Welfare and Violence: The Relationship Between Direct Government Cash Transfers and Community Rates of Violent Crimes

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Abstract

(Castro J. 2022, Welfare and Violence: The Relationship Between Direct Government Cash Transfers and Community Rates of Violent Crimes) The relationship between income levels and crime has long been studied by social welfare scholars and poverty-centered academia. It is a relationship that most people intuitively believe to be negative in nature. That is, as personal incomes increase in a community, levels of violent crime decrease. This is the foundational social paradigm upon which western scholars view and study poverty and social welfare policy. It is this intuition that I attempt to test here in my undergraduate thesis.

This study examines the relationship between government cash transfers as a means of maintaining incomes and its effects on rates of violent crime. Specifically, I examine public records of communities in the past that have been a part of a governmental cash transfer program directly over a period of time and cross-referencing these *artificial* income injunctions with changes in the rates of violent crime. I run a statistical regression on varying communities of socioeconomic conditions to determine a correlation between government led income growth, non-government led income growth, and rates of violent crimes in the short-run, as well as the long-run; making adjustments for inflation where necessary. I also highlight human voices in this study by conducting interviews on participants of periodic unconditional stimulus within communities of high violence and low-income. Highlighting these voices allowed me to gauge the extent and context in which individuals in low-income areas spend governmental additional wage subsidies.

Ultimately, I demonstrated that cash stimuli are useful not only in alleviating community poverty, but also as a statistically significant method of reducing rates of violent crime in the short-run. My findings also demonstrate the means in which cash stimuli proves to temporarily curb violent crimes in communities in which the spending power of individuals are most affected by direct cash infusions. These findings can contribute greatly to the manner by which government resources are

directed at alleviating poverty or violent crime. The implications behind statistically significant results in the short-run, imply that government stimulus checks can serve as a powerful temporary remedy in times of social unrest, whereas my qualitative findings demonstrate that the effectiveness of government cash transfers on perceived community levels of safety depends on the means by which such transfers are made equally accessible.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my econometrics professor for providing me the tools to conduct a quantitative analysis for this project. I would also like to thank my friends and family who participated in my research and helped recommend me further to their friends and family who have received government welfare before and have been so kind in indulging me with their experiences. I believe the best way to eradicate poverty and violent crime is to tackle it directly and so studying cash-transfer programs and interviewing people who receive them helped challenge my convictions about the purposes of welfare and the condition of our welfare state. I would like to thank the City of Sanford Police department for being kind in sharing their data with me, as well as helping me navigate the abundance of data on the FBI universal crime report. Lastly, I would like to thank my parents who despite having to rely on welfare at many points in my upbringing have taught me the value of public service and maintaining an honest work ethic.

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Introduction

Poverty is a proven determinant of crime (Dong). In fact, in most urban areas, high rates of gun crime are experienced in neighborhoods that also suffer from low incomes. Studies show that inequality is a strong predictor of violent crime (Kelly 2000). Low levels of income, within a community, produces a culture which is itself conducive of crime (Lewis 1966). The culture of poverty is a social theory that asserts the values of people experiencing poverty play a significant role in perpetuating their impoverished condition, sustaining a cycle of poverty across generations (Lewis 1969). It is not only an adaptation to a set of objective conditions of the larger society. Once it comes into existence it tends to perpetuate itself from generation to generation because of its effect on children.

By the time impoverished children are age six or seven they have usually absorbed the basic values and attitudes of their subculture and are not psychologically geared to take full advantage of changing conditions or increased opportunities which may occur in their lifetime (Lewis 1969). If we expect any society to be absent of crime, it follows that it must first be absent of poverty. The problem indicates that our emphasis must be twofold: we must create full employment, or we must create incomes (King 1967). In the United States, societal perceptions around the role of the government in maintaining incomes have changed greatly over time. Through a history of cyclical financial crises, the federal government has taken on a greater role in maintaining public welfare, whereas incomes are concerned. Not only has this growth in federal government labor/income oversight resulted in indirect forms of instigating socioeconomic mobility, through labor programs and manipulation of currency markets, but it has also resulted in increasingly direct injunctions of financial stimulus into the economy. The most recent examples of direct government fiscal injunctions into the economy occurred throughout the pandemic, in which Americans who found themselves vulnerable to financial instability due to the worsening labor conditions brought about by the pandemic received three rounds of cash stimulus directly via legislation passed by the United States congress. This is not the first-time congress has acted boldly to avoid a crisis and will certainly not be the last.

Where crime is a concern, the United States is likewise in crisis. As sociological and economic theory contends its relation to poverty, if the government is to take an increasing role in maintaining appropriate low levels of both, it must be understood how these macroeconomic variables are related. Cash transfers lend themselves as perhaps the most appropriate tool through which this relationship can be studied, implicating further the potential obligation of the government in managing social ills through monetary stimulus programming. Except for the recent pandemic, cash transfer programs have not been extensively experimented with on a national scale. This is because public attitudes towards cash-transfer welfare programs have been historically negative (Popple 2018). Prior to the 1950s, historical welfare policy advanced through a residual conception paradigm, in which unfettered major social institutions were held responsible for maintaining social welfare. As the role of the government has since increased, so has the dependency on the state for individuals to receive access to vital benefits and services (Popple 2018). After the 1950s the paradigm has shifted in social welfare policy towards an institutional conception that examines an increasing role of the government in maintaining social welfare instead (Wilensky & Debeaux 1958, Popple 2018).

Outside of sociological theory, today we know those statistical relationships between incomes and community rates of violent crime exist, although it is not linear (Kim 2019). The direct manipulation of community levels of income through government programming like that of cash-transfers has only been tried a few times on local levels and even fewer on a national scale. In these experimental programs, hardly ever has the effect on rates of violent crime been extensively researched. The question this paper will attempt to answer is how government cash transfers affect the rates of violent crime. “Violent Crime” acts as an umbrella term that includes homicides, rape, aggravated assault, and robbery.

“Government Cash-Transfers” serves as an umbrella term which encapsulates negative income taxes, stimulus checks, unemployment benefits, guaranteed incomes, and universal basic income experiments (UBI). There exists ample quantitative data on programs that meet several of the conditions necessary to definitively satisfy a UBI (Jones, Damon and Marinescu 2018). Some programs that claim to have experimented with UBI face to several shortcomings. Many of the programs are not broad enough in scope, or are conditional in nature. Regardless, the data on rising incomes attributable to public and private anti-poverty programs can prove useful when determining the effects of poverty on rates of gun violence. In this paper I will cross-examine data sets related to these programs and data relating to violent crime in these very specific communities/families affected. I also accumulate qualitative data around the experiences, attitudes, and perspectives of those who participated or otherwise took part in these past experiments. Overall, I explore whether cash-infusions into communities directly have a positive or negative impact on the propensity for violent crime. I will draw almost exclusively on working class communities since they are the ones most likely to experience changes in their standards of living. I will focus my qualitative data on cities like that of Sanford, Florida, where the median household income is $47,000 a year and the violent crime rate is over two times the national average (Census 2019).

