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THE FRONTIER AND THE PLANTATION: A POLICE ECONOMY OF POST-SLAVERY JAMAICA

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For Oswald Dawkins, Investigative Archivist

and in Loving Memory of Bernard Headley

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Abstract

The Frontier and The Plantation is a police economy of post-slavery Jamaica. It uses the police as a lens through which the contradictions of the postcolonial present are brought into focus to be closely examined. Rather than producing another theory of policing, the work aims to grasp colonial dramas of dispossession within ongoing processes of capital accumulation, and rather than presupposing that the police are an arm of legitimate violence perpetrated by the state, it aims to reconstruct the global economy of policing in a particular location. Its main task is to theorize what is conventionally called "state violence" without treating the state as a subject and without resorting to simplistic notions of "sovereign power" that abstract the political from economy and society. Its goal is to relaunch a conversation about violence and decolonization, particularly in the post-Fanonian Caribbean.

The dissertation is grounded in 18 months of fieldwork within the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF), in communities subject to intense policing, at oversight institutions, and among the international milieu I call "the reform police." It is roughly divided into three sections. The first section (chapters 1-3) uses the police to chart the arc of state formation and deformation, from the era of imperial reforms that accompanied the abolition of slavery (1834) to contemporary international police reform campaigns. Situating the institutions of organized violence—police, army, and gangs—in relation to structures of plantation debt and mercantilist dependency, I show that Jamaican policing reflects tensions within the state as a global social relation. I further show that the Jamaican police force embodies a double contradiction: between the local state and the external state, and between the state and the people. I then examine an attempt to overcome this double contradiction during Jamaica's "political moment" in the 1970s, when members of the JCF developed a version of anti-colonial political policing in an idiom of black power. Laying out the major stakes of this experiment and describing the advent of counterrevolutionary neo-indebtment

that occasioned its failure, I challenge reformist accounts that understand the coloniality of policing as a “cultural relic,” a direct inheritance from the past. I demonstrate, conversely, that the reform police depend on theories of race and cultural difference to obscure structural determinations that thwart and even prevent meaningful transformations, thereby legitimating the government of creditors.

The second section (chapters 4 and 5) uses policing to analyze modalities of organized violence today after the foreclosure of emancipatory horizons and in the wake of new imperialist dispossession. Here, I introduce the dialectic of frontier and plantation as a central institutional grammar, whereby the specific modes of individual liberty compelled by the frontier imaginary are violently restrained by plantation-like institutions that recover “traditional” hierarchies of race, class, and gender. In this context, police extra-judicial executions are not sovereign spectacles, but an extreme form of managerial violence used to administer communities and to thwart competition from below over proceeds of the illicit economy. Police executions both reflect and exacerbate the dissolution of state imaginary, exposing the state as a class project. Yet the popular understanding of the state as an “extortion racket”, or of the police as “just another gang”, does not give rise to emancipatory mobilization, instead resolving into vengeful populism and violent nihilism—unleashing even more violence upon the emancipated class. This happens because the naturalization of capitalist social relations, particularly in the neoliberal dispensation, makes frontier capitalism appear as simply “the way of the world”.

The third and final section (chapters 6 and 7) analyzes “the community” as a basic unit of the police economy. It recovers two traditions of governmentality by community in post-slavery Jamaica—authoritarian and missionary—now superimposed by neoliberal community-policing-and-development. Despite conflicts among their diverse proponents, all three traditions treat community

as a police technology and are challenged by the emancipated, for whom the community indicates a political claim for autonomy. The last chapter uses a recent community-policing-and-development campaign, Zones of Special Operations (ZOSO), to counterpose the academic neoclassical economic analysis of "crime and violence" with the political economy of crime as theorized by the masses. The emancipated, I show, understand that "crime is a business" organized by class and race antagonism, and view crime and criminalization together as foundational to the reproduction of capital, the power of ownership.

The dissertation concludes by arguing that in Jamaica violence has become doubly alienated: First, politically, as control of state institutions has been wrested from the nation and placed beyond democratic contestation, and second, socially, through the quasi-autonomous movement of frontier capitalist relations themselves. It therefore returns to Fanon's understanding of decolonization as a necessarily violent *event* from the vantage of the post-statist present and suggests rethinking decolonization as a *process* of democratic reappropriation and reorganization of violence across scales.

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During long months of writing, when words refused to come together, I often imagined finally writing this acknowledgment section. Not only because, as everyone knows, this is often the most widely read part of any dissertation, but because it reminded me of all the people who participated in this work and to whom I wish to remain accountable. While the results of the investigation are left for the readers to judge, I hope that those whose stories and voices are herein represented will feel they were treated fairly, as thinkers and narrators.

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List of Acronyms

ATF - Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (USA)

BHC - British High Commission

BOJ - Bank of Jamaica

CIB - Criminal Investigation Branch

CIDA - Canadian International Development Agency

COMET - Community Empowerment and Transformation Project (USAID)

CSSB - Community Safety and Security Branch

DCS - Department of Correctional Services

DFID - The Department for International Development (UK)

DIU - Divisional Intelligence Unit

DPP - Director of Public Prosecutions

GOJ - Government of Jamaica

HEART/NTA - The Human Employment and Resource Training Trust/National Training Agency

ICJS - Institute of Criminal Justice and Security

IMF - International Monetary Fund

INDECOM - The Independent Commission of Investigations

IPO - International Police Officer

JCF - Jamaica Constabulary Force

JDF - Jamaica Defence Force

JPS - Jamaica Public Service (electricity)

JSIF - Jamaica Social Investment Fund

MNS - Ministry of National Security

MOCA - Major Organised Crime and Anti-Corruption Agency

MOJ - Ministry of Justice

NHT - National Housing Trust

NIS - National Insurance Scheme

NODM - National Organisation of Deported Migrants

PMI - Peace Management Initiative

SDC - Social Development Commission

STATIN JA - Statistical Institute of Jamaica

TRN - Tax Registration Number

UNDP - United Nations Development Program

UNODC - United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

USAID - United States Agency for International Development

UWI - University of the West Indies

ZOSO - Zones of Special Operations

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Figure 1: Murders and Police Killings in Jamaica 1978-2019, page 167

Introduction: The Method of Police Economy

In late October 2017, following a petition from Amnesty International and the human rights group Jamaicans for Justice (JFJ), the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) held a special hearing on police violence in Jamaica. As detailed in the petition, since the year 2000, Jamaican security forces have killed over 3,000 citizens, and this is a particularly alarming figure given that the size of the Jamaican population is less than three million. According to a recent study, the rate of police killings in Jamaica, estimated at 4.13 per 100,000, is second only to El-Salvador (5.22) and greatly exceeds Brazil (1.46), the United States (0.311), and South Africa (0.607) (Osse and Cano 2017). As in most of these locations, most victims are young black men and women, and residents of ghettos in the so-called "inner-city."

The title of the hearing, "Reports of Extra-judicial Executions and Excessive Use of Preventive Detention against Afro-descendants," made some global dimensions patent, situating police violence in Jamaica within a broader context of structural violence against black people in the Americas. The Government of Jamaica, which usually prides itself on its contributors to human rights forums, refused to send its representatives to the session. In a letter to the Commission, the Government protested that "with a population of 93 percent afro-descendants, it was unlikely that persons from this background were being targeted by the police because of their ethnicity." (Wright 2017)

Marcia Frazer, whose son Mario Deane was murdered in a police lockup in Montego Bay in August 2014, gave her testimony at the IACHR hearing. She told the panel that her son was on his way to work when he was stopped by the police, frisked, and detained for the possession of one ganja 'spliff.' Only the officers who were present at the station that morning know exactly what transpired, but within a few hours, Deane was rushed to the hospital unconscious, suffering multiple injuries across his head and neck, and bearing unmistakable marks of having been cuffed. The initial police report stated that he fell from a bunk bed in his cell. A few hours later, the police changed its version, saying that Deane was assaulted by other inmates and charged three men for the alleged beating. Two of them were diagnosed as mentally ill, while the third was deaf and dumb—he was pointed out as the killer. Mario lay in the hospital bed for three days under strict police surveillance. He died on August 6, Jamaican Day of Independence.

Following a thorough investigation by the Independent Commission of Investigations (INDECOM), three police officers were charged for manslaughter, perverting the course of justice, and misconduct in a public office. But seven years later, Frazer is still waiting for justice, which is endlessly deferred and postponed by the court. She was therefore not surprised, but once again disappointed, by the State's refusal to confront the Human Rights Commission and take responsibility for police conduct. "It doesn't matter what is being said. It matters what happens," she told me. "We never hear about no Chiney-man or no white person killed by the police in Jamaica. Even if they carry them to the station, they will not make them leave the station unconscious." Like other family members of victims and many human rights advocates, Frazer believes that the Government's excuse was no more than a tasteless repetition of its common disavowals.

Just weeks before the IACHR hearing, the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) finally released the findings of its Administrative Review of the May 2010 'Incursion' into Tivoli Gardens. The police-military operation in Tivoli was the largest and deadliest in the history of independent Jamaica. It resulted in the death of 73 civilians, hundreds detained, and many traumatized and injured persons. A statutory Commission of Enquiry that probed the Incursion raised serious concerns about extra-judicial executions of civilians by policemen during the operation. But the JCF's slim report, in the sheer banality of administrative idiom, stated that it found no fault in the conduct of any of its officers, and no dereliction of duty (JCF 2017)

The events that took place in Tivoli Gardens, Western Kingston, between 23-25 of May 2010, occasioned significant debates in Jamaica, the wider Caribbean, and among thinkers of colonial and postcolonial violence and policing. During a declared State of Emergency, the Jamaican police unleashed a campaign of terror upon Jamaican citizens, which conjured up haunting legacies of slavery and colonialism. Young men were taken out of their homes, brought to their knees, and executed at a point-blank distance while their terrified mothers peaked through the windows and overheard their sons begging for their lives before being killed. Some young men were asked to load police trucks with corpses and were then themselves executed. The Jamaica Defense Force (JDF) provided cover for police atrocities, among other things, by shooting mortars into densely populated shanties. An American surveillance aircraft overlooking the scene, signified the extension of imperial backing to Jamaican state actions (D. Thomas 2019).

The official goal of the Incursion was to capture Christopher 'Dudus' Coke, the "don" of Tivoli Gardens, wanted in the US on charges of drug trafficking. The affront followed nine months of anxious maneuvers by Prime Minister Bruce Golding, who, relying on 'Dudus' to maintain his political power, tried to defer and even revoke the American extradition order. Golding, who won the elections on a promise to rid Jamaica of corruption and clientelism, was found replicating timeworn conventions of so-called Jamaican "political tribalism" (Kerr 1997; Public Defender of Jamaica 2010; Jamaica 2016). Hence the Tivoli Incursion and the political debacle that arguably caused it amplified the voices of those, in Jamaica and abroad, who have long been demanding thoroughgoing state and police reform.

Over the past two decades, Jamaican policing has become a site of multiple interventions, led predominantly by the state's international sponsors and creditors. In 2005, six British policemen were implanted in senior positions of Assistant and Deputy Commissioner of the JCF to lead the process of professional, managerial, and cultural reform. It was hoped that these foreigners, free from commitments to local power brokers and bringing a different police 'spirit', could carry the Force "into the new millennium", as strategic plans promised (Jamaica Constabulary Force 1998; MNS Jamaica 2008). But despite much fanfare, the experiment failed. Local policemen vocally resisted "the return of our colonial masters" and refused to cooperate with them. The foreigners concluded that Jamaican policemen inherited an authoritarian paramilitary culture and that they suffer from a syndrome of "colonial mentality."

Thus, when the Government of Jamaica refused to attend the IAHRC in Paraguay, it clearly understood what was at stake. In a world ruled by a self-anointed "post-racial" hegemon, it is one thing to blame the police for corruption and misconduct and quite another to accuse the state of sanctioning racist terror. Note that the Government was not denying the allegations of police executions and torture by claiming they were false. It simply said that framing the problem in "ethnic" terms is logically inconsistent, contradictory, and therefore impossible.[1] The Government argued that its national police force could not be killing persons of African descent "because of their ethnicity" since nearly the entire population of the island are descendants of African slaves. The Government was probably also channeling national offense at the very idea that Jamaica should be reprimanded in a forum like this. The Organization of American States (OAS), which mandates the IAHRC, is led by the United States, where black men and women are massively incarcerated and habitually murdered by police forces and white supremacists. Jamaican policemen and nationalists told me that they will not take any moralizing from rich developed nations, which accrued their riches through colonial plunder and slavery and are now coming to teach them how not to be racist.

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[1] As a matter of fact, the state's "93 percent" statement was not entirely consistent. According to census figures, 93 percent of the Jamaican population identifies as black, while an additional 6.8 percent identify as mixed-African or "brown". (Jamaica STATIN 2018) In this sense, the state revealed that it understands what is at stake in the argument.

It may seem strange that a state which had only recently declared days of commemoration for the victims of slavery and the heroism of rebellion, and which is simultaneously waging a diplomatic struggle for reparations (D. Thomas 2011; Beckles 2013), would so boldly refuse to consider the coloniality of its own institutions. The proposition that a state which champions the cause of descendants of slaves continues to routinely kill black people with impunity appears so contradictory that one might be led to conclude that at least one of the statements must be untrue. Either the state is utterly insincere, deceptive, and cynical, or else race and ethnicity are not appropriate categories for analyzing Jamaican reality. But politics is not made of logical syllogisms and simple inversions. Politics is made in and of history, which hangs on the minds of the living with all the accumulated weight of unprocessed wrongs, aborted struggles, and unresolved antagonisms of past generations.

Popular Policing

But the paradoxes do not end here, because the JCF is not made of white supremacists and not even of men who are oblivious to color and class disparities. In Jamaica, the police force is overwhelmingly black, not only phenotypically and sociologically, but also in terms of the openly avowed political commitments of many of its officers. In stark contrast to other British colonies, the Jamaican police force, on the eve of the abolition of slavery (1834), recruited its rank-and-file locally, from among the recently emancipated black peasantry (Dalby 2008a; 2008b). The decision proved crucial. It shaped early perceptions of the Force among the elites and the lower classes and profoundly influenced the development of Jamaican police consciousness.

Indeed, the recent return of "colonial masters" to take up high positions in the Force reverses a hard-fought struggle to 'Jamaicanize' the police since the 1940s. In the 1960s, some Jamaican policemen were swayed by the spirit of the decade, anti-colonial struggles, and black liberation and sought to transform the police from an obedient servant of the plantocracy into a national force for the people and by the people. The project failed, crumbling under the weight of internal contradictions and the counter-revolutionary offensive also known as neoliberalism. But even today, Jamaican cops, who remain embedded in the popular milieus of "country" and the "inner-city", often describe themselves as "radical" or even as "Rastafarian" policemen.

How can policemen who fashion themselves as Black Power militants justify their extreme violence against black men of the lower classes? This is one of the questions this dissertation grapples with. One of the characters leading the story, who will make his appearance in several chapters (2, 3, 5) is retired Senior Superintendent Reneto Adams, a Jamaican police persona. Adams joined the Force in 1971 and gradually built his clout as one of the country's celebrated "crime fighters"—men said to "drive fear into the hearts of criminals" (Chevigny 1990). In 2008, he was forced to retire under the pressure of British 'International Police Officers' (IPOs) due to his alleged complicity in over forty extra-judicial executions, particularly the highly controversial 2003 execution of four civilians in the village of Kraal. But despite being ousted by international reformers, or perhaps precisely for this reason, Adams is a popular hero, famed for his no-nonsense policing and as a colorful media personality.

In Jamaica, as elsewhere, the compounded effects of globalization and privatization, which seem to blur distinctions between inside and outside, public and private, legality and illegality, have given rise to popular demands for authoritarian, decisive "exceptional" police action (J. Comaroff and Comaroff 2006; 2016; Caldeira 2000). Located at the crossroad of commerce, the small island has long been an entrepôt of illicit commodities and mercantile violence. The modes of organization of this violence mutated over the centuries, with shifts in global political economy—from privateering to piracy, from state control to so-called "new violence" (Koonings and Krujit 1999; Cruz 2011; Müller 2018; Pearce 2018; Vilalta 2020). The most recent shift has to do with the liberalization of global trade since the 1980s, the incredibly lucrative formation of drug markets in the North, and the reciprocal flow of guns to the South. The rate of murder in Jamaica has been, for three decades, among the highest in the world, and three times higher than the average in Latin America and the Caribbean (Harriott 2016). In 2017, the year I began my fieldwork, there were 1,647 murders—a rate of 55.8 per 100,000, which is considered epidemic (Kleinfeld 2018; Ward et al. 2018)

Hence the common idea that police violence results from the paradox of "impotence and omnipotence" (Caldeira 2013). Policemen suffer from harsh working conditions, are poorly paid, and are subject to institutional abuse by their seniors. They are frustrated by the absence of necessary resources to deal with rising levels of what is generally referred to as "crime and violence", the sluggishness of an outmoded legal system, and political corruption. They are especially under-resourced and outgunned in comparison to large criminal syndicates. As one policeman put it, "in Jamaica, we have Third World cops and First World gangs." The argument of police impotence and omnipotence suggests that the more disempowered the police force—the fewer resources and public legitimacy it commands—the more likely it is to use extra-legal force to further its objectives, what is also known as "police vigilantism" (Harriott 2000, 77)

But the specific Jamaican brand of "police populism" is unique in some respects. Policemen often present crime as emanating from politicians and the business elite, while also arguing that large-scale organized crime is another form of imperialism, set out to enslave Jamaicans. Many policemen further express animosity towards what they call "criminal rights organizations," pointing out that they—unlike self-righteous foreigners and middle classes who live safely in their gated communities—"have to live and raise families here." They see liberal reforms as tying their hands in the fight against what they call "the syndicate." In this sense, Jamaican policemen seek not so much to augment existing law through vigilante enforcement but rather to replace what they see as an elitist and corrupt-by-design criminal justice system with a form of criminal justice which, they argue, truly serves the people.

Popular support for police executions suggests that many citizens agree. But not all police killings are the same, and the differences are important.

The Sovereignty of Money

"In Jamaica, if you want to kill someone and get away with it, call the police", Tamara Wilson told me when I went to visit her in January, 2018. Tamara's son, Renaldo, was killed by police officers in one of Kingston's garrisons in 2010, just days before his 20th birthday. "This is where they shot him, up against that wall… I can see the spot from where I stand on my veranda." On the day her son was killed, Tamara was attending an accounting class in a nearby vocational training center. Her sister was home with Renaldo, and with Tamara's elderly parents. At some point in the afternoon, Renaldo got a phone call from a friend who asked to speak with him privately on the corner. He came out and was shot on the spot, with two bullets to the abdomen and one to the shoulder. "Mi hear the news and mi run home but the police already take him 'way, wash out the blood and collect the spent shells."

Eight years have passed, and Tamara was still waiting to hear the results of the investigation, slowly pursued by the Independent Commission of Investigations (INDECOM). "Nobody nuh come check mi or look fi de witness dem, except the one time an investigator come and say [that] only God can help me." She wrote a long letter to the Commission detailing some information she gathered from relatives and neighbors. "Mi nuh know the police who kill him, though some names did get call," Tamara explained, but she was fairly certain about the identity of the man who paid the police to execute Renaldo, who, she said, is a well-known businessman.

"Why the police kill him? Fi money!", Tamara exclaimed. "If you want to kill anyone inna Jamaica, best thing to do is call the police." Although the market for contract killings is replete with hitmen ready to offer their services, using the police remains the most reliable—even if relatively expensive—way to assassinate a person. Policemen typically charge more for a "job" than an average 'shotta' teenager, who can "take someone out" for as little as 5,000 Jamaican dollars (less than $50 US). The police offer some advantages. First, they actually know how to shoot, and second, their risk of being charged for murder is low. Police contract killings can be easily disguised as ordinary patrol "encounters" or "shootouts" and victims are assumed to be criminals even if the killing was technically unlawful.

"Renaldo was no saint," Tamara said, "but he was not killed on operation. He was killed for money… so first dem kill him, and then dem tell lies about him." She insists that police reports following the event falsified evidence to make it appear as though the police killed her son because he shot at them first, but what actually happened was that he was lured into his death, which was not only premeditated but also contracted. By focusing on the economic motive behind her son's killing, Tamara unsettles explanations of police killings in Jamaica as incidents of (justified or unjustified) intense law enforcement and highlights how little we know about the relationships between the police and Jamaica's illicit economy.

What does it mean to kill *for money*? Does the statement not suggest that money—an abstract symbol of power—now reigns sovereign? Jamaican criminologist Anthony Harriott suggested something of this nature when he wrote that violence in Jamaica has become a commodity, a business, and is therefore "self-perpetuating," and thus very difficult to counteract (Harriott 2009, 5). Essentially, Harriott argues that the production of violence for sale, especially as "protection," turns it from a crude means to an end without end.

Tivoli Revisited: The Colonial Exception Paradigm

I first met Tamara at an event organized by Jamaican NGOs and their international partners to mark International Human Rights Day, December 10, 2017. The event focused on the problem of state violence in Jamaica: police executions, the dismal conditions of lockups, and the status of so-called "vulnerable communities". Tamara came there to share her account of Renaldo's killing, which would serve as an example of the atrocious violence of the Jamaican state and the urgent need to impose human rights obligations and demand accountability. But although Tamara is ready to do all it takes to end police aggression; her account of her son's killing does not figure easily into a conventional human rights framework.

Human rights discourse and law, as well known, concern the responsibilities of states towards their citizens, as well as obligations regarding subject populations of enemy sovereigns. Human rights are enshrined in a legal framework of treaties and obligations that make up an international community of nations. However, such frameworks are notoriously limited in treating liminalities—the many proliferating forms of non- and quasi-state violence that seem to have expanded dramatically in recent decades. Note how "the state," so central to the conventional understanding of who the police are and what they serve, does not figure prominently in Tamara's narrative. Like most of the other mothers and sisters I spoke to, and unlike human rights professionals, Tamara rarely spoke about "the state" in abstract general terms. Instead, she situated her son's killing within economic relations, "they killed him for money," she repeatedly said.

That police violence is state violence seems obvious, nearly beyond question. For the police are recruited, trained, and paid to act on behalf of the state and are identified with the sovereign prerogative. Consider, that when the Tivoli Gardens Incursion began, the Jamaican state performatively declared a State of Emergency, thereby symbolically attributing to itself the violence of its agents. The killings in Tivoli Gardens took place within the temporal purview of "exception," responding to alleged risk to the state, its entire constitutional framework, and the rule of law in its totality. Hence Tivoli fits rather easily into binary frameworks of law and exception, which have become rather conventional in critical discussions of police power (Agamben 2000; J. L. Comaroff 2013; Willis 2015; D. Thomas 2011). Here, the state is an unambiguous agent: it speaks for itself, it declares its unity, its objectives, and publicly presents its mighty power. So even, and perhaps especially, when the violence it exerts is excessive, the state emerges as sovereign, coming into being through radical and performative transgression.

Within this framework of law, its suspension, and its excessive "enthusiasm," it is also possible to speak of "police vigilantism." That is, the idea that policemen somehow embody not the law as found in the books but its "obscene supplement" (Zizek 1997). That extra truth unwritten into the law, without which the legal apparatus would lose its ability to function (Derrida 1989). The police, by most accounts, provide the legal order with a kind of necessary surplus beyond the routine disenchanted bureaucratic administration. It enlivens the Weberian rational state with an irrational, passionate, agentive, subjective, volitional, discretionary, and political element (Jobard 2014). For this reason, anthropologists often use the police to describe the affective nature of the modern state, which remains ultimately connected to forms of magic and spectacle.

Furthermore, police power is figured in most of the literature as an anachronistic relic within the liberal modern state. Nearly all conceptualizations of police allude in some way to the outdatedness of its authority (cf. Arendt 2006). Thus, police is commonly associated, both in liberal and anti-liberal theory, with absolutism and the *ancien regime*, or indeed with colonialism and slavery (Jobard 2014; Dubber 2005). Within the normative universe of modern liberalism, police power marks the irreducible point of transcendence that stamps, establishes, and secures rational legalism—the charismatic entity at the top of Weber's bureaucracy or Hegel's personal sovereign. Indeed, critical scholars often like to "expose" the police as liberalism's dark secret, but there is no secret, for liberal theory itself understands exceptional violence as the heart of policing.

According to Egon Bittner's widely endorsed theory of "the function of police in modern society": "The role of the police is best understood as a mechanism for the distribution of nonnegotiable coercive force employed in accordance with the dictates of an intuitive grasp of situational exigencies" (Bittner 1978; 1990). Bittner's theory was recently extended by Jean-Paul Brodeur to state that the essence of police power is "legal lawlessness" (Brodeur 2010, 6). From this avowedly Weberian perspective, a dysfunctional police force indicates a society that cannot contain its violence—in the two senses of the term contain—by institutionalizing it within a legitimate state apparatus. That is, by placing it within strict limits between the complete dissolution of the political (imagined as "the war of all against all," anarchy and chaos) and hyper-politicization (authoritarianism without bounds).

This "exceptional" concept of police power relates to colonialism in at least two ways. First, the colony, as a paradigmatic locus of exception, is seemingly all about police power. Here, there is no law qua universal exchange and measure, periodically suspended only to be defended (cf. Schmitt 2005; Agamben 2005). There is seemingly only crude, arbitrary, personal authority, without any limitations, or as sometimes said in relation to spaces of colonial exception, "the police are the government," meaning that policing replace policy by driving the law to the most extreme limits of politicization, where it loses sense and meaning (Camp and Heatherton 2016; Fassin 2013; Fassin, Khan, and Tahir 2019). Second, and in close connection, police power is identified with the pre-political site of the 'domestic' the plantation, or with so-called 'primitive accumulation.' (Dubber 2004; Neocleous 2000)

While there is certainty much to learn from the growing literature on colonial policing, approaching the Jamaican case demands caution and responsibility. As we have seen, the colonial police hypothesis is also propagated by what I will call "the reform police" complex. In many of the accounts propagated by police reformers, police violence in Jamaica is seen as indicative of a "mentality" prone to killing or of defective police culture. In this context, the attribution of brutality to Jamaican policemen can quickly turn into "anti-racist racism" (Balibar 1991; Meister 2012). While "biological" racism is proudly denied, the newfound public enemy becomes the postcolonial racist cop, who somehow continues to cling to erroneous and outmoded ideologies.

Another concern is the centralized, unequal, and often commodified nature of public and academic debates on policing tends to subsume concrete instances, histories, and locations, under imperial abstractions and reductive generalizations like "colonialism", without paying enough attention to locational and historical variations. That strategic essentialism (Spivak 1990) may sometimes be necessary is undeniable. Yet, hasty analogies—while making certain political actions possible—preclude what is most distinctive, and sometimes most decisive, about particular locales. Where attention to history is also lacking, it becomes impossible to account for the *reconstitution* of colonial structures, ideologies, and institutions in the face of major economic and social transformations and popular resistance over time.

Finally, there is a risk in presupposing the state as the main or sole subject of policing in postcolonial locations. The relative absence of "the state" from the stories of many of my interlocutors poses a serious problem in theorizing police violence. For if the police are not "the state," then what are they? And what does it mean that, among some sectors in Jamaica, "the state" does not appear as a meaningful everyday category? These problems upend the whole tradition of the anthropology of the state, which is premised on the idea that the state is an alienated social relation, namely, a powerful social abstraction, an imagination, a fantasy (indeed, often embodied by the policeman) (Navaro-Yashin 2002; Das 2006; Gupta 2006; Lynteris 2013). If the state cannot be *imagined* as a unity behind and beyond its various agents and does not appear in performance and spectacle, then what needs to be contended is the possible disappearance of the political itself.

Entering Babylon

Losing the state as a relatively stable, if imaginary, ground for the concept of police, the investigation is thrown into a world of many troubling ambiguities. In this world, distinctions between legal and illegal, formal and informal, political and criminal, as well as political and economic, become blurred and even collapse. This dissertation will not be the first to point out the fuzziness of borders of all kinds in our times, nor does it seek to resolve the problem by redrawing conceptual boundaries. Instead, it begins by looking into this inverted world from several empirically grounded perspectives. Instead of presupposing what the police are, who they serve, and what order precisely they protect, it ethnographically and historically follows the institution and its members to illuminate the contours of the Jamaican political economy through transformations in the social organization of violence.

It is telling, I think, that the Jamaican concept of police does not hinge on the state but does not ignore it either. In Jamaican parlance, the police are called Babylon ("Babylon bwoy all over the place yah," "rasclaat Babylon, watcha deh!"), immediately denoting empire. In Jamaican black Baptism, Revival, and Rastafarianism, two interlinked images of Babylon are especially significant. One, found in the prophets of the Old Testament, is the historical city where 'Israelites' formed a diaspora of captives, where they longed and wept and sang for Zion, waiting for redemption. The other, from the New Testament Book of Revelation, presents Babylon as a city of inequity, corruption, sexual immorality, sin, and greed. Here, Babylon is closely related to the multi-headed beasts, which rise from the sea and from the earth, uttering blasphemies and commanding universal obedience. Consider the following image: "And the beast which I saw was like unto a leopard, and his feet were as the feet of a bear, and his mouth as the mouth of a lion: and the dragon gave him his power, and his seat, and great authority." (Revelation 13:2, KJV) The image is terrifying. A hybridized beast, commanded by a dragon which endows it with authority, and a few verses later, joined by another multiheaded monster, which shepherds the people into docile worship of authority (13:12).

The name Babylon captures, I believe, something fundamental about the Jamaican state and its police. First, it tells us that the police are understood to stand in a relation of synecdoche to a larger imperial system. In other words, that the police force is understood as an incarnation of a larger police order, which expands beyond while encompassing state borders. In this sense, Babylon is a metaphor that points to a local theory of police power, which understands the state as belonging to a hybrid, but a united, assembly of forces, hierarchically ordered but not indistinguishable. The image of Babylon as a terrible beast, a monster with multiple heads and many horns and crowns, is indicative of Jamaican lived experience, where different agencies are distinct but also belong to one alliance and ultimately to one body.

The name Babylon was given to the Force by Rastafarians in the 1950s. Before this, the police were called Rex, another metaphor of imperialism. Therefore, the concept of police *qua* Babylon, helps to point out a crucial difference. If the European notion of police relates to the Greek *polis,* to the city, to bourgeois civil society, then the concept of police in Jamaica indicates multilayered domination and the coming apocalypse. If the European notion of police relates through the Latin to *civitas* and civilization, then the Jamaican Babylon indicates corruption, degradation, and barbarism.

From Spectacle to Drama

The notion of Babylon may be particularly helpful in thinking through the highly overdetermined phenomenon of police killings. Several times over the course of my research I attempted, rather futilely, to list and categorize the different types of police killing incidents I encountered. One of the lists reads:

- Police executions of gang members in response to political and community demands
- Police executions of extortionists in response to demands from property owners and businessmen
- Police executions of dons in the service of the dons' own political bosses

- Police murders pointing to policemen’s personal and institutional involvement in the illicit economy
- Police contracted by businessmen to execute their competitors
- Police executions in the context of family and community feuds and interpersonal conflicts
- Police murdering their women-spouses and girlfriends
- Police murdering other men found to be romantically involved with “their women”
- Police retaliating against those of murdered cops, especially their “squaddies” (mates)
- Police killing as a technique of “branding,” i.e., as terror, in a context of insufficient state authority
- Police killing civilians or colleagues out of negligence or because they are “trigger happy”
- Police murdering mentally ill persons because they are incompetent or because they have been so requested (tragically, sometimes by the victim’s own family or neighbors)
- Police accidently killing “the wrong person;”-cases of mistaken identity
- Police murdering witnesses to pervert the course of justice and intimidate others who might consider testifying
- Policemen murdering informants because they know too much, or have become otherwise a burden
- Police murders in custody resulting from abuse, torture, or in response to “insubordination” of the incarcerated

This list is incredibly problematic. The different ‘types’ of police killings not only fail to form any distinct typology, but the list itself appears muddled. Compiling an adequate list would require me to delineate the boundaries of the phenomenon under investigation, distinguishing police killings from the broader social context where homicides are prevalent. It also requires that I try to make sense of what certainly demands theorization, that is, concepts to render empirical multiplicity more legible, without reducing actual diversity into a slogan about state excessiveness or its opposite, state failure. Admittedly, it took me a very long time to come to a provisional understanding of the phenomenon, which, on the surface, appears like an immense collection of completely different cases driven by different underlying motives, and diverse political, social, and economic processes.

One of my entry points into this problem was Peter Linebaugh's phenomenal *The London Hanged* (Linebaugh 1993). The work is a social history of the rise of wage-capital relations as reflected in the annals of the Tyburn gallows in 18th century London. Linebaugh describes the rise and fall of thanatocracy in detail, revealing the social lives of the condemned and describing the role of terror in turning a "picaresque proletariat"—expressing the traditions and customs of expropriated and proud vagabonds—into wage laborers. In his account, Linebaugh insists on two points that are crucial for some of my argument in this dissertation. First, he sets out to dispel the "lazy characterization" of the public hangings as "merely a raucous spectacle" (ibid. xix) by showing that the executions were used to punish particular crimes, followed specific patterns, and did not always awaken popular enthusiasm, the "exquisite pleasure of venting power on the powerless," as some historians have consistently argued (e.g., Lacquerer 1989, cited in ibid. xx). Instead of reading the hangings as a sovereign spectacle, using, say, a Bakhtinian or Foucauldian framework, Linebaugh reads the Tyburn cases as social dramas— each case considered different and demanding close examination. Linebaugh ultimately argued that the overarching drama underlying the multiple cases he examined was the drama of class conflict as it unfolded in imperial London, then the indisputable capital of global licit and illicit trade.

Linebaugh described the emergence of the wage labor-capital relation in the era of mercantilism and manufacture. He looked at global capitalism from the metropole, where the thickening chains of production, consumption, and trade led to the consolidation of new social classes. Not incidentally, this was also the context wherein the modern police ultimately emerged by no other than West Indian merchants eager to protect their expensive exotic commodities on the River Thames.[2] As Linebaugh has shown, the New Metropolitan Police, established by Robert Peel in 1829, was foreshadowed by the planters River Police, which aimed to prevent dock workers from appropriating part of the stock, as was the custom. Hence, the formation of the police and its ultimate legitimation marks the transition from gory mercantilism to industrial capitalism, from "capital punishment" to "the punishment of capital" (ibid. 1).

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[2] Police visionary Patrick Colquhoun—statistician, magistrate, and planter with expansive properties in the West Indies—wrote in his famous Treatise *on the Police of the Metropolis* (1796): " [T]hat this Metropolis is unquestionably not only the greatest Manufacturing and Commercial City in the world, but also the general receptacle for the idle and depraved of agonist every country; particularly from every quarter of the dominions of the Crown—where the

What happened on the other end of imperial trade, in the West Indies; in Jamaica? How will the story of capital, and its forms of violence, appear if we write it from the colony, as if "backward"? Would it still be a story of increasing rationalization, order, and civilization? Will we see an equivalent growth and stabilization of the property relations? How will race, class, and gender figure into the account, particularly when we understand that their meaning may shift across space and time? And what theoretical and methodological adaptations may be required when we study a process that is still ongoing? When is it impossible to subsume inassimilable contingencies in the narrative through a mastering gesture of Hegelian retroactive teleology? For example, when it is impossible to use the recently quite popular return to Marx's notion of "primitive accumulation," which—despite the current tendency to simply associate it with various modes of coercive dispossession, looting and theft—was for Marx merely a sketch of the conditions of possibility for the emergence of the wage-labor/capital relation? (Harvey 2004). The approach chosen here is to carry out a historical ethnography of the present. That is, to allow ethnographic encounters to push me back into various archives to locate where certain ideas, practices, institutions, and ideologies emerged, and how, from there, they began to mutate. My goal is to try and understand the conditions, contexts, and conflicts that constitute the density and entanglements of capital violence today, as well as to reopen horizons that have long been closed—the horizons of emancipation.

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temptations and resources for criminal pleasures—gambling, fraud, and depredation almost exceed imagination. (Colquhoun 1806, ii)

I call my approach "police economy," arguing that a critique of police as a science and practice central to capitalism is a necessary counterpart to the critique of political economy, pursued by Marx and his many followers. In developing my approach, I draw on Foucault's genealogy of police science (*science de la police* or *polizeiwissenschaft)* in his lectures at the College de France (Foucault 2009; cf. 2003; cf. Knemeyer 1980). There, Foucault convincingly argued that in early modern Europe, especially in France and Germany, police was a central site for elaborating *raison d'état*—a set of practices and knowledges that gave rise to the modern state. Police was an expansive mode of power, which objects was "almost infinite […] (ibid. 2009, 7). It reflected the sovereign desire to know and control everything within the realm, including the regulation of markets, the development of mechanical trades, construction and upkeep of roads and passageways, buildings and squares, responses to accidents, and "everything that may cause impoverishment"; with health and subsistence, hygiene and sanitation, theater and games, public morals, the discipline of labor, administration of the poor, and the control of servants (ibid. 334).

Foucault then reads early modern political theories of natural law, and the social contract, as attempts to limit "the police state" through the discourse of law. But it was only with the rise of political economy and its scientific investigation of the regularities of production and consumption—the populations' "natural" life processes— that the art of government becomes limited by an *internal criticism*, adequate to the objective of *raison d'état* as such. Rather than obstructing the police, like the discourse of law, political economy complements, alters, and extends the art of government by proscribing those areas in which the government must and must not intervene. While Foucault's genealogical investigation implicitly suggests that police power made a comeback with the advent of neoliberalism—an excessively interventionist mode of governmentality—his narrative, as expected in his case, remains within the borders of Europe and fails to account for the colonial contemporaneity of police power with industrial capitalism and global imperialism. I argue that police and political economy are contemporaneous and interrelated, but political economy—or today, economics—is central ideology, whereas the police is esoteric.

Methodology and Ethical Principles

The fieldwork that forms the foundation of this study was carried out in Jamaica between January 2017 and August 2018. During this time, I studied the police "from within," spending six months at one of the JCF's Divisions in downtown Kingston and conducting formal and informal interviews with currently serving and retired policemen. At the Division, I mostly observed the community safety and security team (CSS) and the criminal investigation branch (CIB). I went on patrols with CSS but made sure not to follow them into citizen's private domains—neither entering their homes nor listening to their private deliberations with policemen. It was important for me to respect people's rights to personal space, privacy, and dignity, regardless of what interesting and important data I could potentially collect for my research. The Division, I observed, had a large compound that included different units and branches, as well as a police bar, canteen, and large football field. Residents frequented the place daily, sometimes make a report to, or speak to the police, and sometimes just to hang out or use the facilities around the station. I encountered detainees, but I did not survey or interview them and not report on these encounters here.

When I first came to Jamaica in 2015, Anthony Harriott from the UWI Institute for Criminal Justice and Security (ICJS) humorously informed me that I chose the right place to study, since "the JCF is one of the most corrupt police forces in the world, but also one of the most open to researchers." No doubt, I enjoyed the 'permeability' of the Force, and the Jamaican state more broadly, especially to all sorts of foreign inspectors and adventurers who come from wealthy institutions in rich countries to extract profit and data. The fact that I am a white woman certainly played a role, at least in initial interactions I had with policemen. Some of them were convinced I was a 'Fed' (American security agent), while others, realizing I am Israeli, thought maybe the Mossad developed some interest in Jamaica. Overall, though, my interactions with police officers were usually very productive and, from my perspective at least, sincere. I tried to explain to everyone the objectives of my research and stress that I was not looking for 'scoops' about police corruption or criminality. These are, after all, an open secret. My interest was more in getting a 'feel' of the Force as a site of broader social processes and contradictions. I treated the policemen, like everyone else quoted in this research, not as informants but as theorists.

I understand policing as a practical social science, especially akin to ethnography. Both disciplines seek to produce order out of what appears (to the policeman, to the ethnographer) as empirical muddle, and both are largely based on making society visible and legible. Much has been written about the troubling affinities between observation, inspection and surveillance, and the power relations inherent in these activities (Paton 2012; Borneman and Masco 2015; Fassin 2017). I tried to avoid some of the problems involved in ethnographic representation by minimizing my recordings of practices and activities in an objectifying manner and maximize conversation, interlocution, and dialogue with persons. Ultimately, my concern is to move—both in theory and in practice— from police to politics, and for this purpose, dialogue is indispensable.

During my fieldwork, I was able to spend four months with the Independent Commission of Investigations of Investigations, INDECOM, established in 2010 as part of the more general effort of Jamaican police reform. INDECOM is responsible for investigating charges against the security forces—police, soldiers, and Department of Correctional Services (DCS) officers—across 21 different categories of offense and misconduct. Given the magnitude and acuteness of the phenomenon of what it calls "police-related fatalities," the Commission concentrates most of its resources on these cases, which includes a serious backlog. I observed 35 interviews with witnesses, civilians, soldiers, and policemen, followed other investigation procedures, and read almost a hundred case files related to police killings. As a site, INDECOM also provided me with an institutional counterpoint to the Force since it is jointly managed by Jamaican and British investigators and is generously funded by foreign entities from the USA, Canada, the UK, and Europe. I complemented my observations of the emergent assemblage I call "the reform police" by carrying out interviews with British IPOs, several foreign security experts, and senior staff in development agencies.

My study of the police could not possibly be complete without understanding the point of view of citizens, especially of those who most frequently become its victims. This part of my research was largely facilitated by two Jamaican NGOs. One is called the Peace Management Initiative (PMI). It brokers ceasefires among community gangs, supports processes of conflict resolution, and provides counseling to relatives of homicide victims. The other is the National Organisation of Deported Migrants (NODM), founded by Jamaican citizens who were deported back to the country, often after being incarcerated in the USA and in Britain. I don't report much on these organization's work here, but they assisted me in identifying areas of interest, visiting communities and meeting people, and in working through the materials I collected by discussing them with me with endless patience and generosity.

Over the past few decades, Jamaica experimented with many alternative policy- and policing frameworks, from harsh security measures to "softer" modes of community development and "social intervention." These experiments produced a large body of knowledge and data that served me immensely in this research. Reports by public commissions and task forces, reform agendas and crime plans, taught me a lot about the complex structural problems that Jamaica is facing. They also make apparent that Jamaica, as a small and dependent postcolonial state bordering on an imperial giant, has relatively few options to choose from when it comes to any policy, including dealing with crime.

Mine is not a policy-oriented study, and I try to refrain from making any specific recommendations. Indeed, one of the main concerns of this study is the demise of Jamaican collective agency and the imperial capture of national sovereignty. My main concern is to contribute to a better understanding of the current impasse and to point out those places where I found inspiration for renewing politics. Ultimately, this dissertation aims to reflect back to the people of Jamaica what I understood from what they told me; what I believe they collectively already know but are sometimes forced to forget or ignore. At the same time, I am very much aware of the crisis which, in Jamaica, goes under the title "crime and violence". So, I wish to make it clear from the outset that unlike many other studies in the anthropology of policing, I do not treat crime or violence as mere social constructions or imaginary formations that express a deeper truth lying underneath the surface (cf. Comaroff and Comaroff 2016). This does not mean I am unaware of, or neglect, the massive problem of criminalization—as will become clear, this research is deeply invested in showing how crime is ascribed to the lower classes. However, like other anthropologists who study in areas where large-scale organized crime is prevalent, I have become convinced that "crime" is central to economy and politics, and is essentially part of the state, not outside of it and certainly not against it. The problem is, then, to understand what kind of state we are looking at and on what basis it emerges.

The Frontier and The Plantation

This dissertation uses police as an analytic lens through which contradictions of Jamaica's political economy can be brought into focus and closely examined. Its goal is not to produce another theory of policing but to locate the dramas of colonial dispossession within ongoing process of global capital accumulation. Beginning from the realization that the modern police was born in the scaffold of imperialism and that its localized variants—colonial, metropolitan, and otherwise—are not different "types" or "models" but are internally related to each other. It uses the police to chart the organization of violence—which is to say, the state—as it exists and as it is lived, and not by comparing it to any "North Atlantic universal" (Trouillot 2002). The work draws on three main bodies of literature, which speak to each other and often overlap: Caribbean ethnography and political theory, social history of imperialism and the Atlantic world, and the critique of political economy or the anthropology of capital.

This dissertation argues that the main dynamic animating the Jamaican system—social relations that give rise to a particular state configuration—is found in the dialectic between two colonial institutions: the frontier and the plantation. According to Edgar Thompson (Thompson 2010), the plantation is itself a frontier institution, even a proto-state, that emerges to control labor in a situation of "open resources" (Nieboer cited in ibid.), where land and other means of production are widely available. The plantation is immediately economic and political. Its economic aim is to produce value for investors by cultivating a staple crop for the metropolitan market, employing enslaved or indentured labor. Its intrinsic connection to the world market in money, commodities, and humans determines its location along commercial routes.

Producing exclusively for export, and in turn, importing all it needs, means that the plantation is founded on extreme alienation between humans and nature, processes of production and reproduction, and sensual lived experience. Slavery, which reduces humans into objects and implements of labor—quite literally, into human capital—secures the social relations of production in complete alienation of man from man (Best 1968). Radical alienation creates the need "to encompass the entire existence of the work force," "to admit virtually no distinction between organization and society"—the plantation is a total institution, taking over the entirety of life as such (ibid., 287)

The frontier is a space imagined as having "open resources." That is, as a space where nature and society, materials, land, and people, are violently up for grabs, mainly but not exclusively for profit.

The frontier imagination has certain conventional tropes that are widely familiar. Territories "opening up", missions expanded, or riches discovered somewhere beyond the pale of law, morality, or civilization. Frontiers are about primitiveness and novelty, about new areas to explore and opportunities to seize. They call upon the whole gamut of discoverers, adventurers, entrepreneurs, missionaries, pirates, and settlers, who, by virtue of their private investment and the political qualities of their bodies, assume the prerogative of petty sovereigns. The frontier is imagined as disorderly, unruly, and therefore calling for order and state. Frontiers are therefore often caught in a double movement between expansion and contraction, excess and limitation, without which they could not possibly realize, stabilize, and legitimize any of their gains. And Frontiers are, of course, the quintessential site of speculation, where high-risk uncertain ventures can produce incredible returns on the verge of complete failure, self-destruction, and collapse (Maoz 2020).

The frontier and the plantation, being intrinsically related to the market, are equally subject to cycles of boom and bust, but of somewhat different intensities and tempos. Whereas the plantation is a massive complex of humans, machinery, productive and reproductive domains, and therefore of complex social relations, it cannot be simply transplanted to another location in haste or adapt quickly to emergent market fashions. The frontier is more mobile, more 'haphazard,' and is in many ways defined by movement. This is especially true when the frontier is considered from its mercantile aspect, but paradoxically also where the goal of the movement is the opposite of movement, namely settlement. Politically, the plantation is a form of frontier settlement that is designed to arrest movement or more precisely, to arrest freedom.

This is the nucleolus of the dialectic of the frontier and the plantation. Though the plantation is a frontier institution, it also forms in opposition to the frontier's imaginary possibilities, to its particular modalities of individual freedom and self-making. Where the frontier excites or even compels self-sufficiency and incessant escape from authority, the plantation—through its changing forms and modalities and under different names—restores deference, hierarchy, order, and control. The plantation is an institution that reproduces and reconstitutes the master-slave relation, along most or all of its dimensions, against a centrifugal drive created by the frontier's alienated relation to humans and to nature. In relation to the frontier, the plantation is anachronism, a restoration—or, at least, so it is imagined. Its temporality is retroactive. It always comes *after* or *against* the presupposition of freedom, or indeed, after the knowledge of emancipation.

