejene, Alemneh. *Peasants, agrarian socialism, and rural development in Ethiopia*. Routledge, 2019.

- Desch, Michael C. "A "Final Solution" to a Recurrent Tragedy?." *Security Studies* 13, no. 3 (2004): 145-159., p. 150
- Elson, Robert Edward, and Robert Edward Elson. *Suharto: a political biography*. Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Erickson, Edward J. *Ottomans and Armenians: A Study in Counterinsurgency*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
- Fakih, Farabi. *Authoritarian Modernization in Indonesia's Early Independence Period: The Foundation of the New Order State (1950-1965)*. Brill, 2020.
- Farram, Steven. "Revolution, religion and magic: The PKI in West Timor, 1924-1966." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde* 158, no. 1 (2002): 21-48.
- Fealy, Greg, and Katharine McGregor. "Nahdlatul Ulama and the killings of 1965-66: Religion, politics, and remembrance." *Indonesia* 89 (2010): 37-60.
- Fearon, James D. "Rationalist explanations for war." *International organization* 49, no. 3 (1995): 379-414.
- Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. "Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war." *American political science review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 75-90.
- Fein, Helen. "Genocide: A sociological perspective." (1993).
- Finkel, Evgeny, and Scott Straus. "Macro, meso, and micro research on genocide: gains, shortcomings, and future areas of inquiry." *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 7, no. 1 (2012): 56-67.
- Fox, Andrew. "Strings of Traitors: Social Networks and the Organizational Trajectory of the Khmer Rouge." (2019).
- Fujii, Lee Ann. "Killing neighbors." In *Killing Neighbors*. Cornell University Press, 2010.
- Gallate, J., Wong, C., Ellwood, S., Chi, R. & Snyder, A. (2011). Noninvasive brain stimulation reduces prejudice scores on an implicit association test. *Neuropsychology*, 25: 185–192

- Gambetta, Diego and Steffan Hertog. (2014) *Engineers of Jihad: The Curious Connection between Violent Extremism and Education*. Princeton University Press.
- Gardenfors, Peter. "Conceptual spaces as a framework for knowledge representation." *Mind and matter* 2, no. 2 (2004): 9-27.
- Garrard-Burnett, Virginia, and Virginia Garrard. *Terror in the land of the holy spirit: Guatemala under general Efraín Ríos Montt 1982-1983*. Vol. 7. Oxford University Press on Demand, 2010
- Geertz, Clifford. *Peddlers and princes: Social change and economic modernization in two Indonesian towns*. University of Chicago Press, 1963.
- Getu, Makonen. *Socialism and Development in Ethiopia: A Critical Examination of the Military Regime's Socialist Agricultural Program*. Regnum Books International, 2015.
- Giaccaria, Paolo, and Claudio Minca, eds. *Hitler's geographies: the spatialities of the Third Reich*. University of Chicago Press, 2016.
- Guichaoua, André. *Rwanda 1994: les politiques du génocide à Butare*. KARTHALA Editions, 2005.
- Guichaoua, André. *From war to genocide: Criminal politics in Rwanda, 1990–1994*. University of Wisconsin Pres, 2015.
- Haidt, Jonathan. (2012) *The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Hamid, N., Pretus, C., Atran, S., Crockett, M. J., Ginges, J., Sheikh, H., ... & Vilarroya, O. (2019). Neuroimaging 'will to fight' for sacred values: an empirical case study with supporters of an Al Qaeda associate. *Royal Society open science*, 6(6)
- Hansson, Göte. "The Ethiopian Economy 1974-1994: Ethiopia Tikhedem and After." (1995).
- Harmon-Jones, E. (2007). Trait anger predicts relative left frontal cortical activation to anger-inducing stimuli. *International Journal of Psychophysiology*, 66(2), 154-160.
- Harris, James, ed. *The anatomy of terror: political violence under Stalin*. OUP Oxford, 2013.