My findings help discern the effects of income on gun-violence within working class communities. They also provide insights on the social determinants of crime more generally. The data itself has large implications on welfare policy, as well as within the criminal justice reform policy space. The qualitative data presented here explores the effects that welfare programs have on the nature of relationships members of a community have between each other, and the nature of the relationship they have with the state. Poverty itself is an act of violence, sanctioned by the state. Institutionally engrained, it mandates the active and perpetual forfeiture of life, property, and the pursuit of happiness from the public. In the United States, inequality persists as both an economic and psychological phenomenon. I hope to call into question the psychology and sociology of income and crime, upon which a large body of literature on government cash-transfers and welfare more generally are focused.

Literature Review

Within the very framework of our constitution, the outlined functions of our federal government are to promote the general “welfare,” a term that was nearly synonymous at the time with ”prosperity” (Popple 2018). The term today has since taken on a different meaning, referring to the poor and dependent, fated to negation by connotation (Steensland 2008). We can attribute the changes in how Americans perceive welfare and the responsibility of the state in maintaining and protecting it to the changes in economic demographics. It difficult to measure poverty in the early years of the country because the nature of the economy did not offer clear metrics for measurement. Colonial America had four groups of workers: agricultural workers; a small group of mostly urban professionals (doctors, lawyers, preachers, etc.); artisans and mechanics; and low-skilled high-intensity laborers (Popple 2018). As the nature of work would come to change, Americans increasingly migrated to urban areas, forming a working class that would come to define the backbone of our economy. After the industrial revolution, the role of government in promoting the general “welfare” would come to take on a financial burden. As workers were increasingly negotiating with their firms and their governments for better working conditions, many were finding themselves in financial ruin, becoming increasingly dependent on their firms to maintain their sustenance, and it would be during this age that poverty itself would come to be seen as a *systemic* problem (Wilensky 1975).

For an issue to be considered a social problem two things are required. The first is empirical evidence that a problem exists, the second is that it is perceived as a problem (Popple 2018). Poverty has remained a problem in the United States for as long as our technologies have been able to measure it, but even longer when we consider its permanence within the social consciousness. During the Great Depression, almost a quarter of the American workforce found themselves penniless and unemployed, and thus solicited massive government spending in infrastructure, education, and transportation (ssa.gov). The Social Security Act was signed into law by President Roosevelt in 1935, creating a social insurance program designed to pay retired workers aged 65 or older a continuing income after retirement (ssa.gov).

"We can never insure one hundred percent of the population against one hundred percent of the hazards and vicissitudes of life, but we have tried to frame a law which will give some measure of protection to the average citizen and to his family against the loss of a job and against poverty-ridden old age."

- President Franklin D. Roosevelt

Soon thereafter the federal government began issuing out social security numbers, effectively filing a national registry of all those who, in theory, would be eligible for receiving social security benefits if they were to find themselves retired and impoverished. The federal government began issuing monthly cash stimulus in 1940, and the program, along with other programs which serve to tackle poverty directly, have remained popular ever since (United States Government 2021).

The conditions of poverty themselves propagate the dissolution of general welfare, and often afflict those who prove incapable, either by means, desire, or circumstance, to integrate formally into the economy. Those who are impoverished often own no property upon which they can accumulate wealth, they find themselves isolated from opportunity of employment, and up until the 1960s were excluded entirely from healthcare infrastructure - that is not to discount the plight of African Americans, who have been excluded systemically from participating in our political institutions and much less in public healthcare systems (ssa.gov). As the 20th century unfolded, America became the most prosperous of countries, the federal government took on an increasingly larger role in ensuring a social safety net for individuals suffering from poverty. Medicare was enacted in the 1960s, Social Security would continue to increase, and the federal government, during Richard Nixon's administration, would eventually come to consider a guaranteed annual income as a solution to poverty (Rogne, Estes, Grossman, Hollister and Solway 2018. If we are to glean any discernible pattern from this history of social welfare it is this: the government will continue to take an increasing role in maintaining incomes above the poverty level. What exactly will this look like? How exactly should we consider variables which themselves contribute to poverty like violent crime? Does a guaranteed annual income offer a solution?

A guaranteed annual income, or universal basic income as it is often called, is a periodically distributed cash stimulus given to every citizen of a community by the government with no stipulations or prerequisites attached. A proposal to enact a federal UBI grew traction and would pass the house of representatives in congress in 1969, only to die before ever reaching the senate. I believe there to be a variety of reasons for this legislative stalling, which I will expand upon in the policy implications of this paper, but what's most important is that immediately afterwards congress shifted directions in how to approach public welfare spending. Here, we must evaluate two conceptual frameworks in how social policy in the 1960s and 1970s would develop.

Harold Wilensky and Charles Lebeaux identify two conceptions from which we can observe social welfare policy. The first is what is called the "institutional conception" in which the function of social welfare is to provide institutional benefits and services that are needed by everyone to function in a complex, social environment (Wilensky & Lebeaux 1958). The second is what is referred to as the residual conception, which views major social institutions, mainly the church, family, and the economy, as being able to provide for all the needs of the society so long as they are functioning well (Wilensky & Lebeaux 1958). Under the residual conception, those resources which are to provide external benefits and services are to be reserved solely for the poor, or individuals who experience chronic poverty, and thus are stigmatized (Wilensky & Lebeaux 1958). It would be under this framework that social policy progressivism would come to a halt, and federal policy would begin to reflect desires to facilitate the expansion of labor opportunities as a means of achieving upwards mobility (Popple 2018).

Universal Basic Income left the political consciousness almost as fast as it had arrived, perhaps unfairly so. Ultimately, guaranteed income plans failed politically because they challenged the cultural logic of American welfare policy, which is based on sorting the poor into different programs according to assessments of 'deservingness' (Steensland, 2008). Instead, the Nixon administration would adopt a new type of cash-transfer-based welfare policy, and in 1968 the federal government began administering the first of four Negative Income Tax (NIT) credit experiments in which those households which receive a recorded income below the national poverty line are subsidized up to this threshold. The main purpose of these experiments was to determine how families would adjust their labor supply in response to NIT (Robins 1985). These experiments would end in 1984, after taking place in various cities dispersed geographically across the United States. These experimental locations include urban areas in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Gary, Indiana, Seattle, and Denver; but also rural areas in Iowa and North Carolina (Robins 1985). The experiment varied according to the areas in which they took place. Some were providing stimulus where the breakeven point would range from at the national poverty line to 250 percent above the poverty level. Income selection criteria also varied according to state or region, but most of the time anyone whose family's income was equal to 150 percent of the poverty level or less was eligible for enrollment (Robins 1985). The NIT experiments not only demonstrated the value of government subsidized wages, it also demonstrated that different communities faced different needs in terms of economic injections. It also demonstrates the general attitude towards welfare policy at the time, in which policy makers believe that without stringent criteria upon which to assess the eligibility of recipients, individuals may be undeserving of financial assistance or become dissuaded from working altogether. What was not measured however, was how these program rollouts would affect the crime rates in these urban areas, most of which land well above the national average in violent crime rates.