Institutionally, the Jamaican police occupy a rather strange position between the frontier and the plantation. They are contiguous with both and with neither, and can perhaps be seen as the embodiment of the contradiction. The police were introduced, initially, to replace the plantation—not as a mode of production, but as a social relation—with the abolition of slavery and the gradual introduction of "free labor" (1834-1838). The experiment quickly failed for completely opposite reasons; neither the former masters nor the newly emancipated wished to reconstitute their relations in the form of contract. In the struggle that ensues, overseen and overdetermined by the empire, power lays heavily on the side of the planters but the emancipated already know that they are free, and their opponents know that they know it also. The story of this struggle is what the following chapters seek to relay, thereby grounding the state in shifting configurations of antagonistic social relations.

The Following Chapters

Through the lens of the police, the Jamaican state appears manifold. Not only is it effectively co-governed by metropolitan and national ruling classes, but it also undergoes transformations through cross-Atlantic exchanges among diverse parties. Drawing on Poulantzas (Poulantzas 1969; 2000) and Jessop (Jessop 1999; 2016) and on a variety of secondary sources, in the first chapter I show that the Jamaican state is "a global social relation." Traveling back in time with the JCF, which in 2017 celebrated its 150th anniversary, I explain the introduction of modern policing to Jamaica and its ambiguous relation to the plantation complex. I then relate the transformations of policing over the 19th century by reference to the interlinked processes of state formation and class formation, as they intertwine with hegemonic projects of race and nation across locations. The result is an organization of violence based on three institutional loci—the police, the army, and gangs—which make up the state contraption, materializing and symbolizing divergent but interdependent class projects. Within this framework, I argue that the police embody a twofold contradiction. First, they are located between the imperial and the local state, that is, between the British Crown and Jamaican planters, and second, between the colonial state and the incipient Jamaican nation, the black peasants in rebellion.

In the second chapter, Black Police Power, I examine how some policemen sought to overcome these acutely felt contradictions during Jamaica's "political moment" (Meeks 2000) in the 1970s. I begin again from the present, where I encounter members of the JCF—some associated with death squads—who present themselves as black power militants and as "radical policemen." Using documentary archives and oral history narratives, I show how the development of race and class consciousness among Jamaican policemen in the late colonial era (1940s) created ripe conditions for the identification of policemen with transformative projects later. Focusing on police radicalism during the Jamaican experiment with democratic socialism pursued by the PNP (1972-1980), I elaborate the stakes of anti-colonial "political policing" (Brodeur 1983; 2010 ch. 6). I show that the policemen involved in the project were asking themselves what it would mean to police against the plantocracy on behalf of the nation. I also show that they understood the transformation of policing as inherent with the need to decolonize Jamaican society, economy, and politics. As Democratic Socialism came under increasing internal and external pressures, these too were reflected in policing and ultimately led to its growing militarization. What remains of the project today, after the reconstitution of colonial dependency, are fragments integrated into contemporary "police populism." This reflects the limits of decolonization, which, though dubbed "democratic socialism," ultimately pursued the development of state capitalism.

Reform Police, the third chapter, deals with "the return" of metropolitan policemen to Jamaica in the early 2000s, this time in order to assist in the JCF's "reform and modernization" project. The return of "colonial masters" occasioned intense protest from members of the JCF and, in turn, convinced foreigners that Jamaican policemen are morally corrupt and culturally resistant to change. However, the arguments on both sides are suspiciously familiar and recall earlier movements of imperial reform, particularly abolition. Hence, the chapter locates Jamaican reform police not within the conventional framework of post-Cold War globalization of security apparatuses, but, more concretely, within cycles of imperial reform on the plantation colonial frontier. As well known, the 19th century "age of reform" (Burns and Innes 2003a) reflected momentous economic transformations and galvanized diverse social agents who furthered humanitarian and economic, political and personal agendas. Pursuing this analogy, I describe the political economy of reform, as it responds to imperial crisis and the pressures of creditors and as it opens a new frontier for metropolitan middle classes who respond to economic and social pressures by "going global." I ultimately argue that the reform police failed to address structural constraints that undermined their reform efforts and explain their failure by reference to a reductive theory of police culture and mentality.

In chapter four, Buil n' Kill, I draw on my long-term engagement with one Jamaican don and his community to challenge the conventional understanding of police killings as a form of enthusiastic crime-fighting or vigilantism. "Buil' n' kill" is a phrase used by my interlocutor to explain the process through which politicians groom young men to become their political enforcers and then send the police to execute them when they fail to deliver, rebel, or otherwise become a problem. Drawing on CLR James' short essay *The Economics of Lynching* (James [1940] 1996), I theorize these killings as managerial murders. From this perspective, the idiom 'buil' n' kill' reveals persistence and transformations in the Jamaican plantation complex: The role of the don himself as a builder-contractor and violent overseer of confined labor; the sensationalized figure of the don, which sanctions his execution, and the overall historical process that produced the Jamaican dons and is now making them functionally superfluous.

Chapter five, Unspectacular Terror, continues probing police extra-judicial killings but this time on the commercial frontier of rural Clarendon, once the heart of plantation economy. The chapter reconstructs and compares two extended cases of police death squad operations, situating them within the development and growth of the frontier over two decades. Using primary investigation materials, first-hand accounts by former policemen and residents, and publicly available information, it shows, first, that police squads were formed by powerful businessmen to protect both licit and illicit accumulation from challenges and predations of lower-class extortion and informal taxation. It explains how these men created the squads, how they financed them using various fronts like awards and scholarships, and with the full knowledge and cooperation of senior policemen, politicians, and holders of public office. It then seeks to understand what political imaginaries express or capture this form of violence and finds two main types. One, a form of police populism that intensifies spectacular dimensions of violence, reproducing the state through contradictory but effective protests against "elite violence." The other is what I call "police nihilism" that pursues the destructive logic of frontier capitalism to its logical conclusions and precipitates he annihilation of the political.

Chapter six, Arrested Freedom, uses the introduction of neoliberal community policing in Jamaica since the late 1990s to consider the Jamaican community as a police technology. Unlike other analyses that posit a stark cultural difference between local and foreign modes of community policing, this chapter shows that there are at least two traditions of governing through community in Jamaica which develop after abolition as modes of race and class control. The first is an authoritarian tradition that reconstructs "traditional" hierarchies, clientelist relations, and plantation paternalism. The other is grounded in the history of Baptist missions, free villages, and early creole nationalism, which sought to uplift the poor by increasing their economic self-reliance ("independence") and collective spiritual. Both traditions clash with liberal notions of community as ultimately made of individuals who happen to share some assets in common, and all three strands of community policing together deny the right of communities to autonomously govern themselves. The last part of the chapter relates the demand of some garrison residents to replace the police with their own forces, arguing that the goal of all policing projects—authoritarian, democratic, and liberal— is not to fight crime but to fight the poor.

Chapter seven, 'Dem a Tell Lies Pon Wi' continues probing class conflicts surrounding policing by focusing on Zones of Special Operations (ZOSO) introduced in 2018 as the most recent experiment of combining militarized security campaigns with community development and "social intervention." The chapter begins by explaining the economic and sociological analysis that sanctions ZOSO as a mode of warfare governmentality, teasing out what is new and what is very old about the policy. It thereby reveals certain contradictions between different modes of subjectivizing the population as labor, as customers, as owners of debt and collateral, and as traumatic harbingers of potential violence that need to be preventively controlled. The crux of the chapter, however, is following the pedagogical refusals of my interlocutors to the state's moralizing and criminalizing discourses in all their forms. Listening closely to their objections reveals ZOSO not simply as another instance of securitized governmentality but as intimately connected to regimes of debt and speculations on the financial frontier.

In closing, I collect the disparate lines of investigation and argue that violence in Jamaica has become doubly alienated, first, politically, by being removed from democratic control of the nation, and second, socially, by being invested in the expanding frontier logic of hyper-capitalist social relations. Concluding how the alienation of violence came about and how it is experienced, I argue for a return to Fanon's theory of violence and decolonization from the vantage of the present post-statist condition.

The Multi-headed State: A Global Political Economy of Police in Colonial Jamaica

On my first day of fieldwork, corporal Isaac MacLaine spent the whole afternoon telling me about his life and times in the Jamaica Constabulary. We were sitting at the Community Safety and Security Branch (CSSB) Headquarters in New Kingston, where Isaac was sent from his regular post as an instructor at the Police College. Currently, between courses, he was assigned to a team responsible for organizing a series of events celebrating the Force's 150th anniversary. That afternoon, his task was rather menial: To validate ten-thousand raffle tickets, by hand sealing each one, using a rubber stamp and loose ink. The tickets were meant to be sold to active policemen and retirees, at 1000 Jamaican dollars each (about USD 8)—giving them the chance to win a 2018 Toyota Corolla (the quintessential police vehicle), several vacation vouchers, and kitchen appliances such as blenders and mixers. Isaac seemed quite happy with his assignment. It meant he could sit in an airconditioned office and do the closest thing to nothing. I was also lucky because Isaac, obviously bored at the task, became incredibly talkative.

Isaac was born and raised in Saint Thomas, a rural parish bordering Kingston, divided between sugar plantations to the north and smallholding farming communities along the southern shore and interior. He was raised Baptist by his parents, who worked growing what is simply called "food" in Jamaica; ground provisions such as yams, cassava, potatoes, and bananas. After completing a degree in Information Technology (IT) at the University of the West Indies (UWI), he became a Seventh Day Adventist—a global, US-based millenarian denomination distinguished by Saturday worship. He believes that increasing rates of crime in Jamaica reveal what it means to live through the final dispensation: "The bible is very serious in telling us: In the End Times, men's hearts will be very cold towards one another. The enemy of mankind will be all around, roaming, trying to entrap us." Firmly on the side of Jesus and his providential army, he reasoned, "it was time for me to go and serve Jamaica. The JCF is full of dinosaurs who can't even use a computer. If I can teach even one of them how to use a spreadsheet in the fight against crime, I would be vindicated", he exclaimed while stamping another raffle ticket.

The office was full of uniformed men and women. Some were displaying their computing skills by calmly browsing Facebook and checking their Instagram feeds. It was almost 3 p.m. and post-lunch fatigue was setting in. Soon, most of these workers will begin their long trip along Marcus Garvey Drive, back to Portmore, Kingston's dormitory community where many policemen live. Their mostly oblivious demeanors contrasted with Isaac's eagerness, but both his and their activities seemed somewhat out of touch with the sense of urgency in the national debate on crime and violence and with harsh criticism of the police for its alleged corruption, inefficiency, and outdatedness.

It could be argued that there was something rather tactless about celebrating the police's anniversary while murder rates were soaring. In 2016, the country recorded 1,350 intentional murders, a rate of 50 per 100,000—one of the highest globally, and three times higher than the average in Latin America and the Caribbean (Harriott 2016). Further, to celebrate the police when external criticism of Jamaica's human rights violations was mounting, a statutory Commission of Enquiry had just accused the police for systematic, premediated extra-judicial killings in Tivoli Gardens (Jamaica 2016). Instead of downplaying the festivities or postponing them to a more fitting occasion, the JCF high command decided to "use the opportunity to reach out and to send a message that police and citizens can work together." Announcing a yearlong series of events throughout the island, the Jamaica Observer read:

> Despite heavy public scrutiny, the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) has much to celebrate as this year marks their 150th year of service to Jamaica. The JCF was the first of its kind to be

> established in the English-speaking Caribbean, originally formed in 1867 and has since proven to be a key partner in Jamaica's history and development. In marking this milestone, under the theme 'Our Journey: 1867-2017', the JCF on Thursday will have a launch of a yearlong celebration […] the people who will be in attendance are Prime Minster Andrew Holness, Security Minister Robert Montague, Acting Police Commissioner Novelette Grant, senior officers, and other dignitaries. (Jamaica Observer 2017a)

The article read like a cut-and-paste from a public release communique, except for the first sentence, "despite heavy public scrutiny." The sentence may have been added by the editor to give the text a slightly more balanced, news-like texture, but could have easily been written by JCF Corporate Communications Network itself, oddly as this may appear. I often encountered the "self-reflexive" attitude among policemen, who openly spoke to me about the police's problematic legacy and terrible public image. The history of the JCF and its present misdeeds are well-known realities that the Force as a whole, and each individual cop, cannot deny or belittle. Rather, they must come to terms with it, one way or another, trying to make sense of their position within an inherently contradictory reality. The paradox is located at the very moment of formation. For not only is the birth of the JCF linked to the violent suppression of black popular uprising—the 1865 Morant Bay Rebellion—but this rebellion also symbolizes, in official narratives, the birth of the Jamaican nation.

The Morant Bay Rebellion erupted among small peasant proprietors in Saint Thomas, some thirty years after the abolition of slavery. The disenfranchised farmers— led by Paul Bogle, a black Baptist minister, and George William Gordon, a 'brown' member of the local vestry—protested their continued immiseration, as they faced soaring rents, plantations encroachments on their lands, drought and crop failure, and limited access to state resources and justice—which, given emancipation, they thought they did deserve. A series of local skirmishes with constables and magistrates quickly developed into a larger uprising, which took the volunteer militia and the government by surprise.

After seven protestors were killed, the farmers—who had already managed to pillage the police station—trapped parish notables in the courthouse, set it on fire, and killed 18 men, including a magistrate and other dignitaries. In response, the Government, led by Governor John Edward Eyre, unleashed an unprecedented campaign of colonial vengeance. During a 30-day State of Emergency in Surrey County, British troops killed more than five hundred peasants, arrested hundreds and publicly flogged them, and burned their houses. Gordon, who was in Kingston at the start of the rebellion, was brought into the military jurisdiction, summarily court-martialed, and immediately executed.

At the Institute of Jamaica, the island's foremost cultural establishment,[1] an exhibition entitled *Uprising: Morant Bay, 1865 and its Afterlives*, displayed historical documents, reproductions, and artwork documenting the circumstances leading to the uprising, its violent suppression, and the controversy that ensued afterward. According to Jonathan Greenland, the Jamaica National Museum director, "many of the core issues raised by the rebels of Morant Bay still resonate in Jamaica today." Therefore, exhibition curators decided "to extend the messages and questions from 18th century to the present throwing spotlight on poverty, justice and policing issues" in the present (Sharma 2015). They set up historical analogies no visitor could escape: The last gallery hall was devoted to the 2010 incursion into Tivoli Gardens, where, under a declared State of Emergency, 73 civilians were killed—some openly executed—by the Jamaican security forces. An enormous photograph, depicting a JCF pickup truck with heavily armed policemen, closed the exhibition. Another way to mark 150 years of Jamaican policing. A critic summarized the point for the Gleaner: "This exhibition is the poignant reminder of a bloodstained chapter of Jamaica's history brought to life in the second quarter of the 21st century.

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[1] The Institute of Jamaica was established in 1879 by the Governor Sir Anthony Musgrave to promote and preserve artistic, cultural, and scientific activity. Today, it hosts exhibitions and sponsors events and awards. It serves as the national museum's authority, administering the National Gallery, the African Caribbean Institute of Jamaica, and other establishments. It publishes the *Jamaica Journal*.

The blood from the uprising may have long dried, but the spirits of those who lost their lives, and the injustices still exist in some form." (ibid.)

The JCF, established after the rebellion, is considered a quintessential example of the colonial police variant. It is based on the model of the 1814 Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), which was exported, during the 19th century, to many locales across the British Empire. The colonial policing model differed from the metropolitan "New Police," established in London in 1829, on several counts: It was centrally rather than locally governed and operated along strict paramilitary lines. Its men were armed and lived in barracks, and it never sought democratic consent from the public. It was explicitly directed to enforce order rather than deal with crime (Harriott 2000). Although police rank and file were locally recruited in Jamaica, all the officers were seconded from Britain and all of them were white by local standards (Irish and Scottish included).

Anthony Harriott, Jamaica's preeminent criminologist, argues that the preference of order over law shapes the Force's approach to this day, making the JCF the most colonial institution in postcolonial Jamaica:

> The JCF was perhaps more profoundly shaped by colonialism than any other state institution […] This is reflected in its mode of organization, bureaucratic ethos, dominant political values, style of policing and the nature of its fundamental relationships — that between officers and other ranks, between the JCF and citizens, and between the JCF and government. (ibid., 30)

Harriott and others have persuasively argued that the colonial paramilitary organization of the Force and its hostility towards the people continue to inform its belligerence, brutality, and repressive rather than service-oriented approach. After independence, political control and deep-seated corruption exacerbated the situation, resulting in a police force that cannot function as a legitimate provider of citizen safety, but remains all too present as an oppressor of the black lower classes.

Like many other studies of colonial policing published in recent decades, Harriott's account was shaped by the rise and fall of decolonization movements in the 20th century. Reading history through the prism of nationally articulated anti-colonial struggles, histories of colonial policing tend to emphasize the role of police in suppressing 'nascent' ethnic or racial uprisings. Important as this may be—and it certainly is—the approach sometimes comes at the expense of understanding the role of colonial police forces in the management of imperialist economies (M. Thomas 2012). Hence the result is often a teleological historical narrative, wherein resistance—articulated in terms of race, class, ethnicity, gender, and religion, as well as other idioms—culminates in the birth of the modern postcolonial nation state, which is now dealing with "legacies" and "remnants" of colonial culture and institutions.

My point of departure is an aspect that Harriott did not develop in his study of the police: The relationship of state violence to Jamaica's political economy. I will suggest that the coloniality of the JCF needs to be understood within a broader context of the organization of imperial violence, which is by no means only historical and in which the state is but a part. This framework will guide me throughout the dissertation, but in his introductory chapter I want to lay the foundations for the rest of the investigation. Here, my goal is to portray the organization of violence, which is not structured as a two-way monopoly of force—the police operate internally, and the army secures boundaries—but rather a more complex structure corresponding to a state nestled within Empire. I depict a structure that, while including a police force and a military, devotes to each very different function than what is considered "conventional," which also begins to reveal the third element of organized violence, "gangs." My point of departure is the realization that to understand the state as a complex institutional configuration, it is necessary to examine the state as a global social relation (Poulantzas 1969; 2000; Jessop 1999; 2016). From within this complex configuration, we can begin to understand some of the acute contradictions of policing.

This chapter extends the existing literature on Jamaican policing and colonial policing more broadly in two ways. First, I expand the existing focus on policing riot and rebellion by highlighting the role of the JCF in enforcing the regime of wage labor after slavery, both within plantations and outside of them. As we shall see in detail, the introduction of police meant transferring the management of labor from individual planters to the state— "translating" class and race struggle into the language of crime and punishment. At the same time, the police was designed to produce "free labor," which was found wanting in Jamaica. This it did by preventing "land capture" (squatting), clamping down on vagrants and trespassers, and harassing independent producers and market vendors through strict and discriminatory enforcement. As will be developed later in the chapter, the conflict between plantation and peasant proprietorship that ignited the Morant Bay Rebellion—and which is still apparent in the social geography of St. Thomas, Isaac's home parish—links the colonial demand for order with class conflicts unfolding and shaping a global imperial economy.

My first argument is that Jamaican policing needs to be understood not only by reference to colonialism as a mode of domination but also by reference to the global political economy of an imperial scale. Hence, I focus on the birth of the JCF out of the Morant Bay Rebellion to reflect on interlinked processes of class formation and state formation in post-slavery Jamaica. Like most other commentators, my narrative remains tethered to recurring and cyclical patterns of colonial violence and the lineages of emergency and exception that connect 1865 St. Thomas to 2010 Tivoli Gardens. Yet, my focus is less on the violent events themselves than on the conflicts and crises they indicate, but the tensions that precipitate their eruption or ensue in their wake. This is because these moments mark underlying struggle between social forces, local and global agents, whose actions and transactions make history, in a more or less constrained, more or less self-conscious manner. Better yet: These historical conflicts, which in an altered form continue to this day, are the substance of the Jamaican state as a collective organization of violence and as a global social relation. This is my second argument.

The historical narrative, mostly based on secondary literature, will ultimately relate to ethnographic observations of the three main instruments of organized violence in Jamaica: The Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF), the Jamaica Defense Force (the army, once the West India Regiment), and the "gangs." Though the latter is neither an organized body nor a formal component of "the state" (rather, gangs are usually understood as a threat or challenge to the state), there is no point in trying to understand how violence is organized and signified in Jamaica without taking these informal forces into account. The picture that will emerge will hopefully allow us to understand the police as located in a juncture of many contradictions and tensions—many of which persist to this day.

The State as a Global Social Relation

In this chapter, I use the phrase "the state is a social relation" as coined by Nicos Poulantzas and further elaborated in the work of Bob Jessop (ibid.). In his famous exchange with Ralph Miliband on the nature of the capitalist state (Poulantzas 1969; see: Abrams 1988a) and in subsequent publications, Poulantzas drew on Marx's insight that capital is not a thing, not a material object or set of objects—means of production, stock, commodities, or money—but rather a "social relation"—structured interaction amongst interdependent actors, which is shaped by and in turn shapes habitual practice. It is a movement and a process, a dynamic, constrained and constraining the actors, which experience its reality as objective and as inhering in objects. In an equivalent fashion, Poulantzas emphasized that the state is neither an agent nor an instrument of coercion by the ruling class. Not only because state functions extend beyond repression and ideological domination into the sphere of "civil society" (governmentality), and not only because the state operates in "relative autonomy" from the ruling classes,[2] but more fundamentally because the state is a "the factor which concentrates, condenses, materializes and incarnates politico-ideological relations in a form specific to the given mode of production" (Poulantzas 2000, 27). In other words, the state is not a sovereign legal subject or a monolithic power, but "a strategic field formed through intersecting power networks," a terrain of struggle and maneuver among political factions and classes (ibid. 136).

Marxist sociologist and state theorist, Bob Jessop, developed Poulantzas' theorization into what he calls a "strategic-relational approach to the state" (Jessop 2016, 53). The approach is meant to yield an analysis that treats the state as a dynamic field of struggle rather than reifying the state (but without assuming it is merely an ideological mirage or a fetish, cf. Abrams 1989) and institutionalization undergirded by shifting discourses and technologies of government. The state always exists within a broader space of a global market economy and interstate system, while also subject to forces that seek to appropriate, direct, subvert and block its actions from below or from within. The relative ability of different agents to carry out their strategies is both path-dependent and conditioned by the wider environment. Crucially, "it is not the state as such that exercises power. Instead, its powers (plural) are activated by changing sets [of] politicians and state officials located in specific parts of the state, in specific conjunctures." (56) Whereas talk of the state or state officials as exercising power is sometimes important from a legal and political standpoint—attributing responsibility and holding actors accountable— "it also misrepresents the complex and mediated ways in which power circulates within and beyond the state." (57).

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[2] Poulantzas borrowed the term relative autonomy from Althusser's structural Marxism, where it designated the relative independence of political, legal, economic, cultural and other sub-structures of capitalist totality. For Poulantzas, the relative autonomy of the capitalist state from underlying social forces and, specifically, from the ruling classes, is historically specific, depending on the separation between "the economic" and "the political" in advanced capitalism. According to Poulantzas and many others, industrial capitalism is distinguished from other modes of production in that economic relations are expunged of direct extra-economic (political) coercion and are formally regulated by contract. This in turn frees the political from the immediate organization of production, distribution, and labor, allowing it to operate in relative autonomy from particular interests, giving it the role of a quasi-universal mediator. The relative autonomy of the state allows it to secure the long interests of capital, against the short-term and often destructive actions of individual capitals in competition with each other.

The analytic approach proposed by Jessop, and which I pursue in this chapter, seeks to relate the historical process of state formation and official constitution with the actions, reactions, and interactions of political forces in specific conjunctures. More specifically, I follow Jessop in examining the state from several interrelated directions, which are theoretically distinguishable but (as we will see) overlap in practice: (1) Constitutionality and representation (2) The "state system" or institutional ensemble, including the distribution of power among its various branches (3) mechanisms and modes of state intervention—"the art" of governing, or to use a Foucauldian term, "governmentality" (4) The social basis of state power, namely the specific configuration of social forces that support the state system, its mode of operation, and objectives (including what Gramsci called "power block" and "hegemonic bloc" to highlight, on the one hand, alliances among dominant classes and, on the other hand, the wider coalition of national popular forces rallying behind a particular state project) (5) The state project, which shapes internal unity and modes of policymaking by attributing the state with purpose and meaning.

The last function is critical. Given contradictory social forces and intense political struggles unfolding in and through the state, the ability of the state apparatus to operate cohesively depends on uniting various branches, tiers, and agents around a unifying project that "makes sense." Without a hegemonic vision concerning the nature and purpose of the state, it is difficult, if not impossible, to stabilize the mechanisms of governance, as well as to project an image of state unity and cohesion. "State projects aim to provide a coherent template or framework within which individual agents and organs of the state can coordinate and judiciously combine (calibrate) policy and practices, and also connect diverse policies to pursue a (more or less illusory) national interest, public good, and social welfare." They also legitimate the use of violence to maintain political order and social cohesion

(Jessop 199, 85). In their absence, the necessarily plural and sometimes conflicting policies, practices, and agents no longer appear as belonging to one subject, that is, to the state proper (Ophir 2010, see also chapter 5). I stress this because, as will become increasingly evident later in this dissertation, a hegemonic state project has failed to materialize in Jamaica since the 1970s. This means not only that private agents displace state institutions and functions, but also that the various operations of state institutions proper—the police are my primary concern—no longer seem to embody a coherent project, whether legitimate or illegitimate.

This chapter will provide a historical grounding for what comes next, by focusing on the process of state-making in post-slavery Jamaica. This historical investigation reveals that the process of forging a unified state project, supported by a hegemonic coalition, was rife with tensions, and only achieved tentative and tenuous results. The Jamaican state hardly materialized as a coherent actor because the forces and classes that make it through their conflicts, and are in turn made by it, fail to establish enduring alliances. Not in all respects, but certainly when it comes to the monopolization of violence, the interests of different classes are mutually opposed, and cannot be easily reconciled.

The result, from the perspective of the police force, is outstanding. The JCF, as we shall see, finds itself locked in contradictions. In the earlier stage of police formation—immediately following the abolition of slavery (1834-1867)—the police find themselves trapped between the imperial state and the local plantocracy. In other words, they embody the contradiction between the local state and the external state, which, though not entirely opposed, are nevertheless pursuing different agendas. After 1867, the situation became even more complicated from policemen's point of view, since they came directly into conflict with incipient forces of Jamaican nationalism.

The Political Economy of Plantation and Police

In 1655, British forces conquered Jamaica from the Spanish and built the settlement of Port Royal—an infamous and alluring bastion of piracy, also known as "the Sodom of the West Indies." By the 18th century, the lucrative business of raiding ships and privateering was displaced by sugar cane as the main source of income extracted from the colony. The Spanish introduced sugar cultivation on plantations to the island, but the British expanded the trade, which rested on high-intensity cultivation on large tracts of land, and the hyper-exploitation of enslaved African labor.

Most of the indigenous population of Jamaica was annihilated upon conquest. And while British capitalists imported hundreds of thousands of enslaved Africans to the island throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, Jamaica never became a destination of European settlement. Most plantation owners were absentee proprietors, who remained in Britain and left the everyday management of their business to attorneys, bookkeepers, and overseers (indeed, the separation of ownership and management—financial and entrepreneurial capital—originated right here). The lucrative business, forming a steady "triangular trade" in capital, commodities, and labor, linked distant locations into what became the modern world system.

Lloyd Best's model of the plantation economy (1968) provides a guide for understanding the integration of Jamaica the imperialist world order. What he calls the "pure plantation economy" is the most extreme variation of the "hinterland of exploitation," which is one among three ideal types of hinterland economies (the others being settlement and conquest). The relationship of all colonial economies to the metropole is dependent and mercantilist. This relation defines the general institutional framework of collaboration, which constrains the development of the hinterland economy in five main ways: (1) limitations on trade and intercourse with economies outside the metropole or its sphere of influence (2) division of labor that restricts the hinterland to terminal activities, usually primary production or assembly (3) reliance on metropolitan currency and dependence on metropolitan finance (4) provisions and limitations concerning navigation and (5) imperial preference (terms of trade). But while all three types of colonial economies are distinguished from and related to the metropole, each developed unique social institutions, facilitating different economic motives and types of connection to the core. I focus here only on the plantation economy variant.

The plantation economy is formed by the investment of metropolitan capital in the production of a staple crop for export to the metropolitan market. Capital investment is protected by the imperial navy and army, and the metropole also provides administrative infrastructure and helps to facilitate the importation of labor from other countries. The involvement of the imperial government in the colony itself is, initially, rather limited, and the merchants-planters are given relative autonomy (self-rule) to run their businesses. Although the plantation is an industrial plant, in the sense that it produces surplus through (hyper) exploitation of labor, certain features prevent it from becoming industrial in the strict sense of the term. The plantation is organized as a household estate, where costs of production—including the costs of labor—can not be separated on accounts from the costs of consumption, thereby preventing the rationalization of profits.

Though productive, the plantation economy is "a merchant's game." (ibid. 287) The merchant, who may or may not be the estate owner, is strategically located to facilitate and benefit from the operations of long-distance trade. "The combination of the merchant-pirate ethos with a short view and the introduction of labor into an open resource situation" (ibid. 286) became central to the future development of this type of colony, and its central political-economic institution, the plantation. The plantation is "a "total institution […] encompass[ing] the entire existence of the workforce." (ibid. 287) There is no distinction between social and economic organization of society, and since the workers are slaves deprived of civil rights, government is equally indistinguishable.

The plantation is a political institution which goals are economic. As Edgar Thompson proposed, to study the plantation it is to study "the process of politicization" or even "state making" as such (Thompson 2010, 1). The institution of the plantation was shaped by the problem of controlling labor in a frontier environment where land and other primary resources were "open," that is, widely available. In other words, the use of unfree—slave and indentured—labor is conditioned by the fact that resources are abundant, as opposed to a "free labor" economy, where means of production, including land, are made scarce (ibid. 13). What makes the plantation a political institution, according to Thompson, is that it enforces order "where disorder and uncertainty prevail; where individuals have been torn out of their former group relations and left "disorganized and unattached." (ibid., 3) Authority or political power arises to counter "aggressive self-assertion" by individual men released from traditional kinship bonds and customary social relations. While openly and explicitly coercive, the plantation provides the framework of slowly reweaving "the intricate webs of normal expectations." (ibid. 10).

The planter is doubly sovereign. He holds the powers of both proprietorship and jurisdiction, while "civil administration" (namely, the government of plantation) is geared toward profit. Class relations between masters and slaves are reminiscent of relations on feudal manors, and are similarly defined by deference, loyalty, control, and responsibility. But unlike the manor, the plantation is connected to the world market. This point will be central as we proceed: A plantation is a form of frontier settlement, and the changes it undergoes reflect changes in the organization of the frontier. Some changes are evolutionary, gradual, and result from ordinary human practice. Others are more abrupt and "catastrophic" (ibid. 18). The existence at all times of two oppositional classes with very different motives—one seeking to "humanize" and maintain the plantation and the other seeking to escape or overthrow it—introduces dynamism, without which no change would be possible.[3] The tension between open resources and forced labor continues to animate and destabilize the system (ibid.).

Police and the Plantation in Jamaica

In the mid 19th century, on the eve of the abolition of slavery, the ratio of black and "coloured" to the white population of Jamaica was twenty to one. The enslaved made up more than 90% of the population overall (Dunn 2007). Yet the island was governed by an exclusively white legislative assembly, whose security was maintained by the British army and navy, garrisoned in Port Royal, Spanish Town and Fort Augusta. In addition, the planters operated a local militia based on mandatory conscription of all white males between the ages of 16 and 60. The militia was the first line of defense against slave rebellions, which were not uncommon throughout slavery (Brathwaite 1971).

During the 18th century, over a dozen major uprisings were recorded. Most notable was the 1760 Tacky's Revolt. The British army was called to fight two slave wars against the Maroons—communities of runaway slaves—in 1730 and 1795-1796, which ended in treaties granting the Maroons territorial autonomy in some areas. The Christmas Rebellion (Baptist War) led by Sam Sharpe in 1832 likely precipitated the abolition of slavery; although the development of industrial capitalism in Europe was probably the determining factor, an issue I return to in a minute. Against this backdrop, we will have to understand the introduction of modern policing to Jamaica. That is, the (attempt) to substitute state for plantation as the prime regulator and enforcer of the order of political economy.

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[3] While all civilization, writes Thompson, "grow up at the expense of existing cultures" the plantation complex is stagnant. The binary race and class structure prevents it from forming a "new holistic culture." The idea is reminiscent of M.G Smith's idea of plural societies (Michael Garfield Smith 1975), which equally stresses how Caribbean societies are held together by power alone, as they lack an immanent process of acculturation. The plural society model has been challenged by theories of "creolization" (e.g., Barthwaite 1971), which argue that despite stark distinctions of race and class, shared values, habits, and traditions did develop in Caribbean societies, even under slavery.

What theory of police might serve us in understanding this impending transformation? Marxist and Foucauldian approaches relate the birth of modern policing to the shift from mercantilism to industrial capitalism and the advent of wage labor. The policed society emerges in two stages. First, in the stage of "primitive accumulation," the state ("the concentrated organized force of society," Marx 1992, 915) is mobilized to create the necessary precondition for capital: A class of proletariats, divorced from their means of production and subsistence and a class of capitalist owners. The former is produced, largely, through land enclosure and "bloody legislation," forcing labor discipline upon uprooted peasants turned vagrants and beggars. The latter is produced through combined efforts of colonization, the national debt (effectively, selling or "alienating" the state to ruling classes who become its creditors), the modern tax system (allowing the state to engage in colonial wars and other capital projects, while ensuring riskless returns to its bondholders) and the system of protection, shielding national capital from competition. As Marx describes it, the era of primitive accumulation is marked by plunder, deceit and corruption, genocide, and enslavement. In other words, by deliberate appropriation of humans and resources, driven by competition among European powers.

Capital, then, emerges "dripping blood and dirt from every pore" (Marx ibid.) but it soon loses its "birth certificate" and becomes Capital proper, self-valorizing value. The transition from primitive accumulation to cyclical reproduction requires reinvestment. What may be called "money laundering," to the extent that it transforms ill-gotten wealth into legitimate capital. The reproduction of capital proceeds, in principle, in a functionally rational and calculable manner, rather than in arbitrary and fortuitous feats and bouts—not "boom and bust" but the reproduction of surplus in relatively small increments over time. The transition occurs at least partially through the state's increased regulations of business affairs, which favors the more established and powerful capitalists, who can succeed without turning to illegalities, tricks, or even hyper-exploitation (Engels 2009).[4] Or, as Eric Williams argued in his 1944 classic *Capitalism and Slavery* (1994), "The commercial capitalism of the eighteenth century developed the wealth of Europe by means of slavery and monopoly. But in so doing it helped to create the industrial capitalism of the nineteenth century, which turned round and destroyed the power of commercial capitalism, slavery, and all its works." (ibid. 210)

Thus, in Britain, early modes of policing, experimented with during the 18th century, were concerned with the threat of urban mobs, runaway servants, and the multitude of "masterless men" dubbed by Rediker and Linebaugh "the multi-headed Hydra" (Linebaugh and Rediker 1990). But by the turn of the 19th century, police became tethered to the regime of wage labor and, more specifically, to the process of social pacification it fosters. [5] The introduction of a modern police force to Jamaica followed closely after the formation of Peel's New Police in London in 1829. It reflected Jamaica's contemporariness with the Age of Reform, marked by the abolition of slavery, the rationalization of state institutions and law, and gradual expansion of the vote (Burns and Innes 2003b). Slavery did not fit into the rising liberal reform ideology. For not only was it considered less efficient (economically irrational, inhibiting the growth of population, industry, and national wealth) it also hindered moral progress and the development of civilization. Broad reform agenda expressed the *avowed* shift from immediate physical coercion, as practiced in slavery, to a regime of wage labor based on internalized control and time discipline (Holt 1991). It also indicated a shift from a society governed by rural gentry, with its customary modes of exercising authority and violence, to a bourgeois society, where the ruling class is more reticent about personally exacting coercion and expects the state to do it on their behalf (Silver 1967).

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[4] Engels puts this nicely in the second edition to the Condition of the Working Class in England, where he notes the growing normalization of exploitation and competition: "The competition of manufacturer against manufacturer by means of petty thefts upon the workpeople did no longer pay. Trade had outgrown such low means of making money; the manufacturing millionaire had to know better than waste his time on petty tricks of this kind. Such practices were good enough, at best, for small fry in need of money, who had to snap up every penny in order not to succumb to competition. Thus the truck system was suppressed, the Ten-Hours' Bill was enacted, and a number of other secondary reforms introduced-much against the spirit of Free Trade and unbridled competition, but quite as much in favor of the giant-capitalist in his competition with his less favored brother" (Engels 2009).

[5] While the causes driving pacification or "civilizing" process (expressed in significant drops in male-on-male homicides across most European societies) continue to elude scholarship (see Pearce 2018), there are good reasons to believe it was at least partially affected by the spread of bourgeoise tastes and values—in commodities, customs, and demeanor—among workers, who slowly became capable of affording them, and sometimes even saving. Whether or not this was the case, contemporaries—philosophers, state administrators, missionaries, and reformers—believed in the civilizing power of commercial society. Their actions and policies reflected that ideology.

Yet as we shall see, the introduction of modern policing to Jamaica was uneven and riddled with conflicts. These reflected underlying contradictions in the regime of wage labor, as well as struggles between the plantocracy, emerging social forces, and imperial interests, represented by administrators, military men, and the Governor. The local ruling elite wanted the police to replace the militia, augmenting the army and the militia in quelling rebellions. Hence, in 1833 the Jamaican Assembly passed its first Police Act, declaring that "the late rebellion had evinced the absolute necessity of establishing a police force, to be continually in readiness in case of any future insurrection, or danger of an insurrection" (Dalby 2008b, 2). However, while certainly supportive of this aim, imperial administrators also viewed the police as an element of public force; if not neutral, then at least less biased arbiter between planters and newly-emancipated slaves.

Police and Free Labor

Part of the legal definition of slavery, as the most extreme form of private prerogative over persons, is that masters enjoyed full powers over the life and death of their slaves, including the power to punish, inflict physical pain, and kill at their discretion. With the rise of abolition societies in the late 18th century, arbitrary corporal punishment—especially the use of flogging—became the symbol of slavery's horrors, highlighted in campaigns of abolitionists and reformers. By the early 19th century, the plantation could no longer withstand the advent of the "free labor" interest which enacted the British prohibition of the slave trade (1808) and a process of "ameliorating" the conditions of labor. By the early 19th century, British prohibition of the slave trade (1808) and a process of "ameliorating" the conditions of labor, could no longer withstand the advent of the "free labor" interest. In 1834, slavery was abolished in the British Empire, but full emancipation was deferred until 1838, for four years of "apprenticeship." According to its terms, the emancipated were to continue working for their former masters for 40.5 hours a week and receive their means of subsistence from them: clothing, food, housing, and a small stipend. As planters were determined to squeeze as much labor as possible from their workers during their working hours, the period of apprenticeship gave rise to some of the most brutal forms of labor exploitation management (Holt 1991).

The official goal of apprenticeship was to educate former slaves and former masters into a new regime of free wage labor. It was similar to other gradual processes of abolition carried out by the Dutch and the French. However, only in British colonies did it entail the immediate revocation of the planter's penal prerogative. Effective immediately, the state was to take over the role of disciplining, coercing, and organizing labor in and beyond plantations. Therefore, as Diana Paton (2004) has shown, apprenticeship in Jamaica involved a rapid state-building process, which entailed the "translation" of class struggle between capital and labor into public legal discourse. Paton convincingly argued that despite the apparently decisive transition from private to public violence, in fact, private and public force remained intertwined before and after abolition. Thus, for example, public gaols were established in Jamaica since the 1770s, whereas private punishment remained the norm on plantations long after the formal end of slavery (ibid.). However, unlike in the American South, in Jamaica, the ruling class was neither strong nor coherent enough to fully dispose of the state to cater to its interests. The prevalence of absenteeism, the preeminence of imperial interests, and the power of the formerly enslaved, all meant that planters, while exercising considerable economic and political power, were not able to use the law to create a large-scale proletariat. Primitive accumulation was deferred.

After slavery "the state presented itself in a highly contradictory guise, as both liberator and as enforcer of labor discipline" (Paton ibid. 9). This was perhaps most apparent in the introduction of modern police to the island. The British Abolition Act created new state officials—stipendiary magistrates, who were responsible for enforcing apprenticeship and formed a contra power to local magistrates and justices of the peace who were all planters. The Act also established a network of constables, drawn from the apprentices, to oversee work on plantations.

The 1834 Police Act called for establishing a militarized police force to relieve the military in quelling public disorder and riots—drawing on Sir Robert Peel's 1814 Ireland pacification plan. Initially, the plan was to recruit Europeans to man the new force, thereby also encouraging white settlement in a majority-black colony. The idea reflected a variation of the common practice of recruiting colonial police from distant territories, so they will be more amenable to suppressing the locals. But the plan for a migrant police force failed and recruitment proceeded locally from among the black population (Holt 1991; Dalby 2008a). The decision to recruit locally did not initially seem too problematic since blacks were already serving as headmen on plantations and enlisted to the British West Indies Battalion (see below). However, it will prove decisive in how different social classes will see the police and its own culture, ethos, and self-perception.

Problems with the police appeared almost immediately. The recruits were paid 1 shilling a day, a sum that, according to superintendents, drew only "persons of a very inferior description or without character" (cited in Dalby ibid. 3). During the first year of police operation, at least 100 of its 800 recruits were disciplined for drunkenness, disobedience, and desertion (Paton ibid, 59). Policemen were also regularly put before the courts on excessive use of force, bribery, and extortion charges. (Dalby ibid.) Similar concerns will mark the institution of police throughout the colonial period and even today. Jamaica has an insubordinate undisciplined police force, which is often seen as the very cause of disorder it was designed to repress.

Still, during apprenticeship, the police participated in suppressing labor insubordination. So, despite ongoing complaints about its high costs and the poor quality of its men, the planters and administrative elites were ultimately convinced of its necessity. One special justice listed the use of police to discipline labor on six Portland estates around 1840, noted: "If the police force is done away with, the cultivation of sugar must be abandoned" (cited in Dalby ibid. 4). However, like the emergent state apparatus, the police maintained a degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the planer class. Unlike plantation constables, who were basically slave drivers given a new title, policemen were not part of the plantation workforce and did not answer directly to owners and managers. They only intervened in large-scale signs of resistance that could not be locally managed. At the same time, like stipendiary magistrates, they were sometimes approached by apprentices who used the newly available language of laws and rights to complain about their masters. In some cases, they won.

But the planters did not sit by and let the imperial government interfere with their labor, giving them strange new ideas about the freedom of man. Preparing for a new reality, Jamaican planters busied themselves legislating many new crimes and punishments. Some laws were made to govern labor on plantations, introducing penalties for absences, refusal to work, endangering employer's property, insolence and insubordination, sheltering runaways, attempting to leave the island, or rioting, among many other infractions (Paton ibid. 62). Other laws were made to force labor into plantations in the first place. Among these were the newly introduced Vagrancy Act, Trespass Act, and a full revision of the criminal code creating new statuses dealing with predial larceny, malicious damage, and offenses against the person. Penalties ranged from forced labor to time in the house of corrections, solitary confinement, and whipping. Some of these laws, and the penalties attached to them, were objected to by the Colonial Office, but others were adopted. The objections were not because they were as brutal as labor control under slavery, but rather, because they continued to proscribe discretionary private coercion rather than delegating it to the state, and because they conflicted with the new ideology of wage labor, which demanded rational execution of discipline, in the context of normalized management.

Imperial and local elites were united in fear of black rebellion, which would turn Jamaica into "another Haiti." Their shared interest was materially represented by the British army and navy, permanently stationed on the island ready to suppress dissent. However, until the Morant Bay Rebellion, and to some extent even after, conflicts between metropolitan and local elites about the right to use force were common. After abolition, planters could, for the first time, be penalized for mistreating their workers, and even though they only faced fines for their cruelties and there were literally "two laws in Jamaica," the state presented itself as a neutral arbiter between capital and labor (Paton ibid.). Still, because magistrates and other state functionaries remained largely in planter hands, the execution of law remained deeply skewed and hardly legally rational. Responding to protests from the Colonial Office, Jamaican planters often resorted to conservative, racist, and paternalist ideologies to justify their right (or what they considered their duty) to discipline the "Quashie", or "the lazy negro". However, as many contemporaries evinced, the formerly enslaved were perfectly willing to work, just not for their former masters. They sought to establish themselves as freeholding peasants. (Sewell 2013)

Peasants, State, and Nation

The roots of the Jamaican peasantry are traced to the cultivation of subsistence plots on plantations, during slavery. Seeking to save on the cost of reproducing labor, planters allocated small plots to their slaves, where they produced their own food, while marketing the surplus. Beyond expanding the range of foods available to local consumers, including the planter class, the small plots and the market became important sites for developing Jamaican popular consciousness, associated with the freedom to produce for oneself, travel, exchange, and transact. Hence, when abolition came, many of the formerly enslaved sought to enact their freedom by becoming peasant proprietors (Mintz 1955; 2012; Bakan 1990; Sweeney 2019)

Although planters sought to resist this process by imposing restrictions on buying and selling lands and raising taxes, the emancipated remained determined. Some settled in "free villages" on tracts of lands purchased by missionaries, who envisioned former slaves leading lives of God-fearing, respectable, Christians (Besson 1984; Jean Besson 2002; Hall 1993). Others were given lands by their former masters, in the context of maintaining customary obligations, and still others settled informally on "captured land," mostly in the hills.[6]

But the plantation complex was facing decline anyway. The Sugar Duties Act of 1846, which equalized import duties for sugar imported from British colonies, delivered another blow to West Indian landowners, which could not compete with producers in Cuba and Brazil. This allowed some space for the rise of small peasantry. However, by 1860, sugar prices rose, and plantations became hungry again for land and labor. Although most black farmers could not subsist solely on what food they were growing and continued to depend on seasonal labor on plantations, they could now use strikes and labor stoppages to impose better working conditions and higher wages. To counter this new organized labor power, planters lobbied and succeeded in importing indentured Chinese and Indian indentured workers. Jamaica received some 38,000 Chinese and Indian workers over the next decades—a small number compared to a population of 322,000 formerly enslaved, but enough to repress black contention (Holt ibid.).

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[6] As a result, during the second half of the 19th century the Jamaican rural economy underwent a process of great diversification, compared to its previous nearly complete concentration on sugar and cattle (which was also used on plantations), shifting the balance of production from its exclusive export orientation to locally consumed foodstuff (Bakan 1990).

Recall that despite the abolition of slavery the vast majority of the population was disenfranchised and extremely poor. Elections were held among the tiny minority of white and "coloured" (around 30,000 in total, or 10% of the population of the colony). The administration of justice was skewed in favor of the white upper classes, and land was constantly captured by the plantation complex. In the early 1860s, a series of droughts and floods, and virulent outbreaks of cholera and smallpox worsened the condition of the peasantry. This is the background for the outbreak of the Morant Bay Rebellion. It was only after the Rebellion that the colonial state in Jamaica would truly come into its own, a process marked, among other things, in the constitution of the Jamaica Constabulary Force.

The Morant Bay Rebellion is a watershed moment. Looking back, it can be viewed as part of a tradition of black revolt in Jamaica, which developed under slavery. In this sense, rebellion signifies the ongoing struggle for freedom and cyclical campaigns of repression, in the context of incomplete emancipation. Looking forward, the Morant Bay Rebellion marks, in an incipient form, the contradictory emergence of the Jamaican state and Jamaican nationalism.

