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THE POST-POWER SHIFT EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

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I dedicate this dissertation to my mother and father, Hae Chong Choi and Young Jin Choi

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ABSTRACT

The efforts of states to provide security for themselves by cooperating to avoid internecine war, to deter and to defeat common foes, and to rein in the proliferation of dangerous weapons, have led to the creation of numerous international security institutions (ISIs) since the emergence of a globe-spanning system of sovereign states in the 19th century. Yet, some ISIs have been more effective than others in adapting to the changes in the international balance of power during the last two centuries. I define effectiveness as member state cooperation to solve common security challenges. At a minimum, states belonging to an effective ISI must not wage war against each other or actively seek to thwart their common efforts to address a security problem. The post-1815 Concert of Europe was relatively effective for more than three decades until the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has remained effective despite unsettling shifts in the international balance of power since it was first negotiated in 1968. The NATO alliance has survived the end of the Cold War, arguably the most significant power shift in the last century. What explains the variation in how security institutions respond to power shifts? What are the factors that determine whether an ISI will remain effective through major structural changes in the international system?

Extant works in the literature either claim that institutional effectiveness declines post-power shift; that post-hegemonic cooperation is possible; or that the structure of ideas takes precedence over the distribution of material power, thus denying that a material power shift should necessarily have any influence on ISI effectiveness. In contrast, I argue that the interaction of two variables best explains how a significant power shift will affect an ISI's effectiveness: the number

of great powers in the institution and the degree to which the rules are mainly directed at constraining minor power behavior. An increase in the number of great powers in an ISI aggravates bargaining and coordination problems, while rules written in a previous era that apply to all states will be challenged by great powers that have gained relative power. Great powers are especially likely to challenge existing rules that do not reflect the new balance of power because, by definition, they possess the capabilities to put up a serious fight against even the strongest state in the international system. Such states do not meekly respect the status quo when they have gained relative power: they will demand a rewriting of the rules to better reflect their new power advantages and if their demands are not met, they will flout the old rules to the extent made possible by their improved position in the balance of power, challenging other states with an interest in maintaining the status quo. Thus, the most effective ISI will have only one great power with rules that mainly constrain minor powers while leaving the great power unconstrained.

I conduct case studies on the Concert of Europe, the NPT, and NATO to demonstrate the plausibility of my approach. First, the effectiveness of the Concert of Europe was vulnerable to a significant power shift because its rules sought to control the behavior of great and minor powers alike, and it included all the great powers in the system, complicating inter-state bargaining and coordination. The rise of industrial Britain towards the middle of the 19th century and the lack of common interest binding Russia and the Western powers led to the Crimean War and the total breakdown of the Concert. Meanwhile, the NPT, despite some great power coordination problems, still managed to remain effective after a major structural change such as the end of the Cold War, because its rules mainly focus on preventing minor powers from acquiring nuclear weapons. Finally, NATO has remained effective because it has only one great power, the United States, which provides security to dependent allies. NATO is a nuclear alliance with the US providing

most of the extended deterrence, implying that minor power members have an obligation to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons, an obligation which does not constrain the US which is doubly recognized as a legitimate nuclear power by the NPT and NATO.

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enrichment activities have been able to bear some fruit. I must admit that my sloth in graduate school sometimes worried my parents, who were accustomed to more rapid advances earlier in my academic career. I solemnly promise to my parents - and of course to myself - that in the future I will be a much more productive scholar than I have been in graduate school, that I will complete tasks expeditiously to advance my career in a more timely manner.

Chapter 1 Introduction

This dissertation explores why some international security institutions (ISIs) have remained more effective than others following a significant shift in the international distribution of capabilities. International security institutions are defined as the rules that prescribe and proscribe acceptable and unacceptable forms of behavior among states (Mearsheimer 1994/95; Martin and Simmons 2012, 328), addressing the vital interests that affect states' survival, such as territorial sovereignty and integrity and the use or threat of the use of military force (Hafterdon, Keohane, and Wallander 1999, 2).

When international security institutions are effective, member states renounce the use of military force against each other and seek peaceful means as prescribed by the institution to settle their disagreements. I define effectiveness as member state cooperation to solve common security challenges peacefully; at the very least, states belonging to an ISI must not wage war against each other. Effectiveness does not necessarily imply successfully solving a security problem. Good faith cooperation, especially among the great powers, to manage a security challenge is sufficient to qualify an ISI for effectiveness.

The renunciation of force among member states may not apply to the relations among members and non-members. In fact, one type of security institution - the multilateral alliance - requires that members resort to the use of or threat to use military force against a common adversary to ensure their security.

The efforts of states to provide security for themselves by grouping together to avoid internecine war, to deter and to defeat common foes, and to rein in the proliferation of dangerous weapons, have led to the creation of numerous security institutions since the emergence of a globe-spanning system of sovereign states in the 19th century. Yet, some security institutions have

been more effective than others in adapting to the changes in the international balance of power during the last two centuries. The post-1815 Concert of Europe was relatively effective for more than three decades until the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854. The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has remained effective despite significant and unsettling shifts in the international balance of power since it was first negotiated. The NATO alliance has survived the end of the Cold War, arguably the most significant power shift in the last century.

What explains the variation in how security institutions respond to power shifts? What are the factors that determine whether a security institution will remain effective despite changes in the distribution of power among states? By learning more about these aspects of security institutions, could one apply this knowledge to help build a safer world?

The Argument

The rules of an international security institution reflect the balance of power at the moment of its founding. The security institution can expect to operate effectively as long as there exists an accurate correspondence between the distribution of capabilities of its membership and the content of the institution's rules. However, after a significant shift in the balance of power as a result of uneven international economic growth rates, the content of an institution's rules may diverge from the underlying distribution of capabilities, resulting in revisionist ambitions on the part of newly powerful states and efforts by states in relative decline to maintain the beneficial status quo.

Great powers, given their military capabilities and economic resources, are especially unlikely to countenance rules that unfairly discount their improved position in the new balance of power, and will flout out-of- date rules and enter into conflict with other great powers intent on preserving the status quo (Gilpin 1981). Fewer great powers among the membership means less opportunity for disagreement and conflict over rewriting the rules after a power shift, and the most

durable institutions will have only one great power. Minor powers do not have the capabilities to wage war against a great power, so an institution with only one great power will be the most effective post-power shift. Furthermore, a great power could put a lid on minor power conflict by guaranteeing their security in return for strategic deference.

Also, a security institution will remain more effective after a power shift to the extent that the institution's rules mostly apply to minor powers while leaving the great powers unconstrained. Great powers by definition are states with the military wherewithal to put up a serious fight against the strongest state in the system (Mearsheimer 2001). Such states are not going to obey rules that put them at odds with the pursuit of their strategic interests. In contrast, when a security institution's rules apply only to minor powers, even significant structural changes can leave an institution intact and highly functional. Minor powers to the extent that they remain minor powers will continue to abide by the rules enforced by great powers provided they have remained great powers.

Finally, the magnitude of the power shift matters for maintaining the effectiveness of security institutions. Small shifts in power could be accommodated through the emphasis among great powers on their common interest in survival, and it is conceivable that a particularly strong group of great powers could isolate, deter, and use issue linkage to get a renegade great power to cooperate. But again, this possibility is contingent on the power shift being quite small. There are bargaining costs to renegotiating the institution's rules - including the outbreak of war - as great powers have incentives to misrepresent their true capabilities to secure a better deal (Fearon 1995). When the balance of power shifts significantly, the benefits of intra-institutional adjustment mechanisms and the bargaining costs of renegotiation can no longer deter rising states from demanding a more advantageous institutional arrangement.

Alternative Explanations

Structural Realism and Other Power-Based Approaches

The main works in structural realism do not consider international institutions as relevant to explaining international outcomes. According to Kenneth Waltz (1979) the ordering principle of anarchy, the distribution of capabilities, and tendency for states to imitate winners can explain much of international politics, such as the nature of economic (inter)dependence and (reduced) utility of alliances under bipolarity, for example. The combination of several assumptions, including the above mentioned anarchy; uncertainty about intentions; states as rational actors; the possession by all states of some offensive capabilities; and fundamental interest in survival, drives states to be competitive, mistrustful, and to be wary of welfare-enhancing cooperation as it could lead to uneven relative gains (Mearsheimer 1994/95; 2001). Institutions merely track the balance of power; they are "epiphenomena" reflecting powerful states' calculations of self-interest (Duffield 2006, 7). NATO, for example, was an "American tool for managing power in the face of the Soviet threat" and with the abatement of that threat must "either disappear or reconstitute itself on the basis of the new distribution of power" (Mearsheimer 1994/95, 14).

But if institutions are "epiphenomena", why do they feature so prominently in international politics? Why have states bothered to create the Concert of Europe, NATO, the NPT, and many other ISIs? Why not do away with these empty labels when conducting business? My argument is that just as brands provide information to consumers, security institutions also provide information to states about the boundaries of acceptable and unacceptable behavior. Institutions are especially useful for providing information to minor powers about how they should behave, as the reduction in ambiguity about the boundaries of appropriate and inappropriate behavior increases the probability that minor powers will not defy great powers.

Also, if NATO in the above example needs to be reconstituted on the basis of the new balance of power - which is essentially correct - *how* will that reconstitution proceed? More generally, how do security institutions adapt to new power realities? Power is an essential variable, but intermediate variables that follow power shift need to be specified and elaborated to produce a closer understanding of the effect of structural changes on institutional effectiveness. After all, great variation exists in the post-power shift effectiveness of ISIs. The intuition that places power at the center is correct, but this intuition must be unpacked. Without such unpacking, less fine-grained realist theories can fail to correctly predict NATO's continuity. For example, Walt's (1987) theory of alliances predicts that NATO as an anti-Soviet alliance should disintegrate after the Cold War; but, NATO conceived more generally as a security institution has survived.

Charles Glaser (2010, 123-126) considers institutions as endogenous means or policy choices available for states to achieve their goals. According to Glaser, international institutions could be useful to states in providing information about states' motives and actions and serving as "a forum for negotiating distributional issues and confronting real world complexity." My view is that while ISIs do provide information, the scope of information provision is more limited to promulgating rules to be followed by states given a certain distribution of power. Institutions are not required nor particularly useful for revealing states' motives and intentions, unless joining an institution provides very costly signals which again seems unlikely (Fearon 1997; Quek 2016; 2021; Yarhi-Milo, Kertzer, and Renshon 2018). Joining an institution is certainly less costly than initiating military action to tie hands or sink costs to show resolve, so membership alone will be no more than "cheap talk".

The empirical evidence suggests substantial variation in the effectiveness of security institutions across time and issue areas. That security institutions have displayed such variation in

effectiveness over time presents a hard test for my theory, because security cooperation should be even less likely than other types of cooperation - such as in international trade and investments - that do not have immediate effect on the prospect of state survival (Lipson 1984). Theorists of structural realism are often with good reason skeptical of the utility of security institutions in ordering international politics, but extant theoretical works in this paradigm do not yet present a mechanism to explain why some security institutions have been so much more effective than others through significant structural changes in the international system.

Liberal Institutionalism

The seminal work in liberal institutionalism (Keohane 1984) was a rebuttal to the view that international cooperation requires hegemony (Kindleberger 1973; Gilpin 1981), so it would seem that the mechanisms in this perspective should be able to explain the variation in post-power shift ISI effectiveness. Institutions enable post-hegemonic cooperation mainly through the reduction of transaction costs, greater provision of scarce information, and mitigation of information asymmetry (Keohane 1984, ch. 6). When issues are grouped together under an international regime, greater opportunities exist for issue linkages and side payments that facilitate deal-making, in effect lowering transaction costs. As for increasing the flow and quality of information, regimes provide standards of behavior to assess other states' performance and forums to communicate and to glean intentions. A state's involvement in several regimes can induce compliance in any one issue area due to the negative reputational effects of rule violation on other areas. These in a nutshell are the main causal mechanisms that can explain sustained post-power shift international cooperation through institutions.

These causal mechanisms - transaction cost reduction and information provision - have remained at the core of institutional theory when Heftendorn, Keohane, and Wallander (1999)

advanced a theory to explain the effectiveness of security institutions over time. “Hybrid” security institutions that deal with many issues including both threat- and risk-management, are more likely to succeed in managing the transaction costs of shifting the ISI’s focus to new objectives in a changed security environment. A prime example is post-Cold War NATO, which was more than just an alliance to aggregate power to deter the Soviet Union; the additional function of integrating post-WWII Germany involved developing highly institutionalized structures of intra-alliance consultation and transparency promotion. Contemporary NATO has adapted these portable assets to become a security management institution (Hefterdorn, Keohane, and Wallander 1999, 44).

Even if one were to accept that institutions can help to reduce transaction costs and provide information, how do these mechanisms interact with significant changes in the balance of power? Fearon (1995) has argued that information asymmetry and the incentive to misrepresent private information about capabilities are major causes of war. Then, would institutions facilitate peaceful transitions by revealing private information about capabilities? If so, institutions could contribute to peaceful international outcomes, but the empirical evidence from my research does not demonstrate that the quality of information is so high that great powers can navigate power shifts peacefully. Instead, institutions seem most effective when they provide information to minor powers about the boundaries of appropriate behavior, with great powers as rule enforcers. Therefore, while I do not deny that institutions have a useful role to play in information provision, these mechanisms are most effective when the intended target is a subset of weak states.

Also, the notion of a “hybrid” ISI with portable assets across time (Hefterndorn, Keohane, and Wallander 1999) remains descriptive and avoids the causal origins of such institutions grounded in the balance of power and the interests of powerful states. Great powers design ISIs

and adjust their functions as they see fit. Therefore, the "portability" of an ISI's assets cannot be a causal variable and instead should be a dependent variable to be explained.

Another liberal institutional approach integrates considerations of power and interest to argue that liberal democratic states are especially capable of forging constitutional orders that can withstand significant power shifts (Ikenberry 2001). A post-war hegemonic state foresees that its exalted position in the balance of power is only temporary and therefore exchanges self-restraint today for continued deference into the future; minor powers accept the bargain because due to their immediate weakness they fear either domination or abandonment. Liberal democracies have an advantage in creating such an arrangement because of certain regime characteristics: transparency, decentralized policy processes, and open and decentralized systems (2001, 76).

An additional mechanism referred to as institutional "stickiness" (Ikenberry 2001, 55-56) further ensures that institutions remain robust to changes in the balance of power. Through feedback effects, path dependence, and increasing returns, it is theorized that institutions will not simply track the balance of power, but with the important caveat that shifts in power and interests are *not* substantial. However, the last caveat greatly weakens the explanatory contribution of this mechanism, since the theoretical relevance of feedback effects, path dependence, and increasing returns hinges on institutions surviving significant power shifts.

Another drawback of the constitutional logic is its exclusive treatment of power as something to be restrained, rather than the key enabler of institutional continuity and effectiveness. For example, NATO's effectiveness depended upon US capabilities to deter the Soviet Union; today, US power guarantees stability in Europe, prevents nuclear proliferation on the continents, and pushes democracy and markets eastward. The effectiveness of the NPT over time has depended on the willingness of powerful states to cooperate to deny minor powers nuclear

technology through economic sanctions and military threats and coercion. Power is an independent variable essential to explaining institutional effectiveness across time.

Social Constructivism

Alexander Wendt (1999, ch. 6) argues that there are three cultures of anarchy - Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian - and three degrees of cultural internalization by states which should theoretically lead to large variation in the incidence of fear, mistrust, and conflict in the international system. States can internalize intersubjective norms of a Hobbesian culture to varying degrees, so that at the extreme end of deep norm internalization states can end up valuing power politics as an end in itself, considering aggression as a virtue (1999, 274). In contrast, a third degree internalization of Kantian norms would create a system of decentralized authority where states practice self-restraint because they view the "Other" as legitimately deserving of regard (307-308). Wendt (1999, 299-301) sees Canada-US relations and relations within NATO as approaching a Kantian pluralistic security community where a resort to violence to settle disputes is simply unthinkable.

When a group of states have internalized intersubjective Kantian norms, even significant changes in the balance of material power should not destabilize their pre-power shift relations. An institution such as NATO, if it is indeed a pluralistic security community, should continue on without experiencing an identity crisis or displaying anxieties about the return of power politics. As Risse-Kappen (1996) argued, NATO's norms and sense of collective identity ensured its survival and powered its expansion into Eastern Europe.

NATO members' intersubjective self-understanding as a collective security organization of liberal democracies also stimulated its eastward expansion. Frank Schimmelfenig (1998) argues that the enlargement of an international organization is a process of international socialization to

shape inductees' identities, values, and interests. Rather ominously for countries that do not share NATO's values, from a constructivist point of view, "International organizations seek to defend the community against competing values and norms and to expand the community by disseminating its principles and precepts" (1998, 211). But, in contrast to this muscular version of constructivism, Alexandra Gheciu (2005) argues that the target of expansion must first buy into the international organization's values. For example, NATO is seen as embodying strongly held liberal democratic norms, which Eastern European NATO inductees identified with and wanted to adopt; this facilitated NATO's role as a teacher of norms and agent of socialization.

A drawback of this approach is the severe underemphasis on the role of powerful states in militarily supporting collective security and pluralistic security communities.

Second, empirically, even in zones that are commonly referred to as pluralistic security communities, traditional security challenges such as nuclear non-proliferation and fears of a relapse into power politics have not disappeared. Another puzzle is why socialization seems to be going in only one direction. What would happen if the target of socialization refuses to be socialized into internalizing acceptable norms and values?

Large-N Empirical Literature on Multilateral Alliances

More recent works on the determinants of alliance termination (Leeds & Savun 2007; Leeds, Mattes & Vogel 2009) show empirically that structural changes increase the likelihood of alliance termination/treaty abrogation, and this result is in line with realist theory, but the question remains as to the mechanisms that can explain continued institutional effectiveness despite structural changes.

The empirical results from this body of work shows the mitigating effect of democratic regime type on treaty abrogation, but my work suggests an even more general mechanism

explaining continued effectiveness that subsumes regime type: common security preferences of great powers. I argue that similarity of regime type is not the fundamental cause per se of cooperation over time. Instead, regime type may be a mediating variable or a signal for the military threat that a state poses for other states. My case study on the Concert of Europe shows that authoritarian regimes also cooperated in earnest with each other over many decades because an authoritarian regime-type signaled restraint as revolutionary regimes were better at arousing public opinion and mobilizing the nation in war.

But my theory abstracts away from particular domestic attributes of certain states - such as regime type - and maintains that the more fundamental variable of common external security interests and the relative ease of coordination - dependent on the number of great powers in an institution - explains much of the variation in the effectiveness of security institutions over time.

Definition of Key Term

A state's military power or at least the potential to develop formidable military power is a function of its level of industrialization, total economic wealth and population size (Kennedy 1987, 198-201; Mearsheimer 2001, 60-67). A wealthy, industrialized economy with a large population is in the best position to "equip, train, and continually modernize its fighting forces," (2001, 61) although such factors as "strategy, intelligence, resolve, weather, and disease" often modify the translation of wealth and population - "latent power" - into effective military power (58). In this dissertation, the balance of power refers to the balance of *military* power.

The balance of power refers to the distribution of state capabilities under anarchy where at least two independent states exist that wish to survive (Waltz 1979, 121). Depending on the number of significant states, the international system can be described as either bipolar with two great powers, or multipolar, with three or more great powers. A great power by definition must be

able to deploy enough military assets to pose a serious challenge in an all out war with even the most powerful state in the system (Mearsheimer 2001, 5). When only one great power remains in the system, the distribution of capabilities is unipolar, and the balance of power loses the significance it possessed when it served as a barometer of the competition between at least two independent states wishing to survive.

International security institutions are the rules that prescribe and proscribe acceptable and unacceptable behaviors as agreed upon by member-states in a particular area of international security. Security institutions vary in the breadth of issues under their purview: the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty deals with the relatively circumscribed area of nuclear technology and the conditions of its transfers to treaty members, whereas the United Nations Security Council takes upon itself to address a wide range of issues that are construed by council members as a "threat to or breach of international peace and security."

The effectiveness of international security institutions depends on several necessary conditions. First, for an international security institution to be effective, member states must not resort to war to address their disagreements. Second, the great powers of the institution must make efforts to cooperate on the security issues under the institution's purview throughout its existence; the institution need not succeed in achieving all of its objectives, but at a minimum the major states must demonstrate evidence of sustained cooperation to realize common aims as described in the institution's founding charter and other significant documents endorsed by member states. Third, an effective security institution must be able to demonstrate at least one successful case of member states adhering to and applying its rules to solve a major security issue under institutional purview. This successful example of the application of institutional rules must not be a minor issue on the periphery of the international system, but a major issue that implicates the strategic interests of most

of the great power members and would have led to confusion and conflict had it not been for the coordination gains created by promulgating the agreed upon rules of the institution.

Recent empirical research (Lall 2017) on the factors most conducive to effective performance for international organizations (IOs) confirms the theoretical intuition that cooperation from states is the single most important variable in explaining IO effectiveness, with the latter term defined as the extent to which IOs "achieve their stated objectives and do so in matter that is cost effective and responsive to a wide range of stakeholders" (2017, 245). Similar to this dissertation's claim that institutional effectiveness depends on sustained, post-power shift cooperation among great powers, Lall's (2017, 252) empirical study of a large database of IOs finds that states' incentives to renege on formerly agreed upon organizational rules to pursue narrow national interests - referred to as the "time inconsistency" problem - constitute the main impediment to institutional effectiveness. A key difference between Lall's (2017) research finding and this dissertation is that the former posits certain organizational characteristics that can shield IOs from states, increasing their policy autonomy and hence effectiveness[1], while I argue that there cannot be a credible source of power internal to ISIs that can compete with the preferences and capabilities of great powers. This difference between the two approaches to addressing the negative effects for institutional effectiveness of state defection may be accounted for by the fact that Lall (2017) studies non-security focused IOs such as the World Food Program, UNICEF, and UNESCO, whereas I focus exclusively on security institutions. The critical difference between cooperation in security and non-security affairs (Lipson 1984, 14-15) is that the cost to a double-crossed reciprocator in security affairs is much greater, possibly posing a threat to national survival, since "a crisis is too late to begin serious military preparation, too late to discover that one's cooperative

[1]Lall (2017, 255) argues that IOs remain effective despite states' incentives to violate rules when the former ally with influential non-state actors and engage in technically complex activities that confound states.

efforts have been dashed."[2] Therefore, the relative slack that states display in their dealings with non-security institutions by tolerating IO "policy autonomy", does not appear in the great power management of ISIs.

The Balance of Power as an Independent Variable

In studying the effect of changes in the balance of power - interchangeably, power shift or changes in the distribution of capabilities - on security institutions' effectiveness, the implicit assumption is that the balance of power is important and that it should be expected to somehow influence institutional effectiveness. There are several reasons why this dissertation has specified changes in the balance of power as the key study variable. First, the balance of power is the main explanatory variable of realism, which is the parsimonious baseline paradigm against which newer theories that attempt to explain international cooperation and competition are measured. Kenneth Waltz's (1979) *Theory of International Politics* assumes the ordering principle of anarchy, and relies exclusively on changes in the distribution of capabilities among independent states to explain the international system's polarity, ranging from multipolarity to bipolarity. More recent works have focused on the concentration of capabilities in one actor, leading to unipolarity (Monteiro 201/12). Likewise, John Mearsheimer's (2001) *Tragedy of Great Power Politics* seeks to explain the outbreak of war by focusing only on the changes in the balance of power, ranging from multipolarity to unbalanced multipolarity, where it is observed that all outbreaks of systemic wars in the last two centuries have been accompanied by unbalanced multipolarity wherein one state - an aspiring hegemon - becomes so powerful that it may plausibly take on all others in a bid for regional hegemony. This centrality of the balance of power in explaining war and peace suggests

[2]Security cooperation becomes more feasible when great powers can be assured that a debilitating first strike is difficult and they share some welfare goals that incentivize joint maximization (1984, 15).

that it should also have a major impact on the performance of security institutions which constitute major empirical regularities in international politics.

Second, I posit that as a result of the centrality of the balance of power as one of the main explanatory variables in international politics, changes in the balance of power affect a plethora of other variables that could individually influence security institutions' effectiveness. For example, changes in the distribution of capabilities that lead to changes in the relative ability of states to inflict harm on each other will likely influence the mutual threat perceptions among an institution's member states as well as those between member and non-member states, which will in turn impact the level of cooperation within the institution and member interactions with non-members. As this hypothetical chain of causal linkages demonstrates, the balance of power is a fundamental explanatory variable that sets in motion a host of intervening variables that affect the dependent variable (Van Evera 1997, 11-12).

Third, as fundamental as the balance of power is as an explanatory variable in accounting for important outcomes, there are condition variables that influence how much impact that the balance of power and other intervening variables exert on institutional effectiveness. The contribution of this dissertation is to identify those condition variables.

Method

This dissertation develops a theory to explain the effects of changes in the balance of power on the effectiveness of international security institutions. To test the theory's hypotheses, it will conduct case studies of three international security institutions: the Concert of Europe, NATO, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The choice of these institutions as appropriate cases for testing theory rests on the following reasons. First, the cases under study represent intrinsically important and representative security

institutions of their eras, involving almost all, if not all, the great powers in the international system as members. A good theory purporting to explain the variation in the effectiveness of security institutions in response to power shifts should be able to account for the evolution of these particular institutions across time.

Second, the cases exhibit extreme values on the independent and dependent variables, permitting the application of congruence procedures that would better insure against the possibility that some unknown omitted variables are responsible for the variation in the dependent variable (Van Evera 1997, 58-63). For example, the cases are marked by the most significant changes in the balance of power in the last two hundred years, such as the fall of Napoleonic France; the rise of British relative power during the first half of the 19th century driven by its global commercial prowess and the Industrial Revolution; the disintegration of the Soviet Union; the emergence of US unipolarity; and the rise of China. Likewise, the cases exhibit much variation in the dependent variable in response to significant power shifts, with continuing effectiveness for NATO, somewhat diminished effectiveness for NPT relative to NATO, and ineffectiveness for the Concert of Europe.

Third, the cases exhibit large within-case variance over time in the values of the independent and dependent variables, permitting the application of congruence procedures within cases as well as across cases. Also, all three security institutions under study have existed for more than five decades and through a number of significant shifts in the international balance of power, permitting at least several observations of values on the independent and dependent variables within-case (Van Evera 1997, 61-62).

In addition to using the congruence procedure of selecting extreme values on the independent variable to minimize the possibility that omitted variables are actually causing changes

in the dependent variable, this dissertation relies on process tracing to test its proposed theory. The dissertation's theory lays out a causal chain of intervening and conditional variables that parses the space between the independent and dependent variables. To test the theory's hypotheses that together comprise the causal chain and hence the explanation for the variation in the dependent variable, the dissertation examines the relevant historical records, both primary and secondary documents, for each of the institutions under study.

Chapter 2 Theory: Explaining Post-Power Shift Institutional Effectiveness

How does a significant change in the balance of power affect the effectiveness of international security institutions (ISIs)? First, the balance of power is an independent variable of enduring interest and importance in international relations because states operate under anarchy in the absence of a central authority that can impartially adjudicate between competing states' claims and effectively enforce any adjudications (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001). In international politics "the victim, and nobody but the victim, of a violation of the law has the right to enforce the law against the violator...it delivers the enforcement of the law to the vicissitudes of the distribution of power" (Morgenthau 1979, 312). While a certain degree of hierarchy prevails in the relations between a great power and its client states and protectorates (Lake 2001; 2007)[3], the relations among great powers remain clearly anarchic in that no effective central authority exists above the most powerful states to restrain their behavior. Thus, in a self-help system, at least the most powerful states must rely on their own capabilities to first assure their survival and to pursue other goals that do not detract from their primary objective of survival.

What are International Institutions?

International institutions are rules that prescribe and proscribe acceptable and unacceptable state behavior (Mearsheimer 1994/95; Martin and Simmons 2012, 328).[4] ISIs then are rules that aim to regulate state behavior in the more circumscribed area of international security, with

[3] David Lake (2007) argues that relations between a great power and minor powers can fall under several political forms including informal empire, protectorate, and sphere of influence. Likewise, Mearsheimer (2001) argues that the United States maintains regional hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, which corresponds to Lake's (2001; 2007) argument that not all relations in international politics are anarchic.
[4] In their overview of the literature on international institutions, Martin and Simmons (2012, 328) adopt Mearsheimer's (1994/95) definition of international institutions as rules that "stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other." According to Martin and Simmons (2012, 328) this definition has the advantage of including both formal and informal rules and separating the institution itself from behavioral outcomes; a previous definition by Keohane (1989) for example, included constraint on states activities and shaping of expectations within the definition, making it difficult to separate out the institution as an independent variable from the dependent variable of state behavior and expectations.

international security defined as dealing with all matters involving the cross-border threat or actual use of physical violence against states by other political actors.[5] A useful definition of ISIs identifies three main areas where these institutions are meant to regulate state behavior (Duffield 2018, 2): (1) the threat and use of violence for political purpose and the response to such aggression; (2) the production, possession, exchange and transfer of various types of weapons; and (3) the peacetime posture, deployment, and activity of military forces.

Great powers write the institutional rules, with duties, rights, obligations, and prerogatives that roughly correspond to the balance of power at the time of the institution's founding.[6] The most powerful states should write rules that minimize obligations on themselves while maximizing their latitude, leaving them as unencumbered as possible in pursuing their strategic objectives. Minor powers should face the most constraints from rules written and enforced by the great powers in their interest.

Scholarship based on observations from international political economy (Kindleberger 1973; 1981) has maintained a more benign view of the role of powerful states as providers of international public goods that allow themselves to be exploited by minor powers resulting in the "exploitation of the great by the small" (Olson 1965, 29). International public goods are goods that are non-excludable and non-rivalrous, so that their consumption by one state does not reduce what is available for another state's consumption of the same goods, and furthermore states cannot be

[5] This is a more circumscribed, traditional view of what constitutes international security. For a more eclectic, heterogenous take on the concept of international security that includes environmental, economic, demographic, cultural, and human-centric perspectives, see Krause and Williams (2018). The integration of concerns that go beyond the cross-border threat or use of violence makes the concept more unwieldy, and ISIs would have to include international economic and health institutions such as the WTO and WHO.
[6] Empirically, great powers have dominated the practice of institutional rule-writing. At the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the four victors - Austria, Britain, Prussia, and Russia - by themselves determined the distribution of European territories (Rich 1992, 15). The United States and the Soviet Union spearheaded the initiative for and the drafting of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. NATO's Article 5 was a pledge by the United States to aid Europe, but care was taken in the wording to avoid the impression that a military response had to come first.

excluded from enjoying their benefits.[7] A powerful state provides public goods - such as global financial stability, international economic openness, freedom of the seas, etc - because only it has the capability to provide them and the benefits that accrue to it are greater than the costs of provision, even if that one state were to single-handedly undertake the public goods provision. By applying similar reasoning one could claim - misleadingly - that ISI's also constitute a type of public good that benefits minor power "free-riders" at the expense of great power efforts in creating and managing them.

However, the application of the international "public goods" concept to ISIs is misguided for several reasons. First, unlike a true international public good such as clear air which should be unambiguously appreciated by everyone on the planet, the great powers design ISIs so that the "good" in question - some type of security arrangement and its effects - often goes against the strategic interests and preferences of minor powers. For example, the "good" created by ISIs regulating the production and possession of a certain class of weapons is a world with a reduced presence of such weapons. But unlike in the case of a true public good, it is unclear whether all states appreciate being forbidden to produce and possess them. When great powers build an institution to iron out their mutual antagonisms and to keep minor powers in line, the "good" in question is a great power condominium; what is probably a public good for one class of states may be a source of unappreciated restraint on the sovereignty of another class of states.

A second problem with applying a "public goods" approach to ISIs is that the "public good" created as a byproduct of the ISI may not even be public, but rather private. Most obviously, the security effect of a multilateral alliance is not a public good because it excludes other states that

[7] There is an argument that aspects of an open international economy such as free trade are not true public goods (Lake 1993, 463). Furthermore, scholars have persuasively argued that the presence of a single hegemonic state is not a necessary condition for the provision of international public goods (Conybeare 1985; Snidal 1985).

are adversaries; also, the "good" produced by the alliance is rivalrous because increasing the security of alliance members will reduce the security of adversaries. But this issue of rivalry also appears in the case of supposedly universal ISIs that are theoretically open to all states. The effect of an ISI regulating the production and possession of a certain class of weapons is to reduce the security of some states who may calculate that they need them. The consumption of the "good" - a safer world - by some states makes others less secure, making the "good" rivalrous.

Therefore, it seems that the security effects of ISIs often include everything but public goods, such as club goods and private goods. Importantly, how states perceive the effects of a security arrangement depends on their position in the international system and the nature of relations they have with other states. For example, a group of states may benefit from denying a target state access to nuclear states. For the former group, the security effects of this arrangement is a club good, since the benefits are excludable to the target state and other states friendly to it; furthermore, the benefits are nonrivalrous in that the security created by keeping the target state non-nuclear does not diminish with the number of states who embrace this arrangement. Private goods are both excludable and rivalrous. The security benefit provided by an alliance headed by a great power is excludable as the protection is not available to states outside the alliance. The benefits are also rivalrous because the great power can become overextended by proliferating its security commitments to too many allies, so that extending the alliance can conceivably diminish the credibility and effectiveness of the security guarantee.

Is it possible to have ISIs that exclude great powers and include only minor powers, in which case great powers could not dominate the rule-writing? Would not such institutions have an important role to play in international security affairs? Security institutions formed only by minor powers should have little to no effect on international politics, which is a self-help realm where the

ultimate currency of interaction is military capability.[8] An ISI exclusively formed with minor powers would not be able to restrain a great power unless the minor powers were to form a confederation much as the early American states did to achieve independence from Great Britain or as the Italian states did to confront Austria (Rosato 2011, 235-238). But then such an ISI would no longer be an international institution but instead a new great power.