One contemporary example of periodic cash stimulus in which my data will expand upon is the more recent 'stimulus' checks that were dispersed nationally throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. Between March 2020 and March 2021, the federal government provided three rounds of direct payments targeting lower and middle-class Americans, costing taxpayers a total of $850 billion (Peterson Foundation 2021). Individuals were given varying amounts of supplemental income according to how much they earned, phasing out for married couples who earn more than $150,000 a year. Overall, the payments reached an estimated 85% of US households, alleviating much of the economic hardship Americans faced throughout the pandemic (Internal Revenue Service 2021). Although the majority of households who had lost employment-based income received a payment, unemployment status was not a necessary stipulation to receive a stimulus check. The stimulus checks of the COVID-19 pandemic provided for the first time the closest public policy to a Universal Basic Income in that it reached many more people and recipients were not required to meet such stringent criterias of employment status, as is the case of other federally organized supplementary income programs. The Stimulus checks proved to play a pivotal role in preventing many Americans from falling into poverty (Han et al. 2020). Although, it is difficult to determine how Americans would have fared without receiving stimulus, it is fair to say that much can be gleaned from spending habits of those who received a government stimulus over the past year. Macroeconomic data on rates of poverty and health are readily available, but not enough has been gathered on the nature of spending habits, and how this stimulus effected rates of violent crimes and perceptions of community safety.

Altogether, welfare policy continues to remain stringent, often offering services or financial assistance with various strings attached. The programs that have been tried have been short of universal in their applications and often erect more barriers to upwards mobility rather than eliminating them. Whether it be Social Security, Negative Income Tax, Temporary assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Food Stamps, or unemployment insurance, the United States has yet to implement a comprehensive non-discriminatory wide-scale social security net, having perhaps reached the closest definition of a guaranteed annual income through the COVID-19 stimulus packages. As such, America has not alleviated itself of poverty, an apparent testament to the very intrinsic nature of destitution in our society.

Poverty is cyclical in nature. It constantly perpetuates itself, creating within itself social limitations and developing in the victim financial ruin and crippling debt. The subculture of the poor develops mechanisms that tend to perpetuate it, especially because of what happens to the worldview, aspirations, and character of the children who grow up in it (Lewis 1969). The burdens of poverty themselves are systemic and imposed upon the most vulnerable members of the society, leading to the formation of an autonomous subculture as children are socialized into behaviors and attitudes that perpetuated their inability to escape the lower class (Lewis 1969). Poverty in many ways acts as a disease. For this disease, there is only one apparent cure, stable incomes. Basic income can be considered an institution of health, as well as contributory to public systems of health (Haagh 2019).

Reverend Martin Luther King Jr., spoke on a guaranteed income as not only a means of eradicating poverty, but also as a means of properly integrating the poor and destitute into our society systematically (King 1967). He states that to solve American poverty we must “create full employment or create incomes” (King 1967). King addresses poverty not just as a national health emergency, but also as a social problem, which manifests itself in other negative social externalities. However, there currently is no reliable data for systematic inquiry about "the impact of the welfare state on real welfare (Wilinsky 1975). The primary externality of a culture of poverty, which I believe the national narrative has misdiagnosed severely, is that of crime more specifically, violent crimes.

There is ample literature on the motivations of crime, mostly suggesting that there is a human nature that develops in intimate settings out of a complex interaction of constitutional and social factors, and that this nature affects how people choose between the consequences of crime and its alternatives. (Wilson & Hernnstein, 1985). If we examine crime under a neoclassical economic framework, then individuals commit crime as a rational means of subsistence (Friedman & Ebenstein 2012). But this framework is neither helpful in explaining sometimes volatile rates of gun violence, nor does it accurately represent the nature in which the general public perceives the perpetrators of such crimes. Much of the public concern about crime focuses on interpersonal violence, and so public policy mirrors this emphasis (American Psychological Association 2013). Violent crime should instead be construed primarily as a public health emergency, and the statistics and data existing on rates of violent crimes demand this framework be adopted immediately. By taking a public health approach to violent crime, a diagnosis can be reached as to both its causes and symptoms. Above all else, poverty is implicated.

Referring again to Oscar Lewis' term, "the Culture of Poverty," we see further how a public health framework is useful in examining the relationship between violent crimes and income. There has always existed a correlation between neighborhood incomes levels and the rates of violent crime. Empirical examinations do little in the way of explaining this correlation, as my data analysis will go on to testify, so instead we must examine the sociological intuitions. Neighborhoods which experience high rates of poverty are perpetually impoverished since conditions of poverty themselves propagate such barriers as to maintain themselves (Lewis 1969). An example of this process would be the lack of access to higher education. Impoverished neighborhood schools are provided less financial resources than their wealthier counterparts (Cornman, S.Q., Zhou, L., Howell, M.R., and Young, J. 2017). The results of these limited resources are limited opportunities, such that those who attend these low-income schools are less capable of social and economic mobility, and thus are maintained in the same conditions which are to be inherited by their children. Violence is considered a proponent of the culture of poverty, in that poverty both perpetuates and is perpetuated by violent crime (Allen 2018). Intuitively this makes sense, those who are impoverished have a greater motivation than others (hunger, homelessness, mental health) to commit violent crimes than others. After a crime occurs, property values decrease, and, if an individual is murdered, or incarcerated, then the community is deprived of a potentially productive economic and social asset (Hellman, Daryl A. and Joel L. Naroff 1979). This is what occurred during Richard Nixon's administration, when the "war on drugs" initiative led to an influx in the rate of incarceration, particularly among African American communities, which on average experienced lower levels of income (Sirin 2011). As such these communities were systematically deprived of their supply of labor.

This narrative around criminality has allowed for the public to be dismissive of the needs of those individuals who perpetuate violent crimes especially, as so public policy mirrors this emphasis. In the past, policy has focused on the nature of punishment, rather than tackling the motivations for crimes themselves. Progress toward explaining criminality does not reduce the need for punishment, as it only enables us to think more clearly about how punishment might work on people who commit, or might commit, crimes (Wilson & Hernnstein, 1985). Much of the public narrative around crime has historically insisted on using penalties as a primary deterrent of crime rather than addressing the social determinants of health. Social determinants of health include social capital, reflecting informal and formal social ties within society; income inequality, the divide between the rich and the poor; residential racial segregation and economic segregation; non-medical social spending such as government spending on welfare and education; and intergenerational social mobility (Chetty et al. 2014).