Two men are associated with leading the Morant Bay Rebellion: Paul Bogle, a charismatic Baptist deacon with a large peasant following, and George Willian Gordon, a creole politician and landowner. Gordon was born to a wealthy planting attorney and a slave woman circa 1820. He was manumitted by his father, who also paid for his education and helped him start his career as a merchant. By the 1840s, he had accumulated some wealth, married a white woman (a clear sign of upward social mobility), and elected to the assembly. But by the mid-1850s, his coffee business ran into trouble, and he had lost most of his fortune (Heuman 1994). Until the early 1860s, Gordon's politics did not differ significantly from other Jamaican assemblymen—a fact made evident by his voting record (Holt ibid., 290-293). However, touched by the 1861 Baptist Revival, and possibly by falling out of favor with his class given his growing debts, he gradually became a vocal supporter of the interests of the black emancipated class.

After his conversion into charismatic Christianity, Gordon allied himself with Bogle, leader of the native Baptist church in Stony Gut and a small landowner who grew sugar and cotton. Bogle was portrayed by his contemporaries as a man "of limited education but considerable intelligence and energy," exerting influence over "his class and color" (Harvey and Brewin cited on Hueman ibid. 64). He became Gordon's "political agent in St. Thomas" (ibid.). Note, that the relationship between the two men manifested some of the characteristics of customary patron-client relations. Bogle asked Gordon to pay taxes that would enfranchise some of his supporters, and later asked him to "provide something for me to vote upon for the year coming," and enclosing a list of election expenses, including relatively high sums spent on cheese, music, bread, ale, porter, and rum. (ibid. 66) Bogle's campaigning helped Gordon win a seat in the assembly and the vestry against virulent protests by white planters. While his opponents made several attempts to expel him from elected forums, Gordon's popular support grew in St. Thomas and beyond.

Thomas Holt has persuasively argued that a strong religious undercurrent shaped the shared worldview of Gordon and Bogle, who were driven by an evangelist quest for social justice and viewed the plantocracy and the Governor, John Edward Eyre, as "evildoers" (Holt ibid.) Nevertheless, Gordon's subordinate position in terms of wealth and status, surely played a part in his political association with the downtrodden. We will see this pattern returning repeatedly: A conflict among factions of the Jamaican ruling classes (and aspiring social climbers) fought through the mobilization of (formally or effectively) the disenfranchised masses. This may not be unique to Jamaica; arguably, this is modern politics in most "representative democracies." The distinguishing factor is that in Jamaica, the ruling class hardly ever managed to forge alliances around a shared economic goal.

The Rebellion's brutal repression reflected "white panic and paranoia" (Heuman ibid.), raising the specters of the Haitian Revolution and fears that the blacks would expropriate and kill all whites in the colony (sparing only Gordon). As the militia and the small police force proved entirely inadequate for the task, the Governor sent several battalions of the British army to St. Thomas and the neighboring districts, and imposed martial law in the entire Eastern part of the island for thirty days. Among imperial administrators, not only Haiti but also the more recent Indian Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 provoked fears of losing the empire to disorder. The rebellion, Eyre said, had to be repressed decisively and without hesitation. This meant a massive campaign of terror unleashed on villagers from Port Antonio to Kingston. Peasants were publicly flogged, shot dead, forced to watch their neighbors and family members executed, while their crops were confiscated and their houses burned (Hueman ibid.). Alongside British troops, Maroons also participated in repressing the rebellion, guided by their former white commander, Alexander Fyfe, and with weapons supplied by the Governor. Gordon was brought to Morant Bay to face court-martial, which convicted him of high treason and sedition and ordered his execution.

Could the panicked reaction of the white upper class not be explained by the emerging collaboration between an upwardly mobile "coloured" politician and the black masses? It is easy to understand why such an alliance would be threatening to whites in power, and why repressing the rebellion could become a metonym for repressing a counter-hegemonic bloc in the making. But in arming the peasants, both materially and spiritually, Gordon gave rise to Jamaican nationalism. Ultimately, the class of "brown" Jamaicans would lead the country into independence under the title of racial pluralism— "out of many one people." Looking back, Gordon appears as a key actor in the process of nation-building and class formation, for he was the forerunner of a class becoming conscious of itself as a historical political agent, a nation (we may recall that for Benedict Anderson, creole elites were key to the birth of modern nationalism (Anderson 2006, ch. 4). In most accounts of the birth of Jamaican nationalism, the rise of creole national movement and the 'modern' Jamaican political sphere is traced to the labor rebellions of 1938—that is, too much later. However, the Morant Bay Rebellion and its suppression suggest the process began already in the middle of the 19th century.

Drawing Imperial Boundaries

Before continuing with our story, it is worth spending some time understanding the changing position of Jamaica within imperial discourses and political processes. In the 1790s, the West Indian colonies—of which Jamaica was the largest and most prosperous—accounted for four-fifths of British overseas capital investment, a third of its foreign trade, and one-eighth of total revenue from taxes (Bowling 2010, 143). The growth of the abolitionist movement, as we saw earlier, was related to the rise of industrial capitalism and the slow but significant demise of sugar in the British West Indies. A demise that also affected the diminishing power of planters qua The West Indies Interest in parliament. Yet, the apparent "failure" of emancipation to create "free labor" in Jamaica gave rise to new forms of racism. Instead of a civilizational discourse on the universal, albeit hierarchically ordered, human progress, came increasingly biological theories of human difference.[7] Antipathy for Jamaican blacks and sympathy with Eyre were strongly intertwined with growing fears of Irish rebellion and working-class agitation in Britain.

When Eyre's news dispatch reached London in November, the Colonial Office responded by commending the Governor for his "spirit, courage, and energy." Yet, by then, testimonies of British brutality and news of Gordon's execution were already circling among abolitionist milieus, which demanded an investigation to be pursued. A Royal Commission of Enquiry was subsequently formed, sitting for 51 days in Jamaica and hearing testimonies of some 720 witnesses, including many peasants. The Commission concluded that the state of emergency had been overly extended and called for state reforms to improve the conditions of peasants. It did not recommend, as many had hoped and demanded, prosecuting Eyre and his troops for their crimes against the Queen's subjects (Heuman ibid.). A forum calling itself The Jamaica Committee, whose most notable speaker was John Stewart Mill, continued pursuing a campaign against Eyre, calling for him to be charged with murder. An opposing group was set up in Eyre's defense, involved men like Thomas Carlyle and Charles Dickens. Clearly, the remote rebellion became a metropolitan affair, soliciting interest among public intellectuals, politicians, and jurists. Why? According to Nasser Hussain, the Morant Bay Rebellion was a key event in the process of "the jurisdiction of emergency," aiming to restrict the corrupting influence of colonial use of emergency decrees on domestic common law practice. In the process, race became an important marker of difference between norms applicable in the metropole and those applicable in the colony. It will remain for years to come (Hussain 2003; Watson 2008; Kostal 2005).

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[7] In abolitionist discourse, the blacks were construed as deprived of agency, victims of white planter brutality that had to be salvaged. While pursuing their goal, the abolitionists generally denied or minimized the possibility of black conspiracy. They presented the enslaved as victims who have no interest to exact vengeance upon their captors and aggressors. Conservatives, however, entertained fears of precisely that nature, the obvious result of their own brutal terror and the mechanism of projective repression. The Morant Bay Rebellion appeared to support the latter analysis.

Metropolitan working-class movements played a role in the making of "colonial difference" (Chatterjee 1993). Although they had supported the abolition of slavery, working-class movements blamed middle-class abolitionists for hypocritically ignoring "white slavery" at home, a charge that was by no means unfounded. Racialized greatly, the English working people lived in filthy dumps and dens, suffered diseases and brutalization, and were seen by the ruling and middle classes as barbaric hordes, harboring contagious rage and resentment. Standing at the gates of civil society, in two key moments of reform (1832 and 1867), the English proletariat sought to distinguish themselves—respectable working men—from "others," unworthy of political rights belonging by birth to Englishmen. In this process, race became a crucial means of differentiation; as did gender. Citizenship was linked to economic independence: It was a status reserved for men with jobs and families, capable of rational participation in public matters (Hall 2000a; 2000b).

The Colonial Origins of Organized Crime

The result of these complex imperial negotiations was that Jamaica became a Crown Colony, directly governed by the Colonial Office on behalf of the imperial government. The local Assembly was abolished in what Mimi Sheller called "de-democratization" (Sheller 2001). The Jamaican ruling classes begrudgingly agreed to this arrangement because of their obvious dependence on the military backing of the Empire, which ultimately secured their properties and often their lives as well. The Crown Colony government created the administrative apparatus of the modern state in Jamaica. It reformed the district courts and the system of education and devoted public funds to improve roads and irrigation (Augier 1954). For our purposes here, the most important transformation was the disbandment of the 1834 police and the formation of the JCF.

As noted in the introduction, the JCF was roughly modeled on the paramilitary structure of the Royal Irish Constabulary. Its stipulated functions were wide and varied: from keeping watch and preserving the peace to detecting crime and apprehending criminals. It was tasked with serving all summons and warrants, and with aiding the officers of the Revenue in collection of taxes. For these functions, and whatever may be ordered by the Governor from time to time, the police budget was enlarged from £25,000 to £40,000 per annum (Law 8 of 1867, cited in Dalby ibid.). Under its first Inspector-General, Major Prenderville, the JCF introduced several novel policing initiatives, most of them unoriginal. For example, in 1870, the Force established a Register of "habitual criminals" and a detective division headed by an officer from England. In 1872, it began publishing the Police Gazette, to advertise information on stolen goods and criminal activity. However, the Force's actual success in curbing rising rates of crime remained a very contentious issue (ibid.19).

The JCF numbered 695 members in 1867. Twelve of its thirteen Inspectors were white Jamaicans, the remaining one was English. By 1869, the Force was supplemented by a rural constabulary made of 856 constables and 214 headmen.[8] As with its forerunner, the rank and file were recruited locally, largely from among the black peasantry. The rural police was established already in the mid-1850s to cope with prevalent complaints of predial larceny, but the force was considered disorderly and ineffective, and was therefore abolished in 1867 and reestablished. Rural policemen were not salaried functionaries but paid only when they were called out, under the authority of resident householders and headmen, and subject to the authority of the local JCF Inspector (ibid.).

What was the cause of predial larceny? Supposedly, the peasants' growing poverty. Despite the avowed commitment of the Colonial Office to improve the condition of black peasants after Morant Bay, rural deprivation remained great. Land registration data suggests that by the end of the century, peasant plots were diminishing in size and quantity due to customary parcellation of family land to all inheritors (male and female) and the increasing encroachment of multinational agricultural firms on fertile lands. With the arrival of United Fruit Company, banana cultivation also emerged as an important sector—marking a gradual shift from British to American influence, as well as the growing exposure of local farmers to global market pressures (Holt ibid. ch. 10).

Yet, as Patrick Bryan, one of few historians to closely study Jamaican society in the late 19th century, said, predial larceny was not primarily motivated by want and poverty (Bryan 2000). Rather, the practice points to the rise of an illicit business of smuggling cash crops from Jamaica to the United States: "Predial larceny was sometimes attributed to ignorance, sometimes to hunger, but it is naïve to assume that people stole only to supply immediate nourishment." Though some historians found correlations between theft and crops success and failure, "some evidence points to the marketability of the stolen produce as a major incentive." Export commodities like citrus, logwood, and pimento become increasingly attractive to theft following market demand in North America (ibid. 24). The relationship between rural crime and international commerce was also suggested by a contemporary magistrate, who, upon inspection of wharf books and merchant records, observed "a suspicious connection between larceny of produce […] and the business of the merchant." The same observer noted that in several cases of pimento and logwood theft, there was no doubt the thief had sold the produce to "a local buyer who was himself the employer of the buyer and the party who ultimately profited by the theft." (Gibbons to Governor Norman 1884, cited on ibid. 25)

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[8] The water police, established in the 1870s, was another auxiliary force responsible to deal with crime, security and quarantine matters on the wharves and in the harbors. There were 19 water policemen.

Building on Anton Blok's seminal study of mafiosi in Sicily (Blok 1988), we can say that in Jamaica gangs were born to mediate tensions: Tensions between distant central government and local elites and landowners on the one hand, and between landowners and peasants on the other. They provide an informal means of organized violence that connect peripheral economies to the metropole, extracting rent for fulfilling the function of coercing labor, or from various types of illicit brokerage. Differently put, the role of gangs is one of mediation: By providing an informal means to achieve economic and political power, they gave local elites—disempowered by the rigid political economy of empire—a mode of enriching themselves and maintaining their power. Indeed, it appears that long before "the global illicit economy" became a major concern in the late 20th century, merchants on the margins of the world market were developing networks of illicit commerce—an incipient form of "organized crime" or at least of organized gangs. Despite being coordinated at high levels, adequate for the scope of capital required for cross-border operation, predial larceny was blamed on the rural peasant-proletariat and seen by social reformers as the result of still incomplete habitation to wage labor. Treated as such, the law prohibited roadside buying and selling of produce. The punishment for predial larceny, since it was treated as "a black crime," was flogging (Bryan ibid.).

The emerging pattern reflects purposely "inefficient" law enforcement—providing impunity to local business interests—combined with harsh repression of the lower classes, recruited into "crime" by their social superiors. This pattern will concern us throughout the dissertation. It conditions the form of the state, which does not seek nor obtain a monopoly over legitimate violence. That is, a state which does not use the law consistently to govern the use of force to public ends (as opposed to a state that "fails" to monopolize violence). We will see this pattern reconstituted again and again. The evolution of elite crime went hand in hand with the development of a very active discourse concerning police corruption, inefficiency, and unprofessionalism—which was also dubbed "black."

The ruling classes, which were already inimical to the police force, which they had associated with imperial intervention, continued to question the police's competence and integrity. Major elite newspapers complained that local constables are "subjected to no discipline, are altogether insubordinate, are neglectful of their duty and too frequently get in a collision with the inhabitants and create disturbances where they ought to be preserving the public peace" (Dalby 2008, 8). They claimed that detectives were "sadly wanting" and that the overall educational level of recruits was incomparable to what was common in the metropole—although, in fact, it was. Some even ruminated nostalgically about the relative advantages of the pre-1867 Force. (Dalby ibid.) In the want of adequate police, "Robberies are committed with impunity; private residences are entered by thieves who fill their bags or baskets with jewels, clothes, and other articles that they can 'lay their hands on,' and then scamper off with the certainty that there need be no fear of detection" (cited in ibid. 15).

The Force's white officers argued, in response, that "the class from which the majority of candidates are drawn is not of the highest order" and that investing black peasants with legal authority, following only a short period of training, may indeed lead to occasional abuse of power (Thomas 1920 cited in Dalby ibid. 16). But over time, the officer rank became the target of vehement criticism as well. An influential elite newsletter exclaimed: "our constabulary is useless; its chief worthless. He takes no interest in the discovery of crime, is seldom seen, wholly unlike the London Superintendent" (cited in ibid.20).

And thus, by 1884, a consensus will emerge, that "of all the branches of the public service the constabulary is perhaps the one which has made the least satisfactory return for the vast amount of money which it annually absorbs." Then, as today—recall Harriott's claim above—the main problem identified in the Force was its paramilitary organization, which prevents it from properly investigating crime, which, as a result, becomes rampant. "The semi-military idea that underlies the organization of the constabulary has destroyed its usefulness as a good police or detective force […] The police force stands in need of complete reorganization before it can perform the satisfactory work" (cited in ibid. 23).

Now, the majority of black policemen found themselves trapped in a whole web of contradictions and antagonisms. Not only between the imperial state and the local state but also between different sectors of the local elite and the majority of the people. The police came into direct confrontation with the black peasant class, who suffered their brutalization, and obviously resented them. Consciously or unconsciously catering to the interests of a sector of the merchant class, which became invested in illicit trade, using black peasants as criminal labor. At the same time, the police were unfavored by the respectable middle and ruling classes, which saw them as incapable of solving crime and preventing its recurrence. This raises the question, who's interests precisely was the police force serving?

The Jamaica Defense Force: Internal Security and Imperial Order

While many of the questions raised in this chapter will have to wait for later—not so much to be resolved, but to be further developed—there is another element that needs to come into our frame because it will highlight the multi-headed structure of the Jamaican state. The best way to see the structure of the state is to closely observe the differences and relationship between the police and the army: the British West India Regiment.

The army's West India Regiment developed out of the imperial garrison formed in Jamaica immediately upon conquest. Formally established in 1792, the Regiment had a dual purpose: To defend the island—once Britain's most valuable sugar colony—against rival European powers and to quell internal revolts and rebellions. Here too, officers were white, while rank-and-file corps were black and coloured. Initially, they included mostly slaves enlisted immediately upon arrival and some freed slaves from North American colonies. After emancipation, recruitment proceeded locally.[9] The Regiment was considered an integral part of the British army, although lower in the hierarchy than metropolitan battalions. Its soldiers participated in British campaigns in two World Wars. Locally, though the army participated in quelling rebellions, the formation of the police allowed it to recede somewhat into the background when it came to crowd control and population management (Bowling 2010).

The division of labor between the police and the army is noticeable in Jamaica to this day. Whereas the police high command was quickly turned over to locals after independence in 1962, the military continued to employ British officers in substantive posts until the late 1960s. In 1964, there were still 45 British officers in the JDF's top ranks, including the Chief of Staff position. In 1965, when the JDF became fully 'independent,' there were still 22 British officers, which were renamed British Joint Service Training Team (Lacey 1977, 151). As Tarry Lacey suggested, "the responsibility for the problems and inadequacies of the JCF with the relatively smooth development of the JDF during the 1960s is at least partly attributable to the state in which the British left it." (Lacy ibid.) Simply put, the British colonial state always invested more in the military function than in the police, because their concern for imperial defense was greater than their concern with internal peace. We will see later, in the Police Reform chapter, this priority has not changed.

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[9] As several scholars have recently shown, the colonial backdrop was a crucial, thought largely unacknowledged, factor in the development of European military powers. Not only for the riches accumulated through pillage, commerce, and slavery in the New World, but also thanks to the conscription of colonial subjects—especially among groups considered "martial races"—to metropolitan militaries. In other words, the development of standing armies and gradual replacement of "private" mercenary armies with public forces, was made possible not only by militarizing the nation in Europe but also by gathering men globally (Bryant 2000) This has implications for the way we theorize the relationship between primitive accumulation and the rise of metropolitan nation states. The military might of the British Empire depended significantly on the fact that, since the 16th century, it recruited *most* of its troops outside of England proper. This had many implications. For one, this meant that the state and the notion of citizenship developed not along republican lines–grounding citizenship in wartime sacrifice—but, more prominently, on the inherent rights of "Englishmen", that is, on race and pedigree. From a postcolonial perspective, imperial violence that secured the Jamaican state from "outside" can be understood as accumulated violence; extracted and signified as 'belonging' to imperial power.

The Jamaica Defense Force (JDF) is the direct descendent of the Regiment and continues to be associated with the Empire, both materially and symbolically.[10] The two original functions of the JDF have not changed. Formally, in addition to supporting law enforcement, the JDF is tasked with maintaining Jamaican sovereignty against external aggressors. But there aren't any. The last military deployment took place in support of the US counterrevolutionary invasion of Grenada in 1983. The JDF does participate heavily in internal policing, especially during a declared State of Emergency. After independence, the Jamaican Government declared an emergency in 1966 to respond to political warfare discussed in the next chapter. More recently, during the 2010 Incursion into Tivoli Gardens, and again between 2018-2019, to curb violent crime and a soaring rate of murder. But even under "ordinary" circumstances, the JDF routinely patrols alongside policemen in "high-crime" neighborhoods and garrisons. The JDF also maintains a strong intelligence unit (MIU) and, especially through its coast guard and air wing, participates in regional campaigns against drugs smuggling.

Given that the police are paramilitary, and the military regularly engages in policing, what is the rationale for maintaining two distinct security forces, with independent organizational and command structures? Over the years, many have called for such a merger, but calls have always been rejected. Not only by the command of the security forces interested in organizational preservation, but also by statemen and experts on several counts. Firstly, from a constitutional perspective, two security forces provide a more stable arrangement than one, and allow distinguishing between emergency measures and everyday peacekeeping, however blurred they actually become. More importantly, the JDF enjoys much wider public support and is considered significantly less corrupt than the JCF.

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[10] The JDF is made up of a Regular Force and a Reserve Force, and seven major units: combat arms; air wing, coastal guard, and engineer regiment; and a logistics battalion. The Regular Force is approximately 2,500 men strong. Major military bases are in Newcastle, in the Blue Mountains overlooking Kingston, and in Up Park Camp, near Crossroads—a bustling center of the city.

In opinion polls, citizens of Jamaica consistently rate the army as the most highly respected and trusted institution of government. In 2017, on a scale of 1 to 100, the JDF achieved a trust rate of 63.6, much higher than the police (38.3), the justice system (44), and parliament (31.9)(Broadie and Bartley 2017). More recently, in 2020, over 60 % of Jamaican citizens expressed support for deploying soldiers in policing, instead of the Jamaica Constabulary Force. 87% of the respondents believe that the JDF should continue to be involved in regular crime-fighting (Hyman 2020). The polls reveal the massive discrepancy between trust in the police and the army, which is worth dwelling on for a minute.

According to former Chief of Staff Anthony Anderson, the JDF recruits from the exact same pool of youngsters as the JCF but does a better job in screening and disciplining them so that they don't become insubordinate and corrupt. Curiously, over the decades following independence, while the police force was subverted by political and criminal interests, the army remained untainted, nearly spotless. The riddle is solved once understood that the JDF is not so much a force of the Jamaican local state but continued to be wielded and controlled by imperial powers. Its officers are trained in the British military academy and receive additional training in the US and Canada. It carries out defense exercises alongside other Caribbean forces with American, British, and Canadian Militaries (Lacey ibid. Bowling ibid.)

But perhaps more interesting from an ethnographic perspective is the cultural association between the JDF and the Empire. Indeed, though the pool of recruits is identical, members of the

JDF are viewed as more respectable and a military career certainly provides a path of social mobility into the middle class. The army's respectability depends in part on its association with the Crown, which was considered the protector of the black masses, and partially from the clear and calculated attempt of its senior officers, foreign experts, and heads of the state to keep the army at a safe distance from the local population (Bowling ibid.).[11] As we shall see, the Jamaican popular classes tend to treat the police as if it were basically another gang. Though direct attacks against the police are relatively sporadic, they are not uncommon. Soldiers are far less likely to be targeted by gangs, perhaps because they are not viewed as a threat and perhaps because the army symbolizes authority, a feature the police utterly lacks.

How and why was the division of violent labor between the police and the army created? We can only speculate. It may be that foreign control over the JDF remained tight and effective, preventing the army from "going rogue" like the police force. It may have resulted from an explicit or implicit elite agreement to maintain the JDF's impartiality, so that it continues to represent hegemonic consensus and become available to protect the entire dominant class. In this sense, the division of violent labor between the JCF and the JDF maintains the implicit division between local and imperial elites, which persisted throughout the colonial era. Whereas some sectors of the local elite may favor a police and justice system that are easily corrupted and amenable to their private interests, they nevertheless recognize the need for "imperial" backing, support and defense, against the people. But of course, there can be no local "corruption" without imperial military sponsorship, protecting—if only implicitly—the existing state order. In other words, if the police force is part of the fragmented local state apparatus, the JDF remains very much an imperial force, governed by and used to protect global interests—which are partially in conflict but fundamentally in agreement with local power holders.

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[11] JDF soldiers are less likely to brutalize civilians and far less likely to partake in extra judicial killings. This is in part because, under normal circumstances, they have no authority to apprehend suspects and lead them through the criminal justice system. With regards to killing, the exception seems to prove the rule. In 1978, in an incident that became known as the Green Bay Massacre (and which will be treated in the next chapter) several Kingston gang members were lured into a military shooting range and executed by members of the JDF. The killings followed orders from the PNP government and had important consequences. Not least, in advancing a peace agreement between gangsters of the two rivaling parties. For our purposes here, however, the important point is to note that, since that incident, the army did not carry out premediated executions of civilians and maintained its autonomy vis-à-vis the bipartisan conflict.

The distinction between "local" and "metropolitan" interests is perhaps not entirely accurate, especially today, when (as we shall see in the chapter on The Reform Police:) classes are more global than territorially based. I maintain the distinction, however, because of its cultural significance. Associated as it is with foreign interests, the army is widely viewed as a third party, neutral vis-à-vis local conflicts. The army enjoys relative autonomy from bipartisan interests, turning it, perhaps, into the only *state* institution strictly speaking.

Paradoxically, the army can maintain this consensual position, and endow it with national symbolism, precisely because it is identified with and most heavily controlled by foreigners. In this sense, the JDF inherited the symbolic place of the British Crown, widely popular in Jamaica, including among the lower classes, because it symbolized impartiality and even benevolent government against rogue masters. This paradoxical situation suggests why the army—far less reformed, far more controlled by foreign interests—is hardly ever charged with being as "colonial" as the police. Put even more strongly: The notion that the JCF is the "most colonial institution" in postcolonial Jamaica can only stand if one completely ignores the JDF. In fact, and as we will see in the next chapters, attempts to decolonize, civilize, and 'Jamacanize' the JCF have been ongoing since the 1940s. While these efforts surely failed, no attempts were ever made to "decolonize the JDF" since that would mean breaking away from imperialism—a preposterous idea that mustn't be uttered.

Conclusion

If by "colonial" we mean authoritarian and outdated, then, certainly, the JCF is among the most colonial institutions in Jamaica. Its ostentatious ceremonies and insignia, excruciatingly apathetic administration, and apparent reluctance to join "the digital age" give credence to those who argue that the Force has not yet made it to the 21st century. One hundred fifty years after its establishment, everyday work in police stations remains mostly manual and paper based, with massive station diaries—about 30 inches tall—used to register incidents, suspects, procedures, and schedules. There are not enough computers, nor the competence to use them effectively (at least at the station and divisional levels) to collect, store and analyze crime data and identify meaningful patterns. There are not enough police cars, and the existing fleet is quite inefficiently managed, prolonging police response time to calls, and obviously irritating the public. Policemen use their private vehicles to visit witnesses and apprehend suspects, because they can't, or are unwilling to, wait until the one car assigned to their unit returns from making an urgent delivery or hauling the Superintendent to the Commissioner's Office.

Once we read reports from civil society and human rights organizations or speak to many victims of police brutality, the travesty turns into a nightmare: Petty and sadistic abuse of power by "trigger happy" policemen, apparently taught to terrorize the people rather than serve them lawfully. Whether by design or by perversion, through intentional or rather gradual decay, the JCF is seemly clearly incapable of effectively detecting and solving crime or countering the rising rate of murder.

"We are Third World cops facing First World Gangs," one policeman told me early on in my research, expressing a sense of exasperation and helplessness I will encounter time and again. While I think it is wrong, and will argue against, associating police violence to frustration, I believe this policeman points us in the right direction: Jamaican policing continues to be shaped by contradictions and discrepancies that are global in nature. Contradictions that owe their consistency not to some local cultural stubbornness—institutional and political unwillingness to shake off colonial inheritance—but to the persisting imbalances of the world market, that have their roots in imperialism and are constantly reproduced today.

This may seem obvious, but perhaps it isn't. In recent years, development specialists and civil security experts, as well as academic social scientists, have increasingly turned to a theory of "elite violence" to explain why countries like Jamaica remain unpacified (Kleinfeld 2018). Driven by what is perhaps a wider trend in the social sciences in the wake of populism and public outcry against oligarchy, the theory of elite or "privileged" violence suggests that societies with high rates of murder are often governed by fraudulent and self-serving elites, which use organized state power as well as criminal and paramilitary forces to further their interests, in complete disregard to civilian life, especially the lives of the lower classes. The important point made by this body of literature is that states operating in this way are by no means "failed states." Rather, in them, the state had been "captured" by elites who refuse to come to an agreement about the monopolization of legitimate force (ibid. see also: Pearce 2018). The theory is very compelling. As this chapter has shown, Jamaica's old plantocracy was often ready to use legal and extra-legal means to further its economic and political ends, combining—in a fashion that appears initially arbitrary—harsh repression of the black lower classes and highly ineffective law enforcement to uproot illicit commerce and traffic. The pattern for police operation, as it developed first under apprenticeship and fully evolved after the Morant Bay Rebellion, reflects this history to the letter. However, as we began to see, and will continue to observe throughout this dissertation, this is not the whole story, but only half. The JCF, like any police force, "serves the ruling classes", but it does so in a way that reflects the particular configuration of race and class relations in Jamaica, which cannot be fathomed by artificially separating the "local" political economy from the wider imperialist and neo-imperialist ("global") context. To put things bluntly: If today's upper classes continue to use the police like 19th century slave masters, then, perhaps, it is not their personal immorality or cultural impropriety that we should question but the very structure and function of the Jamaican state as such and its integration into the capitalist world system.

My main concern in this chapter was to theorize the state as what I called, following Poulantzas and Jessop, "a global social relation." Whereas all modern states are global, by merit of their integration into and dependence upon the world market and the interstate system, I tried to show how the particular way in which Jamaica was integrated produced a complex and rather contradictory state of affairs. Since its early plantation settlement, through the period of Crown Colony, and until today, Jamaica remains a terrain of strategic and relational action by "locals" and "foreigners," with sometimes conflicting and sometimes overlapping goals. I sought to show that the organization of violence—the Jamaican state proper—makes sense, once, instead of treating Jamaica as a "perverse" Weberian state, we attend to its local specificities and to the formation of classes and races within an imperial economic and political space.

My goal was to make the case that the "petty police," the JCF, needs to be related to the wider police—the political economy and its resulting orders of administration and violence. But what I hope became apparent was the doubly contradictory role of the JCF within the evolving state and social order. If Jamaica's first police force, introduced immediately upon the abolition of slavery, was marked by a contradiction between the local and the imperial state, then the second police, the JCF established after Morant Bay, placed the police in an even more complex set of relations: Between the formal state and the informal state, and between the state and the nation. In the next chapter, I will show how, on the road to independence and in the early post-independence era, black policemen sought to deal with these inescapable contradictions by embracing Democratic Socialism and Black Power.

Black Police Power: The Political Moment of the Jamaica Constabulary

Retired Senior Superintendent of Police Reneto Adams walked me into his office above a garage in Spanish Town. He put down his Winchester rifle—a semiautomatic hunting gun, which he carried around to run errands—and had me seated in his chamber, where he currently manages a small security firm. In 2008, Adams retired from the JCF after 41 years of service, during which he became known as one of Jamaica's famous "crime fighters"—a brand of policemen who rose to fame in the 1970s, amid bipartisan warfare and expanding criminal violence, and are seen as capable of driving fear into the hearts of "badmen" and gangsters. Around the time I came to interview him, in March 2018, over 18,000 Jamaicans signed a petition calling to make him Commissioner of Police. He is regularly invited to speak on talk shows, as part expert and part curiosity, always in dapper suits, a bow tie, and his signature aviator sunglasses.

Revered and feared, famed and disdained, sensationalized and ridiculed, Adams is certainly a cop with an attitude. Clearly aware of the power of images and the media, he actively promotes what may be called, in the spirit of our times, "police populism": anti-elitist campaigns promoting harsh and punitive law enforcement, in the name of true interests of "the people." Adams opened our conversation by sharing with me his critical evaluation of the JCF as having "the same job description as before," to protect "the masters, the slave owners, the people with the means of production…the rich against the poor." Perhaps not the first thing one would expect to hear from a seasoned police officer. Aren't the police supposed to be protecting the system? But Adams was for some time engaged in a campaign against Jamaican political elites and senior members of Force, who, he argues, participated in a neocolonial conspiracy to have him ousted.

In 2004, Adams was charged, along with six of his subordinates, for conspiracy and murder in a famous case of extra-judicial killings in the village of Kraal in central Jamaica. This will be discussed at greater length in the coming chapters. The case was investigated by a team of Scotland Yard detectives, whose arrival indicated growing metropolitan concerns about police abuse and corruption in the post-colony. Adams, who was already known as a no-nonsense policeman, became the arch-antagonist of reformers and human rights activists, while growing his popularity. But I could tell Adams was not simply voicing empty demagogical slogans. His analysis of Jamaican society and politics, as he laid it out to me in a four-hour-long interview, was preceptive and critical and sometimes felt more on point than what I heard from other critics and commentators.

Adams explained that his approach, which he called "radical policing," grew out of his experience as a young constable, who joined a police force increasingly radicalized by trade union mobilization, anti-colonial struggles, democratic socialism, and black power. He emphatically recalled "the revolutionary spirit" of the 1970s, when things African—culture, politics, aesthetics—were finally publicly extolled and widely celebrated. He also spoke very eloquently about the predicaments of postcolonial economic dependency, noting that crime is partly a symptom of poverty and dispossession and partly a counterrevolutionary affront.

Adams may be the most vocal proponent of these views, but he is certainly not alone. Over the following months I met several senior police officers who advanced a highly sophisticated and critical analysis of Jamaican society, tracing the evolution of crime and policing to the history of the plantation and the structures of global capitalism. I also met younger men and women who, though enlisted to protect "the system," were critical and politically conscious. They were living contradictions, embodying acute postcolonial paradoxes. For while they serve one of the most lethal police forces in the world, abhorred by black youths in the ghettos, they carry out their role with an avowed commitment to black nationalism and even to black power. How can we make sense of this troubling disparity?

Studies of Jamaican policing have thus far largely neglected this question. As we began seeing in the previous chapter and will continue seeing later, most commentators relate police brutality to the historical constitution of the JCF as a colonial paramilitary force, designed to enforce order rather than serve citizens and detect crime in a professional and democratic fashion. Police culture is viewed largely as an institutional inheritance, passed from generation to generation, without being ever seriously troubled or challenged. This rather linear narrative sits well with reformist agendas, which emphasize the need for improved police training on ethics, human rights, and liberal values. It also sits well with the idea that colonialism is a thing of the past.

Anthropologists working in other postcolonial contexts, where racialized police violence is common, advance two main theses in their effort to resolve similar paradoxes. One line of research emphasizes the cultural and even psychical inheritance of white supremacy among postcolonial policemen (French 2013; Maart and Campbell 2014). The other stresses the affective appeal of bolstered performances of authority, which overcompensate for neoliberal dissolution of borders and waning sovereignty. They show how vigilante policing today recuperates colonial motifs, particularly in contexts where 'the law' was never experienced as universal and monopoly over legitimate violence was never complete (Caldeira 2000; Caldeira 2006; Comaroff and Comaroff 2006; 2016; Kyed 2018).

Building on these propositions, but also departing from them, this chapter proposes a non-linear reading of the coloniality of policing. Rather than reading the coloniality of policing today as a direct inheritance from the past, I posit a break in the story, a fleeting but not insignificant moment, when colonialism was troubled and then violently restored. Following Walter Benjamin, my account seeks to "blast a specific era out of the homogeneous course of history" to recover lost hopes and unrealized possibilities, against an enemy who continues to win (Benjamin 2007b, 262). Based on conversations with policemen, oral histories, and documentary evidence, I reconstruct Jamaican police consciousness as it evolved through struggles from the late colonial period up to the late 1960s. I then focus on Jamaica's experiment with Democratic Socialism between 1974 and 1980, and show that members of the police force, like many of their fellow citizens, were openly debating what national independence could practically mean.

They discussed agrarian reforms, economic self-reliance, social programs, education, and cultural politics, and related the movement in Jamaica to anti-colonial struggle worldwide. Policemen, in particular, understood some of these transformations as indispensable for changing how policing is administered. The movement was crushed in 1980, under the weight of neoliberalism, leaving only fragments that were later reworked into contemporary police populism.

The handful of policemen I quote in this chapter are, to some degree, representative. Their opinions are, of course, their own, but they are not outliers or dissidents. Even though they mostly identified, in the 1970s, with the People's National Party (PNP)—not something to take lightly given Jamaica's intense bipartisanism—their comments reflect tensions and contradictions of which all Jamaican policemen are deeply aware. And how could they not be? In almost any society, policemen hail from the classes most vigorously policed, often serving as "native informants" and viewed as traitors by their own people. In Jamaica, the tension is acutely felt, as the vast majority of policemen hail from the black peasantry, either coming directly from the countryside or from among the dispossessed who migrated to the city. They live in a society that views rebellion as central to national culture, and openly chastises the police as "Babylon", an agent of the corrupt and corrupting Empire.

We saw in the previous chapter that the colonial police were situated amidst a twofold contradiction: Between the imperial state and the local state and between the colonial state and the nascent nation, the people. This chapter follows directly by focusing on a brief and intense moment when some policemen sought to resolve these contradictions by identifying with a broader political project, through which, they believed, they could be overcome—both objectively and subjectively.

Part of my argument, with reference to the literature, is that police ideology—like any ideology for that matter—provides a way of imaginarily resolving contradictions that cannot be resolved in reality. Police embody an extreme form of contradiction felt by any capitalist subject, more or less acutely, between what one *believes* and what one actually *does,* between what we think and how we live. Taking police ideology seriously, neither as cynicism nor as false consciousness, is therefore also an exercise in reflexive anthropology. It further allows us to ask interesting questions: Under what conditions might police forces become politicized? Are there situations where the police can become a progressive agent? Can policemen's criticism of the state of affairs relate in any way to radical criticism voiced by disenfranchised communities and activists? Is there anything we can learn from self-proclaimed "radical policemen", without turning them into heroes or villains?

I propose considering the ideology of Jamaican policemen as containing elements of a now-defunct project of political policing: explicitly biased law enforcement on behalf of the people. Projects of radical political policing can be understood as those which recognize the bourgeois social order as particular and skewed, and advance their own version of just law enforcement. They differ from reforms, which seek to rectify and reconstitute the liberal order, as well as from calls for police abolition, which strive to undo policing *tout court*, without seeking to provide any clear alternative. But they are no less universal and no less utopian. Universal, in suggesting that an egalitarian society depends on coercing groups that defy the public good. Utopian, in dreaming up a world beyond conflict.

Within current debates, the option of radical political policing has not received much, if any, attention. This absence reflects, I think, the predicament of engaging in a serious debate about alternative modalities of socially organizing violence, political power as such, where all forms of violence are treated as equally disagreeable and repulsive. Without entering the admittedly unpleasant conversation about violence we risk leaving the stage empty for those who firmly believe that policing, as currently practiced, is the only option for organizing complex modern societies. Even worse, in denying and repressing violence we reproduce the conventional tendency to project violence onto "others"—who thereby become tainted by what we cannot bear about ourselves.

Political Policing

Policing is always and everywhere political. Even in liberal democracies, where the law purports to be universal, the police are institutionally disposed to protect the social order through organized and sanctioned use of violence. In this chapter, however, I use the notion of political policing to consider what happens when policemen begin to understand themselves as political actors who have a stake in radically transforming their society. For this purpose, I draw loosely on Jean-Paul Brodeur's theorization of political policing as a modality of "high policing" (Brodeur 1983, 2010). Genealogically traced to 16th century French *haute police*, high policing concerns the protection of the state from external and internal conspirators and enemies. It intervenes in the field of government proper, and is distinguished from "low policing," which deals with crime, order, and emergency. In absolutist France, the notion referred specifically to "the policing of families," that is, to policing the nobility—a strata that was suspected of plotting against the king. Brodeur cites von Henting, who captured the idea, in writing: "A political police is not so much an instrument for the protection of society as a form of political activity through the medium of the police" (von Henting 1919, cited in Brodeur 2010., 226).

Political or high policing takes on different forms, as well as different objectives, under different types of regimes, depending on how they understand potential threats and appropriate means to counter them. As conceptualized by Brodeur, the notion is basically synonymous with "elite" law enforcement agencies and specialized, often covert, operations of national security. I don't follow him down this path but am interested instead in thinking about policing as a form of political activity, specifically of a type that aims to counteract or even wrest power from modern “nobles,” the ruling classes, or in the Jamaican case, the plantocracy. This kind of theoretical project is, to my mind, as necessary as and complementary to thinking about abolishing low policing, given the magnitude of criminality and corruption emanating from the top echelons of nearly all capitalist societies, and the criminalization of neocolonial governance.

In a short essay published after the 2012 Marikana Massacre in South Africa, anthropologist Julia Hornberger considered the difference between colonial political policing and political policing that might be democratic. Keeping in mind Brodeur’s definition but also drawing on Steinberg, she points out that political policing can be understood as biased enforcement against certain groups or interests. Having studied the South African Police Service (SAPS) and its democratic reforms since the end of Apartheid, Hornberger asked what it would mean to take seriously the police’s avowed commitment to break with the past and truly serve the South African people. She proposes that to accomplish its new democratic mission, the SAPS must become partisan on behalf of the citizens. For example, in a situation of protest, the police should not concern itself solely with the maintenance of public order but take an active role in assisting the crowd in delivering its message. She says that while the police cannot change the distribution of power and resources in society in general, they need to take a stand (Hornberger 2014; see also: Hornberger 2011).

In this chapter, I follow Hornberger’s suggestive proposition by examining a historical moment when biased anti-colonial policing appeared, for a short moment, as a real possibility. Slightly departing from Hornberger, I don’t maintain the distinction between political policing committed to protecting a democratic constitution and political policing that is ‘arbitrary’. The distinction is relevant and valuable in the South African context, where the constitution, at least, is democratic and even progressive (Cornell 2014). Instead, I argue that in the Jamaican case, political policing was conceived as part of an attempt to establish a new constitutional order, breaking with colonial structures of clientelism and patronage.

As we shall see, the political experiment pursued in Jamaica in the 1970s under the title of democratic socialism was an attempt to deal with the predicament of colonial policing in a context of capitalist imperialism. Understanding the relationship between economic dependency and the undemocratic order, the project aimed to turn the state into an engine of development and social and political reform. Drawing on the plantation economy school, championed the New World Group, it sought to transform state and society by directly challenging the order of plantocracy within a formally constitutional democracy (Stephens and Stephens 1986). Investigating how the police force fit into this process, and trying to lay out the stakes, is the main concern and challenge of this chapter.

The Anti-Colonial Police Federation

We left the JCF in the last chapter around the turn of the century. Let us now pick up the threads, and observe the gradual but noticeable politicization of policemen, taking place in the context of massive social changes: The development of labor unions, the emergence of mass political parties, the rise of Pan-Africanism, and Rastafari. As we saw earlier, the Jamaican economy of the late 19th century diversified somewhat, as the peasantry was able to acquire more land under Crown Colony. Banana trade marked the expansion of American finance capitalism, but culture and politics were still very much tied to Britain. Social and economic pressures were somewhat relieved by large labor migration, as tens of thousands were recruited to build the Panama Canal, to work in large industrial farms in the US and Canada, and to cut sugarcane in Cuba and Costa Rica. But in the 1920s immigration quotas were implemented in the Northern countries, the construction of the Canal was completed, and the global economic crisis sent many workers home to join the growing ranks of the unemployed in Kingston (Austin-Broos 1997)

Returned migration, waves of rural displacement, and the concentration of trade and services in town, led to rapid urbanization. Many peasants came to town in search of work, but most of them had no marketable trade. They were employed as day laborers, domestic servants, or sold in the market. The peasants adapted their rural lifestyles and spiritual practices to the new urban setting. Rastafarianism, for example, reworked older themes of black Baptism and Revival churches (Chevannes 1994). Rastafarianism was already becoming a global religion, expressing an emergent consciousness of Pan-Africanism and international blackness, as many of the men who migrated for work, as well as others who served as soldiers in WWI, were exposed to the universal condition of Africans in the New World. Marcus Garvey, the Jamaican leader of the mass United Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) in the US, was deported back to the island in 1935 making black nationalism a force that elites had to contend with (Post 1978). This was especially the case since, as the bourgeoning national elites understood full-well, the black masses were about to gain suffrage and to enter the political sphere.

The 1939 Caribbean-wide labor rebellion gave rise to Jamaica's two major political parties, the People's National Party (PNP) and the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), both strongly rooted in trade unionism. Despite the centrality of organized labor and the advent of universal suffrage (1944) the absence of a national bourgeoisie and the large proportion of lumpenized peasants, conditioned the development of parties along clientelist lines (Stone 1980). The struggle over the state as a vehicle of distribution and accumulation led to violent clashes between the parties, though their programs did not differ significantly. The PNP, headed by Norman Manley, championed a form of Fabianism, and was stronger among the urban middle classes and organized workers, teachers, nurses, and policemen. JLP, led by Alexander Bustamante, was more conservative, reflecting a coalition between wealthy businessmen, sugar workers, and peasants. Both leaders, who were also cousins, hailed from the brown middle class. They peacefully led Jamaica into independence (1962) under the slogan "out of many one people"—creole nationalism deflecting and even denying black nationalism. The black majority remained politically, socially, and culturally marginalized. Its churches, leaders, and movements—most notably Rastafarianism—were ridiculed, persecuted, and victimized (van Dijk 2007)

We saw in the previous chapter that most colonial policemen were recruited from the black peasantry. As a point of interest, Claude McKay, who in the late 1920s will become one of the leaders of the Harlem Renaissance, was a police constable in Jamaica before migrating to the US. Born to a peasant household in rural Clarendon, McKay had the typical profile of rank-and-file colonial policemen. Some of his earliest poems, collected in *Constab Ballads* (1912) (McKay 2016), reflect on the hardship of a man who understood himself to be a race/class traitor: "'tis hatred without an' 'tis hatred within" (62), he wrote in anguish, and expressed fear that "my people won't love me again […] my people… my owna black skin." (63)

McKay ultimately resigned from police duties, explaining his decision as resulting from his personal "unadaptive" temperament and sensitivity to injustices. But in the Preface to *Constab Ballads* he did not completely disavow the Force or its members. Rather, he wrote, "As constituted by the authorities the Force is admirable, and it only remains for the men themselves, and especially the sub-officers, to make it what it should be, a harmonious band of brothers." (8)

Addressing sub-officers in this fraternal fashion, McKay was appealing to black policemen who, during the colonial era, were not promoted beyond the rank of sergeant, and who might have been, like him, proto-revolutionary. By the 1940s, this contingent became mobilized by national trade unionism, which sought to gradually 'Jamaicanize' institutions—in this case, replacing the whites at the helm of the Force with black officers.

On the eve of national independence, the problem of colonial policing was widely and vocally debated, and the conversations we find in the archives prefigure most, if not all, of the arguments we still hear today. On April 24, 1945, The Gleaner, Jamaica's preeminent newspaper, announced "for general information, the impending arrival of Superintendent W.A. Calver of the London Metropolitan Police, to carry out a "comprehensive investigation of the Police Department." The Gleaner, a paper representing a conservative segment of the middle class, positively anticipated this inquiry, and advocated replacing the colonial model of the Force with a consensual metropolitan type: "the ordinary policeman is, in fact, a friend as well as a servant of the ordinary, decent, man and woman […] For the policeman's job is not to curtail liberty and freedom but to enable everyone to enjoy those rights (Gleaner Correspondent 1945a). A similar sentiment was expressed in another editorial published in October, which cast the police as "A Terror and a Friend"—"terror" to the anti-social criminal who "make his gains out of society without proper return in labour," and "friend" to the law-abiding citizen. This article stressed the major advancements in detection technology over recent decades, "the use of the microscope, the spectroscope, the laboratory, and careful filing systems," stressing that "to be a terror to the criminal the police must be further ahead." (Gleaner Correspondent 1945b)

The Gleaner failed to anticipate the virulent response to Calver's investigation. The Report, it was later related, "closely guarded secret in official circles, but, for some unexplained reason, local policemen are apprehensive." The newspaper voiced concerns that a police strike is imminent, over grievances that "may or may not be resolved when the contents of the Calver Report [...] are made public." (Gleaner Correspondent 1946a) When the Report was finally published, in September 1946, The Gleaner published its primary recommendation and commended it as "thorough and far-reaching" (Gleaner Correspondent 1946b).