As the international relations scholar Joseph Nye (2011) convincingly argues, "Markets and economic power rest upon political frameworks, which in turn depend not only upon norms, institutions, and relationships, but also upon the management of coercive power...military power provides a degree of security that is to order as oxygen is to breathing."[9]

How Are ISIs Useful to States?

I argue that ISIs are useful primarily for their role in providing clear information to states about the boundaries of acceptable and unacceptable behavior in the issue area under the ISI's purview. More specifically, great powers find ISIs useful because they can use these devices to promulgate to minor powers the boundaries of appropriate behavior in a particular security area. For example, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty lays out clear rules and expectations about refraining from weaponizing civilian nuclear programs and to accept safeguards with IAEA. Great powers can write rules that clarify their mutual obligations, such as at the Congress of Vienna, but the most enduring and enforceable rules are those imposed on minor powers.

The role of international institutions in information provision has been extensively theorized, with benefits that include mitigation of information asymmetry where "some states may know more about a situation than others" (Keohane 1984, 93). The dissemination of information

[8] This claim might seem extreme, especially for scholars working in international political economy perspectives. However, since 1860, fully 25 percent of all states in existence have "died" at least once. See Fazal (2004).

[9] Nye, Joseph. 2011. "Has Economic Might Replaced Economic Might?" https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/has-economic-power-replaced-military-might(accessed January 5, 2020).

through institutions assists in democratizing knowledge by reducing asymmetry and creating "standards of behavior against which performance can be measured" (1984, 94). Institutions arise to reduce uncertainty by providing information about states' intentions and likely choices (Wallander and Keohane 1999, 30). Greater institutionalization implies common expectation about appropriate behavior, more specific and enduring rules about appropriate behavior, and functional differentiation as institutional rules assign different roles to state members (1999, 24). Institutions are "endogenous" creations of states to help achieve their goals, by providing a variety of information about motives, states' actions, and even a forum for inter-state negotiations (Glaser 2011, 124).

The institutionalist theorizing about information provision had in mind more benign effects of the creation of international institutions, whereby states in general, not just the most powerful, would be able to strike more mutually beneficial deals with the aid of higher quality information. However, I argue that the clearer information provided by an ISI's rules serves to more tightly constrain minor powers by holding up unambiguous standards for appropriate behavior, with great powers deciding what constitutes appropriate behavior. Much of the institutional benefits from reducing information asymmetry as claimed by Keohane (1984) accrues to great powers, as the unambiguous rules and increased clarity of intentions reduces strategic and diplomatic maneuvering room for minor powers; there is less opportunity to hide behind ambiguities of perception and interpretation when clear rules are promulgated. For example, in the absence of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a nuclear aspirant could plausibly quibble about whether refusing to accept international safeguards or receiving equipment for processing fissionable material constitutes a breach of international norms and law; the NPT shuts down this debate by making expectations unambiguous, exposing the divergence between the rules and the nuclear

aspirant's actual behavior. With reference to clear, publicly available standards, the nuclear aspirant's noncompliant behavior sends signals to international observers about the latter's malign motives and intentions.

If minor powers are often disadvantaged by joining an ISI, what explains their extensive membership? Why would sovereign actors enter a deal that makes them worse off? There are two ways to address this question. First, not all states are equally sovereign and international relations does not approach pure anarchy for all states even though they may have won international legal sovereignty. Hierarchy and anarchy coexist in international relations along economic and security dimensions, with great power interactions satisfying the anarchical ideal while some great power-minor power relations can be construed as being economic dependencies and a security protectorates (Lake 2007, 56-61). David Lake (2007, 61) argues that the United States exerts so much economic and security influence over some countries in Latin America and the Carribean that he would characterize the relationship as a "sphere of influence" or "informal empire." The Soviet Union exercised such tight control over the security policies of its East European satellite states that the Soviets ran a de facto empire. When minor powers belong in the lower rungs of an international hierarchy, great powers can exercise their authority to essentially command the former to join an ISI that reduces their welfare.

A second way to understand why minor powers would join an ISI that makes them worse off compared to the status quo is to consider the possibility that great powers have what Lloyd Gruber (2000, 38-43) calls "go-it-alone power". According to this logic, great powers do not have to openly coerce minor powers to join an institution. There does not need to be an open acknowledgement of hierarchical relations and exercise of authority. Instead, great powers without consulting other states, can simply set up an institution and create a new status quo that they

calculate is better for them than the old status quo, regardless of whether a particular minor power decides to join or not. But minor powers do not have the capabilities and resources to take in stride the negative externalities imposed on them by the creation of a new institution in a new status quo.

While Gruber (2000) primarily considered IPE examples such as free trade agreements in his argument, the same logic could be applied to the NPT. The superpowers drafted the NPT and had it ready for signing by 1968. Even if no minor power was threatened to accede to the treaty, a state that refused to sign on would have experienced a hit to its reputation as an actor with malign intentions, and a weak state dependent on multifaceted relations with the outside world for its prosperity could not have endured the negative externalities imposed on it by the new status quo under the NPT. In contrast, a revolutionary major power like China in the 1960s pursuing foreign policies already inimical to either the West or the Soviet Union could afford to hold out for decades.

Finally, given that great powers are determined to place constraints on minor power behavior, the creation of a formal ISI can actually make it easier for minor power governments to rationalize to their domestic audiences the imposition of such strictures. Snidal and Abbott (2000, 449) argue that governments of weak states may face domestic audience costs if they are publicly perceived to be obeying the dictates of a great power. By organizing otherwise coercive relationships under the facade of legalized international arrangements with seemingly autonomous international agencies and secretariats, states can work around such audience costs "without unduly interfering with the outcomes desired by a powerful state" (2000, 449). In the age of nationalism when citizens of nation-states identify closely with the honor of their country, such legitimating and neutralizing devices can be extremely valuable to great powers with an interest in weakening minor

powers' nationalist recalcitrance.[10] For example, NATO is a US-led ISI centered on American nuclear deterrence for its membership in which the supreme allied commander is always an American general. Having a European NATO secretary general and the North Atlantic Council are aspects of a legalized order of seemingly depoliticized, technicized agencies that mitigates the reality of an alliance guaranteed by the nuclear arsenal of one great power and led in the service of the latter's politico-strategic priorities.

The Argument

Given the nature of effective ISIs as rules written by great powers, it is an empirical fact that some institutions have been significantly more effective than others over time, surviving and prospering even after dramatic shifts in the balance of power. What explains this variation in the effectiveness of security institutions over time? Why has NATO remained highly functional after the Cold War while the Concert of Europe formed by the consensus of Europe's most powerful and conservative rulers failed to dodge the Crimean War, leading to its collapse? How did superpower adversaries manage to craft the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that to this day remains the international legal reference point and forum for great power efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons?

To answer these questions, I consider two variables that mediate a significant change in the balance of power: (1) the number of great powers in a security institution, and (2) the degree to which the institution's rules mainly constrain minor powers while leaving great powers unconstrained. ISIs are most immune to a loss of effectiveness after a major structural change in the international system when they have fewer great powers and the rules mostly constrain minor powers. Great powers are by definition states that have the military wherewithal to put up a serious

[10] There is a voluminous literature on the nature of nationalism and the historical evolution of the nation-state. For a brief background see Anderson (1981), Gellner (1983), and Posen (1993).

fight against even the strongest state in the international system (Mearsheimer 2001, 5). Such states do not meekly respect the status quo and follow the old rules when a significant power shift has made them even stronger: they will demand a rewriting of the rules to better reflect their newly gained power advantages and if they do not get their way they will flout the old rules to the extent made possible by their increased relative capabilities, challenging other great powers that want to maintain the old rules. Great power disagreement over the institutional rules that have bearing on their core strategic interest in survival can escalate to war. Thus, having fewer great powers in a security institution lowers the chances for a clash and the most effective institutions will tend to be those with only one great power: in such institutions no state will dare challenge the one great power militarily and thus by definition no intra-institutional war can erupt. In the unlikely event of an intra-institutional challenge from a minor power, the great power would be able to neutralize it rather quickly by offering side benefits or through coercion.

In a more general approach to the problem of international cooperation, Kenneth Oye (1986, 18-20) identified several drawbacks to increasing the number of players cooperating, or states as members of an ISI in our example: (1) an increase in transaction and information costs; (2) greater heterogeneity of discount rates for future payoffs, increasing the risk of defection; and (3) collective action problem that accompanies enforcement and punishment of defection. It is clear that with only one great power member an ISI would be able to avoid or minimize all of the above negative effects of having multiple great power members. Great power intra-institutional bargaining over rule change naturally involves transaction and information costs: after a significant change in the balance of power, a state that has lost relative power has an incentive to understate the degree of that loss, and a state that has gained relative power has an incentive to overstate the degree of its relative gain, so that any rewriting of the rules over- rather than under-compensate its

actual capabilities and increase its strategic latitude. This incentive to misrepresent private information about true capabilities has been theorized to be a principal "rationalist" cause of war (Fearon 1995), and the same incentive to misrepresent private information should be present in any other forum of great power competition including during bargaining over institutional rules.

Oye's (1986, 19) second point about the drawbacks from a large number of players is the concomitant increase in the heterogeneity of discount rates for future payoffs and the risk of defection from cooperation. Applying this insight to the problem of multiple great powers in an ISI, great powers may differ in their assessments of the future strategic landscape and the utility of the ISI in serving their objectives. This variability of assessments would increase with the number of great powers, even if we were to assume that all great powers were rational actors that acted with caution to ensure their survival; uncertainties about states' intentions, capabilities, resolve, battlefield outcomes, and how the distribution of power will evolve in the years ahead, are a constant in international politics (Mearsheimer 2001, 34-38), explaining why great powers would diverge in their discount rates for future payoffs from a cooperative endeavour such as an ISI. The uncertainties listed above emerge for rational unitary actors that seek to maximize their chances for survival. When international relations is assumed to be a "two-level game" where each state's executive bargains with international counterparts to pursue its own political interest as well as to partially fulfill demands by domestic interest groups (Putnam 1988), or when cartelized politics and logrolling shape grand strategy (Snyder 1991), the sources of uncertainty about the future proliferates. Again, having only one great power in an ISI reduces the relevant sources of uncertainty and minimizes this particular obstacle to continued post-power shift effectiveness of the ISI.

A third obstacle to cooperation from a large membership is the collective action problem related to enforcement and punishment for defection (Oye 1986, 20). It is conceivable that great powers could face a collective action problem when they attempt to enforce the ISI rules and to punish defectors, with one state free-riding on the efforts of another to maintain cooperation. Such free-riding is most likely when great powers deal with minor power defectors, since great power defection indicates that the ISI is beyond repair through the ordinary mechanisms of enforcement and punishment that could be meted out to minor powers; indeed, when a great power violates the ISI rules in serious ways, it should be regarded as having exited the ISI since enforcement measures and punishment cannot be expected to effectively restrain a powerful state with sufficient capabilities to flout the rules. The prospect of ineffective if not futile efforts at enforcement and punishment directed against another great power is minimized with only one great power in the ISI. Collective action problems associated with punishing a minor power defector also disappear because the ISI's sole great power must by default assume enforcement responsibilities.

The notion that a key impediment to effective bargaining over institutional rules is the incentive to misrepresent private information about capabilities finds empirical support in the fact that the major ISIs throughout history have appeared in the immediate aftermath of great power wars or serious military contests, such as post-Napoleonic Concert of Europe, post-WWII NATO, and the post-Cuban Missile Crisis Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. A war is inefficient for warring parties from a rationalist point of view as it imposes a deadweight loss (Fearon 1995), but it can also expedite bargaining among great powers to build effective institutions by revealing the "true" balance of power. A deadly and unintended antidote to the incentive to misrepresent capabilities is a contest to credibly reveal actual capabilities. With only one great power, an ISI can

avoid potentially dangerous post-power shift haggling over rewriting rules, and the lack of need for such bargaining contributes to keeping the ISI effective.

The second condition for maintaining post-power shift institutional effectiveness is that the rules are limited to constraining minor powers[11], so that the great powers have less reason to behave aggressively to rewrite rules and to attempt to break free from constraints. Great power cooperation to enforce the rules against minor powers should be much easier to maintain than cooperation among great powers to restrain themselves against the incentive to defect after a gain in relative capabilities. It is possible that a significant power shift leads great powers to disagree over the methods employed to enforce the rules against minor powers, but they will at least remain in consensus that the rules must somehow be enforced, which creates an important ceiling on the intensity level of any conflict to which great power discord over rules could lead.

Great power cooperation to restrain minor power behavior can be usefully construed as a pure coordination problem or alternatively a "dilemma of common aversion" (Krasner 1991, 338), where cheating is not a problem and the only requirement is for there to be a mutually intelligible, common set of rules to be followed.[12] Granted, Krasner's (1991, 365) argument was that even in supposedly technical coordination problems such as standard setting, distributional issues figured prominently, so that even the question of which equilibrium point states would settle along an efficient Pareto frontier depended on the balance of power: "The issue here is movement along the Pareto frontier, not how to reach the frontier." Following this line of reasoning, one can argue that *how* to restrain minor powers could be a source of distributional struggle among the great powers

[11] Gundlupet-Venkataramu (2008) has also argued that the strongest and most effective security institutions are those built by powerful states to regulate the behavior of weak states. However, I study what happens after a powerful shift rather than considering institutions statically, and interact the degree to which the rules mainly constrain minor powers with the number of great powers as relevant for intra-institutional bargaining to update rules in response to structural changes.

[12] For an introductory background on simple games such as collaboration vs coordination that provide models for international politics, see Keohane (1984: 65-85), Snidal (1985), Oye (1986), Stein (1990), Krasner (1991), Martin (1992: 15-45), Fearon (1998), and Morrow (1999).

in an ISI; there is a range of tools that great powers can use to discipline or rein in minor power defectors - side payments, issue linkage, economic sanctions, invasion, etc - and the chosen method can benefit some great powers more than others, and this is assuming that disagreement about method of enforcement does not interact with an even more intractable collective action problem about which great power should bear the costs of enforcement and punishment meted out to rule-violating minor powers. While this logic is undeniable, the negative effects on institutional effectiveness arising from such disagreements should pale in comparison to the complete institutional breakdown which can be expected from great power conflict over restraining their own behavior.

Finally, it is conceivable that rather than a significant shift in the balance of power, a relatively small power shift could affect the membership of a security institution. This raises the related issue of just how much power shift is necessary for there to be demands from great powers that have gained relative power to rewrite the rules. First, when the ISI's rules mostly constrain minor power behavior, even a significant change in the distribution of capabilities among great powers should have no bearing on their continued interest in reining in minor powers; constraints on wayward minor powers help great powers maintain their exalted positions and in no way threaten the latter's survival. So, it goes without saying that such an ISI - which remains effective even after significant power shifts - should also remain effective after a small change in the balance of power.

Second, when an ISI's rules constrain both minor and great power behavior, the incentives for rule changes brought on by small shifts in the balance of power would have to be weighed against the costs of initiating rule changes on great power cooperation. When great powers create an ISI they do so with the realization that a common interest exists in policy coordination to

achieve mutual benefits given the particular balance of power at the time of the ISI's founding. If great powers attempted to update rules to reflect every small change in the balance of power, they would incur large transaction and information costs (Oye 1986; Fearon 1995; 1998) related to incentives to misrepresent private information about capabilities; rational actors would weigh the transaction costs from constant bargaining and the negative effects this would have on cooperation against the benefits of maintaining an effective ISI that promotes the great powers' common interest in survival and the pursuit of other strategic objectives that become viable once their chances for survival is not under grave threat. Thus, in ISIs with rules that constrain both minor and great powers, the great powers that have gained relative power will rationally seek to rewrite the rules only after a significant power shift. It is difficult to theoretically offer a cut-off for the size of a power shift for there to be serious demands for institutional restructuring, but empirically, serious demands for rewriting rules tend to come after a sustained period - decades - of uneven economic growth among great powers that in turn result in a change in the military pecking order.[13]

Sunk Costs, Path Dependency, and Increasing Returns: A Rebuttal

To explain why institutions endure, Ikenberry (2001, 70) indiscriminately applies the concept of large sunk costs related to existing institutions to the calculations of all states in an institution, arguing that sunk costs incentivize states to live within the old order despite the knowledge of alternative arrangements that better align with great power interests; institutions change only when the gains from innovation are substantial enough to outweigh sunk costs. There are two problems with this view. First, this logic should not apply to rational actors who by

[13] This is a tentative theoretical suggestion informed by historical observations about the cycle of great power emergence, growth, decline, and fall. Given changes in technology, the rate of diffusion of innovation, and other factors relevant to causing a significant power shift, the time frame to witness a major change in the international distribution of capabilities will probably vary through historical periods. See Kennedy (1987) for a broad overview of the rise and fall of great powers, and Horowitz (2010) on how military innovations spread over time to affect the distribution of power in the international system.

definition do not care about sunk costs, as these are irretrievable costs incurred in the past that are irrelevant for making future decisions (Mankiw 2018, 274-276).

Second, how great powers think about institutional sunk costs will depend on whether a state is gaining or losing relative power. Despite the irrationality of considering irreversible past expenses in making future decisions, the strategic management literature shows that some economic actors can be emotionally attached to failing strategies, do not wish to "waste" the initial investment, or be unwilling to admit the flaws of prior decisions due to reputational concerns (Shreyogg and Sydow 2011, 328). It is difficult to see how cognitive biases about sunk costs that affect individuals could equally apply to the decision-making of a state that is *increasing* in relative power: why would a state gaining relative power feel emotionally invested to maintain the old order that is undervaluing the state's position in the balance of power? What cognitive payoff exists for a state gaining relative power to undervalue itself by respecting old rules out of alignment with new power realities? The mechanism to explain this anomaly is not clear. Ikenberry's (2001) application of sunk costs and related cognitive biases may be relevant for a state that is losing relative power and wants to maintain the old rules, but even such cognitive biases are not really biases as they are grounded in and motivated by the rational self-interest to maintain the old rules that overvalue its relative capabilities.

Path dependency and increasing returns to institutions are another set of social mechanisms that have been misapplied to the preference functions of states to explain institutional inertia (Ikenberry 2001, 69-72). Paul Pierson (2000, 252) defines path dependency as a phenomenon in which "preceding steps induce further movement in the same direction...because the relative benefits of the current activity compared with other possible options increase over time." To illustrate the concept of "increasing returns" Ikenberry (2001, 71) points to how a technical

standard such as VHS format, "through luck and circumstances unrelated to efficiency", came to dominate the market as the increasing number of adopters made switching to a different standard more costly; the opportunity costs of switching over to a different standard increased as more people adopted the VHS format, lowering its production costs through scale economies and giving rise to many interdependent and complementary technologies, which in turn further increased the opportunity cost of switching.

But is the above example appropriate to illustrate intra-institutional great power bargaining dynamics and their evolution over time in international politics? When great powers decide to build an international institution, Ikenberry (2001, 52) notes that they consciously seek to strike a self-interested constitutional bargain "to lock in favorable arrangements that continue beyond the zenith of its power." Likewise, a highly vulnerable minor power will agree to restrain itself even as its relative power increases in the future, in exchange for the great power's promise of self-restraint today. This difference in time horizons - future relative decline of the great power's capabilities, and the current vulnerability of the minor power - is what enables a rational bargain to be struck. But the VHS technical standard example, unlike the constitutional logic, does not involve utility-maximizing bargaining over standards, as the adoption of the standard is through "luck and circumstance unrelated to efficiency." The historical institutional logic of path dependency and increasing returns as illustrated by the technical standard example is distinct from the self-consciously rational and distributional logic of the constitutional bargain.

Great powers approach international institutions not as neutral, depoliticized forums for coordination without concern for distributional issues, but rather as rules that guide and restrain behavior with important distributional consequences related to their security and survival. Great powers will evaluate institutional rules with respect to how much they align with the balance of

power; any misalignment increases (or alternatively deceases) the security of some states over others, since rules restrain behavior and great powers are interested in maximizing their own latitude while minimizing that of others in the pursuit of measures to increase their chances for survival. A state that has lost or is losing relative power will seek to maintain the old rule to restrain another state that has grown more powerful, preventing it from taking further steps to increase its capabilities. If it is the case that wars arise as a result of the inability of rising states to credibly commit to refrain from future aggression (Fearon 1995), it is unclear how an old institution whose rules are misaligned with the changing balance of power could serve as a mechanism of credible commitment.

The rules of an international institution will neither be self-reinforcing nor experience increasing returns over time if the distributional consequences are misaligned with the balance of power, since great powers gaining relative capabilities retain the option of challenging the status quo through force. Institutional path dependency will be able to restrain a great power only if the institution evolved along a path that simultaneously kept that great power weaker than it would have been without the institution. Thus, the concept of institutional path dependency matters for international politics only to the extent that it can be clearly shown how the institution kept states' relative capabilities in check. In fact, I maintain that whether an ISI is permitted to develop along a certain path is dependent on the preferences of great powers and their position in the balance of power.

In contrast to my argument, and similar to Ikenberry's view (2001), Pierson (2000, 259) argues that path dependency and increasing returns are actually stronger in politics than in economics because of the "complexity and opacity of politics." Politics, unlike economics, argues Pierson (2000, 261), is a far murkier environment because politics does not benefit from the

clarifying role of market prices; unlike markets where competition and learning weed out inefficient players, "political institutions rarely confront a dense environment of competing institutions that will instantly capitalize on inefficient performance, swooping in to carry off an institution's customers and drive it into bankruptcy." Pierson's (2000) rather benign, inertia-filled picture of politics is unrecognizable to the student of international politics where empirically - aside from the theoretical constructs of realism - state death (Fazal 2004) has not been an uncommon phenomenon over the past two centuries: Tanisha Fazal (2004, 320) has shown that since 1860 fifty of 202 states have died violently, with "buffer states" located between great powers especially likely to die, but even great powers have died through wars, including the Austrian, Russian, German, and Japanese empires. The most spectacular recent example of international political competition weeding out inefficient players was of course the collapse of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellite regimes.

As for Pierson's (2000, 261) view that politics lacks a clear price mechanism to facilitate rapid adjustments such as the removal of inefficient behavior and institutions that perpetuate the process of "increasing returns", one can point to the balance of power in international politics as the political equivalent of the market price system. And as the empirical record of state deaths suggests, this political pricing system has been quite efficient and unforgiving for states that failed to imitate best practices to ensure their survival.

Summary and Hypotheses

When an existing ISI is exposed to a significant shift in the balance of power that results in a severe misalignment of current rules with new power realities, the great power members will attempt to renegotiate the rules to bring them back into alignment. Given great powers' incentives to misrepresent their true capabilities to individually secure the best deal - minimizing restraints on

oneself while maximizing them for others - the bargaining process can easily break down in an impasse. When the issue under the ISI's purview is especially important for the security of great powers and a lack of agreed upon rules can undermine their interactions compared to the alternative with agreed upon rules, a great power war could break out due the impasse. ISIs are most easily constructed after a systemic war that has credibly revealed the actual capabilities of the great powers. ISIs that mostly constrain minor powers are more easily constructed than those restraining all powers, as great powers have less incentive to misrepresent their capabilities to write rules that do not restrain themselves. If ISIs that constrain all types of states both great and small have to simultaneously address problems of collaboration (prisoner's dilemma), coordination, suasion, and assurance[14], ISIs that are mostly focused on constraining minor powers only have to address problems of coordination and assurance among great powers to control minor powers. The most difficult problem is managing collaboration problems among great powers; a significant power shift that requires rewriting of rules disturbs an already fragile institutional attempt to minimize great power defection in the pre-power shift period.

By interacting the two variables explained at length in the previous sections - (1) the number of great powers in an ISI and (2) the degree to which the rules mainly constrain minor powers while leaving great powers free - and integrating other insights about bargaining problems related to institutional creation and maintenance, it is possible to generate a number of hypotheses about how a significant change in the balance of power will affect the post-power shift effectiveness of ISIs:

Hypothesis 1: The great powers of an international system will dominate the rule-writing process for an ISI. Within the club of great powers, the most powerful will in turn exert the most influence on the content of the rules

[14] See Martin (1992) for a brief description of these four game types.

Hypothesis 2: Great powers will actively misrepresent the private information about their true capabilities and drive a hard bargain to secure the set of rules most advantageous to their strategic interests.

Hypothesis 3: The most historically prominent ISIs' rules will end up being an accurate reflection of the balance of power at the time of the institution's founding. This is because despite great powers' incentives to misrepresent private information about their capabilities, the most prominent ISIs are formed after a systemic war or a serious military contest that reveals their true capabilities.

Hypothesis 4: ISI's provide clear signals to minor and great powers about "constraints, opportunities, and the likely consequences of one's actions" (Ripsman 2019, 49). ISI's play a role by widely promulgating the relevant rules so that there is no ambiguity about acceptable and unacceptable behavior, in line with the institutionalist literature's insight about the role of institutions in information provision (Keohane 1984, 92-95).

Hypothesis 5: There should be an inverse relationship between post-power shift effectiveness of ISIs and the number of great power members.

Hypothesis 6: Security institutions are more likely to remain effective post-power shift when the rules apply mostly to control minor power behavior while leaving great powers unconstrained.

Hypothesis 7: Security institutions most immune to loss in effectiveness from significant structural changes will have only one great power member and the rules will mostly constrain minor powers.

Hypothesis 8: The weight of great powers' common interest in creating the ISI could accommodate them to the status quo after a small shift in the balance of power, but not after a significant change in the balance of power.

Hypothesis 9: After a significant change in international distribution of capabilities, the great power that has gained relative power will demand a rewriting of the rules, and if not accommodated, will simply violate them in accordance with its strategic interest and to the extent that its increased capabilities enable it. At worst, the inability to accommodate rising powers within an ISI can lead to a breakout of war between the former and the states that have experienced a loss in relative power.

Hypothesis 10: ISIs with one great power will not have rules that constrain the great power to the same extent as minor powers. In fact, such ISIs will be rare or non-existent. Great powers will only submit to seriously restrain themselves in cooperation with other great powers as they share a common interest in survival, the threat to which can only come from great power peers.

A table on the next page enumerates eighteen major ISIs since the 19th century that I have been able to identify. Also, a diagram following the table succinctly conveys the basic intuition behind my theory.

Table 1. List of major ISIs since the 19th c.

ISI	# of Great Powers	Rules Constrain Great Powers	Power Shift	Post-Power Shift Effectiveness
Concert of Europe	5	Yes	Mid-19c British Ascendence	Least Effective
NATO	1	No	End of Cold War	Most Effective
NPT	5	No	End of Cold War	More Effective
ABM Treaty	2	Yes	New Nuclear Aspirants	Less Effective, Defunct
SALT	2	Yes	US relative decline/End of Detente	Defunct
INF Treaty	2	Yes	Rise of China	Defunct
UN Security Council	5	Yes	End of Cold War; Rise of China	Less Effective
START	2	Yes	Rise of China	Moderately Effective
Missile Tech. Control Regime	2	Yes	End of Cold War; Rise of China	Moderately Effective
League of Nations	6	Yes	Rise of Axis Powers	Least Effective
Washington Naval Treaty	5	Yes	Rise of Axis Powers	Least Effective, Defunct
SEATO	1	No	Detente/End of Vietnam War	Defunct
CENTO	1	No	US relative decline/Detente	Defunct
Shanghai Coop. Organization	3	Yes	Rise of China	Least Effective
Warsaw Pact	1	No	End of Cold War/Soviet Collapse	Defunct
Biological Weapons Convention	3	Yes	End of Cold War/Rise of China	Less Effective
Chemical Weapons Convention	3	Yes (Redundant)	Rise of China	More Effective
Collective Security Treaty Organization	1	No	Re-emergence of Russia	Most Effective



Figure 1. A framework for explaining post-power shift ISI effectiveness

Chapter 3. The Concert of Europe

I. Background

On January 19 1805, in the midst of the French revolutionary wars and a full decade before Napoleon's final defeat in June 1815 at the Battle of Waterloo, then British Prime Minister Pitt the Younger communicated to the Russian ambassador in London about the possibility of forming a concert of the European great powers to repel France behind its ancient borders and to guarantee the post-restoration peace. It is worthwhile to quote at length Pitt's exact words because it is a compact and accurate description of what the conservative convenors of the Congress of Vienna had in mind when they met in October 1814 to sketch out the contours of a post-Napoleonic Europe. The British prime minister argued that the Concert had three main objectives (Bourne 1970, 197) :

> Ist To rescue from the Dominion of France those countries which it has subjugated since the beginning of the Revolution, and to reduce France within its former limits, as they stood before the time.
>
> 2ndly To make such an arrangement with respect to the territories recovered from France, as may provide for their Security and Happiness, and may at the same time constitute a more effectual barrier in future against Encroachment on the part of France.
>
> 3rdly To form, at the Restoration of Peace, a general Agreement and Guarantee for the mutual protection and Security of different Powers, and for re-establishing a general system of Public Law in Europe.

Pitt's view was that defeating Napoleon was not sufficient to guarantee a lasting peace, that to achieve long-term stability it was necessary for the principal powers at the period of a general

pacification to "bind themselves mutually to protect and support each other" (Bourne 1970, 198). In addition to forming intra-war balancing coalitions to defeat France, Pitt was advocating for the establishment of a post-war international security institution that would restrain "any projects of aggrandizement and ambition similar to those which have produced all the calamities inflicted on Europe since the disastrous era of the French Revolution" (Bourne 1970, 198).

While Pitt's advocacy of the Concert of Europe as an international security institution to manage the post-War peace proved to be prescient, in 1805 it was unclear whether Napoleon could even be defeated and France driven back to its ancient borders. It was only after the disastrous French invasion of Russia in 1812 that the Allied coalition seemed to be gaining a clear upper hand against Napoleon. Only after confirming the disastrous French defeat and retreat from Russia in the winter of 1812 did the German powers - Prussia and Austria - decide to join the balancing coalition against France. Prussia signed the Treaty of Kalisch with Russia in February 1813, abandoning its prior collaborations with France. Austria joined the Allied camp six months later in August 1813, weighing till the end the costs and benefits of joining the coalition against remaining neutral.

Even after the 1812 French rout in Russia and the Treaty of Kalisch that brought together the militaries of Prussia and Russia, Napoleon remained a formidable adversary, defeating the Allied army twice in May 1813 at Luetzen and Bautzen.[15] As a result of these French victories and the confidence-sapping memories of Austrian defeat in 1805 and 1809, the Austrian emperor remained fearful of Napoleon (Kissinger 1957, 71). In addition to fearing French martial prowess, the Austrian chancellor Metternich also harbored suspicions about Russian intentions and designs in central Europe; Metternich waited until the very end to join the Allied camp because a total war

[15]The nervous diplomatic maneuvering and wavering in the waning days of Napoleonic Europe are well-documented in several excellent texts. See Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored* (Gloucester, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957) 62-84. See also F. R. Bridge and Roger Bullen, *The Great Powers and the European States System 1814-1914* (Harlow, UK: Pearson Education Ltd., 2005), 20-34. Another concise reference is by Douglas Dakin, "The Congress of Vienna, 1814-15, and its Antecedents" in Alan Sked, *Europe's Balance of Power 1815-1848* (UK: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1979), 14-33.

that destroyed France would lead to a situation in which "one of the most important counterpoises to Russia would be lost" (1957, 98). Metternich's maneuvers between France and the Allied camp during the pivotal year of 1813 provide an excellent example of a relatively weak state - Austria - strategizing to maximize its chances for survival by seeking to assume the role of a mediator between Napoleon and his adversaries and accruing to itself legitimacy as an ancient power working in the interest of the European equilibrium among more powerful rivals (1957, 62-106). As Kissinger describes (1957, 70):

> Metternich considered Austria the pivotal state because he was convinced that neither side could achieve a decisive victory without Austrian assistance. And he could translate this estimate into reality because Austria was the only one of the contending parties capable of conducting diplomacy. The relations of France with the allies were "revolutionary"; they were contending about the nature of the legitimizing principle and diplomacy had necessarily to prove futile. But Austria could appeal to both sides on grounds they considered "legitimate"; to the Allies on the need for a European equilibrium and to Napoleon on the basis of a family compact.

What stands out in the above quote is the assessment of Napoleon's policy as "revolutionary", in the sense that he refused to set limits on expansion and saw any compromise as either defeat or merely an opportunity to bide time for future aggression. On the other hand, Austrian foreign policy was "legitimate" in the sense that its vulnerabilities as a multinational empire in an era of revolution and nationalism in addition to financial weakness drove it to seek diplomatic solutions that respected the existing borders and established prerogatives of the great powers. It even sought to placate Napoleon by a method commonly used in the 18th century to temper inter-state conflict:

marriage between royal houses. However, the fact that the Austrian emperor married off his daughter to Napoleon did not temper down the latter's revolutionary inclinations, nor did it prevent Austria from ultimately allying with the other great powers to defeat France.

With Austria and Prussia firmly in the Allied camp, the first major French defeat was in October 1813 at Leipzig. By next year on March 31, 1814, the Allied armies entered Paris and signed the First Peace of Paris on May 30. Napoleon was banished to the island of Elba and the victorious great powers convened the Congress of Vienna in October 1814 to solve the complex problem of re-designing an international order that had been upended by revolutionary and nationalist excesses. Remarkably, as the plenipotentiaries of the great powers were convening at the Congress of Vienna, Napoleon escaped Elba, landing at Cannes on March 1 1815. He raised a new army but was decisively and finally defeated at the Battle of Waterloo on June 18. Through these disturbances the Congress of Vienna managed to carry on with its agenda of rebuilding the European international system (Rich 1992, 23).