In 2019, Daniel Kim recognized this problem, and conducted a research project in which he attempted to ascertain the social determinants of firearm-related homicides by exploring and comparing a variety of social factors; social mobility, social capital, income inequality, racial and economic segregation, and social spending. His findings concluded that the rich–poor gap, level of citizens' trust in institutions, economic opportunity, and public welfare spending are all related to firearm homicide rates in the US (Kim 2019). If there exists a relationship between public welfare spending and rates of violent crime, then this relationship would be reflected by cross-examining rates of homicide or violent crime more generally, and rates of poverty, which public welfare itself attempts to alleviate, albeit historically indirectly. Existing literature fails to quantitatively and qualitatively draw a relationship between welfare spending and violent crime; hence I will embark on such endeavors in this paper, understanding that poverty is as much a health problem as it is a social and economic problem. The poor person stands undoubtedly outside the group, inasmuch as he is a mere object of the actions of the collectivity. But being outside, in this case, is only, to put it briefly, a particular form of being inside (Simmel 1971). The impoverished are stigmatized and excluded from society, perpetuating often violent externalities. As such, the study of violent crime and its relationship with welfare policy is a gap in the existing literature which I hope to close in the following pages.

Most literature today no longer focuses on the empirical relationship between poverty and crime, failing to consider the varying social pressures that exist among communities with varying levels of income. Instead, literature has focused on the relationship between income inequality and crime. This correlation has not only been empirically proven but is also sociologically sound. Income inequality is an issue on the rise in capitalist structured economies today more than ever. Some of the wealthiest cities in America also experience disproportionately large percentages of people experiencing absolute poverty and homelessness. Wherever such disparities in wealth are localized and extremified, we see the highest rates of violent crime. This existing literature is relevant in framing the data analysis section further. It is also important in contextualizing the relevance of a guaranteed income program, which could serve as a means of potentially countering the increasing rates of income inequality.

BA DRAFT: DATA AND METHOD:

My data is essentially two-fold. The first half of my data consists of quantitative research in which I will collect publicly available macroeconomic data from various cities and metropolitan statistical areas and run a statistical analysis to find potentially significant correlations between changes in income and changes in violent crime. The second half of my data will consist of qualitative interviews conducted by myself with voluntary individuals who have received a direct cash transfer from the government. This half of my data is intended to shine a light on the human voices and the direct-account impacts of influxes in government cash payments, spending habits, and changes of perception in community safety. By juxtaposing these two forms of data I hope to find the intersection between personal income and rates of violent crime.

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS:

OUTCOME VARIABLE: VIOLENT CRIME RATES

I will be using publicly available records to run a regression analysis and determine whether there is a statistically significant correlation between violent crime and income. More specifically I am focusing on data from cities which experience high rates of violent crime and lower than average personal incomes. Florida, as my home state, offers ample observation sites which satisfy this condition. I will be observing data from these sites to track the correlation between short term and long-term effects of changes in income on rates of violent crime.

I will be examining historically low-income communities which also experience high rates of crime. By establishing a null hypothesis, rooted in the literature, that there exists a inverse relationship between income and rates of violent crime, we have a starting theoretical assertion upon which to challenge. This assertion will be challenged through a quantitative analysis, using STATA, of macroeconomic variables. The outcome variable is Violent Crime Rates, whereas the dependent variables are not only local Per capita personal income but also real per capita personal income and short and long term rates with regard to both. In most cities, the per capita personal income consistently trended upwards, but due to inflation this is not translatable to an actual increase in purchasing power. By using locally sourced estimates of the consumer price index, I recalculate per capita personal income to be reflected in actual increases in purchasing power; measuring instead Real Per Capita Personal Income. That is not to say that there may not also be a calculable effect of nominal changes in income on crime, as often the effects of nominal income increases in the short-run may be predictable. One can imagine that a spike in wages may have positive effects on rates of crime in the short-run, if inflationary pressures experience what economists call a lag period.

My observation sites mostly consist of municipalities in Florida that experience historically high rates of crime and low-levels of personal income. By controlling these factors with proximity, the implications are that communities which are similar enough demographically will behave similarly with regard to the impact of changes in personal income on rates of violent crime. Within Florida, the observation sites include Sanford, Pompano Beach, Miami, and Seminole. I’ve likewise chosen cities around that country that are demographically similar to these municipalities. These include the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) of Denver, Colorado and Stockton, California. I’ve also chosen to include macro-economic data across the entire state of Alaska and the King and Snohomish County in Washington State. The reason for including these two regions are that, besides being demographically opposite from the other cities with regard to high rates of violent crime. In effect, this will measure determinants of crime with respect to non-income related factors.

I also studied these cites over varying periods of fiscal and wage growth. The periods I have chosen regarding each site span over a time frame in which a large percentage of the community received direct government fiscal invention. That is, each site, over a specific set of years, received a periodic stimulus directly from either the state or local government. I collect crime and income data from 2015-2020 in every county in Florida; from 1970-1995 in Alaska; 2000-2020 for Sanford, Florida (my hometown); 2000-2019 in Raleigh, North Carolina; 2000-2019 from Miami, Florida; 2003-2019 Pompano Beach, Florida; 2000-2019 Stockton, California; 2000-2017 Denver, Colorado; and 1965-1995 King/Snohomish County, Washington. Over these years, these sites all received a government stimulus package, most notably in 2020 with the three rounds of stimulus brought about by the Covid-19 pandemic as well as the Alaska Permanent Fund which began in 1976. I have chosen to study data from Denver, Stockton, and Seattle because these cities currently have guaranteed income-friendly administrations and are currently exploring future options to provide periodic government-provided wage subsidies to all citizens.

I used STATA software to conduct a data analysis. All data sources of income come from the St. Louis Federal Reserve Economic Data website whereas all crime data is published in the FBI Universal Crime Reporting database. Within my data analysis, I differentiate between high income communities and low-income communities, as well as before and after “treatment” which would be when a stimulus package was provided. This discontinuity regression will prove especially insightful for a place like Alaska, where the beginning of the Fund Dividend marks a clear spike in personal incomes statewide.

Changes in income may result in changes in violent crime rates that may not be reflected immediately. For this reason, I not only test correlation of changes in income over 1 year with violent crime rates, but also over 5-years periods in order to ascertain more long-term associated effects. Measuring how these variables interact with each other in areas which are both demographically similar and demographically different will help in determining the implications of community influxes of cash in communities of differing needs.

I chose to investigate Alaskan macroeconomic data between 1965 to 1985 because in 1980 the state government began the Alaska Permanent fund, in which every legal resident of the state is provided a 1-2 thousand dollar check directly at the end of every year. The effects of this universal basic income like program on crime have not yet been investigated. Similarly, King County Washington in 1969 began negative income tax experiments where individual incomes were subsidized up to the national poverty level in order to curb crime. Denver likewise participated in this Nixon-Administration driven initiative, while also planning future potential guaranteed income programs. Measuring the effects on crime of these programs in these areas will likewise require an in-depth long- and short-term analysis centered on these years of administration.