The Calver Report, and the subsequent reform it prescribed, established the structure of the JCF as it exists to this day.[1] It also proposed a host of other reforms that, with necessary adaptations, are still very much on the agenda. For example, it questioned the emphasis on paramilitary training and the maintenance of a large "riot reserve" and openly called into question the Force's colonial formation. It also proposed greater professionalization of detective work, recommending the systematic integration of criminal statistics, and visual "flagging" of high-crime areas on the map, to "give a picture of crime incidents and locations" (Gleaner Correspondent 1946c). All of this is, of course, very much reminiscent of contemporary reforms with emphasis on "data" and "police hot-spots," which continue to be presented as novelties.

Similarly, issues concerning police vehicles, which are still a pressing problem in the present, were addressed, with the necessary difference that the majority of police vehicles at the time were horses. The Report further addressed regulations for police work "on gratuity," what is called police "moonlighting"—private hiring of policemen to guard private events, clubs, beaches, and dancehalls. The system of discipline—punishment and rewards—was also revamped, with the purpose of introducing more rationalized management. The report emphasized that although refurbishing police stations is not the first order of business, several new police buildings should be constructed "to be less military and more suitable to the ordinary British civil police practice." All police stations should be gradually transformed into "public buildings wherein Station Officers and staff are always ready to attend to the public, as distinct from people under arrest." (ibid.) The same day Gleaner editorial celebrated the Report's recommendations. In line with the liberal policing ethos promoted by the paper, it read:

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[1] Among other things, it divided the island into five police areas, each under the control of a superintendent, established the Criminal Investigation Branch (CIB) headquarters, formed the Administration Branch and Secretariat, institutionalized weekly high-command meetings and the weekly circulation of Force Orders, introduced the standard educational examinations for incoming recruits and promotions, and reorganized training.

> We hope that his recommendations will have the effect of bringing to the Constabulary a new conception of their purpose and a gradual improvement in the efficiencies which are essential to a real police force […] The Force has paid undue attention to drill and too little to detection and to social service. The history of Colonial Police Forces makes that inevitable. They were conceived too much as repressive political forces, side-agents of the military, and too little as servants of the public in the preservation of law and order for the common good. They became emblems of the Sovereign and not emblems of civil protection. Hence the natural summarization of the people's reaction in their speaking of a constable a "Rex." The time has come, with the tremendous social and political changes which have taken place, for the police to lead in alerting that public reaction to them. The policeman as the people's friend must be the new relationship.

We observe here a discourse of police reform that is almost identical to that which we hear today, with the same insistence that problems in the JCF are due to its colonial inheritance. Perhaps the only thing that really changed is that Jamaicans no longer call the police "Rex" but rather "Babylon." A few weeks later, Gleaner commentator John Horner, introduced another recurring thematic. To him, the Calver report offered the most decisive answer to the question of why "we have […] an almost permanent crime wave." Horner took a special interest in Calver's emphasis on the police's ability to predict and prepare in advance for any event. He further stressed the need to improve detection and to improve the police's overall technical competence. "Limited interest in police work in upper ranks" exemplified the need for better educational qualifications and training. Most importantly, and very much like today, crime was taken as indisputable evidence that reform is imperative (Horner 1946)

But the Gleaner's campaign for liberal policing again failed to impress the reform's main addressees, members of the JCF itself. They were less excited about being called to become "the policemen of the future" (Gleaner Correspondent 1946d) than by the reproduction of colonial relations within the very same reform process. Soon after the report was published, the Police Federation exclaimed that the raises and improvements of working conditions were still "insufficient." By December, the Police Federation Conference released complaints about "continued victimization" of its members and stated that it "deplores the fact they have not been consulted" in the process of Calver's investigation (Gleaner Correspondent 1946e)

The crux of the conflict is to be found in the divide between "gazetted" and "non-gazetted" (or "sub") officers—the former mostly coming from Europe and the latter locals. Jamaican members of the JCF were, under colonial government, not promoted beyond the rank of inspector. They therefore saw the arrival of Calver as another indication, even entrenchment, of the prevalent idea that that the Force should be controlled by foreigners. At their annual conference, members of the Federation made clear their anti-colonial stance, resolving to cease supporting the "Officers Paper" and establish, instead, a magazine of their own, which would be a "Sub-officers and Men's Paper." (ibid.)

Unfortunately for them, the Calver Report only prepared the ground for Calver's own return to the island in 1947, this time as Police Commissioner. His stated mandate was to carry out the reforms he proposed, and for this he was accompanied by two additional English policemen who were to take up high-ranking positions. Together, the three men were to implement a thorough-going reorganization that was "[to put] the Jamaica Constabulary Force on a modern and efficient footing." (Gleaner Correspondent 1947)

By 1951, the police became a battleground of anti-colonial sentiments. Willis O. Isaacs, a colorful member of parliament (PNP), voiced allegations that the Force under Calver's command was replete with dishonesty, disloyalty, and corruption. Isaacs passed a resolution in the House of

Representatives to set up a Commission of Inquiry to inquire into "disquieting reports" emanating from the police. Isaacs's allegations were plenty. He stated, among other things, that "Mr. Calver introduced a system in the Force whereby policemen were told to spy on and watch each other, to report upon the conduct of their colleagues even on their own private life." The method, which he termed "Gestapo," had been so rampant that, according to Isaacs, no less than four officers committed suicide in response to its terrors. Further, he claimed, surely with the full awareness that it would cause contention, "there are reports to the effect that [Calver] has recommended to the Governor that a few hundred English policemen be brought into the country." If this is not enough, Isaacs added that graft and immorality have become endemic under Calver, with officers turning a blind eye to the proliferation of vices such as prostitution and gambling in residential areas. He exclaimed that, with the foreigners' arrival, homosexuality has become normative in the Force, "causing complaints from the men not prepared to submit to this distressing way of life." (Gleaner Correspondent 1951a)

Opposing Isaacs, during the Commission's hearings in May, one Joseph Kealey, Superintendent, alleged Mr. Wills Isaacs was himself a police informant and a controller of a "Gestapo system," which provided intelligence about "extreme" elements of the PNP leadership (the PNP at the time was undergoing an internal struggle between centrists and communists). Isaacs, he further testified, threatened to take several officers into the hills and shoot them should they not participate in his 'vendetta' against the foreigners:

> One particular thing he has threatened was to put all the white officers in canoes and send them back to England. He said he hoped that the canoes would not get further than Port Royal. This is apart from other things he promised to do when the PNP got to power, and he is appointed minister of revenge. (Gleaner Correspondent 1951b)

In the years leading up to independence, the police became a site of intense conflicts. It was a symbol of colonial rule and, as such, a focal point for raising anti-colonial and national sentiments. Indeed, Isaacs' was not shy about his motivation, telling the Commission that,

"my activities have been to show that this (meaning the Police Force) is an outcome of imperialism. My whole idea is to get charge of the State. When I get full self-government in my country, I will reform the Police Force." (Jamaica 1951, 14). Isaacs' political commitments, the report stated, give reasons to doubt his specific allegations concerning malfunction and corruption, especially those that pertain to the activities of white expatriate officers. It went as far as calling Isaacs' interest in the Force "unhealthy" and argued that his campaign aimed to spread dissatisfaction and disloyalty in the JCF (ibid).

Race, Class, and the Colonization of Political Power

By the late 1960s, independence hopes dampened. "Industrialization by invitation," the Puerto Rican development model globally promoted by the US, faltered. Though bauxite exports increased, and tourism expanded, these sectors—like banking, communication, agriculture, and infrastructure—were still owned exclusively by foreigners. The demand for labor remained stagnant as the population grew. The top 20% held 90% of the wealth compared to 2.2% of the wealth held by the lowest quintile. A highly concentrated elite consisted of 21 families, most of them "Jamaican white" (Reid 1977). During the first decade of independence the number of civilians killed by police rose dramatically: From 5 killings in 1961 to 79 in 1969. We should be careful about concluding that violence was a postcolonial development. Instead, the forms of violence followed established clientelist patterns, now clad in political rhetoric (Payne 1995). Though independence brought a noticeable growth in crime rates and some social unrest, the more intense nature of violence is likely the result of the growing flow of guns into the island (Lacey 1977).

In the JLP, which ruled the country from independence, a new political force was emerging—Edward Seaga, Cabinet Minister for Development and Planning, later Minister of Finance. Seaga may have been the first to develop his constituency into a "garrison"—the spatial configuration of clientelism—later adopted by both parties. Garrison communities are political strongholds, from which opposition is expelled by armed force and where loyal local voters receive housing, utilities, services, and jobs. It is form through which the rebellious lumpenproletariat—not unlike their rural predecessors—became co-opted into an illicit political economy extending into the state and internationally (Stone 1980; O. Gray 2004). Seaga was notable in his advancement of black folk culture, religion, and music, in his promotion of the repatriation of Marcus Garvey's remains to Jamaica and the Government's invitation of Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie, revered by Rastafarians, on a state visit in 1966 (O. Gray 2004). This was done in a Cold War context wherein black nationalism, still connected to communism, was suppressed as a subversive ideology. Thus, while promoting folk traditions, the government continued sending police to suppress Afrocentric activity, Rastafarians and communists (Stephens and Stephens 1986).

The structure and function of the JCF had not changed much in the century since it was founded. It consisted of 3,000 men and was augmented by about 7,000 auxiliaries (Lacey 1977). Furthermore, after independence, policemen saw drastic decline in their pay and status. Their conditions of service worsened with the rise in political violence and crime, while police armories—with a small arsenal of British military rifles—was no match to firepower acquired by newly formed gangs. During the 1966 West Kingston State of Emergency, preceding the elections, policemen were caught in crossfire and stations were barricaded and attacked. In 1968, when the Government dragged its feet in contract negotiations, the Police Federation went on a "sick out." Police collective action intersected with major popular mobilization under the slogan of Black Power.

In October 1968, as the police strike was in process, the Government banned Guyanese historian and socialist militant Walter Rodney from returning to the island. Rodney's banning sparked riots, especially among University of the West Indies (UWI) students and downtown Rastafarians. This marked the opening of the "black power moment" in Jamaica, which expressed deep social discontent, communality with black radicalism in North America and the Caribbean, and international anti-colonial solidarity. The uprising was quickly quelled, but Black Power did not dissipate. It was rather endorsed by Michael Manley, elected as president of the PNP in 1968. Three days after the riots, the Government resumed negotiations with the Police Federation and order was restored in Kingston, at least momentarily (Lacey 1977; Bogues 2009).

Democratic Socialism in Jamaica

Against this backdrop of acute social tensions, The PNP returned to power in a landslide victory in the 1972 elections. Responding to economic depression, the Government initiated reforms aiming to alleviate class conflict and promote economic progress. It increased state ownership and introduced pro-labor legislation, including minimum wage, equal pay for women, automatic recognition of unions and protections against dismissals; Initiated a mass literacy campaign, free education across all levels, public housing, and food subsidies; Reformed family courts and outlawed "illegitimacy," and expanded health services. Though the 1973 global economic crisis served a blow to Jamaica, an oil-importing country, it was still the leading exporter of bauxite, accounting for 30% of world production. In 1974, the Government unilaterally increased the tax levied on bauxite seven-fold, causing alarm among American mine owners. Simultaneously radicalizing its stance on Third World issues and the social question in Jamaica, by the end of the year, Manley declared the advent of "democratic socialism." (Stephens and Stephens 1986)

Democratic Socialism in Jamaica attempted a non-capitalist development path, informed by dependency theory—especially its Caribbean variant, which focused on plantation economies.[2] The program assumed that social-economic transformation could be achieved through representative constitutionalism, rather than a revolutionary takeover. In turn, that social-economic equality is a prerequisite for undercutting clientelist structures leftover by colonialism. Increasing the collective power of the lower classes—the ability to bargain and deal with employers and landlords—would have reduced the hold of patronage, replacing it with mass mobilization. The cultural aspect, Black Power, was to reduce feelings of inferiority, which cement clientelism. It related the current national trials to the history of the people, elevating symbols of popular struggle and promoting an egalitarian notion of citizenship. The expansion of democracy and participation supported the developmentalist aim, which, in breaking with the neocolonial model, would rely on the productive drive of the people. Breaking with dependency also required changing consumption patterns, shifting tastes, values, and desires away from the metropole by building a stronger cultural identity and revaluing folk traditions and more contemporary manifestations of popular culture. In the economic sphere proper, the state was to gain control over large enterprises, utilities, and infrastructure, and affect distribution through fiscal policies, employment creation, and wage and price policies. Unionization and workers' cooperatives were also encouraged, but there was no plan for sweeping nationalization or eliminating the private sector. Even this comparatively modest framework, however, required that Jamaica wage independent foreign policy. In practical terms, diversification of trade and establishment of economic cooperation with both the Western and Eastern bloc, that is, non-alignment. Third World solidarity was the prerequisite for pursuing this agenda. (ibid.)

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[2] The New World Group formed in 1962 by West Indian scholars committed to the decolonization of knowledge informing social, economic, and cultural life in the Caribbean. Led by economists Lloyd Best and George Beckford, the group is known for its studies of plantation economies and societies. The group's journal, New World Quarterly (now available online https://newworldjournal.org/) published a mixture of scholarly and creative works across disciplines. In 1976, members of the Group, as advisers to the Manley Government, became core planners in the Emergency Production Plan. The plan was an alternative to IMF austerity and liberalization and was based on a "bottom up" effort, sourcing over 10,000 suggestions on economic policy from the public (Stephens and Stephens 1986, 150–51).

"Revolution in All Areas"

We noted the historical alliance between the PNP and the Police Federation and the rise in violence and crime in the 1960s. Responding to this trend, the Government first increased the fleet of police cars, raised police salaries, and expanded recruitment. It called upon citizens to voluntarily support public order by joining the Home Guards and instituted joint military-police operations. Yet, the rate of crime continued rising, causing public pressure. The Government then expanded police power to search, seize, and detain suspects, and established the Gun Court, where anyone accused of illegal use of firearms would be tried *in camera*. (ibid.)

That same year, 1968, Police Service Commission appointed Basil Robinson, a black Jamaican, as Commissioner of Police. This was a cause for excitement among a whole generation of recruits, who for the first time could see themselves ascending to the top ranks of the organization. Ellsworth Johnson joined the Force in 1966, when he was 18 years old, explained the meaning of moment:

> Prior to the 70s most people who worked in banks were very-light skin and Chinese. Blacks were seldomly seen, the most you could see blacks as teachers and nurses, but there were some other professions that you would definitely have seen the classicism and the racial biases. Policeman were black, the rank and file, but the Commissioner was always white and [so were] many senior officers who came from England.

For young recruits and the middle ranks of the JCF, nationalizing the force was about particular and collective interests. Promotions meant higher pay, improved conditions of service, access to vehicles, and status. From a political perspective, removing foreign cops from top echelons of the JCF was equivalent to removing foreigners from the commanding heights of the economy. Manley's election was perceived as completing the process of decolonization, by changing the economic and social structure and sending the colonizers back from whence they came. This attempt to complete what the national movement started was conditioned by the historical opening. Retired ACP Leon Rose recalls:

> After the 1972 election, the political order in Jamaica echoed a new social cultural consciousness among the Jamaican people…we spoke of inequities in employment, in education, in housing, in the criminal justice process, and in policing also […] It was a dynamic time of social revolution, persons [were] becoming more socially empowered, you know, and resistance. You had a lot of resistance movements, resistance movements to challenge the status quo […] I felt that as part of policing I had to be part of the change process. What motivated me to join the Force was not only this sort of social consciousness, but it was the whole process of redefining […] the Jamaican state.

The new political order "echoed" the social and cultural consciousness of the people; the spirit of the time expressed on the streets. Policemen, as members of their class, were aware of the demands for justice being raised in all areas of social life and seem to have identified with most of them. Above, calls to reform the police are one element in a long list of social, economic and cultural transformations. Perhaps the culmination of all attempts to "redefine the state". Members of the Force were acutely aware that Black Power protests were directed against "the system" for which they themselves stood as the most glaring symbols: "People were demanding the police change their attitude from protecting the powerful and the colonial masters [...] it was never accepted at the top but the middlemen, the sergeants the inspectors were talking about change."

Policemen felt Black Power calls aimed at them directly. Given their own experience of trade union mobilization, the calls also resonated, especially with a younger generation of recruits. This inspired them to examine police attitudes and allegiance, to ask who indeed they should serve and protect. The police had long been seen by the majority of Jamaican blacks as agents of Babylon, the corrupt empire that enslaves and torments. In this interpretation, the policeman stands in a long line of overseers and slave drivers, many of which were drawn from the ranks of the enslaved themselves. This sense of being race and class traitors never escaped the consciousness of policemen. Hence, the appeal of democratic socialism for policemen was the fleeting possibility of overcoming a subjective conflict. For a brief moment, hegemony offered a vision that would redeem them from their status as living contradiction. A utopian vision, proposing that the interest of police could cohere with the interests of the people. Offering relief to the individual policeman, torn by the conflict between what he *does* and what he *believe*s.

The influence of democratic socialism on police ideology reveals, among other things, how the movement deepened mass mobilization of Jamaicans across diverse social milieus and positions. Rose recalls:

> It was part of the political atmosphere of the time, where nations began to rebel against colonialism, against systems that they see were unjust, systems that they felt did not create the type of social and economic empowerment for them, and so you have intellectuals coming out of the university to advise the Government. And unlike the conservative Jamaica of the 1960s, the 1970s created a more liberal Jamaica, a Jamaica that became very vocal in terms of questioning the international order.

Several interesting observations are found in this quotation. First, Rose situates the Jamaican experiment in the context of anti-colonial upheaval against an economic system that does not lead to their "empowerment". Second, he notes the involvement of "intellectuals from the university" in the process of transformative planning. Third, he notes the shift in conservative Jamaican morality. The broader geopolitical currents of the era are clearly at work in transforming cultural values and attitudes on the local level. Here, culture is not so much an element of one's minoritarian identity as much as a national project of a people coming into its own collectively.

As far as I know, university professors did not take an active interest in reforming policing proper, so we can only speculate what might have been the results of such an experiment, the extent to which it would be different from more conventional reform attempts. However, the ideological sharpness of the project made policemen acutely aware that police reform by itself will not lead to change. They realized that changing policing requires upending the whole society. Adams:

> There was a spirit of revolution in all areas: Education, living standards… we wanted to become self-reliant, to produce our own means of subsistence, to be in charge of our factories, our universities, and so on […] and we [the police] at our own levels, from below, started creating police youth clubs, started radicalizing the minds of these people towards self-reliance. We motivated them to get a good education, make sure that you think along the lines of your own culture, how you see yourself. We were taught that we were people to be seen and not heard. This was the traditional colonial thinking, right? So, we would say there is nothing wrong with my hair, it's the most beautiful, there is nothing wrong with my nose… and so on. Our own activism, socialism, but it goes further than socialism, was that you are defining now your color, your culture, your African-ness, your own history and from whence you came.

In this supple quote, we find the policeman's affective identification with "the spirit of revolution in all areas" and his ability to clearly enumerate the specific reforms sought in the social, economic, and cultural spheres. Self-reliance in production, for example, was an important aspect of the plan to reduce dependency on imports and foreign currency. Again, note the link between "our factories" and "our universities", as too sides of the desire to produce locally, overcoming economic dependency that produces alienated consciousness. For Adams, going beyond socialism meant learning African history, revaluing black cultural traditions and asserting "black is beautiful." Cultural politics does not substitute for economic transformation but deepens it. The economic and especially cultural transformation is affected "from below", through community associations and youth groups. This is the way the police "at our own levels", was involved also.[3]

Political activism, in the form of party politics, was making its way into the Force. As Rose recalls, some policemen were openly affiliated with the parties and saw themselves as "part of the new social order":

> There were a number of police officers who were activist[s] who were part of the new social order and social empowerment […] So, there were those who challenged the established status-quo in terms of how we look at our disciplinary process, how we look at training, at what stage should one be elevated. We also did speak of the question of what the self-interest of a police force should be. Should that self-interest be to protect the plantocracy, to protect the status-quo, to protect the particular… or should it be to protect the Jamaican state and the people?

Rose speaks of several types of activism. Party activism, associated with active support of the new order, trade unionism concerned with improving the lot of policemen as workers, and a general "trend" of questioning institutions. Police political activism, often seen as deeply problematic, raises the question: If there are political university professors, political social workers, political doctors and teachers, why not political policemen? The question is amplified when we realize that there is no such thing as apolitical policing, and that the question of who is deemed criminal and what laws are enforced is necessarily open to conflict. For some Jamaican policemen in the 1970s, an independent police force, properly understood, was to enforce the law against the enemies of the people, colonial masters past and present. In Rose's terms: "a force that was more Jamaicanized was a force designed to serve the people and not protect the plantocracy... a change with regards to the status-quo."

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[3] Police Youth Clubs were formed in 1954 by social workers and policemen to offer extracurricular activities to youths in impoverished areas. In 1972, the clubs were brought under the newly formed Police Public Relations Division and were one of several nation-wide projects addressing youth unemployment and social alienation.

The term *status-quo* appeared repeatedly in my conversations with policemen, as that "social order", which goes without saying. What does it mean? In Jamaica, the status-quo, the way classes are woven together into a structure, takes the form of clientelism. Jamaican political analysts have long suggested that clientelism is rooted in the social economic conditions of a post-plantation post-colony. Because the majority of capital remains in foreign hands, the national bourgeoisie remains too feeble to forge hegemony, by asserting its own interests as universal in the national form. Instead, it must enter into coalitions with other classes, achieving consent through distribution of favors and, when this fails, through violence. "Democratic socialism" sought to break with these conditions, by harnessing the state as an agent of economic development. The goal was not only to achieve economic growth but also to create conditions for a bourgeois revolution in the periphery, where an indigenous bourgeoisie was too feeble. The development of industry and manufacture—and with it more "rational" classes— was to undercut the link between the elite and the lumpenproletariat, which subsisted (as they still do) on illicit capital accumulation.

Building on this analysis, political policemen did not understand their project as biased or corrupt but as furthering the universal ideal of the rule of law. Indeed, to vigorously enforce the law *against the privileged*, was to them the very condition for egalitarianism. Institutional questions, such as those concerning training and discipline, were thereby linked to a revision of police goals. "What is the self-interest of the police?", as Rose put it: Should the JCF defend the status-quo and its beneficiaries, or the interests of "the state and the people"? Note how, in this rendition, the state and the people are placed on one side, against the ruling classes. This is of course a political claim, rather than a factual one. A claim which, as suggested thus far, marked the utopian horizon of the project of democratic socialist police reform.

Negotiating Colonial Legacies

A Force seen as a relic of colonialism could not fit the social order of democratic socialism. Hence, the project demanded rewriting the history of the Force in a manner that would make it capable and worthy of its renewed mission. One such narrative was suggested to me by Rose and others, who interpret the establishment of the Force as a primary act of state-building. As noted, the black peasant upheaval at Morant Bay occasioned the abolition of the Jamaican Assembly and the replacement of local constitutional arrangements with Crown Colony. A process is often seen as entrenching colonial rule through decree and exception (Sheller 2001). However, Rose sees the moment differently:

> After that revolution, England started to note that there was a tremendous amount of social injustice in the colonies. We had a Royal Commission that came out, and Britain understood the need to have centralized government and authority [...] The Governor, Sir John Peter Grant, was sent to the island and his mandate was to restructure to reorganize the Jamaican state and to have created institutions that would represent the needs of the people. For instance, a police force known as the Jamaica Constabulary Force was established, the National Public Works Agency, the National Postal Service... So, it began a process of national institutions that would form the Jamaican state.

Instead of viewing the announcement of Crown Colony as a process of "de-democratization" (Sheller 2001), which demolished local representative institutions, policemen like Rose remind us that the Jamaican House of Assembly and the colonial militia were institutions serving the white planters. After Morant Bay, in an act that completed the abolition of slavery, power was wrested from their hands and given to the Crown as a custodian of the public interest. Through this process of divesting power from a feudal ruling class, the foundations were created—or so Rose suggests—for the creation of a modern state. The JCF, as one of the major institutions established, is therefore not an institution tainted by original sin but almost pre-revolutionary. From this perspective, the attempt to further decolonization in the 1970s is viewed as completing the historical process that began with emancipation. But not all policemen share this sentiment. Adams, for example, believes that the Force—rather than breaking with the system—essentially continues to serve the same entrenched interests:

> Well, the history of the Force comes out of the landed aristocracy from England, the masters, the slave owners, people with the means of production [...] In 1865 came the Morant Bay Rebellion, when the blacks marched and protested and created what the whites called "terror." These people were caught, tried, and hung by the hundreds. So, evolving from that, they formed the Jamaica Constabulary Force in 1867, with the same job description as before, only in a more organized way, with Commissioner and all the ranks. And the job description given then, as far as I'm concerned, where the JCF is concerned now, remains the same. It is to protect the rich against the poor.

According to Adams, the endurance of race and class domination, though passing through distinct phases of formalization, has not been altered since the days of slavery. [4] A similar, though more refined view, was proposed by former Acting Commissioner Novelette Grant:

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[4] The difference between Adams' and Rose's approaches can be explained in terms of individual biography. Rose retired from the Force after serving in many commanding functions, including heading the controversial Mobile Reserve, the JCF's notorious paramilitary unit. He remains active in the Past Policemen's Association, and commonly appears in public functions representing the old guard of the organization. Adams, however, was ousted from the Force after being accused of extra-judicial killing. He believes he was made into a scapegoat by British officers, local policemen and politicians. Notwithstanding biographical differences, similar approaches to both of their takes are prevalent in the JCF across ranks and positions.

> Post-independence Jamaica maintained much of the colonial mentality. It is the same kind of doctrine that ran the colonial establishment, the same approach towards the poor and dispossessed. The history of the Force is all about order maintenance in the interests of colonial powers. In some ways, [this] persisted in the draconian legislation in the 70s, which did not address the root causes of crime and violence.[5]

Grant speaks about "the approach" of colonialism—degradation of the dispossessed and the poor—as its lasting legacy. She admits that the entire history of the Force, up until and including the draconian legislation of the 1970s, largely retained "colonial mentality." Grant is reacting here, however subtly, to the hegemonic discourses surrounding contemporary police reform. One of the effects of the postcolonial moment was to forge a consensus around the colonial inheritance thesis itself, evident also in Grant's nuanced analysis of the historical sources of crime and intercommunal violence:[6]

> After slavery, the seeds of conflict were sown into the social fabric of the community. This relates especially to land issues. Lack of access to land contributes to many of the social disorders this country is facing. This country is the land of former slaves and their descendants, which means we are dealing with a baseline of marginalization and endemic disorder that is not easy to fix. Slavery undermines almost every institution of the state and of society—the family, and by extension communities, and entire societies. We are looking at people who are forced to seek land on their own initiative

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[5] Grant was appointed Acting Commissioner of Police in late 2017, following the resignation of Dr. Carl Williams. She was not selected to become permanent Commissioner, likely on the advice of international officers. Grant is considered a staunch detractor of international reform efforts and as a protector of the corrupt top echelons of the Force, although she is also known for her work on sexual and gender-based violence and considered an experienced practitioner of community policing.

[6] This is not the place to address this point in great depth but today, as much as in the 1940s, international reform campaigns are carried out under the title of decolonization. In an odd recasting of modernization theory for the era of political correctness, "colonial mentality" of black Jamaican police officers is now the justification for incessant foreign intervention (see, e.g: Kleinfeld 2018). On the other hand, as men and women with vested interests in not changing the system, police officers in Jamaica often proclaim that structural conditions are too stringent to affect meaningful changes in institutional practice.

> and do it without any form of order. Perhaps there is something that runs in the society in terms of how we solve problems. Maybe it is a result of history, the harsh punitive approach on the plantation, where justice was distributed immediately. This is a society that has not successfully processed its history.

Grant's analysis of the development of crime is rooted in a broader understanding of economic dependency and plantation society. She emphasizes violent social relations developed through slavery, which sowed "seeds of conflict sown into the community." This she immediately relates to the post-emancipation period, the hunger for land among freed men and women, who struggled never to return to plantations—this involved squatting or "capturing land" for subsistence farming and settlement. The condition of disordered development worsened through waves of expropriation by agri-business and, later, by political warfare.

Grant is clear about the sociocultural consequences of slavery and colonialism on the level of conciousness, or what she calls "mentality." She notes the popular desire for "swift" justice, what historian Patrick Bryan (2000) described as Jamaican "love" for the (vengeful side of) law. She foregrounds the dialectic of crime and policing, rebellion and conservativism, legal transgression, and reaffirmation. Her analysis takes these cultural dimensions into serious consideration, but in a way that is different from the civilizing racist discourse of "the culture of criminality." Grant's "culture of colonialism" and the inheritance of psychical structures is not simply a relic of the past, which would imply blacks suffer from neurosis or false consciousness. Instead, culture continues to operate because the attempt to alter social reality was severely undercut.

Crime and Counterrevolution

Despite efforts by the Manley Government, economic conditions continued to worsen. While the country remained dependent on imports for basic food and energy, bauxite prices on international markets were dropping. Disruption in the balance of payments led to growing inflation and shortages. At the same time, local and foreign capitalists—troubled by Government actions and the rising power of communism— reacted decisively. Reaction immediately affected the JCF, says Johnson:

> In the late 70s, the police force suffered immensely because economic hardships began to grow, and this became more pronounced, particularly when Jamaica established a diplomatic relationship with Cuba. So, the police force started to suffer in terms of lack of resources and the maintenance of critical components to support the procurement of vehicles, arms, and other encroachments. There was no doubt that Washington was not pleased with the fact that Jamaica, in the company of other nations, was turning left, and there was no doubt that the police force did not escape this whole East-West divide in terms of the economic capacity of the country to support the Force.

Crime and violence continued to grow in advance of the 1976 elections in what some regarded as an organized destabilization campaign. The claim is based on the observation that, in addition to common forms of opportunistic crime and gang warfare, the period witnessed the rise of new forms of violent incidents clearly intent on destruction. Such were, for example, the fire set to a retirement home and the curious oiling of dangerously steep roads— incidents which could not be traced to any partisan motive. Attacks on the security forces increased as well. Policemen were shot on guard duty, and police stations were attacked. Several incidents of internal fights within the police and the army led the Commissioner of police to announce there was a calculated plot to demoralize the police force. Minister of National Security, Keble Munn, claimed in November 1976 that there are plans to divide the police and the military (Stephens and Stephens 1986).

After declaring the path of democratic socialism, Manley strengthened cooperation with the Cuban Government and was more vocal and adamant in taking a stance against colonialism and Apartheid. In the Cold War context, the United States was quite discontent with developments in Jamaica. Whether the US pursued an active destabilization campaign in Jamaica, complete with CIA machinations, remains an open question. However, what is certain is that American hostility increased when, in 1979, the New Jewel Movement took power in Grenada, and the Sandinistas won over Somoza in Nicaragua. With the growing power of the left in El Salvador and Guatemala, the US strengthened its military presence and surveillance in the region, coordinating its activities under the Caribbean Task Force. Johnson is quite certain, like most Jamaicans, that the CIA took an active role in Manley's loss of the 1980 elections:

> Manley's democratic socialism moved away from communism, giving it his own definition, "socialism is love." But with political violence and propaganda, people were afraid. They thought Manley would take their possessions. The CIA was likely involved. Once America realized the influence on the whole Caribbean, they sent CIA agents attached to the embassy… African Americans who blend in and knew everything that was going on. Coming up to the 1980 election the situation got very tense, the police was caught in the middle, some people believed the police was taking sides. JLP went all out to replace the so-called communist government.

As Johnson notes, for democratic socialism to take hold in Jamaica, it was necessary to "indigenize" its messaging and political language. "Socialism is love," one of Manley's slogans, was aimed to speak to a society where the majority adopted Christianity during slavery and where brotherly and neighborly love means unity and solidarity. Black Jamaicans had behind them a long history of rebellion, but emancipation remained very much rooted in the notion of self-possession and private property, and political culture remained, in many ways, conservative (Maingot 2015). Political violence and propaganda tapped into deeply engrained fears of losing one's possessions (as opposed to property), amplifying Cold War anti-communism. He adds:

> The whole policing perspective should be around inclusion, motivation. Everybody is equal. And there were certain classes in society who didn't like that because the policing now was being diverted from protecting the interests, the police perspective and psychology was diverting from protecting them. And seeing everybody now as equal… they didn't like that!

Despite his increasingly radical statements, Manley was unlikely heading towards full-fledged socialism (not to mention "communism") in Jamaica. Even the most far-going economic plans of his government remained committed to the mixed economy. Yet, he was able to antagonize well-off Jamaicans who increasingly left the island. Fears of black power also played a part in elite migration, with memories of anti-Chinese riots activating fantasies of violent expropriation. The elite united behind Seaga's JLP, pouring money into its election campaign and using the Gleaner—the oldest and most influential newspaper in Jamaica—to spread its messages. An orchestrated media campaign in the US deterred tourists from visiting the island.

The effect of capital flight, economic sabotage, and possible destabilization intensified food and energy shortages. Ultimately, in 1977, Manley had few alternatives but to ask for loan from the IMF. Internal opposition in his party led him to abandon the agreement in 1979, a move that galvanized JLP supporters toward the violent 1980 elections. Over 800 citizens were killed during the runup, mostly in the course of urban warfare among rivaling political gangs. The territorial nature of the war, with each party seeking to expel opposition of prime electoral constituencies led to the displacement of thousands of families.

The initial strategy adopted by the JLP vis-à-vis the police, was to insinuate that a communist contingent, led by the PNP and the Workers Party of Jamaica (WPJ), had infiltrated the Force. Adopting Cold War "anti-totalitarian" human rights discourses, Seaga sought to mobilize the population against the PNP by drawing on historical animosity against the Force. JLP attacked in particular the Government's calling upon citizens to join communal brigades, and its announcement of a State of Emergency in 1976. Seaga blamed the security forces for pursuing a partisan plot to deliver Jamaica to communism and establish a totalitarian police state. Johnson recalls:

> The PNP was a socialist party, [it] led the whole movement of social revolution. That social revolution saw international relations being redefined, closer relations with USSR and Cuba, and the whole non-aligned movement. The JLP government that was a conservative party was more aligned with the United States, and they *saw the police force as having been manipulated and infiltrated by these sort of social ideas*, and so as the struggle to reestablish what the Jamaican Labour Party would call the "recovery" of Jamaica from the brink of socialism or quote-unquote "communism."

Leading up to the 1980 elections, the JLP's campaign changed. It now praised the security forces as defenders of the people, with only "a minority" of communist policemen, trained by the Cubans to carry out paramilitary terror. "Regular members of the police force," said Seaga, "must be asking themselves the question daily, what is in store for them when they are required to face trained squads of terrorists, armed with machine guns?" (Jamaica Gleaner, 30 April 1980, cited in Stephens and Stephens 1986: 132). Although the police were attacked and overpowered by political gangs for most of the preceding decades, the 1980s elections put members of the security forces in a more precarious situation, as the legitimacy of public authority was collapsing. Political violence, as well as economic hardships, finally led the majority of policemen to turn against the PNP. One clear indication of this was the Police Federation called, in 1980, to remove Minister of National Security, Dudley Thompson, from office, due to government neglect of deadly assaults against policemen. This was not only a breach of discipline on behalf of Force and a vote of non-confidence but also a clear message as to where the Force was now standing politically.

The Reconstitution of Dependency

The JLP won 59% of the vote in the 1980 elections, increasing its support across all classes and parishes. Seaga returned Jamaica to the path of dependent capitalism.[7] Shortly after his election, Seaga traveled to New York to renegotiate the terms of the agreement with the IMF and mingle with captains of industry, such as the Rockefellers. When Ronald Regard became US President in 1981, Seaga was the first foreign head of state to be invited to the White House. Thus, Seaga's election initially resuscitated capital's confidence in Jamaica, and his first couple of years in office were characterized by a relative return to growth and slightly expanded investment, fueled by loans that restored access to foreign currency and trade liberalization that expanded imports (Seaga 2010)

But recovery did not last. Within a couple of years, production was declining again, inflation was rising, and poverty expanded. By 1984, inflation was close to 30%, unemployment grew to 26% of the labor force, while salaries remained stagnant and then dropped. Currency trading on the parallel market, by the relatively wealthy as well as ordinary citizens trying to secure their savings, caused further devaluation of the Jamaican dollar and precipitated a vicious cycle spiraling downwards. Massive labor strikes, endorsed by bi-partisan trade union coalition, undermined the government's political legitimacy, while the IMF was no longer as lenient as before, and was pushing for Structural Adjustments (Robotham 1998; Campbell 2019)

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[7] When Seaga entered politics in the 1960s, he, like everyone else, was rather nationalist where economic policies were concerned. His major interest was in 'Jamaicanizing' the economy, that is, wresting control of crucial industries and sectors from foreign capitalists who still controlled them. But the times had changed. He was now placing himself as the capable broker of global capital, trying to redraw foreign investment to Jamaica.

The Government obliged, and imposed austerity. This meant both monetary and fiscal tightening, acceding to continuous currency devaluations and deep cuts in public spending, alongside increased taxation to cover debt servicing. The national import substitution policy was replaced by a focus on export-oriented production—especially the introduction of sweatshop labor in textile "maquiladoras" near Kingston. The shift was cemented by signing the Caribbean Basin free trade Initiative (CBI), which removed import restrictions. Also responding to IMF dictates, the Government moved to suppress trade unions and wages, pushed for privatization, and liberalized the banking system. Importantly, the Government push to reduce the size of the public sector undermined one of the main avenues of black social mobility (Robotham 2000).

In place of the PNP's Non-Aligned policy, the Seaga Government boldly realigned with the West. This was most apparent in Jamaica extending support to the US military invasion to quash the 1983 revolution in Grenada. This realignment was also directed toward the restitution of the tourism industry, which became the leading sector in most economies in the region. Branded as offering "sun, sand, sea and sex" (Robotham ibid., 317), the revival of tourism reinvigorated the older white and light-skinned elite economic position, weakened by the decline of plantations.

Political Murder and the Murder of Politics

Looking back, some policemen argue that the PNP government, mostly stripped of international aid, could simply not sustain a police force capable of countering the increasingly powerful forces of political warfare. Destabilization severely undermined public safety, which was one of the leading factors in PNP losing the elections. Johnson suggests that the police force was intentionally starved by Western countries that previously provided aid, and that aid was restored after 1980:

> After the election of 1980, there was a tremendous influx of resources to the force in terms of motor vehicles and firepower, and this firepower capability allowed the police

> force to now be in a better position to challenge the criminal element who were heavily armed.

But recognizing the counterrevolutionary campaign unleashed against the Jamaican democratic socialist government does not absolve the police of ever-increasing brutality. As Rose admits, the enthusiasm with which policemen embraced belligerent paramilitarism is one of the main reasons why the JCF continues to be seen as repressive and authoritarian:

> In the 70s a lot of macho police officers, you know […] crime fighters, real crime fighters... so part of the imagery [of] that period was that this was a Force, although this became more pronounced in the 80s, 90s and 2000s, where the image of the force is seen as one that never respected human rights at all.

In 1978 the JCF was involved in 167 fatal shootings. By 1980 the number of civilian casualties was 234, and in 1984 it stood at 355— the highest annual figure in Jamaican history. Policemen often explain the dramatic rise in the use of force by reference to escalating crime rates and political violence. The trend, as we can see, persisted under governments formed by both parties. By the end of the 1970s, the Force was divided between party clients and politicians became intimately involved in promotions, transfers, and many other policing matters.

The police officers I spoke to tended to explain the implosion of Jamaica's revolutionary moment in rather familiar terms. They said the project overplayed tiny Jamaica's political power within a still-imperial order, and in retrospect, it can be seen as pretentious and dangerous. They emphasized the growing gap between Manley's actions and rhetoric, which galvanized social forces that could have been supportive. Grant refers to this as "posturing":

> What happened in the 1970s was the ascendance of a political ideology that was unacceptable to the West. Unfortunately, there was a lot of political posturing going

> on, without the economic backing. A situation that will always inevitably end in a disaster. […] This is supposed to be a sovereign nation, but maybe political independence without economic independence is a fallacy. At the end of the day, we have to take responsibility for the extent that we are pushed. We have to make a shift in our mindset, how we prioritize. Borrowing from international lending agencies puts us in a problem. It leads to underdevelopment of our human capacities. It is based on the desire for quick fixes. We are like hamsters on a treadmill, where the horizon of our politics is five years at best.

After the tremendous upheaval and violence of the 1970s, both parties surrendered to the Washington Consensus. In 1989, when Manley returned for a second term, it was clear that the socialist episode was over. The meaning of the capitulation to the IMF was an end of political agency, an end of self-determination and a loss of sovereignty. This made politics impossible and led to "underdevelopment of our human capacities," which include the possibility of having a horizon of transformation longer than the five-year election cycle. As Jonson put it:

> In the 1970s people came out to question how the country should be governed. This diminished. People lost all hope in politics. Right now, as we speak, two political parties fight to take state power… but the question is not how the country is governed, because none of them have no plan. Both parties work very hard to mobilize their own base and garrisons. None of them ask how to make citizens as a whole powerful.

It henceforth appeared that politics was always nothing but a ploy, devised by politicians, to manipulate, control, and disempower the people. Politics was never about real differences in opinions, plans, modes of governing, but only about personal advancement and greed. In retrospect, the revolutionary rupture of the Black Power moment became subsumed into a narrative that views history as nothing but the struggle for power. A narrative where actors change in color, ideology, and garb, but always remain self-interested individuals. The foreclosure of political possibility, the implosion of political momentum, gave rise to pessimism and hopelessness, the Jamaican version of "post-politics." In this context, the very idea of a public force serving the interests of the people became inconceivable. As Rose admits, policemen themselves became disillusioned.

> There were times I thought I ought to have leave, there were many times, because I questioned [whether] our political war was a just struggle... I wouldn't say struggle... I want to say the violence could not be justified, there were no justifications to the violence. I could see, based on my own understanding of history, the rebellion of Morant Bay and even activities of 1938, were quite justified, but not this level of political violence that were fighting and pitting against each other. I could see that this was not just at all and that the politicians were responsible for it.

As "ideology" was being rejected, parties retreated from any principled battle and returned to be what they always were—clientelist structures distributing favors and patronage and intertwined illicit commerce. With globalization, these structural characteristics of peripheral neocolonial capital became even more amplified. Growing migration facilitated the development of international cocaine smuggling networks, which also benefited from relaxed capital controls. The magnitude of wealth generated in the process deeply unsettled established relations between clients and patrons, giving rise to new popular politicians-cum-gangsters, the infamous Jamaican dons. [8]

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[8] Seaga's role in this process was central. His flagship "Spring Vegetables" Project, launched in 1983, has been associated by a few commentators with drug trafficking. The large commercial farm in Clarendon was officially presented as intended to grow seasonable crops for export to colder countries. To establish this new agro-complex, Seaga recruited an Israeli team headed by Eli Tisona, a known mobster with no prior experience in agriculture. In 1999, Tisona will be convicted in the US for money laundering for the Cali Cartel. The operation allegedly worked in such a way that aircrafts from Columbia would stop at the Jamaican facility to fuel and upload "vegetables" on their way to America. An Israeli water technologies expert who worked in the project recalled that the farm was surrounded with barbed-wire fences and guarded by men carrying machine guns.

In hindsight, it can be said that the police killed the political moment, when in 1979 it executed Claude Massop, one of the initiators of the West Kingston Peace Treaty. The historic treaty between JLP and PNP gangs was negotiated in the aftermath of what is known as the Green Bay Massacre. On January 5, 1978, five JLP activists were lured into a military range and shot by members of the JDF. A few men, who managed to escape, told their neighbors and the press what transpired, a revelation which sent shock waves across Kingston's garrisons.[9] It suddenly dawned on militants from both parties that their political patrons were using them to further their own interests, unleashing senseless violence and division among the lower classes. A few weeks later, peace was declared in the ghettos, enforced by the gangs themselves. But the peace was fragile and tenuous. It succumbed to immediate needs of survival—political handouts and jobs—and could not withstand the deliberate intervention of those, on both sides, who had an interest in reigniting war. On February 4, 1979, Massop—much loved and admired by the people—was ambushed and killed by motorcycled police. After his killing, the peace quickly disintegrated, and violence returned to the streets with renewed vigor. Until today, it remains unclear who ordered the police to assassinate Massop. It was, however, a political assignation; even an assassination of politics.

Head of security operations for the Spring Plain Complex was Lester Coke, who replaced Massop as the don of Tivoli Gardens. Through his involvement in the project, it is said, Coke developed the skills and expertise to move large quantities of cocaine through the Caribbean. Quickly, the Posse would establish itself as major actor in the narcotics distribution business.[8] Seaga's liberalization of the banking sector facilitated Jamaica's integration into global narco-banking. For example, the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), which began operating in Jamaica in 1981 and took over the management of all foreign current accounts of the Jamaican Government right away, was later found by a commission of the US Senate to have facilitated money laundering on a massive scale for Saddam Hussein, Manuel Noriega and the Medellín Cartel, among others (Campbell 2019). Ultimately, Seaga's disciplinary techniques will not withstand the pressures of his own economic policies. More precisely, the structures carefully created by Seaga—the social engineering anthropologists—produced unanticipated consequences that will soon change the course of Jamaican economy, culture, and politics.

[9] It is interesting to consider, but beyond the scope of this chapter, what might have been the reasons for choosing the army, rather than the police, to carry out this plot, particularly in light of what later became an informal, but almost taken for granted, distinction between the security forces. In Jamaica, the police are considered "undisciplined" and corrupt, and is commonly used to carry out extra-judicial executions. The army is highly disciplined and maintains safe distance from party politics.

Conclusion

Democratic socialism faced many internal and external challenges, and it is beyond the scope of this chapter to explore all the causes of its failure. I suggested, however, that the project which aimed to break with clientelism ultimately collapsed under the weight of a global capitalist pressures, forestalling social, economic, and political transformation, and entrenching authoritarian policing.

Franz Fanon's *The Wretched of The Earth* (Fanon 2004) suggests the process of decolonization is bound to encounter counterrevolution from within and from without. Decolonization is always a violent process, not only in the first instance, because it confronts the incompetence of the colonial bourgeoisie and the counterviolence of reaction. Both forces, Fanon argued, will prey on the lumpenproletariat, which will easily be co-opted, and the only way to overcome these complicated predicaments—if indeed it is possible—is to maintain the movement, never to halt the development of popular national consciousness. Consciousness must proceed by ongoing militant and intellectual practice, critique and self-critique, and ever finer analysis of power. National liberation was only the first step, and it was bound to fail, if social, political, and economic transformation weren't pushed through as well (ibid.)

In Jamaica, the problems discussed by Fanon appeared starkly. From the end of slavery in the 19th century, a large and dispossessed peasantry became entangled in webs of clientelism and organized crime, orchestrated by parts of the ruling class. Capital remained almost entirely in foreign hands, prohibiting a bourgeois revolution that strives to become universal. Democratic socialism was an attempt to overcome this predicament, substituting the state for the bourgeoisie as the central agent of development. To do this, it had to mobilize the masses, increase productivity, and divert the people's desire away from metropolitan values and commodities. Black Power provided a major idiom in this effort, popularized through mass education and participatory frameworks.