The four great powers of the victorious Allied camp - Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia - dominated the proceedings of the Congress of Vienna. Some scholars argue that this directorate of four great powers was actually an even more exclusive club of two hegemons in charge of two distinct spheres of influence (Schroeder 1992). One of these hegemons, Great Britain, enjoyed commercial and financial primacy, having funded the war efforts of all the other powers in their fight against France, and with its insular geography and naval capabilities, seemed immune to any attack from the continent (Kennedy 1987, 151-158). Russia, the other hegemon, emerged as the prime land power of Europe, with a large army stationed in Poland and its troops having marched across central Europe and into France, to be stationed there until 1818 (Bridge and Bullen 2005, 24). Both Great Britain and Russia were first rate colonial powers, with Britain

possessing numerous overseas colonies and Russia expanding across Asia towards the Pacific Ocean. Thus, both in Europe and the extra-European world, neither Great Britain nor Russia had any serious challengers. Austria and Prussia were great powers only because they were officially recognized as such by the real great powers - Britain and Russia - and the German powers were able to maintain the trappings of great powerdom only because Great Britain could not accept a complete Russian domination of the European continent (Bridge and Bullen 2005, 35).

At the Congress of Vienna, the great powers agreed to and carried out a number of policies that had the aim of hemming in France and compensating European rulers who had lost territories under Napoleon's empire. First, the great powers reinforced the kingdom of the Netherlands that included the territory of what would later be an independent Belgium; this hemmed in France from the north and created a buffer between France and the English Channel (Bridge and Bullen 2005, 33). A German confederation of independent German states ruled by native princes emerged under the leadership and influence of Austria and Prussia. These German princely states controlled heavily fortified territories east of the Rhine River, forming the eastern frontier of France (Rich 1992, 20-21). To the southeast, Austria gained hegemony over much of northern Italy (1992, 19). In eastern Europe, Russia claimed much of Poland while Prussia as compensation gained a part of Saxony in Germany (Bridge and Bullen 2005, 28).

After the Congress of Vienna, shaken by Napoleon's return from Elba and realizing that France remained a major power and a source of future revolutionary and nationalist ferment and military threat, the great powers signed the Quadruple Alliance of November 20 1815. The most noteworthy aspect of this treaty and the Second Peace of Paris is Article VI, which stipulated that the allies "renew their meetings at fixed periods...for the purpose of consulting upon their common interests" (Bridge 1979, 36). Thus, the Congress of Vienna, rather than becoming a one-off great

power diplomatic conference, became the first in a series of such meetings among European sovereigns to settle their disputes peacefully through diplomatic bargaining and perhaps at the expense of lesser powers whose interests had to be sacrificed to stave off military clashes between the great powers. Thus, Article VI of the 1815 Quadruple Alliance was a solid realization of British Prime Minister Pitt the Younger's suggestion to the Russian ambassador in 1805 for the creation of a concert of Europe that would serve at the end of the Napoleonic wars as the "general Agreement and Guarantee for the mutual protection and Security of different Powers".

II. Applying the Theory to the Evidence

The 19th century Concert of Europe included from the beginning of its existence all the great powers of the European state system - Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia. France was not a great power until the 1818 Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, because its territory remained occupied by Allied troops for three years after Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo. By Article VI of the Quadruple Alliance of 1815, the European great powers agreed to convene regular conferences to discuss European security issues, and the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle was the second meeting to be convened according to the treaty after the Congress of Vienna. At the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, the allies renewed the Quadruple Alliance of 1815 aimed at France, but also invited France to attend in the capacity of a fellow great power any future congresses to be convened according to Article VI. Thus, at this point the Concert of Europe became a truly encompassing security institution that included all the great powers of the European international system, marking the "transfer of the control of the European states system from a four power directory to a Pentarchy of powers" (Bridge and Bullen 2005, 41).

Having established that the Concert of Europe included from the outset the maximum possible number of great powers, what does the theory say about how such an encompassing

institution should fare under conditions of changing relative capabilities? Generally speaking, such institutions should lose their effectiveness when the balance of power shifts among its membership, because newly powerful actors will seek to change the rules that prescribe and proscribe acceptable behavior in a direction favorable to their strategic interests and more faithfully mirroring their increased strength in the international system. Other great powers are most likely to band together to resist such revisionism, and in the absence of a higher power to suspend anarchy and to impose hierarchic order on the system, such disagreements could spiral out of control and in the worst case lead to a great power war. This is the theoretical insight and empirical evidence of structural realism (Mearsheimer 2001). In a conflict among the great powers of an encompassing institution, there can be no expectation of a hegemonic power that could impose order and enforce cooperation, because under anarchy no state exists that could achieve such a feat. When a hegemonic power emerges that could enforce cooperation between great powers, the system is no longer anarchic but hierarchic (Lake 1996).

The balance of power did not stay absolutely still from 1815 until the 1854 outbreak of the Crimean War. Russia was the dominant landpower in the immediate post-war years, but as Kennedy (1987) demonstrates, the economies of Britain and France grew faster than those of Russia and Austria. If so, what was the durable common interest that bound the great powers together during the period when Russian landpower came to dominate Europe? Why did not Russia take advantage of its powerful army that had emerged after 1815 as much stronger than the armies of all the other European powers to launch a series of revisionist wars that could have further enlarged its already extensive territory? A common fear of liberal national revolutions shared by the Russian, Austrian, and Prussian monarchs served as the mechanism to bind them together in a manner similar to that against an external adversary. These revolutions, in addition to

posing domestic threats to their own regimes, created the specter of a dangerous, revisionist military power like Napoleonic France, that through revolutionary nationalism could mobilize its citizens to launch wars of conquest. For example, the Russian Tsar Nicholas I, while personally antagonistic towards the Austrian arch-conservative Metternich, and certainly less conservative than his predecessor Tsar Alexander, nevertheless adhered to a conservative policy of maintaining a nominally independent Ottoman Empire because he feared that overthrowing the Sultan would enable his Egyptian vassal Mehmet Ali to create a powerful, centralized, pan-Arab state south of Russia's borders (Anderson 1979, 89). A weak, reactionary, multinational and thus centrifugal Ottoman Empire posed less of a security threat to Russia than a revolutionary Arab national state, and Tsar Nicholas I, despite possessing the military capabilities to occupy Constantinople and unseat the Ottoman sultan, protected the latter by signing the 1833 Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi and the 1841 Straits Convention.

In a similar vein, at the outbreak of the 1848 revolution and the Hungarian nationalist uprising in the Austrian Empire, the Russian tsar sent a great army to put down the Hungarians and restored Austrian rule without taking advantage of Austria's weakness by demanding territory or imposing other types of humiliations on a royal peer (Bridge and Bullen 2005, 106-108). The Russian tsar's mild policies towards the Austrian and Ottoman monarchies despite possessing the military wherewithal to overthrow them, attest to the mutual fear of liberal national revolutions commonly held among the reactionary powers. Even in liberal Britain, her foreign minister Castlereagh who was present at the Congress of Vienna, cooperated with conservatives like the Austrian chancellor Metternich to maintain a stable Austrian Empire in central Europe to balance against the revival of revolutionary France and the growth in power of an autocratic Russia. While Britain was not threatened by liberal revolutions like the eastern powers, its close cooperation with

Austria necessarily implicated British foreign policy in conservative endeavours to help maintain an ancient dynasty. Also, conservative administrations in Britain would be more favorable to the eastern monarchical perspective than liberal cabinets. When the significant expansion of British industrial power throughout the first half of the 19th century (Kennedy 151-158) merged with an aggressive liberal foreign policy under Palmerston (Snyder 1991, ch. 5) the result was the Crimean War and the end of the Concert of Europe as an effective and viable forum for solving the continent's security problems through dialogue and bargaining.

In this chapter, I will examine three episodes of shifts in the European balance of power during the decades following the fall of Napoleon in 1815 to the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854, and how these power shifts affected the effectiveness of the Concert of Europe as an international security institution. The first power shift to be examined is the emergence of Russia as the preeminent European landpower with no viable competitor after 1815. How did the other powers balance against Russia and induce moderation in its policies, and what common interests held the membership together, at least in the case of the three eastern monarchies of Austria, Prussia, and Russia?

The second episode of power shift is the reemergence of France after defeat as a major European power with deeply revisionist views. Even the restored Bourbon king of France was dissatisfied with the Concert of Europe and the territorial adjustments made at the expense of France at the Congress of Vienna. With the withdrawal of allied troops in 1818 from French territory and the growth in France's economic and military capabilities in the ensuing decades, how did the Concert of Europe respond to French revisionism?

The third episode of power shift is the growth in British economic might as the preeminent industrial and financial power of the world and attendant growth in military capabilities throughout

the post-Napoleonic period up to the Crimean War. What common interest did Britain share with its continental neighbors that moderated its behavior, and why did the Crimean War erupt in 1854, resulting in the destruction of the Concert of Europe as an effective security institution?

III. Russia as the Newly Emergent Pre-eminent Landpower of Europe

It is true that from 1815 to 1854 Russia's relative power as measured by GNP, per capita GNP, share of world manufacturing output, and per capita level of industrialization declined relative to the Western powers, Great Britain and France (Kennedy 1987, 170). But, at least in the first decade following the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Russia assumed the role of the gendarme of Europe, maintaining the continent's largest army of 800,000 troops ready to be deployed to crush revolts and revolutions in neighboring countries. For example, after a radical revolution overthrew the Bourbon King Ferdinand VII of Spain in January 1820, the Russian Tsar Alexander suggested at the Conference of Troppau to include Russian troops in an international force that would intervene in Spain to crush the revolution (Rich 1992, 36). When in July 1820 a similar liberal revolution broke out in Naples in the Austrian sphere of influence, the Russian tsar this time at the Congress of Laibach, until persuaded otherwise by the Austrian chancellor Metternich, once again favored an international force that included Russian troops to restore the old regime. One of the questions which this section addresses is why Russia moderated its initially aggressive posture and relented in the face of diplomatic persuasion by Austria's Metternich. Had Russia ignored Metternich and cooperated with France to intervene in an Austrian sphere of influence, this would have been a serious attack on the consensus-based ideals of the Concert of Europe and resulted in the loss of institutional effectiveness by alienating a founding member through the application of brute force.

A common interest in preventing liberal national revolutions from overthrowing the old regimes can best explain the Russian tsar's deference to Austria's Metternich and the restraint that Russia displayed in the use of military force against the will of a weaker power. This common interest in maintaining stability mediated the effect of a shift in the balance of power in favor of Russia in central Europe. The most obvious reason that a fear of liberal national revolutions would bind absolutist regimes such as Russia and Austria is that these revolutions could topple them and set up regimes more responsive to the demands of their people. But, aside from motives related to domestic regime survival, there is also an external, military-security logic as to why great powers located far away from the site of revolutions in places like Spain and Naples - and thus arguably less vulnerable to contagion effects - would seek to put them down. As the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1976, 592) noted, the reason revolutionary France had been such a formidable adversary was that the revolution had mobilized the entire French nation in the war effort, so that other European states still in the mode of fighting limited kings' wars could not suppress, at least initially, the onslaught of an entire nation at war:

> The people became a participant in war; instead of governments and armies as heretofore, the full weight of the nation was thrown into the balance. The resources and efforts now available for use surpassed all conventional limits; nothing new impeded the vigor with which war could be waged, and consequently the opponents of France faced the utmost peril.

Writing in the 1820s and 1830s at the height of the operation of the Concert of Europe and the Metternich-system of inter-monarchical cooperation - at least among the three eastern monarchies of Austria, Prussia, and Russia - to suppress revolutions, Clausewitz (1976, 593) asks whether

future European wars will continue to involve the efforts of entire nations, or whether wars will revert to the 18th century-style limited wars of the monarchs :

> From now on, shall every war in Europe be waged with the full resources of the state, and therefore have to be fought only over major issues that affect the people? Or shall we again see a gradual separation taking place between government and the people? Such questions are difficult to answer, and we are the last to dare to do so. But, the reader will agree with us when we say that once barriers - which in a sense consist only in man's ignorance of what is possible - are torn down, they are not easily set up again.

In attempting to understand what Metternich was trying to achieve at the Congresses of Troppau, Laibach, and Verona, and why the Russian Tsar was so receptive to his diplomatic overtures despite the preponderance of Russian landpower that could have permitted him to brush off Austria, one can interpret their cooperation as the European conservatives' response to Clausewitz's question: that there must resume a gradual separation between the government and the people, and that the barriers torn down by the French revolution and the rise of nationalism must be set up again. In this light, Metternich's and Alexander's cooperation goes beyond a narrow concern for the domestic immunization of their own regimes from revolutionary contagion, evincing a conservative, pan-European effort to fight liberal revolutions as the precursor of nationalism, which in turn could create powerful states with the ability to mobilize the entire nation on a destabilizing course of revisionism and conquest.

In the early years of the post-1815 period, the Russian foreign minister Capodistria and Pozzo di Borgo, the Russian ambassador to Paris, sought a rapprochement with Restoration France to balance against what they perceived to be an inordinate amount of Austro-British influence over

post-war Europe. They found their opportunity to cement Russo-French relations when Spain and Naples experienced liberal revolutions that in both cases substituted radical constitutions for absolutism. France volunteered its troops to crush the revolutions and to put in place more moderate regimes deferential to French strategic interests (Bullen 1979, 64-65), and Russia, under the influence of its anti-Austrian foreign minister and ambassador to Paris, persuaded the Tsar to support France and to also offer Russia troops in the intervention. The British foreign minister Castlereagh was opposed to French intervention, seeing it as an effort by France to flex its military might in order to begin pulling away from the strictures put around it by the Quadruple Alliance of 1815 (Bridge 1979, 40). However, when a similar revolution broke out in Naples, Castlereagh supported an Austrian military intervention without the aid of French and Russian troops to restore absolutism. Metternich agreed with Castlereagh that Austria alone should intervene in its Italian sphere of influence to prevent revolutionary contagion into northern Italy and Germany itself (Bridge 1979, 40). Opposing French intervention in Spain while endorsing Austrian intervention in Italy seemed to France and her supporters in Russia such as Capodistrias, an act of self-serving hypocrisy only benefiting Austro-British interests. France and her Russian supporters called for an international intervention Naples to restore a moderate regime, hoping to "find in Italy the opportunity so recently denied her in Spain to break out of the constraints of the 1815 system, especially if she could promote the establishment of a moderate constitutional regime in Naples, under the protection, not of Austria, but of the Pentarchy" (Bridge and Bullen 2005, 45).

Despite Metternich's reluctance to internationalize the requisite military intervention to restore the old regime in Naples, Russian and French pressure was too great to ignore, and a European congress was convened on October 20 1820 in Troppau to discuss what common action if any that the great powers should take. At the Congress of Troppau, and subsequent congresses in

Laibach and Verona, Metternich managed to persuade the Russian Tsar Alexander I to adhere to the Austrian line, at the expense of the advice of his own ministers. In Kissinger's (1957, 257) words, Metternich proceeded to have himself appointed "High Priest of Alexander's religious exaltation, the officially recognized interpreter of the Holy Alliance, thus to achieve not only legitimacy for the social struggle but also sanctity." To break up the emergent Franco-Russian alliance, Metternich scared the Russian Tsar with reports of a "European conspiracy, with headquarters significantly in Paris, alleged to be attempting to undermine all thrones" (Kissinger 1957, 257). Metternich had used similar arguments in 1819 to convince the king of Prussia and other German princes to resolutely adhere to the Austrian policy of reaction: when a German student murdered a journalist in the service of the Russian tsar, Metternich persuaded the princes that a "directing committee was coordinating the whole vast revolutionary conspiracy from its seat in Paris" (Bridge and Bullen 2005, 43). The Karlsbad Decrees as advocated by Metternich managed to set up a police state in Prussia and other members of the German Confederation that censored intellectual activity, monitored subversive individuals, and favored reactionary interpretations of the constitutional provisions laid out in the Federal Act of the confederation (2005, 43).

As did the King of Prussia in 1819, the Russian tsar was also highly receptive to Austrian chancellor Metternich's warnings about an international revolutionary conspiracy directed by a committee in Paris, and this durable common interest in counter-revolution of the three eastern monarchies led a powerful Russia to hew to the policy direction set by the weaker Austria. The Russian tsar reportedly told Metternich: "Tell me what you desire and what you wish me to do and I will do it" (as quoted in Rich 1992, 37). At the Congress of Laibach held the next year on January 11 1821, the tsar was notified of a mutiny of his own regiments in the Russian capital as

well as a revolt against Turkish rule in Wallachia, becoming ever more convinced by Metternich's warning that an international revolutionary committee existed "which give the signal for revolutions in countries which have been carefully prepared by intrigues and agitations" (as quoted in Rich 1992, 38). The tsar rejected his own foreign minister Capodistria's advice to form a multinational intervention force including the French to impose a moderate constitution on Naples, instead opting for Metternich's policy of an exclusively Austrian intervention to crush the revolution and to restore absolutist rule. Thus, with the sanction of the Concert of Europe including its most powerful landpower Russia, Austrian troops crossed the Po River to impose on Naples a regime with prerogatives for the monarch and only advisory functions for the Council of State and the assembly of deputations of the Estates (Kissinger 1957, 277). After his diplomatic successes that persuaded the Russian tsar to defer to a weaker Austria by making the eastern monarchs converge on their durable common interest in counter-revolution, Metternich observed:

> "Russia does not lead us, it is we who lead the Emperor Alexander and for several very simple reasons. He needs advice, but he has lost all his advisers. He considers Capodistria a Carbonari chief; he distrusts his army, his ministers, his nobility, and his people. In such a situation, one does not lead...And England is completely on our side" (as quoted in Kissinger 1957, 281).

Metternich succeeded in binding a powerful Russia to a weaker Austria by emphasizing their common interest in counter-revolution. As Kissinger (1957, 283) notes, "had all the revolutions of 1819-1820 occurred simultaneously, there is no doubt that the Austrian Empire would have collapsed a century before its ultimate demise." As it is impossible to rerun history and counterfactuals are all we have to rely on, it is difficult to lay down how much of Metternich's efforts were simple scare-mongering versus prudent policy, but what is important is that the

Russian tsar came around to his views and cemented Austro-Russian relations which in turn led to a more effective Concert of Europe.

But why did the British foreign minister Castlereagh share Metternich's reactionary policy of intervention in Italy? Great Britain, despite a limited franchise, had a powerful parliament that controlled the pulse strings and which also exercised immense executive authority through a cabinet formed by its leading members; it was indeed a model for revolutionaries seeking to set up a liberal constitutional regime. Not surprisingly, the British government did not officially support the coordination and cooperation among Austria, Prussia, and Russia to intervene against revolutions in their smaller neighbors. However, while Great Britain did not share the ideological enthusiasm of the three eastern monarchies to crush all revolutions, it did selectively favor intervention in cases where British strategic interests were at stake, such as in Italy, where it wanted Austrian influence to prevail over those of France and Russia. When the 1820 revolution broke out in Naples, the Duke of Wellington, then the British prime minister, advised the Austrians to deploy 80,000 troops to crush it (Bridge 1979, 40). However, despite or rather because of this preference for selective intervention depending on the strategic context, the British did not send an official delegate to the Congress of Laibach and only a lower ranking substitute for Castlereagh to the Congress of Troppau where the eastern powers wanted to come up with a general resolution on the right of intervention wherever revolutionary threats may arise.

Despite these official displays of opposition to the principle of intervention as part of the Public Law of Europe, Castlereagh left an opening to justify Austrian intervention in Naples for strategic reasons, arguing that Austria may intervene in Italy according to circumstances provided the intervenor committed to respect the territorial adjustments made at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 (Rich 1992, 38). In response to the revolution in Spain that had occurred a few months prior

to that in Naples, Castlereagh, while denying the need for intervention in Spain, also left open the possibility of future intervention where its strategic interests may be more at risk (Bourne 1970, 200)

> That circumstances might arise out of such experiments in any Country directly menacing to the safety of other States cannot be denied, and against such a danger, well ascertained, the Allies may justifiably, and must in all prudence be on their guard; but such is not the present case; fearful as is the example which is furnished, by Spain, of an Army in revolt, and a Monarch swearing to a constitution which contains in its frame hardly the semblance of a Monarchy, there is no ground for apprehension, that Europe is likely to be speedily endangered by Spanish arms.

In his State Paper or 'Minute of the Cabinet', Castlereagh mentions in several places the institutional differences between representative and monarchical governments, arguing that representative governments such as his must pay heed to the "Public Mind", which would be soured by indiscriminate intervention in other countries' domestic affairs and end up opposing even those interventions which may be strategically necessary: "The fatal effects of such a false step might be irreparable when the moment at which we might be indispensably called upon by duty and interest to take a part, should arrive" (Bourne 1970, 203). In another part, Castlereagh argues that there is a "moral impracticability" for representative governments to condone military intervention in the internal affairs of others (1970, 206). Unless the territorial balance of Europe as adjusted in the Congress of Vienna comes under threat, Great Britain could not "act upon abstract and speculative principles of precaution" under which great powers would agree to a general principle of intervention against revolutions wherever they may arise (1970, 207).

In summary, the combination of the emergence of post-war Tsarist Russia as the preeminent landpower and the 1820 revolutions in Spain and Naples created the opportunity for a rupture in the Quadruple Alliance and the destruction of the Concert of Europe, had a powerful Russia and revisionist France persisted in launching international military interventions against each of these sites of revolution. Neither Britain nor Austria wanted to see combined Russian and French forces marching into their spheres of influence. In 1823, France unilaterally and alone intervened in Spain to put in place a more moderate regime in place of the radical one established in 1820; this was a solitary action by France and because none of the other great powers responded militarily, no open rupture emerged among them to destroy the Concert of Europe. In the case of Naples, Britain, Russia, and Prussia all agreed - although Britain was more discreet in its official pronouncements - that Austria should intervene by itself to restore Ferdinand I's authority as an absolute monarch; the original members of the Quadruple Alliance pushed aside France's objections, and because the latter did not dare to respond militarily, no clash occurred among the great powers over this decision.

It is clear that the key to solving these crises peacefully was that the state that had gained the most military weight since 1815 should restrain itself, but not for moral reasons. Russia did restrain itself because Metternich reminded its tsar of the common security interest in counter-revolution that the eastern monarchies shared, persuading him to sanction an exclusively Austrian military intervention. That Great Britain's strategic interest in excluding Russian and French military presence on the Italian peninsula coincided with this common interest in counter-revolution further contributed to maintaining the effectiveness of the Concert of Europe as an international security institution.

In my theory, ISI's are most effective and robust to changes in the balance of power with fewer great powers and most rules constraining minor powers. The common threat against regime survival posed by liberal national revolutions - and the fear that such a revolution could create another Napoleon - mitigated against the negative effects of having many great powers in the Concert. Russia restrained itself despite its predominant landpower because the costs of any such self-restraint was more than offset by the benefits of great power cooperation in putting down threatening revolutions in minor powers.

IV. The Post-Napoleonic Re-Emergence and Revisionism of France

In the previous section, the mechanism that kept Russian policy in line with Austrian and British preferences over military intervention in the Neapolitan revolution was the common interest in counter-revolution shared by the eastern monarchies of Russia, Austria, and Prussia. This fear of revolutionary contagion and the negative domestic regime and international security consequences of such contagion so skillfully emphasized by Austrian chancellor Metternich to a worried Russian tsar, effectively moderated Russian enthusiasm to intervene with its own military forces in different parts of Europe; Russia, despite having emerged as the greatest landpower on the continent post-1815, closely adhered to the policy preferences of a much weaker Austria in such matters as the exclusively Austrian character of any military intervention to be carried out on the Italian peninsula.

In this section, I will apply my theory to explain how the original great power signatories of the Quadruple Alliance - Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia - cooperated in fencing in France's revisionist ambitions following its recovery from defeat in the Napoleonic Wars. In an encompassing security institution such as the Concert of Europe that includes all the great powers of an international system, two methods are available to keep the institution effective despite the

incentives provided to great powers by differential growth rates to deviate from the rules that they agreed upon at the founding of the institution. The first method, as examined in the previous section, is through the binding mechanism of a common interest such as the shared fear of revolutionary contagion. The second method to mediate the negative effects of changes in the balance of power on institutional effectiveness is intra-institutional balancing. Any time one or more of the great powers in a security institution grow in relative power, I argue that they face strong incentives to revise the rules to better reflect their strengthened relative position in the balance of power. If the great powers are unable to peacefully address such revisionist preferences, a war can break out which would be the clearest signal of complete institutional breakdown. But, if enough powerful members are able to form a coalition to deter and to coerce without resorting to war, a revisionist target state to moderate its demands, then the security institution will have successfully addressed the problem of accommodating changes in the balance of power, maintaining in the process institutional effectiveness. Of course, this method only works after a modest shift in the balance of power. The potential revisionist has to calculate that the costs of bargaining for more advantageous institutional rules outweigh the benefits of change, since there is always the possibility that bargaining could break down and lead to war given private information about capabilities and incentives to misrepresent true capabilities to secure a better deal (Fearon 1995).

Post-1815 France was a revisionist state deeply dissatisfied with being hemmed in from all directions by the victorious Quadruple Alliance and effectively excluded from areas that it considered to be its traditional spheres of influence: Prussia concentrated its army on the Rhine, Austria dominated the Italian peninsula, and the Netherlands served as a buffer between France and the English Channel (Bullen 1979, 124-125). In the French Foreign Office, a group of officials

trained under Napoleon managed the operations of foreign policy-making such as composing instructions for French diplomats abroad, and this group held revisionist preferences for the destruction of the Quadruple Alliance and the restoration of France as a first-rate great power (1979, 126). Most politicians across the political spectrum, from ultra-royalists to radical Republicans were also revisionists; the ultra-royalists wanted to restore the greatness of France under powerful Bourbon Kings like Louis XIV, while Republicans wanted to foment revolutions across Europe and send in the army of the French Republic to battle despotism (1979, 127).

Between 1830 to 1860, France outpaced Russian and Austrian growth rates on such measures of power as relative shares of world manufacturing output, per capita levels of industrialization, and per capita GNP (Kennedy 1987, 149). Throughout the 1820s and 1830s France steadily increased its military spending, so that by 1828 naval spending had increased to 83 million francs from 40 million francs in 1818, the year Allied occupation of French territory ended and the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle officially reintegrated France into the European state system as a great power. Also, during this period the number of French men liable for military service exceeded the number in demand, reassuring successive French governments - the Bourbon Restoration, the July Monarchy - of their ability to deal with emergency military situations (Bullen 1979, 131).

In the context of recovering military capabilities and economic growth rates ahead of Russia and Austria, the French government in the 1830s resorted to an activist policy in the Mediterranean where in addition to colonizing Algiers, it sought to influence Mehmet Ali of Egypt, the Ottoman sultan’s nominal vassal, to oppose Russia’s policy of maintaining the status quo in the Near East. The Russian military was powerful enough to take Constantinople on its own and bring down the Ottoman Empire, but the tsar and his advisors feared that an Ottoman collapse would

invite other great powers such as Great Britain and France to demand their fair share of Ottoman lands through partition. Another concern for the tsar was that an enterprising vassal like Mehmet Ali might overthrow the Ottomans and create a strong national state in the Near East that could more effectively resist Russia and the great powers. A special committee of the Russian government set up in 1828 to review its Near East policy concluded that it was in Russian strategic interest to preserve the Ottoman Empire as a weak buffer state (Anderson 1979, 86-87).

At the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish War of 1828, the Russians and the Ottomans signed the Treaty of Adrianople, which despite territorial and other concessions awarded to Russia, was milder in terms of exactions than what could have been possible given the magnitude of Ottoman losses to Russia; by practicing restraint, Russia could best stave off counter-balancing by Great Britain and France, while "leaving Russia in a position to absorb the entire Ottoman empire at some time when its rivals were occupied elsewhere or some other propitious opportunity should present itself"' (Rich 1992, 55). When four years later in 1833 the Ottoman sultan asked his adversary the Russian tsar to help him defeat a rebellion by his vassal Mehmet Ali of Egypt, the tsar obliged, sending troops to defend Constantinople. The Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi signed between the two countries in 1833 established Russia as the protector of the Ottoman Empire and stipulated the closure of the Dardanelles to the passage of all warships (Rich 1992, 71). In the same year, Russia, Austria, and Prussia signed the Treaty of Munchengratz, which expressed their consensus for preserving the Ottomans by checking Mehmet Ali and for great power consultation and cooperation if the partition of that empire became inevitable (Bridge and Bullen 2005, 93).

Both Great Britain and France were dissatisfied with this expansion of Russian power in the Near East, despite the latter's apparent restraint towards the Ottoman Empire. British Prime Minister Palmerston decided to respond to he Eastern powers' Treaty of Munchengratz with his

own Quadruple Alliance of 1834 that formed a coalition of four western powers, Great Britain, France, Spain, and Portugal. These developments seemed to create two hostile camps on the continent, a liberal Western and an absolutist Eastern, that could have made compromise difficult within the Concert of Europe, but a subsequent crisis in the Near East precipitated by the Ottomans laid to rest this concern and demonstrated that great power cooperation between Great Britain and Russia remained solid.

In 1839, the Ottomans attacked Mehmet Ali's Egyptian occupation forces in Syria to reclaim lost territory. But, the Egyptians were able to rout the Ottomans and the empire was on the verge of collapse until Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia intervened on behalf of the sultan to restrain Mehmet Ali. Only France supported the latter. Despite the fact that France was part of the British-led Western-liberal Quadruple Alliance of 1834, Great Britain sided with the signatories of the Treaty of Munchengratz, in effect abandoning its French ally. The French foreign minister Thiers told Mehmet Ali to hold his position in Syria, while threatening to launch a French invasion force across the Rhine to punish the German states that supported the Ottomans. However, Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia stood firm against French threats, effectively "grouping" France by forming an overwhelming coalition to deter, isolate, and if necessary defend against possible military action. This grouping against France was a resounding success: in September 1840, after a British squadron's bombardment of the coastal areas of Syria and Lebanon, an amphibious landing of combined Anglo-Austrian forces helped an Ottoman army drive back Mehmet Ali to southern Syria (Rich 1992, 74).

The Straits Convention held on July 13 1841 formally committed all the great powers, including France, to respect the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and to keep the Dardenelle closed to foreign warships. While the Ottoman-Egyptian conflict was a proxy war

between France and the other great powers, it did not expand into a great power war and the reason for this strategic restraint was the isolation of France by its grouping under the Concert of Europe. When the most powerful members of the security institution formed a coalition to check a revisionist member, the former was able to successfully deter the latter from engaging in military action that could have caused a great power war which in turn would have destroyed the Concert.

Most importantly, France had grown in relative power in the two decades since 1815, but the consequent shift in the balance of power was not overwhelming. For example, French share of world manufacturing output increased by a quarter from 1800 to 1830, versus more than doubling of the same indicator for Britain (Kennedy 1987, 149). The Concert's members could deter France from risking war to rewrite the rules because while it was relatively more powerful in the 1830s and 40s than in 1815, the power shift in its favor was not sufficiently pronounced.

V. The Crimean War and the Complete Breakdown of the Concert of Europe

Unlike the Near Eastern crisis of 1839-41 which peacefully ended with the Straits Convention of 1841, the subsequent crisis in the region precipitated by the French acquisition of control from the Ottomans of Christian holy places in and around Jerusalem, led to the Crimean War, in which the great powers engaged in direct warfare against each other. This destroyed the Concert of Europe because the minimal requirement for a security institution's effectiveness is that its members do not fight a war in opposing camps.

Why were the great powers able to address the Near Eastern crisis of 1839-41 peacefully, while the subsequent crisis once again involving the Ottoman Empire spiralled out of control into open warfare? One argument to explain this variation is that the crisis of 1839-41 was provoked by two minor powers, the Ottomans and their vassal Mehmet Ali, whereas the in the run-up to the Crimean War, the great powers, France and Russia were directly responsible for the provocations

(Bridge and Bullen 2005, 116). The argument is that it is easier for great powers to move away from the precipice of war and to find face-saving measures when they are not directly involved in a conflict; they can blame their proxies for any extreme actions and retain for themselves the responsibility of restoring the peace. Another argument focuses on the "log-rolling" dynamic seen in the domestic politics of great powers such as Great Britain, where sections of society with influence in foreign policy-making advocate for policies in their narrow sectional interests; these groups cooperate to form powerful political coalitions - log-rolls - that would increase the probability of their sectional preferences being implemented into policy, but such incoherent sum of sectional preferences result in overall policies that deviate from a rationally conceived notion of the national interest (Snyder 1991).

The above arguments are useful in understanding the causes of the Crimean War and the collapse of the Concert of Europe. But, I argue that the most important variable is the immense increase in combined British and French relative power during the three decades of the post-Napoleonic era. In the first decade after the Napoleonic Wars, the undisputed landpower in Europe was Russia, and other great powers feared its military might and deferred to its preferences. In the previous section, I argued that despite its quasi-hegemonic position, Russia restrained itself because it feared revolutionary contagion which could disrupt regimes internally and give rise to external aggression by a revolutionary state forged in a liberal national revolution such as that seen in the example of Napoleonic France.

In the intervening decades between the fall of Napoleon and the Crimean War, Great Britain far surpassed Russia in the growth rates of its GNP, relative share of world manufacturing, and per capita levels of industrialization: between 1850 and 1860, the decade of the Crimean War, the British total GNP surpassed that of Russia, and per capita GNP became almost three times as

large (Kennedy 1987, 171). On the eve of the Crimean War, Kennedy (1987, 173-174) shows that Russia's economic and industrial backwardness severely impacted its military effectiveness: Russian naval vessels were built from fir trees, while the British and French fleets were comprised of steam-driven gunboats; Russian flint-lock muskets had a range of only 200 yards versus the British and French 1,000 yards; and with no railways south of Moscow, Russian military logistics was highly ineffective. Given the significantly increased relative power position of the Western liberal camp led by Great Britain, there was less reason than ever to back down in a conflict with Russia, especially if we are to accept the log-rolling internal political dynamics that further fueled a muscular, aggressive British policy against Russia (Snyder 1991).