Ultimately, my quantitative datal shows a consistent relationship between personal income and violent crime trends. The role of the government in maintaining incomes as a means of combating violent crime rates is neither quantitatively nor intuitively conclusive. However, the data does measure the effects of fiscal forms of government intervention. It is worth noting that very little data has been published thus far on the effects the COVID-19 stimulus checks have had on violent crime and although I try to control for variables such as historical high rates of crime and low-income communities, it is difficult to control for variables relating to the COVID-19 pandemic itself. What is most important and academically relevant throughout my findings is that the data analysis uncovers just how proportionately large fluctuations in personal incomes affect Violent Crime rates. The government's responsibility as a catalyst to this is something that I believe the qualitative data itself ascertains.

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

I conducted 14 total interviews for individuals who are recipients of a repeated government cash-transfer and/or have been, or currently are, within proximity to violent crime. The purpose of these interviews is to gauge the usefulness of government cash-transfers in alleviating and avoiding poverty, and potential gauge observational data on how such transfers affects the social landscape of a community. This data is not conclusive in the real effectiveness of government intervention in violent crime with respect to subsidizing incomes, nonetheless it is useful in gauging further public perception of welfare policy and how individuals relate these efforts to combating crime or sense of community safety.

To recruit individuals, I started with individuals who I know personally, either through history of work or through academic circles. My immediate social base is large enough and meets the age criteria so that from there I managed to snowball sample, incorporating individuals from extending social spheres. I will also be recruiting directly from public resources such as libraries and recreational centers. Participants have been given explanations as to the purpose of the study and asked to formally concede consent before participating.

I choose to place emphasis primarily on people who are between the ages of 18-25. Violent crime is most common among this demographic and the literature suggests that individuals within this age range are in closer proximity to it as well (Perkins 1997).

I conducted interviews with individuals who have received one of the following:

- Unemployment Checks
- Universal Basic Income experiments
- COVID stimulus checks
- Negative Income Tax Credit
- Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians Casino Dividend
- Alaska Permanent Fund
- Returning Citizen Stimulus

Subjects were asked a series of questions regarding their financial status prior to receiving a cash-transfer, the conditional nature of said cash-transfer, and how the cash-transfer positively or negatively effected their own lives, or the lives of those in their community.

Subjects were also asked on their perception of crime and poverty within their communities, and questions pertaining to their sense of community safety and history with violent crime.

The entirety of every interview was fully recorded through an audio recording device and subsequently transcribed afterwards. These questions are intended to ascertain whether they feel that there exists a correlation between rates of violent crime and poverty, and whether they have felt compelled to own a firearm to ensure their own safety, and perhaps how that sense of safety may have been altered after they, or members of their community, received government cash-transfers. Levels of trust in government, police, and access to resources will also be asked of participants in the study.

This data is further juxtaposed with my quantitative research to determine the effects of sudden increases in income on rates of violent crime. Together a more comprehensive analysis incorporating both forms of data allowed me to provide a criminal justice-based focus on welfare policies which mechanically increase incomes, something the proponents of a UBI sign off on.

Researcher Positionality

As a student and avid observer of politics and public policy, I believe that over the next several years, Universal Basic Income, or a Guaranteed Annual Income as it is sometimes referred to, is becoming an increasingly ripe policy fruit. I ascribe to the belief in UBI as a potential solution to many societal ills. Having grown up in a low-income household and community, I have been in close proximity to both violent crime and poverty. Having witnessed the interplay between these two forces, I implicitly recognize their indirect connection, and therefore am looking to quantify and qualify them further in an effort to spur public policy discourse around the abolition of poverty in the United States. As mentioned in the literature review, much of the public discourse around gun violence and efforts to alleviate it revolve around notions of federal restrictions and erecting legal barriers to ownership. Determining a qualifying and quantitative connection between both violent crime rates and poverty rates, which I do intuitively believe exists, can have large implications on what effective criminal justice reform and public health policy can look like.

Findings and Data Analysis Section

Quantitative Findings:

There exists a binomial relationship between rates of violent crimes and community levels of income. The highest rate of violent crime exists at nominal personal income levels of $40,000. This translates roughly to $18,000 in real wages (according to 1984 figures). This number hovers just around the federal poverty rate and so intuitively it makes sense that high crime would exist around these numbers. See **Figure 1.1.**



Figure 1.1

Figure 1.1 shows two trends based on the quantitative data collected from every individual county in *Florida between 2000-2020*. It shows the quadratic relationship between crime and income. The red line indicates the predicted trends according to Real Income levels whereas the blue line is a projection using Nominal personal income levels. Real Income is simply Nominal income adjusted for Inflation according to a base year of 1984. This distinction is relevant in that when talking about increasing incomes, especially with regard to economic stimulus policies, in that often increases in wages do not reflect an increase in actual purchasing power.

What is perhaps most interesting is that in both cases increases in income actually cause an increase in violent crime rates up to a certain threshold. **Figures 1.2 and 1.3** below demonstrate this difference in relationship between communities of high income and low income.



Figure 1.2 **Figure 1.3**

This difference in the relationship implies a lot about which communities in particular should be targeted in government cash-transfer programs. A negative income tax, in which the Nixon's administration rolled out in the late 1960s targeted increases in incomes up to the federal poverty level, waning off after this. According to these trends, this program would actually serve to *increase* rates of violent crime.

Furthermore I examine the relationship between changes in incomes and changes in Violent Crime. **Figure 1.4** shows the yearly relationships between changes in personal incomes (both real and nominally) and changes in violent crime.



Variable	A1	A2	A3
ChangeinPCPI	.00696703		
ChangeinRP~I	-.02057825		
NominalPCPI		-.00002238	-.00001398
RealPCPI		.00005421	.00009652
_cons	2.0169802***	5.8822993***	.89174966***
N	148	401	336
r2	.00106144	.00895436	.0631209

legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Figure 1.4

These two images in **Figure 1.4** show the relationship between Annual Changes in Income and annual changes in the violent crime rate, as percentages. A1 refers to the Change in Violent Crime Rate. A2 refers to the Violent Crime Rate per 100000, and A3 refers to the murder rate. With exception to the constant, there are no significant correlation coefficients. However, the graph on the right demonstrates a predictable trend based on goodness of fit. The Chart demonstrates that among all Florida counties. Changes in income that are positive generally result in a decrease in the Violent Crime Rate. Next I looked at the difference between counties of lower incomes and higher incomes. See **Figure 1.5.**



Figure 1.5

The graph on the right of **Figure 1.5** shows the relationship between changes in nominal incomes and changes in violent crime rates. The graph on the right shows the relationship between changes in real incomes and These two graphs demonstrate a deviance from the findings in **Figure 1.4.** Here we see that the highest increases in violent crime occur when incomes are stagnant (between -5% and 5% growth). Figure 1.6 shows the same variable relationship goodness of fit for personal incomes above $40K Nominal PCPI/$20K Real PCPI.