Policemen were drawn into the project by their historical affiliation between the PNP and the Police Federation. They were against the backdrop of union activism for "Jamaicanization" of the Force since the 1940s. Policemen's openness to radical ideology also reflects what is sometimes called the "undisciplined" character of the Jamaica Constabulary. Unlike the military, which succeeds in maintaining its legitimate and respectable aura, the Jamaican police—perhaps because of the deep contradiction it embodies—remains somewhat rebellious. I suggested that some policemen were drawn to democratic socialism because, for a moment, a political project aspiring to hegemony promised to resolve the contradictions they were experiencing as individuals. Offering a vision of complete social reformation made room for a utopian vision in which the black policeman would no longer be an enemy of the black nation. Like most contradictions emerging from racial capitalism, this one too is endured individually, and cannot be resolved without radical transformation of "the system."

The political moment of the JCF, at least as presented by its members, tied police reform to a radical transformation of Jamaican social order. Its proponents spoke of land redistribution, import substitution, universal education, as necessary elements of remaking society, emphasizing the need to foster black consciousness and self-confidence among African descendants. They wove together socialist commitments with pan-African solidarities into a program that, if realized, might have been truly radical in addressing structural conditions of crime and police violence. They rooted their vision of revolutionary change in an international awakening of formerly colonized peoples and remain acutely aware of the geopolitical pressures of new imperialism.

The tensions and contradictions inherent in democratic socialism were also reflected in policing. The police were torn between serving an elected government, pursuing a political project that aimed to produce mass democracy, fighting the nexus between the lumpen and the ruling classes, and ultimately exacerbating—if not actively joining—partisan violence. The complicated legacy of politicization of policing in 1970s Jamaica is as much a result of the failure to affect transformation as it is a simple continuation of the past. Colonialism did not simply proceed without a break. It was actively resisted and then reconstituted through an affront. I stress this point because today, internationally prescribed police reforms present a unidirectional historical narrative, which begins with slavery and colonialism, continues with political war and ends with transnational organized crime. The different moments appear as progressions of different forms of "corruption," against which neoliberal technocratic policing— "apolitical," as it were—is judged. Oddly enough, institutional critique originating in anti-colonial struggle is today used to further neocolonial interventions in the name of countering "colonial mentality."

Divorced from a critique of political economy, the call to decolonize police forces has become a new version of modernization theory. Within this framework, black Jamaican policemen appear steeped in false consciousness, incapable of releasing themselves from colonial culture and mentality. Telling the story of political policemen, as problematic as it surely was, is a way to counter these simplistic stories with their racist undercurrents. As reconstructed by the protagonists of this story, the challenge of Jamaican policemen to liberal reform is obvious: It is simply impossible to effect police reform along liberal lines, respectful of rights of citizens, and formally equitable, in a society that remains trapped in economic dependency. We will see more of this in the next chapter.

Perhaps the violence unleashed by the political experiment in Jamaica and its ultimate failure expresses the limitations of projects that seek to follow in the footsteps of North Atlantic modernization. Even those that follow a different path, in this case, democratic socialism. Which is yet another reason to return to Fanon, who reflects on this possibility: "Perhaps everything needs to be started over again: The type of exports needs to be changed, not just their destination; the soil needs researching as well as the subsoil, the rivers and why not the sun." (Fanon ibid. 56-57) Fanon maintains that such a grand endeavor, humanizing a world destroyed by imperialism, would require technical skill and capital, which only the West can provide to emerging postcolonial nations. He calls for reparations.

The Reform Police: Reforming the Plantation, Civilizing the Frontier

When detective Mark Shields was dispatched to Jamaica in 2004 to investigate allegations of police extra-judicial killings, he hardly expected this excursion to last fifteen years and counting. He was 47 years old and already approaching retirement. He joined the London Metropolitan Police ('the Met') at 17 and climbed to the rank of Chief Superintendent in charge of operations and organized crime. Shields came to Jamaica to prepare a legal case against Senior Superintendent Reneto Adams, suspected of executing four civilians in the village of Kraal, Clarendon, in 2003 (see also chapter 6).[1] It took Shields almost a year to collect evidence implicating Adams and his crew in murder, tampering with the crime scene, and gun planting. But the Jamaican jury was not impressed, and in December 2005, they acquitted the cops of all charges.

Not long after, Shields was asked by the Government of Jamaica to extend his secondment and join the JCF as Deputy Commissioner, responsible for the Criminal Investigations Branch (CIB). The request came as Jamaica was experiencing a 52% increase in the number of murders over one year, causing alarm locally and internationally. For almost five years, Shields headed a team of five International Police Officers (IPOs), who took up senior posts in the JCF and whose role was to oversee and promote the much delayed "reform and modernization" process. Shields, presenting himself as a beacon of integrity against corruption—and never shying away from publicity—quickly established himself as the island's preeminent foreign security expert, who is regularly consulted on matters of policy, and ultimately launched his cross-Caribbean security firm, Shields Crime and Security Consultants Ltd.

The Jamaican press loved Shields. Newspapers would regularly feature photos of him on their "Social" and "Flare" supplements, usually dressed in tropical garb and attending exclusive venues in the company of beautiful models and socialites. The Gleaner nominated him as "one of Jamaica's thirty most eligible men," a sentiment echoed by the Guardian, which described Shields as "charming and attractive," with "the air of someone who knows it" (also quoting his driver who said, "it's not bad to drive around a sex symbol") (Deeson and Pilkington 2007; Aitkenhead 2012). In 2007, Shields came into the international limelight for a moment as the head of the team that investigated the mysterious death of Cricket coach Bob Woolmer during the World Championship in Jamaica. Woolmer, the South African coach of the Pakistani team, was found dead in his hotel room in Kingston, without evident signs of break-in or violence. The peculiar case led to a host of speculations about international intrigue and match-fixing, mixed with religious tensions and racial animosities. Despite being thoroughly investigated by a team of seasoned detectives and with the help of forensic examiners overseas, the case was never solved and remained shrouded in mystery.[2]

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[1] Also spelled Crawle and Crawl.

No doubt, Shield's expedition to Jamaica provides material for some riveting postcolonial detective fiction. As a British cop descending on the island in a seemingly heroic attempt to reform the natives, his figure is almost a literary portrayal of the moral dramas of policing projected on a post-imperial stage. One can think here of Rudyard Kipling's memorable detective, Strickland, "going fantee" in colonial India, or, perhaps more appropriately, of detective inspector Henry Scobie in Graham Greene's *Heart of the Matter*, seconded to serve the Empire somewhere in West Africa and trying to balance his deep Catholic commitments with endemic corruption in the diamond-trading colony. A more recent example, often referenced by my British policemen interlocutors in Jamaica, is the BBC comedy series *Death in Paradise*. The show follows a British detective sent to investigate crimes on the fictional island of Saint Marie, where his encounters with the locals are repeatedly depicted as a comedy of errors resulting from unbridgeable 'cultural difference.'

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[2] Woolmer's death brought up a flurry of speculations, especially because it came just after his team, Pakistan, unexpectedly lost to Australia. Was his death associated with match fixing, corruption and intrigue in the sport's league? Or, as some suggested, to acrimonious relations between the white South African coach and his team, which (again, according to some commentators) were increasingly turning to Islam? The investigation was further complicated by the postmortem examination carried out by Jamaica's chief pathologist, who insisted that Woolmer had been strangled. A statement that was in tension with the police inability to show that anyone entered the hotel room except Woolmer himself. An additional postmortem was then commissioned by a team of Canadian experts, which surmised that Woolmer died of heart failure.

Indeed, Shields managed to quickly aggravate local policemen who, in addition to resisting reforms for many other reasons, treated the IPOs with irrepressible animosity. Shields described his entry into the Force as complicated by anti-colonial sentiments: "Some of them [senior JCF officers] absolutely loathed the sight of us. They were anti-colonial or anti-white and were hostile and obstructive." In turn, Jamaican policemen I spoke to resented what they called "the return of our colonial masters" and questioned the IPOs' understanding of Jamaican reality. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Jamaican policemen have been schooled in strong nationalist ideology. They have a long and proud tradition of resisting the colonial practice of placing white foreigners in senior ranks of the police force. That British IPOs received salaries three times higher than their local peers contributed to the feeling that international police reform reinforces racist colonial hierarchies.

It is easy to understand why international policing interventions in Jamaica, especially when headed by British missions, conjure up colonial specters among nearly all participants. British colonial rule in Jamaica lasted over three hundred years (1655-1962), establishing one of the most brutal regimes of modern slavery and racial capitalism. The institution of slavery shaped every element of colonial society, from its demographics to its economic base and class structure, through its modes of sociality, customs, and political subjectivities, culture, and ideology. Of course, it shaped the organization of law and police, both in the limited sense of the mode of organizing and distributing legitimate coercion in society and in the wider sense of defining the parameters of order. Jamaican policing is widely understood as a paradigmatic example of British colonial policing, imported to the West Indies from Northern Ireland. This model is broadly defined by its paramilitary, heavy-handed, centralized, and hierarchical style, distinct from the supposedly 'consensual' model of liberal policing applied in the metropole.

But today, in what may appear like an ironic turn of fate, the colonial mission from the metropole is returning to Jamaica with an unmistakable "de-colonizing" agenda. Drawing on both local and foreign studies, contemporary police reform efforts are determined to overcome the entrenched paramilitary, centralized, authoritarian, and order-oriented model of the Jamaica Constabulary with a more liberal, community-oriented, Police Service. And as they do so, they recover another language of imperial domination: The language of reform, civilization, and even abolition and emancipation. Once we begin to think about police through the lens of reform and not vice versa, we immediately encounter the problem that modern policing was born—in Jamaica as well as in England—precisely at the moment of slavery's abolition, during what historians called the Age of Reform.

In the first chapter of this dissertation, I tried to show how the organization of Jamaican policing in the long era of emancipation and through the Morant Bay rebellion developed through conflicts between colonial and metropolitan sectors, often negotiated through idioms of class, culture, and race. In this chapter, I aim to do something similar with regards to police reform efforts today, namely, to show how attempts to reconstruct (indeed, re-form) imperial order proceed through tense conflicts and collaborations and draw on a wide range of discourse examples, distant models and debates. As I do so, however, I come to examine a troubling, though potentially useful, analogy between contemporary police reforms in Jamaica and the historical moment of the abolition of slavery.

Similarities are hard to ignore. Reform today is driven by a diverse coalition of economic and political forces, some of which openly mobilizing a civilizing humanitarian discourse while also reflecting transformations in global capitalism and the immediate interests of financiers and creditors.

The reform police coalition, which began with a kind of optimism at the end of the Cold War, developed, over time, a more "radical" approach. An approach that sometimes explicitly calls for dismantling the JCF—which increasingly appears irreformable—and replacing it with an entirely new "police system," which caters more immediately and directly to metropolitan interests. Given what we know today about what 19th-century "abolition" actually was—reconstitution of the plantation under a new form—we might be now in a better position to assess the current moment.

Abolition and Reform

In this chapter, I describe a complex I call "the reform police" in the context of the development of global and frontier capitalism and the evolving relationship between metropole and (post)colony. I use the term "reform police" to highlight the primacy of reform as a technology and discourse of order, which constructs and reconstructs policing in response to changing demands and ideologies. Reform is a permanent feature of capitalism, used to administer gradual changes between forces and relations of production, so that they don't burst out in a revolutionary upheaval or, more commonly, simply lead to chaos and destruction. To be clear, I have no interest in rejecting all reforms for the sake of some grand revolutionary program. My point is to argue and show that revolutionaries must look closely at what the reform reforms, and what abolition abolishes.

Earlier on, I argued, following Thompson, that the plantation was initially conceived as a form of police—immediately both political and economic—to deal with the frontier disorder. Now, I want to turn to Lloyd Best's theory of plantation economy to draw some ideas about the dynamics of transformation and constraints of reform (Best 1967). In a seminal paper, Best describes the life cycle of the pure plantation economy as characterized by a rapid rise and a slow, protracted downfall. The plantation economy emerges through favorable but largely passive support of the metropolitan government (historically, the British Crown), which provides land grants and concessions to merchants and planters. At this stage, the metropole creates the institutional framework of collaboration with the colony, broadly mercantilist, involving limitations on what can be produced in the colony—mainly primary production of an agricultural staple and sometimes basic assembly—as well as terms of trade, navigation, and currency convertibility.

During the golden era of its development, the plantation economy expanded quickly, responding to increased demand for the colonial staple in the metropole and the resulting growing political power of (mostly absentee) owners. More lands are brought under cultivation, and more slaves are imported. At this stage, the plantation economy becomes stamped with some distinguishing features that will be very hard to overcome. Among these are limited diversification on local production and acute dependence on the metropole, both as a market and as a source of imports—commodities for subsistence, luxury items, and capital products. Because of the limited base of the economy, the plantation must mobilize metropolitan political backing to protect the price of exports against fluctuations.

Crucially, the establishment and expansion of production rely on metropolitan credit. This is fine so long as production continues to yield a large surplus. But once conditions change—the price of the staple drops, protections are revoked, and technological advancements in other areas lead to increased competition—many plantations sink into insolvency. Still, the economy remains dependent on imports. Hence borrowing must continue, and this created a cycle of indebtedness that is nearly impossible to dissolve. As debt grows and production continues to stagnate, the power of the creditors grows. Financiers can now demand higher interest rates and also become more involved in the management of their properties.

While the colony declines, the metropolitan economy continues to grow. Liberalization of trade is called for; protections and subsidies are revoked. However, by now, even with a sincere desire to transform, the legacy of the plantation will be incredibly hard to overcome. In addition to growing debt, major difficulties in transforming the colonial economy include the unavailability of advanced technologies, sources of fuel and energy, and skilled labor. The colonial plantation economy sinks deeper into crisis.

Then, on the verge of collapse, the metropole gets involved. It will not be wary of using military force to maintain stability and recover the colony's debt. The plantation society is forced to become competitive by reducing costs of production, particularly the costs of labor, or diversifying its endeavors. But even when it is forced to transform, the colonial plantation economy will continue to be restricted by its subservient role in the world economy and "carry over" legacies of its previous order: "The legacy of institutions, structures and behavior patterns of the plantation system are so deeply entrenched that adjustment tends to take place as an adaptation within the bounds of the established framework." (ibid. 294)

It will be necessary to keep in mind Best's structural political-economic analysis going forward because it will allow us to clearly see the limitations of reform. But it is also important to view reform as a concrete social process—not simply as the encounter of impersonal political and economic forces. This is because, to even get off the ground and do the kind of work it does, reform must become a mission, a personal commitment, an ideology. Anthropologists of imperialism have shown this many times before.

In *Tensions of Empire* (1989; 1997), Ann Soler and Frederick Cooper famously argued that the traveling agents of empires, particularly during the age of reform, shaped the mutual constitution of metropole and colony. Colonies served as a backdrop against which the meaning of being European—particularly white, male, citizen—was imagined and formed. In turn, colonial domination, as well as colonial reform, often borrowed from available metropolitan discourses of class conflict. While tensions surrounding reforms in colonial locations reflected shifting coalitions among specific social groups, their relation to the state, and their political and economic aspirations in particular moments, they were "more than hypocritical ruses of bourgeois rhetoric." (1997, 3) They were also "efforts to define what a dominant class or government could and could not do…clarifying who was fit to rule at home and abroad." (3)

Jean and John Comaroff's monumental *Of Revelation and Revolution* (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991; 1997) is even more directly concerned with reform missions. Specifically with the encounter between Methodist missionaries and the Tswana of South Africa on the transforming colonial frontier. Their story begins in the English countryside, disrupted by the enclosures, with the downfall of the English yeomanry and the rise of protestant pietism. This, they write, was the movement that sent "persons caught between rich and poor" to remake their lives, the world, and even the Kingdom of God, in the colony (ibid. 1992, 85). Imperialism, especially during the first half of the 19th century, provided ample space for independent missions, filled with a sense of moral responsibility and outrage in the face of corruption. As well known, the main cause of evangelist missions during this era of reform was the campaign to abolish slavery in the British Empire and beyond. In this context, benevolent racism emerged, placing European white men and women in a position of saviors and philanthropists. With one arm, struggling against the appalling and sinful barbarism of slavery, with the other, leading the would-be emancipated on a path to middle-class industriousness and Christian respectability.

As ideas and ideologies, reform and abolition captured the minds of 19th century Europeans, providing them with tropes and images to speak about and make sense of their shifting social position. Concomitantly, imperialism was an incubator of admiration and bureaucracy—as various professionals, managers, experts, scribes, and scientists were put in worldwide circulation—playing the crucial role of smoothing differences between different spaces of accumulation within an increasingly global system. With its highly mobile lifestyle, this global middle class led to what some historians called a "managerial revolution within empire" (Manjapra 2019, 185). At the same time, this emerging global middle class came into conflict with local professionals and elites, which were very commonly negotiated the "global currencies" of culture, race, and ethnicity.

Reform in the British Empire was part and parcel of the transformation of capitalism, from its earlier mercantilist beginnings to industrialism. But in England, bourgeois activism was tempered by fears of revolution *à la française*, making reform even more urgent. For reformers of that era, 'old corruption' was lurking within every institution - in churches, schools, and local councils, in the East India Company and in the Bank of England. Indeed, reform was a deeply moral discourse that linked the failing of individuals, of institutions, and corruption in society (Innes and Burns 2003). It was called for from nearly all sides of the political spectrum, including socialists who called themselves "radical reformers" through liberal Tories, Whigs and evangelists. Notable moments were, of course, the passing of the two Reform Bills of 1832 and 1867, which expanded the vote dramatically (but certainly not universally).

Jamaica, the largest British colony in the British West Indies, was a central node of these imperial reform efforts, and a site that figured momentously in the development of imperialist practices and ideologies. The abolitions of slavery, as Eric Williams so famously argued, was capitalism turning back on its earlier moment, in an effort to re-form. While mercantilism and Atlantic slavery were crucial moments of original accumulation, industrial capitalism had to ultimately overcome slavery as a mode of production that constrained further development of capital. Whether the economics of the story line up with precise accounting is still widely debated, but the basic insight remains. Williams showed that abolition was championed by a broad coalition of social forces, with divergent and even conflicting interests, but was undergirded and made successful because slavery was seen as uneconomical. Slave rebellions played a role, and so did humanitarianism, but economic forces and interests largely conditioned the demise of slavery. This does not undermine the achievement of abolition or its historical significance, but it does allow us to understand more clearly the institutions that ultimately replaced chattel slavery.

In a series of works on imperial reform, Catherine Hall has shown how the optimism that accompanied early 19th-century abolition movements was gradually dampened by the failure to establish wage labor in the post-emancipation colonies. If abolitionists began by believing that with the removal of slavery modern civilization in Jamaica would prosper, they quickly awakened to a reality that was far more complicated. Neither the slave masters nor the slaves seemed particularly keen to participate in the grand free labor experiment. But why not? The main answer given to this problem was racial and cultural difference—the blacks were lazy or indulgent, were unresponsive to discipline and reform, while the planters were brought to the level of barbarism in the distant tropical colonies—they too were quite irredeemably corrupt. After the Morant Bay Rebellion, it was therefore resolved that Jamaica would be ruled directly by the Crown, which would paternally rule over both. And so, as we saw in the first chapter, Jamaica got its colonial police force, modeled on the Irish Royal Ulster Constabulary.[3]

Reform and Modernization

In the previous chapters, we saw the tensions and contradictions that accompanied the formation of the JCF and the momentous attempt to overcome them—on the subjective and institutional level—during the "political moment" of the 1970s. We then passed through the reconstitution of plantation and indebtment under Structural Adjustments and liberalization in the 1990s. We saw how this wave of reforms, instead of reviving the economy, furthered the demise of export-oriented sectors that were forced to compete, and that subsistence production was undermined by free trade agreements that flooded the market with cheap imported commodities. On the margins of the plantation, and with support from the local (and possibly international) bourgeoisie, traditional cash crops—sugar, coffee, and cocoa—were replaced with more lucrative marijuana and cocaine.

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[3] Developments in Jamaica correspond to what historians call the second Enlightenment. If the "first" Enlightenment put trust in universal law itself as a guarantor of order, the experience of the French Revolution and a series of colonial revolts dampened this prospect. The notion of civilization, understood as the march of human progress towards its necessarily rational essence, had to be reworked *as a challenge and predicament*. It was no longer simply believed that civilization springs organically out of theoretical postulates, rather, it had to be formed (or re-formed) in governmental practice.

The demise of plantation led to instability in the system of authority. The emancipated began to revolt—and now they were getting rich and increasingly bold. The number of murders, and other forms of criminal violence, rose exponentially, from 490 in 1981 to 849 in 1989. The metropole began to notice instability in the colony as Jamaican gangs extended along diasporic routes to North America and the United Kingdom. In 1987, the American Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) launched its first nationwide effort to destroy Jamaican drug networks, declaring Jamaican "posses" a "national problem." (Tanton and Lutton 1993, 222).[4]

In 1991, as part of the global drive to pursue security reforms, and with the triumphalist optimism of immediate post-Cold War capitalism, the British Government sent M.J. Hirst, a Chief Constable of Leicestershire, to conduct a review of the JCF and make recommendations for its reform. Hirst's recommendations focused mainly on improving training and community policing and were formally adopted by the Force in the publication of the 1998 JCF Corporate Strategy. The Strategy was developed as part of the JCF "modernization project," supported by a sizeable implementation grant from Britain. Despite the generous contribution, the official stance of the British High

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[4] The AFT declaration went hand in hand with the FBI's warning "that international crime and terrorist organizations have placed America under siege" and that "new ethnic mobs" are wreaking havoc in American cities (Kleinknecht 1996) The racist-cultural codification of these "new mobs" labeled Jamaican gangs as ruthless and prone to extreme brutality, "moving American blacks off the street corners, and […] ready to use whatever violence is necessary to do the job." (Tanton and Lutton ibid.: 222).

Commission (BHC) was that reform should be entirely devised and led by Jamaicans, and that British and other foreign governments were only contributing financial and technical assistance (Wolfe 1993; Harriott 1998)

Yet Jamaican crime continued to overflow the national container. By 1996, the "ABC countries" (America, Britain, and Canada) had all revised their immigration acts to allow expedited deportation of people who were convicted of crimes as well as nominal infractions of the law (Headley 2006). In 1998, the Met launched Operation Trident to target gun crimes in London's black communities, which was understood as primarily related to renewed immigration from the West Indies. The Trident Task Force became increasingly interested in following investigations—victims and perpetrators—back to their 'origins' in the Caribbean. In this context, the Met enhanced its surveillance capacity in Jamaica, using both human intelligence and technological collection methods. This remained, for a time, secret. None of the imperial powers operating in the Caribbean wanted to present themselves as breaching Jamaican sovereignty.

Indeed, as the new security arrangements were being established, the Jamaican Government made several attempts to reassert its sovereignty. It protested, without much success, provisions relating to deportation of its citizens, but was much more successful in signing the 1995 Ship Rider and Hot Pursuits Agreement with the United States (Vasciannie 1997). Initially, the US demanded full discretion for its security agents operating in the Caribbean Ocean, to board and search Jamaican vessels suspected of carrying narcotics. In negotiating this agreement, Jamaica insisted that, as a matter of principle, its Maritime Police should be granted the reciprocal right to search American vessels, which may be carrying guns and ammunition. Indeed, one of the recurring difficulties in transnational security arrangements, from the point of view of Jamaica, is the non-reciprocal nature of cooperation. While foreign security agents can consistently intervene in Jamaica to prevent "crime migration," Jamaica can do very little to curb the sources of crime and violence emanating from metropolitan territories. Most importantly, Jamaica remains rather helpless in the face of liberal gun laws in the US, which facilitate the endless flow of arms into the island through formal and informal ports of entry.

Acute power disparities notwithstanding, it would be wrong to present the advent of international policing and police reform Jamaica in stark binary—local/global, national/international, colony/metropole—terms. Police reform is not simply imposed on the poor postcolonial state by powerful imperial sponsors but is also actively pursued locally. Many sectors within Jamaican society have consistently called for reforming the police. Arguably, although Jamaica does not suffer from a high rate of property crime, which has been steadily declining since the 1970s, high rates of violence are said to pose serious obstacles to the development of the local economy. The institutionalization of corruption at the highest levels of government and administration makes business costs hard to predicate and to calculate. Jamaica's tarnished public image threatens to undermine the viability of important sectors, mainly tourism (though, we note in passing, tourism is also said to be one of the sectors most invested in money laundering and human trafficking). The highly skilled and educated middle classes wish to live in an open liberal society, where civil rights are respected and where ambitions and talents can be freely expressed and developed. Obviously, the lower classes suffer the most from high rates of violence—of which they are both primary victims and primary (immediate) perpetrators. But without significant institutional reforms, they can barely express their grievances, far less, to affect politics directly.

Jamaican criminologist Anthony Harriott, from the University of the West Indies, has played a key role in advocating police reform. In 2000, he published Police and Crime Control in Jamaica: The Problem of Reforming Ex-Colonial Constabularies (Harriott 2000). Based on several years of intensive research of the Force and previous reform initiatives, the book laid the foundation for subsequent transformations over the next two decades. Harriott argued that most of the problems found in the JCF—excessive reliance on force, endemic corruption, inefficient investigations, low morale, and general incompetence—largely result from the colonial model adopted after the 1865 Revolt.

The JCF, Harriott convincingly argued, was designed to deal with colonial disorder, not with riot and revolt. It was never built to enforce the law and deal with crime control. Heavy-handed policing, passed down as institutional culture and further reinforced by the politicization of the Force, made the police into a veritable enemy of the people. It is seen by many, especially the poor, as an illegitimate organization, marred by criminality and corruption, which cannot be trusted (ibid.). Previous attempts to reform the JCF, drawing on technical and professional models, failed because they did not address the crucial problem of institutional ethos and culture. Indeed, it was not enough to introduce new techniques and technologies—the Force had to be completely overhauled along all parameters—organizational hierarchies, processes, modes of authority and control, and to be reborn as a new organization, which respects the rights of civilians and operates along well established liberal democratic principles (ibid.).

Decolonization and New Global Policing

Despite ongoing debate about police and crime control, things progressed rather slowly. Then, on May 7, 2003, a British surveillance system picked up a phone call made by JCF SSP Reneto Adams, then head of the Crime Management Unit (CMU), to Denay Williams, a well-known gangster from Eastern Kingston. Adams asked to purchase a gun and ammunition, planted on a scene where the CMU had just killed four civilians.[5] As will be more deeply discussed in chapter 6, the incident—which came to be known as the Kraal Killing—caused some turmoil in Jamaica and abroad. Mainly because there were witnesses willing to give accounts of the police executing the four victims in cold blood.

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[5] I give a more detailed account of the Kraal Killings in chapter six. Briefly: On the afternoon of May 7, 2003, the CMU headed by SSP Adams came to house in the rural village of Kraal and shot two men and two women—Angela Richards (44), Lewena Thompson (39), Kirk Gordon, and Matthew 'Renegade' James. While the police claimed they came under fire from the premises, neighbors and witnesses, including Richard's ten-year-old daughter, insisted the victims were executed in cold blood, without any provocation. Such differences between police and civilian versions are not uncommon. What made the case exemplary was the decision of British authorities to intervene in investigating and prosecuting the matter.

The Jamaican public was never made aware of the fact that British intelligence overheard the conversation between the policeman and the don. But within less than three weeks, four senior Scotland Yard officers, among them Mark Shields, flew to Jamaica to investigate the Kraal killing. Shields and his associates arrived on the island on May 27. In early June, the Met Chief of Police came to Jamaica to convene with the Ministry of National Security. British authorities demanded that Adams be removed from frontline duty, and that the CMU be immediately disbanded. The Jamaican Government conceded.

This was not the first time the JCF "special squads" were involved in extra-judicial killings. The CMU alone had been implicated in killing some 40 civilians between its establishment by P.J. Patterson in 2001 and its disbandment in 2003. But the Kraal case was apparently different. It seemed to prove to British law enforcement that, given the high level of collusion between the police and high-level criminal actors, the JCF could not be trusted with intelligence and other sensitive matters. There were also growing concerns that human rights violations in Jamaica could undermine the legitimacy of British policing, at home and internationally. Since the British Government has been consistently financing the JCF, providing it with equipment and training, the British public would reasonably be wary about what is being done with their tax money. Indeed, the more the JCF was brought into international policing network, especially in the context of counter-narcotics operations, the more it became necessary to ensure that its standards of operation don't become a public relations burden, undermining the legitimacy of its metropolitan partners.

Since its inception, officers involved in Operation Trident followed their investigations to Jamaica. They often found it necessary to study the relationships between gangs in, for example, Kingston to pre-empt violence in, say, Brixton. They also found it important to liaise with family members of victims and perpetrators as part of their ongoing intelligence collection efforts. So, when the Met came to Jamaica in 2003, to offer (or force) its support in the Kraal investigation, it could build on established relationships and proven expertise in transnational gangs and narcotics. Furthermore, embedding their own officers within the JCF could help the Met learn even more about the Jamaican criminal milieu and its relationship with state and politics.

Now, it is crucial to bear in mind that although the professed ideology of reform seeks to alter the "colonial model," reformers did not seek to turn paramilitary policing into peaceful and unarmed community service. They still thought the force should have the capacity to engage gangs in forms of urban combat. The idea here is not to give up the use of force entirely but to make it more professional and targeted, neo-counterinsurgency or war on terror style. In this context, the use of force in police-military operations should be based on meticulous collection and analysis of intelligence and express at least formal degrees of "accountability" to make it legally defensible.

After Kraal, the Met, alongside American and Canadian security agencies, joined the Jamaican security forces in a large counter-narcotics campaign called Operation Kingfish. Launched in 2004, Kingfish was conceived precisely on this basis, as an alternative to "special" (death) squads used by the JCF. It aimed to replace violent suppression of crime (in police lingo, "containment") with targeted intelligence-driven efforts. Though Kingfish was considered a success from the point of view of most partners, problems with the JCF continued to crop up. Foreign partners as well as commanders of the JDF worried that high levels of corruption among police ranks suggest that the JCF cannot be trusted to deal with sensitive information.

The Metropolitan Police then stepped in. In recent years, like other police departments experiencing budgetary cutbacks and the advent of neoliberal benchmarking, Scotland Yard devised plans for increasing its "self-generated income." It has a Business and Corporate Services Branch, which packages, markets, and sells police reform plans, especially in parts of the Global South that were, or still are, part of the British Commonwealth. It also contracts its senior officers as consultants and experts, offering them pre- and post-retirement secondments, that are often very rewarding.

One of the more successfully marketed police reform plans designed by the Met is the model implemented in Northern Ireland—now considered the gold standard of police reform, especially in postcolonial states whose police forces were originally modeled along the lines of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (Ellison and O'Reilly 2008). Thus, in yet another ironic historical twist, just as the Irish "colonial model" became the blueprint for building police forces in the British colonies, the reformed Northern Irish Police Service is today going global.

The Irish model is seen as particularly relevant for Jamaica not only because of the original model they share, but as Justin Felice, an IPOs who had previously worked in Ireland, explained, there are several additional similarities: In Ireland, the police were found to be colluding with "terrorist" groups and impacted by political animosities between Loyalist Protestant and Republican Catholics. This, he argued, resembles collusion with criminal groups in Jamaica as well as the impact of "political tribalism." In Ireland, the police were resolutely partisan, with over 90% of the RUC drawn from the Loyalist camp. They used to carry out extra-judicial killings and other atrocities mostly against Catholics. The exposure of police abuses strengthened the IRA's campaign, helping Republicans to gain support internationally, especially in the US (where, as Felice said, prominent members of the political elite—including Biden, Obama, and the Clintons—take pride in their Irish roots).

The British security establishment became worried about growing support for the Republican campaign, and therefore invested significantly in transforming the RUC into the Irish Police Service. Now, Felice says, "The Police Service, the new force, is at the cutting edge of how to police. It is brilliant, it recruits 50/50 [from both communities], it really got the diversity." In other words, police reform in this case was intimately related to the political goal of legitimizing British rule in Northern Ireland. Similarly, the campaign of police reform in Jamaica may be understood to some extent as a response to concerns about human rights violations in the context of the war on crime in Jamaica, both among the West Indian diaspora in the UK, and the African diaspora globally.

As IPO Les Green explained, around the early 2000s, the West Indian diaspora was becoming increasingly interested in what was happening with the police in Jamaica. He said that what worried them was not "only" grave human rights violations over there, but also how corrupt policing and crime in Jamaica might affect their communities in England. Events happening in Kingston could easily spark gang wars in the UK, and with the loss of human life and safety also came anti-black racism. Operation Trident, to recall, was the main task force launched by the Met to deal with "black crime" in London. Apparently, the task force had an advisory committee made of community members of West Indian descent, who even came to Jamaica to observe what was going on.

> We had visitors come [to Jamaica] from London. The mayor, and the advisory group for Operation Trident…. many of them were actually ex-pats from Jamaica and other parts of the Caribbean. They felt this was very useful. They want to change the context of how Jamaicans are seen in relation to criminality. After all, we are speaking about a minority in the UK, also minority in Jamaica, that is involved in crime. The issues [in both places] are the same […] Certainly, in the UK criminality from the black community has decreased, but we still have many members of the black community who murder and who are victims of crime, and a lot of criminals in the prison population.

More crucial than diasporic support was the decision of Jamaican capitalists, led by Oliver Clark, owner of the Jamaica Gleaner, to invest their own money in advancing police reform. The Gleaner, though generally a conservative newspaper, had always championed police reform—this is evident at least from the 1940s. But this time, Clark decided to go beyond public pressure on the government. He made arrangements with Chief of the Met, to implant British police officers in senior roles in the JCF. Clark and the coalition of businessmen he gathered around him, provided a third of the funding toward the IPOs salaries, with another third paid by the UK Government, and a third by the Jamaican Government (meaning that the contribution of the Jamaican public remained equal to local salaries of the same posts). Interestingly, Clark participated in handpicking and recruiting the officers, and even became their mentor on the island—hosting regular breakfasts with the IPOs and keeping them abreast of local news and politics.[6]

From the local businessmen's perspective, the goal of the IPO project was twofold. On the one hand, they sought to increase foreign pressure on the JCF and the Government, to push reforms that were long anticipated but constantly stalled. On the other hand, Clark and his collaborators wanted to expose "international partners" to the complexities of the Jamaican crime problem, thereby perhaps persuading them to take a more active role in curbing the illicit flow of guns and money from their territories (Harriott 2011). The economic interest can be easily inferred. This segment of the local bourgeoisie feels blocked by the outdated colonial plantation framework. It would like to see a more liberal economy emerging, removing various distortions caused by crime, corruption, and red tape.

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[6] Contributions from the private sector were explicitly and consciously made public. The aim was to show the private sector's commitment to changing the common practice of contributions to the police, that were local, unregulated and bordering the criminal. Businessmen paying commanders in their division to ensure their properties would be secured, i.e., as a form of protection, often linked to political clientelism and sometimes to corruption proper (as one IPO explained: "you had police benefactors… but the Superintended would often abuse or misappropriate the funds and there were no mechanisms of accountability"). By contrast, the reform police complex seeks to formalize the means through which capitalists could support and bolster police capacity, aiming to increase bourgeois *class* influence while reducing "corruption", that is, the influence of individuals who pursue their short-term goals at the expense of long-term economic growth and stability.

Their agenda, as a small postcolonial bourgeoise with universal aspirations, is to use international resources to further what they see as a national agenda.

Thus, in 2005, in the wake of yet another dramatic surge in murder figures, the Government of Jamaica formally asked Shields to stay on the island and assume the role of Deputy Commissioner of Police on its behalf. Shields agreed on the condition that five additional foreign policemen be recruited to fill the ranks of Assistant Commissioner (ACP), each leading reform efforts in one of the key areas of the JCF's corporate strategy: criminal investigation, firearms, intelligence collection and management, anti-corruption, and community policing.

The rationale for inviting IPOs was laid out in a document entitled *Police Reform in Jamaica 2008-2011*, which openly stated that "underperformance and corruption amongst officers have undermined the JCF reform process." The foreign policemen, it was said, will provide the necessary skills, experience, innovation, and leadership to "sustainably" transform the organization. Officially, the IPOs were supposed to support transitioning the JCF to a community-based policing service, which is considered most challenging. They were also meant to strengthen the investigative capacity of the JCF, as well as its capacity to produce and operationalize intelligence. Another important objective was to address police corruption and improve public accountability. But the most important point, arguably, was that the IPOs were not embedded in the Force and in Jamaican society more broadly, and could operate more professionally, without being dragged down by vested interests and corruption. It was also expected that the IPOs would help install a new culture of management, based on clear procedures, objectives, and evaluations, but not harsh and bureaucratic as such. The ethos was clearly grounded in the "new spirit of capitalism" (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007)—managers who are creative, flexible, but also bound by a strong sense of mission and impeccable individual morality.

The Return of Metropolitan Policemen

The IPOs occupied a strange position between reformers and policemen. On the one hand, they were brought for a limited, though yet undefined period, as if to model for the local policemen how to carry out their roles. On the other hand, they were sworn in formally as Jamaican policemen, placed in senior ranks of the organizational hierarchy, and displacing seasoned officers who have been waiting to be promoted for years. Indeed, those closest to the top of the pyramid had to endure and climb through multiple levels of "bureaucratic clientelism," which exposed them—if not more—to corruption and political mongering. But they were also pursuing their own experiments with community policing, notably, the pilot launched in 1995 in Kingston's Gold Street.

Not unsurprisingly, problems arose from the very first moment, and conflicts were often farmed by local policemen and understood by the foreign cops in terms of nationalism, race, and culture. Shield recalls: "Here I am, this white Anglo-Saxon, with a very strong police culture that is totally different from theirs, and I'm in a senior position. Now, how do you think that went? It was like trying to mix water and oil." After nongraduating himself for this metaphor ("this just came to me, I will use it again because it is absolutely brilliant," he said), Shields carried on telling me about his first day on the job, and how the Commissioner himself did not even stand up to shake his hand in a meeting with the Minister. It was basically all downhill from there. Senior officers would not return his calls, crucial information was hidden from him, and worst of all, some of his investigations were actively undermined by senior officers. Shields says he and his team faced resistance on all fronts. "Everything was a blocker. It was difficult for [the IPOs] to go and meet people. If they wanted to meet with ACP Operations, it would be difficult to get an appointment. As if they weren't even in the Force, and when they would get there, they would have to wait for hours until he would see them."

Community policing initiatives were opposed by those who had other ideas about how to structure them, or who considered British notions of community policing as soft and ineffective. Officers refused the proposal to replace M16 rifles with short-barrel carbines, more appropriate for policing operations ("because the M16, as I'm sure you know is totally impractical for policing. Whether you are stripping and searching or whether you're doing lots of other things.")

Anti-corruption, headed by Felice, faired a little better, perhaps because the unit was isolated from the rest of the Force and each member was polygraphed and vetted. But where it came to investigations of extra-judicial killings, Shields says he encountered endless obstacles, including attempts to destroy evidence, by senior policemen and with support from the Commissioner. Much of the resistance was experienced as "anti-colonial" or "anti-white" by Shields and his colleagues: "There were people like [X] who was a complete anti...anti... Brit… anti colonial... anti-white, you name it. Certain senior officers were frankly overtly hostile and obstructive."

As could be gleaned from the M16 example, when the IPOs spoke about "cultural difference" they often meant to say that Jamaican policemen are prone to irrational, immature and unfounded use of force, and perhaps that the whole of Jamaican society is somehow more violent than others. I provide a few illustrative examples, beginning with Les Green, ACP Crime:

> The biggest problem in Jamaica, if you look at the criminal history and the facts of what has happened in Jamaica, I think Jamaica has always been, for whatever reasons, historically, potentially a violent country. And it always has had episodes of very violent incidents and a "violentish" way of life. I mean there is a uhm mm... risk ... no, so, anger management uhm… Dealing with anger, poor education, lack of options to have other arrangements to diffuse tension, haven't really been part of Jamaica's uhm... development. So it always has had a particular problem with violence, uhm, now this

> isn't because of the history of where the people have come from because you look around the Caribbean it's not quite the same. There have been other factors to blame. I've read a number of different reports that the worst sort of slaves or the violent slaves who couldn't be trusted anywhere else were always put into Jamaica, well, that's possible. I don't know. I haven't studied enough of that. But, I mean, there has always been an underground of violence more associated with Jamaica in the Caribbean. But the biggest issue has always been firearms. Not necessarily gangs but the access to firearms.

"For whatever reasons" Jamaica has always been violent. But lest we accuse him of racism, Green says it "isn't because of the history of where the people came from" (Africa?) and also not with slavery as such, but perhaps has to do with the "worst sort" or "the violent" slaves that have been "put into" Jamaica. There are social factors, perhaps lack of education or other mechanisms to settle conflicts (this would be within the remit of community policing). To be clear, such arguments are often and commonly made by Jamaicans also, but they seem to bear more weight and become more consequential when they are spoken by a man responsible for criminal investigations. As for Jamaican policemen, IPOs saw them as part of the problem, if not worse than the people they were supposed to police. Shields:

> It is a sensitive thing perhaps for me to say, but I do think that if [senior policeman] had been born German in the 1930s he would have been a member of the Gestapo and would have been doing some of the atrocities that happened then. He has that mindset, that cold thing…And I thought many times in the past, not really shared it very much, that I can see comparisons between how the Germans went on when they had this situation, where people there thought about the final solutions [sic] and what happened in the 1930s and what happens here. There seems to be these people

> throughout history […] and the sad thing here is that the middle-class, the upper-class in Jamaica, they've given up on justice as well. They almost accept that's how the police has to be because there's no other way. There's almost, "ok, well, it has to be like that."

Here, the Jamaican policeman is presented as a Nazi, no less. The incarnation of evil, which returns through history in different guises, while the rest of society looks away. The evil policeman is a unique individual, with that "something" about him—a kind of mindset or a temperament—that is distinguishing. Society as a whole is not taken to be evil, necessarily. Still, it becomes complicit by association with the worse perpetrators, because it has given up on justice or has become incapable of imagining that things could be otherwise than they currently are. This is dreadful because, after all, we are talking about "the final solutions" knocking at the door.

This analysis, quite obviously, legitimates installing foreign policemen in top ranks, for they come from outside and are yet untainted. The IPOs are on a humanitarian mission against humanity's worst criminals, saving civilians from state terror. IPOs and other British and American security experts I spoke to repeatedly questioned the Jamaican elite's morality, suggesting their greed overpowers their most basic human instincts, to care about the poor and disadvantaged being killed. As Justine Felice put it, for example:

> Culturally it's very difficult. Have they [Jamaicans] got that desire in their belly to alter things, or do they just want the status quo? They seem to be fairly happy to live with a thousand deaths a year from murder… But perhaps they don't care because you know what, they [the poor] are murdering each other, and death in Jamaica is cheap unfortunately. It's a terrible thing to say, but they're not dealing with poverty on the street. It's horrible, what are they doing about it? The rich are rich. Very rich. What

> are they putting back into [society]? It's not just about enforcement, it’s about changing a way of life for a lot of people, that’s what’s it all about.

Transformation hinges on culture, on a shift of consciousness and commitment, but Jamaicans “seem to be fairly happy with a thousand deaths a year,” apparently, because those who are not dying are extra-rich. We should note here that the emphasis on elites, and elite violence, which has become pervasive in development and security discourses well beyond Jamaica (Kleinfeld 2018), is also concomitant with concerns about populism and oligarchy in the “metropole” in recent years. In foreign accounts on Jamaican policing, more common than allusions to Hitler were allusions to Trump and, more broadly, to the “one percent” super-rich. But in both cases, notwithstanding the difference, the focus is on personal immorality driving violence and corruption, where little attention is paid to structural factors. In the context of reform police this is key, not only because this type of thinking may quickly lead to racism, but also because it prevents reformers from asking what changes would be necessary to bring about the change they want to see. Or, as Felice himself put it at the end of the quote: “It is about changing the way of life of a lot of people.”

Policing the Postcolonial State

How did the IPOs persevere in the face of vehement resistance while being convinced that they were working amongst despicable, barbarous criminals? For one, they all said that they were moved and encouraged by the responses of citizens who approached them, called them, wrote them letters, and asked for their involvement in their cases or just giving them a piece of information. The IPOs emphasized, time and again, that citizens often felt they could trust them more than they could trust local policemen, who they (justifiably) assumed to be corrupt or somehow connected to unsavory elements. Citizens obviously saw the foreign policemen as much more capable of providing them with witness protection and may have approached them hoping that they will help them migrate in exchange for information. The IPOs promoted their image as servants of the public, especially of the voiceless and dispossessed, among other things, by giving out their phone numbers to civilians, in individual encounters and even on broadcast television. More or less consciously, they replicated the kind of paternalist relationship between the British Crown and the colonized and enslaved during the age of emancipation—protecting the Queen's subjects from the scandalous barbarity of planters.

In addition to citizen support, the IPOs admitted that despite the resistance, some local policemen supported the IPO mission. Shields: "There was a critical mass within the JCF who were pro IPOs. They gave me tremendous support. Some of them were not whiter than white. Some of them were bad guys and had been bad guys, but they could see that we were trying to do was trying to transform the organization modernize the organization, and that was it."

Indeed, the IPO program became a platform for attracting additional resources for police reform and modernization, including the procurement of technology and equipment, because although it was not within their official job description, each of the IPOs was effectively tasked with raising funds and cultivating partnerships with foreign security forces, diplomatic missions, and development agencies. IPOs brought with them policing expertise and the skills of management, which in most organizations today involves the capacity to fundraise. Because of their position, IPOs had relatively easy access to the donors, and they also commanded trust and confidence—money given to them would surely be used efficiently, and for worthy causes.

After years of budgetary cutbacks left the Force famished, and this made the IPOs instrumental in financing the JCF. In the wake of state downscaling, and probably corruption as well, the JCF lacked even the most basic supplies and equipment—writing paper, photocopying machines, not to mention computers and other more advanced technologies for forensic and ballistic examination. Working conditions in police stations were (and still largely are) dismal, with broken furniture, inoperative toilets, and dysfunctional air conditioners. That they could bring in some money made many local policemen see the point of working with the IPOs, even if only strategically.

In the quote above, Shields is referring specifically to men and women in senior positions who, despite being personally involved in various corrupt and unsavory dealings ("not whiter than white") nevertheless understood that they might have something to gain from working with the foreigners instead of against them. He didn't say openly, but only implied, that IPOs had the power to "convert" impure cops, at least in the eyes of international partners and donors. Shields, we learned from Wikileaks cables, at first resisted the nomination of Owen Ellington to Commissioner due to substantial suspicions concerning his involvement in criminal business (Embassy Kingston 2007c). But later, he supported him publicly—support that proved crucial in his 2009 selection as Commissioner. This support came after Ellington "surprisingly" passed a polygraph examination and just around the time Shields went off to establish his private security firm. It should be noted that in 2014 Ellington was forced to step down after all, when his American visa was suspiciously revoked. A point I will return to in a moment.

One of the main reasons reform was so strongly resisted and even resented was that it proceeded without much tact to conquer the most sensitive and valuable resource any security agency has: intelligence. Undoubtedly, American and British and other foreign security services used the IPO program to increase their surveillance capacities in Jamaica, especially to learn more about what is taking place in the inner corridors of power. Felice told me that international partners expected to receive raw and sensitive intelligence from the IPOs, in direct breach of their [the IPOs] mandate to serve the Jamaican people and state, as official members of the Constabulary:

> We were providing a constant stream of information [from the anti-corruption branch] …My paymasters wanted me to put a dongle into the computer and download

> everything and give it to them on a monthly basis. That's something I refused to do, because it was JCF intelligence. They weren't happy at all about it, so the next thing they did was to send people from their country to come and work for the [undercover] unit. Well, I'm not stupid enough to not know what they were doing. They were downloading our intelligence. But I didn't give it to anybody. I know where it was going, it was safe… but I mean, everybody wants everybody else's intelligence.