Russia, annoyed by the French challenge to Russian prerogatives over the Holy Places in the Ottoman Empire, responded by bullying the sultan to retract from its deferential policy towards France. The Menshikov mission to Constantinople to pressure the sultan failed because of Ottoman intransigence to Russian demands; the Ottomans were hoping that they could rely on a powerful Great Britain to push back against the Russians. The British ambassador in Constantinople, Stratford Canning, advised the Ottomans to stand firm against Russia; in May 1853, the British fleet entered Besika Bay in the Dardanelles to provide support for the sultan (Bourne 1979, 75). On July 2 1853, Russia occupied the Danubian principalities to coerce the Ottomans, in response to which the British and French fleets moved through the Dardanelle up to Constantinople (Bourne 1979, 76). In his memorandum to the British Foreign Secretary Russell, the Home Secretary Palmerston opined that (1979, 320)

> If England and France stoutly support Turkey in this matter by negotiation, backing up their negotiation by adequate naval demonstration, they will ultimately succeed even if Austria and Prussia give them no assistance… We may not succeed in

> weeks, it may take us months; but if England and France make the Russian government clearly understand that the Russian troops must go out, the Russian government will somehow find the way to make them go out.

In addition to standing firm against the tsar, Palmerston (Bourne 1979, 321) pointed to the military weakness of Russia, much like the description given of Russian military backwardness by the historian Paul Kennedy (1987), creating a sharp contrast with the fear of Russian military might harbored by European statesmen in the early years following Napoleon's defeat:

> I believe very great misapprehension exists as to the offensive means of Russia...Her armies never come into the field anything like what they appear on paper. They soon dwindle away in a campaign. Peculation misapplies the means destined for their maintenance; a bad commissariat leaves the men ill-fed; bad medical arrangements leave them to be disabled or to die from fatigue and disease. As the army advances, and the line of communication lengthens all these causes operate with increasing intensity.

Thus, the balance of power had unambiguously shifted in favor of Great Britain and France. Russia could not hope to group these powers the way the great powers had grouped France in the Near East Crisis of 1839-41. Likewise, Russian intransigence in its determination to demonstrate its superior position vis a vis France in the Ottoman Empire, and the Ottomans' trust in British and French capabilities to back up its own intransigence against Russian coercion, led to the eruption of the Crimean War in the spring of 1854 when Great Britain and France declared war against Russia.

No durable common interest in counter-revolution existed between Russia and the western liberal powers, unlike the convergence of ideologico-security preferences existing among the eastern monarchies of Russia, Austria, and Prussia. The Western liberal powers did not fear

revolution, and in the case of the British statesman Lord Palmerston, actually preferred moderate liberal reforms rather than reactionary measures to more effectively preempt radical demands for change. According to one historian, Britain's policy at this time was to stir up revolution: "Everywhere, indeed, by stirring up national feeling and liberal agitation, she prepared to overthrow the Europe established by the 1815 treaties" (Droz, as cited in Bartlett 1979, 162). Thus, on the eve of the Crimean War, the two factors that could mediate a destabilizing intra-institutional shift in the balance of power, were absent. Neither the Western liberal states nor Russia were powerful enough to balance against, deter, or coerce the opposing power into sustaining cooperation, and no common ideologico-security interest in counter-revolution could bind the liberal states with Russia.

VI. Summary

From the defeat of Napoleon in 1815 to the eve of the Crimean War in 1853, I have identified three shifts in the international balance of power: the rise of Russia as the preeminent landpower in the years immediately after 1815; the recovery and growth of France as a revisionist state by the late 1830s; and finally the rise of Great Britain by the 1850s as the largest economy in Europe, surpassing even Russia in total GNP, and multiple times wealthier on per capita terms. The Concert of Europe faced threats to its effectiveness after each of these shocks to the balance of power, but the effect of these changes to the security institution's effectiveness varied according to how intermediate variables - the existence of common interests in survival and the magnitude of the power shift - mediated the power shifts.

In the case of the rise of Russian landpower, common interest in counter-revolution moderated Russian territorial ambitions and allowed a weaker Austria to set policy under its conservative chancellor Metternich. A moderate Russia was also in Great Britain's interests, so that

a certain harmony of views and aims existed among the original signatories of the 1815 Quadruple Alliance, all at the expense of French revisionism.

France recovered and set out to revise the order established by the 1814-15 Congress of Vienna, but Anglo-Russian cooperation and moderation in the 1839-41 Near Eastern Crisis managed to group France under the Concert of Europe. Finally, the rise of Great Britain as Europe's largest economy, persistent French revisionism, and Russia's relative military backwardness by the 1850s, combined with the failure to converge on any common ideologico-security interest, led to the Crimean War and the complete destruction of the Concert of Europe by 1854.

Chapter 4. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: The Case of North Korea

I. Introduction

This chapter tests the dissertation's theory by applying it to the historical record of how one of the most widely adhered to international security institutions - the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty - dealt with North Korea's nuclear program. Great powers can try to enforce the clauses of the NPT either through unilateral and extra-institutional efforts or by formally passing resolutions in the UN Security Council. In relation to the North Korean nuclear program, the great powers have resorted to both unilateral and multilateral means. The UN Security Council, despite its failure to restrain great power competition over many security issues - most notably the US-Soviet rivalry over the course of the Cold War - has witnessed a remarkable degree of great power consensus in the form of security council resolutions unanimously condemning North Korean nuclear and missile tests and satellite launches, placing crushing economic sanctions on that nation to discourage its nuclear and missile development pursuits. This historical record of great power cooperation both inside and outside the UN Security Council in support of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty strongly confirms the theory that international security institutions can thrive despite otherwise unsettling shifts in the balance of power when the institution's rules mainly constrain minor power behavior and the rule makers/enforcers are few in number to minimize coordination problems when making and enforcing rules.

Before going through the case study of great power cooperation in enforcing the NPT to address the North Korean nuclear program, I will briefly summarize the dissertation's theory. First, I assume that the rules of an international security institution reflect the distribution of capabilities among member states. At the institution's founding, great powers write the rules that prescribe and proscribe acceptable and unacceptable forms of state behavior; the more powerful states at the time

of the rule-making should have more of their interests and preferences reflected in the rules than the less powerful. The trouble emerges for the institution after a significant change in the balance of power when newly-powerful states may want to revise the old rules to better reflect their interests; when the old guard refuses to accommodate the parvenues, these latter states may resort to force to effect changes. Then, the security institution would no longer be effective as the minimum standard for evaluating effectiveness is that member states refrain from going to war against each other.

Given this set up, the key question to ask is whether most of the institution's key rules focus on constraining minor power behavior in the interest of the great powers. If this is the case, then even a significant structural shift in the international balance of power would not affect the effectiveness of the security institution as the great powers despite some reordering in their power rankings could continue to cooperate to control minor power behavior. Even if in the extreme case a minor power were to become a great power, the institution could accommodate its interests as the rules focus on controlling minor power behavior; having graduated into the great power club the institution's rules would no longer apply to the former minor power and it would in all likelihood be content to become the enforcer of the rules after having been the target of enforcement prior to the shift in the balance of power. In the two centuries of historical record considered in this dissertation's case studies, no minor power has ever become a great power, although there have been many instances of reshuffling in great power rankings (e.g., Austria grew weaker throughout the 19th century while Prussia grew stronger, although both remained great powers throughout the century). The only case of a minor power accumulating sufficient military strength to become something other than a purely minor power is North Korea, which has so far conducted seven nuclear tests including the testing on September 3, 2017 of a hydrogen weapon with an yield 17 times greater than the Hiroshima bomb, three intercontinental ballistic missile tests in the second

half of 2017, submarine-launched ballistic missile tests, and numerous shorter range missile tests landing near or over the Japanese archipelago.

Next, an international security institution can include as members all the great powers of an international system or only a subset of them. In terms of identifying great powers, historians and political scientists have come to a consensus on which states qualify as such throughout the last two centuries that are the focus of this dissertation. For example, in post-Napoleonic Europe up to the breakout of the Crimean War, the great powers were Great Britain, Russia, France, Prussia, and Austria. In the Cold War, there were two great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The assessment for the post-Cold War has been more varied, with Samuel Huntington (1999) arguing that the United States was the *primus inter pares* in a "uni-multipolar" world, while William Wohlforth (1999) posited that the United States was the unipolar power in a unipolar world. According to Mearsheimer (2001, 5) to qualify as a great power a state must have enough military assets to "put up a serious fight in an all-out conventional war" against the most powerful state in the system, and by this standard the United States, China, and Russia have all qualified as great powers since the end of the Cold War. When an international security institution comprises all the great powers of a system, I label it as an encompassing institution. When the institution incorporates only a subset of the great powers, it is an exclusive institution. The distinction between encompassing and exclusive institutions is important because an institution is more effective when there are less great powers in it as this reduces the scope of great power disagreement and conflict over rule-making and enforcement measures; coordination problems are less likely to obstruct cooperation with fewer great powers clashing over running the institution. In the extreme case, an institution may have only one great power, as is the case with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; then, the institution maintains maximum effectiveness despite

unsettling shifts in the balance of power, provided the one great power member retains its preeminent relative capabilities.

Therefore, notwithstanding significant and often unsettling changes in the balance of power, an international security institution retains its effectiveness when its rules mainly constrain minor power behavior and it has few great power members for the sake of easing coordination and bargaining problems over rule-making and enforcement. In this regard, we will see that the NPT has certainly been more effective than the 19th century Concert of Europe which ambitiously aimed to moderate and control the behavior of great and minor powers alike. But, the NPT has not been as effective as NATO which I argue in the next chapter exists to prevent nuclear proliferation to Germany and other European states and to spread liberal democracy in Eastern Europe, which are the policy preferences of NATO's sole great power member, the United States.

II. The Origins of the NPT in Cold War Europe

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has its origins in the shared concern between the United States (following the Eisenhower administration) and the Soviet Union about the negative effects of nuclear proliferation on their security interests. In Europe, the most logical and worrisome candidate for acquiring a nuclear arsenal was West Germany (FRG). Located on the central front between NATO and Warsaw Pact armies, the FRG under Chancellor Adenauer did not hide its desire to acquire an independent nuclear arsenal and barring that, to at least be able to participate in a sea-based Multilateral Force (MLF) that even with a US veto on nuclear usage, would bring German troops closer to the ultimate decision of launching nuclear weapons. The Eisenhower administration was sympathetic to the FRG's nuclear ambitions because as a sovereign state the FRG had as much right as France and UK to acquire its own arsenal, and President Eisenhower's New Look policy called for a more cost-effective, lighter US military footprint in Europe with a

greater reliance on nuclear retaliation against any Warsaw Pact invasion; the devolution of the nuclear trigger to the FRG was a logical step in this more hands-off approach to European security.

The Soviet Union, however, found the prospect of a nuclear-armed West Germany completely unacceptable. Marc Trachtenberg (1999) argues that Soviet Premier Nikita Krushchev's provocation over the status of NATO forces in Berlin - starting with the 1958 Berlin Ultimatum and culminating in the 1961 Berlin Crisis - had its origins in the Soviet attempt to demonstrate its resolve to oppose any scheme that would bring the FRG closer to nuclear acquisition. Fortunately for the Soviet Union, the Kennedy administration shared the Soviet aversion to nuclear proliferation but for a different reason. Kennedy administration officials believed in pursuing a nuclear policy of controlled and flexible retaliation which required a single authority to decide on launch decisions; the devolution of nuclear launch authority to numerous NATO members would make controlled and flexible retaliation impossible. According to Kennedy administration advisor Dean Acheson, "It was most important to the US that use of nuclear weapons by the forces of other powers in Europe should be subject to US veto and control" (Trachtenberg 1999, 305). By 1963, what Trachtenberg (1999, 398) calls "the Cold War political system" came into informal existence whereby the Soviets would no longer initiate provocations over the status of Western forces in Berlin, and the United States would put a lid on German nuclear ambitions by maintaining a strictly hierarchical nuclear order in which the FRG would remain under a US controlled nuclear umbrella under NATO.

In order to create a general framework for handling the German nuclear issue so that it would not seem as though the United States and the Soviet Union were singling out the Germans as a nation that must never acquire nuclear weapons, US Secretary of States Dean Rusk suggested creating what we would now recognize as an international nuclear non-proliferation regime

(Trachtenberg 1999, 382). Another key prospect for nuclear acquisition in near future was the People's Republic of China, and the Kennedy administration also had the Chinese in mind when it proposed the idea for a nonproliferation regime (1999, 384). In a February 1963 meeting with the British and French ambassadors to the US, Secretary of State Dean Rusk made it clear that he wanted both the Chinese and the West Germans to sign a nuclear non-proliferation agreement and expected to use possible Chinese intransigence on participation as a bargaining chip to dampen Soviet demands over controlling the FRG's nuclear ambitions.[16] In April, Rusk met with the Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, candidly stating that "on purely theoretical grounds no nuclear power could be interested in any other power's becoming a nuclear power."[17] From this theoretical perspective, Rusk felt that a "genuine common interest existed between the Soviet Union and the United States and indeed the United Kingdom and France." After assuring Dobrynin that there would be no arrangement within NATO - including a possible multilateral force - that would devolve control of nuclear weapons to states not already possessing them, Rusk stated in a clear and candid manner the rationale of the a nuclear non-proliferation regime:

> The main objective is to prevent the spread of national nuclear capabilities. We are not interested solely in one, two or three countries but on a world basis. After all, countries not allied either with the US or the USSR may be planning to acquire nuclear capacities. Hence we think that a four-power agreement along the lines of the declaration would be great progress.

US efforts to build an international nuclear non-proliferation regime in cooperation with the Soviet Union continued in full force during the Johnson administration and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty opened for signature in 1968. The following section will examine some of the evidence that

[16] https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v07-09mSupp/d165
[17] https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v07-09mSupp/d178

attests to the depth of cooperation and consensus between the superpowers in their pursuit of denying nuclear weapons to minor powers; their consensus and smooth coordination on nuclear non-proliferation is striking given the stylized representations in the IR literature of two implacable foes staring down at mutually assured destruction. This dissertation argues that the enduring effectiveness of a security institution depends on how much of its rules focus on constraining minor powers while leaving great powers free to pursue their interests. A second criteria for judging institutional effectiveness is that there is an inverse relationship between institutional effectiveness and the number of great powers involved in rule-making and enforcement. The NPT fulfills all the criteria for the making of an enduringly effective security institution as its rules focus on preventing non-nuclear states from acquiring nuclear weapons while committing five nuclear weapons states to denuclearization at an unspecified future date. The combination of restraint on minor powers and broad latitude for great powers and the small number of recognized nuclear weapons states - capped at five - have meant that the NPT has been able to serve as a focal point for great power cooperation and consensus for the better part of half a century despite all the upheavals in international politics during this period including the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the rise of China, and tensions in US-Russia relations in the post-Cold War period. Essentially, when it comes to the issue of nuclear non-proliferation, the great powers can set aside even the sharpest disagreements to come to a consensus on cooperating to keep minor powers denuclearized, just as the United States and the old Soviet Union did in the second half of the Cold War.

After a brief sketch of US-Soviet cooperation to craft the NPT during the Johnson administration, this chapter will focus on North Korea's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and the hostile reception it received from the Soviet Union on this front. The historical record shows that oftentimes North Korea's relations with its larger communist neighbors, China and the Soviet

Union, were far from cordial, and that in the post-Cold War period these same neighbors cooperated with the United States to force the North Koreans to give up their nuclear program. Despite structural incentives after the Cold War for Russia and China to balance against the United States which had emerged as what many scholars and policymakers referred to as the unipole, on the issue of the North Korean nuclear program the United States, Russia, and China set aside their strategic differences to voice and to enforce their displeasure both unilaterally and multilaterally through the UN Security Council. It is remarkable that the UN Security Council, so often dismissed as an ineffective talking shop or an arena for power struggles, witnessed such a high degree of great power consensus and cooperation on the issue of nuclear proliferation.

Whereas Trachtenberg (1999) argues that by 1963 an informal Cold War political system had come into existence whereby the United States kept nuclear weapons out of German control in exchange for Soviet acquiescence in the Western presence in Berlin, Soviet suspicions about the American commitment to keep Germany non-nuclear lingered in the years after 1963. For example, in a letter dated January 11, 1966, the Soviet premier Kosygin expressed to President Johnson his concerns about the dissemination of atomic knowledge from the United States to Germany and the American military's training of Germans in handling and using nuclear weaponry[18]:

> Indeed, it is a fact that the USA on an ever growing scale provides the FGR and the other NATO allies with atomic information. It is a fact that the USA trains military personnel of those countries in the methods of using nuclear weapons. It is a fact that the USA provides some of its allies including the FRG with the very weapons which are capable of carrying nuclear shells, although it declares at the

[18] https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v11/d108

same time that the nuclear warheads for such weapons remain under the control of the US.

After threatening to take “all measures” to counter nuclear proliferation to the FRG, calling this issue a “question of the vital interests of the Soviet Union”, Kosygin stated that his country was “ready to begin businesslike negotiations to prepare a non-proliferation treaty."[19] President Johnson responded to Soviet concerns in a letter to Kosygin by emphasizing the FRG’s peaceful, defensive posture and unambiguously stating that American nuclear weapons deployed in Europe could only be used with US consent. Johnson also provided a useful definition of the term “proliferation” as a situation “when a non-nuclear nation acquires its own national capability or the right or ability to fire nuclear weapons without the explicit concurrent decision of an existing nuclear nation.”[20] As the United States would always hold a veto over the decision to use nuclear weapons in Europe, proliferation by definition could never occur on that continent. Johnson ended the letter by concurring with Kosygin that negotiations for a nuclear non-proliferation treaty must begin soon in Geneva at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. The exchange of these letters demonstrates that the United States was willing to reassure the Soviet Union of its intention to keep the FRG non-nuclear and to initiate and solidify great power cooperation in stemming horizontal nuclear proliferation.

By the time of the meeting of the US National Security Council on March 27, 1968, the US Ambassador William Foster was able to report to President Johnson that the United States and the Soviet Union had two weeks earlier submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva identical drafts of a complete Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Non-nuclear states such as India and Brazil expressed misgivings about the treaty, but the nuclear weapons states had

[19] Ibid.
[20] https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v11/d116

managed to come to a consensus on the governing principles of a global nuclear order.[21] The superpowers' shared commitment to the draft text of the NPT was so strong that Ambassador Foster felt the "present draft was the text of the NPT and not simply a proposal subject to general amendments."[22]

Thus, international organizations such as the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and the UN General Assembly would be presented with the treaty and member states would be expected to sign on even if the treaty did not fully reflect their preferences and interests. The drafting process and the presentation of the draft treaty to the international committee provides evidence for this dissertation's theory that an international security institution should faithfully reflect the balance of power at the time of its creation. The United States and the Soviet Union were the two militarily and economically dominant states in the international system, and the articles of the NPT reflected the convergence of their preferences; weaker states protested, as did India and Brazil, for example, but their preferences for an opening in the treaty for a legitimate path to future nuclear weaponization were unceremoniously left out.

III. The Case of North Korea's Nuclear Program: Did the NPT Fail?

By July 1, 1968, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was ready for signing in the capital cities of the "depositary" nations, the United States, the USSR, and the United Kingdom. These three nuclear weapons states at the summit of international politics had the most to lose from the proliferation of nuclear weapons to less powerful but antagonistic states who sought means to balance the inequality of strength between themselves and the great powers. In addition to providing legitimacy to the nuclear arsenals of the three depositary states, the NPT also recognized the nuclear weapons of France and China, who, despite recognizing how much the NPT promoted

[21] https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v11/d229
[22] Ibid.

their interests, refrained from signing the treaty until 1992. France during the periods before and after the creation of the NPT had Gaullist pretensions to maintaining a degree of outward independence from the superpowers in the conduct of its foreign affairs, and refusing to formally bind itself to the NPT supposedly demonstrated its independence. China likewise sought to demonstrate its independence from the superpowers and concern for the rights of countries in the non-aligned world by claiming that the NPT was discriminatory in officially recognizing a subset of privileged states as nuclear powers.

This section examines North Korea's nuclear aspirations, the development of its nuclear program, and the great powers' reaction to North Korean progress on nuclear matters. The series of successful and increasingly powerful nuclear weapon tests by North Korea in 2006, 2009, 2013, and 2016, culminating in a hydrogen bomb test on September 3, 2017 and the test of the Hwasong-15 ICBM capable of carrying nuclear warheads on November 29, 2017, may convince some that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has been a failure as an international security institution as it has not prevented North Korea becoming a de facto nuclear weapons state. However, major powers that would otherwise have acquired nuclear weapons have been dissuaded through great power cooperation, most notably the FRG, and North Korea is the exception rather than the norm in showcasing the effectiveness of the NPT as an institutional framework for coordinating and legitimating great power cooperation to prevent horizontal proliferation.

In fact, North Korea is a least likely or hard case (Eckstein 1975) in comparison to confirmatory cases such as the FRG in evaluating the dissertation's theory of the conditions which keep security institutions effective despite significant shifts in the balance of power. First, great power cooperation to deny North Korea access to nuclear weapons stretches over a longer time horizon comprising the most significant structural changes in international politics in the last four

decades: the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of China. In the FRG case, US-led NATO basically subsumed unified Germany under its nuclear umbrella after the Cold War, but the North Koreans have not had similarly stable client-patron relations in the security realm with any other great powers, despite facile and misleading talk from commentators about North Korea being under Soviet and then later Chinese security patronage. Thus, given the pressing structural incentives for great powers to compete to ensure their survival (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001) and the destabilizing shifts in the balance of power in the past decades, we should have seen *less* great power cooperation over the North Korean nuclear program than what we have actually witnessed. It is remarkable that even great power fears about survival under anarchy and the temptation to maximize relative power (Grieco 1988; Mearsheimer 2001), have not been sufficient to pull them apart when it involves cooperation over derailing the North Korean nuclear program. Second, in the FRG case, only two great powers were involved, the United States and the Soviet Union, and after the Cold War, the extension of the US nuclear security umbrella over all of Germany meant that no complex coordination among great powers was required to ensure that Germany remained non-nuclear. In the North Korean case however, three great powers - US, Soviet Union/Russia, and China - have been coordinating to check its nuclear program, and despite this more complex setup involving a greater number of players with clashing strategic interests in other areas, great power consensus has continued on this issue.

In summary, two conditions differentiate the North Korean case and make this a least likely or hard case for the dissertation's theory. First, the period over which great powers have been coordinating over the North Korean nuclear issue is longer and more turbulent - in terms of structural changes in international politics - than for other successful cases of nuclear denial. Second, a greater number of powerful states - the US, USSR/Russia, and China - have been

coordinating and cooperating than for other cases. Against these odds, there is no evidence to suggest that any of the great powers worked against the spirit of the NPT to aid the North Korean nuclear program. In fact, the record shows that North Korea's relations with the USSR/Russia and China were often strained, mutually distrustful, sometimes outright hostile when it came to the former's nuclear program; it goes without saying that US relations with North Korea have been continuously hostile since the Korean War began in June 1950 and ended in July 1953 without a peace treaty. That North Korea persevered in its nuclear endeavors and became a de facto nuclear weapons state does not prove in any way that the NPT as an international security institution has been ineffective to the extent that great powers have sincerely cooperated - as archival records demonstrate - to slow down and to shutter its nuclear program. Rather than demonstrating the ineffectiveness of the NPT, North Korea's sprint across the nuclear finish line is evidence of the country's unique characteristics which have hardened it to all engagement and intervention from the outside world to change its behavior.[23] To put it bluntly, short of waging a nuclear war against North Korea and the occupation of that country in the aftermath, ridding the country of its nuclear program would not have been possible in the heyday of great power consensus in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s (the 1994 Agreed Framework, the Six Party Talks of 2003-2009, and the 2017 UNSC Resolutions against North Korean nuclear and ICBM testing). That the great powers did not wage war against North Korea does not mean they abetted the development of its nuclear

[23] North Korea's party-state rigorously adheres to the *Juche* (Self-Reliance) ideology of its founding president Kim Il Sung, a tenet of which is that his country must always stand guard to preserve independence from great powers. The founder is credited with admonishing his people to adopt a security posture of self-reliance and that to abandon it would result in ruin, in reference to his own country's international situation in the late 19th and early 20th centuries when the royal government relied on a series of foreign powers - China, Russia, and Japan - to maintain its regime before Korea succumbed to becoming a Japanese protectorate and colony in 1905 and 1910 respectively. On the origins of Korean nationalism centered on the concept of *Juche*, see Park (2007: 4-5). Given this adherence to the Juche ideology, the North Koreans have devoted the limited economic resources of their country to building up disproportionately - for a country of its size - large conventional and nuclear forces; the US State Department's 2018 World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers report estimated that North Korea spends approximately a quarter of its annual economic output on national defense and an extraordinarily high 5 percent of its 25 million people serves in the military.

program. Within the framework of the NPT, the UN Security Council and according to rational strategic calculus, it seems the great powers have done all they can do to stop nuclear proliferation, and that they ultimately failed proves the uniqueness of the North Korean case rather than the ineffectiveness of the NPT as a forum for great power coordination to carry out their consensus on the prevention of horizontal proliferation.

IV. Sino-Soviet Reactions to North Korea's Early Nuclear Aspirations

North Korea's top leadership demonstrated an intense interest in pursuing a nuclear program by as early as 1956 - if not earlier - and expressed the wish to cooperate with the Soviet Union in nuclear research, only three years after the Korean War during which coercive aerial bombing by US air forces devastated much of the northern half of the Korean peninsula.[24] An armistice signed in July 1953 brought the war to a temporary halt; there is evidence that the armistice came about as a result of the Eisenhower administration's threats to use nuclear weapons against China and North Korea in the context of a favorable shift in the military balance of power towards the United States and the consequent withdrawal of the Soviet nuclear umbrella over its communist neighbors (Pape 1996, 164-168). Thus, if the armistice was indeed the result of US nuclear coercion, given North Korea's ultimate national objective of repulsing foreign forces and re-unifying the entire Korean peninsula under its rule, it is little wonder that it has devoted so much of its resources to the development of a credible nuclear deterrent.

In April 1958, North Korea's ambassador to the USSR, Ri Sin Pal, met the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to request aid in setting up scientific research work to organize the production of atomic energy for "peaceful purposes", a request to which the Soviet side expressed

[24] "Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov for 20 January 1956," January 20, 1956, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, RGANI Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 412. Translated by Gary Goldberg. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/120790

positive interest.[25] Regardless of the rhetoric about atomic research for "peaceful purposes" there is no doubt that from the earliest days of the Cold War and the division of the Korean peninsula, North Korean officials thought that it was perfectly legitimate to acquire nuclear weapons to counter the nuclear arsenal of the United States. For example, in 1962, in a meeting with the Soviet ambassador to Pyongyang, the North Korean Foreign Minister Park Seong Chol raised suspicions about the possibility of US transfer of nuclear knowhow to West Germany despite the US proposal to set up a non-proliferation regime, and spoke approvingly of China's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons in defiance of the United States. Then, foreshadowing the future and official North Korean line in justifying its nuclear program, Park claimed in relation to the role of nuclear weapons in the US-centric alliance system in East Asia[26]:

> The Americans hold on to Taiwan, to South Korea, and South Vietnam, blackmail the people with nuclear weapons, and with their help, rule on these continents and do not intend to leave. Their possession of nuclear weapons, and the lack thereof in our hands, objectively helps them to eternalize their rule. They have a large stockpile, and we are to be forbidden even to think about the manufacture of nuclear weapons?

Although China conducted its first nuclear test in 1964, Mao Zedong rebuffed North Korean leader Kim Il Sung's request for nuclear cooperation (Hecker 2010, 48; Cha 2012, 249). Despite formally signing onto the NPT only in 1992, China clearly benefited from and enforced the treaty's constraints on transferring nuclear knowhow to non-nuclear states, even in the case of a supposedly close ally - close as lips and teeth - such as North Korea with which it had fought the

[25] "From the Journal of Gromyko, Record of a Conversation with Ambassador Ri Sin-Pal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," April 28, 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF fond 0102, opis 14, delo 4, p. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116019

[26] "Conversation between Soviet Ambassador in North Korea Vasily Moskovsky and North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Seong-cheol," August 24, 1962, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF, fond 0102, opis 18, papka 93, delo 5, listy 22-23. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Sergey Radchenko https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110598

Korean War against the United States. The Soviet Union, however, assisted North Korea in the construction of its first enriched uranium-fueled Soviet IRT-2 megawatt research reactor in the Yongbyon nuclear complex in 1967; throughout the 1960s and 1970s, North Korea sent hundreds of scientists to the Soviet Institute for Nuclear Research at Dubna, and the trained returnees helped to create North Korea's first nuclear physics laboratory at the National Academy of Science; in 1973, Kim Il Sung University opened its first Department of Nuclear Physics and Department of Radiochemistry while the Kim Chaek Institute of Technology established departments focusing on nuclear materials, reactors, and engineering (Cha 2012, 249).

The Soviet Union, however, was unwilling to provide any more serious assistance to further develop a substantial nuclear program in North Korea. Whatever Soviet assistance that came forth during the 1960s had the goal of placating and preempting North Korea from taking serious measures on its own to cooperate with other nuclear aspirants to build indigenous nuclear expertise and programs. For example, it is known that North Korea hedged its bets by seeking nuclear cooperation with countries other than the Soviet Union, including East Germany (GDR): in 1963 the ambassador of the GDR to Pyongyang disclosed that the North Koreans had been asking him about obtaining information about nuclear weapons and the atomic industry from East German universities and research institutes.[27]

Such appeal to the GDR for nuclear cooperation continued in 1967 when a North Korean delegation led by its vice-chairman of the DPRK Atomic Energy Commission visited several nuclear research institutes in East Germany; they requested that the East Germans provide them with equipment necessary for the construction of a nuclear power plant and to share expertise about running nuclear reactors. Specifically, the North Koreans sought to purchase from the GDR

[27] "Conversation between Soviet Ambassador in North Korea Vasily Moskovsky and the German Ambassador," August 26, 1963, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF, fond 0102, opis 19, papka 97, delo 5, list 93. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Sergey Radchenko. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110608

the following items: instruments measuring radioactive isotopes, measuring instruments used in nuclear physics, equipment used in nuclear research, and copies of Western scientific journals specializing in nuclear research. The GDR's response was ambiguous, as it persuaded the North Koreans to appeal to the Soviets while also assenting to its requests to send trainees and exchanging delegations of experts.[28] As a Soviet satellite state with half a million Soviet troops deployed throughout its territory, the GDR was not in a position to defy its patron to pursue an independent foreign policy as the Koreans were encouraging them to do.

Its seems that as a result of their sheer tenacity and intense pursuit of a nuclear program, the North Koreans by 1968 had built up a significant nuclear research complex, employing several hundred scientists in undisclosed locations throughout the country; the fact that the northern half of the Korean peninsula is rich in high grade uranium ore deposits aided in this endeavor.[29] In addition to sending a scientific delegation to the GDR, in the same year North Korea made high level contacts with Romania and Poland to initiate cooperation in nuclear research.[30] As in the case with the GDR, Romania and Poland were Soviet satellites that could not afford to go against the wishes of their patron to respond positively to North Korean appeals. Even if the Soviets were unwilling to engage in serious nuclear cooperation with North Korea, it was clear that the latter would undertake whatever task that was necessary to establish a nuclear program, including building up native scientific and technical talent and appealing for cooperation to socialist countries other than the Soviet Union.

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[28] "Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry," February 29, 1968, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1968, 58. doboz, 5, 001871/1968. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Balazs Szalontai. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110626

[29] "Lt. Col. J. Załuska, 'Record: Information from CSSR Military Attaché, Col. Goch, obtained during a Hunt'," February 05, 1968, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AIPN, 2602/7974. Obtained by Marek Hańderek and translated by Jerzy Giebułtowski. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/208547

[30] "Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No.76.121, TOP SECRET, April 8, 1967," April 08, 1967, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116697

Therefore, it seems that Soviet aid in helping North Korea to build a small research reactor in the 1960s was an attempt to placate a determined and defiant neighbor unafraid to cause dissension within the socialist camp to embarrass the Soviet Union if the occasion demanded for such effrontery. Indeed, North Korea's relations with the Soviet Union soured in 1976 when the Soviets refused to provide immediate assistance in the construction of a nuclear power plant.[31] Records from the Hungarian embassy in Pyongyang suggest that North Korea had some leverage over the Soviets in that it was the main supplier to important Soviet industrial plants of certain critical raw materials, without which production could not continue.[32] However, the Soviets never came around to providing assistance for constructing the nuclear power plant, and Soviet-North Korean relations never recovered until the disintegration of the USSR in 1991.

Even without Soviet assistance, it was apparent from US military satellite imagery and other intelligence that by 1984 and 1985 North Korea was building a fifty-megawatt and two-hundred-megawatt nuclear reactors in the same area, as well as six-stories-tall radiochemical laboratory capable of reprocessing weapons grade plutonium from spent fuel rods; a separate five-megawatt reactor capable of producing six kilograms of plutonium annually was in operation by 1986 (Cha 2012, 250).