Figure 1.6

The graphs again show the same polynomial relationship of incomes (Nominal on the right; Real on the left) but shifted over to the right along the x-axis. The implication by these predicted values is that for higher levels of personal income, when incomes increase, proximity to violent crime increases. Here rather, stagnation in incomes is the most conducive to decreasing rates of violent crime.

Using Florida County data we can ascertain how different communities' violent crime rates respond to changes in income growth rates. However, this does little to demonstrate the influence of a governmental cash transfer of the like that government stimulus programs provide. For this we look at a different example, that of Alaska. **See Figure 2.1**.

Figure 2.1

Figure 2.1 shows Violent Crime Rate and Per Capita Personal Income in Alaska as a function of time. Both increased over the course of 25 years. In 1980 is when the permanent fund began. How can we be sure that the program had an effect on the violent crime rate? See below **Figure 2.2.**

Linear regression

Number of obs	=	21
F(3, 17)	=	0.42
Prob > F	=	0.7426
R-squared	=	0.0469
Root MSE	=	11.063

ChangeViole~e	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Dividends	-59.38684	69.46525	-0.85	0.404	-205.9457	87.17202
Yearsaffected	-62.19723	69.42903	-0.90	0.383	-208.6797	84.28522
YDividendsVCR	.107331	.1269221	0.85	0.409	-.1604512	.3751131
_cons	64.04909	69.58053	0.92	0.370	-82.75299	210.8512

Figure 2.2

Figure 2.2 tells us we can not be sure of there being no effect. If we look at the explanatory variable YDividendVCR it tells us how much the dividend would have affected Violent crime rates before the dividend was even implemented. The coefficient is positive, but it is not statistically significant. Meaning that within a 95% confidence interval, statistically we cannot say if the dividend would have had an increase or decrease in the violent crime rate of Alaska. To ascertain a potential trend. Perhaps Alaska is an anomaly, after all, socially speaking, the culture of Alaska varies a lot compared to the rest of urban America. For this reason, I turned to King County Washington, where in 1969 a negative income tax experiment began subsidizing incomes below the poverty level. The macroeconomic data analyzed from Florida would tell us that this artificial inflation in incomes among the lowest income bracket would lead to an increase in violent crime rates, here we see if this is the case for King County. See **Figure 3.1**.

F(3, 26)	=	38.17
Prob > F	=	0.0000
R-squared	=	0.5302
Root MSE	=	6539.1

PerCapitaPe~D	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
NIT	0	(omitted)				
Yearseffected	-15340.24	1707.51	-8.98	0.000	-18850.07	-11830.4
YNIT	1895.913	418.7822	4.53	0.000	1035.094	2756.732
YNITPCPI	.7089464	35.11509	0.02	0.984	-71.47115	72.88904
_cons	19058.57	1703.31	11.19	0.000	15557.37	22559.77

Figure 3.1

This regression uses a variable I created call YNITPCPI which is the effect of the NIT on years before and after the program was initiated. Although the NIT experiments occurred after 1969, I cannot conclude that they would have had an effect on violent crime before this date without first creating this variable showing an interaction between income and NIT over the course of specified years. Although the coefficient is positive again we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the negative income tax and rates of violent crime. The R2 is also only at about **0.5302** meaning that these effects only account for 50% statistically for the increases in violent crime in King County (Seattle, WA).

Ultimately the quantitative data only proves useful in predicting a model based on goodness of fit. In this case, we can use the statistical models to conclude that stagnation in personal incomes, both real and nominal, lead to the highest rates of violent crime. We can also conclude that both the Alaska Permanent Fund and the Negative Income

Tax experiments did not lead to actual growth in incomes within a given 10 year span before and after these programs took effect. These two findings juxtaposed together tell us that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that these two cash-stimulus driven programs had determinable effects on the rates of violent crime, except when they drastically alter incomes negatively or positively beyond ≈ 5%. The quantitative data however does not reflect the government's role in doing so. For this we turn to qualitative data gathered regarding a separate government program, the COVID-19 Stimulus.

Qualitative Findings

I conducted a series of **14 interviews** in which I asked respondents a series of questions regarding their receival of a COVID-19 Stimulus Check. The questions ranged from what their spending habits were to how appropriately they felt the COVID-19 stimulus fund was allocated, as well as how they felt it contributed to community levels of safety.

Almost all of my interviewees were between the ages of 18-25 with **3 exceptions**. All participants received a covid-19 stimulus check and/or unemployment benefits over the course of 2020. Each interview was about 30 minutes long and each interviewer on average earned about **$3,300** over the course of 2020-2021. Eight out of ten respondents said that they were living **paycheck to paycheck** prior to receiving a government stimulus. Of these, all respondents explained that they used the **money primarily to cover debts** relating to housing. Only **7 out of 14** respondents believed that there are **others in greater need** of a stimulus check as opposed to themselves.

“Once you touch that kind of money there is no way you’re saving it”

- Hannah Salama, COVID-19 Stimulus Recipient

“Those who weren’t forced to spend it all, invest their money, stock market went up, people were bidding up”

- Nazir Crump, COVID-19 Stimulus Recipient

This quote highlighted a general sentiment among individuals receiving lump-sums of money for the first time, not experienced with budgeting, or struggling to make ends meet. For many young people the COVID-19 related government cash transfers were the first of its kind. Many felt that it was the first time they were able to engage the economy directly, using the cash on consumer goods beyond what their debts could afford them.

I also asked participants questions regarding their community and sense of safety within their community. **11 out of 14** people said that they felt safe in their respective communities, with an average safety rating of **6.85 out of 10** (10 framed as “comfortable walking alone at midnight”). Of these, **8** individuals explained that they felt the cash-transfers only increased their sense of community safety. **6 individuals** claimed it created a sort of social segregation between those who received government benefits and those who didn't.

“I feel that… if there were different standards for everybody [with stimulus checks] it impacts my safety, some would have felt repression.”

- Samira Mahmud, COVID-19 Stimulus/Unemployment Check Recipient

"It's a very thin line between helping and enabling"

- Jari Rivera, COVID-19 Stimulus Recipient/Unemployment Check Recipient

These two quotes from Samira and Jari reflect how in many instances, people are uncomfortable with the perception surrounding government welfare programs. There exists a common thread of the need to destigmatize government benefits that all my interviews held more generally. All recipients explained that they were helped tremendously by the stimulus check and allowed for them, as well as members of their community to be financially at ease.

9 out of 14 participants explained to me that they felt their community was in great need for a government stimulus check. **9 out of 14** participants said that they personally considered government cash-transfers to be a deterrent to violent crime, more specifically property crimes. Those who received also received multiple, more frequent, government cash stimulus (greater than 2 over a 6-month period) were also 66.67% more likely to claim that government cash transfers have a direct effect on violent crime, whereas those who received less frequent payments claimed so at a rate of 40%. This reflects a changing perception that is perhaps fueled by increasing government dependency. It may also be interpreted to reflect how government cash-transfers serve to benefit those who themselves feel a closer proximity to crime by association with a cash-oriented welfare social service.

