When Structure Takes Over: The Autonomy of Global Supply Chain Networks Beyond Firm Capacity and Institutional Constraints

Building on research that highlights the role of governance, institutional, and network structures in shaping global value chains (Gereffi et al., 2005; Coe & Yeung, 2015; Coleman, 1998), this study investigates why firms in the semiconductor industry continued to outsource production after the 2020–2023 chip shortage, despite significant shifts in risk and cost (Miller, 2022; European Commission, 2022). I analyze how persistent outsourcing patterns are produced not only by firm capabilities or national policies, but also by the autonomous effects of supply chain network structure itself (Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1985). Using an original dataset of 160 publicly traded semiconductor firms and 517 buyer-supplier ties, I apply social network analysis, Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP), and Exponential Random Graph Models (ERGM) to systematically disentangle the influence of governance (firm capacity), institutional (state and role similarity), and network (triadic closure) structures on the formation of long-term supplier relationships. While prior research has emphasized the explanatory power of firm resources and state intervention (Williamson, 1981; Goldberg et al., 2024), my results show that institutional similarity—such as shared supply chain role or headquarters country—strongly predicts tie formation within a network, whereas differences in market capitalization and R&D spending do not. Most crucially, the analysis reveals that network structure—specifically, the prevalence of triadic closure—exerts an independent and statistically significant effect on the persistence of outsourcing ties, even after accounting for institutional similarity. This suggests that global supply chain networks can partially decouple from both firm-level capacity and institutional arrangements, sustaining legacy patterns through path-dependent network effects. I argue that, following the chip shortage crisis, the supply chain network itself has become a stabilizing force, locking firms into enduring hybrid relationships and limiting the impact of policy or market interventions.