In 1985 North Korea signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty without acceding to a safeguards agreement monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). With neither IAEA inspections or any agreement with other states like the Soviet Union and China to monitor its nuclear program, there was no way to ensure that North Korea was not building nuclear

[31] "Telegram, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry," June 25, 1976, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1976, 82. doboz, 5, 00854/5/1976. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Balazs Szalontai. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111475

[32] "Memorandum, Branch Office of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Trade in Pyongyang to the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Trade," August 09, 1976, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1976, 82. doboz, 5, 00170/7/1976. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Balazs Szalontai https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111476

weapons. Records from the Hungarian Foreign Ministry suggest that North Korea may even have already possessed some type of a rudimentary nuclear device by 1976, long before the first official detonation of a North Korean atomic weapon on October 9, 2006. In 1976, the Hungarian Foreign Ministry received the third secretary and the deputy military attache of the DPRK embassy to Hungary, during which the latter disclosed that North Korea already possessed nuclear warheads and short to medium range missiles capable of hitting targets in Seoul, Tokyo, Nagasaki, and Okinawa; the North Koreans claimed that no country had transferred the warheads to them, and that they were manufactured domestically.[33] It is unclear how much credence one should accord to some of the more surprising disclosures from these now declassified documents from Eastern bloc countries with which North Korea had official diplomatic relations. Indeed, the North Korean embassy personnel may have been describing their nuclear aspirations rather than actual deployment of such weapons at the time of their discussion. In 1977, the Hungarian Foreign Ministry records describe a meeting with the Czechoslovak First Secretary who claimed that the North Koreans alluded to acquiring nuclear weapons in preparation for a likely nuclear war on the Korean peninsula.[34]

Regardless of the archival speculation about whether or not North Korea may have already possessed operational nuclear explosives by the mid-1970s, there is no doubt that North Korean officials did not feel constrained by the nuclear non-proliferation regime or the wishes of great powers to have it reduce the scale and scope of its nuclear research and development. They did not hesitate to cross the Soviets when the latter proved less than cooperative in the construction of a

[33] "Memorandum, Hungarian Foreign Ministry," February 16, 1976, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1976, 83. doboz, 6, 002134/1976. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Balazs Szalontai. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111471

[34] "Memorandum, Hungarian Foreign Ministry," February 16, 1977, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1977, 78. doboz, 81-2, 001197/1/1977. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Balazs Szalontai https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110127

nuclear power plant. Also, despite signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the North Koreans had a very low opinion of the treaty and a negative assessment of the motives and behavior of the great powers that sponsored it.

First, the North Korean government accurately perceived the NPT as a form of reconciliation between the United States and the Soviet Union which would benefit the United States by relaxing tensions in Central Europe and providing it with the opportunity to concentrate its attention on pressuring North Korea and successfully conducting the Vietnam War. Also, North Korea had a policy of "arming the entire people and turning the entire country into a fortress" which did not accord with the intent of the NPT to prevent non-nuclear states from acquiring nuclear weapons.[35] So then what might have persuaded the latter to sign the NPT in 1985 despite its low opinion of the treaty as counter to its core strategic interests? One possible answer is that by 1985 its gas-graphite nuclear reactor at theYongbyon complex - in development since at least 1956 - was sufficiently advanced that it regarded itself as a state on the cusp of producing nuclear weapons and by acceding to the treaty it was demonstrating its goodwill to the international community in promising to eventually disarm at an unspecified future date as Article VI requires of all nuclear weapon states.

According to this dissertation's theory the effectiveness of an international security institution depends primarily on the cooperation and coordination among the great powers to impose and to enforce rules on minor powers. These rules must not bind the great powers, and the number of great powers in the institution must be kept small - the best case being one great power -

[35] "A 20 December 1967 DVO Memo about the Attitude of the Korean Leadership toward the Issues of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ," December 20, 1967, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF f. 0102, op. 23, p. 112, d. 24, pp. 113-114. Obtained by Sergey Radchenko and translated by Gary Goldberg. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116718

to facilitate coordination; when these criteria hold, institutional effectiveness continues through significant changes in the international balance of power. By these criteria, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty fits the bill for a more effective security institution than most in existence. While North Korea did eventually acquire nuclear weapons, I have argued that the North Korean case does not prove that the NPT was ineffective as the great powers had many cases of success, with keeping West Germany non-nuclear and directly related, calming the superpower tensions around Berlin (Trachtenberg 1999) being among the crowning achievements of great power cooperation through the principles, norms, and rules of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It must be emphasized that the superpowers adhered to the non-proliferation regime's rules because these reflected their strategic interests.

Other achievements under the NPT include non-nuclear South Korea, Japan, and Brazil. In the Eastern bloc, no country acquired nuclear weapons. Whether through the logic of alliance coercion (Gerzhoy 2015) or alliance assurance through extended deterrence (Schelling 1966) or a combination thereof, a significant number of important regional states have foregone nuclear arsenals despite retaining the capacity to enrich weapons grade uranium and to reprocess spent fuel. The great powers did not try to neutralize each other's non-proliferation efforts by transferring nuclear materials to states in their respective spheres of influence.

The archival evidence clearly demonstrates that neither the Soviet Union nor China was eager to assist with the North Korean nuclear program. The Soviets never came around to building a nuclear power plant for the North Koreans, and up to the last days of the USSR they sought to get North Korea to accept a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. For example, in 1991, the Soviet government called on the North Korean ambassador to Moscow to accede to the nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA, claiming that it was illegitimate for North Korea to link its

accession to the safeguards agreement with the removal of US nuclear weapons from South Korea or the inspection of US military bases there; the Soviets threatened to downgrade economic and military cooperation with North Korea if the latter did not accept IAEA inspection of its nuclear facilities. The North Korean ambassador replied that these were matters solely between North Korea, the IAEA, and the United States, rejecting Soviet demands.[36] As this tense episode within the socialist camp demonstrates, North Korea did not have the support of the Socialist bloc great powers in its nuclear pursuits and managed to sustain its nuclear program outside of IAEA safeguards only because it defied the Soviet Union, unlike the FRG, South Korea, and Eastern bloc countries that caved in to the non-proliferation pressures from their respective security patrons.

Therefore, in the sense that the great powers cooperated and coordinated to deny minor powers nuclear weapons and mostly succeeded in their non-proliferation pursuits, the NPT has been an effective security institution from its founding in 1968 to 1991. In 1991, the Soviet Union disintegrated into its constituent republics, representing a significant shift in the international balance of power as the United States emerged victorious from the Cold War, marking the end of bipolarity and the beginning of what some scholars have called the unipolar era (Wohlforth 1999) or the "uni-multipolar" era (Huntington 1999).

Given this marked structural change from bipolarity to unipolarity, one might suppose that the interests of the five nuclear-weapon states recognized by the NPT may have also changed, and that as a result the non-proliferation regime may have lost some effectiveness going forward as the major powers jostle among themselves to adapt institutional rules to their changed relative capabilities. This dynamic did not appear when it came to the NPT. In fact, the five recognized

[36] "Record of Conversation between F.G. Kunadze and Son Seong-Pil," October 02, 1991, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF) fond 10026, opis 4, delo 2803, listy 1-3. Obtained and translated by Sergey Radchenko https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119251

nuclear weapon states intensified their cooperation to prevent nuclear proliferation with the formal accession in 1992 of China and France into the NPT. Why did the most significant shift in the balance of power since 1945 have no effect on the NPT's effectiveness? The reason is that the end of the Cold War did not affect the recognized nuclear weapon states' common incentives to limit nuclear proliferation; they remained intent on enforcing a rule that only constrained minor powers without nuclear weapons.

The negotiations, multilateral and unilateral sanctions, and war scares surrounding the North Korean nuclear program up to the present day demonstrate a symbiotic relationship between the NPT and the UN Security Council (UNSC) as the five enforcers of the NPT are also the five permanent members of the UNSC. Remarkably, the UNSC, which has mostly been an ineffective institution during both the Cold War and after, has proven to be an indispensable and effective forum for legitimizing the great powers' enforcement of the NPT. That the UNSC is so effective when linked with the NPT but much less so on other issues provides further evidence that security institutions are most effective when they focus on constraining the activities of minor powers while leaving great powers untouched.

V. The NPT and North Korea Post-Cold War: Less Change, More Continuity

As shown in previous sections, the Soviet Union and China were reluctant to share nuclear technology with North Korea and the North Koreans had to go to great lengths to persuade - most of the time unsuccessfully - minor powers in the Eastern Bloc such as East Germany and Hungary to extend whatever limited aid they could sneak past their Soviet patron on nuclear research. North Korean demands for Soviet contribution to the construction of a nuclear power plant did not materialize before the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the Russian Federation that succeeded the Soviet Union inherited and exacerbated an already acrimonious relationship with

North Korea. For example, in November 1992, Russian President Yeltsin visited the North's southern rival and normalized Russia-ROK relations, pledging to develop their relations based on "their shared values of freedom, respect for human rights, and free market principles" (Meyer 1994, 507). This was a shocking development for a country that had just two years before been the main constituent republic of the USSR. As a further affront to North Korea, the Russians in March 1993 sent an observer to the Team Spirit exercises held by the South Koreans and their American allies, in recognition of which the South Koreans sent an observer to the August 1993 biennial Northwest Pacific Russian naval exercises (1994, 507-508). In response to Russian overtures to South Korea to normalize bilateral relations, the North Korean government relayed a memorandum to the Kremlin stating that the DPRK-USSR alliance would come to an end and that Pyongyang would have "no other choice but to take measures to provide for ourselves some weapons for which we have so far relied on the alliance" (Kim 2010, 59). The Korea scholar Samuel S. Kim (2010, 59) points to this ominous statement as presaging the beginning of the 1990s North Korean nuclear crisis.[37]

In contrast to the cordial turn in relations between Russia and South Korea, Moscow terminated all military and economic aid to North Korea and continued the late Soviet policy of refusing all official cooperation in the nuclear field (Meyer 1994, 508). In 1991, the new Russian Federation served notice to North Korea to start servicing its debt to the former Soviet Union with the principal outstanding then estimated to be US $4.6 billion, and also initiated the shift from Soviet era barter trade to settling bilateral commerce in hard currencies; Russian oil deliveries to

[37]In the previous section, I referred to declassified documents from the Hungarian Foreign Ministry describing North Korean officials hinting that their country had already acquired nuclear explosives in the 1970s. Such statements when taken at face value create tension with the North Korean warning in 1990 that they may have to go nuclear to compensate for the loss of the Soviet nuclear umbrella. One way to reconcile these contradictory positions is to assume that North Koreans were distinguishing between a stance of strategic ambiguity/"hard hedging" and full-fledged nuclear status. For the related conceptual issue of the strategies of proliferation, see Narang (2016/17).

North Korea remained an exception for the time being, but the amount of delivered oil declined from 1 million tons in the 1980s to only 30,000 tons by 1992, causing the "single greatest blow to the North Korean economy" (Kim 1994, 18). In fact, it is estimated that the deterioration in economic relations with Russia led to a 20 percent shrinkage in the size of the North Korean economy between 1990 to 1993 (1994, 17). By January 1995, Russia definitively terminated all barter arrangements with North Korea, demanding hard currency payments such as the US dollar for bilateral trade; Soviet-era deliveries to North Korea of oil products, cotton, and steel at subsidized prices reverted back to market prices, and bilateral trade between North Korea and Russia halved to $30 million by mid-1995 compared to the same period for the prior year (Kim 1996, 96).

Aside from the collapse in bilateral trade, Soviet economic aid to North Korea had also been steadily declining during the 1980s before hitting bottom in the post-Cold War years. For example, Moscow's aid to Pyongyang fell from US$260 million in 1980 to only US$6 million in 1986, and in the years 1987, 1988, and 1989, North Korea had to pay back Soviet loans in the amount of US$33 million, US$41 million, and US$16 respectively (Kim 2010, 58).

In 1994, as relations between the United States and North Korea were deteriorating on account of the latter's nuclear program with the Clinton administration seriously considering a surgical military strike against the Yongbyon nuclear complex (Cha 2012, 89), Russian President Yeltsin notified his South Korean counterpart that Russia will not be renewing a 1961 friendship treaty with North Korea expiring in 1996 (Meyer 1994, 509). Article 1 of the 1961 friendship treaty contained a clause about automatic military involvement in case of a military attack on one party to the treaty by an external actor, so that Yeltsin's declared intention to abrogate it signaled that Russia would not defend its treaty ally in case of a US military strike against the Yongbyon

nuclear complex; in November 1995, Yeltsin formally abrogated the defense treaty (Kim 1996, 96).

North Korea's relations with China also remained tense throughout the 1990s. In lockstep with Russia, China also normalized relations with South Korea, to which North Korea retaliated by seeking closer economic and cultural relations with Taiwan; during the years 1992-1999, no meetings took place between the top leaderships of North Korea and China (Jian 2003).[38] What was particularly offensive to North Korea was China's abandonment of the Cold War line that the North was the only legitimate state on the Korean peninsula by supporting the simultaneous 1991 induction of the northern and southern rivals into the United Nations; coming in the immediate aftermath of the FRG's absorption of East Germany in October 1990, the recognition by its long time socialist neighbor China of South Korea as a legitimate Korean state was particularly galling to the North, as if China were tacitly recognizing the possibility of the absorption of the North into the South (Kim 1994, 14-15). Adding insult to injury, during Chinese leader Jiang Zemin's official state visit to South Korea in 1995, the Chinese Foreign Ministry's spokesperson announced that despite a friendship treaty existing between China and North Korea, the Chinese were not under any obligation to defend the North in a peninsular war (Kim 2006, 188).

In tandem with the deterioration in political relations, China's economic relations with North Korea also faltered. For example, effective January 1, 1993, Beijing demanded that North Korea settle bilateral trade in hard currency, doing away with bartering arrangements that had been common during the Cold War. The 1.2 million tons of Chinese crude oil sent to North Korea had to be settled in cash, unlike in the past when 650,000 tons were exchanged through barter and the remaining 550,000 on credit (Kim 1994, 19). Coupled with the near termination of Russian oil

[38] http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2017/ph241/kennedy-c2/docs/asia_rpt115b.pdf

shipments effective 1992, China's hard-nosed policy shift proved disastrous for the North Korean economy reliant on the import on credit or by barter of foreign fossil fuels.

The Korea scholar Samuel S. Kim describes China's position up to 2002 as the "who me?" posture of "calculated ambiguity and equidistance" (2006, 189), adhering to Deng Xiaoping's foreign axiom of "hiding its light under a bushel" by being evasive on the Korean question (184). However, I would go further and argue that the Chinese policy towards the Korean peninsula in the 1990s, far from being ambiguous and equidistant between the North and South, was clearly partial to South Korea and left the North to fend for itself under the shadow of a potential US military strike in the course of its arduous negotiations with the unipole over the former's nuclear program. This abandonment of the North by its former socialist bloc neighbors and the resultant imbalance of power on the Korean peninsula become more glaring when considering that the South remained securely under the US nuclear umbrella with tens of thousands of US troops deployed in South Korea, Japan, and Guam. Indeed, the North Korean government not so subtly expressed its sense of betrayal at the Chinese and the Russians when it announced that the successful negotiation of the October 1994 Agreed Framework between itself and the Clinton administration could be attributed solely to North Korean diplomatic prowess and deterrent military

strength[39], rejecting any recognition whatsoever of contributions by its larger neighbors China and Russia to the bilaterally negotiated peaceful outcome (2006, 189):

> We held the talks independently with the United States on an independent footing, not relying on someone else's sympathy or advice, and the adoption of the DPRK-US Agreed Framework is an achievement of our independent foreign policy, not someone's influence, with the United States finally accepting our proposal.

The intensive Russian and Chinese political and economic pressures on North Korea were occurring in the context of the 1993-1994 North Korean nuclear crisis, when the IAEA suspected that the country was producing weapons grade plutonium from spent fuel through its gas-cooled, graphite-moderated reactors; these reactors ran on natural uranium fuel abundant in the northern half of the Korean peninsula, and generated electrical power and heat for civilian usage, but the IAEA's demands for proper accounting of weapons grade plutonium from spent fuel went unfulfilled. In addition to fears about North Korea accumulating weapons-grade plutonium, there were suspicions that the former was pursuing a highly enriched uranium path to weaponization (Hecker 2010, 45). The United States was close to launching precision air strikes on North Korea's

[39]Since the Korean War ended in 1953, North Korea has been constructing "enormous underground tunnels and facilities in mountain redoubts, from troop and material depots to munitions factories, and even subterranean war plane hangars" (Kim 2017, 123). In total, it is estimated that North Korea maintains approximately 15,000 underground military facilities (2017, 124). Such extensive underground military preparations were most likely due to the lessons learned from the Korean War when on account of US air superiority, coercive aerial bombing of the northern half of the peninsula destroyed all of North Korea's industrial centers, much of its rail system, and irrigation dams (Pape 1996, 137-173). Then, in the mid-1970s, the United States adopted the "AirLand Battle" strategy whereby it would use tactical nuclear weapons to quickly strike targets deep inside North Korea (Kim 2017, 123), further incentivizing the latter to rely on an extensive network of underground facilities for its defense, in addition to expanding and redeploying its military forces along the DMZ (2017, 124). Also, Pyongyang's subway system is 34 km in length and 100 meters in depth, large enough to serve as a bomb shelter for the city's two million residents; according to the Korea expert Han S. Park (2007, 4) who has visited North Korea on numerous occasions, every town in the country is equipped with such secure shelters.

suspected nuclear sites (Pollack 2003, 18)[40] until former President Carter visited Pyongyang to dampen tensions and to begin negotiations on the Agreed Framework.

Under this agreement negotiated in Geneva by the Clinton administration and North Korea, Pyongyang agreed to shut down its graphite moderated-reactors, fuel fabrication plant, and the reprocessing facility, with an American technical team on site to unload and to repackage spent fuel rods from the 5-megawatt reactor to be kept in a cooling pool until their ultimate removal from the country; in return, the United States promised to construct two light-water reactors with financing from Japan and South Korea through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) (Hecker 2010, 46).

The fact that the Russians and Chinese withdrew critical economic and political support throughout this crisis is evidence for great power cooperation to denuclearize North Korea. Rather than balancing against a unipolar United States by supporting a strategic irritant to US regional and allied interests, the former socialist bloc great powers bandwagoned with the unipole to crack down on proliferation, attesting to the great value that nuclear weapon states place on keeping the nuclear club small; both on security and prestige dimensions,[41] a dilution of this currency of power would be undesirable. Furthermore, the bandwagoning behavior demonstrated by China and Russia during the North Korean nuclear crisis of the 1990s provides evidence for Stephen Walt's (1987) balance of threat theory, as contra the balance of power theory, balancing against North

[40] The planned air attack on the North's Yongbyon nuclear complex was designed to "entomb the plutonium in the reactor and to destroy the reprocessing facility" (Pollack 2003, 18). Of course there was no guarantee that the United States could have successfully deterred an all-out war from breaking out starting with a North Korean retaliation against an attack.

[41] Scott Sagan (1996) lays out three models for explaining why states go nuclear: security, domestic politics, and norms. Prestige gained by having nuclear weapons would fall under the "norms model". Other scholars such as Etel Solingen (2007) argue that the propensity of states to acquire nuclear weapons depends on their stance towards integration into the global economy, with integration-minded states more likely to forego nuclear weapons. However, this logic would not apply to great powers such as the United States and the USSR, which were highly integrated into their respective orders - indeed led their orders - while going nuclear.

Korea practically substituted for balancing against the US in Northeast Asia in the 1990s despite the enormous concentration of military and economic capabilities in the latter. The threat posed to regional states by a nuclear-armed North Korea outweighed whatever threat posed by a systemic concentration of power in the United States accounting for how the NPT has remained so impregnable to a wide spectrum of disturbances in the structure of the international system.

VI. Alternative Explanations for Russian and Chinese Behavior

There are at least four possible alternative explanations to address the question of why in the years immediately following the Cold War, Russia and China effectively abandoned North Korea - a former socialist bloc neighbor with which both had signed mutual defense treaties - and followed the US lead in upholding the nonproliferation regime. The first explanation is the one offered by this chapter, that Russia and China were willing to cooperate with the United States in its anti-proliferation endeavors to keep the nuclear club small; a significant shift in the balance of power did not lead to balancing behavior in those areas of international politics governed by the NPT because the rules constrained minor powers such as North Korea while leaving the great powers unconstrained, thus facilitating cooperation and coordination to pressure North Korea into accepting denuclearization. A second alternative explanation points to the growth of South Korea's economy and Chinese and Russian eagerness to engage with the South Koreans by distancing themselves from the North. A third alternative explanation might consider the distribution of capabilities as being so skewed in favor of the United States that China and Russia could put up no resistance to US-led proliferation efforts; this is a variant of Eliza Gheorghe's (2019, 97) argument that thwarting nuclear proliferation is easiest under unipolarity because the absence of great power rivalry facilitates regulating nuclear supplier behavior by the unipole and its resort to economic and military capabilities to influence suppliers' behavior. Thus, it could be that China and Russia

wanted to assist North Korea with its nuclear weapons program but was cowered into compliance with the NPT under US browbeating. Finally, another alternative explanation could be that China and Russia adopted the norms of the NPT as constituting their self-image as defenders of the non-proliferation regime and thus socialized, they cooperated in the US-led anti-proliferation efforts by doing their part to put political and economic pressures on North Korea to denuclearize. I will consider each of these alternative arguments in turn.

First, could Chinese and Russian desire to expand economic relations with South Korea have been the main driving motive for distancing themselves from North Korea? Indeed, from 1978 to 1993, Sino-ROK bilateral trade expanded from a mere US$40,000 to US$9 billion, with China becoming South Korea's third largest export market and correspondingly South Korea growing into China's sixth largest export market (Kim 1994, 18). For Russia, value of bilateral trade with North Korea declined from US$2.3 billion in 1990 to only US$83 million in 1995 (Zakharova 2016, 152), while the value of Russia-ROK catapulted from what was already a relatively sizeable US$1 billion in 1992 to US$15 billion in 2007 (Zakharova 2019, 1). Since the North and South are rivals and the economic opportunities with the latter seemed far more attractive, one could argue that China and Russia abandoned the North to curry favor with the South and to cut losses with the economically troubled former. Thus, Chinese and Russian distancing from North Korea had little to do with security issues and mainly concerned seizing opportunities for economic gains with the South. This line of argument is unconvincing because significant changes in security policies accompanied economic distancing: China and Russia both announced their intentions to abrogate the mutual defense treaties that they had signed with the North in 1961. There is no indication that the South Koreans or the United States demanded an public abrogation of deep-rooted security relationships for the purpose of expanding bilateral

economic relations, and a Sino-Russian economic distancing from North Korea, if indeed such distancing was on purely economic grounds, did not have to be accompanied by statements threatening North Korea's core security requirements. If economic prosperity had motivated Chinese and Russian actions, they would have taken more care to assuage North Korea's security concerns since a possible breakout of war in Northeast Asia by cornering the North would have been most counterproductive to fostering economic growth, trade, and investments in the region. Instead, as I have argued in this chapter, the economic measures taken against the North - cutting off aid, terminating barter trade and credit extensions, demanding hard currency payments - were Russian and Chinese pressure tactics, along with abrogation of mutual defense treaties, to get North Korea to submit to denuclearization as most vocally demanded by the United States under the NPT regime.

A second alternative explanation to account for Sino-Russian cooperation with the US anti-proliferation endeavors could rely on the logic outlined by Eliza Gheorghe (2019) whereby the polarity of the system interacts with the intensity of competition among great powers to determine the effectiveness of nuclear "thwarting". The argument here is that unipolarity is the best system to pursue nuclear non-proliferation because the one great power - the unipole - faces no credible challenges from rival great powers in its efforts to control the nuclear supplier group's incentive to sell nuclear materials and technology to potential proliferators. On the opposite end of the spectrum, a multipolar system with intense security competition would make great power coordination difficult and more importantly, rival great powers could actually compete to supply nuclear knowhow to buyers: under multipolarity "thwarters have powerful incentives to undermine each other" (Gheorghe 2019, 97). Applying this theory to the mid-1990s Northeast Asia, unipolarity best explains Sino-Russian cooperation with the United States to end North Korea's

nuclear program: the United States exercised so much power in the international system that China and Russia had to abide by the NPT rules and exert more pressure on North Korea than they would have preferred in the absence of unipolarity.

While I concur that coordination becomes somewhat more difficult with the increase in the number of great powers in the system, there is little support for the counterfactual that China and Russia would have been any more lenient towards North Korea had the United States not been a unipole to regulate the nuclear supplier group in the 1990s. Indeed, China's Mao Zedong flat-out refused to help the North Koreans with a nuclear program after the former's successful nuclear weapons test in 1964, and the Soviets were always very hesitant to cooperate in the nuclear field with the North Koreans as archival records demonstrated in earlier sections of this chapter; this avoidance of cooperation in the nuclear field was during the Sino-Soviet split (Gaddis 2006, 192-194), when intense great power competition, as predicted by Gheorghe's (2019) theory, should have made nuclear transfer from supplier to buyer more likely. Great power security competition could intensify under multipolarity, but this by itself should not lead to great powers undermining each other by abating the spread of nuclear weapons as any dilution of the nuclear club reduces their collective and most importantly their individual power, security, and prestige. Thus, nuclear non-proliferation under multipolarity resembles a more manageable coordination game where all great powers at least agree that the "pareto frontier" (Krasner 1991) is the denial of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states. The game in Gheorghe's (2019) theory of nuclear proliferation is misleadingly framed as a prisoner's dilemma or a collaboration game where it might make sense for individual great powers to "defect" by abating proliferation as policy preference under conditions of intense security competition. My argument is that this is never the case, which bodes well for the continued effectiveness of the NPT regime as the international system transitions

to multipolarity from unipolarity (Posen 2014; Ikenberry 2018; Mearsheimer 2019) as "the old triad of patrons of the postwar liberal order is slowly dwindling in its share of the wider global distribution of power (Ikenberry 2018, 17-18).

Finally, what is the possibility that China and Russia were socialized by the NPT regime's rules, principles, and norms to behave in ways that defended the non-proliferation regime? This type of argument is much more difficult to falsify because it is impossible to definitively prove that governments were not thus socialized. In fact, official government statements from China and Russia read as if they value the NPT regime for its normative and constitutive effects rather than for narrower security interests. However, one rebuttal to such arguments is the fact that China only signed the NPT in 1992, protesting during the Cold War that the treaty was in fact discriminatory towards non-nuclear weapons states: Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai declared that the NPT was a "big conspiracy and swindle" by the United States and USSR to turn non-nuclear weapons states into protectorates (Malik 2000, 448). So, if China had not been socialized into accepting the NPT's norms during the Cold War, what might have led it to belatedly sign the NPT in 1992? One answer is that in the 1980s China realized that it needed to pursue nuclear cooperation with the United States and other advanced Western states to gain access to cutting edge nuclear technology; a condition for this type of cooperation was that China abide by Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines to place exports of Chinese nuclear materials, technology, and equipment under IAEA safeguards (Malik 2000, 450-451). Thus, China's formal induction into the NPT was a signal to the United States that it would fulfill the conditions attached to the pursuit of nuclear cooperation with advanced Western countries.

As the United States and North Korea stepped back from the brink of war to negotiate the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea was completely isolated as countries of the now defunct

socialist “Second World” sided with the unipole, markets, and capitalism. Natural disasters such as devastating floods plagued North Korea during the decade, leading to famines and an exodus of people unable to bear the hardships.

The record of the 1990s provide unambiguous evidence that despite the dramatic shift in the balance of power in favor of the United States as the unipole, one cannot glean signs of Russian or Chinese balancing against the United States when it came to the issue of North Korea and nuclear non-proliferation. Instead, great power interest convergence and coordination reigned on this particular issue. Russia drastically reduced economic transactions with North Korea, and China, having formally joined the NPT in 1992, cooperated with US non-proliferation efforts by reducing trade and terminating high level contacts with North Korea throughout the 1990s.

VII. Decline in Great Power Cooperation Over Time

Even after negotiating the 1994 Agreed Framework in Geneva, the United States retained its suspicions that North Korea was cheating on the agreement by hiding nuclear materials from inspectors, continuing to covertly build two graphite-moderated reactors in Taechon and Yongbyon - capable of producing 275 kg of weapons grade plutonium per year sufficient to build forty nuclear weapons - and secretly operating a HEU facility for a second path to nuclear weaponization (Pollack 2003, 18-19). In turn, the North Koreans complained about the energy shortages and economic losses they were incurring as a result of shelving their graphite-moderated reactors while waiting for the light-water reactors promised by the United States and to be paid for by KEDO (Korea Energy Development Organization) through the financial contributions of its client-allies South Korea and Japan (2003, 20).

Despite North Korea’s complaints about delays in the delivery of the light-water reactors - which in fact were never completed after the incoming Bush administration scrapped the Agreed

Framework - and US suspicions about the hidden scope and depth of the former's nuclear weapons program, a remarkable sequence of events occurred starting in 1999, culminating in North Korea's normalization of diplomatic relations in 2000 and 2001 with a number of US allies, including most major EU states such as Italy, Germany, Spain, and the UK, in addition to summit meetings with the leaders of China and Russia.

It is puzzling that the international community should have hurried to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea, despite the lack of any real progress on denuclearization under the Agreed Framework and after a provocative long-range missile test over the Japanese archipelago on August 31, 1998. Why did the devastating economic and political problems that North Korea endured throughout much of the 1990s give way to a series of diplomatic overtures and recognitions beginning in 1999, when the former had not made any real concessions and even staged a major provocation by launching the Taepodong missile? Why did great power cooperation begin to weaken just as North Korea was growing in relative power? There are two main approaches to address this puzzle. One explanation could be that the rise of China and Russian economic recovery throughout the 1990s and into the new century weakened the foundations of unipolarity which in turn intensified the level of competition among suppliers in the nuclear market; the nuclear cartel under unipolarity is tightly controlled by the unipole, but under multipolarity great power competition undermines intra-cartel cooperation to prevent proliferation, and minor power nuclear aspirants can insert themselves into the interstices of such competition to opportunistically acquire necessary technology and materials. This is the argument advanced by Eliza Gheorge (2019) but it does not explain why the great powers and their allies relented in their pressures against North Korea *after* a major provocation such as the launch of the Taepodong missile over Japan. Also, there is no evidence to indicate that either China or Russia passed on

specifically nuclear materials and technology to North Korea as their relative capabilities grew. Finally, North Korea already had plutonium-producing graphite-moderated reactors as well as a HEU facility if we are to believe US intelligence on the latter point. Therefore, Gheorge's (2019) argument may apply to states that possess only an incipient nuclear program, but for a de facto nuclear state like North Korea as of the late 1990s - de facto because it already had a very advanced weapons program by this time - an alternative argument does a better job of explaining why great power cooperation against the latter slackened over time.

A more convincing argument is that the great power cooperation to pressure North Korea abated since the late 1990s because of the growth in *North Korean* relative capabilities. The tight coupling among the US, China, and Russia to pressure North Korea as witnessed in the early to mid 1990s failed to replicate itself in later years because the latter's nuclear program had advanced so much during the decade that China and Russia reasoned that it was futile to attempt to completely dismantle it. Short of waging full scale war against North Korea, it must have seemed that denuclearizing the country through suffocating economic sanctions alone was impossible[42]; after all, the North Korean party-state had survived intact a devastating famine between 1994 to 1998 that led to excess deaths of 600,000 to 1 million people corresponding to 3 to 5 percent of the pre-famine population (Kang 2011/12, 155).

Furthermore, an analysis of North Korean behavior up to 2017 and great powers' engagement with the former reveals a certain disturbing pattern: with each advancement of North Korea's missile and nuclear weapons programs and the more assertively it behaves on the international stage, the more accommodating the great powers and their allies become. For

[42] On why sanctions do not work, see Pape (1997). The most likely reason why sanctions might fail to change the target state's behavior is nationalism that renders societies willing to endure great suffering; in fact, imposing devastating sanctions, rather than causing civilians to revolt against their own government to alleviate the pain, may enhance the nationalist legitimacy of defiant rulers who can blame the coercing state for their countries' sufferings.

example, after the October 1998 Taepodong missile launch over Japan, North Korea, rather than being punished, either received high-level foreign officials in Pyongyang, such as the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in October 2000, or held summit meetings with the top leadership of its neighbors, such as the May 2000 summit with Chinese President Jian Zemin[43] and the July 2000 summit with Russian President Vladmir Putin. In October 2000, US President Bill Clinton welcomed North Korean Vice-Marshal Jo Myong Rok to the White House.

Continuing this pattern of North Korean provocation and great power engagement, North Korea's October 2006 nuclear test - rather than leading to the dissolution of the China-led Six Party Talks - resulted in agreements in February and October 2007 to deliver to the former heavy fuel oil in return for declaring and disabling its nuclear facilities. In 2017, North Korea test-launched three ICBMs and test-exploded a hydrogen bomb; continuing the pattern of provocation and engagement, summit meetings with the leaderships of the great powers followed these aggressive actions. In addition to summit meetings in 2018 with the leaders of China and Russia, North Korea held its first ever summit meeting with a sitting US president. All of the above summits included promises to improve political relations between the countries holding the summit. In a puzzling pattern, the growth of North Korea's relative capabilities over the years has ameliorated its relations with the great powers and led to the abatement of great power cooperation to exert political and economic pressures to dismantle its nuclear program. Table 2 below summarizes this repeated pattern of North Korean provocation and great power engagement and accommodation in response. An exception to this pattern - at least as apparent from open source materials - occurred

[43]The post-Taepodong missile test thaw in Sino-DPRK political relations led to an immediate expansion in economic exchange, with North Korean imports from China increasing from US$24.6 million in the first half of 2001 to US$142 million in the second half of the year, a 468 percent increase; by the second half of 2003, North Korean imports of Chinese goods rose further to US$287 million (Kim 2006, 191). Likewise, North Korean annual exports to China increased from US$37 million in 1999 to US$396 million by 2003 (2006, 196).

during the second term of the Obama administration when the United States did not engage positively with North Korea in any visible form after the latter's nuclear tests in 2013 and 2016.[44]

Table 2. North Korean provocation and great power engagement, 1998-2018[45]

North Korean Provocation	*Great Power Engagement* [46]
-August 1998 Taepodong missile launch over Japan	-Summit meeting with Chinese leadership in May 2000 -Summit meeting with Russian President Putin in July 2000 -US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visits Pyongyang in October 2000 -North Korean Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok meets President Clinton October 2000
-January 2003 withdrawal from the NPT after the October 2002 revelation of a secret HEU facility; expels IAEA inspectors and restarts nuclear reactors -April 2003 public announcement that it already possessed nuclear weapons	-The first round of Six-Party Talks starts in August 2003, convened by China in Beijing -Adoption of the September 19, 2005 Statement of Joint Principles (denuclearization of the Korean peninsula; US promise to not attack North Korea; recognition of North Korea's right to peaceful nuclear energy)
-October 2006 underground nuclear weapon test	-Resumption of the Six-Party Talks -February 2007 Agreement to deliver to North Korea heavy fuel oil in exchange for a nuclear reactor freeze -October 2007 Joint Statement to freeze the Yongbyon nuclear reactor in return for 900,000 tons of heavy fuel oil
-July and November 2017 ICBM tests -September 3, 2017 hydrogen bomb test	-Three summits with Chinese President Xi Jinping in March, May, and June 2018; two more summits in January and June 2019 -June 12, 2018 summit with US President Donald Trump; additional summits in Hanoi and the DMZ during 2019 -April 2019 summit with Russian President Vladmir Putin

[44] See Choi (2016), Cha (2020) and Ludvik (2020) for a background on the Obama administration's North Korea policy dubbed "strategic patience."