- Harvey, Barbara Sillars. *Permesta: half a rebellion*. No. 57. Cornell Univ Modern Indonesia, 1977.
- Hatzfeld, Jean. *Machete season: The killers in Rwanda speak*. Macmillan, 2005.
- Hecker, Tobias Katharin Hermenau, Anna Maedl, Thomas Elbert, & Maggie Schauer. (2012) Appetitive aggression in former combatants—Derived from the ongoing conflict in DR Congo. *International Journal of Law and Psychiatry* Volume 35, Issue 3, Pages 244-249
- Herrera, Linda. "Youth and Politics in Post 1974 Ethiopia: Intergenerational Analysis." (1974).
- Hickok, Gregory and David Poeppel (2014), Dorsal and ventral streams: a framework for understanding aspects of the functional anatomy of language. *Cognition*. 92(1-2):67-99
- Izuma, K., Aoki, R., Shibata, K., & Nakahara, K. (2019). Neural signals in amygdala predict implicit prejudice toward an ethnic outgroup. *Neuroimage*, 189, 341-352.
- Jefremovas, Villia. *Brickyards to graveyards: From production to genocide in Rwanda*. SUNY Press, 2002.
- Jenkins, David. "One reasonably capable man: Soeharto's early fundraising." *Soeharto's New Order and its Legacy* (2010): 17.
- Kahin, Audrey. *STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE: WEST SUMATRA IN THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL REVOLUTION: 1945-1950*. Diss. Cornell University, 1979.
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. *The logic of violence in civil war*. Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Kammen, Douglas, and Katharine E. McGregor. "The contours of mass violence in Indonesia, 1965-1968." (2012).
- Karsh, Efraim. *The Iran–Iraq War 1980–1988*. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014.
- Keller, Edmond J. "State, Party, and Revolution in Ethiopia." *African Studies Review* 28, no. 1 (1985): 1-17

- Kesner, L., Fajnerová, I., Adámek, P., Buchtík, M., Grygarová, D., Hlinka, J., ... & Horáček, J. (2020). Fusiform Activity Distinguishes Between Subjects With Low and High Xenophobic Attitudes Toward Refugees. *Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience*, 14, 98.
- Kiernan, Ben. *Blood and soil: A world history of genocide and extermination from Sparta to Darfur*. Yale University Press, 2008.
- Kiernan, Ben. *The Pol Pot regime: Race, power, and genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-79*. Yale University Press, 2002.
- Kimonyo, Jean-Paul. *Rwanda's popular genocide: A perfect storm*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2016.
- Kosslyn, S. M. (2013). *Top brain, bottom brain: Surprising insights into how you think*. Simon and Schuster.
- Laitin, David D., and James T. Watkins IV. *Hegemony and culture: Politics and religious change among the Yoruba*. University of Chicago Press, 1986.
- Legge, John David. *Sukarno: a political biography*. Editions Didier Millet, 2003.
- Lemarchand, René. "A history of genocide in Rwanda." *The Journal of African History* 43, no. 2 (2002): 307-311.
- Lemarchand, René. "The Burundi killings of 1972." *Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence* (2008): 1-11.
- Lemarchand, René. *Burundi: Ethnocide as discourse and practice*. New York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994.
- Lemarchand, René. *Burundi: Ethnic conflict and genocide*. Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Lindblad, J. Thomas. "The economic decolonisation of Indonesia: A bird's-eye view." *Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities* 4 (2012): 1-20.
- Lindsay, Brendan C. *Murder State: California's Native American Genocide, 1846-1873*. U of Nebraska Press, 2012.