In addition to picking up raw data from the JCF's computers (that they had installed), foreign embassies would also receive regular briefings from the IPOs. Wikileaks cables reveal Shields visited the American Embassy several times a year, to provide briefings on Jamaica's security situation as well as ask for American assistance. Presumably, he was working much more closely with security liaisons at the British High Commission, as well as with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Jamaica liaisons, but we lack cables to confirm this. In one case, Shields came to the Americans with a proposal to provide them with intelligence on drug trafficking, in exchange for detailed intelligence they had about corrupt Jamaican policemen (Embassy Kingston 2005; 2007b).[7]

Shields constantly raised alarm among the diplomatic staff, making them acutely aware of rampant corruption and criminality among police ranks. In one cable he is quoted saying that Jamaican police officers "will do anything they can, including extra-judicial killings of witnesses and intimidation to protect themselves and their colleagues" and naming specific policemen as "known to be corrupt" (Embassy Kingston 2007a; 2007c; 2009). In another case, he explained to the diplomatic mission that no one within the ranks of the JCF has the moral authority to deal with corruption and that a culture of fear and intimidation in the organization prevents senior cops from turning against their colleagues.

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[7] In many cases it is hard to ascertain whether Shields was commissioned to do certain things by British security service or the JCF, or whether he was acting on his own initiative. For example, in 2007, Shields went to Florida to advocate opening a Kingston Liaison Office for the American Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (AFT) (Embassy Kingston 2007d)

While serving as Deputy Commissioner responsible for organizational transformation, Shields claimed that "the JCF was too corrupt to be reformed" and claimed it should be disbanded. And indeed, the American mission was convinced that "the JCF is less interested in reforming than in protecting its own." It also concluded that both political parties, the PNP and the JLP, "appear equally incapable and unwilling to seriously address the nation's crime problems or risk angering the criminal elements with which the party is intertwined." (Embassy Kingston 2009)

The cables leave the reader with a very strong impression that diplomatic missions and foreign security staff know everything there is to know about crime and corruption in Jamaica. That they know more than locals is evident, for example, in a cable depicting a meeting between newly selected members of the Police Civilian Oversight Agency (PCOA) and staff at the American embassy. Instead of the locals briefing the Americans, members of PCOA turned to the embassy to ask for US assistance in identifying corrupt policemen and giving a general assessment of corruption in the Force (Embassy Kingston 2007a). Justin Felice confirmed this suspicion during our conversation when he told me the following:

> National Integrity Action [NIA][8] gets funding from the US and UK but what are they delivering?... Well, perhaps they should be going to these countries and say, "until you start sharing information we're not going to go anywhere." You're not telling me the Americans don't know what's happening with the Prime Minister, the Minister, and

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[8] National Integrity Action (NIA) is the Jamaican "franchise" of Transparency International. The NGO was established by Trevor Monroe, former leader of the communist Workers Party of Jamaica. In a fascinating change of heart and politics, Monroe, a professor of politics at the University of the West Indies, turned from orthodox Marxism-Leninism to an agent of neoliberal reformism, working closely with USAID and DFID.

> everything else. *Of course, they do!* We're in the 21st century! they know what shoe size they've got, get real! But they drip-feed you what they think you need.

Felice believes that the international security networks and foreign governments are reluctant to use the intelligence they gather is partly the result of security organizations' general tendency to keep intelligence to themselves ("knowledge is power"). But he also suggested something further, namely, that the international community turning a blind eye to corruption and organized crime in Jamaica has something to do with a strategic concern for maintaining the delicate balance between reforming Jamaica and keeping it "stable":

> In the Caribbean you've got so many operators, so many people with a lot of interests because it is so strategic. If you look at Jamaica on the map it is very very very strategic. Right in between the US and South America… and when you think what happened in Cuba and that people flirted with this idea also in Jamaica, and quite a few people still think about it today. There's a very very safe democratic society in Jamaica. Politically, there's a very very safe two-party structure. Nobody wants to rock that boat.

Felice understands there is a conflict between maintaining the stability of the Jamaican regime against risks like "what happened in Cuba" and the avowed commitment to fighting organized crime. "Unfortunately," he concluded, without sharing intelligence, "you'll never combat corruption, you'll never combat the narcotics trade, you'll never combat the firearms trade, you will never defeat criminality."

Northern Atlantic governments seek to balance their avowed commitment, and strategic interest, in fighting organized crime and corruption, with their desire to maintain "stability"—pro-Western pro-capitalist governments. This fine balance is achieved by combining open reform measures with working behind the scenes and exerting concentered pressure when necessary. A tactic favored by the US Government is to revoke the visas of Jamaican politicians, senior administrators, and policemen, without providing reasoning. Visa revocation is an administrative procedure, which does not demand public explanations, but precisely for this reason is very effective. It alerts the individual in question, as well as the government, "we are watching you," but without raising the conflict to the level of diplomacy and international politics.

As noted earlier, in 2014, the US revoked former Commissioner Owen Ellington's visa, forcing him to step down after five years considered very successful (with a considerable drop of 34% in the rate of murder). This was supposedly related to their growing conviction concerning his involvement in the guns for drugs trade, which was already noted around 2007, when he was first nominated to become a Commissioner, but was later dropped (Nationwide Newsnet 2014). More recently, in December 2020, the US declared it had canceled the visas of six policemen implicated in the Kraal killings in 2003, nearly 15 years after being acquitted by a Jamaican jury. Commenting on this practice, Felice admitted to being embarrassed. "You revoke these men's visas on the basis of intelligence you never shared with me, while I am working in the Force and answering to the Commissioner?"

Seen in this light, the reform police mission is not simply about reform, nor about "police assistance," but is related directly to informal and powerful mechanisms of imperial management. Having people on the ground tracing the links between business, police, and politics, provides foreign governments with a significant lever of power, which they can use to informally police the Jamaican elites, while also calling them barbaric. The more information they can amass, even if this information is not always put into action, the more they can exert influence when and where it fits their interests. This tactical use of power exposes the extent to which the Jamaican elites are dependent on their international partners. But it also suggests that these "partners," in turn, are dependent on local elites to pursue their long-term interests in the Caribbean. In other words, beyond the public exchange of allegations—Jamaicans complaining about illegitimate foreign intervention and international partners accusing Jamaicans of criminality and corruption—one finds both "sides" working together quite closely. Ultimately, both are invested in keeping the situation more or less stable, even if their long-term interests are not identical.

The Reform Police Complex

In the face of stern and unrelenting resistance and given their limited achievements, the IPO program was finally discontinued. The five ACPs left the island between 2009 and 2013, and most of them today serve as private consults to other police missions. Shield, however, stayed in Jamaica, divorced his wife in England, with whom he had two children, and married Emily Crocks, a successful criminal lawyer and TV personality, whose family is deeply involved in Jamaican business and politics. He now runs his own security firm, Shields Security Consultants, which operates across several Caribbean and Central American territories. Building on his strong links in business and government, Shields was able, for example, to supply the Government of Jamaica with DNA marking technology and CCTVs—two technologies he strongly advocated as Deputy Commissioner. Shields's firm also sells "security solutions" to the private sector, including homes and businesses. It specializes in "solving crime and developing sustainable crime prevention strategies," with notable expertise in areas of "fraud and corruption." The firm also sells services and training in investigation management, surveillance, and risk assessment. One of its most recent bundles provides specialized solutions to the emergent industry of medical cannabis, based on Shield's work with the Jamaican Licensing Agency. This, of course, has nothing to do with corruption. This, presumably, is managerial competence.

In any case, following the IPO difficult experiment, foreign security services and donor agencies became convinced that the JCF was so reluctant to change that they decided to overhaul their involvement strategy. As David Osborne, a British security consultant with DFID, put it, "after years of working on reform and modernization, things in the JCF are still pretty rotten." He said that the Force is endemically corrupt, excessively violent, and "incompetent people constantly get promoted all the time." Reforms have been costly and largely ineffective: "you can send some specialist, but it all falls apart quite quickly." Things have come to the point that DFID, in one of their strategic consultations, decided to stop working with the JCF almost entirely. "There is no point in continuing to work with the organization if we don't see a significant change in the leadership," Osborne said.

> I have sympathy for regular police officers, but not for the management. They are perfectly aware of the problems and had many opportunities to change their ways. Consider the number of people being shot while unarmed, caught in crossfire, these things are easily preventable, but these are just cultural, shoddy cultural practices that are embedded in the Force. Their rejection of reform is non-sensical. […] They use violence very easily, stick to colonial model, and as you [the reformer] pull away it goes back to what it was.

According to Osborne, who is in this sense entirely representative, The JCF's resistance to reform is rooted in a belief in "their own way of doing things," which is "cultural" to the degree that it is irrational, namely inexplicable. "Culture" here denotes some exotic indecipherable difference, a kind of hiccup, outmoded and awkward tradition. Culture is what obstructs reform, prevents it from "sticking," and causing the organization to relapse, time and again, into its old bad habits. Note that Osborne makes no attempt to consider why "shoddy cultural practices" linger, and why is the "colonial model" persists. "Culture," apparently, substitutes for reasoning. We hear, once again, outrage in the face of immorality, corruption in high places, which is aggravated because, after all, "they had many opportunities to change their ways." Here, the emphasis on "the culture" of corruption, criminality, and incompetence, especially among senior officials and the elites, has precise effects. It legitimizes the near-complete abandonment of the principle of national sovereignty and self-determination—even if it has long been just a façade—and allows imperial agents to take the lead in managing state affairs. There is no longer any need to quibble around with declarations about the right of each nation to autonomously rule itself. The situation demands that responsible adults take over the business, which is oh so badly mismanaged.

Osborne is here echoing the conclusions of a report of the JCF review panel commissioned by the Ministry of National Security, entitled A New Era of Policing in Jamaica (MNS Jamaica 2008). The stated aim of the panel was to "enhance and strengthen the capacity of the JCF to better fulfill its mandate" (ibid. 12). It was composed of eight members, four foreign and four locals. The foreigners were representatives of police departments and police scholars from the US, the UK, and South Africa. The locals included the President of the Northern Caribbean University, a former JCF Deputy Commissioner, a former Finance Secretary, and Vice President of Citibank. Here we see how the convergence of local and metropolitan interests has much to do with the changing composition of debt, which was discussed in the previous chapter.

Since the 1990s, Jamaican sovereign debt has been " indigenized, " to a great extent, "indigenized," such that over 60% of it is domestically owned by individual and institutional creditors (Johnston and Montecino 2011). This explains why the interest of finance and banking was so heavily represented on the panel. Creditors, foreign as well as local, can exercise a significant degree of leverage vis-à-vis the state. They have both the interest and the power to demand reforms, for they own the state as an asset. The point was made abundantly clear by the report itself, which begins by stating that the JCF needs to be reformed to better serve the interests of "citizens and stakeholders" (MNS Jamaica 2008, 4). It points out that "key stakeholders [...] expressed worries about the operation of the Force in recent decades" because insecurity and ineffective law enforcement "undermines Jamaica's ability to establish and maintain a viable economy that can sustain acceptable levels of wellbeing for the majority of its citizens." (ibid).

The report does not explicitly name these "key stakeholders," nor does it determine who, in the final instance, should politically control the JCF— "stakeholders" or citizens. Indeed, it never raises the question of popular sovereignty and democratic control of state power, replacing these with an avid commitment to supposedly universal norms of respect for human rights, bureaucratic accountability, and the rule of law. But its primary source of performative authority is managerial neoliberal discourse, which is evident in the form of the report as much as in its content. Indeed, out of the many reform and modernization documents I read, this one is by far the most comprehensive. It reads like a well-structured project proposal or business plan. The form fits with the content, which is designed to stress: "The police service must be organised to provide value for money and to set the highest standard for public service. It must manage its finite resources efficiently so as to produce effective outcomes." (ibid. 16)

Building on Harriott's (2000) analysis discussed earlier, the report states that all previous attempts to reform the JCF failed because they did not address culture and ethos. Culture, in this context, refers to "behaviors, beliefs, attitudes and ways of working," which, together, form the organizational character, and which allow it to carry out its role effectively, in collaboration with others. The new type of policing required in an open, democratic, society, is different from what was required in the past. Law enforcement should not be geared so much toward "punishing persons who do not act peacefully" but rather seek to reform, correct, and rehabilitate. Indeed, the "higher purpose" of law enforcement is "to engage citizens so that they act peacefully themselves and promote peace" (MNS Jamaica 2008, 15). This requires a very different type of policeman, projecting a very different kind of authority than what Jamaicans are currently accustomed.

While the goals themselves may be debated, agreed to, or rejected, the main point is that the notion of culture, alongside the focus on ethos and ethics, remains abstract and idealist, hence prone to failure. It reminds us of the optimistic discourse that accompanied the advent of "free labor" in the British West Indies, where the former slaves were expected to internalize—through endless training, preaching, and often harsh discipline—what it means to be modern and free. As pointed out earlier, when this experiment of "cultural change" through inculcation and education failed, the backlash reinforced colonial control, which is with us today.

Another area of concern for the panel was police corruption. But here, they are forced to concede a special challenge because of the prevalence of corruption in Jamaican society (ibid. 6). The police, in this sense, must somehow be disembedded from its social environment. This is not practical, of course, unless the idea is to import an entirely new police force. Hence, the report ultimately suggests, not so much to reform the JCF, but rather to dramatically restrict its mandate. The broad category of corruption also includes "human rights violations," particularly police extra-judicial killings. Here, the approach is to turn the poison into medicine, by making the police "service" the ultimate guarantor of the rights of citizens.

> Human rights have come to define what is meant by 'security.' In today's world, to be secure is to enjoy fundamental human rights. This understanding of security is now widely shared around the globe. To govern security means to govern in ways that ensure human rights are protected. As the primary guardians of security within a society, police are the primary guardians of human rights; thus policing, by definition, means protecting human rights. (ibid. 16)

Without arguing for or against this conception of human rights or "human security," the goal of this statement is rhetorically simple. It aims to provide the police with a new ethos, based on a somewhat inflated definition of their mission, while dramatically restricting its functions and transferring most of its current roles to other, to be established, designated agencies. The goal is to drive home the idea that the police should no longer "monopolise the governance of security" (ibid., 17) but rather fulfill specifically designated tasks, while collaborating with others, in a "security governance system." (ibid. 15) This system will be made of different agencies, state and non-state, local, national, global, public and private, of different scales and with different capacities. Each independent unit will provide specialized services and collaborate with others to achieve the best outcome. The role of the state is to oversee and weave together the disparate elements of this security network (ibid., 16). The police will no longer be responsible for "high policing" functions—dealing with organized crime, cybercrime, corruption, complex frauds—but will only respond to low-level street crime and disorder, being distinguished by its right to use force.

By establishing new law enforcement agencies, which take over most roles of the Force, the reform police are able to circumvent the JCF, marginalize it, and build a web of new policing and security organizations that, from the beginning, embody the kind of culture and ethos they want to achieve. These new security agencies, however, are entirely co-managed by foreign and local officers, which gives the reform police stronger and immediate control over security and law enforcement in the colony. In other words, instead of funding existing state institutions, which are corrupt to no repair, donor states are now building new agencies, which they can directly manage. Today, just as in 1867, "culture" justifies "de-democratization" (Sheller 2001).[9]

But let us look at how the new security governance network looks and works in practice. Of course, it cannot be studied as a whole, so I focus here on one site I observed, the Independent

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[9] A related shift can be observed in the field of NGO projects and service delivery—another arm of the reform police. Here, for example, USAID, which, since the early 2000s supported community policing and community "social intervention" programs through its Community Empowerment and Transformation Project (COMET), decided in 2017 to divest from most of its project and instead to hire a consulting firm and freelance project managers, to implement its programs on its behalf. This way, instead of wasting money on anachronistic institutions, which lack "the capacity" to deliver, the agency hires those who can get things done effectively. Ironically, some of the freelance private contractors hired to run the programs were formerly NGO employees, but now work directly for USAID instead of having to spend time on gathering resources, reporting, and being accountable to anyone apart from the agency. Of course, this is just the obvious conclusion of outsourcing. Contemporary capitalism outsourced even management to consulting firms, allowing these to run corporations directly for shareholders, with no mediation of "vested interests" (everyone knows how management can get so bossy). In this sense, the reform police are merely adopting the new "best practices" of business. Their goal is efficiency, which is, of course, completely a-political.

Commission of Investigations—INDECOM. INDECOM was established in August 2010 to replace the JCF Bureau of Special Investigations (BSI) and the Police Public Complaints Authority (PPCA) in probing violations and misconduct of the security forces. It was broadly modeled along the South African Independent Police Investigative Directorate, as it employs Jamaican and British staff. INDECOM's operations are jointly funded by the Government of Jamaica and a number of international agencies, including DFID, the EU, CIDA, and the United States Department International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) (Indecom 2021).

The INDECOM Act authorizes the Commission to investigate complaints against policemen, military, and prison personnel across 21 different categories of abuse, injury, and death. For obvious reasons, it is most concerned with investigating "police-related fatalities," including a backlog of hundreds of cases that were never properly investigated. Thus far, it had decent success in bringing policemen to court, but less success in achieving convictions—which is notoriously tricky in the case of use of force by policemen. Nevertheless, it can legitimately take credit for a consistent decrease in the number of police fatalities. The Commission cut the average number of deaths by police in half (53%) within several years.[10]

The Commission is led by a Jamaican Commissioner and a British Deputy. It employs two additional Scotland Yard retirees as chief Inspectors of Investigations, and has a staff of some 100 Jamaican investigators—most of whom are civilians with no experience in policing, who receive ongoing training on the job. The Commission has a small legal team, a research desk, a media department, and a small "special investigations" team working on more complicated and strategic cases. The Commission has three offices across the island (Manchester, Montego Bay, and Kingston), with headquarters and a legal branch located in two buildings in the New Kingston business district. The head office houses INDECOM's independent forensics laboratory and an in-house ballistics registry. Apart from an occasional whiff on the very unpleasant odor of human remains, the work environment is pleasant, corporate style, and corporate etiquette. INDECOM has a small fleet of black SUVs, its case files are largely digitized using quick mobile scanners, and its investigations are managed according to "best practices" international standards. Its investigators work very hard, often in shifts, since they are required by law to arrive on the scene of any incident where a policeman discharged his firearm within two hours of being notified by the police.

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[10] Though I look mainly at INDECOM, it is important to keep in mind that the policy has also given birth to other new security agencies: MOCA—The Major Organised Crime and Anti-Corruption Agency—is an independent organization that replaced the JCF Anti-Corruption Branch and the Major Organised Crime Task Force. According to the MOCA website: "It was structured around a joint staff concept with international partners to foster the best intelligence assets, investigators and prosecutors." The goal is to bring "high value criminals" to justice—presumably major kingpins or perhaps even senior politicians. (Thus far, its investigations only resulted in prosecutions against low-ranking policemen. I was unable to find recent figures on the Agency's website) Another "independent" agency is the Financial Investigations Division, which similarly becomes autonomous by merit of its many foreign frequent flyer employees.

During my fieldwork, the Commissioner was Terrence Williams, the lead prosecutor in the Kraal case trial, and his Deputy was Hamish Campbell. Campbell is a former Met Detective Chief Inspector, who served Scotland Yard for 38 years. From what I was able to gather, he enjoys respect from both superiors and subordinates. Although not involved in the day-to-day grind of each investigation, Campbell is incredibly well versed in all major developments and is impressively aware of most minute details of hundreds of cases. Every time I came to see him, over the four months I spent observing INDECOM's work, he appeared to be working diligently on updating his database, trying to make sense of timelines and tables, and cross-referencing results from ballistic and forensic examinations. He expressed a nearly fanatical determination to resolve each and every case, while becoming increasingly aggravated by the Jamaican criminal justice system, which seemed intent to block INDECOM's attempts to prosecute policemen and, perhaps even worse, to further those investigations that could potentially lead to dramatic revelations (see chapter six). Despite being versed in the details of cases, small and large, Campbell said he simply could not make sense of extra-judicial killings in Jamaica. He ultimately concluded:

> It's a cultural thing. They think they can do anything; they think they are kings of their kingdom… ultimately, they don't want to change, they have their own way of doing things… this is a cultural fix… the inability to reflect on patterns of behavior. [He then added quickly:] I'm not trying to tell Jamaicans how to live, I am trying to tell the police how to behave so that others can live their life in peace. Because there is no point in these killings. It's a culture. They live in a siege mentality from top to bottom.

Perhaps Campbell was so invested in the details of each investigation, that it was difficult to get him to share his analysis or his thoughts about the broader context. Perhaps he was simply reluctant to share his analysis with me, fearing that he might step out of line in so doing. But the statement above still appears rather resolute and conclusive. It doesn't sound like something said by someone trying to hide what he thinks. As I explain in chapter six, I spent weeks probing Campbell about a highly complex investigation of a police death squad that operated in Clarendon between 2007 and 2013, discussing with him various elements of the cases he allowed me to read, as well as sharing my emerging analysis. But I could hardly get the answers I was looking for from Campbell. He was simply operating in a different register than mine, that of the criminal investigation.

As I explain in chapter six, from this experience I came to see the way criminal investigations—however important they may be—by no means promise to clarify and reveal historical, economic, and political context. In many ways, they achieve precisely the opposite: Focusing on identifying evidence pertaining to individual culpability prevents us from seeing larger structures of violence and complicity. And thus, even a man like Campbell, who is truly committed to human rights and reform, and is by no means a bigot or racist, ends up covering up a gap in the explanation of the situation by referring to flat notions of culture that are presented as so rigid and fixed that they might as well be seen as inherited traits.

In addition to carrying out investigations and trying to bring policemen to justice—a momentous task on its own—the Commission is part of the reform police cultural mission. As the senior UN Human Rights Advisor in Jamaica, Birgit Gerstenberg, told me, the approach of the UN is to use legalistic reforms—embedding model human rights codes and policies in domestic legislation across many nations— in order to promote a culture of human rights and respect for fundamental freedoms. While often emanating from outside the state and circumventing popular democratic processes, the process derives legitimacy from its promise to defend 'vulnerable' groups and populations, thereby becoming aware of their rights and freedoms and of the institutional means to realize them. In this capacity, she helped INDECOM lead a process with Jamaican security forces, of formulating a new Use of Force Policy. Again, the assumption here is that Jamaican policemen need to become more aware of professional policies and human rights principles, and that this will transform their relationship with citizens. Unfortunately, as we will see in the next two chapters, this idea is grounded in a very shaky and highly unspecific analysis of the causes of police violence.

Dele Bolude is also a Met retiree working at INDECOM. She is a black policewoman detective, born in Brixton in 1963 to a Nigerian father and Antiguan Mother. Her mother, she told me, was one of the first black women community councilors in England and among the founders of the Black British Archives. Dele joined the Met in 1983, mainly for economic reasons, and ended up serving as a detective constable for 35 years. This point is worth stressing. Dele was never promoted beyond the entry rank, and it took her many years to convince her superiors ("the old boys club") to send her on detective training. After finally completing the course, she was assigned to investigating sex offenses, including very difficult cases of abuse and rape. The nature of cases she dealt with, and the long shifts, took a toll on her health and wellbeing. She became terminally obese and had to undergo gastric banding (today, she is a self-professed "gym rat" who eats healthy food and makes sure to relax). Campbell, her indirect superior at the Met, personally recruited her to INDECOM, recognizing her abilities as well as her personal connection to the Caribbean. Dele was already somewhat familiar with the local scene, having visited the island on a few occasions to liaise with Jamaican families of London-based victims. As a transnational cop, rather than an ordinary constable at the Met, she now finally receives the professional recognition denied to her during most of her career and is also compensated accordingly. This allows her to offset years of entry-level salary and augment her equally meager pension with additional savings.

Dele's colleague, Rod Shea, graduated from the Met's Police College (Hendon) in 1980 and worked crime in London until 2011. He said:

> A lot of austerity happened, and I was made redundant, with 2,500 other men […] The Met was making our working conditions more difficult. They stopped paying for travel and other benefits […] The UK is cutting down on crime-fighting and is letting people off… ten years ago it would be unbelievable, but the Government doesn't want 30-year pensioners. They want to pay 26 Grand, a constable's starting pay, rather than keep their men. It's demoralizing.

Indeed, although neoliberal reforms tend to increase public expenses on security relative to other social expenditures, public police organizations are put under more rigid management, demanding that they too become more "efficient" and "lean," that is, reduce their workforce and diminish workforce costs. After being let off, Shea tried to find a job in another part of England but found it unsatisfying. Then, a colleague told him about an opening in Jamaica.

> It always happened that people went to places like Hong Kong and Australia, but now It's much more prevalent. The kind of job and salary you get depends a bit on the length of your service and your skills. For me, it is a little too late to enter the game of

> becoming a financial investigator, which is in high demand these days. But still, these posts would usually double or quadruple your wages in the private sector.

For both Rod and Dele, the job in Jamaica presents an exciting opportunity for social mobility. A way to cope with economic precarity at the lower middle ranks of neoliberal English society. They may not plan to stay on the island long term, and probably lack the penchant and links to convert their expertise into lucrative consultancies, as Shields did. Yet, even for them, the move to Jamaica involves a noticeable change in status—they become part of the small well-off upper-middle class on the island. Here, they are able to afford a standard of living that is unattainable for them in the UK and become part of a small and exclusive 'uptown' milieu made of Euro-American 'expats' and local professionals. In this context, they are no longer *seen* as policemen, an occupation of low status and prestige nearly everywhere—but rather as reformers, security experts, development workers, and even human rights activists. This change in social location and social position is key to changes in consciousness. In this sense, the neo-colonial frontier offers more than material opportunities—it provides a place to be reborn as part of the global middle class and become invested in liberal middle-class values. That human rights and humanitarianism often serve as a pretext for North Atlantic interventions is commonplace, but this is not pursued through some cynical manipulation, rather this is an ethic that emerges in contexts of practice, like the reform police complex.

The Commission works very closely with international and non-state agencies, including human rights organizations that are, by definition, supposed to be in a position of criticizing the state and independent of it. For example, it collaborates with Jamaicans for Justice and Amnesty International on raising awareness of extra-judicial killings, and participates in conferences, symposia, and other public outreach activities to promote human rights and police accountability.

The boundary between the state and the non-state becomes very fuzzy, not only on the side of the "corrupt state" but also on the side of the reform police. Although it is a state agency, at least partially and formally, INDECOM does operate like an "independent" agency, where independence essentially means it is catering other interests than those of other parts of the Jamaican "state" than currently represented in government and bureaucracy. This creates endless points of tension and conflict, which I can only note in passing, not only with the police (which is to be expected) but also with other parts of the criminal justice system, especially the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP).

Its conflicts with other parts of the state do not necessarily make it trustworthy in the eyes of citizens. INDECOM often suffers from similar problems to those encountered by the police, namely, citizen's reluctance to provide statements and testify. They are still worried about being dubbed as "informers" and, very often, simply consider INDECOM as just another part of the government. Indeed, Jamaican citizens are not so much impressed by the claim of "independence." As a mother of a victim of police killing told me, "All of dem is the government and at the end of the day all a dem protect each other." Or as Earl Allen, whose son Demalli ('Marley') was murdered in 2010 told me, "dem boring man," and after thinking some more said the following: "Jamaica state is one body with so many heads coming out of it, like a monster. When one head get a headache the other one come on."

If we recall (as any Jamaican would immediately remember) that the multi-headed monster is one of the biblical figures of Babylon, then it becomes clear that from the point of view of many Jamaican citizens, the new reform police complex, or the "security governance system," is simply another incarnation of imperial rule in the colony; a form of rule that is terrifying not so much because it is totalitarian and cohesive but precisely because it is so dispersed, torn by endless unprincipled conflicts between agents and agencies, with each trying to put forth its phony pro-poor ideology. A system marked by its strange reversals, odd coalitions, the blurring of inside and outside, which appears to be governed by completely different rationales, but ultimately belongs to one corrupt body.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I examined the evolving complex I call the reform police in Jamaica. I began by situating contemporary police reform within the context of imperial reforms, particularly, the abolition of slavery in the British West Indies—which I conceptualize not so much as a moment but as a process of experimentation with instituting "free labor" between 1832 and 1867. Drawing on Best's schematic model of reform in a plantation economy as well as historical anthropology of imperial reforms and missions, I aimed to provide a grounded account of current developments in Jamaica, that show how the structure is both disclosed and effaced in practice.

The chapter provided a historical account of reform, explaining how metropolitan and local interests converged around a certain program at a certain moment. It showed that reforms are not simply imposed on the postcoital state by foreigners but are actively pursued also by locals. From an economic perspective, reforms are necessary to counter a complex of organized crime and political power which tentacles extended so deeply into the state apparatus so as to make not only democratic governance, but also economic development, impossible. The convergence of local and global interests also related closely to the 'indigenization' of debt in Jamaica since the 1990s. The criminal state, itself an evolution of colonial power, has become a problem, weighting down on capital. A problem, perhaps, of the magnitude of slavery—as an outdated mode of production—posed for 19th-century reformers and political economists. Indeed, within reform milieus, one can hear a proto-abolitionist discourse. A discourse that seeks to completely disband existing state institutions—starting with the terrible police—and rebuilding them from the ground up on a completely different basis.

The strategy initially adopted by foreign imperial governments vis-à-vis Jamaica consisted of open, highly publicized campaigns to 'democratize' and reform the police force and make it into a community service, trusted and accountable. Over time, the strategy has altered, so that today Jamaica is basically co-managed, or at least co-policed, by national and international policemen. While effectively taking over crucial nodes of management, in the interests of "stakeholders and citizens" the reform police does not seem to push toward complete usurpation of the power of local government, for that would imply taking complete responsibility over the population, its life and death, social and economic conditions. It therefore also involves interventions, which seek to exert pressure on the postcolonial government and senior bureaucrats, without delegitimizing them completely or making them redundant. In this way, the stability of the state as a functional element of post-imperial global management is maintained, and everyone gets to play their chosen heroic role, whether nationalist militant or imperial savior. Here, "culture" serves as a kind of pretext, covering up distinct and intertwining interests.

By attending closely to the gradual evolution of ideas and institutions of reform, I aimed to show how, much like in an earlier historical moment, initial optimism about the self-explanatory value of notions like human right and freedom, quickly dims as the objects of reform—for inexplicable reasons—stick to their own culture and ways of being. I pointed out that, in reviewing how reform developed through failures, is that every time it faltered, "culture" was the explanation. "Culture" was used as a placeholder, or more often as a replacement, for explanation. The lacking explanation has everything to do with what cannot be stated: continued relations of economic dependence and the absolute failure of developing Jamaica along a free-market capitalist path.

Since this small point was never considered, "culture" constantly re-emerged as an unfathomable, unreasonable, and persistent problem, that reform must tackle but cannot fully address. From this perspective, there may be no better solution than simply displacing the locals with competent foreigners who can write business plans and make neat spreadsheets. I don't mean to be cynical. I am perfectly aware that the new reform police, with its many agencies, may provide a higher degree of personal security for Jamaicans, and this is not something to belittle or forget. Indeed, that INDEOCM was able to dramatically reduce the number of police killings, despite much resistance, is a true feat that should be celebrated. I doubt whether the agencies working on corruption and organized crime will have similar success, given the deep mutual imbrication of imperial government with local elite interests. At the end of the day, as we say from more than one direction, they are all mainly invested in "keeping the peace" for the sake of capital accumulation.

This is one of the main reasons why reforming the Jamaican state, including and perhaps notably the police, presents tremendous difficulties, which might not be so different from the problems encountered by imperial governments when they finally set out to abolish slavery nearly two centuries ago. Creditors and reformers must find a way to carry out the process without causing political turmoil and without losing their investments. The last thing they would want to see is even more "rebellion" and "chaos," which may result from further delegitimizing the government. Disorder is kept at bay by "rotten" local institutions. But gradually, the creditors are displacing their planters with more capable and trustworthy estate managers.

As we have seen, the reform police are gradually transferring most advanced policing functions—nearly everything except the community policing and street crime functions—to new authorities that are "jointly" managed, on behalf of "stakeholders and citizens." Despite its overt commitment to human rights and liberal freedom, the reform police does not even pretend to derive its legitimacy from the people. It derives its legitimacy from its supposed higher level of competence and unqualified integrity—claims that can be contested on many counts, including some questionable self-serving moves of men of high integrity like Shields. But more fundamentally, what precisely is competence when one does not understand the basic parameters of economy and society that they are supposed to police? Competence, in this case, is simply another word for ideology.

"Buil' N' Kill": Dons, Politicians, and Police in a Transforming Plantation Economy

About a year into my fieldwork, I attended a New Years' party at a large estate in the Blue Mountains, overlooking Kingston. Many of the guests were academics, faculty of the University of the West Indies (UWI), with some specializing in criminal justice and security studies. The atmosphere was relatively jolly, considering the circumstances. The Government had just announced a State of Emergency in St. James to curb the spiraling rate of murder in the parish, which is mostly known for its capital, Montego Bay, Jamaica's "second city" and tourist destination. In 2017, the city of Montego Bay, with a population of some 427,000, recorded 375 homicides—a rate of 118 per 100,000 inhabitants. The staggering rate, among the highest for any city in the world, has been attributed mainly to intense inter-gang warfare over proceeds of the lucrative lottery scamming—a form of advance-fee scam, reminiscent of the famous "Nigerian Sting," wherein American, mostly senior citizens, are lured (or threatened) into believing they had won a lottery draw but must pay the caller a fee to cash their fantastic prizes.

The scam grew out of the Business Processes Outsourcing (BPO)— "glorified call centers," as aptly called by one of my interlocutors—which were supposed to solve the crisis of labor, resulting especially from the demise of the rural economy. In these neo-plantations, young Jamaicans learned the trade of selling anything to Americans, and, no less importantly, they gained access to lists of potential customers, who now became potential victims. The scam, which requires as little as a cellphone and a list of phone numbers to commit, should be understood in the context of the growing fragmentation and 'liberalization of the criminal economy, which was once centralized under the authority of legendary figures such as 'Zeeks' of Mathews Lane or 'Dudus' of Tivoli Gardens. Since the mid-2000s, however, most prominent dons have been extradited, killed by the police, or incarcerated in Jamaica (Leslie 2010; Jaffe 2013).

Today, with growing access to cheap guns and what can be done and learned on the internet, any aspiring youth can launch his micro criminal enterprise. The spiraling rate of murder in Jamaica today is attributed mainly to the fragmentation of gang structures in what can be called "the Post-Dudus era." (Meikle and Jaffe 2015; Harriott and Jaffe 2018). In 2017, it reached 56 per 100,000 inhabitants, a rise of 19% compared to the previous year. The numbers continued to rise despite a whole range of crime-curbing policies and plans introduced by the Government and the police, from administrative detention introduced in February and quickly revoked to the more ambitious Zones of Special Operations (ZOSO), which was first launched in September, in a section of Montego Bay called Mount Salem (see chapter 7). But nothing seemed to work, or at least, that's what my colleagues at the party suggested. I listened to a conversation of a group of men, most of them lecturers and professors, analyze the situation:

"Criminals have become too cocky," they said. Garrison people have reverted to their customary "indiscipline," "bridging light" (pirating electricity) everywhere, without any regard for law, order, or private property. They have become too accustomed to getting everything for free from politicians, are unwilling to work, and are, sadly, "irredeemable." There is no point in trying to reform them, for they will never become "productive members of society." There is only one way of dealing with this "lost generation": "Bring back the Jamaican crime fighters and take them out."

"Take them out," as the context likely makes clear, is a euphemism for killing, especially killing those considered "criminals." It was, of course, not the first time I heard this idea being vocally supported by middle-class Jamaicans, who are quite unapologetic concerning their support of retributive killings. As a white foreigner, the men to whom I was listening identified me as a potential human rights defender, so they made sure to explain to me that force is the only language "the Jamaican criminal element" understands and that they've had enough of those "criminal rights organizations" who hypocritically criticize Jamaica in its war against terror.

Coming from Israel, the arguments seemed incredibly familiar. I am very much used to hearing that people like myself, supporters of Palestinian rights, are detached elitist liberals who identify with the enemy and have no empathy for their own people. And in some sense, I could see my colleagues' point concerning Jamaica and identify with their anger at the multidimensional hypocrisies of imperialist and elitist human rights discourses that usurp the people's democratic power. Nevertheless, I found their support of police extra-judicial executions incredibly unconvincing. I felt they, too, no less than their imaginary opponents, were speaking about the problem in terms borrowed from elsewhere and are somewhat out of touch with local processes. Contemplating what I learned in my first year of fieldwork, I began to see human rights campaigners and advocates of police killing as reflecting each other's positions. The mirror images they projected were at odds with the reality of police killings and their relation to crime, as I was beginning to understand it.

Police Killings are not a new phenomenon in Jamaica. Official data, reaching back to Independence, reveals a consistent upward trend from the mid-1960s until the mid-2010s. The trend is consistent, in broad terms, with the rise in criminal homicides and the rise of the Jamaican "crime fighters," or so-called "killer cops." Paul Chevigny, one of the first scholars and human rights advocates to have studied the Jamaican phenomenon from a comparative perspective, concluded that police killings are driven by a perceived threat of unrest among the lower classes. This perception is perpetuated by the elites, opinion-makers, and the media, which "painting a picture of Jamaica as so anarchic, so filled with terrorists, as to have no alternative to police violence." (Chevigny 1990, 411). The claim rings true today, as evidenced by the abovementioned comments of my colleagues at the party.

Anthony Harriott, the preeminent Jamaican criminologist, related police routinized turn to extra-judicial executions to the paramilitary colonial history of the JCF, with its preference for order over law. Killing reflected a colonial understanding of law as an instrument of retributive punishment, which combined with growing pressures on the Force to present "results" in the fight against crime and frustration with the ineffectiveness and sluggishness of the justice system. The result is what Harriott, like many other students of policing, have called "police vigilantism" (Harriott 2000, 77, cf. (Jauregui 2011): Killing dehumanized criminals as a form of "social cleansing" in the name of a defenseless society. Surveying members of the JCF in the mid-1990s, Harriott found considerable support—around 44%, depending on rank—for the summary execution of gun criminals." (Harriott ibid. 83)



Figure 1: Murders and Police Killings in Jamaica 1978-2019. Sources: Jamaica Constabulary Force, Harriott 2000, 82, INDECOM 2020

Like the killings themselves, campaigns against police brutality and extra-judicial executions also have a long history, which can be traced to black radical groups like Abeng in the 1970s. From the 1980s onward, the campaigns became increasingly informed by, and integrated into, human rights campaigns and liberal struggles for democratic transition in Latin America and the Caribbean. Over the years, human rights groups like Jamaicans for Justice (JFJ) and Amnesty International documented police killings and assisted victims' families in the long and often vain struggle for justice. Then, in 2010, as part of a broader campaign of police and state reform and responding, in part, to exceptional levels of police violence during the Tivoli Gardens Incursion, the Independent Commission of Investigations (INDECOM) was formed. As we began to note in the previous chapter, INDECOM faces ongoing criticism in the media and by members of the public, which, as we have seen, seem to want to bring back the "killer cops."

Heated public debates of this sort are not unique to Jamaica. Anthropologists studying crime and policing have been incredibly attentive to them and what they might tell us about sovereignty in the postcolonial neoliberal era. The basic argument proposed is that precisely the dissolution of sovereignty and its distribution among multiple local and global, formal and informal, agents, create an affective desire for fully present and decisively agentive sovereign police performance (Brown 2010; Butler 2006; Comaroff and Comaroff 2006; Caldeira 2013; Penglase 2013; Willis 2015). It is clear, from the conversation I cited above, that the discourse around police killings in Jamaica is no different: Rising rates of crime are attributed to the growing influence of globalization— the permeability of national borders to foreign guns, unwanted people, anti-social values, money, and commodities. Police violence is presented in terms of a "national culture of policing," "our way of doing things," which is under threat by global human rights groups who further—conspiratorially or naively—imperialist interests.

The debate between self-proclaimed "police apologists" and human rights defenders moves in a closed recursive circle. What the former call "our culture," the latter dub as defective "police culture." What the former describe as the right to "take out" terrorists, the latter identify as sheer vigilante criminality, a relic of the colonial order. By and large, both camps are more concerned with countering the other's arguments than with looking at the situation on the ground. They are more concerned with reproducing a representation of police killings that fit their ideology than in investigating its actual causes. And these representations, on both sides, are deeply skewed by adopting North American understandings of police violence rather than looking closely at the political economy of police executions in Jamaica.

In this chapter, I draw on a short essay by CLR James, *The Economics of Lynching* (James 1996), to theorize what one of my primary interlocutors, a retiring don, dubbed "buil' n' kill": The process of "building up" dons to serve as middlemen for politicians, and their subsequent killing by so-called "vigilante" policemen. The don, who I call here Rudy, was born in a rural slum in St. Catherine, once a slave village. His life story, which reveals the customary social functions of the don as a broker of political patronage and labor in his community, allows me to illustrate how police figures into the violent political economy. Far from denying the importance of images, effects, and representations in police executions, I pay close attention to the role of phantasmatic hyperbole, the process of criminalization, and slanderous dehumanization, which legitimize the killing of dons.

The premeditated and strategic execution of dons on behalf of their political patrons, carried out by handpicked policemen, is by no means the sole, or even the most prevalent, motive behind police killings. But by focusing on this particular type of murder, I aim to show, first, that the much-debated phenomenon is quite different than what we often assume when we talk about it. Second, I make the case that "buil' n' kill" provides a useful allegorical phrase with which we can think about broader transformations in Jamaica's political economy and their effects on growing rates of crime and violence. In this chapter, "buil' n' kill' will be used to consider:

- The role of the don himself as a *contractor* (building) and as political *enforcer* (killing)
- The dynamic whereby politicians *groom* ("build-up") young men to become their dons and kill them when they pose a threat or are no longer useful
- The highly sensationalized representation of dons, which *builds up their clout* on the one hand and criminalized them to legitimize their murder on the other.
- The macro-sociological process whereby dons have been *produced* and are now considered *superfluous*.

The Economics of Lynching

In his 1940 essay, *The Economics of Lynching*, CLR James contrasts two forms of racialized murder that grew out of plantation slavery. The first, more well-known and generally decried, is the form of violence embodied in the vigilante lynch mob. In these theatrical and explicit rites of racial hatred, a white crowd captured by "widespread hysteria…grows wild and tears the living flesh from the burning Negro." The mob is usually made of young men, in their teens and twenties, "with a sprinkling of morons of all ages"; a selection of "the underprivileged, the dispossessed, and the unattached," lacking skills or social standing. "Their own misery, defeat, and the fear for the scraps by which they live," writes James, is expressed in "periodically terrorizing and wreaking their wrath against the social system on the Negroes, whom they see as their greatest enemy, and whom they are traditionally taught to despise."

James argued that the lynch mob was born out of radical transformations in the social and economic structure in parts of the American South after the end of slavery. It is most common in areas, like Northern Texas and Central Oklahoma, where blacks achieved a degree of social mobility and where they constitute a significant part of the electorate, threatening to vote the white poor out of power and privilege. In these areas the white propertied classes have nothing to lose from fierce struggles among white and black sections of their labor force. In other words, they have no incentive to prevent the poor whites from attacking their black neighbors. Rather, they profit from perpetuating racism, which cloaks competition and hides the class base of privilege, channeling bitterness away from employers and undermining efforts to transform the economic system. Thus, where racism is encouraged as a labor control tactic, lynching takes the form of terrifying ritual scapegoating—where resentment and popular vengeance are expressed in bacchanalian terror (James ibid.).

Another kind of extra-judicial murder takes place in the South as well: The murder of workers in the Black Belt, where the plantation system remained largely unaltered after the abolition of slavery. Here, it is not a lynch mob that commits the murders but rather the employers and overseers, who use them as a technique of labor-management and supervision. In these areas, blacks are protected from white mobs by the fact of social and economic segregation, as well as directly by plantation owners, for whom black working hands are indispensable and who "will not allow their labor force interfered with by a rival labor force." But "when there is any lynching to be done, [the planters] themselves do it, in a systematic and organized manner. For its aim is not to wreak vengeance upon the race but to "to conserve traditional landlord-tenant relations…in somewhat of a business transaction." (Raper 1933, cited in James ibid). Such managerial lynches are less frequent and are far less impassioned; they are carried out in "near clock-like precision," in an almost technical manner.

James traces both forms of lynching to the political economies in which they are embedded, with a focus on labor-management, intra- and inter-class relations. His attention to the different functions of violence in post-plantation economies will allow me to illustrate the difference between North American theorizations of contemporary "police vigilantism" and the types of police murders discussed in this chapter.

Police murders of black citizens of the United States have been often associated with white vigilantism. Although the history of policing on plantations and through slave patrols has for some time been on the agenda of North American police research (Reichel 1988; Hadden 2003), the "post-racial" post-civil rights era has arguably intensified forms of racialized policing that seek to purify the "white nation" from "outsiders," primarily black men identified as a threat to white "family values" and the white republican imaginary. Underlying these fears are continued animosities resulting from competition in the labor market, and more broadly, a struggle over access to citizenship, articulated in the idiom of race. When considered in this framework, the murder of a black youth, Trayvon Martin, by a white vigilante, George Zimmerman, is no less an act of policing than killings by uniformed police. What unites them is a phantasmatic structure of white supremacy, grounded in histories of slavery and settler colonialism (Singh 2014; Davis 2005; Ralph and Chance 2014; Ralph 2013). In Jamaica, the situation is different, and the police killings discussed in this chapter, "buil' n' kill," are much more akin to what James described as "managerial" lynching. But to fully understand the dynamics of this process, it will be necessary to clarify the role of the Jamaican don within the post-plantation clientelist political economy.

What is a Don? Colonial Economies of Risk and Brokerage

The Jamaican don is usually understood in political, rather than political-economic terms. The emergence of this controversial figure is normally traced back to the emergence of Jamaica's modern political scene and primarily to Kingston's garrisons. It is associated with the rise of the Jamaican modern political system, plagued by bi-partisan violence since its inception in the 1940s. After independence, in 1962, the Jamaican Labour Party (JLP) and the People's National Party (PNP) both developed as extensive clientelist networks, trading votes for material benefits. Their fulcrum was the political form known as "the garrison"—inner-city communities that became party strongholds.

Garrisons have been defined by political scientist Carl Stone (Stone 1980) as areas where an overwhelming majority of votes—bordering on unanimity—are cast in favor of one party. Homogeneity is violently enforced by area leaders or dons, who are responsible for driving out opposition and distributing scarce benefits to the community of party supporters: housing, utilities, jobs, social services, and even cash inducements (Kerr 1997; Figueroa and Sives 2002).

In the 1980s, Jamaican gangs expanded their international reach (Gunst 1995). Ganja trade—which by the 1990s exceeded the proceeds of sugar, bauxite, and other imports together (Khan-Melnyk 1995 cited in Price ibid.)—was supplemented by proceeds of cocaine and guns, which financed political warfare in Kingston (Gunst ibid. Price ibid.). By the 1980s, the ideological struggle between the JLP and the PNP subsided, as both accepted the neoliberal dictates of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Election violence persisted, minus ideological garb that once covered it (Girvan and Bernal 1982; Bissessar 2014). This process went hand in hand with the erosion of political authority, which increasingly appeared in the eyes of the citizens as impotent, corrupt, and predatory (Meeks 2000; O. Gray 2004). Expanding criminal proceeds, alongside contraction of state distribution due to Structural Adjustments (SAPs), empowered dons vis-à-vis politicians and turned them into quasi-sovereigns in their own right, which replace politicians and the state in central functions, from dispensing welfare to enforcing informal justice (Price 2004; Johnson and Soeters 2015; Munroe and Blake 2017; Warnecke-Berger 2019) Simultaneously, politicians became more dependent on dons to maintain stability in the ghettos, in the face of popular disillusionment, and debt-induced social and economic crisis.