[45] For the chronological data in this table see Arms Control Association (2020).

[46] I do not include engagement by minor powers of North Korea on this list, because such states need to closely coordinate policy with great power patrons before taking any bold initiative with a widely condemned country like North Korea. Minor powers are not an independent variable in dealing with a serious security situation like the North Korean nuclear crisis. Therefore, I do not include the June 15, 2000 summit between North and South Korea or Japanese overtures to North Korea in this table.

The conventional explanation for slackened great power cooperation to pressure North Korea points to China's paramount interest in regional stability as the main cause; regional stability to promote economic growth and to prevent the flow of refugees across its border best explains China's reluctance to push North Korea over the edge, as a nuclear North Korea was preferable to state collapse next door (Kim 2006, 186). This reasoning also fits with the theoretical argument that institutional effectiveness declines with the increase in the number of great powers in an ISI. While all great powers in the ISI including China would prefer a non-nuclear North Korea, the formers' discount rates for future payoffs are heterogeneous, increasing the risk of defection by any one member state (Oye 1986, 19). The heterogeneity of discount rates for future payoffs - in this case the prospect of a denuclearized North Korea - derives from the fact that strong pressures for denuclearization could cause regional instability such as uncontrolled refugee outflows to which the United States thanks to sheer distance from Northeast Asia would be immune unlike regional great powers. Therefore, China's discount rate for valuing the prospect of a denuclearized North Korea would be much higher than that of the less vulnerable United States, rendering a nuclear but stable North Korea preferable to more unstable scenarios even without nuclear weapons.[47]

Second, since as a result of geography and history China has more extensive commercial relations and people-to-people contacts with North Korea, a collective action problem emerges when punishing the defection of the minor power from the NPT. Essentially, other great powers in the ISI will attempt to free-ride on China's efforts to pressure North Korea since it is the only one with any plausible leverage to affect the latter's calculus. But given China's higher discount rate for valuing a non-nuclear North Korea as argued above, it will not "catch the buck" and permit free

[47] The Chinese international relations expert Shi Yinhong (2009) provides a comprehensive analysis of China's balancing act in its pursuit of key policy objectives: a non-nuclear North Korea, peace on the Korean peninsula, and maintenance of good Sino-DPRK relations. What is apparent is that operating within these constraints diminishes Chinese influence over North Korea.

riding on its efforts alone. When great powers attempt to shift the burden of enforcement and punishment of the ISI rules onto each other, institutional effectiveness declines.

China's paramount interest in regional stability and thus its unwillingness to fully exploit its coercive economic leverage over North Korea - or alternatively, its refusal to let other great powers free ride on its efforts alone - provide only partial explanations for the decline in great power cooperation over time to denuclearize North Korea. If the above factors are specific to the ISI's great powers, the following explanations originate from the special nature of North Korea as a highly militarized garrison state armed with a powerful nationalist ideology grounded in *Juche* (self-reliance) and *Songun* (military first).[48]

North Korea has been an especially difficult target for the great powers to denuclearize because despite its relatively small population and territory it is a significant military power with "large defensive and asymmetric attack capabilities" (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2017, 1) that supplies weapons - small arms, missiles of various ranges, and even nuclear technology - to states around the world, including Egypt, Iran, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sudan, Syria, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Vietnam, and Yemen (2017, 22-23). Thousands of North Korean military personnel have been involved in Middle Eastern conflicts in the aid of Egypt (1973 Yom Kippur War), Iran (1988 Iran-Iraq War), and Syria (for the construction of the Al Kibar nuclear reactor).[49] According to a *New York Times* report from 2018, North Korea's embassy in the Egyptian capital

[48] See Park (2007) to understand the power of nationalism as the main source of domestic unity and party-state legitimacy in North Korea. The founder of North Korea, General Kim Il Sung, was an anti-Japanese guerilla fighter in the 1930s and early 1940s; on the eve of Japan's surrender in 1945, the general and his followers entered the Korean peninsula, establishing the DPRK and purging pro-Japanese collaborators in the northern half of the country. The nationalist credentials of North Korea's founding group constitute the bedrock of party-state legitimacy. According to the University of Chicago historian Bruce Cumings (2017), the founder was "recognizably a hero: he fought for a decade in the harshest winter climate imaginable with temperatures falling to 50 degrees below zero...Other Korean guerillas led detachments too - among them Choe Yong Gon, Kim Chaek, and Choe Hyon and when they returned to Pyongyang in 1945 they formed the core of the new regime."

[49] For an account of North Korea's troubled relations with Israel and its involvement in the aid of Israel's Mideast adversaries, see Solomon (2019).

Cario serves as a “bustling arms bazaar for covert sales of North Korean missiles and cut-price Soviet-era military hardware across a band of North Africa and the Middle East” (Walsh 2018). It seems Egypt’s secretive offensive missile program under the aegis of its state weapons conglomerate, the Arab Organization for Industrialization, relies heavily on North Korean expertise and components, so much so that despite receiving $1.3 billion in annual US aid, the Egyptians refused the Trump administration’s entreaties to cut off all ties with Pyongyang (2018).

In addition to being a producer of sought-after weapons exported overseas in complete disregard of UN sanctions against such activities, North Korea has built formidable defenses against air attacks, including an extensive network of tunnels and underground facilities housing its military-industrial complex and bomb shelters for soldiers and civilians. The possession of potent defensive systems reduces the likelihood and the credibility of the threat of great power military action to denuclearize the country by force. Since the Korean War ended in 1953, the country has been constructing “enormous underground tunnels and facilities in mountain redoubts, from troop and material depots to munitions factories, and even subterranean war plane hangars” (Kim 2017, 123), adding up to approximately 15,000 such underground facilities (2017, 124).

The construction of an extensive network of tunnels was due to the lessons learned from the Korean War when on account of US air superiority, coercive aerial bombing of the northern half of the peninsula destroyed all of North Korea’s industrial centers, much of its rail system, and irrigation dams (Pape 1996, 137-173). In a declassified North Vietnamese foreign ministry document detailing a 1965 discussion between the DRV Deputy Prime Minister Le Thanh Nghi and the North Korean President Kim Il Sung[50], the latter advises the Vietnamese to follow his

[50] "Lê Thanh Nghị, 'Report on Meetings with Party Leaders of Eight Socialist Countries'," 1965, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, 8058 – “Báo cáo của Phó Thủ tướng Lê Thanh Nghị về việc gặp các đồng chí lãnh đạo của Đảng và Nhà nước 8 nước xã hội chủ nghĩa năm 1965,” Phủ Thủ tướng, Vietnam National Archives Center 3 (Hanoi). Obtained by Pierre Asselin and translated by Merle Pribbenow. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/134601

country's example of building machinery factories inside caves 2.5 acres wide and that he will send 500 experts and laborers to North Vietnam to guide the construction; in the conversation, the North Korean leader reveals that his country produces machinery, tools, trucks, and jet aircraft in facilities dug under mountain ranges, and that the first phase of cave- and tunnel-digging to house factories began during the Korean War in 1951. The North Korean leader explains the rationale for these efforts below:

> The enemy bombed us very heavily in order to put strong pressure on us. During the Korean War they bombed our entire country, and they even destroyed our dikes. We think the enemy may bomb Hanoi. It was Korea's experience that during the entire course of the war large enterprises were unable to function and that the only enterprises that could operate were small and widely dispersed.

Then, in the mid-1970s, the United States adopted the "AirLand Battle" strategy, according to which it would rely on tactical nuclear weapons to quickly strike targets deep inside North Korea (Kim 2017, 123), further incentivizing the latter to rely on an extensive network of underground facilities for its defense, in addition to expanding and redeploying its military forces along the DMZ (2017, 124).

Relatedly, Pyongyang's subway system is 34 km in length and 100 meters in depth, large enough to serve as a bomb shelter for the city's two million residents; according to the University of Georgia Korea expert Han S. Park who has visited North Korea on numerous occasions, every town in the country is apparently equipped with such secure shelters (2007, 4).

Finally, after North Korea's official test of a nuclear weapon in October 2006, one could argue that strictly speaking the former is no longer the intended target of the NPT since the treaty as originally drafted by the US and the USSR was meant to constrain non-nuclear states from

nuclear breakout, not to revert nuclear weapon states back to non-nuclear status. The only state that purposefully built - rather than inherited - nuclear weapons and relinquished them is South Africa, but coordinated great power action under the NPT to denuclearize South Africa does not explain this unique case of nuclear rollback as it will be apparent below.

Some commentators such as former South African Prime Minister F. W. de Klerk, who was involved in his country's nuclear rollback, sees hopeful lessons in the South African case to eventually facilitate a similar nuclear rollback for North Korea (Friedman 2017). There are two reasons why a study of the South African case leads to the conclusion that the two cases are not comparable. First, South Africa was an anti-communist state threatened by Soviet- and Cuban-backed external adversaries in neighboring Angola and Mozambique, and internal adversaries in the African National Congress. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the threat environment significantly improved, contributing to its decision to relinquish nuclear weapons (Lieberman 2001, 74-75). The reduction in external threats most likely permitted then Prime Minister De Klerk to adopt more liberal domestic and foreign policies, and in line with Etel Solingen's prediction that states more engaged with the international economy are less likely to acquire nuclear weapons, South Africa dismantled its nuclear weapons arsenal (2001, 81).

Similarly auspicious conditions for nuclear rollback do not hold for North Korea, which is a socialist state that has designated the United States as its principal foe, with its supreme leader Kim Jong Un declaring at his country's 2021 party congress meeting that "Our foreign political activities should be focused and redirected on subduing the United States, our biggest enemy and main obstacle to our development" (Smith and Kim 2021). Accepting at face value North Korea's assertion that the United States is its principal enemy, and under the assumption that only a drastic improvement in its security environment similar to that experienced by South Africa at the end of

the Cold War is necessary for nuclear rollback, then one can confidently conclude that the former will never give up its nuclear weapons as there is no reason to believe that the Soviet Union's fate will ever befall the United States. As long as the United States remains an Indo-Pacific power (The National Security Strategy 2017) with forward troop deployments on and extended nuclear deterrence over the territories of South Korea and Japan, North Korea's external threat perceptions will not improve, rendering a South African-style voluntary nuclear rollback most implausible.

Indeed, how North Korea defines the "denuclearization of the Korean peninsula" - a phrase included in the 2018 DPRK-US Singapore Summit Agreement - is unclear to most Western observers. Tufts University professor Sung Yoon Lee argues that North Korea understands denuclearization to involve the withdrawal of all US troops deployed in South Korea, a view shared by Shin Beom-chul of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, a leading think tank in Seoul (Denyer 2019). Going even further, a major South Korean daily, the *Dong-a Ilbo*, citing former head of CIA Korea Mission Center Andrew Kim, reported that the North Korean officials defined the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula to include the removal of all US nuclear strategic assets from Guam and Hawaii (Lee and Han 2019). Corroborating these assessments, the North Korean state news agency the KCNA issued the following definition of the "denuclearization of the Korean peninsula" (Kim and Smith 2018):

> When we refer to the Korean peninsula, they include both the area of the DPRK and the area of South Korea where aggression troops including the nuclear weapons of the US are deployed...When we refer to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, it, therefore, means removing all elements of nuclear threats from the areas of both the north and the south of Korea and also from surrounding areas from where the Korean peninsula is targeted.

The North Korean reference to the necessity of removing nuclear threats "from surrounding areas from where the Korean peninsula is targeted" imparts an unacceptably broad definition of denuclearization for the United States since the existence of intercontinental ballistic missiles, long-range bombers, and nuclear-powered submarines makes practically anywhere on the planet a possible staging ground for a nuclear attack on North Korea. Only a complete, verifiable, and irreversible global nuclear disarmament would satisfy North Korea's stringent definition of peninsular denuclearization, a proposition which is unacceptable to the United States.

A second reason why the South African case does not apply to North Korea is that besides the end of the Cold War and the decline in Soviet-backed threats, South Africa was transitioning from Afrikaner to ANC rule. "Fear and loathing of the ANC" (Purkett, Burgess, and Liberman 2002, 190) and the consequent unwillingness to see the new regime armed with nuclear weapons may have contributed to the De Klerk government's decision on voluntary rollback. North Korea, on the other hand is a "racially homogenous" state where practically everybody belongs to the Korean ethnicity (CIA 2021), led by a regime with powerful nationalist credentials rooted in anti-Japanese guerilla struggles in the colonial period (Armstrong 1995; Byman and Lind 2010, 53; Cumings 2012; 2017; Park 2012). It is most implausible that in the highly remote event of any kind of political transition in the north that the outgoing regime will seek to deny an incoming co-ethnic regime access to nuclear weapons; on the contrary, as devoted Korean nationalists, it is not far-fetched to speculate that the outgoing regime would make sure that any ethnic Korean polity remains a nuclear power.

Samuel Huntington (1996) extended this logic to speculate on South Korean perceptions of the North Korean nuclear program: rather than seeing their northern brethren's weapons with dread, at least some southern co-ethnic nationalists may secretly laud the northerners for bearing

the entire burden of crossing the nuclear finish line in contravention of the NPT, a burden in which the southerners would have had to share if the Koreas were to unify and then decided to develop nuclear weapons. By this logic, and in contrast to the transition process observed in South Africa, the southern nationalists owe a debt of gratitude to the northerners who, even if primarily interested in regime preservation, will be less loath to bequeath a nuclear arsenal to a successor co-ethnic, unified state than were the Afrikaners to the ANC.[51]

Dong Sun Lee (2007, 478) corroborates the above view by pointing out that democratization in South Korea has been accompanied by a surge in pan-Korean nationalism according to which South Korea's past authoritarian regimes and their American patron are perceived more negatively than North Korea: "Nationalist radicals even claimed that the DPRK nuclear arsenal was a valuable national asset that would guarantee the survival of a reunified Korea in the future." Even if nationalist governing elites were not as strident as "radical" nationalists in their open embrace of the North Korean nuclear program, the former "discounted threats posed by the DPRK nuclear and missile capabilities" in opposition to US and Japanese policy preferences (2007, 482).

The rise of pan-Korean nationalism poses a serious threat to the future of the US-ROK alliance and US non-proliferation efforts in the region because nationalists want political rapprochement and confederation-type unification on equal terms between the South and North; US hostility towards North Korea and concerns about nuclear proliferation are construed as interfering with intra-Korean affairs. South Korea's pro-American, conservative old guard lacks

[51] It must be emphasized that this exercise in hypotheticals is on the assumption of a political transition in North Korea. If the nationalist credentials and hence the legitimacy of the North Korean party-state is as strong as experts like Bruce Cumings (2012; 2017) and Han S. Park (2007) claim and argue, then the prospect of a transition seems most unlikely. Indeed, North Korea neither collapsed like the Soviet Union and its satellites, nor did it adopt market reforms and integrate into the US-led international economy as did China and Vietnam. Meanwhile, it is logical to speculate that the recent spate of successful ICBM and nuclear tests, and the leadership's summits with great powers strengthened regime legitimacy in the eyes of the people.

both the powerful anti-Japanese guerilla credentials of the North Korean party-state and the southern nationalists' democratization activist credentials. In a democracy, the lack of any publicly laudable credentials constrains the conservative old guard from successfully mobilizing its resources to assist the United States maintain its preeminent position in South Korea. In fact, South Korea's old guard elites trace their historical origins to active collaboration with the Japanese colonial administration before the arrival of US occupying forces on the peninsula. Perceived as opportunists and traitors, the ethnic Korean landlords, police, and bureaucratic functionaries who remained after the Japanese withdrawal in 1945 were "often more hated than the Japanese overlords" (Cumings 1984, 23). National security laws dating from 1948 have so far halted the widespread infiltration and diffusion of information legitimizing North Korea by criminalizing such writings and speech (Haggard and You 2014), but as a constitutional democracy it will be difficult to stem in perpetuity the free flow of information about and from North Korea to the South Korean public. Since nationalism has always been a potent force in Korea (Lee 2007, 482), any loosening or outright repeal of the national security laws will probably further expand and intensify the kind of pan-Korean nationalism that Dong Sun Lee (2007) observed in the first decade of the 2000s, which will in turn lead to ROK nationalist elite and popular demands for the US to sign a peace treaty with the DPRK, to completely normalize relations, and to tacitly accept its nuclear and missile programs.

The conclusion one can draw from the above analysis is that South Africa's experience with nuclear rollback has no applicability to the Korean case as nationalist fervor for an independent nuclear arsenal is too strong not only in the North, but also in the South. South Korea's posture is most perplexing for the United States because of the presence there of an underlying current of nationalist elite and popular sentiment in *support* of North Korea's nuclear

and missile programs as constituting a protective shield for the entire Korean nation. Any future weakening or repeal of the draconian South Korean national security laws currently discouraging the public expression of pro-North Korean policy preferences[52] will bring these alliance ambiguities and contradictions out into the open, potentially heralding a historic crisis in the US-ROK relations that may even lead to the demise of the alliance.

VIII. Conclusion

In summary, the preceding section has advanced three main reasons to explain the post-1990s decline in great power cooperation to denuclearize North Korea. First, this dissertation's theory argues that ISIs that mainly constrain minor powers but have several great powers as members may experience coordination problems among the latter to enforce the rules and to punish violators. While China shared the broader objective of denuclearization, its discount factor to value the prospect of a non-nuclear North Korea was higher than that for the United States; essentially, given the risks of fallout from implosion and explosion involved in putting too much economic and military pressures on a bordering state, China placed a lower value on the objective of denuclearization than did the United States located across an ocean. Also, given the geographic and historical circumstances as a close neighbor with the most extensive ties, China was expected to bear the brunt of punishing North Korea, creating a free-rider problem, which was a proposition that the Chinese refused to take up.

The second reason is not part of the dissertation's theory and is a factor unique to North Korea. It seems that North Korea's deterrent posture and military capabilities have been simply too robust to consider an outright invasion or any kinetic means to denuclearize it. Such idiosyncrasies

[52] In December 2020, the South Korean legislature passed a law to revoke power from its intelligence agency to investigate domestic activities related to North Korea, banning anti-communist investigations by the National Intelligence Service and transferring that role to the domestic police starting in 2024 (Jung 2020).

of the case depart from the dissertation's theoretical assumption that great powers are dealing with a minor power that lacks agency, a weak state vulnerable to coercion. After each North Korean military provocation, such as long range missile and increasingly potent nuclear tests culminating in a hydrogen bomb explosion, the great powers opted in response for diplomatic engagement by holding highly publicized summits with the North Korean leadership, perhaps the most spectacular being the 2018 Singapore Summit with United States President Donald Trump. Similarly, after the first ever test of a hydrogen bomb in September 2017, the following year China's President Xi Jinping held no less than three summits with North Korea's Chairman Kim Jong Un. Some research into North Korea's defensive postures showed that the country was heavily militarized, with more than 15,000 deep underground facilities shielding its military industrial complex, which produces weaponry not just for itself but for a number of other anti-Western states around the world, such as Iran and Syria. Thus, the inherent defensive strength of North Korea is a factor specific to the case that has weakened great power enthusiasm and efforts at denuclearization.

Finally, the third reason for the decline of great power cooperation is that the NPT applies to states that have not yet crossed the nuclear finish line. Once again for reasons unique to North Korea as an especially resolute party-state infused with a powerful nationalist ideology of *Juche* and *Songun*, even a famine from 1994-1998 that killed approximately 3-5 percent of the pre-famine population could not persuade it to abandon its nuclear program in exchange for participation in the international economy. By the time of North Korea's first official nuclear test in 2006, it was a nuclear weapon state whose activities had strictly speaking left the purview of the NPT. Absent a separate ISI with agreed upon rules to induce nuclear rollback, the great power must rely on ad hoc and idiosyncratic methods to persuade North Korea to denuclearize, an effort which so far has led to failure. Since the strategic weight of a nuclear weapon state with long range

missiles able to carry nuclear warheads is clearly greater - on account of its ability to cause mass destruction - than that of a state yet to cross the nuclear finish line, the NPT is clearly an insufficient ISI to deal with North Korea. The great powers might be able to build a new ISI for the purpose of inducing nuclear rollback, but since the targets would be nuclear powers, they are technically no longer minor powers that the NPT was meant to constrain. If the possession of nuclear weapons arguably turns states into "major powers" (Monteiro 2011, 14-15) then an ISI for nuclear rollback will be much less effective over time than the NPT has been, since "major powers...even though their power projection capabilities are inferior to those of the unipole possess sufficient capabilities to deter any state in the system" (2011, 14).

An ISI created to compel "major powers" to denuclearize will be almost as ineffective as ISIs that seek to restrain great powers post-power shift, as the targets would be much more difficult to coerce than minor powers. For comparison, the Concert of Europe from the previous chapter declined in effectiveness because it tried to constrain the behavior of great powers - Britain and Russia - as well as states that should be more accurately labeled as major powers - France, Austria, and Prussia. Russia, a great power, could not prevent a major power, France, from invading its own territory, the Crimea. If it sometimes happens that a great power cannot deter a major power from attacking its territory, an ISI with the purpose of forcing nuclear rollback on major powers will be even less effective since compellence involves more steps and is thus more complex than deterrence (Schelling 1966, 69-78).

Chapter 5. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

I. Brief Historical Overview

There are striking similarities between the strategic situations in Europe at the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 and the Second World War in 1945. At both junctures in European history, an enterprising Western maritime power and a tenacious Eastern landpower successfully beat back an aspiring regional hegemon on the continent; the winning coalition then fell apart as soon as it accomplished its mission, resulting in a wary, decades long mutual suspicion and competition between the maritime offshore balancer and the Eurasian landpower.[53]

However, there were several differences that rendered the post-WWII juncture more dangerous from a balance of power perspective. First, the Soviet Union, unlike Tsarist Russia, faced fewer obstacles to expansion in central and eastern Europe; in 1815, Prussia and Austria remained in control of central Europe, and if Tsarist Russia had designs on France to the west of these powers, those ambitions had to remain political rather than territorial. Second, the European great powers in 1815 remained fearful of the potential of France to return to a revolutionary footing and were in agreement that to moderate its awakened nationalism they had to impose a mild peace on their former adversary; although Napoleon had lost the war, much of France proper had not experienced the ravages of war and remained the richest and largest kingdom on the continent. Therefore, the balance of power in 1815 did not tilt dangerously in favor of Russia; a rehabilitated France in the west, and Austria in the east with British financial patronage could maintain a stable balance of power. The fear of liberal revolutions and nationalist uprisings restrained the conservative Russian monarchy to cooperate with fellow autocrats in Austria and Prussia to restore as much as possible the status quo ante before the Napoleonic Wars.

[53] For a succinct historical overview of balance of power considerations for great power competition in the modern period and the role of offshore balancing in maintaining the balance of power, see John Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (W. W. Norton and Co.: New York, NY, 2001): 267-333.

In 1945, the Soviet Union was a revolutionary power and Germany lay in ruins, its territory occupied by Allied forces; France and Britain were middle powers exhausted by the war effort and were in no position to balance against the Soviets by themselves. Ominously, Western government officials believed that the Soviet overall power advantage relative to Western European countries would increase in the coming years given its large population and natural resource base (Rosato 2011, 45). Such pessimistic prognosis proved correct as the ratio of Soviet overall power to that of Britain and France significantly increased from the year 1947 to 1960: in 1947, the Soviet Union was 1.5 and 3.9 times as powerful as Britain and France, but by 1960 the ratio had increased to 5.1 and 5.6 times (2011, 44). Relative to a coalition of Britain, France, and West Germany, the Soviet Union remained 1.6 times more powerful (44).

If the Concert of Europe reflected the preferences of conservative regimes to establish a condominium that would govern the continent in the interest of reigning monarchs threatened by nationalism and liberalism from below, similar institutions could not be arranged in 1945 because the Soviet Union was more powerful than Tsarist Russia and ruled by a more confident, revolutionary regime. Since institutions are rules that prescribe and proscribe acceptable and unacceptable behavior by states, the more powerful and confident a great power is, the less likely it will agree to any set of rules that restrain its freedom of action.

To balance against the Soviet Union, the United States had to intervene to safeguard Western European states from imminent Soviet domination, providing them with the time and resources necessary to integrate themselves into a balancing coalition that could ultimately stand by itself as a pillar of the balance of power. By 1948, negotiations were well under way between the United States and its European allies to create a formal international security institution that would include the United States as a permanent member. By July 1949, the United States, Canada,

Portugal, Italy, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, the Benelux countries, France, and Britain ratified their entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As Rosato (2011) convincingly argues, Western European states needed to integrate both militarily and economically - since a large and prosperous economy is the source of military power - but as economic integration takes more time than forming a one-off military alliance, an American security umbrella over Western Europe was necessary to earn time so as to preclude a Soviet takeover before the completion of meaningful integration. By the 1951 Treaty of Paris, six Western European states formed the European Coal and Steel Community as a forerunner to the creation of the European Economic Community in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome.

The events that precipitated the creation of NATO in 1949 included the Czechoslovak coup and Berlin Blockade of 1948, but the jolt that led to the further centralization of NATO under US leadership was the start of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, leading to the creation in December 1950 of an integrated military force under the central command of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) (Kaplan 2004, 9-11). Secretary of State Dean Acheson thought that the Korean War was peripheral to the balance of power in Europe, and considered the Chinese intervention in Korea as a useful opportunity to rally the American people to contribute to the rearmament of Europe against the Soviet threat (Gaddis 2006, 114). The Korean War gave Congress reason in 1951 to authorize a 257 percent increase in defense spending relative to the originally proposed amount, bringing to realization NSC-68's perspective that given unused capacity in the American economy it was possible to increase defense spending while concurrently improving domestic living standards (2006, 110-111). While large increases in US defense expenditures and the decision to send a further six US army divisions for the defense of Europe

may have reassured the Europeans of US commitment to their security, the Pentagon also raised fears of revived German militarism by requiring that West Germany rearm and enter NATO (112).

Arguably the most consequential event in NATO history was the FRG's entry into NATO in 1954 through the back door after first entering the Western European Union (WEU) which included the UK as a member, assuaging French fears that it would be left alone in the European Defense Community (EDC) with a remilitarized West Germany. West German integration into NATO was essential to provide the alliance with the large requisite manpower to face the Warsaw Pact in central Europe.

Early NATO history shows that the US was NATO's patron and sole great power in the alliance. The institution's rules constrained the allies but mostly left the United States unconstrained, leaving it free to adjust rules as it saw fit. For example, the United States under the Kennedy administration was adamant that the control over nuclear weapons within NATO remained with the United States; it was deemed necessary for implementing the administration's strategy of flexible response that the nuclear trigger remained in the hands of one controlling center rather than with multiple parties. The Soviets apparently agreed with this formulation as it stopped provoking the West over Berlin after the United States abandoned plans for a multilateral force (MLF) of on-ship nuclear weapons that would have given launch decisions to a group of NATO allies including the FRG (Trachtenberg 1999).

NATO's Article V may be construed as constraining the United States, but that clause does not necessarily call for a military response to an armed attack against a NATO ally, leaving it open to interpretation as to how the United States should respond to an attack. Regardless of what Article V mandated, the United States would have responded to an armed attack against the territory of NATO allies if it judged that the balance of power in Europe was in danger of being

overwhelmed by the Warsaw Pact. Thus, strategic calculations rather than Article V would have determined US actions; indeed, the institutional rule embodied by Article V was a reflection of the European balance of power in 1949 when the overwhelming capabilities of the Soviet Union relative to Western European states convinced the United States to remain engaged in Europe to protect its allies as they sought time and shelter under the US security umbrella to integrate their economies to transform themselves into an independent force more capable of balancing Soviet power (Rosato 2011).

On the other hand, the European NATO allies were highly constrained by the preferences of the United States, as evident in their tepid reaction to the US decision to scrap the Multilateral Force (MLF) and the dependence of Britain on the US for advanced nuclear weapons systems such as the Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles (Kaplan 2004, 34-38). As the security of European NATO allies were dependent on US strategic decisions and military posture, they had to tread nervously whenever voices in the US Congress called for a retrenchment of US forces from the continent (2004, 53). France under De Gaulle behaved as a recalcitrant ally by leaving the integrated military command and seeking overtures with the Soviet Union, but such moves proved that France was geographically sheltered and relatively less threatened than the FRG, whose survival was more at risk for its location on the Central Front directly facing the Warsaw Pact.

II. After the Cold War

After the Cold War, good realist logic led to the prediction that NATO would dissolve and that US troops would leave Europe (Mearsheimer 1990). Since the Soviet Union had disintegrated into its constituent republics and Russia was a much weaker state, it seemed European NATO allies could maintain the balance of power on the continent by themselves; steady nuclear proliferation to certain European states such as Germany, for example, could even facilitate this

task by making war less likely due to the prospect of mutually assured destruction. The leading theory on alliance formation would also suggest that it would have been unsurprising had NATO disbanded with the fall of the Soviet Union. According to the balance of threat theory (Walt 1987), whatever threat posed by a Russia tottering under economic collapse should have been much less threatening to European NATO allies than that posed by the Soviet Union, and one could have even made the case that the emergence of an economically dominant, unified Germany meant that Germany, and not Russia, constituted the greater threat to European security.

Realist logic notwithstanding, NATO did not disband. It has continued its existence and approximately 40,000 US troops remain deployed in Germany. Not only has NATO continued to exist, but it remains arguably the most effective security institution in the world despite going through the most wrenching structural change to the international system since 1945. NATO remains effective in that the US military presence continues in Germany; Germany has refrained from building nuclear weapons; there seems to near zero likelihood of the resumption of armed conflict among the major Western European states; and European NATO states, despite chidings from the US about their low defense expenditures and criticisms about their relative lack of military capabilities, have contributed in not insignificant ways to the wars and conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.

This dissertation's theory addresses the puzzle of the continuity of NATO and its relative effectiveness by arguing that security institutions can remain effective even after far-reaching changes to the balance of power when two conditions hold. First, there is an inverse relationship between post-power shift institutional effectiveness and the number of great powers in the institution. During and after a significant shift in the balance of power, great powers will maneuver to improve their relative positions and to compete with each other to check aspiring regional

hegemons; they will seek to rewrite the institution's rules to better reflect their new positions in the balance of power. When great powers that have gained power seek to change the institution's rules to their benefit, those that have lost relative power are not likely to oblige to such measures without a struggle. By definition great powers are states that have the military wherewithal to put up a serious fight against the strongest state in the international system (Mearsheimer 2001). But the ensuing struggle over the rewriting of rules to reflect the new balance of power can result in war, which would destroy the institution. The historical example of the Crimean War led to the destruction of the Concert of Europe as an increasingly powerful Great Britain and a weakening Russia could not reset their relations peacefully to reflect the new balance of power.

NATO has remained effective because the United States has been and remains the only great power in the institution. The fact that it emerged as the unipole after the Cold War made the power differential between itself and its European NATO allies even greater than during the Cold War. Since no other great power exists in NATO to challenge the United States, no serious conflict can ensue within the institution to pit the US against another member. Indeed, the most devastating sign of an institution's loss of effectiveness - war among member states - cannot occur within NATO as no member state can hope to match US military capabilities and the US remains a pacifier keeping a lid on conflict (Joffe 1984; Mearsheimer 2001).

Second, the institution's rules must apply to minor powers while leaving much latitude to the great powers. When rules exist that seriously constrain the behavior of great powers, the latter will simply break them if such rules get in the way of the pursuit of their strategic interests. When the United States under George W. Bush claimed that Iraq was harboring an advanced nuclear weapons program and that it needed to be disarmed by force, the lack of a UN Security Council resolution authorizing an invasion did not affect its behavior. Great powers have the large latent

power and the formidable military capabilities to pursue autonomous policies relatively unrestrained by the wishes of other states and international institutions.

Within NATO, the most important rule that applies to the United States is Article V which obliges all NATO members to respond to an armed attack on an alliance member in a way it deems necessary to assist the ally under attack. This is a very general mandate open to broad interpretation as to the actions that the United States must take; there is no requirement that the response must be military in nature. Meanwhile, NATO states such as Germany have an obligation to remain non-nuclear and to mainly rely on the United States for extended deterrence. The 2010 NATO Strategic Concept unambiguously explains NATO as a nuclear alliance under the US nuclear umbrella; according to the official NATO document, the nuclear arsenals of the UK and France can provide further deterrence, but the main source of deterrence for the alliance is the US nuclear arsenal.[54]

III. Explaining NATO's Continued Effectiveness

Empirical evidence from post-Cold War NATO shows that the United States has not been hindered by NATO's rules. In fact, the existence of NATO complements key US foreign policy objectives. First, NATO complements the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty's objective of keeping non-nuclear states, including Germany, non-nuclear. Second, for much of the post-Cold War period, the United States has pursued the spread of liberal democracy and free markets as a key strategic objective. There has been much criticism about this aspect of US grand strategy, with some scholars arguing that the US has been free to pursue non-security goals based on domestic political imperatives because of the benign international environment under unipolarity (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007; Mearsheimer 2011; Posen 2014). Regardless of the strategic merits

[54]https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120214_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf

of seeking to expand the zone of liberal democracy towards Russia, this has been a key rationale for maintaining the NATO alliance after the Cold War. Third, European NATO allies have consistently demonstrated their willingness to support the US military presence in Europe as a hedge against the resurgence of German nationalism. Fourth, lingering fears of the return of Russian geopolitical assertiveness creates demand in Europe for keeping NATO. And fifth, NATO's European allies have failed to sufficiently upgrade their defense capabilities to secure strategic autonomy from the United States, making them reliant on the United States for their core security needs for the foreseeable future.