- Liu, Yunzhe, et al. (2015) Neural basis of disgust perception in racial prejudice. *Human brain mapping* 36.12 : 5275-5286
- Longman, Timothy. *Christianity and genocide in Rwanda*. Vol. 112. Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Luft, Aliza. "Toward a dynamic theory of action at the micro level of genocide: Killing, desistance, and saving in 1994 Rwanda." *Sociological Theory* 33, no. 2 (2015): 148-172.
- Mamdani, Mahmood. *When victims become killers*. Princeton University Press, 2020.
- Mattan, B. D., Wei, K. Y., Cloutier, J., & Kubota, J. T. (2018). The social neuroscience of race-based and status-based prejudice. *Current opinion in psychology*, 24, 27-34.
- McDoom, Omar Shahabudin. *The path to genocide in Rwanda: security, opportunity, and authority in an ethnocratic state*. Vol. 152. Cambridge University Press, 2021.
- McDoom, Omar Shahabudin. "Who killed in Rwanda's genocide? Micro-space, social influence and individual participation in intergroup violence." *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 4 (2013): 453-467.
- McDoom, Omar Shahabudin. "Predicting violence within genocide: A model of elite competition and ethnic segregation from Rwanda." *Political Geography* 42 (2014): 34-45.
- McIntyre, Angus. "Divisions and Power in the Indonesian National Party, 1965-1966." *Indonesia* 13 (1972): 183-210.
- Melvin, Jess. *The army and the Indonesian genocide: Mechanics of mass murder*. Routledge, 2018.
- Melvin, Jess, and Annie Pohlman. "A case for genocide: Indonesia, 1965–1966." In *The Indonesian Genocide of 1965*, pp. 27-47. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2018.
- Mendez, Mario F. (2017) "A neurology of the conservative-liberal dimension of political ideology." *The Journal of neuropsychiatry and clinical neurosciences* 29.2: 86-94.
- Midlarsky, Manus I. *The killing trap: Genocide in the twentieth century*. Cambridge University Press, 2005.

- Moran, J. K., Weierstall, R., & Elbert, T. (2014). Differences in brain circuitry for appetitive and reactive aggression as revealed by realistic auditory scripts. *Frontiers in behavioral neuroscience*, 8, 425.
- Mortimer, Rex. *Indonesian communism under Sukarno: Ideology and politics, 1959-1965*. Equinox Publishing, 2006.
- Molenberghs, P., & Louis, W. R. (2018). Insights from fMRI studies into ingroup bias. *Frontiers in psychology*, 9, 1868.
- Ndarubagiye, Léonce. *Burundi: the origins of the Hutu-Tutsi Conflict*. L. Ndarubagiye, 1996.
- Newbury, Catharine. *The Cohesion of Oppression: clientship and ethnicity in Rwanda, 1860-1960*. Columbia University Press, 1988.
- Ngaruko, Floribert, and Janvier D. Nkurunziza. "An economic interpretation of conflict in Burundi." *Journal of African economies* 9, no. 3 (2000): 370-409.
- Niwandhono, Pradipto. "The Making of Modern Indonesian Intellectuals: The Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) and Democratic Socialist Ideas, 1930s to mid-1970s." PhD diss., 2021.
- Ocklenburg, Sebastian & Onur Güntürkün. (2018) *The Lateralized Brain: The Neuroscience and Evolution of Hemispheric Asymmetries*. Elsevier.
- Oketch, Johnstone Summit, and Tara Polzer. "Conflict and coffee in Burundi." *Scarcity and Surfeit, The Ecology of Africa's Conflicts*. Institute for Security Studies, South Africa (2002): 85-156.
- Oliver, Eric and Thomas John Wood. (2018) *Enchanted America: How Intuition and Reason Divide Our Politics*. Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Padgett, John F., and Walter W. Powell. "The emergence of organizations and markets." In *The emergence of organizations and markets*. Princeton University Press, 2012.