Against this backdrop, we may begin to see why extraditing Christopher 'Dudus' Coke to the US in 2010 posed such an immediate risk to then Prime Minister Bruce Golding, the JLP, and more broadly to the ruling elite. On the one hand, there was a demand from the US, Jamaica's imposing neighbor, largest trading partner, powerful creditor, and global policeman. On the other hand, the most powerful don in Jamaica, whose authority—represented among other things in the number of gunmen ready to protect him—extended way beyond Tivoli Gardens. The extradition order staged a battle between two sovereigns, mediated by the least powerful third, the formal Jamaican state. The battle ended in the death of 73 civilians and sent the nation into a long period of soul-searching (Price 2004; D. Scott 2000; Anthony Bogues 2007; Harriott and Jaffe 2018). In the meantime, the removal of dons has occasioned the rise of many claimants to the title. Today, young men who lead small community gangs call themselves dons, perhaps hoping they too will one day reach the level of notoriety and fame reserved for mythological gangsters.

It is not only aspiring ghetto youths who are fascinated by the alluring figure of the don. Rather, mainstream, as well as social media, contribute to the process of mystification. Dons are understood as major drivers of criminal activities like guns and drug trafficking and as deviant father figures who entice young men into a life of crime and violence. Fascination and revulsion are closely related and mutually reinforcing. For example, later at the party described in the introduction to this chapter, I joined a few women who enthusiastically discussed the question: Who is the biggest don today in Jamaica? Several names were suggested, and a famous expert said that after Dudus, there are no more big dons in Jamaica. Then, one of the women took out her phone and launched Instagram. She told us that, for several months now, she has been following one "money Mike," a don who apparently enjoys showing off his expensive Rolexes and fancy girlfriends on social media. Sharing all she had learned from following this man secretly on Instagram, the woman confessed being worried she might accidentally 'like' one of his posts, which could expose her unsavory habit of stalking the criminal.

Popular fascination has a corollary in social research. For example, Densil Williams and Kadamawe K'nife of the Mona School of Business proposed viewing the Jamaican don as a Schumpeterian entrepreneur—powerfully endowed with "the desire to form a private kingdom or dynasty," "the will to win, fight and to conquer," "the joy and satisfaction [in] creation and problem-solving," and of course, a penchant for risk (D. A. Williams and K'nife 2012, 68). The point is that the Schumpeterian entrepreneur is, itself, a myth. From the Promethean adventurer-entrepreneur of the 19th century through the rational and paternal corporate manager of high industry, the late-modern entrepreneur takes on traits once associated with the criminal (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007). Today, networked personas, thriving on volatility and risk, are glorified heroes. Of course, heroism can easily turn into villainy when the entrepreneur—the social striver, would be capitalist—fails to deliver. When this happens, he tends to be blamed for destruction and is shamefully ousted. The entrepreneur and the "big criminal" (Benjamin 2007a) are twin figures: loved and loathed, feared and revered, terrifying and enigmatic.

A long and proud tradition of anthropological research has thought about Mafiosi as entrepreneurs. Anton Blok first introduced the idea in his seminal study *The Mafia in a Sicilian Village* (Blok 1969; 1988), which situates the mafia within a specific "configuration" of Italian capitalism and state-building. Blok argued that Mafiosi were peasant brokers whose role was to protect landed property and coerce peasant labor in conditions of incomplete state monopoly of violence and the distance between town, where landowners resided, and peasant-based production in the countryside. The work gained significant traction with the apparent expansion of global organized crime since the 1990s, where the term "violence entrepreneurs" was used to describe the provision of protection services by local strongmen, in the context of state privatization and loss of monopoly over legitimate violence (Gambetta 1996; Volkov 2016; Lupo 2009; Grajales 2016). In the Jamaican context, Harriott has argued that violence has become an entrepreneurial field of business ventures, where dons and other criminal actors offer protection and coercion for a profit (Harriott 2016). At the same time, and on an apparently parallel track, anthropologists contributed to the critique of the "entrepreneurial subject"—that competitive, self-making, and "responsibilized" self, the hallmark of neoliberal governance (Rose and Miller 2008; Foucault 2010; C. Freeman 2014). How can these shifts in the practice and understanding of entrepreneurship help us understand the shifting role of the Jamaican don in a global political economy?

First, there are good reasons to think about Jamaican dons as peasant brokers. As argued in the first chapter of the dissertation, the role of the don as a broker of political power and largess can be traced to the 19th-century countryside, on the edge of the plantation (Payne 1995). In some areas, landless peasants provided labor to plantations and incipient barons of "organized crime," who enriched themselves by smuggling cash crops to North America (Bryan 2000). Then, as today, avenues of accumulation were strictly limited, and access to government was necessary to amass wealth. Peasants could not vote, but they could rebel, assisting the rise of creole ("brown" or "colored") politicians who became the ruling class. With the advent of adult franchise (1944), and through the process of urbanization, clientelist relations migrated with the peasants to Kingston. The implications of this history will become more apparent in the ethnography that follows in this chapter.

Yet, as we will also see, the notion of violent entrepreneurs used by Blok and others—centered on his role as broker between classes and overseer of labor—is historically specific. It is grounded in, and adequate for, the analysis of a specific moment in the development of peripheral capitalism. The emergent forms of violent entrepreneurship, which are evident today in the post-Dudus era, are different. They correspond to shifts in global capitalism in the 21st century and the re-emergence of the colonial figure of the entrepreneur as an adventurer and risk-taker. Attention to this mythical figure, criticized by Marx in the third volume of Capital, and studied by Foucault in his lectures on neoliberalism, will allow me to shed some light on questions of subjectivity and ideology and point out some differences between old and new dons.

Few scholars engaged Marx's theory of entrepreneurship. Some claim that he lacks such a theory and ignores the notion altogether (Blaug 2000). In fact, Marx engaged the theory of entrepreneurship in terms of fetish and ideology. In his critique of the entrepreneurial figure, Marx read political economists Richard Cantillon and Jean-Baptiste Say, pointing out how their theory was shaped by their own investments in colonial plunder and plantation slavery. Cantillon made his fortune as a colonial merchant and a banker, and is known for his participation in John Law's Mississippi Company speculative racket. Say was employed by two London-based sugar firms, which owned plantations in the West Indies and dealt with shipping, slave insurance, finance, and distribution of colonial commodities. Later, he became the owner of a French spinning mill, employing some 450 workers, many of them women and children. Cantillon defined the entrepreneur as a risk-bearer whose uncertain profits depend on the difference between fluctuating costs and fixed payment. Building on the late-medieval meaning of entrepreneur as "*celui qui entreprend quelque chose*", he identified the entrepreneur with the contractor executing large public works on his account and for a profit. The notion extended to settlers and privateers operating under public prerogative in the colonies. Say's entrepreneur is a capitalist owner: planner, organizer, and labor supervisor (Say 1971; Hoselitz 1951).

Marx identified entrepreneurship with the function of management—either carried out by the capitalist owner, or by a supervisor, overseer, or indeed, slavedriver. The function emerged prominently on plantations, where "opposition between the worker as direct producer and the proprietor of the means of production […] reaches its high point […] but it is also indispensable in the capitalist mode of production." (Marx 1991, 508). The function further gave rise to a particular kind of apologetics, which justified the profit of managers as an expanded wage, paid as "just compensation for the labour and talent employed in governing [the slave] and rendering him useful to himself and to the society." (ibid. 510)

Entrepreneurs solved problems from creditors or absentee owners. Capitalists who, because they lived far from their factories in the colonies, hired an intermediary to manage their estate and oversee the labor process. As capitalism developed, the distinction between absentee owners and entrepreneurs was recast in terms of financial versus entrepreneurial capital. The former "idle" and provided as credit, only indirectly engaged in valorization. The latter "active," immediately present on the scene of exploitation and actively engaged in coercing labor. Both subsist on surplus value—unpaid labor—but while creditors' claim to a share of the profit is predicated on title of property, the entrepreneur justifies his revenue by reference to his "productive" function.[1] As more recent historical research has shown in detail, techniques of time and labor discipline on plantations have been central to the rise of modern management (Rosenthal 2018).

In contrast to their predecessors, classical political economist Adam Smith and Ricardo paid very little attention to the function of entrepreneurial capital. Like them, Marx tended to believe that the growing productivity of labor and the advent of machinery will lead to growing centralization, and individual capitalists personally involved in productive activities will be replaced by joint-stock companies (traded conglomerates) on the one hand and hired managers on the other. The disappearance of the capitalist-owner under monopoly capitalism was a major concern in Schumpeter's *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (Schumpeter 1976). Schumpeter, one of the figures most known for glorifying the entrepreneurial figure, was actually decrying the "the obsolescence of the entrepreneur" in advanced monopoly capitalism. According to Schumpeter, growing rationalization of capitalist society and the emergence of absentee ownership has led to unprecedented productivity alongside worrying cultural entropy. "The civilization of capitalism," with its necessary dependence on accounting, science, and logic, eliminated traditional authority, heroic virtue, bravery, and glory. Centralization undercuts entrepreneurship, which historically rejuvenated the bourgeoisie by recruiting the most talented elements of the lower classes. Without it, the ruling class loses its vigor and sinks into listless apathy. For Schumpeter, then, "creative destruction" was not simply about renewing productive innovation but was also the key to revitalizing the entire capitalist universe.

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[1] In the struggle over the division of surplus value, the sides become antagonistic. The entrepreneur views his profit as what remains after paying all costs of production, particularly the cost of credit and experiences-the duress of competition and fluctuating rate of interest. Financiers, on their part, extract revenues from lending to entrepreneurs, and remain oblivious to exploitation. Subjective antagonism is reflected in theory in the division between "entrepreneurial profit" and "self-valorizing value", which occludes the contribution of labor. In historical practice, the exploitation and finance are intimately bound.

The myth turned into economic theory with the advent of neoliberalism. One stream of thought, emerging from Austrian neoclassical economics and German ordoliberalism, viewed entrepreneurialism as a means of bringing together traditional values and robust competition. The American Chicago School, which became dominant, emphasized the newfound notion of "human capital" (Foucault 2010). Developed by Gary Becker and others, the notion recast the worker in the guise of the entrepreneur— someone investing in and profiting from accumulated skills and capacities. This meant, effectively, the elimination of the labor-capital relation, and, as Foucault famously argued, the rise of the entrepreneurial self. This neoliberal subject was no longer a man of exchange and utility, but "an entrepreneur of himself," constantly capitalizing upon opportunities to self-enrich (ibid., see also Rose and Miller 2008).

Foucault and most of his followers fail to mention that the entrepreneurial subject of late liberalism could offer his services within a newly decentralized global political economy. After the capitalist crisis of the 1970s, large conglomerates were obviously not turned into small competitive firms in a bustling small-business economy, as Ordoliberals may have wanted. Instead, while corporations gobbled up more financial assets—becoming more centralized as owners of capital—they outsourced many productive, logistical, service, and management functions to smaller firms and enterprises. In this context, the sole risk-taking entrepreneur re-emerged, often operating in hopes of being discovered by large financiers. In what follows, I use this historical sketch as a backdrop for

Rudy's life history—an illustrative representation of the social life of a Jamaican don. Midway through the tale, the idea of the entrepreneur's "obsolescence" will take a dark, macabre, turn.

Building: A Don and His Community

Rudy was born in 1976 in Western Kingston, the third of his mother's five children. During the 1980s election runup, when members of the rival party firebombed their house, the family escaped to Golden Bay, some 20 miles from the capital. There, with other refugees they 'captured land' (squatted) near the outskirts of the village. With a population of 12,000 people, Golden Bay is located in an area once called the Sugar Belt and administratively belongs to the dormitory community of Portmore. Before Portmore was built in the 1970s, Golden Bay, like most villages in the district, was a workers' barrack supplying labor to agricultural estates. Most residents, with little formal education and vocational training, subsisted on seasonal labor and small-scale farming.

Since the demise of Sugar in the mid-19th century, cycles of economic boom and bust left small proprietors extremely vulnerable to unemployment, hyper-exploitation, and encroachments on their land. Yet Golden Bay slowly developed into a vibrant community, with several churches, a basic school, and a few roadside businesses serving sugar-cane truck drivers and loaders. In the 1960s, real estate developments precipitated an influx of squatters to the community, joined by those displaced by political warfare in the 1970s and 1980s. Urban migrants brought back to the countryside the violence of the inner city, itself a mutant form of customary relations between landowners and peasants on the edge of the plantation. In the process, the urbanizing countryside was recast in terms of clientelist politics, without losing touch with its rural backdrop.

Rudy says that Golden Bay of his childhood was a dismal place, with "'nuff criminals running amok […] terrorizing the people dem." He recalls his home being broken into and robbers holding his mother at gunpoint. This was when he decided to get a gun for protection. The opportunity came along when men in Kingston recruited him and his friends to sell what he now calls "the worst ting inna de world," crack cocaine. In the mid-1990s, the expansion of global drug trade opened lucrative opportunities for aspiring men like Rudy. After buying a gun to protect his newfound turf, Rudy slowly began spinning webs of patronage among friends and relatives.

When he was about thirteen, he demanded of his mother, Aaliyah, to cook two additional portions of food each day for his two best friends, who became his most loyal associates through this act of generosity. In addition, he began to use the money he earned from selling crack to buy coveted commodities, like sneakers and caps, and distribute them to youths in the community, becoming their favored benefactor. The process was almost intuitive, he says:

> Two type of persons did mek it outta Golden Bay. One group go a sell drugs in America and come back with fancy car, pockets full of money, and gifts fi the pickney [kids] dem. The next group go school a town or a farin [abroad], but mi neva' know what happened to them 'coz dem did neva' come back, not even fi a visit.

Rudy says that there were two options for men like him. One, to work hard, be a good student, becoming socially mobile through education, but leave the community behind and "never come back, not even for a visit." Two, to become a drug dealer in America, and return as a popular hero, with gifts for the children and pockets full of money. Why he made his personal choice to become a drug dealer is made explicit in this statement. He wanted to be socially regarded by his own people, he wanted to stay in his home, with his people, in his environment.

Recalling the turf wars of his youth with some nostalgia and undisguised pain, Rudy says, "I knew that if I don't fight this war, I will have to keep running my whole life, I could never stay in one place, will always be a guest in some other man's home." He explains that he had to ward off rival gangs from Spanish Town, as well as local men, who the community couldn't trust to serve its interests.

This is the meaning of "turf": it is an economic unit, where all economic activities fall under the management and control of the leader, who organizes labor, provides security, and enforces a certain tax on businesses and development projects, legal and illegal. Emerging triumphal from a series of gang wars, and with the tacit blessing of political representatives, by eighteen Rudy became the indisputable don of Golden Bay.

Golden Bay in the 1990s, much like in the 19th century and up to this day, is home to the Jamaican "proto-peasantry" (Mintz 1989), which has become a massive "surplus population". The village-ghetto houses a large pool of unskilled labor, highly dependent on temporary contracting and public works. The don here functions as an entrepreneur in the original sense of the term, a government contractor. Over the years, Rudy won many tenders for executing projects like gully clearing (cleaning the open drainage system), de-bushing (pruning outgrown vegetation), construction, and road repair. He also provided security services to development projects in his community and neighboring areas. Contracts are primarily awarded through the involvement of the political representative, who can use various local government and ministry budgets to distribute work in his home constituency.

By employing labor in this way, political representatives provide labor to communities that are mostly out of work, while keeping communities dependent on them for income and basic services. The don, as a middleman, takes a cut of the contract, which he oversees and manages, grows his own base of support in the community, which serves to guard and protect him, and develops crucial links with people who can assist him in government and administration.

Because work and social benefits are politically mediated, the community can only enjoy them if it operates as a unanimous voting bloc, voting *en masse* for the same representative. People's livelihoods depend on their party winning the elections, which is part of the reason violence has been so persistent in Jamaican political campaigns. Furthermore, in the absence of police service, the community could easily fall prey to random criminals or be subject to the rule of external gangs, serving the interests of foreign communities. Hence, the interest of the don and the interest of the community are to some degree shared, though we should not romanticize it. Every community is different, and relations between residents and the don vary significantly.

Let's look more closely at the role of the don in the process of organizing labor. As noted, the meaning of turf is that anything within the boundaries of the community, private and public land, falls under the don's informal jurisdiction. This has an important implication. For example, on one occasion, Rudy negotiated on behalf of squatters when the land they "captured" was demanded by its new buyers for commercial purposes. Recently, when several families and a few farmers were required to evacuate their plots to make room for development, he managed to secure the tenants' monetary compensation, which they would likely not receive otherwise. Similarly, Rudy recently secured the employment of community laborers in a large construction project near Golden Bay. His ability to negotiate such a deal is predicated on the implicit threat ("give us the jobs… or else…") and as such can be understood as a form of extortion. Rudy explains:

> The yute dem nuh a go sit dung and pree [see] other men get the wok… dem nuh a go tek it. Wi nuh waan fi force nobody wit' no badness, wi jus' wanna render wi service, but if *you* now waan do some fuckery, dat a yuh business.

For Rudy the matter is simple: The youth are hungry and armed, so it would be wise to hire them for the job. A vast construction project is likely to produce large profits for the developers, as well as bribes to bureaucrats and politicians. All the community is asking for is "to render wi service," that is, temporary employment at minimum wages. Reasoning in this way, Rudy appeals to customary rights rooted in historical conflicts between 'proto-peasants' and landowners in the post-emancipation countryside. What is often called extortion—the threat of violence to force business—he understands as collective bargaining. This practice, rooted in custom and tradition, Rudy distinguishes from collecting protection monies, which he rejects as "preying on the people" and calls "wickedness."

A champion of labor? Perhaps, but Rudy is also a "proto-capitalist". Over the years, he operated agricultural ventures, cottage-manufacturing (for construction materials and simple commodities), commercial spaces, "route taxis" and informal buses, bars, restaurants, a hotel, and entertainment. Many of these businesses were launched while Rudy was incarcerated, with the help of his loyal teenage friends and supportive relatives. The businesses allowed him to maintain his legitimacy in the community, allowing him to continue providing work and money in growing quantities.

His employment patterns reflect his "entrepreneurial" understanding of the best way to combine labor and capital. For example, Rudy recently acquired a new machine for one of his operations, which, as a businessman, he clearly wishes to utilize to secure the highest profit. Yet, he understands he can't simply squeeze out his labor since "Jamaicans nuh waan work fi no boss" and don't like to work long hours. He therefore devised an arrangement by which he employs workers in short shifts each day, during which they produce a fixed quantity of commodities that Rudy appropriates. Anything beyond this quota belongs to the workers, either to sell independently or to sell back to Rudy for distribution.

Though not immediately involved in any of his business operations, Rudy constantly spoke of "the work dat mi get" or "the hard work that mi do"—and demanded I acknowledge his efforts. I often reminded him that, beyond employing people and giving orders, he doesn't do anything "of value." This remark he considered personally offensive although, as he commonly said, "mi was not born to labor." He consistently conflated the work done by others, which he was contracted to supervise and manage, as his own labor. And, on this very basis—his function as an overseer—justified his enlarged compensation. It is noteworthy that he operated many of his ventures from prison, where he was incarcerated for murdering one of his prominent rivals. It is in prison that Rudy gained most of his knowledge in management and accounting, “mi did always think outside the box,” he said laughing.

Killing: Lethal Administration

As so often happens, Rudy’s incarceration contributed to his clout and extended his network and clout far beyond Golden Bay. In prison, he was able to form alliances with other communities and send his soldiers to fight distant turf wars, for a share of the profits. He gradually became influential in several communities in Kingston, which caught the attention of prison guards and, more importantly, the political party’s directorship. Recognizing his power and influence, prison authorities recruited him to resolve conflicts among inmates. At the same time, politicians became increasingly interested in this young man from St. Catherine, whose name was becoming known on the street.

Because he was still officially the don, neither challenged nor replaced during his long incarceration, Rudy continued to liaise with the political establishment even from inside the prison. This meant, in the main, that he remained responsible for rallying votes for local and national elections. Some very disturbing attacks on members of the opposing political party in his constituency were launched by his foot soldiers on his behalf, while he maintained plausible deniability. Rudy explained these attacks to me in terms introduced earlier: Without unanimity, the community as a whole will all be lost. Hence, people need to understand voting is not an individual choice and is not strictly about them.

Rudy’s “boss,” so he calls him, is the local Member of Parliament (MP). By dealing with him and other party officials directly, he gains contributions to his businesses, including tools and machines, vehicles, and land allocations. More recently, Rudy upped his demands from his political benefactors-creditors, in the interest of making the community more self-sufficient and ultimately retiring himself from the business of being a don. If Rudy is a "violent entrepreneur," then, by the same token, politicians are "violent financiers" or "violence creditors." This designation encapsulates two interrelated meanings, as follows:

On the one hand, politicians are so-called absentee owners of the garrison, which produces for them not commodities but rather political capital. Elections, says Rudy, are a business. Politicians reap significant benefits from their office by gaining direct access to state funds and resources, alongside status and contacts that facilitate profits. If they don't compete for public contracts directly (although they often do), they gain from their control of the distribution of licenses and permits, pocketing handsome kickbacks. Politicians enjoy police protection and travel internationally without hurdles, allowing them to engage quite freely in illicit commerce and amass great wealth. Thus, Rudy reasons, it is only fair that they share some part of their profit with men like him, who carry out "dutty work" on their behalf. It is apparent that Rudy conceives of his profits as a wage, paid for the work of supervision, management, and indeed extraction—in this case of political power—from the underlying population. On the other hand, politicians provide "credit" for dons to use violence—either on their behalf, as during elections, or for their own purposes. We can think of the state, as mediated by the politician, as a large bank of violence, which is lent out in smaller doses to those who manage and capitalize on it. Rudy reflected on the matter in terms that nicely extend my allegory:

> Politicians dem look at crime like dem a cook a pot of dumplings. Dem know seh the fyah [fire] hot and dem dish a go burn. Dem a get worried seh it a go spoil and mash up the kitchen. But it a dem food dem a look after, so the most dem can do is tun dung [reduce] the flames fi a while.

In Jamaican parlance, "food" stands for monetary and material interests. By using this term, Rudy suggests that crime is a main source of revenue for politicians who have no interest in eradicating entirely, as they often slyly propose in the press. Instead, their approach to crime is ongoing risk management: they will continue cooking the dumpling but make sure the kitchen doesn't burn down. At a higher level, the state appears as applying a "monetarist" theory of crime, protecting the economy from "overheating," that is, from inflation of violence. To prevent inflationary violence, politicians adjust the rate of interest, which they charge on the violence they credit, curbing excessive spending, when necessary, by exacting more from the dons, their lenders.

Explaining how this happens, and more broadly characterizing the relationship between dons and politicians, Rudy introduced me to the phrase that gave the title to this chapter: "buil' an' kill." The buil' phase begins when a politician identifies a youth with potential and "build him up" by showering him with money, weapons, and economic benefits, and making him into a trusted broker for all intents and purposes. The killing stage is obviously more of an instant. Dons are killed when they become a burden or a threat, when they know too much or somehow disobey. The killing is usually carried out by handpicked policemen, who are sometimes paid for their services. Such killings are regularly disguised as so-called "shootouts".

Perhaps the most famous case associated with this pattern of managerial murder is the killing of Claude Massop, briefly introduced at the end of the last chapter. As noted there, Massop rose to prominence among the milieu of rude bwoys and hustlers in 1960s West Kingston. His power and influence grew when he became the don of Tivoli Gardens, where he reigned between 1968-1978, under the patronage of Edward Seaga. During those years, Tivoli became an unsurpassable force and model garrison, which form was later replicated by both parties in other areas of Kingston. Massop played a crucial role in organizing the force, rallying votes, and breaking strikes organized by PNP unions. In return, he was given guns and police protection, which extended his power and clout, securing his leadership. Indeed, although he was celebrated as a popular hero and militia leader, Massop largely accommodated himself to the dictates of his bosses until the 1978 Green Bay Massacre. It was only then that Massop and his associates challenged political directorship by seeking to forge a peace agreement between JLP and PNP gangs. In February 1979, Massop was ambushed and murdered by the police, likely on orders they received from someone who had something to lose from the peace.

Rudy came close to being killed once, while he was still in prison. “I was naïve,” he explains in retrospect, “I did think seh mi alone can really run deh community.” Without going into too much detail, which could put him in danger, I will briefly explain that Rudy was harshly penalized for promoting community interest against a don of higher rank, and in explicit violation of dictates from party leadership. He was put on death row, though he was never sentenced to death, probably not to execute him there, but to exert torturous pressure. After his lawyer intervened, he was transferred to solitary confinement in a military facility, where he stayed for nearly a decade in very harsh conditions.

At the same time, an orchestrated smear campaign was launched against him in the media, blaming him for crimes he said he had never committed, from gang rape to mutilation of bodies. How do we know he likely didn’t commit these offenses? Because, sure enough, all punishments were revoked the moment he obliged to the party’s demands and was again called to rally votes for a nearing election. No one really bothered to clear his name, “dem tell lies pon wi, that is part of the deal. Wi a born criminal”, he told me (see also chapter 7). The point is that smear campaigns such as the one experienced by Rudy prepare the ground for police executions, because killing a despicable don appears justified to most everyone outside of the immediate community.

Such smear campaigns bolster the don’s entrepreneurial-criminal mystique, dissociating him from the hand that feeds him, while legitimizing the execution in mediatized public opinion. Taken together, fear, fascination, indignation, and wrath—all classical affective attachments to 'the criminal'—form a complex that turns the don into an alluring and terrifying, nearly superhuman, figure. Ultimately, indignation and attraction are dialectically related: The wicked man condemned to eternal damnation is simply the other side of the man esteemed for his exceptional, enigmatic, mystical powers. In either case, what we witness is not a real person, cut to human size, but a fantastic and charismatic man who is "one of a kind." Of course, what is true for the don is also true for the glorified figure of the capitalist entrepreneur, in our times in particular: The entrepreneur takes all the credit for social labor and invention, justifying his right to an overwhelming share of the profit based on the risk he supposedly individually assumes.

In the current capitalist dispensation, some commentators are becoming invested in thinking about the Jamaican don as a potential capitalist agent. Though dons are still used to rally votes in more than one location, many politicians and businessmen see them as a burden—producing untamable violence that increases uncertainty, retarding growth, and repelling investment. Today, crime is increasingly seen as raising the cost of doing business, straining public services, and reducing the quality of "human capital," which is necessary for Jamaican development to pick up, finally (World Bank and UNODC 2007). Yet, in a country devoid of tangible means of economic development, crime is also beginning to be seen by some as a risky but vibrant avenue of capital formation (Cross 2017). In this context, a dons' entrepreneurship is refigured. Could their ingenuity, creativity, and boldness not be harnessed to positive ends? Are these men not proven, albeit in deviant ways, that they are the brightest, most resourceful, elements of the proletariat?

Surplus Violent Labor

Rudy is aware of the structural conditions that led him to become a "criminal," a title he is not proud of but takes as a given. Although "mi may feel sorry for some of the tings, an' for hurting 'nuff people, but is not mi who mek [create] the ghetto." Similarly, when it comes to so-called "corruption," his approach is pragmatic: "it a deh system…the question is how you treat [behave] with it." To him, the institutions that shape his life and the life of his fellow Jamaicans, and black people more broadly, are set. Set against them, and largely beyond their ability to affect. Then, the important question for him is not which position in the system you happen to fill—something you are born into and is rather arbitrary. Instead, the question is how you behave and relate to others from *within* the position you fulfill. How do you develop an ethic, a character, that makes the most of what life has afforded you? For example, when speaking of why he helped one of his prison guards finance his children's education, he explained this in terms of "friends" helping each other from their respective positions, sharing the relative privileges and advantages they have. I highlight this point because it allows us to see how the notion of Babylon, as an embodied and lived system, becomes operative in daily life and as an ethic. Perhaps you cannot choose what position in the system you fill, but you can choose who you align with, to whom you extend your assistance and solidarity. You do this by taking responsibility for who you are as a person within unchosen roles and circumstances.

After he was released from solitary confinement and brought into an ordinary prison, Rudy began taking classes, which awarded him several Caribbean Examination Council (CXC) certificates. He explained to me that he wanted to take these classes because he wanted to stay in touch with his eldest daughter, who by then was finishing her bachelor's degree in accounting. But once he started learning, he became increasingly enraged about the educational neglect he suffered as a child from a poor family: "Dem nuh teach wi poor people fit use figurative language. That is why poor people so easily fooled. Dem tek everything literal."

If he had a chance, Rudy said he would study three things: History, "coz it 'llow yuh fi understand da world, and how change happm," reading, by which he meant gaining a good command of literary and interpretive practice, for he is not illiterate. And finally, he said he would like to study rhetoric, oratory, and public speaking. All of these are, of course, the skills of a classical politician. But when I asked Rudy if he ever considered running for office, he balked. Though he enjoys wide support and legitimacy in his quarters, he could never imagine himself in parliament. He had internalized the idea that politics is a vocation reserved for the better sort, and he did not see himself as part of this elevated social milieu.

Indeed, Rudy could not imagine himself as a politician, which in many ways he already was, but felt much more comfortable thinking of himself as a "businessman"—which in Jamaica is often used as a euphemism for don. Rudy spent his final years in prison reading books like Donald Trump's *How to Get Rich* and investment bestsellers like *Rich Dad Poor Dad and* taking classes in business enterprise. In recent years, the Department of Correctional Services (DCS), alongside NGOs and development agencies, started investing more in prison education, particularly in job training and entrepreneurship, to reduce recidivism. Rudy did not need much persuasion to join these courses. At 44, he had grown tired of the life of a professional criminal and was ready to "go legit": to set up a small construction firm and expand his family's farming activities. He wanted to retire peacefully.

All around him, Rudy observed people caught by the entrepreneurial spirit. In 2017, The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) ranked Jamaica first in the world in media attention to entrepreneurship, and second in positive public perceptions of the notion (Jamaica Observer 2017b). He listened carefully to what some experts were saying. Namely, that dons do not need to be seen as Jamaica's curse and bane but can become useful, productive, positive contributors to the nation. He took the offer of becoming a legitimate entrepreneur very seriously and has begun seeking credit from his political patrons, with the hope of leaving donmanship behind him. Will they let him?

Forces are pulling both ways. Some members of the Jamaican political class and business sector believe it is crucial to work with dons and the communities they serve to further the country's development agenda. Others, however, raise concerns and even halt efforts proceeding in this direction. For example, the plan proposed by Dr. Gladstone 'Fluney' Hutchinson involves local "area leaders" in the process of redeveloping downtown Kingston. Hutchinson worked with Peace Management Initiative (PMI) to bring 35 dons to the table to discuss their role in restoring the city's waterfront and major commercial district.[2] But not everyone came on board with this bold initiative. Someone leaked the news on a meeting between dons and developers to the press, causing alarm in some sectors, and giving a few media-savvy politicians a chance to display their moral disgust and self-righteousness. The Urban Development Corporation (UDC) had to back off, and the politicians won themselves a few more years of lucrative plantation politics (Cross 2017). In the wake of the fiasco, head of the Private Sector Organisation (PSOJ), Howard Mitchell, Hutchinson's close friend and collaborator, said so openly: Instead of developing the nation and furthering equality, politicians foster "a system of hierarchy that replicates the plantation" and "perpetuate slavery." (Serju 2017).

Rudy believes that his success as a businessman, achieved under the system of plantation-garrison, attests to his personal skill and insight as an entrepreneur. Indeed, the fact that he ran more than a dozen small businesses from inside the prison is rather impressive, even if somewhat unsavory. But the current discourse of entrepreneurialism also enhances his authoritarian tendencies. He believes that his success was solely a result of his efforts and forgets the collective efforts and price he paid to make it. The more he got into the entrepreneurial spirit (constantly pleading with me to read his bestsellers and get into business with him), the more he spoke about having a "spiritual gift," which protected him from rivals and endowed him with that special "something" that made him so loved and successful. He began telling his life story as if it was a single-man epic, "mi alone on the road fighting the enemy," he reminisced on his youthful turf wars. He started speaking of himself as a visionary, without whom the community would wither, and as a common entrepreneur, presented himself as a leader, a captain, and a hero. Of course, this justified why he, and not the community, is entitled to a major share of the profits of "his" businesses. In his case, at least, it is hard to deny that as an "entrepreneur," he did take on substantial risk.

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[2] Hutchinson is the former head of the Planning Institute of Jamaica, chief adviser to the Urban Development Corporation (UDC) and professor of economics at Lafayette College in Pennsylvania. For many years, he advised the Government of Jamaican on economic policy. More recently, Hutchinson—a black Jamaican— led a fascinating community rejuvenation project in the US Appalachians, where economic development went hand in hand with restoring a sense of dignity and self-worth. The project, he says, was a major success. With regards to the Kingston redevelopment plan, Hutchinson's plan emphasized the projection, creation, restoration, and cultivation of the commons, against the tendency of the formal and informal business sectors to self-maximize with complete disregard for the need of a social protective framework. Jamaica's crime problem, writes Hutchinson with great clarity and insight, is partially "caused by Jamaica's deep-rooted and stubborn social and economic polarity and its resulting social class marginalization, and the country's history of conflict over the privatization, de jure and de facto, of public and common-pool assets, including its culture, access and user-rights to "public" markets, waterfront spaces and beaches." (Hutchinson 2017, 50) In other words, colonial capitalism which attitude is based on short-sighted extraction and hyper-individualism. "The classic Tragedy of the Commons condition occurs when the independent self-interested benefit-maximizing actions of individual stakeholders compromise and deplete shared community benefits achieved through cooperative action (ibid. 51)

But although Rudy is becoming increasingly versed in the language of neoliberal entrepreneurship, which shapes his subjective understanding and his social consciousness, he is still very much rooted in the world of customary patron-client relations, with its distinct modes of virtue and authority. His goal, he says, was never to become ultra-rich or being a super consumer. "Sure, mi waan mi nice car, nice clothes, a house fi be comfortable. But mi really waan fi mek people happy. Dat is a deh real reason seh mi wanna be rich." Rudy is interested in money because it allows him to have influence and power. In Jamaica, it is achieved by giving your money to clients and "friends," not by hoarding or accumulating *ad nauseam*. His entire persona, not least his sense of masculinity, is grounded in paternalism. His talent is to make people feel confident and secure, asuring them he will always have their back.

Generous gifts of food, commodities, and cash secure Rudy's legitimacy and solidify a collective interest in his success and personal safety. For example, he once arranged to distribute daily meals to sex workers in the district after learning that these women can go for days without eating. By becoming their benefactor, not only did he feel like a protector and savior, but he also purchased the allegiance of women who constantly obtain first-hand information from other criminals and policemen.

But gifting is not entirely or immediately instrumental. Rudy's approach to money is the very opposite of the protestant ethic. He once told me something that floored me, which I will paraphrase: The poor are afraid of money because it is a force they cannot control and constantly must struggle "against it." But the rich too are afraid of money, of having too much or not having enough. Only I, he said, really love money in all my heart. I love it so much that I am not afraid of it, and therefore it doesn't control me—I maintain my freedom in relation to it. Rudy's profound insight that capitalism runs on *fear* of money rather than on *love* of what money can buy is not only about economics, but also about authority. Consider what it means to love God rather than to fear Him.[3] Indeed, Rudy often referred to his own form of ruling as a government based on love and sustenance. He would regularly shed significant amounts of money, distributing gifts and cash to his associates, relatives, and anyone who asked him. "Mi know what it feel like fi be hungry. Mi woulda' neva' let a man walk hungry when I have money inna mi pocket."

As could be anticipated, Rudy also held some beliefs about money, which reflected customary social relations. For example, he believed that when you plan a venture that you hope will be profitable, you need to put money into circulation, give it to others, and increase your luck. The belief makes a lot of sense in a small economic space, greatly based on reciprocal exchanges, where what you give to others will eventually return to you, in one way or another. The same approach shapes Rudy's interpersonal ethics: "Mi is like a mirror, what you put forth, that is what you get back. You treat me with love, I treat you with love, you treat me with respect, I treat you with respect, you treat me with hatred… I don't say I would treat you back with hatred but…" he never completed the sentence.

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[3] The insight, I think, grew out of a gap or the tension Rudy felt between customary relations, where "use values" dimensions of wealth remain central and more alienated modes of capitalism, which emphasis exchange value proper.

Rudy is also acutely aware that his philanthropy is today frowned upon and actively delegitimized by opinion makers, the police, and the press. He doesn't fully understand their problem, but he accustoms himself to changing circumstances. He says he had recently stopped organizing community events and providing welfare and services: "Da police dem say is a don ting, so mi just nuh do it again. It a break mi heart not to hold a treat for the pickney dem, but a so da thing set." Rudy is concerned that the good, positive, sides of being a don are no longer meaningful for the new generation of "scammers," whom he treats with open contempt and even anger. He certainly does not see them as part of his milieu, which observed community norms and even protected them, and which was as much about preventing violence as it was about enforcing it. "Dem come up quick quick quick and Dem nuh ready man, dem nuh ready." They have no understanding of the responsibilities that come with the don's position.

Rudy is especially concerned with those youth involved in scamming and petty extortion, who prey on innocent people and have no sense of right and wrong. He says growing competition among them leads to senseless violence, which men use for branding or "mek dem name a call." His message for these teens was as follows:

> 'Nuff people chase things but when dem get it, dem nuh know what to do with it. Mi see 'nuff 'nuff men fight fi be don, yute kill and get kill fi it. But when dem get it, dem nuh know what to do. Ok, so yuh a don now, now what? Mi see 'nuff people chase love, people chase money, chase status. Dem nuh realize seh the real work start when you get the ting, what yuh a go do with it? How yuh a go keep it? It was the same for our ancestors, who rebelled and fought against slavery. But when freedom finally

> come, dem fret [were afraid]. Dem nuh realize seh dem gonna haffi [have to] fend fi themselves."

Rudy here reflects openly about what it means to get what you want, to have power, and to be free. He argues that most people get so caught up in the race of getting what they want, in a competition that is often lethal, that they forget that the "real work beings" once you get what you want or assume the position you so wished for. OK, you're now a don, now what? What are you going to do with this position? — Are you willing to take on the responsibility of living as a free man or are you going to realize you are too scared to "fend for yourself" and go back to being a slave? Slavery here can mean, literally, to return to a subordinate position of being ruled by another. Still, it can also mean, I think, backsliding into a kind of inauthentic life, where you fail to become your own master.

Rudy is aware of the campaign to oust dons in legal and extra-legal ways. Many of the men who have been killed, arrested, or extradited in recent years are his friends, or at least former associates. He feels the pressure himself, not only in the police preventing him from distributing charity, but much more acutely, in fearing the police will execute him before he manages to make the full transition into being *and being seen* as a legitimate businessman. He spends a lot of time thinking about how to make sure everyone knows that his businesses are now respectable, and that he earned each penny lawfully. For example, he began using a cart and a donkey to distribute his bricks, so no one could say he didn't start from the very bottom, building his business diligently, day by day. He is also considering a baptism, which many former gunmen use to convey that they have changed, indeed born again. Becoming associated with the church helps keep the murderous lawmen away.

But his recurring attempts to get loans and especially public works contracts from his political contacts suggest that he has not fully grasped the significance of the changes around him. Indeed, while individual dons are undercut by being murdered, the social position and function of the don are mostly undermined by assigning more and more construction contracts to foreign companies, especially Chinese construction firms. As one of my interlocutors from August Town, a garrison in Kingston, explained: Its terrible how "lickle wok'" is used by politicians to "control the people dem," but it is far worse to see other people come fix the road in your community while "yuh a look wok' fi feed yuh pickney dem."

Conclusion

Rudy said he was never taught to use figurative language, but "buil' n' kill" offers an incredibly productive metaphor for speaking about the changing place of dons within the transforming political economy of post-plantation Jamaica. First, the term "buil' n' kill" is used literally to speak about the relationship between political bosses, members of parliament, and dons, their political enforcers: Dons are built up to serve the politicians interests in amassing power and wealth, and when they become threatening, insubordinate, or redundant, they are killed. Second, as we have seen, the don himself was involved in buil' n' kill: Providing jobs to his community by winning public contracts in construction and in security, as well as building his businesses. Winning these contracts and receiving various forms of credit—money, police protection, and the right to use violence—depended entirely on his ability to enforce a unanimous vote in his community, and this could, and sometimes did, involve killing.

I argued, following CLR James, that the execution of dons by police cannot be understood as driven by police frustration or colonial vigilantism. They are part of the arsenal of tools used by politicians to manage garrisons as neo-plantations. And while this type of police killings may not represent the majority of police inflicted fatalities and outright murders, they nevertheless trouble simplistic understanding of the phenomenon and the debates surrounding it. If the don is a manager and overseer of quasi-plantation labor, then his killing is "economic," not driven by hatred and not simply used for the purpose of public spectacle.

Yet, it is hard to realize this is what is happening because killings are carried out by policemen, disguised as "shoot outs," and often follow smear campaigns that justify the killing as the only possible response to inhumane criminality. This is the third way in which "buil' and kill" comes handy, in allowing us to understand the relationship between the way dons are "built up" to be feared and revered and the ease with which they are killed. Finally, I used the notion to chart a wider social transformation in the Jamaican political economy, which has built the dons and is now in the ambivalent process of ousting them. "Taking out the dons" proceeds not only by killing them by undermining the social relations in which they were embroiled, a process that, at least thus far, has caused a significant rise in social harms, particularly homicides.

The second notion I mobilized in this chapter is the broad, even ideological, notion of entrepreneurship. I introduced the notion for several reasons, which should once again be made explicit. One, I observed a growing discourse, among experts, practitioners, and dons themselves, treating dons as business entrepreneurs, social entrepreneurs, violent entrepreneurs, and related terms. This led me to inquire about how the notion had been used in social theory and the history of political economy and to consider how different ways of using the term interact with shifts in social relations within a global political economy.

I found that Rudy's life history falls very much into the pattern of social relations introduced by Anton Blok in his classical study of "violence entrepreneurs" in a Sicilian village. He worked as a kind of broker, connecting peasants with sources of economic and political power, while relying on a customary cultural code that was meaningful and allowed to transact across wide social divides. While he is increasingly drawn to the neoliberal ideology of entrepreneurship, to which he was first introduced in prison, he is ultimately very much a traditional character, especially in terms of his aspirations and values. There is no need to romanticize the position of the peasant entrepreneur as a kind of rebel or bandit (Hobsbawm 1965; Hobsbawm 1969) to be able to appreciate Rudy's reflective approach and political acumen. Clearly, he is a man fully aware of his condition, and there is no need to moralize him about the faults of being "a criminal." He is also witnessing the world changing around him, as a new generation of petty dons and scammers, who, as far as he is concerned, don't know the first thing about what it means to be free and being your own master.

I turned to Marx's writing on enterprise because, somewhat surprisingly, this section of *Capital*, involves one of these most detailed discussions of slavery. Indeed, for Marx, the managerial function embodied, for a time, in entrepreneurial capital, is destined to disappear. But this disappearance can take one of two directions. It could either lead to increasing abstraction of social relation, whereby capital appears as a self-moving agent, which valorizes itself, or it could lead to society realizing the collective functions of organizing labor rationally, that is, politically, and take responsibility for this. If we become capable of so doing, Marx suggests, we will get rid of surplus coercion rather than continue to dehumanize, murder, and destroy so-called "surplus men."

Unspectacular Terror: Open Frontiers and Closed Political Imaginaries

The post-plantation landscape of Clarendon, a rural parish in central Jamaica, provides a chilling scenery for some of the most atrocious cases of extra-judicial police executions in recent years. Clarendon is the third-largest parish in Jamaica in terms of territory, with a population of some 250,000 people. The mostly flat terrain is traversed by five large rivers, making the area particularly suitable for agricultural cultivation. The Spanish used the wide plains for cattle ranches in *hatos* or *haciendas*, whereas the British established cotton, indigo, tobacco, and sugar plantations. Sugar, of course, became the most prominent exportable crop by the 18th century, gobbling up most of the arable land until the mid-20th century. In the 1950s, the parish became one of the primary sites of the modern bauxite mining industry, but the parish also has deposits of limestone, sand, gypsum, marble, and maybe gold. Clarendon still has the largest proportion of land in farming in Jamaica. In addition to sugar and bananas, the parish exports fish, coffee, citrus, pimento, strawberries, and mushrooms (STATIN Jamaica). Small landholding peasants, scattered around the larger agricultural plantations, grow food crops for the local market, root vegetables such as yam and sweet potato, tomatoes and onions, and goats and chickens.

The capital of the parish, May Pen, is located 30 miles West of Kingston, a 30-minute drive along Highway 2000. It sits on the banks of the Rio Minho and has a population of around 65,000, residing in village-like communities, dilapidated workers barracks and informal settlements on "captured land." In recent years, this parochial market town has become one of the epicenters of Jamaica's murder increase. The number of murders in the parish grew tenfold over the past two decades, from around 15 per year in 2000-2001 to 135 in 2017 and 115 in 2020. Along with the neighboring parish, St. Catherine, Clarendon accounts for one in three murders occurring on the island (JCF 2019).

According to the JCF, Clarendon is suffering from a dramatic increase in "first generation gangs"—relatively new groupings, which are neither deeply entrenched nor widely extended criminal networks (Corey Robinson 2019; Simpon 2020). They say that the gangs develop due to growing rural immiseration and easy access to guns, smuggled into the island through its long and winding coastline.[1] Certainly, the rise in crime in Clarendon since the early 2000s corresponds to an equivalent decline in Jamaica's economy, which the rural parishes arguably suffered the most. During fifteen years before the world financial crisis in 2008 (1993-2007), real GDP growth averaged 1.1 percent per year (0.4 per capita). Between 2008 and 2011, the economy contracted by 5.1 percent, and subsequent recovery from the recession was particularly sluggish (Johnston 2015; Schmid and Malcolm 2016)

Clarendon was badly affected. In recent decades, both export-oriented and local agricultural production suffered a steep decline due to trade liberalization. Total land in crops dropped by some 20% between 1996 and 2007, which only marginally reversed thereafter. Sugar production, no longer enjoying preferential entry into the European market, reduced to about a quarter of its mid-20th century levels (Robotham 2017). While, in theory, downsizing the sugar industry could present an opportunity to expand small holding cultivation, local farmers cannot compete with cheap food imports from the United States. Bauxite operations were also dramatically scaled down. Some of the plants—now owned by Chinese and Russian corporations—closed completely after the 2008 financial crisis, and are being reopened intermittently, depending on global markets. Gaping craters of muddy copper-colored land provide a vivid reminder of environmental destruction and the creeping effects of climate change. Residents of Clarendon are already feeling the effects of rising sea levels, and the intensification of floods and drought. Along the south shore, the livelihood of small fishing communities is jeopardized by reduced fish stock, resulting from overfishing and disruptions to marine ecology.

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[1] Over 80 percent of homicides in Jamaica are carried out using a firearm, and some guns were found to have been used to carry out dozens of unrelated murders. This is because many of the imported guns are offered for rent. The borrower pays a fee for use of the weapon and returns it to its illegal owner after having committed a robbery or a murder.

In the meantime, Rocky Point fishing village has grown into a central node in the bustling trade of drugs for guns on the southernmost tip of the coast. Here, small fishing boats carry ganja from Jamaica in exchange for weapons and ammunition from Haiti—a barter system that analysts believe started operating around 2007 and is now estimated as worth between $1.3 and $1.7 million USD (Insight Crime 2020; Witbooi 2019). Each month, between 150 and 200 firearms are smuggled from Haiti and sold on the local market for anything between 100,000 JMD for a handgun ($700 US) to $400,000 for an AK47. The trade has also expanded to include cocaine shipped from Honduras and Guyana, since the direct exchange of commodities allows circumventing enhanced enforcement against money laundering (ibid.). Keep this in mind because it will become important.