I will address each of these factors to argue that the last three factors - fear of German and Russian resurgence and the underinvestment in European military capabilities - have constrained European NATO allies and given much latitude to the United States in its pursuit of the first two factors as its core policy objectives - nuclear non-proliferation in Europe and and extension of liberal democracy and markets eastwards. Essentially, today's NATO is an arrangement in which the United States provides security to European allies in return for their acquiescence with US strategic objectives for the region.

An alternative but related framework to understand the five factors explaining NATO's post- Cold War persistence is to adopt the supply and demand language of economics. I have argued that the demand for NATO comes from European fears about resurgent Germany and Russia - the return of great power politics in Europe - and the perennial underinvestment (Emmott 2020)[55] in and the resultant ineffectiveness of European militaries. The supply for NATO to meet this demand comes from the US incentive to prevent nuclear proliferation to Germany and to

[55] In 2020, only 10 out of 30 NATO allies reached the NATO defense spending goal of 2 percent of GDP demanded by the United States. Among the larger NATO members, Germany, Italy, and Spain, failed to meet this goal. Germany announced that it will try to meet the 2 percent spending target by 2031 (Emmott 2020).

consolidate liberal democracy and markets in Eastern Europe and beyond. The amount of security provided and the price - the loss of European sovereignty through over reliance on the United States for security, for example - is determined at the point where the supply and demand curves intersect.

Figure 2. The supply and demand for US security provision through NATO



With the aid of this simple framework[56] one can make several predictions about the level of US security provision through NATO and associated European sovereignty costs given changes in the several factors that determine the supply and demand functions. First, keeping European demand constant, NATO will expand if US preferences for non-proliferation and democracy promotion intensifies; by shifting the supply curve rightward, the US will extend even more security benefits to the Europeans at a lower cost to their sovereignty. If, however, the US policy goals change to place less value on non-proliferation and democracy promotion, the leftward shift

[56] See Mankiw (2009) for a brief overview of supply and demand framework.

in the supply curve will result in less security benefits to European allies at a higher cost to their sovereignty.

Next, keeping the US preferences constant, an increase in European demand for NATO - as a result of growing fears about Russian assertiveness or continued underinvestment in European militaries - will lead to more security benefits for Europe but at a higher cost to its sovereignty. Meanwhile, a reduction in European fears about the return of great power politics will lead to less security provision from the US at a lower cost to sovereignty.

Finally, if both the supply and demand curves shift simultaneously so that the US becomes more invested in non-proliferation and democracy promotion at the same time as the Europeans grow to fear Russia more in the light of their perennially low defense budgets, more security could be provided at similar or even lower costs to European sovereignty.

These hypothetical possibilities are not exhaustive and more scenarios are possible depending on how one manipulates the supply and demand curves for NATO. Also, this framework to understand NATO has an important drawback in that it does not integrate other relevant variables, most importantly future changes in the balance of power. For example, regardless of the intensity of US policy preferences for non-proliferation and democracy promotion, a decline in its relative power could limit its capacity to implement them. Or, a significant increase in US relative power - through the acquisition of a highly effective missile defense and splendid first strike capability - might decrease its appetite for nuclear non-proliferation and its willingness to commit to NATO.

Finally, rather than shifts in the supply and demand curves, we could imagine a change in their slope. Under this scenario, the United States and the Europeans maintain their current level of security provision and restraints on sovereignty, but experience a change in how much sovereignty

the Europeans will be willing to trade for an incremental unit of security provision. For example, a reduction in European fears of German resurgence could decrease the slope of their demand for security, so that they become less willing to give up their sovereignty for additional security provision from the United States.

NATO's Reinforcement of the NPT in Europe

First, NATO complements the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty's objective of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states. As one of the two superpower drafters of the 1968 NPT, some scholars have convincingly argued that nuclear proliferation has been an independent and critical pillar of America's grand strategy since the dawn of the nuclear age (Gavin 2015). As the argument goes, in the resolute pursuit of such "strategies of inhibition" the United States has continued to remain engaged in regions of the world without aspiring regional hegemons threatening to disturb the balance of power and where it would make good sense from a realist logic to simply withdraw the US military presence. Rather than following realist advice to encourage steady nuclear proliferation as a means to maintain regional stability (Waltz 1981; Mearsheimer 1990), the United States has instead chosen to remain in Europe, maintaining a nuclear security umbrella over the continent and keeping potential proliferators such as Germany non-nuclear.

Indeed, the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept recognizes NATO as a "nuclear alliance", asserting that as long as nuclear weapons exist in the world that NATO must also maintain a deterrence posture to discourage the use of such weapons on its members: "As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance" (NATO 2010, 14). The Strategic Concept recognizes the United States as the main provider of this deterrent and emphasizes the centrality of nuclear weapons to the alliance by stating that "the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies

is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance" (2010, 14). The British and French arsenals are to assist the main US arsenal in NATO's overall deterrence posture and security arrangement (14). Other NATO members without nuclear weapons are promised "participation in collective defense planning on nuclear roles, in peace time basing of nuclear forces, and in command and control and consultation arrangements" (16), but it is unclear what role these states will play during wartime decision-making over nuclear use. The participation on nuclear matters concern pre-war planning, and during a crisis or war, given the integrated command structure headed by an American general, it is clear that the ultimate decisions on the use of US nuclear weapons will be made by the US.

A strong argument can be made that the US and NATO may be in violation of the articles of the NPT as a result of the nuclear-sharing arrangement in which the US deploys its nuclear weapons to five NATO allies, Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey (K=1Project 2012). After all, Articles I and II of the NPT prohibit the transfer and receipt of nuclear weapons among nuclear and non-nuclear state signatories. A report commissioned by the NATO Secretary General claims, without providing any argument, that the nuclear-sharing arrangement is in compliance with the NPT (NATO 2020, 38). Omitting any international reasoning, the report advances a strategic rationale that nuclear-sharing ensures political cohesion among allies, and most importantly, prevents an "increase in the number of independent arsenals" (2020, 38).

In claiming that the current nuclear-sharing arrangement's "political value is as great as the military value it brings," NATO is echoing intra-alliance controversies from the early Cold War when the US struggled to "absorb and to deflect pressure for national nuclear forces, which if left unchecked, could lead to a German nuclear capability" (Trachtenberg 1999, 314). The balancing act at that time for US policymakers had been to create a politically acceptable NATO nuclear

force - such as the multilateral force - that did not arouse German nationalist indignation at second-class status within the alliance, while ensuring that the US had the final say on the use of nuclear weapons (1999, 314-317).

At this point, one can ask whether there was any legitimate reason for the US to have been so concerned about proliferation in Europe, specifically to the FRG. Was there any German demand for an independent nuclear arsenal, or was the US concern just a misdirected apprehension about a non-existent nationalist backlash? The evidence suggests that the FRG was indeed interested in an independent nuclear arsenal, and if that was not considered realistic, then it wanted to get as close as possible to the manufacture, control, and launching of nuclear weapons (Schwabe 2004, 39). This German preference for more control over nuclear weapons spanned both the Eisenhower and the Kennedy administrations, two administrations that had very different nuclear strategies, massive retaliation and flexible response respectively. German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer found faults with both administrations' nuclear strategies and came to the conclusion that only an increased German control over nuclear weapons could best promote his country's security.

As an example of Adenauer's dissatisfaction with US nuclear strategy, during the 1958 Berlin Crisis, the chancellor thought massive retaliation was reckless and wanted options to slow down military escalation; he told the US Secretary of State Dulles, to the annoyance of the latter, that "German problems were not ones over which a nuclear war could or should be fought" (Schwabe 2004, 42). Then, after the shift from massive retaliation to flexible response in the Kennedy administration, Adenauer complained that the new strategy of relying more on conventional forces lacked resolve to stand up for Berlin; he demanded for the creation of a NATO nuclear fire brigade without a US veto over launch decision, in which Germans could decide with other Europeans to launch a nuclear first strike without waiting for US consent (2004, 44-45). If

Adenauer had called for restraint with Eisenhower's strategy of massive retaliation, he now demanded that Kennedy commit to a preemptive tactical nuclear strike against Soviet conventional aggression (47). The common factor in Adenauer's demands across two very different administrations and their nuclear strategies is his call for more German input into nuclear planning and control over launch decisions.

If historically there has been visible German demands for greater nuclear independence, have any remnants of such preferences survived in contemporary Germany? Today, no mainstream German politician publicly advocates acquiring an independent arsenal. However, fears of abandonment by the US and indignation over slights against democratic allies during the Trump administration have led to some prominent voices in German civil society questioning whether independent security measures such as going nuclear might be necessary. For example, the prominent German political scientist Christian Hacke wrote an op-ed in the major daily newspaper *Die Welte* expressing his alarm that the Trump administration represents an underlying isolationist, unilateralist, and populist strain in American politics which could lead to the abandonment of Europe and Germany by their US security patron. To prepare for the eventuality that Germany may be left defenseless and vulnerable to nuclear blackmail by hostile states, Hacke (2018) insists that Germany itself must be ready to go nuclear. Hacke (2018) argues that a European nuclear force is not an alternative to an independent German arsenal because the EU has yet to settle on a common defense policy after seventy years of trying, and Britain and France cannot be trusted to risk their own annihilation to deter attacks against Germany.

Other voices in Germany that have publicly endorsed building a European nuclear deterrent not reliant on the US - though less strident than Christian Hacke's support for an independent German nuclear arsenal - have included defense experts associated with the country's

major political parties. For example, Roderich Kiesewetter of the Christian Democrats has called for turning the French arsenal into a deterrent for Europe under joint command (Fisher 2017). Alexander Graff Lambsdorff, a defense expert and vice chair of the Free Democrats, has also acknowledged the need to discuss a Plan B after the US withdraws its nuclear deterrent from Europe, arguing that "The end of the Cold War did in no way end the era of atomic weapons - one can lament this but that is the reality" (Szabo 2018).

There is no guarantee that the United States will not see in the future the return of an administration in the mould of the Trump administration. European fears of abandonment and indignation at diplomatic slights have subsided for now; but if one can argue that there is a certainty in international politics it is that uncertainty about intentions - "actions that a state plans to take under certain circumstances" (Rosato 2014, 52) - and especially future intentions, can never be completely overcome. Even if one distinguishes goals/motives from intentions (Glaser 2011, 38; Rosato 2014, 53) and assumes that fundamental US motives - for example, maximizing relative power and spreading democracy and markets - will be fixed into the future, *how* the United States intends to best carry out its fixed goals will vary according to the idiosyncrasies of particular administrations and exogenous factors like the state of technology and the balance of power which can evolve in unforeseen ways. Therefore, the Europeans, and Germans in particular as a nation with a great power economy - and therefore with much of value to protect - but minor power security responsibilities, will remain wary of the possibility that abandonment resurfaces in future US intentions towards the continent.

However, I argue that the Europeans do not have to fear abandonment unless the United States is somehow forcibly pushed out of Europe by an even more powerful state, or it comes to possess a new weapon system that can neutralize nuclear weapons. As Francis Gavin (2015,

20-21) has documented in detail, the United States greatly fears the potentially devastating effects of the spread of nuclear weapons on the physical security of the homeland: “The higher the number of states that possess nuclear weapons, the greater the risk the United States might be hit.” Secondary reasons for the US pursuit of non-proliferation have to do with preserving its freedom of action as a preeminent world power: vigorous non-proliferation efforts serve its strategic interests because nuclear adversaries can better deter the United States and could become emboldened to act more aggressively, and nuclear-armed allies would grow harder to control. Therefore, the US will remain committed to NATO as the best mechanism to forestall proliferation in Europe. The German defense experts had no reason to wring their hands about abandonment if that indeed was the true motive for going public with musings about acquiring an independent nuclear arsenal.

Therefore, I see only two circumstances in which the United States will dismantle NATO and abandon Europe. First, a state will have to appear on the horizon armed with a previously unseen, completely novel type of weapon system that can neutralize the US nuclear deterrent; such a state - effectively armed with splendid first strike capability - would be able to blackmail the United States into abandoning Europe. Or, the United States itself will have to acquire the defensive means to completely neutralize nuclear weapons directed against it; only then will it feel secure enough to give up on global non-proliferation endeavors, dismantle NATO, abandon Europe, and retreat to the homeland.

Eastward Extension of Liberal Democracy and Markets

The second supply factor that explains the post-Cold War continuity and effectiveness of NATO is the US policy of promoting democracy and markets around the world. As all documents

that lay out the US National Security Strategy (NSS) since 1993 to the present day[57] make clear, the United States has made promoting liberal democracy and free markets a central pillar of its grand strategy. The 1993 NSS document released by the Bush Sr. administration lays out the US position that it was able to defeat the Communist system by nurturing "a democratic community of nations" and "laying the foundation for a global economic system based on multilateral cooperation, liberalized trade, international institutions for financial cooperation and development assistance" (1993, 5). The first NSS document released after the Soviet collapse declares that with respect to Eastern Europe and the former USSR, "Nothing would more profoundly enhance our security than to have our former adversaries succeed in establishing stable democratic, free market systems" (1993, 6). To emphasize that the United States will not be passively waiting for the global diffusion of democracy and markets, the NSS document declares: "After sacrificing so much to contain and defeat Communism, we must act to assure its replacement by democracy, freedom, and human rights" (6).

While it has been widely acknowledged that the United States intended to maintain military primacy to consolidate and perpetuate its gains after the Cold War,[58] less attention has been paid to the security benefits that US policymakers then perceived in the global promotion and spread of liberal democracy. This positive association of increased security with the spread of democracy is apparent in the controversial 1992 Defense Guidance which has been regarded as primarily

[57] Compared to previous administrations, the Trump administration's National Security Strategy (2017) devotes the least space to democracy promotion and expansion of free markets. Rather than championing the expansion of trade as previous administrations have done, the Trump NSS emphasizes corrective counter measures to realize "fair trade" in which other countries are not permitted to use "dumping, discriminatory non-tariff barriers, forced technology transfers, non-economic capacity, industrial subsidies…" (2017, 19). Also, the term "democracy" does not appear in any of the section subtitles as has been the practice in previous administrations - Clinton, Bush, Obama - and instead is subsumed under the generic heading of "American values". The fact that the term "democracy" does not appear anywhere in the table of contents is a notable departure from standard practice of previous administrations.

[58] The Wolfowitz Doctrine as the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance has become informally known, caused controversy because of its forceful advocacy of military primacy to forestall the emergence of peer competitors in the principal regions of the world - Western Europe, East Asia, former Soviet territories, and Southwest Asia. See Department of Defense (1992).

concerned with maintaining US military primacy. For example, the 1992 Defense Guidance argues that the optimal method to prevent the reemergence of a hostile power in the former USSR is to "support the efforts of its successor states to become peaceful democracies with market-based economies." Rather than focusing on the military capabilities of Russia, the Defense Guidance places emphasis on its regime type to forecast its future intentions. Democratized former Soviet states are assumed to be willing to "demilitarize their societies, convert their military industries to civilian production" in addition to refraining from exporting advanced military technologies to third parties (1992, 14). To its discredit, the 1992 Defense Guidance provides no argument as to why democratization would necessarily succeed in persuading another great power to unilaterally disarm, unless the implicit assumption is that democratization signifies turning a great power into a minor power.

The academic literature provides considerable evidence through statistical correlations that two democracies are indeed more likely to maintain peaceful relations than a dyad that comprises two non-democracies or a democracy and a non-democracy, although the logic explaining this relationship is contested.[59] It is not clear from the

[59]There is a large academic literature on the democratic peace showing a strong negative relationship between democratic dyads and the incidence of war. Russett and Oneal (2001) provide statistical evidence showing that a combination of democratic regime type, bilateral trade and membership in international organizations is positively correlated with peaceful dyadic relations. However, the causal mechanism to explain this robust positive correlation is as yet unclear. For example, Rosato (2003) argues that none of the normative and institutional logics for explaining the democratic peace stand up to empirical scrutiny. Instead, Rosato (2003, 599-560) hypothesizes that the democratic peace has prevailed in the post-1945 period because most democracies were in the Americas and Western Europe where the US was militarily and politically preponderant. Also, critiques exist about possibly miscoding dyads. For example, Oren (1995) argues that Woodrow Wilson considered pre-WWI Imperial Germany as an advanced constitutional state on par with England and the United States; indeed, Wilson argued that the civil service method of selection could substitute for elections provided all men had fair opportunity to govern (1995, 173). Relatedly, Joanne Gowa (1999) argues before WWI, democratic dyads were not less likely to go to war than non-democratic dyads; only after WWII does the democratic peace hold, because post-WWII democracies were more likely to be allied to each other against the communist bloc. Recent empirical research argues that a dyad of "limited democracies" are more war-prone than any other kinds of dyads (Baliga, Lucca, and Sjostrom, 2011), which suggests that less than full democratization could actually fuel interstate conflict.

Defense Guidance why a Russian liberal democracy would no longer fear a fully armed United States and proceed to disarm, nor why the burden of disarmament would end up falling only on one party. Applying one prominent causal logic of the democratic peace, one could argue that constitutional democracies enjoy special contracting advantages that permit them to make credible, long term agreements (Lipson 2003)[60], but if this is indeed the case, why would the disarmament of a democratic Russia even be necessary? Under the democratic peace theory, would not a state's capabilities be irrelevant to its future propensity for aggression against democracies provided the state itself remained a liberal democracy? It seems that the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance either had not understood in a theoretically rigorous way how democratization could affect interstate relations, or perhaps, was using the term "democracy" as a diplomatically acceptable substitute for American preponderance and the imposition of an "imperial peace" based on power (Rosato 2003, 559).

The 1994 NSS document released by the Clinton administration is a continuation of the themes of the previous administration's NSS. For example, the 1994 NSS states: "Our national security strategy is based on enlarging the community of market democracies...The more that democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold in the world, particularly in countries of geostrategic importance to us, the safer is our nation likely to be" (1994, 2). More specifically, the document makes clear US intentions to "focus on preserving democratic processes in key emerging democratic states, including Russia, Ukraine, and other new states of the former Soviet Union" (5).

NATO expansion into Eastern Europe has been a good example of the pursuit of this ambitious grand strategy. Recent scholarship has made a well-documented case that the United

[60] Lipson (2003) argues that constitutional democracies enjoy special contracting advantages due to their accessibility to external scrutiny, regime continuity, electoral incentives for democratically elected leaders to keep promises, and constitutional framework that facilitates enduring commitments.

States was interested in NATO's eastward expansion even as it was informally reassuring the Soviet Union in 1990 that there would be no NATO expansion beyond a unified Germany; during the unification negotiations, the deal among the US, FRG, and the Soviet Union was that NATO troops would not be stationed on the territory of the old East Germany post-unification and that NATO would not move eastward to former Warsaw Pact and Baltic states (Sarotte 2010; Shifrinson 2016; Trachtenberg 2021).

Research on alleged US ressurrances to the Soviet Union about NATO expansion mainly concerns private discussions among the leaders. But, as early as 1991, before the final collapse of the USSR, the United States began to publicly signal its intentions to use NATO for broader purposes than the narrower role of defending Western Europe from the Soviet Union. For example, the 1991 NSS, after noting that Eastern European countries were becoming democratic with the withdrawal of Soviet troops, declared that NATO should play an essential role "in promoting a stable security environment throughout Europe, an environment based on democratic institutions...free of intimidation or attempts at hegemony" (1991, 6) Then, it is noted that NATO has already established relations with the militaries of the new Eastern European democracies to help them consolidate their newly-won freedoms (7). While there is no explicit mention of eastward NATO expansion at this point, by clarifying US intentions about using NATO to promote stability throughout the whole of Europe and establishing contacts with the militaries of former Soviet satellites, strong public signals were sent of the possibility that NATO's reach would not remain confined to the territory of the former FRG.

Related to this view that the United States has always been eager to expand NATO eastward, some analysts have made a strong case that the Ukraine crisis has been the result of Russia's moves to defend itself against NATO and EU encroachment eastward. The EU would be

the economic arm and NATO the military arm of this US-led project to spread liberal democracy and free markets to authoritarian Eastern European countries like Russia (Mearsheimer 2014).

Given that the United States is the world's leading liberal democracy and largest open market economy, leveraging NATO - itself an alliance of democratic states - to spread its ideology and to destabilize adversarial regimes serves as a force multiplier. The increased credibility gained by the US in acting through a liberal international security institution like NATO more than offsets any incremental freedom of action it may gain by acting extra-institutionally. This dynamic is even more pronounced when it is the only great power in the institution and other members are essentially security wards dependent on the United States for extended deterrence

European Fears of United Germany's Future Intentions

The latitude enjoyed by the United States within NATO is a function of the willingness of its European NATO allies to rely on US nuclear deterrence and to countenance liberal hegemony with equanimity. This is in good part due to the European NATO members' fear of resurgent German nationalism, uncertainty about its future intentions, and their lack of military capabilities to deal with the return of great power politics on their continent without US assistance. A return of great power politics in Europe meant that a united Germany could become "free once again to roam over the West and East and play the East off against the West with see-saw diplomacy, *Schaukelpolitik*, at the expense of French interests and West European integration" (Mitterand 1997, 129, as cited in Newton 2013, 310).

The prospect of a unified Germany caused much unease and foreboding in the British: UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher wanted to postpone unification for as long as possible; the rapid turn of events through the three-way negotiations among Kohl, Bush, and Gorbachev leading to the removal of Soviet troops and German unification caused great dismay for the British. Thatcher

complained to French President Mitterand about German Chancellor Kohl's single-minded focus on reunification: "West Germany was constantly pressing forward toward unification...this would confront us all with a major problem and could cause particular difficulties for Mr. Gorbachev" (Bozo 2015, 139).

Publicly, the French President Mitterand was more diplomatic, taking care to weigh Germany's sovereign rights against the exigencies of European stability, but in private he also expressed alarm at what he perceived to be Kohl's hurried pace on reunification, replying to Thatcher that the Germans were acting "with a certain brutality and concentrating on reunification to the exclusion of everything else" (Bozo 2015, 139). Thatcher confided to Mitterand that the British felt London, Paris, and Moscow should cooperate to impose a significant transition period before completing the reunification process, reminding him of the four Allied Powers' rights over Germany deriving from post-WWII occupation of the country (140).

Thatcher's suggestion for a tripartite obstruction of German reunification did not go very far because the United States was fully on board with reunifying the Germanies quickly, which would eventually lead to the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the territory of the GDR and the movement eastward of NATO borders to at least the Oder Neisse (Art 1996, 11-12). An added bonus for the United States was that Germany would foot the bill for "bribing" the Soviets out: by the Spring of 1990, German Chancellor Kohl convinced German commercial banks Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank to extend a loan of DM 5 billion to the Soviet Union, a sum that the Soviets could not borrow on international credit markets (Sarotte 2010, 122). In the summer of 1990, the FRG agreed to pay DM 1.25 to defray stationing costs of Soviet troops in the GDR and permitted Soviet soldiers to exchange their savings into Deutschmarks at an above-market rate (2010, 127).

While Thatcher wanted US-led NATO to continue as the leading security institution in Europe to tie down Germany and keep out Russia (Art 1996, 19-22), Mitterand wanted Germany firmly integrated into both NATO and a more European-centric security institution such as the European Defense Identity (Art 1996, 13-19; Bozo 2009, 952-954) the latter option for which the Bush administration showed little interest given its determination to keep NATO the leading security organization for Europe (Sarotte 2019, 11-13). For example, the first President Bush told Mitterand at the NATO Rome Summit in 1991: "We cannot support the development of a European force delinked from the Alliance, in competition with it or based on the premise that NATO is fading away" (Bozo 2009, 951).

In addition to such historically grounded fear of German resurgence harbored by neighboring states, German elites and people themselves also wanted to remain a part of NATO and under the US security umbrella to reassure neighboring countries of their country's benign intentions; German domestic liberal elites may have seen the continued US military presence in Germany under the NATO banner as a method to keep at bay illiberal, nationalist forces, "reinforcing democracy and civilian control of the military" (Wallander 1999, 160). An official in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed fear that a "number of people in German society are now thinking that they are a big power and should behave like one." (Art 1996, 23). Despite German public opinion favoring a post-unification departure of US forces, the German political elite shared a strong consensus against pursuing unilateralism (*Sonderweg*) and supported enmeshing their country in multilateral institutions such as NATO; during the Cold War, German political leaders had sometimes pursued policies on important security issues unpopular with the general public and their continued commitment to NATO reflected this tradition (Duffield 1994/95, 784).

The German fear of its own potential for aggression has manifested itself politically and legally in what some scholars call the "domestication" of the sovereign executive, according to which the German chancellor's executive authority to mobilize military force remains heavily constrained by the Bundesrat. For example, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled in 1994 that the executive can only deploy troops abroad if in cooperation with other states in a collective security system; the Bundestag was acknowledged as constituting - as the source of - the executive's sovereign authority and possessing of the right to set domestic limits on the executive's assertion of military power (Harnisch 2009, 462; Wiegandt 1995, 904-913). German troop deployment in the Balkans was justified on the grounds that the Bundestag had ratified the FRG's entry into NATO in 1954, but a significant minority of dissenting justices in the 1994 ruling argued that NATO's offensive intervention in Yugoslavia should require a treaty amendment that should in turn be ratified once again by the Bundestag; bracketing this process undermined the rights of the German parliament (Wiegandt 1995, 910).

Domestically thus constrained from engaging in bold, executive-led unilateral actions to respond proactively to the changing threat environment, Germany by default must rely on NATO for its security. Germany's domestic political, legal, and even psychological milieu ties its hands, sends costly signals to its neighbors of its benign intentions, and makes NATO the most natural mechanism for playing out its role as a "civilian power." With a domesticated, semi-sovereign executive, Germany's role in international politics is limited to reinforcing international law and promoting multilateral principles and cooperation (Brummer and Oppermann 2018, 2). Some scholars argue that post-Cold War Germany has begun to behave as a more "normal" state pursuing its egoistic interests within the EU by driving harder bargains on austerity with Mediterranean neighbors (2018, 8-9). But if egoism in the economic sphere qualifies Germany as a

"normal" state,[61] it has always been rather normal. The determinant of normalcy should be whether the executive is empowered to take unilateral military actions if necessary in the pursuit of the nation's core security interests affecting its prospects for survival, and the tight self-imposed lock on Germany's ability to do so signifies that it is not a "normal" state, but a "semi-sovereign state".[62]

In addition to fears of a latent, offensively-oriented nationalistic strain in German society that could potentially set the country on a path of renewed aggression, concerns existed for the rise of a resentful nationalism in response to the perception that Germany had to apologize in pertuity for its past deeds and to go out of its way to reassure its neighbors of its benign intentions, even as these same neighbors called for encircling and containing it. As German Chancellor Kohl noted, this kind of talk - on containing Germany - "plays into the hands of precisely those forces, not least in Germany, which propagate old-style nationalism" (1996, 23). Therefore, both the German left and the governing center harbored fears about the domestic consequences and the international effects of their country's reunification; indeed, the German far left opposed reunification, while the ruling center advocated for policies to tie down Germany within European institutions and to bind its fate with other European states (24).

There were two main methods to tie down Germany and to bind its fate to that of its neighbors: the intensification of intra-European integration through monetary, political union and the development of a European defense identity (EDI), and keeping NATO. These methods were not mutually exclusive and Germany's governing center coalition embraced both means to reassure France, which was partial to the intra-European integration route, and the UK and the United States, which preferred NATO (Art 1996, 25). German Chancellor Helmut Kohl was wise to take

[61] Germany is better characterized as a geo-economic power that has pursued its commercial interests by nurturing a powerful export sector, but it is not a "geostrategic actor" which the United States is (Szabo 2017).
[62] For the term "semi-sovereign state" see Harnisch (2009).

the moderate route, because the United States has consistently maintained the stance that NATO must remain the preeminent security organization for post-Cold War Europe. For example, the 1991 National Security Strategy document acknowledges the European Defense Identity (EDI) and efforts by Europeans to take on more responsibility for their own security, but with the caveat that NATO must not be sidelined: "While European governments will naturally take the lead in developing their own institutions, these efforts will enjoy our full support as long as they strengthen the Alliance" (1991, 7). A powerful bipartisan consensus and the long continuity of US policy were on display a decade later when under a different administration the 2000 National Security Strategy issued an identical statement on NATO: while acknowledging European allies' efforts to develop their own European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), NATO is described as the "leading guarantor of European security and a force for European stability" (2000, 52). The EU may play an increased security role under the ESDP, but "we intend to remain fully engaged in European security issues, both politically and militarily" (52).

European Uncertainties about Russia's Future Intentions

Another demand factor explaining NATO's post-Soviet continuity was the lingering European fears of the re-emergence of Russia as a great power with aggressive intentions. The prospect of a Russian revival was threatening to Europeans because of Russia's formidable nuclear arsenal - officially the largest in the world in terms of number of weapons[63] - and its vast reserves of hydrocarbons[64] vital for running Europe's economies. A revived Russia could leverage these two sources of power to influence and to coerce Europe.[65] I have argued that a key supply factor

[63] See Arms Control Association (2020a). Russia to this day maintains 6375 nuclear warheads vs 5800 in the United States and 320 in China.

[64] As of 2017, Russia was the world's largest producer of crude oil and third largest producer of petroleum and other liquids, after Saudi Arabia and the United States (EIA 2017, 1). In 2016, 70 percent of Russian oil exports went to European countries (2017, 10-11). Russian proved oil reserves were 80 billion barrels as of January (4); Russia holds the largest proved natural gas reserves in the world (16).

[65] High oil prices in the 1970s and the construction of oil and gas pipelines from the Soviet Union into Eastern Europe raised fears that Western Europe would also become dependent on energy imports from the

for the continuity of NATO has been the US policy objective of promoting and consolidating democracy and markets in Eastern Europe. This US policy objective was also grounded in uncertainty about Russian intentions so that both the US and its European allies shared in a common apprehension over Russia's future intentions.

While the Soviet Union "collapsed" at the end of 1991, it must be remembered that Russian troops did not fully withdraw from the territory of the former GDR until August 31, 1994. Between 1989 and 1993, the German government had to pay the Russians DM 90 billion in aid money (approx. 45 billion euros) to bribe the Red Army out of Germany (Newnham 2017, 46-47). One of the pretexts for the 1991 failed Soviet coup by Stalinist hardliners was opposition to the Soviet troop withdrawal from the GDR, and with 400,000 troops still stationed there, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl could not rest easy until the Red Army had completely left (2017, 48). With deteriorating living conditions, Soviet troops stationed in East Germany seemed "desperate, hungry, and potentially dangerous" (Sarotte 2010, 126). The Soviet foreign minister Shevardnadze confided to the FRG foreign minister Genscher that the troops deployed in the GDR had their wives and children with them, and that in a crisis it was not clear whose orders they would necessarily follow (2010, 127). From at least as early as 1959 until 1994, the Soviets had also deployed nuclear tipped missiles in small East German towns a few miles north of Berlin (Evans 2012). By 1991, the Soviet Union had deployed around 20,000 nuclear weapons on 600 bases, with that number falling to 6300 weapons by 2020, still qualifying as the world's largest nuclear arsenal.[66] The point is that the disintegration of the Soviet Union did not immediately affect the

Soviets. President Reagan pressured NATO members to boycott Soviet gas pipelines being built to supply Western Europe (Newnham 2011, 136).

[66] For these figures see Arms Control Association (2020a) and Woolf (2020, 13).

military reality on the ground and required a few years[67] of bribing and persuasion for the post-Communist transition to consolidate.

The French President Mitterand is said to have told Gorbachev: "Germany is our friend, but I feel more comfortable with you" (Bozo 2015, 116). But French avowal of its level of comfort with Russia was a relative one, and the evidence shows that France preferred to consolidate West European integration through such measures as the European Monetary Union (EMU), rather than pursuing a pan-European path that integrated Russia through the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), an alternative path favored by Gorbachev. For example, Gorbachev, concerned about the Soviet Union being left out of Europe and becoming the target of a new NATO that included a unified Germany, told US Secretary of State Baker: "I will propose to the President, and will say publicly, we want to enter NATO" (Sarotte 2010, 125). However, the US reluctance to accept this proposal and the French preference for a federalist, West European-centric integration contributed to alienating Russia from the rest of Europe.

Earlier, Charles De Gaulle had preferred a *confederal* approach to Europe that used interdependence only instrumentally to constrain German behavior while maximizing French sovereignty; in this scheme of a loose, confederal Europe, the Soviet Union was deemed a welcome eastern presence to balance against perceived US predominance and to put a further lid on the resuscitation of Germany as a great power. Mitterand gave up on this Gaullist policy and opted for more federalism at the expense of French sovereignty and Russian involvement in the balance of power in Western Europe.[68]

[67] The exact time frame for full Soviet withdrawal from the GDR was open to bargaining and a matter of uncertainty. At the July 1990 meeting in Archys, Gorbachev suggested withdrawal within five to seven years of German unification, and Kohl had to pay the Soviets to reduce the time to four years and to "compensate" them for the costs of withdrawal, resettlement, and retraining of deployed troops (Sarotte 2010, 132).

[68] For an extended discussion of this aspect of change in French policy from favoring limited, confederal integration to federal European integration, see Newton (2013, 306-313).