Oddly enough, this uncertainty in the relationship between increases in cash-transfer based incomes and property crime is also reflected in the quantitative data. One trend I found among all **14 participants** was this notion of the necessity of the stimulus checks in providing economic infrastructure in our society. This quote by Nazir Crump, a COVID-19 stimulus check recipient, I think perfectly encapsulates this sentiment:

"There is a Structural inevitability with stimulus checks"

- Nazir Crump

Nazir, along with all other participants in the study felt that the dispersion of the stimulus checks was necessary to maintain the general welfare afloat. Essentially, they all believed that due to the lack of structural economic safety nets, the inevitable recessionary flow of our economy mandates direct government intervention in the form of cash-transfers. How this affects violent crime was not directly mentioned by any of the participants in this regard, but I think it's worth noting that the quantitative data regarding violent crime rates seems to imply this as well.

Another finding from these interviews is that every participant correlated crime further to desperation and economic hardship than to social factors alone. This implies that people tie poverty to crime intuitively much more than they do for social factors. This is relevant because every individual believed that increasing levels of community incomes would serve to decrease crime. This, however, is not backed by the quantitative data always.

Dillon Jules, a recent graduate from Florida State University, who received two of the three rounds of stimulus, while also receiving weekly unemployment from May 2021 – August 2021, expressed how he felt that the stigma around receiving government welfare had diminished greatly over the past few years. He tied this to the growing demand of government subsidized income, a reflection of a struggling economy. Relating this to crime, he expressed that those struggling, who find themselves more "willing" to commit crimes instead have an easier time looking and asking for help. Ultimately it reflected a sentiment that **12 out of the other 14** individuals shared in which greater access to social services, whether that be a cash stimulus program, alleviates violent crimes that is perceptively fueled by economic insecurity. Government cash stimulus programs, or wage subsidies programs was welcomed as a viable means to achieving this by **13 out of 14** participants (with notable exception to the one Alaskan interviewee).

• Policy Recommendations: Draft

When looking at government solutions to poverty, direct cash-transfer programming offers promising results and is often the first place policy makers turn to. There is however an abundance of lacking considerations that must be made before any large scale government periodic cash-transfer program can be implemented. A cash-transfer approach must consider the effects of inflation, that is, how is this money being funded. Often governments have artificially inflated incomes through a close monitoring of the fed, and through printing money. To avoid runaway inflation, money must be reallocated and reorganized in a society. Another important consideration that must be made before implementing a cash-transfer program is to whom would be receiving a stimulus. It is clear that certain income brackets respond differently to changes in income with respect to rates of violent crime. Finally, any cash-transfer program targeting violent crime must necessarily provide a stimulus large enough to have determinable effects, which statistically is at least 5% growth in personal income. If these three considerations are made, government-cash transfers offer a potential solution to curbing rates of violent crime. Inflation often nullified the effects of cash-transfers on violent crime. This is because cash-transfers no longer become a relevant factor in violent crime over an extended period of time. Statistically, the implication here is that although cash transfers should be cyclical, they should occur sporadically as to overcome such inflationary pressures. Another issue arises however, in that often inflation itself is sometimes caused by these cash-transfers. Literature about inflation suggests that money must not be printed or created to fund these programs, but rather reallocated from other sources, which in this case would be other government programs. If inflationary pressures are taken into account, a cash transfer could work to close gaps of income inequality as well. Although I do not touch on the effects of income inequality on violent crime, there is an increasing amount of literature around this connection that my data itself is also suggesting. If this relationship between income inequality and violent crime is a linear one, as the literature and data suggests, then perhaps a cash-transfer (either universal or for low-incomes) would serve to bridge this gap. Inflation is a tricky subject to navigate in the long-run, so any approach to alleviating violent crime in the short-run must necessarily take on a short-run focus.

It is clear that a cash-transfer serves to benefit varying groups of people differently. Although my qualitative data suggests that inequalities in the dispersion of cash stimulus can create social stigmatization and community levels of insecurity, statistics show that high-income earners increase their proximity to violent crime when receiving a large wage subsidy. This means that any cash-transfer government program targeting violent crime should not also target high income earners. Statistics also show that low-income learners are also vulnerable to increased proximity to violent crime through wage stimulus. Personal incomes increasing up to around $40,000 a year demonstrate an increasing rate of violent crime. The implication here is that middle class households (in terms of income) serve to benefit the most from cash-transfers. This is counter to the existing paradigm around welfare policy, which focuses primarily on lifting individuals out of poverty to alleviate the conditions which are perpetuated by it, like violent crime. The limitations to this are those unequal distributions of cash-transfers, although in effect diminishing income inequality, contribute to further social isolation and stigmatization of the poor or individuals who receive welfare benefits.

Lastly, any cash-transfer program must provide significant enough financial assistance as to immediately subsidize a wage over 5%. Anything below would be characterized as a wage stagnation and would not have discernible effects on rates of violent crime. A limitation to this is that 5% looks different in different places and to different people. Another limitation to this is that although an annual growth of 5% is useful in reducing crime it is unsustainable in the long run. This means government cash-transfers can only serve as potential a short-term solution to spikes in violent crime, so long as they surpass this 5% threshold. My qualitative data (so far) indicates further that there is a structural inevitability to government financial policy aimed at boosting wages, so doing it through a cash-transfer type of program may prove very fruitful.

Conclusions:

In both my quantitative and qualitative analysis, it proved difficult to determine whether government cash-transfers have a discernible effect on violent crime rates. The study of the Negative Income Tax experiments is limited in that these cash-transfers are not universal in nature, and so the study of its effects on high-income households is incomplete. The Alaskan Permanent Fund is limited in that it is not a state with historically high rates of violent crime, and its rural settings draw great contrasts culturally to urban areas elsewhere in the United States. The relationship between income and violent crime rates are in line with existing literature around both in that violent crime rates increase as incomes approach the poverty level from either direction. However, I go beyond this literature by studying drastic changes in income and how these changes affect violent crime rates. Although my results were statistically insignificant, they fall in line with my experience conducting qualitative interviews with subjects who directly received government cash-transfers. These individuals received cash-transfers from the COVID-19 Stimulus checks. Although, I would like to juxtapose these qualitative findings with quantitative macroeconomic data directly relating to the dispersion of these stimulus checks, such data has yet to be published as the pandemic is ongoing in many places.

Ultimately, the most consistent findings in both forms of my data analysis are with respect to the effects of wage stagnation on violent crime rates. In both my qualitative (so far) and quantitative data, there is a positive relationship between income stagnation and violent crime rates. My participants felt that stagnant incomes always necessitate financial government intervention, and the quantitative data seems to support this. Income inequality also seems to be a relevant finding that was not explored enough in my qualitative data. In all the Florida county observation sites we see a trend where communities with disparate levels of income experience higher than average rates of violent crime. This is something that literature around income and poverty has been written about although not extensively and is worth exploring further in my data.