- Power, Samantha. " *A Problem from Hell*": America and the Age of Genocide. Basic Books, 2013.
- Pretus, Clara, et al. (2019) "Ventromedial and dorsolateral prefrontal interactions underlie will to fight and die for a cause." *Social cognitive and affective neuroscience* 14.6: 569-577.
- Prunier, Gérard. *Darfur: A 21st century genocide*. Cornell University Press, 2008.
- Prunier, Gérard. *The Rwanda crisis: History of a genocide*. Columbia University Press, 1997.
- Rawson, David. *Prelude to genocide: Arusha, Rwanda, and the failure of diplomacy*. Ohio University Press, 2018.
- Redfern, William A. *Sukarno's Guided Democracy and the Takeovers of Foreign Companies in Indonesia in the 1960s*. University of Michigan, 2010.
- Reid, Anthony. "Verandah of violence." *The Background to the Aceh Problem*. Singapore (2006).
- Rever, Judi. *In praise of blood: The crimes of the Rwandan Patriotic Front*. Vintage Canada, 2020.
- Riker, William H. "Events and situations." *The Journal of Philosophy* 54, no. 3 (1957): 57-70.
- Robinson, Geoffrey. *The dark side of paradise: Political violence in Bali*. Cornell University Press, 1995.
- Robinson, Geoffrey. "The Economic Foundations of Political Conflict in Bali, 1950-1965." *Indonesia* 54 (1992): 59-93.
- Robison, Richard. "Toward a class analysis of the Indonesian military bureaucratic state." *Indonesia* 25 (1978): 17-39.
- Rochijat, P., & Anderson, B. (1985). Am I PKI or Non-PKI?. *Indonesia*, (40), 37-56.
- Roessler, Philip. *Ethnic politics and state power in Africa: The logic of the coup-civil war trap*. Cambridge University Press, 2016.

- Rogers, L. J., Vallortigara, G., & Andrew, R. J. (2013). *Divided brains: The biology and behaviour of brain asymmetries*. Cambridge University Press
- Roosa, John. *Buried Histories: The Anticommunist Massacres of 1965-1966 in Indonesia*. Critical Human Rights, 2020
- Rummel, Rudolph J. *Death by government*. Transaction Publishers, 1997.
- Russell, Aidan. "Obedience and selective genocide in Burundi." *Africa* 85, no. 3 (2015): 437-456.
- Russell, Aidan. *Politics and Violence in Burundi: the language of truth in an emerging state*. Vol. 145. Cambridge University Press, 2019.
- Russell, Aidan. "Rebel and rule in Burundi, 1972." *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 48, no. 1 (2015): 73-97.
- Saarinen, Aino, et al. (2021) "Neural basis of in-group bias and prejudices: A systematic meta analysis." *Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews* 131: 1214-1227.
- Santos, A., Meyer-Lindenberg, A., & Deruelle, C. (2010). Absence of racial, but not gender, stereotyping in Williams syndrome children. *Current Biology*, 20(7), R307-R308.
- Schöne, M., Seidenbecher, S., Kaufmann, J., Antonucci, L. A., Frodl, T., Koutsouleris, N., & Bogerts, B. (2021). Appetitive aggression is associated with lateralized activation in nucleus accumbens. *Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging*, 111425.
- Schreiber, Darren, et al. "Neural nonpartisans." (2020) *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*: 1-2
- Scherrer, Christian P. *Genocide and crisis in central Africa: Conflict roots, mass violence, and regional war*. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002.
- Sedda, Anna & Federica Scarpina, (2012) "Dorsal and ventral streams across sensory modalities" *Neuroscience Bulletin*. Volume 28, pp. 291–300