While there is the perspective that Mitterand excluded Russia because he subscribed to a vision of restoring the medieval Carolingian empire in the West as opposed to the statist, Gaullist philosophy (Newton 2013, 306), it is more likely that Mitterand simply did not trust the Soviet Union/Russia to play a responsible role if invited into Europe. Had Mitterand trusted the Russians, their presence would have been welcome under either one of the two circumstances that would have followed the end of the Cold War, (a) complete US withdrawal from Europe, or (b) continued US involvement with NATO. First, in the case of a US withdrawal, France alone would not have been capable of tying down Germany; a "Common European Home" framework pushed by Gorbachev would have provided France with added Russian assistance to more securely hold down the Germans. Second, in the case of continued US involvement with NATO, France could have considered involving the Russians à la de Gaulle to balance against US dominance; in this second scenario, the US would tie down Germany in line with French preferences, but France would cooperate with Russia to ensure that the US did not become too overbearing in its unipolar moment. That Mitterand chose the narrower West European integration rather than Gorbachev's pan-European path despite the advantages of the latter option - contingent on trust in Russia - suggests that France saw too much uncertainty in Russia's future intentions to consider deepening its engagement with it through institutions.

By the time of Putin's ascension to the Russian presidency in May 2000, Russia was an economically broken country[69] and despite its formidable nuclear arsenal, most Europeans did not fear it as much as they had before the last Red Army divisions withdrew from East Germany in 1994 (Newnham 2017, 44-45). However, European apprehensions about Russia began to return

[69] During Russia's 1991-1998 transition from a Soviet centrally planned economy to capitalism, it lost 30 percent of its GDP. It experienced an inflation rate of 2000 percent in 1992 and a still high 20 percent by the end of the decade. By 1999, Russia had experienced a capital flight of US $150 billion. For a summary of Russia's economic woes in this period see Cooper (2009, 2-5).

when the start of a bull market in commodities including oil and gas coincided with Putin's terms in office, reviving the country's economy, reducing its dependence on the West, and in mirror-image fashion demonstrating Western dependence on vital Russian hydrocarbons. During Putin's two terms in office, the Russian economy expanded at an annual rate of 6.9 percent, and average real wages went up by 10.9 percent per year; the unemployment also halved from 12.6 to 6.3 percent (Cooper 2009, 5). On the back of booming commodity prices,[70] Russia's total exports increased six-fold from only US $75 billion in 1999 to US $471 billion in 2008 (2009, 8). Between 1998 to 2005, Russian annual exports to Germany - mostly oil and gas - nearly tripled from EUR 7.7 billion to EUR 22.3 billion, allowing it to pay off the entirety of its US $60 billion debt to the Paris Club of creditor nations (Newnham 2017, 54). By the end of German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's term in 2005, Russia alone supplied 40 percent of Germany's natural gas imports; Schroeder acted to deepen this over-reliance on Russian hydrocarbons by approving the construction of the first phase of the Nordstream gas pipeline which began operations in 2011 (2017, 52). Poland and Ukraine resented this move as the overland gas pipelines through their territories would lose relative value, endangering transit payments to the two governments, and raising fears of coercive Russian gas cutoffs that would spare Germany since it would be served by a separate pipeline traversing the Baltic Sea (52-53).

Putin, at the helm of a booming economy and no longer as economically beholden to the West as his predecessors[71] began to take bold measures to reassert Russia's status as a great power. For example, in 2005, Russia leveraged its position as the main supplier of hydrocarbons to

[70] Oil prices hit a low of US $12.50 per barrel before steadily increasing in price throughout Putin terms in office. By July 2008, oil prices hit a high of US $134.37 per barrel. In 2007, oil, natural gas, and coal constituted 65 percent of Russian export revenues (Cooper 2009, 16-17).

[71] Gorbachev' Soviet Union was so short of cash that it accepted economic aid from the FRG in return for withdrawing from the GDR (Sarotte 2010, 121-123). Russia under Yeltsin borrowed funds from banks by placing shares of state-owned companies as collateral; when the state defaulted on the loans, the lenders acquired the companies, effectively privatizing the Russian state sector on the cheap and giving rise to the oligarchs who controlled large parts of the Russian economy (Newnham 2011, 136-137).

Ukraine to coerce the country's pro-Western president Yanukovich who had come to power through the Orange Revolution: state-owned Gazprom hiked gas prices from US $50 per TCM to US $235 per TCM and demanded Ukraine's immediate repayment of accumulated debts for gas services (Newnham 2011, 140). In August 2008, Russia waged war against Georgia to support the separatist forces in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, successfully ejecting the Georgian army from the two breakaway regions. Incidentally, the Georgian president Saakashvili was a pro-Western politician brought to power through the Rose Revolution, in parallel with Yanukovich's Orange Revolution.[72] In 2014, Putin moved on from supporting the sovereignty claims of non-Russian separatists to supporting Russian co-ethnics in the Crimea by annexing the territory from Ukraine.[73]

According to some prominent analysis Russia's recent military overtures constitute a defensive reaction to NATO expansion eastward (Mearsheimer 2014). The counterfactual in this reasoning is that had NATO not expanded, Russia would not have resorted to aggression in its near abroad. However, one could also argue that NATO expansion itself was a preventive defensive measure against prospective Russian reassertion of power. If the above dynamics were at play, then NATO-Russia relations correspond to a genuine security dilemma/spiral model in which security-seekers are doomed to compete in self-defeating competition (Jervis 1978; Snyder 1984; Glaser 1997; Tang 2009).

If Russia's aggressive reactions were indeed those of a defensive security seeker, NATO would have been better off not expanding, sending a costly signal[74] to the Russians of its benign intentions, thereby reassuring the latter and dampening any competitive spiral. But, it is not clear

[72] For a background and analysis of the Russian conflict with Georgia see Cooley and Mitchell (2009; 2010).
[73] There are at least three explanations for Russian actions in recent years: (1) defensive reaction to NATO expansion; (2) imperial project to restore the territories of the Soviet empire; and (3) improvised gambits (Treisman 2016, 47-48).
[74] Sending a costly signal in this context involves engaging in an action that would be costly for a greedy state but relatively costless for a security-seeker. See Kydd (1997) for some of the methods available for security-seekers to identify themselves to other actors.

whether Russia ever has been a security-seeker and therefore whether the security dilemma should be the preferred approach to model bilateral relations. The hawkish Harvard historian Richard Pipes (2004) has opined that Russia's combative posture cannot be simply attributed to Putin, but rather to the conservative nationalism of the Russian people. Combining Russia's patrimonial and peasant historical context[75] with its myriad struggles against foreign invaders, Pipes (2004, 11) argues that ordinary Russians are contemptuous of Western-style, multi-party liberal democracy, preferring instead order over freedom and strong leaders in the mould of Peter the Great, Lenin, and Stalin, who can make Russia great and feared abroad (2004, 14). Revealingly, in a poll that Pipes (2004, 14) cites, a very significant 48 percent of Russians want their nation to be perceived abroad as "mighty, unbeatable, indestructible, a great world power" versus only 3 percent who preferred their country to be perceived as "peace-loving and friendly" or "law-abiding and democratic."

In assessing state motivations, the electoral process plays an important role in revealing the policy preferences of the electorate and the candidates running for office (Kydd 1997, 130). Despite Western criticisms about authoritarian tendencies in Russian politics and evidence of fraud in the electoral system, prominent Russia experts - using a "list experiment" method to account for possible self-censorship of survey respondents - have concluded that Putin enjoys genuinely high public approving ratings, reaching 80 percent in 2015 and never dipping below 60 percent during his terms in office (Frye, Gelbach, Marquardt, and Reuter, 2017). Thus, it seems Richard Pipes was correct to conclude that the Russian people's deeply rooted, conservative nationalism is the main cause of its frictions with the West and that Putin's popularity is owing to his pursuit of policies reflecting the national will. Furthermore, using these facts to assess Russia's motivations,

[75] To understand patrimonialism as a unique form of governance in Russia centered around an absolutist Tsar and a weak nobility as his appendage, see Richard Pipes, *Russia under the Old Regime* (London, England: Penguin Books, 1993).

one cannot conclude that Russia is a security-seeker and that the country and NATO are going through a security dilemma. Rather, Russians want their country to be strong, to stand up to the West, to regain its former glory, and not be "law-abiding and democratic" or "peace-loving and friendly" as Westerners expect.

If Russia is likely not a security-seeker, then what about US-led NATO? Successive administrations in the United States have made liberal democracy and free market promotion as a pillar of their grand strategy. The implication of such a grand strategy is that if a target country does not embrace such values and institutions, it will have to one day be made to accept them. Color revolutions, supporting anti-regime rebel groups, and outright invasions have been some of the more visible methods applied to realize this aspect of the grand strategy. It is most probable that Russia does not regard the United States and NATO as security-seekers.

Therefore, there is neither a security dilemma nor a "a tragedy of great power politics" at work in NATO-Russia relations, since both parties are clear about the other's present and future intentions. US-led NATO wants the expansion and consolidation of its institutions and values in the east, including regime change in Russia. Russia wants to regain its former glory as a world power. If my analysis is correct, then it makes little sense for either party to send costly signals about benign intentions or to restrain oneself in the face of opportunities to score tactical and strategic victories.

The continuity of NATO and its expansion eastward are logical consequences of an accurate assessment of Russia as a revisionist power intent on regaining its former superpower status, and an honest self-understanding of US-led NATO as a crusading power determined to spread its values and institutions by whatever means available. Not expanding NATO under such circumstances would have given Russia a free lunch and amounted to an idealistic denial of the

dangerousness of international politics. As the German jurist Carl Schmitt noted, "If a people no longer possess the energy or the will to maintain itself in the sphere of politics, the latter will not thereby vanish from the world...only a weak people will disappear" (2007, 53). President George H. Bush understood the point well and expressed it more simply in regards to why the US should not compromise with the Russians: "To hell with that! We prevailed, they didn't. We cannot let the Soviets clutch victory from the jaws of defeat" (Sarotte 2010, 136). Given such fundamentally aggressive motives on both sides, whatever restraint one might witness between NATO and Russia should be temporary and tactical; perhaps an even greater East Asian adversary on the horizon - say, an anti-Western, Sino-DPRK alliance - could bring them together in a coalition, and only if that East Asian enemy does not succeed in breaking up any NATO-Russia entente by either providing Russia with incentives to buck-pass, bandwagon, or taking out one power at a time.[76]

European NATO Allies's Military Ineffectiveness

The final demand factor explaining the European allies' acceptance of US leadership in NATO has been their military ineffectiveness, proven while addressing out-of-area contingencies in Bosnia and Kosovo. European allies did not have the requisite airpower nor the resolve to sacrifice ground troops to address Serbian atrocities; US airpower was a key element in restoring order in the Balkans (Stigler 2002/2003).

The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) did not challenge NATO's preeminent role in Europe's security because the CFSP was run by the Council of Europe, an

[76] There is no guarantee that a balance of power will always form to check aggressors. The Western European experience of repeated and successful balancing against potential hegemons from Napoleon to Hitler, is an exception rather than the norm in the context of both European and world history. For example, the Roman Empire itself was an example of a potential hegemon that neutralized balancing against it and achieved hegemony. The Mongol Empire incorporated countless states across Asia and unified nearly the whole continent under its rule. Drawing on empirical evidence from China's Qin Dynasty - the first dynasty to unify all of China - Notre Dame political scientist Victoria Hui (2006) contrasts the logic of balancing against the logic of domination; in the logic of domination, potential hegemons rely on divide and rule, ruthless stratagems, and self-strengthening reforms to break apart balancing coalitions and achieve hegemony.

executive body of European heads of state that operates on unanimity voting procedures for certain policy areas. The states in the EU retained full sovereignty over sensitive areas in the foreign policy and security domains. In addition to concerns about retaining sovereignty, the EU did not find success in building a European military because of perennially low defense expenditures by member states and the lack of equipment for out of area operations such as satellite intelligence systems, air-refuelling assets, and heavy transport long-range aircraft (Gordon 1997/98, 94). The EU would need to borrow NATO military assets to conduct independent operations, but these same NATO military assets are mostly American assets.

The deficiencies in EU military capabilities and low defense spending noted at the end of the last century have continued unabated to this day. For example, on measures of three core military systems deemed essential for conventional land warfare, the combined forces of six European militaries - France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK, and Poland - have seen steep declines since 1990: the number of main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery have each plunged by 85, 64, and 56 percent, respectively (Meijer and Brooks 2021, 25). Aside from severe shortfalls in individual weapons systems, Europe remains reliant on American command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) to put its weapons to effective use (2021, 26). But, to acquire the necessary C4ISR capabilities Europe would need to make costly investments with long lead times to build reconnaissance and communications satellites; early warning and control aircrafts; sensor systems; and air, naval, and land command and control platforms (26). Europe is a wealthy continent, but its defense and technological industrial base remains fragmented along national lines and must adopt an integrative, continent-wide common procurement policy to generate the economies of scale necessary for building complex and expensive weapons systems (32). Therefore, the problems

involved in developing autonomous European defense capabilities goes well beyond simply meeting the 2 percent of GDP target.

As the European security expert Sven Biscop (2018, 173) argues, "Spending more is not in itself an answer, given that the nature and scale of many key shortfalls is such that no single European state is capable of acquiring sufficient capabilities to make a difference." To become less reliant on US strategic assets related to C4ISR, fragmented, national defense industrial bases must cooperate to "achieve synergies and effects of scale, and by minimizing duplication" an effective European military could emerge even with defense spending at less than 2 percent of GDP (2018, 173).

However, Biscop's (2018) prescription to rationalize the continent's fragmented defense industrial base[77] is easier said than followed from both realist and liberal intergovernmental perspectives. The European Council and the Council of Ministers - intergovernmental organizations composed of heads of state and nationally appointed officials - retain the final say on all matters related to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); on major foreign policy and core national security matters, the 28 EU member states need to reach unanimity, effectively giving each member veto power.[78] The 2009 Lisbon Treaty is clear on the fact that "national security remains the sole responsibility of each member state" (Bindi 2011, 126). Post-Lisbon Treaty institutional innovations such as a foreign affairs high representative (HR) and the European External Action Services (EEAS) do not substitute for national ministries of foreign affairs and their ministers (Lesquene 2015, 356). Essentially, these EU bodies serve as secretariats and clerks for coordinating intergovernmental bargaining, with no sovereignty invested in them by the

[77] As of 2020, Europe had 178 different weapon systems versus only 30 for the US, demonstrating the duplications and redundancies in Europe's national defense industries (Gifford 2020).
[78] For an introduction to the rather complex web of EU institutions and institutional responsibilities and accountabilities, see Dermot Hodson and John Peterson eds., *Institutions of the European Union* (Oxford, UK, 2017), chs., 3, 4, and 13.

member states. Therefore, rationalization of European defense industries will require intergovernmental bargaining, in which case domestic constituencies and vested interests in national defense industries will loudly object to any transnational efficiency-enhancing consolidation plans that may lead to job losses. Applying Moravschik's theory of liberal intergovernmentalism (1998) and the theory of collective action (Olson 1965), one can see that the concentrated interests of domestically-oriented, inefficient national defense industries will exert the most pressure on national leaders; the costs of a fragmented European defense sector is widely dispersed in the form of less security for all Europeans, while the benefits of maintaining inefficient national defense industries accrues to vocal national minorities whose livelihoods are on the line. Once national preferences are formed, Moravschik (1998) argues that states that would most benefit from a deal will have to make concessions to those who would prefer the status quo. In the context of European defense rationalization, those states with large, advanced, and efficient defense sectors would be most open to continental integration and consolidation. Of the 28 EU members, only some - France, Germany, and Italy - as measured by revenues and market share have large, competitive defense industries that would be left standing relatively unscathed after a continental consolidation spree (Schutz and Molling 2018, 3). Therefore, given the unanimity voting procedure on the European Council, national leaders from countries with relatively inefficient defense sectors will veto EU-led efforts on this front.

A realist reason why EU defense industrial base consolidation will be difficult relates to the argument that success will be contingent on the degree to which EU states anticipate a US turn to unreliable unilateralism and abandonment through troop withdrawal (Jones 2006, 136-139). However, as I have argued earlier, there is little reason to fear US abandonment because to support

its grand strategic objective of nuclear non-proliferation, it will remain committed for the foreseeable future to providing extended nuclear deterrence for Europe.

Seth Jones (2006) has argued that US unilateralism forces EU states to hedge against abandonment by increasing their defense spending and intra-European cooperation. Latest figures show that Germany increased its 2019 defense expenditures by 10 percent to $49.3 billion. However, this remains only 1.38 percent of German GDP, well below the NATO commitment of 2 percent.[79] Contra the perspective presented by Seth Jones (2006) of European allies slowly but surely working towards security autonomy, why has Germany kept its military expenditures so low even in 2019, nearing the end of the term of the most unconventional US administration in recent memory? One educated speculation comes from a reconsideration of the role of "strategies of inhibition" in US grand strategy (Gavin 2015) and the European allies' understanding of the centrality of this grand strategic pillar: if nuclear non-proliferation is indeed so critical to US grand strategy, the US would never disengage from central Europe to the extent that Germany - as a major civilian nuclear power[80] - retains the latent power to quickly build nuclear weapons. Knowing that the US would never abandon Germany, the Europeans, despite constant chidings from successive US administrations to spend more on defense, may continue to muddle through without fundamentally restructuring their security postures or increasing defense spending.

Barry Posen's (2020) campaign analysis-based argument that Europe has the wealth, population, advantageous geography, adequate conventional military assets, and even French and British nuclear weapons at its disposal to independently deter Russia, is besides the point. It is highly plausible that the combined capabilities of a wealthy continent could deter Russia. The

[79] See Heinrich (2020) https://www.dw.com/en/sipri-germany-significantly-increases-military-spending/a-53250926 (accessed on January 12, 2021).
[80] While the German government has pledged to shut down all of its nuclear reactors by 2022, it still has six in operation and 26 are undergoing decommissioning (IAEA 2020).

deterrent power of a nuclear-armed Germany could probably achieve this outcome without any European integration. NATO's continuity and French support for European integration are two faces of the same coin of tying down Germany and preventing any further nuclear proliferation. In this sense, Europe's low defense spending far below even the moderate 2 percent NATO target, constant US chidings across administrations to spend more on defense, and ultimately no change in the status quo, have become ritual steps in a readily recognizable and repetitive political dance that will not end until the US can embrace selective nuclear proliferation.

IV. Alternative Arguments

I have argued that NATO has remained effective because it is a modern day Delian League led by one great power who is free to pursue its grand strategic objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and democracy promotion by leveraging its position in NATO. But, the junior allies also have had a strong interest in maintaining a US-led NATO to address their apprehensions about the future intentions of Germany and Russia, and to compensate for their perennially low defense expenditures as percentage of GDP. In addition to only having one great power member, NATO's rules do not constrain the United States in important ways; even the famous Article V was first invoked after the 9/11 attacks to support the US. Meanwhile, NATO imposes important constraints on Germany and other non-nuclear members to remain non-nuclear. Furthermore, given the strong US interest in promoting democracy and free markets in Eastern Europe, NATO members have cooperated by reducing their economic ties with Russia and joining in US efforts to pressure the Putin government.

The standard realist views on NATO's post-Cold War continuity only partial explanations, focusing on either the demand or the supply factors without considering them *in toto*. For example, Christopher Layne (2000) argues that increasing US capabilities guided its intentions and

expanded policy objectives, leading to a bid to maintain its hegemony in Europe and beyond by perpetuating NATO. But, Layne focuses on the supply side - why the US decided to stay - while paying little attention to the demand side - European fears of German and Russian resurgence and lack of European military capabilities. My analysis shows that NATO's continuity was not a one-sided imposition of hegemonic designs on weak allies, but the result of a fortunate coincidence in which the US could pursue its own interests while meeting the security demands of its European allies. Meanwhile, Robert Art (1996) focuses on the demand side - renationalization fears, uncertainties around German reunification - and underemphasizes the supply side US incentives to stay in Europe. Stephen Walt (2019) has similarly opined that NATO is all about addressing European anxieties about returning to interstate rivalry in the absence of the American pacifier. That is one aspect of NATO - the demand side - but the supply side that Walt overlooks is that the US also has an interest in staying to prevent nuclear proliferation.

Liberal institutional arguments focus on NATO's observable institutional features while underemphasizing the interests, preferences, and the balance of power among member states that comprise the institution and determine its shape and direction. For example, Celeste Wallander and Robert Keohane (1999, 34) argue that NATO has successfully transitioned from a threat-directed alliance to a risk-management institution because it had a variety of rules, features, and functions that could be adapted to new security environments; NATO's hybridness made it an especially portable institution for the managing risks in post-Cold War Europe. This may be an adequate description of NATO, but it does not explain *why* NATO had risk-management and power aggregation functions that allowed it to adapt. An analysis of the demand and supply factors for NATO and the preeminent power position of the United States can better account for why NATO has taken its current form and function.

G. John Ikenberry's (2001) explanation for NATO continuity does *not* apply his theory of constitutional order building. Instead, European states' fear of renewed Russian imperialism is raised as one motivation to maintain and to expand the alliance (2001, 236), which is the demand side of my argument for NATO continuity; again in congruence with my argument on the supply side is mentioned the US objective of locking in democractic and market reforms on the continent (239). According to Ikenberry (2001, 248) "the persistence of order among the Cold War allies...does not validate any particular theory" although he hypothesizes that binding institutions most likely restrained the unipole and dissuaded weaker states from balancing against or pulling away from the US. However, rather than restraining the unipole, NATO serves as an additional leverage for the unipole to efficiently pursue its policy objectives of preventing nuclear proliferation and the spread of its values and institutions. Ikenberry's (2001) conceptual lapse is that he sees institutions primarily as tools of equal restraint rather than as a mechanism for enabling influence and discipline by one party over another.

Constructivist perspectives on NATO continuity rely on logics of norm internalization and common collective identity (Risse-Kappen 1996; Schimmelfennig 2003; 2007) and security communities and communities of practice (Adler and Barnett 1998; Adler 2008). According to these views, NATO members have internalized common values and norms and broadly share a liberal democratic identity. War is unthinkable among the members of a security community sharing deeply held liberal democratic norms; member self-restraint is a critical practice in the security community (Adler 2008, 198). In my analysis of post-Cold War NATO, there is little evidence to provide strong support for these hypotheses. For example, leaders of Britain and France demonstrated apprehension if not outright fears about a unified German's future intentions. Had liberal democratic norms and self-restraint been deeply ingrained in NATO, French president

Mitterard would not have exerted so much effort to speed up European integration to further bind Germany. Also, German liberal elites expressed uncertainties about the future direction of their country's nationalist impulse and therefore wished to remain in NATO as a hedge against domestic instability. Finally, despite talks about deeply ingrained norms and self-restraint, nuclear weapons are not shared, remaining under tight control of the respective American, British, and French militaries.

V. Conclusion

This chapter considered the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to understand how an international security institution could remain highly effective despite a significant shift in the balance of power. The Soviet collapse represented the most dramatic structural change to the international system since 1945, ending bipolarity and turning the United States into a unipole. Without potential regional hegemons on the horizon in Europe, why did not the United States leave NATO and disengage from that region? Relying on realist logic, convincing arguments appeared predicting or advocating for the retrenchment of overseas deployed US forces and the withdrawal from related security institutions (Mearsheimer 1990; Carpenter 1994; Gholz et. al. 1997; Layne 1997).[81]

Instead, we have seen steadfast US commitment to Europe and the continued effectiveness of NATO as a key forum for European countries to connect among themselves and with the United States on key security issues facing their region. Liberal institutionalist scholars have argued that NATO has evolved as an institution by adapting to new contexts and adopting new roles (Heftendorn, Keohane, Wallander, 1999) but this is a description rather than an identification of the

[81] Christopher Layne (1997) argues that the US follows a strategy of preponderance whereby it seeks to maintain and to expand a zone of mutually enforcing security and economic interdependence; guaranteeing this is US military power. A feature of this strategy is keeping a lid on German and Japan renationalization and reemergence as great powers. Thus, Layne's (1997) theory provides one plausible explanation for the continuing US presence in NATO Europe.

causal factors that led to such institutional change. The key question is how NATO successfully managed to adapt its security assets - an integrated military command structure, joint force planning, political consultation mechanisms - to new missions, transforming itself from a Cold War alliance to a "security management organization" (1999, 45). I have argued that the policy preferences of the United States grounded in its ambitions under unipolarity and the match between the former and the security vulnerabilities of European allies have been the driving force in NATO's continuity and effectiveness.

Social constructivist arguments (Adler and Barnett 1998; Adler 2008; Schimmelfennig 2007) point to common liberal democratic identity internalization by NATO states and the consequent creation of a security community as the cause of institutional continuity and expansion following the Soviet collapse. In contrast, empirical evidence in this chapter suggests much anxiety about Germany's power and future intentions, and apprehensions about the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear NATO members.

This chapter has applied a power and interest-based theory to demonstrate that neither liberal institutionalist nor constructivist logics are necessary to understand NATO's continued effectiveness. Conventional realist logic cannot explain post-Cold War NATO because under unipolarity the unipole enjoys such a large margin of safety with respect to the odds of its survival that it can afford to deviate somewhat from the narrow security-based motives of realism. My theory has argued that two conditions permit security institutions to remain effective following a significant power shift. First, institutions remain more effective with less great power members as this reduces the opportunity for conflict over rewriting rules to reflect the new balance of power. Second, institutional rules should mostly constrain minor powers while leaving great powers

unconstrained. If these conditions are not present, major structural changes in the international system will leave security institutions much less effective.

Chapter 6. Conclusion

Institutional Variation in Post-Power Shift Effectiveness

In this section, I will briefly apply my theory to recap the main lessons from the case studies. This study has examined why security institutions vary in their effectiveness after significant shifts in the balance of power. If great powers write the rules governing institutions then it would seem at first glance that a major structural change would probably affect institutional effectiveness in a negative way. The logic is that institutions reflect the balance of power and if that balance undergoes significant change then great powers should engage in a struggle to rewrite the rules to better reflect the new power balance.

But some security institutions do not seem to be affected at all by significant structural change. They maintain their effectiveness as great powers continue cooperating to enforce the rules. This occurs when the institution's rules constrain minor powers while leaving great powers unconstrained. This dynamic was most evident with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, one would have expected a brooding, resentful Russia intent on getting back at the United States by aiding North Korea's nuclear program. From both a balance of threat and a balance of power perspective, it would not have been out of character for Russia to balance against US preponderance by getting closer to North Korea.

Instead, what we saw in the North Korean nuclear case is that Russia did not balance against the US by abetting North Korea's nuclear ambitions, but rather bandwagoned with US non-proliferation efforts to isolate North Korea by cutting off military and economic aid to its former Socialist bloc ally. Chinese policy demonstrated similar dynamics as the PRC normalized relations with South Korea and held back on high-level meetings with North Korean counterparts for much of the 1990s. Russian and Chinese coolness towards North Korea complemented US

efforts to denuclearize it through military threats and economic carrots such as the 1994 Agreed Framework. The key to great power cooperation was that restraining North Korea did not constrain the great powers; they were able to compartmentalize their strategic competition from the security management task of keeping minor powers non-nuclear.

Compared to NATO, the NPT has not been as successful due to the coordination problems among great powers. There is a consensus that they must prevent nuclear proliferation, but the method may be up for debate. For example, China's geographic proximity to North Korea and the fear of catastrophic repercussions (Lee, Iordanka, and Zhao 2020) from too tight an economic noose on the latter - state collapse and refugee outflows across the border, for example - led to milder policies than the United States would have preferred.

Unlike the NPT, the effectiveness of the Concert of Europe was not immune to significant changes in the balance of power because its rules focused on reining in both minor and great powers. The Concert could accommodate smaller shifts in the balance of power, such as the rehabilitation and reemergence of France as a great power, as conservative Eastern monarchies converged on their common interest in staving off nationalism and liberal revolutions to pressure France into cooperation. British interest in a strong Austria as the bulwark against Russia in Central Europe led Britain to join the conservative powers in hemming in France, so that French dissatisfaction with the status quo could be isolated through balancing within the institution. But, a truly dramatic shift in the balance of power, such as the rise of industrial Britain towards the middle of the 19th century, and lack of common interest binding Russia and the Western powers, led to the Crimean War and the total breakdown of the Concert of Europe.

Finally, NATO has remained an effective security institution despite reasoned predictions about its dissolution in the wake of the Soviet collapse. The reason for NATO's resilience is

twofold. First, there is only one great power in NATO, the United States, implying that there is no opportunity for intra-institutional great power conflict over rules, nor is there an occasion for the kind of coordination problems present in the NPT. Minor powers cannot challenge a great power and out of fear for their security tend to defer to the latter's leadership. Second, NATO rules do not constrain all powers equally. For example, NATO is a nuclear alliance - as described in official NATO strategic concepts - with the US providing the extended deterrence, implying that minor powers such as Germany have an obligation to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons, an obligation which does not constrain the United States which is doubly recognized as a legitimate nuclear power by the NPT and NATO.

The Role of Institutions in Ordering International Politics

Great powers promulgate their security preferences and the current state of the balance of power to the rest of the world by writing down institutional rules. Thus, institutions play a promulgatory function by letting minor powers know what is acceptable and unacceptable behavior in international affairs. Rules applying to great powers are only useful as information about the balance of power that existed at the moment of the rule writing. When the balance of power shifts, constraining rules applying to great power need to change to reflect the new balance of power or else the institution will break down as they assert themselves against the old rules.

What this analysis of the nature of security institutions and their relationship to the balance of power demonstrates is that for an institution to be effective in international affairs it must be grounded in the realities of power politics. Legal, ethical approaches that seek to use institutions to establish preconceived notions of the good order in international politics will invariably fail if one does not realize that great power interests govern international order and that at the root of this order is economic and military power of the strongest states. When institutions do not closely track

the underlying distribution of capabilities, rising states will seek to renegotiate the rules. Bargaining for new rules is a fraught process because great powers have an incentive to misrepresent their true capabilities to secure rules that overcompensate for their actual position in the balance of power; since this incentive to misrepresent is common knowledge, great powers do not fall for it and in the worst circumstances a war can break out due to such information asymmetry (Fearon 1995). It is for this reason that the most prominent security institutions have been created in the immediate aftermath of a systemic war when states' true capabilities have been publicly revealed.

Great powers are highly skilled at arranging cooperative institutions and coordinating among themselves to achieve their strategic goals. War is the exception rather than the norm in international politics. However, all good cooperation must originate in the pursuit of strategic interest and what a state can do and how much it can gain are based entirely on its position in the balance of power. Thus, the finding of this study provides reasons for both optimism and pessimism: great powers spend enormous effort trying to avoid conflict among themselves, but the cost of this peace is their tightened, orderly control over minor power behavior.

Using Theory to Predict the Future Viability of Prominent ISIs

What does my theory predict about the future course of some prominent ISIs? I will apply my theory to four ISIs and several non-security institutions: NATO, the NPT, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the UN Security Council, the World Health Organization, the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. I have included for consideration non-security institutions because in times of intensifying great power competition, ostensibly non-political issues can easily become politicized.[82]

[82] As the German jurist Carl Schmitt (2007, 37) notes, "Every religious, moral, economic, ethical, or other antithesis transforms into a political one if it is sufficiently strong to group human beings effectively into friend and enemy."

First, NATO will remain the world's most effective ISI as long as the United States does not acquire the means to completely neutralize all incoming nuclear warheads against the homeland. For the foreseeable future, then, the US will provide extended nuclear deterrence to Europe and its troops will remain deployed on the continent. Given the large capabilities gap between the US and its European allies and the rather bleak future of the EU (Rosato 2011), the US will continue to be NATO's hegemon and no opportunity will arise for any serious intra-alliance disagreement over rules that could lead to a war; the US will lead and the allies will defer.

Second, the NPT will not be as effective as NATO given that it has three great powers as members, but given a strong consensus on non-proliferation and no constraints on great powers, coordination problems about *how* to enforce the treaty will not lead to a direct conflict among the great powers. Even well before the end of the Cold War, great powers worked hard to deny North Korea nuclear weapons; my case study showed that it was North Korea's *sui generis* characteristic as a highly determined and militarized garrison state armed with a powerful ethno-nationalist that explains its nuclear outbreak. Perhaps no other state in the world is and will be as fanatical or impenetrable to sanctions and coercion as North Korea. Therefore, under most circumstances the NPT will continue to be effective in promulgating the great powers' non-proliferation objectives and the latter will cooperate regardless of shifts in the balance of power to keep the nuclear club small.

Third, I will address the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the UN Security Council (UNSC) together because for the purposes of my theory they are identical. Both ISIs contain multiple great power members, and the rules constrain all states alike. For example, the SCO's rules are all-encompassing, including maintaining "peace, security, and stability in the

region" (SCO 2021). The Sino-Indian border skirmishes in 2020 is a clear indicator of the institution's ineffectiveness, as peaceful resolution to disagreement over the issues under institutional purview is a necessary condition for effectiveness. The UNSC will see sustained great power cooperation on only a minority of issues such as nuclear non-proliferation. Therefore, the prognosis for both ISI's effectiveness over time is bleak.

For non-security institutions such as the WHO, WTO, and IMF, how portable is my theory to predicting their future effectiveness? The rules in these institutions constrain both minor and great powers alike. Furthermore, all the great powers in the international system are members. These aspects alone will work against their future effectiveness. When great power competition intensifies in periods of power transition, ostensibly technical, non-political issues can become politicized and become sources of tension. We have already seen such fallouts with the World Bank and the IMF, where China has complained about the gross mismatch between its voting shares and its growing share of global economic output. China in protest struck out on its own by establishing the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, which the United States and Japan have spurned (Etzioni 2016). My prediction is that as geopolitical competition heats up, technical and economic institutions will be pulled into the vortex of great power politics and their effectiveness will decline. Also, issue areas that used to be exclusively studied by IPE scholars, perhaps over-reliant on economic-technical and domestic political perspectives, will be gainfully studied from a geopolitical and security perspective.

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