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Appendix

STATA CODE:

Florida Counties Do-File

```
clear

import excel "C:\Users\jandrickc\OneDrive - The University of Chicago\County By County Florida 2015-2020.xlsx", sheet("County by County 2015-2020 (1)") firstrow

destring TotalViolentCrime, replace ignore(`"*"', asbytes) float percent dpcomma

describe

*GRAPHS*

twoway (fpfit ViolentCrimeRatePer100000 NominalPCPI)

twoway (fpfit ViolentCrimeRatePer100000 ChangeinPCPI)

twoway (qfit ViolentCrimeRatePer100000 ChangeinPCPI)

twoway (fpfit ChangeViolentCrimeRate ChangeinPCPI)

twoway (qfit ChangeViolentCrimeRate ChangeinPCPI)


*Regressions*

reg ChangeViolentCrimeRate ChangeinPCPI ChangeinRPCPI, robust


*For incomes below 40K Nominal PCPI*

sort NominalPCPI

twoway (fpfit ViolentCrimeRatePer100000 NominalPCPI in 1/211)

twoway (fpfit ChangeViolentCrimeRate ChangeinPCPI in 1/211)


*For incomes above 40k Nominal PCPI*
```

twoway (fpfit ViolentCrimeRatePer100000 NominalPCPI in 211/402)

twoway (fpfit ChangeViolentCrimeRate ChangeinPCPI in 211/402)

Below 20k Real pcpi (343)

twoway (fpfit ViolentCrimeRatePer100000 RealPCPI in 1/343)

twoway (fpfit ChangeViolentCrimeRate ChangeinRPCPI in 1/343)

Above 20k Real pcpi (343)

twoway (fpfit ViolentCrimeRatePer100000 RealPCPI in 343/402)

twoway (fpfit ChangeViolentCrimeRate ChangeinRPCPI in 343/402)

Alaska Do-File
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gen Dividends=(Year>=1980)

gen Yearsaffected=0

replace Yearsaffected=1 if inrange((Year),1975,1985)

gen YDividendsVCR=Yearsaffected*Dividends*ViolentCrimeRate

Graphs

twoway (fpfit ViolentCrimeRate PerCapitaPersonalIncomeinAl)

twoway (fpfit ViolentCrimeRate RealPerCapitaPersonalIncome)

twoway (fpfit ViolentCrimeRate ChangeinNPCPI)

twoway (fpfit ViolentCrimeRate ChangeinIncome) twoway (fpfit ChangeViolentCrimeRate ChangeinNPCPI)

twoway (fpfit ChangeViolentCrimeRate ChangeinIncome)

reg ChangeViolentCrimeRate Dividends Yearsaffected YDividendsVCR, robust

est sto A1

est table

Year to Year Graphs

twoway (connected ViolentCrimeRate Year, sort) (connected PerCapitaPersonalIncomeinAl Year, sort yaxis(2))

twoway (connected ViolentCrimeRate Year, sort) (connected RealPerCapitaPersonalIncome Year, sort yaxis(2))

twoway (connected ViolentCrimeRate Year, sort) (connected ChangeinNPCPI Year, sort yaxis(2))

twoway (connected ViolentCrimeRate Year, sort) (connected ChangeinIncome Year, sort yaxis(2))

twoway (connected ChangeViolentCrimeRate Year, sort) (connected ChangeinIncome Year, sort yaxis(2))

correlate

King-Sno Do-File
clear

import excel "C:\Users\jandrickc\OneDrive - The University of Chicago\BA Data\Cumulative BA Data.xlsx", sheet("King-Sno County Crime Data") firstrow

describe

Graphs

twoway (fpfit ViolentCrimeRate PerCapitaPersonalIncomeFRED)
twoway (fpfit ViolentCrimeRate RealPerCapitaPersonalIncome)

twoway (fpfit ViolentCrimeRate ChangeinNominalPCPI)
twoway (fpfit ViolentCrimeRate ChangeinIncome)
twoway (fpfit ChangeinViolentCrimeRate ChangeinNominalPCPI)
twoway (fpfit ChangeinViolentCrimeRate ChangeinIncome)

Year to Year Graphs

twoway (connected ViolentCrimeRate Year, sort) (connected PerCapitaPersonalIncomeFRED Year, sort yaxis(2))
twoway (connected ViolentCrimeRate Year, sort) (connected RealPerCapitaPersonalIncome Year, sort yaxis(2))
twoway (connected ViolentCrimeRate Year, sort) (connected ChangeinNominalPCPI Year, sort yaxis(2))
twoway (connected ViolentCrimeRate Year, sort) (connected ChangeinIncome Year, sort yaxis(2))
twoway (connected ChangeinViolentCrimeRate Year, sort) (connected ChangeinIncome Year, sort yaxis(2))

Interview Questions: Cash Transfer Recipient

Q: How would you characterize your current level of financial stability?

- Not stable at all
- Paycheck to Paycheck
- Somewhat stable
- Financially comfortable
- More than financially comfortable

Q: Have you ever received a conditional cash transfer from any of the following welfare-related programs? If so, which one?

- Unemployment Checks
- Universal Basic Income experiments
- COVID stimulus checks
- Negative Income Tax Credit
- Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians Casino Dividend
- Alaska Permanent Fund
- Returning Citizen Stimulus

Q: When were you enrolled in this program(s)?

Q: How long were you enrolled in this program for? How many cash transfers did you receive?

Q: How would you characterize your financial stability prior to enrolling in this program?

- Not stable at all
- Paycheck to Paycheck
- Somewhat stable
- Financially comfortable
- More than financially comfortable

Q: Did you receive multiple cash transfers while enrolled in this program? Were they periodic in Nature?

Q: If you care to disclose, how much did you receive with each transfer?

Q: How did/does the cash help you directly? How did you spend/save your cash transfer?

Q: How did/does the cash help others around you? Your neighbors? Friends? Immediate associates?

Q: How would you characterize your community?

Q: Are there others who you feel are in greater need of such a cash stimulus than yourself?

Q: Would you be willing to recommend someone who has participated in one of the aforementioned cash-transfer programs?

Q: How safe do you feel in your Community currently?

- 1-10, 1 being never leaving the house, 10 being comfortable walking alone at midnight.

Q: Has your perception of community safety changed when receiving cash-transfers? How so?

Q: Do you own or have you ever legally/illegally owned a firearm?

Q: Have you ever been a victim or perpetrator of a violent crime involving a firearm?

Q: If so, for what reason(s) do you own one?

Q: Would you consider a firearm necessary for your lifestyle? If so, why?

Q: Do you believe it in everyone's own individual interests within your community to own a firearm?

Q: Do you believe there are more reasons to own a firearm in your neighborhood compared to others?

Q: Has your income changed before and after?