- Siollun, Max. *Oil, politics and violence: Nigeria's military coup culture (1966-1976)*. Algora Publishing, 2009.
- Singh, Harjinder. *Agricultural problems in Ethiopia*. Gian, 1987.
- Smith, K. B., Oxley, D., Hibbing, M. V., Alford, J. R., & Hibbing, J. R. (2011). Disgust sensitivity and the neurophysiology of left-right political orientations. *PloS one*, 6(10), e25552.
- Stevenson, John Allen. "Capitol gains: How foreign military intervention and the elite quest for international recognition cause mass killing in new states." PhD diss., The University of Chicago, 2014.
- Stoler, Ann Laura. *Capitalism and confrontation in Sumatra's plantation belt, 1870-1979*. University of Michigan Press, 1995.
- Straus, Scott. "The order of genocide." In *The Order of Genocide*. Cornell University Press, 2012.
- Straus, Scott. *Making and unmaking nations*. Cornell University Press, 2015.
- Tanasaldy, Taufiq. "The Rise of Dayak Politics (1945-1960)." In *Regime Change and Ethnic Politics in Indonesia*, pp. 79-108. Brill, 2014.
- Tareke, Gebru. "The Ethiopia-Somalia war of 1977 revisited." *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 33, no. 3 (2000): 635-667.
- Teferra, Daniel. *Social History and Theoretical Analyses of the Economy of Ethiopia*. Vol. 4. Edwin Mellen Press, 1990.
- Tegegn, Melakou. "Mengistu's 'Red Terror'." *African Identities* 10, no. 3 (2012): 249-263.
- Tilly, Charles. *The politics of collective violence*. Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Tops, M., Boksem, M. A., Luu, P., & Tucker, D. M. (2010). Brain substrates of behavioral programs associated with self-regulation. *Frontiers in psychology*, 1, 152.
- Toggia, Pietro. "The revolutionary endgame of political power: the genealogy of 'red terror' in Ethiopia." *African Identities* 10, no. 3 (2012): 265-280.

- Tucker, Don M. and Phan Luu. (2012) *Cognition and Neural Development*. Oxford University Press.
- Uscinski, Joseph E. and Joseph M. Parent. (2014). *American Conspiracy Theories*. Oxford University Press.
- Valentino, Benjamin A. *Final solutions*. Cornell University Press, 2013.
- Van der Maat, Eelco. "A typology of mass political violence." *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy* 20, no. 4 (2014): 685-695.
- Van der Maat, Eelco. "Genocidal consolidation: final solutions to elite rivalry." *International Organization* 74, no. 4 (2020): 773-809.
- Verwimp, Philip. *Peasants in power*. Springer. 2013.
- Verwimp, Philip. "The 1990–92 massacres in Rwanda: A case of spatial and social engineering?." *Journal of Agrarian Change* 11, no. 3 (2011): 396-419.
- Verwimp, Philip. "Testing the double-genocide thesis for central and southern Rwanda." *Journal of conflict resolution* 47, no. 4 (2003): 423-442.
- Voigtländer, Nico and Hans-Joachim Voth. (2012) "Persecution perpetuated: the medieval origins of anti-Semitic violence in Nazi Germany." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 127.3: 1339-1392.
- Wade, Francis. *Myanmar's enemy within: Buddhist violence and the making of a Muslim 'other'*. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019.
- Wallis, Andrew. *Stepp'd in Blood: Akazu and the Architects of the Rwandan Genocide against the Tutsi*. John Hunt Publishing, 2019.
- Wiebel, Jacob. "Atrocities in Revolutionary Ethiopia, 1974-79: Towards a Comparative Analysis." *Journal of Genocide Research* 24, no. 1 (2022): 134-147.
- Wiebel, Jacob. "" Let the Red Terror Intensify": Political Violence, Governance and Society in Urban Ethiopia, 1976-78." *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 48, no. 1 (2015): 13-29.

Weinstein, Warren. "Conflict and confrontation in Central Africa: The revolt in Burundi, 1972." *Africa Today* 19, no. 4 (1972): 17-37.

Weinstein, Warren, and Robert A. Schrire. *Political conflict and ethnic strategies: A case study of Burundi*. Vol. 23. Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, 1976.

Woldesenbet, Wassihun Gebreegizaber. "The tragedies of a state dominated political economy: shared vices among the imperial, Derg, and EPRDF regimes of Ethiopia." *Development Studies Research* 7, no. 1 (2020): 72-82.

Woube, Mengistu, and Örjan Sjöberg. "Socialism and urbanization in Ethiopia, 1975–90: a tale of two Kebeles." *International journal of urban and regional research* 23, no. 1 (1999): 26-44.

Zinner, L. R., Brodish, A. B., Devine, P. G., & Harmon-Jones, E. (2008). Anger and asymmetrical frontal cortical activity: Evidence for an anger–withdrawal relationship. *Cognition and Emotion*, 22(6), 1081-1093.