According to one fisherman interviewed by the Gleaner, 10 pounds of marijuana swaps for a handgun, 30 can get you a rifle, and one kilo of cocaine is worth at least three rifles. The fisherfolk normally carry 3000 pounds of ganja on each excursion, which takes a day and a half to transport, depending on winds and the presence of US and Jamaican Coast Guards. The fishermen say, "a lot of big people and gang leaders are involved in the trade […] deep-pocketed businessmen" as well as "gang members from Kingston, St. Catherine, and St. James […] They come to us because we have the Haitian connect and we know how to manage the waters." For their dangerous and highly demanded services, fishermen pocket 50 percent of the proceeds. Their sponsors pay them in kind, which allows them to purchase guns and resell them locally (Jamaica Gleaner 2020). Haiti's economic, political, and social implosion precipitated other kinds of swaps as well. For example, growing demand for affordable meat in Port-au-Prince triggered a rise in goat stealing in Clarendon.

The number of guns entering the island through informal harbors on the south shore is dwarfed by imports of firearms from the US, passed covertly through formal ports of entry—only a fraction of which are successfully intercepted. In 2016, 71% of the guns examined as part of the ATF survey in Jamaica were found to have been originally purchased in the US, where gun laws are notoriously lax (Ahmed and Hicks 2019). The trade in drugs and guns provides an apt allegory for imperialism: The Global South produces various kinds of licit and illicit drugs—sugar, tea, coffee, opium, marijuana, cocaine, as well as fantasies—that placate capitalist core areas, receiving in return a swarm of weapons to run political economies built on poverty and war profiteering.[2]

Politically, Clarendon is divided into six electoral constituencies. After the 2016 elections, these were equally divided among the two main political parties, PNP and JLP. May Pen is part of the Central Clarendon constituency, represented by Mike Henry (JLP), Jamaica's longest-serving parliamentarian—occupying the seat since 1980. Henry's 1980 campaign was associated with high levels of political violence, and today there are still concerns about his involvement in distributing guns to young men in the parish. But Henry, himself a light-skinned man, is also a renowned champion of Jamaica's long struggle to receive reparations for slavery from Britain and, like most Jamaican politicians, is openly supportive of progressive measures to improve the social and economic conditions in the country and, of course, in his own constituency.[3]

In recent years, scholars of Latin America and the Caribbean, and thinkers of violence more broadly, have become increasingly concerned with the role of elites in the reproduction of criminal violence (Kleinfeld 2018; Pearce 2018). The trend marks a necessary, and timely, revision of the one-sided focus on the immediate context of violence in poor and marginalized communities towards a broader view of social dynamics in steeply stratified national economies. In a region that continues to exhibit the highest rate of homicide in the world—accounting for some 30% of global murders, with only 11% of the world's population (Pearce ibid.)—most direct perpetrators are poor young men. The vast majority of victims are young men and women of poor means, and indigenous or African descent. Researchers rightfully point out, however, that focusing on the poor leaves out important parts of the picture: The role of elites in perpetrating criminogenic conditions through their own involvement in illicit accumulation, corruption, and strategic capture of the state to advance their interests. Specifically, recent studies have argued that "elites" continue to benefit from de-monopolization of violence and foster a "fragmented security state" where the police, rather than enforcing the law in a universal fashion, is used to further particular economic ends, and periodically violently suppress the lower classes (Snyder and Duran-Martinez 2009; Müller 2018; Vilalta 2020).

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[3] By naming Henry, I am violating a Jamaican taboo against "calling out names" of formidable VIPs. I do so with some wariness. Not so much because I am worried of libel suits—though Jamaican politicians and businessmen are known for those—but because I simply do not know enough, and will likely never know, about what illicit dealings are carried out by Henry or most other prominent personas in Clarendon. I name Henry not because I believe he is outstandingly corrupt or mischievous—he may be, or he may not be—but because I have been explicitly asked, by a few of my interlocutors, to use my relative freedom as a foreigner and do so. Barely raising his voice beyond a whisper, one of them clenched my hand and sworn me to name "the politician."

In this chapter, I think through this emerging body of research while examining the place and roles of the police within the complex, competitive, and highly lethal economy of Clarendon. The chapter analyzes two extended cases of police extra-judicial executions carried out by JCF death squads in the parish, which reveal both the integration of police in the "guns for drugs" trade and their instrumental role in protecting elite interests and property relations. The first incident I discuss is the relatively publicized and already discussed case of extra-judicial murder of four persons in the village of Kraal in 2003, which I already examined from other perspectives in previous chapters. The second case I discuss is a series of at least 69 separate incidences of police murder by the Clarendon Division Street Crime Unit (SCU), which operated in the May Pen area between 2007 and 2012. The investigation of the SCU, to which I became privy through my fieldwork with INDECOM, sheds light on the earlier Kraal incident. Together, they help dissipate some of the "epistemic murk" (Taussig

1984)—the atmosphere of terror—surrounding power, money, and violence in Clarendon. But my concern is to try and identify if it is even possible, given the complex ecology of violence in the parish, to politically theorize the situation, and if so, in what terms.

Death Squads and Elites in Latin America and the Caribbean

Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror (Sluka 2000) is an edited volume that draws on ethnographic case studies from many parts of the world, specifically Latin and Central America, to make a case for anthropological engagement with systemic forms of coercion and intimidation perpetrated by state actors. It begins by establishing the category of state terror itself, noting that the distinction between state and anti-state violence is more ideological than empirical. Whereas both state terror and anti-state terrorism use intimidation to achieve political ends, the difference between them is, first, a matter of scale, and second, that the former is used "to maintain the status quo" whereas the latter is used "to achieve political change." (ibid., 1) Indeed, the overtly political nature of state terror is given in the proposed definition of the term: "State terror refers to the use or threat of violence by the state or its agents and supporters particularly against civilian individuals and populations, as a means of political intimidation and control (i.e., a means of repression)." (ibid. 2).

Today, the definition feels dated. First, because we have developed anthropological skepticism in "the state" as a subject and an agent (Abrams 1988a; Mitchell 1999; Navaro-Yashin 2002; Poole and Das 2004; Gupta 2006). Second, because the kind of state Sulka has in mind—a strong authoritarian state, engaged in routine intimidation, torture, disappearances, and political murders, is no longer part of lived experience in most parts of the world. With the end of the Cold War, the US-supported counterinsurgency state has given way to a much more diffuse neoliberal (post)state or rather to a "system of governance," which cannot be conceptualized using once appropriate binaries. The main targets of the terrorist state as theorized by Sulka and other contributing authors, were "political opponents, anyone associated with subversion […] anyone with "an activity or idea that challenges the status quo—including organizing peasants, unions, Bible classes, proposals for land reform, or tax increases on the rich." That is, "clergy, labor organizers or trade unionists, human rights activists, indigenous peoples, and minorities asserting their rights, teachers, students, health and social workers, journalists […] defined as subversives, terrorists, traitors, or communists." (ibid. 4-5) Today, as a first approximation, the main victims of "state terror" are part of a global racialized surplus population, which subsists on the margins of market and state, amongst various quasi- and para-statal formations.

To be sure, the volume made important contributions to the anthropology of the state, among other things, by focusing on the dramaturgical and affective dimensions of political terror. This facilitated an important move away from overly rational approaches to the state, introducing questions of desire and fantasy that have since become central to the discipline's engagement with political objects. More specifically, with regards to questions dealt with in this chapter, much of the analyses of extra-judicial violence, notably death squads, remain relevant today, at least in elucidating the mechanics of terror and its tactics: "while death squads operate outside the law, they effectively do so with impunity and are generally and secretly fully integrated into the state's regular security network. […] their separation from the regular security forces allows systematic murder to be carried out for which the state can deny any knowledge and responsibility." (ibid. 5) Furthermore, many of the volumes' insights remain important for anthropological engagements with the cultural production and social effects of dread. For example, it focuses our attention on the way terror shatters solidarities and reinforces social atomization by pushing men and women to cooperate with despotic power to save their lives and the lives of their families; on how terror "forces a choice of competitive struggle for relative advantage," and how it is perpetrated under the guise of necessity, emergency, and other collective fantasies (16). But here, too, the volume provides a binary framework of state against anti-state, status-quo versus rebellion, which raises doubts about the extent we can still use the proposed theorization to make sense of today's more elusive formations of terror.

Around the same time that the *Death Squads* volume was published, Latin Americanists were already pondering what they called "new violence." The notion registered the seemingly paradoxical effect of transition from authoritarian regimes to democracy, which rather than reducing the level of state and non-state violence, as hoped and expected, resulted in their multiplication (Koonings and Krujit 1999; Caldeira 2000; Müller 2018). Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt dubbed the phrase "the democratization of violence" to highlight this paradoxical correlation, as well as to stress the expanded use of violence by diverse social agents. If "old violence" was ordered by relatively stable authoritarian and clientelist structures, hierarchically distributed and centrally managed, "new violence" is privatized, dispersed, and related to the expansion of informal and illicit markets, corruption, state fragmentation, and the proliferation of plural violence-and-governance actors (Arias and Goldstein 2010; Vilalta 2020).

The shift from notions of state and politics to governance reflects a considerable difficulty in theorizing "new violence" politically, seeing that it is not perpetrated to take over state and government, but only in pursuit of profit. Here, illicit economic activities, such as drug trafficking, are not means to other ends, it seems. Rather, they are explicitly opportunistic and economically driven. Its major agents, it is said, do not even *pretend* to fashion or organize themselves in the guise of any ideology. Supposedly, they are neither on the side of the status quo nor resolutely against it, but find it more productive to manipulate the state without formally wielding power (Bricose 2014; Barnes 2017). And yet, as many scholars have pointed out, the mere magnitude of organized crime or illicit economy, as well as its effects on national and international conflicts, make it hard to ignore as a political phenomenon. And when it comes to sheer lethality, the number of deaths resulting from "crime" on a large scale far surpasses the number of fatalities in "wars," that is, explicitly political conflicts between enemies (ibid.)

Responding to this new challenge, recent efforts to "make violence political"—that is, make new, criminal, economic violence legible in political terms—include, for example, attempts to conceptualize large-scale organized crime as "criminal insurgency," which challenges the state's right and capacity to govern, even without trying to take over the state explicitly. Others have sought to understand "criminal politics" in terms of possible configurations of competition, conflict, cooperation, and accommodation with the state, ultimately suggesting that the state and the anti-state precariously and unstably share power (Barnes ibid.) Still others have advanced the notion of "state capture," which begins from the understanding that illicit sectors can become dominant only where agents within state bureaucracy have been compromised, corrupted, and bribed (Arias and Goldstein 2010). Overall, there is growing awareness of the incredibly blurry boundaries between state and non-state domains, wherever large-scale illicit accumulation takes place. However, most of the literature maintains a largely unquestioned distinction between the economic and the political.

Among many emergent attempts to theorize criminal/political formations, one body of literature began to crystalize around the notion of "elite violence." The conceptual framework for this paradigm, in the regional context, was most clearly laid out by veteran political scientist and anthropologist Jenny Pearce of the London School of Economics. Pearce forcefully argues that it is time to turn the gaze to the role of elites in reproducing "violences" in societies they govern. Following Durán Martinez (2015), Pearce uses the notion of a "fragmented security state" to illuminate how elites mobilize the state strategically to further their economic interests, rather than support the rule of law and public accountability. The fragmentation of the state allows elite actors—who buy security on the market and therefore do not depend on the state for their safety—to use the security forces against rivals and competitors, protect illicit accumulation, escape regulation, and conceal corruption.

Drawing on an established legacy and repertoire of political violence from previous eras, elites use violence selectively and with impunity for economic ends. Unified campaigns for law and order, which are periodically manifested—for example, the use of state of emergency to raid and reconquer ghettos— indicate consensus around targeting and repressing the poor, subject to untimely death and mass incarceration. Simultaneously, as state actors and bureaucrats are lured into colluding with traditional and new elites, the state loses any claim to legal universality.

Pearce understands full-well that the notion of "elites" is unspecific and analytically problematic. Originally developed by thinkers like Mosca, Pareto, and Michels, the sociology of elites was conjured as an alternative to the Marxist notion of class and was often used to further conservative agendas. The term "elites" further lacks historical specificity, for one type of elite or another exists in all stratified societies, regardless of the mode of production (slavery, feudalism, capitalism, etc.) The notion, therefore, remains vague with regards to distinctions between ownership of the means of production, control of wealth, access to political power, and social status (itself a highly complex notion, given the colonial interlacing of ethnicity, race, color, and class in the Americas). Pearce favors the term "oligarchic elites," which, she says, stresses wealth as a major source of power in the neoliberal era. But more significantly, she uses the multivalent notion of "elites" to methodological advantage, suggesting that different segments of the elite could be empirically studied to examine how the dynamics of specific economic sectors (ranching, mining, construction, etc.) shape attitudes toward the use of violence and the rule of law. Her crucial point is that disunity and competition among Latin America and the Caribbean elites may explain the region's incomplete state formation, especially the absence of monopoly over legitimate violence.

Here, the problem of elite unification relates to the macro-sociological theory that views state formation as resulting from "elite pacts." The idea is that, in Europe, internal pacification depended on the gradual consolidation of an agreement among powerful agents to stop using violence in their dealings with each other. According to this line of theorization, the agreement gradually developed into a more refined division of labor and the formation of a state as "a single coercive individual with a monopoly on violence" (ibid. 15). But in Latin America, Pearce argues, and for reasons that she does not fully explicate, "oligarchic elite interests fail to coalesce around the rule of law despite democratization." In other words, the absence of monopoly over violence reflects disjunction and disunity among the upper classes.

How are we to distinguish "elite violence" from respectable capitalism, as it developed in Europe? Is it simply a more extreme version of class domination, or something qualitatively different? Pearce remains rather vague on this question, noting imperialism only in passing (to point out, in order avoid cultural essentialism, that Europeans were violent too, only in other ways). But she says that where elites fail to put down their weapons and reduce interpersonal violence amongst themselves, there is no chance for a broader social "civilizing process," *a la* Norbert Elias (Elias 1978). As illegality and violence become established as a norm at the helms of society, the poor lose all hopes and trust in the law, develop their violent modes of self-help, and are drawn into criminal networks, "absorb[ing] the culture of a short life lived with high levels of violence, consumption, and excitement." (Pearce ibid. 23) This leads to higher levels of violence and undermines trust in the viability of the political process. As Pearce puts it: "even understandings of what the state is for, a means of articulating a shared interest in public goods and goals, are transformed by elites who have little interest in addressing violences that they themselves can avoid. As criminality flourishes and further fragments the state, the line between legal and illegal accumulation only becomes ever more blurred." (Pearce ibid. 25).

A state that cannot be imagined poses a very different problem than a state that is fantasized, even in excess. As Israeli political philosopher, Adi Ophir (2010) argued, a necessary condition for "the political" —which he defines as the act of problematizing power in public—depends on our ability to recognize and articulate the unity of a ruling power, which becomes "the common denominator" of those who understand themselves as governed. Making something political involves giving it a name, revealing it as a durable structure. For example, "patriarchy" or "capitalism" are political notions, because they allow us to connect disparate encounters with specific iterations of power and view them as a united formation, as ultimately referring to some One. It is only on this basis, Ophir claims, that power can be problematized, questioned, and negotiated. It is only on this basis that we can begin to conceive of alternatives modes of socially relating.

In other words, if governing power seeks to project a representation of unity and coherence where it lacks in practice, then, for the governed, the identification of relations of power as political depends on the use of the imaginary faculty. Because the structural attributes of power are not immediately present in any of its agents—police officers, tax-collectors, social workers, employers, qua individual women and men—we need to be able to perceive them as embodiments or representations of a broader and more sturdy organization of multiple relations. The imaginary faculty is necessary to understand interactions with agents of power not as one-off events but as related to an encompassing structure, which endows them with unity and coherence, and relates them to established hierarchies.

Ophir argues that lack of coherence undermines the authority of governing power. It erodes its elevation vis-a-vis "society," de-mystifies it, and undermines its necessary alienation, what anthropologists often refer to as "the state idea," "the state effect" or "the state fetish" (Abrams 1988b; Mitchell 1999; Aretxaga 2003; Navaro-Yashin 2002). Indeed, "when power is performed by those ascribed with agency and authority—the policeman, the tax collector, the streetlight with its camera, or the talking head on Television—each of its agents may invoke the imaginary perpetuity and ubiquity of the ruling power and the supremacy of its authority." (Ophir ibid.) Conversely, if ruling power does not appear or is not attributed with unity, the multiplicity and plurality of governing practices will reemerge, undermining the very existence of the political, and the possibility of identifying the body of the governed corresponding to it. Or again, political power depends on performance and spectacle to reassert its signification, and on techniques of monopolizing—violence, territory, population, and currency—and centralizing their representation. By the same token, those who challenge power depend on re-dividing, splitting the figure of unity, and then reassembling the many by alluding to a different principle of organization—an alternative unity.

As we shall see, the two extended cases of police death squads examined in this chapter can be empirically gathered under the title of "elite violence" as developed by Pearce and others. But they also enact very different modes of signification—or rather de-signification—in public imaginary. The first case, the killing in Kraal, became politicized by various agents, although in ways that radically distort what actually happened. It produced a spectacle that, despite and perhaps precisely because it was based on falsehood rather than facts, became utterly political and, as such, contestable. The second case, where a death squad operated in plain sight, furthering nearly identical economic aims, was un-spectacular or even anti-spectacular. It didn't result in any political gesture, not even a kind of pre-emptive politicization by the state seeking to detract possible contenders. The result was a state-of-affairs that could not be named. A state-of-affairs that, I claim, is radically political because it destroys the political itself.

The Kraal Killings

Around 5:30 in the afternoon on May 7, 2003, police communications reported that a police unit approaching a house in the rural Pennants district came under intense gunfire from gunmen hiding in a dwelling. In the battle that ensued, four persons were killed. Two guns and several rounds of ammunition were recovered from the scene. Angela Richards, Lewena Thompson, Kirk Gordon, and

Matthew 'Renegade' James were the four deceased. Another man, whose identity was unknown, managed to escape.

The news spread quickly across the parish and the media. Whereas the police framed the incident as a shootout, neighbors insisted that the police put up an ambush and executed the four in cold blood. Pictures from the scene and forensic evidence strongly supported the neighbors' version, displaying blood-soaked mattress, bullet-riddled refrigerator, and other evidence of intense gunfire by policemen. Scene reconstruction and testimonies from witnesses revealed later that the two men were shot on the veranda and the two women were shot inside the house, in a bedroom where they tried to take cover. Thompson's eight-year-old daughter, Shanice Stoddart ("Pinky"), who crawled under the bed with Richards, later told the court that she was taken out of the house by one of the policemen and told to stand underneath a mango tree in the yard. From where she was standing, she could clearly hear the two women begging for their lives, and summarily executed.

It took the JCF Scenes of Crime Unit and Criminal Investigation Branch (CIB) located in May Pen over three hours to arrive on the scene. In the meantime, the house was not secured against evidence contamination and tampering. The bodies of the victims were removed—taken to the hospital to be pronounced dead before they could be photographed and inspected by forensic investigators and detectives. The Branch of Special Investigations (BSI), then responsible for investigating civilian killings by policemen, only arrived at Kraal the next morning, after most of the evidence was gone. The police claimed it had recovered two firearms—one telescopic rifle and a 9mm Taurus pistol—as well as several rounds of live and spent shells supposedly used by the gunmen. But there were serious concerns that this evidence had been planted. Suspicions about police tampering with scenes of extra-judicial killing were already common in Jamaica, but they were usually left as rumors without corroboration. As we saw in the police reform chapter, what made this case different was that a British Intelligence network picked up the call made by Adams to a prominent East

Kingston don, Danhai Williams, right after the killing, asking to procure one of the guns that were later recovered. As discussed there, this precipitated an outstanding international investigation of the Kraal case, leading senior detectives from Scotland Yard to come to Jamaica and try to build the case against Adams and his subordinates.

After several months of investigation, using advanced technologies and ample resources, six policemen, including Adams, were indicted for murder, conspiracy, and perverting the course of justice. Forty-four witnesses were called to testify in what was called "the mother of all trials," which opened in October 2005 in the Home Circuit Court in Kingston. Among them, principal eyewitness Shanice Stoddart, two former members of the CMU who quit their job and moved abroad, and Danahi Williams, the notable East Kingston don. The prosecution believed its case was airtight, even when the defense did not hold back on attacking and undermining the witnesses, claiming there was "a nasty little plan" to take down Adams and his team (Whyte 2005). The British intelligence recording of the call between Adams and Williams was never revealed to the jury (they were never told such a recording exited). So, when Williams declined to come to court and testify—claiming he feared retaliation—the prosecution lost its key witness. By December 2005, the six policemen were acquitted, and most of them returned to frontline active duty.

What brought the police to Kraal in the first place? Apparently, the CMU was after a man named Bashington 'Chen Chen' Douglas, a notable gangster from Spanish Town, who had recently set up an extortion racket around a gold mine near Pennants. This was the first gold mine to open in Jamaica since 1540 and was projected to yield 41,000 ounces over several years. Perhaps the mere allure of gold—appearing as if out of nowhere in central Jamaica—was enough to draw Chen Chen to the area. But it turns out that Chen Chen and Adams had a history, and that the former moved to his father's house in Clarendon to "cool out" because the police relentlessly pursued him in Spanish Town.

Keeping what he thought would be a safe distance, Chen Chen used his vacation from Adams to establish his small business.

In an interview conducted with him by journalist Mark Wignall, just days after the Kraal killings— and a few months before he himself was murdered—Chen Chen reported that AusJam "employed his services at $30,000 per month to protect their equipment"—a claim never verified by the corporation, which preferred to remain silent about the whole affair (Wignall 2014). It was further alleged that Chen Chen was conspiring to abduct two of the mine's foreign operators, but AusJam denied having made any complaints of this nature (Jamaica Observer 2003). In any case, the company had no intention to stick around and entertain rumors and speculations. In 2004 it closed its operations, declaring that the mine was not as profitable as expected. It only generated about a half of the estimated yield in the first two years, and future projections apparently suggested that the mine was nearly depleted.

Given that no other gold mines operate in Jamaica, it is hard not to consider this one as somehow connected to the evolving illicit economy in the parish. According to a recent review of the global drug economy, gold, seen as having intrinsic value, is a conventional means of payment for illicit commodities, where cash is too bulky to carry or too complicated to launder. Alternatively, mining itself can offer a convenient front for money laundering activities, allowing for mixing "illicit money" with alleged proceeds of the mine, which are usually much smaller than officially reported. Another method is to consolidate scraps and pieces of gold brought into the country illegally, as proceeds of trafficking, and present them as if they were extracted locally. (OAS 2013, 36). I don't have the capacity to review AusJam's financial statements to determine whether and which forms of money laundering were pursued. Still, the possibility should be kept in mind, if only as a conjectural but rather sensible hypothesis.

The decision to close the plant in 2004 may have also been motivated by ongoing labor disputes and conflicts with surrounding villages. One of the major cause of dispute was that the company blocked neighboring communities' access to a freshwater spring, the main source used by villagers for drinking, household necessities, and farming. In 2014, the Gleaner reported that residents trek "twice-daily to the abandoned gold mine, by donkey, foot or motor vehicle loaded with plastic containers." Having no other source of fresh water in their vicinity, "they have constructed a makeshift system, channeling water from a spring from the mountainside at the back of the property to a tank with a pipe attached." (Cunningham 2014)

After the mine closed, AusJam evacuated the area, leaving only one security guard to look after the property in its absence. In 2011, a cow that drank from the spring died from poison contamination, and the National Environment and Planning Agency (NEPA) was brought in to remove toxic waste from the area. It turned out that in its haste to leave, the corporation left behind several barrels of highly toxic sodium cyanide, just meters away from the precious water spring used for generations by the peasants. NEPA later sued AusJam for 4.5 million dollars to recover the costs of cleaning. The firm declined to pay, even after a legal settlement that cut the sum in half. And if that was not enough, they also sued NEPA for damages. In the meantime, residents continued to use the water, praying no one would die of contamination. (ibid).

The harms suffered by residents of Kraal and Pennants are manifold, multilayered, involving both slow and fast violence. Severe and endemic rural poverty and effective disenfranchisement, expose rural communities to predations by state and non-state actors, operating through, against, and in the many grey areas of the law. Ausjam—a multinational firm that won special mining privileges based on rather speculative projections—operated in the area in open disregard of labor and environmental regulations and may have been involved in money laundering and tax evasion. Chen Chen, an opportunist gangster, claimed his share of the profit, after he was chased into Clarendon by

Adams and his policemen, thereby helping to spread extortion racketeering to the parish. The police came in to deliver the gangster his fate but instead executed four civilians, lied about what transpired, concealed the evidence, and still were lawfully acquitted. Residents say they have been traumatized, stigmatized, and abandoned. By 2020, the village still had no road, no running water, and no garbage collection.

Some of my interlocutors claimed that the Kraal Killings played a crucial role in spreading crime across the parish. One ex-policeman pointed out that Chen Chen would have never migrated to the Pennants were Adams not trying to kill him in Spanish Town. More broadly, he said, after the police killed two prominent Spanish Town dons in the early 2000s, Spanish Town gangs became splintered, and some of their factions moved to the neighboring parish. This caused the expansion of extortion, which has long been the expertise of gangs in Saint Catherine. Thus, alongside the demise of the rural economy in recent years, there are reasons to believe that the police hastened the spread of crime across new territories. Be that as it may, by 2007, the problem of extortion in Clarendon grew to such proportions that another special unit was formed: The Street Crime Unit, more commonly known as the Clarendon death squad.

The Clarendon Death Squad

In late 2010, investigators at INDECOM's central district started noticing a recurring pattern of reported police fatalities in May Pen and its environs. Police operations ending in fatalities repeatedly took place around the same time on Thursday afternoons and would normally involve the same small group of policemen, who also appeared extra-cooperative. INDECOM investigators were greeted on scenes with outstanding police politeness, and involved policemen would produce detailed statements without the usual fussing and delays. Around the same time, rumors concerning an unmarked car—a white Toyota pro-box—used to carry out murders began circulating in the parish. But no one could say for certain whether these murders were carried out by gunmen or by undercover policemen. INDECOM investigators listed the cases, drew maps and tables, and searched for witnesses. But everyone they met was unwilling to speak to them, certainly not on record. Then, rather unexpectedly, in August 2013, constable Collis "Chucky" Brown of the Clarendon Division contacted INDECOM and asked to provide information about his own involvement in premeditated police killings. During a lengthy interview under caution at the Commission's headquarters in Kingston, Brown spoke about the Street Crime Unit—a covert operations squad established in 2007, to "deal with criminals who are giving trouble" in the parish.

Brown sat with INDECOM investigators for two lengthy interviews. He also agreed to covertly record conversations with teammates and commanders who were involved in the collusion. Based on the information Brown provided, The Commission was able to link 69 homicides, which took place between 2007 and 2013, to the SCU. Despite their limitations, which will be explained in a moment, Brown's interviews expose a great deal about the inner working of the JCF and the routinization of police executions.

The Street Crime Unit was established by then commander of the Clarendon Division, SSP Dathan Henry. Its 16 officers were given a list of "wanted men" and were tasked with "taking them out." The unit operated mostly in plain clothes and in a quasi-autonomous manner, out of unmarked vehicles and private businesses rather than from police stations. Most of its communications, including orders, reports on scenes and incidents, were not recorded in police diaries, sheltering the organization and its superior commanders behind claims of plausible deniability.

SCU received support from a range of branches and units in the Clarendon Division: The Divisional Intelligence Unit (DIU) provided the unit with pictures of suspects and intelligence on their movements. Patrol and Traffic Divisions were asked to stop cars driven by targets and detain them so that they could be killed. Criminal Investigation Branch (CIB) detectives, who were in on the conspiracy, attended scenes to "make sure that the thing is put together properly." The CIB office also kept some of the unregistered firearms and ammunition used to carry out executions and plant on scenes. Detectives participated in instructing witnesses how to forge statements, and to corroborate false accounts made by the policemen.

After executing their targets, the policemen involved in the shooting would normally be removed from the scene, and sent home to recover from the "trauma" they had just endured. The next day, after producing written statements, they would proceed to a counseling session with the divisional chaplain, before speaking with the Bureau of Special Investigations for administrative review. Officers always had ample time to coordinate their statements. And not only were they not disciplined for their actions, but many were even promoted, and some received medals for their service. For example, in 2012, SSP Henry won the Annual Clarendon Police Award, sponsored by the local business community.

Brown is, to date, the only Jamaican policeman to have volunteered information to the Commission on widescale police conspiracy while implicating himself in multiple murders. He was obviously aware that he might face life in prison for his actions, so what made him approach INDECOM in the first place? In May 2013, a well-known gangster, Adif Washington, was murdered at the May Pen hospital by masked gunmen, several hours after he was injured by gunshots upon leaving a police station. By then, the existence of a police death squad was more than a speculation—it was basically common knowledge in May Pen. Brown's commanders decided to transfer him out of the parish to another station to shut down the chatter and minimize the damage. Brown feared that in doing so, they were indirectly sending the message that he was indeed the person who had murdered Washington, and beyond denying the allegation, Brown clearly worried that having his "name get call" killing a prominent gangster would put him and his family in severe and immediate risk of violent retaliation. Since he could not turn to the police to protect him, and having fallen out of favor with commanders, he had no other option than turning to INDECOM, seeking to be rescued.

Brown likely had hoped that in exchange for providing the Commission with very valuable information about widescale police conspiracy he and his family would be sneaked off the island and resettled abroad peacefully. INDECOM investigators, in turn, hoped that Brown could be used to bring some of the more senior commanders involved in the death squad to justice. But INDECOM could not offer Brown immunity, which is a prerogative of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) in Jamaica. After a few months, Brown became frustrated and stopped cooperating.[4] Finally, in May 2014, he was charged and arrested for the murder of three men: Robert 'Dutty' Dawkins in 2009, and Andrew Fearon and Dwayne Douglas in 2012. These represented only a fraction of the murders he and his teammates allegedly committed, but it was better than nothing. Brown completely denied allegations related to Dawkins, saying he was not even present on the scene, and in the other case he claimed he was acting in self-defense. Brown was ultimately cleared of the allegations related to Dawkins' murder but, in January 2019, convicted of murdering Fearon and Douglas and sentenced to 51 years in prison. Twelve other policemen were charged as a result of the investigation, but none of them was thus far convicted.[5]

Because Brown ceased cooperating at a key moment, the investigation left many questions open. INDECOM uncovered enough to explain the operation of the SCU and implicate a few of its members, but it failed to reveal who the unit was serving or why particular men were slated for execution in the parish. The killings were too organized, the murders too pinpointed, to be random execution of criminals, a kind of broad-brush campaign. There was a list of men to be killed, but who composed this list, and what were their motives—the files didn't say. I read investigation material many times over, trying to understand what story they were telling. Finally, I drove to Clarendon to speak to trusted contacts who I believed could shed some light on the story. The first person I spoke to, a former policeman, was well informed about the investigation. He immediately explained to me who were behind the operation and what were their motives:

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[4] More than one of my interlocutors said openly that the DPP Paula Llewellyn was too close to the police and other vested interests to allow Brown to spill the beans.

[5] During the trial, Brown denied having ever approached INDECOM and said he spoke to "a human rights advocate" and was subsequently contacted by the Commission and invited for a meeting where he was asked to record information implicating his colleagues and senior officers in conspiring to murder. When unsuccessful, he said, he was arrested and charged for murder, implying the Commission was retaliating against him.

> May Pen was plagued with extortionists who would prey on the business community, who began lobbying low- and high-level politicians to solve the issue. This is how the SCU start. They got limitless unmarked cars, donated by the mayor, and Chucky Brown was living in a hotel the whole time, also paid by the businesspeople. They asked them to be "cleaners," and they were ruthless […] The whole thing tun' up [intensified] after this Chiney-Man [Chinese] businessman was killed.

According to this speaker, private businesspeople established the unit, financed the purchase of cars, guns, and ammunition—to be used in executions and planted on the scenes. They also provided financial inducements to policemen who carried out the murders. Instead of pressing charges against extortionists who troubled them, the businessmen turned to the police and paid to carry out a massive but directed "clean up" operation. The scenario is similar to the killings at Kraal, but on a much larger scale.

The unit was financed through a variety of fronts, erected by businessmen for this purpose. In 2007, the same year as the SCU was formed, the Clarendon business community launched The Clarendon Police Award to recognize outstanding policemen. The initiative was led by the vice-chairman of the parish's Crime Prevention Committee, Anthony Smatt, owner of several local shopping malls. In 2012, Divisional Commander Henry received the award for his remarkable success in reducing the rate of murder in the parish, through "an anti-crime strategy which has dismantled more than a dozen criminal gangs" and his innovative "Gang Reduction and Prevention Education" (GRAPE), which aims to "steer vulnerable youth away from crime" with support of "the corporate community." (JIS 2011)

One of my interlocutors called SSP Dathon Henry "the mastermind behind the operation." But just days before he was supposed to take up the role of Assistant Commissioner—having passed the exam with flying colors—Henry was rushed to the hospital in Kingston, where he soon died. A postmortem examination found that Henry was "systematically poisoned" with rat insecticide, but there was not enough evidence to say who poisoned him. In 2013, shortly after SSP Henry died and was replaced by SSP Michael Bailey, the May Pen Station was once again recognized as "The Best Police Station" in the Public Sector Customer Service Awards competition. According to my interlocutor, a former policeman:

> A lot of money is involved. The mayor has his own fund that he runs to solve crime, according to him. Somebody renowned in the Clarendon or May Pen Chamber of Commerce is murdered, and they put 500,000 dollars on Crime Stop to compensate anyone giving information that will lead to an arrest. Somehow this money always gets to the police, though nobody no provide no information. This is the way they filter money to commanding officers and the policemen dem. You are offered 250,000 [Jamaican] dollars with no record. No strings attached. A policeman who declines [to take the money] gets a transfer and won't be promoted.

Chairman of the Crime Prevention Committee, Custos of Clarendon,[6] William Shagoury, was SSP Henry's close friend or associate. When SSP Henry died, Shagoury, who owns a mining company in the parish, provided one of the main eulogies at his funeral, alongside Commissioner of Police Owen Ellington and Minister of National Security Peter Bunting. Shagoury recalled Henry's "commitment to clean up the crime-ridden parish […] and his efforts to build strong relationships between police and citizens there." Shagoury reportedly said: "We must continue the work that he started, this is going into the community gaining the trust of the people and urging them to clean up their own areas. Dathon would have wanted us to continue on this path." (Edwards 2012). The Jamaica Observer, which covered the funeral in detail, reported: "the custos […] fought hard to hold back the tears as he spoke about the relationship the two shared." At the end of his speech, Shagoury pledged to honor the legacy of "the man who helped to transform the parish by donating the 'Dathon Henry Award of Excellence' plaque, which will be awarded to an exemplary member of the Clarendon police division" alongside a generous cash grant "to further his studies." (ibid.) According to a former policeman who worked in the area:

> When I was in the JCF, they would have welcome parties for senior commanders, in the house of mayors, politicians, and them use to kill pig, kill goat, cook soup... Welcome parties, holiday parties, those sorts of things. Known druggists would donate a whole heap of meat to the narcotic division. I once was asked to go pick up this meat from St. Elizabeth. There was so much we could barely carry it.

Politicians in Clarendon oversaw police appointments and promotions, but the killings were not "politically motivated." That is, they did not follow the traditional patterns of bi-partisan warfare. As could perhaps be gleaned from the description of Henry's funeral earlier, the collusion likely involved men from both parties—politicians, policemen, and gangsters. Member of Parliament, Mike Henry, and Mayor of May Pen, Councillor Milton Brown, were both members of the JLP, but some of the businessmen and policemen involved seem to have links with the PNP. Brown himself was said to be close to a notable PNP don, Skeng Don, Kenneth Black. When Collis's father, also a senior policeman, died during his detention, Chucky spent his week out of prison at the don's Manchester mansion.

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[6] Among his roles and duties, as representative of the Governor General in parish, the Custos participates in appointing chief magistrates and justices of the peace, organizing voluntary work, meeting circuit courts judges, fulfilling various chairmanships, and is referred to as 'Honorable'.

During Brown's trial, an ex-convict turned state witness testified that the SCU was colluding with prominent leaders in the guns for drugs trade. The man claimed he had worked as a police informer between 2009 and 2013, providing the Clarendon Division with intelligence about the whereabouts of "criminals" so they could hunt them down and kill them. He specifically mentioned having provided information leading to Douglas's murder, saying he was paid 40,000 JMD (around USD 350) in cash by the police Superintendent for his service. He further claimed that Douglas, the victim, was targeted because he had "disrespected" a powerful drug boss—a prominent Manchester-based "contractor," who was Brown's "friend" and collaborator. He told the jury that while they were both detained, Brown himself confessed "working for two dons." Brown denied the allegations.

The death squad investigation reveals close collaboration between members of the government and the opposition, between dons, traffickers, and policemen. When INDECOM raided the May Pen police station in 2013, it found 70 rounds of ammunition that were not sourced from the central police armory. The police claimed they had recovered these bullets from murder and shooting scenes, but based on ballistic examination, investigators believe they were likely procured from what is known as the Rocky Point "bullet tree," which deals in ammunition.

The Commissioner of Police between 2009 and 2013, at the height of the death squad operation, was Owen Ellington. Ellington's appointment was sanctioned by international donor states, despite serious suspicions concerning his involvement in the guns for drugs trade. A US embassy cable from 2008 describes Ellington as "A career JCF officer with strong JLP ties and suspected links to organized crime." The cable notes that the Anti-Corruption Branch of the JCF "pulled together a file on Ellington's extra-curricular activities" and cited a former Commissioner, who said that "Ellington needs to decide whether he wants to be a police officer or something else." (Embassy Kingston 2008a). Other Embassy cables reported that Ellington is held in high regard among members of the JCF and has a reputation of a highly capable police officer. Somewhat euphemistically, embassy staff mentions that "he is no shrinking violet when it comes to calling for tough measures against criminals." But concerning his appointment as Commissioner, diplomats remained uncertain: "questions still remain about Ellington's links to suspected criminals and dirty politicians," they said. Despite these concerns, after Ellington "surprisingly" passed a polygraph examination, the foreign missions withdrew their opposition, and Ellington became Commissioner on the eve of the incursion into Tivoli (Embassy Kingston 2008b).[7]

Having read and heard many rumors about Ellington, I was often surprised to meet honest policemen, men of apparently high integrity, who continued considering him "one of the best Commissioners in the history of the JCF" or as "one of our best policemen." During his tenure, after 2010, murders dropped dramatically by 34 percent. The downward trend in homicide rates continued for four years and was generally attributed to the "shock" endured by criminal gangs after Tivoli and Dudus' extradition, as well as to the successful work of Ellington as Commissioner. In 2014, Ellington stepped down surprisingly, shortly after his US visa was revoked without explanations. To recall, in the reform police chapter, I noted that visa revocations are commonly used by the US to signal to the Jamaican senior politicians and policemen, of American discontent with their practices. Jamaican investigative journalist Zahra Burton discussed the revocation on her television show, 18 Degrees North, where links between Ellington and the drug trade were discussed, but few conclusions were drawn (18 Degrees North TV 2017; Burton 2015).

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[7] I met one policeman who claimed he had worked in Ellington's criminal operation. A man I call Darius Roberts, who was born and raised in St. Catherine. Roberts joined the JCF when he was twenty-eight, shortly after his father, a farmer, passed away. While Robert's brothers used their share of the father's inheritance to set up a small business, which quickly failed, he decided instead to invest in a seaside property on the south coast. Roberts never intended to become a career police officer, he was quite content with remaining a constable, earning a salary of around 85,000 JMD (~ $750 US) a month. But he sought to use his position— a police officer with a seaside property—to get involved in the lucrative trade in guns and drugs. Weeks after settling into the house, just as planned, Roberts was approached by a middleman who asked to use his yard to store drugs buried in the sand. Roberts would receive 5,000 for each shipment that passed through his premises and an additional fee for securing the contraband.

After Ellington's removal, murder rates immediately peaked again, and many policemen blamed INDECOM. Not for directly removing Ellington, but for having denied their right to use lethal force. Is this really the reason the murder rate rose? I suppose it is hard to say, but likely not directly. One possibility is that Ellington was able to influence the illicit milieu because he was part of it, having been one of its main players. If this is true, then his removal, no less than the removal of Dudus and possibly to a greater extent, led to fragmentation and conflicts over market share and the distribution of profits. Another possibility, more benign by comparison, is that the police went on one of their "Italian strikes," aiming to push the government to give them a new Commissioner, which they respect and favor.

Once we understand that illicit trade is not a marginal economic sector but a rather large operation, at least in relative terms, we see that "good policing" is not necessarily a matter of allowing or disallowing the trade, or even about the interest of legal commerce against criminal businesses. It is, more immediately and realistically, about *controlling* the illicit economy, containing its effects, and reducing the level of violence. In illicit markets, violence becomes more pronounced when business groups, i.e., organized gangs, become splintered and scattered, raising competition and conflicts over turf and market share. This is well known and amply documented (Duran-Martinez 2015; Yagoub 2017). Such conflicts, which obviously cannot be brought to courts for formal third-party mediation, require informal mechanisms of conflict resolution, sponsored by powerful agents within and without the state apparatus.

The effects of such stability—secured by politicians, powerful dons, as well as some policemen—are highly appreciated by the public, even if not always in ways that are openly articulated. Arguably, Reneto Adams enjoys the same kind of appreciation and respect as Ellington. Though everyone knows he is not untainted, his actions are understood as promoting order and a modicum of "good governance" against the uncontainable rise of murderous gunmen. If Ellington and Adams still represent some form of state, however corrupt and criminal, then the Clarendon death squad series seems to have escaped the state and the control of the ruling classes and descended into a form of police nihilism.

It turns out that SCU was not only working on behalf of elite businessmen, employed by dons, and invested in their own criminal ventures, but also began targeting businessmen they were presumably hired to protect. In other words, the policemen did not stay exclusively committed to the men who contracted them to unleash terror, but bootlegged their bosses' terrorist business methods. As one of my interlocutors put it, "these guys were getting high on power. They were straight-up criminals!" He told me that in one case, members of the SCU gave guns and ammunitions to three young men and instructed them to rob a businessman during his regular trip to the bank. The robbers and the policemen were then to share the profits 50/50. One half would go to the police for providing guns and protection, and the other half will be paid to the youths, who were to carry out the operation. And so, the youth committed robbery as planned, but, for unclear reasons, ended up killing the businessmen. When they came to meet their sponsors a few hours later, the policemen took their guns and immediately executed them. Then, the policemen planted the unlicensed guns on the teens' bodies, implicating them in robbery and murder, which they had in fact committed. The cops pocketed the money.

Additional circumstantial evidence suggests that policemen found themselves on all sides of the violence in Clarendon. My friend Oswald Dawkins, Investigative Archivist and President of the National Organisation of Deported Migrants (NODM) patiently collected the stories of all policemen killed in Jamaica in 2007. Of 19 killings recorded that year, five took place in Clarendon or targeted policemen attached to the May Pen Division (Dawkins 2015):

- Constable Ralston Ebanks of the May Pen station was shot at point-blank by unknown gunmen on January 2, 2007, while driving with his sister and niece from Hellshire beach in St. Catherine. According to one police report, Ebanks's killing was not random, as he was trailed to the location. His sister was also killed in the incident, and her 15-month-old child was injured
- Special Constable Joslyn Francis, 48 years old, of Chapleton, Clarendon, was shot dead by an unknown gunman on May 26, 2007. Police reports speculated he was killed in retaliation for a police shootout in the area two weeks earlier.
- Constable Fidel Beckford was shot and killed in the community of Toll Gate, Clarendon, on October 28, 2007, several weeks after his firearm was seized by police authorities who were investigating him for reported "irregularities." Beckford was killed while standing in front of a shop, in a drive-by shooting by gunmen who shot him eight times in the back and escaped without leaving a trace.
- Constable Richard Alexander, attached to the St. Andrew South Division, was killed in May Pen while visiting his family in the area on March 27, 2007. Constable Alexander was stabbed and shot in what appears to have been a mob killing in retaliation for police killings in the area known as Juno Crescent.
- Sergeant Cleveland Wilson was executed in a barbershop in Busy Park, Clarendon, on July 31, 2007. According to reports, three gunmen entered the shop and shot Sergeant Wilson while he was getting a haircut. They stripped him off his gun and cellphone and left the place on foot.

> Several weeks later, one of the eyewitnesses, Hopeton Benjamin, was shot and killed by a lone gunman while playing dominos with a group of men. His body was found riddled with bullets, but the witnesses refused to identify the murderers. As Dawkins put it, "Was this not to ensure that those who needed to get the message to *see and blind, hear and deaf* would do so?" (Dawkins ibid, 18)

These murders don't seem to be random. Except for the case of corporal Alexander and possibly constable Francis, who may have been killed in retaliation against police aggression, the policemen appear to have been targeted by "gunmen" who searched for them. These gunmen managed to escape without any hurdles, were not subsequently found, and were capable of silencing witnesses through some form of effective intimidation. The patterns strongly resemble SCU's mode of operation and suggest one of two options: Either the policemen were killed because they too were involved in extortion in the parish and therefore put on SCU's blacklist like any other criminal, or that the policemen were targeted because they somehow interrupted SCU's work and had to be "taken out" before the collusion was revealed. In any case, the killing of policemen by policemen, more common than it may appear, indicates their growing involvement in the illicit economy as individuals.

A former police constable I met told me he was part of the SCU and that Collis Brown was his good friend. Explaining the death squad operation, he told me that the situation in Clarendon was such that guns and drugs were constantly coming in. As policemen, they were called to attend multiple scenes of murder, which left them wounded and depressed: "we saw mutilated bodies, we even saw a woman, eight months pregnant who was shot and killed. This made us think some people deserve to die, or don't deserve a second chance." This traumatized policeman was later convicted of kidnapping a St. Andrew businessman for ransom. He told me he knows he was convicted because the man he targeted was powerful. "Powerful men who use the same methods get away with nothing," he argued.

This policeman's story diverts quite dramatically from the ordinary stories of police vigilantism. It begins in a conventional manner. The policeman is exposed to terrifying scenes of violence committed against the innocent, and this makes him both angry and vengeful, and he begins to think that "some people don't deserve to live," and that some are "irredeemable." But in this case, despite being a policeman, the speaker does not become a "crime fighter" and expands his wrath as "legal vengeance". He does something very different. Having perhaps understood that the source of violence is "guns and drugs constantly coming in," or maybe just out of spite and resentment, he turns his weapon against a rich person. However, he does not kill his target but rather demands a form of rent, a ransom. In some sense, his action manifests a conflict around the distribution of rents, very much like the extortion of businesses involved in illicit appropriation.

At the same time, extortion is connected to "high-end" illicit commerce in several ways. First, extortion follows in the footsteps of more established illicit businesses, hoping to skim off part of the profits, knowing full-well that business owners cannot turn to the courts to deal with them. Extortion, therefore, can be easily presented as a tax on behalf of a community, which demands to receive a share in the yields of business operating on its land and dumping on the community its "externalities." Or, more realistically, it can be sheer opportunism of the poor responding to the sheer opportunism of the rich. But if the rich import guns, making them widely available, then extortion obviously becomes an accessible attraction. Where guns are abundantly available through expanding trade, which must be integrated with seemingly legal businesses, all forms of violent crime are prone to expand. This includes anything from using arms to solve interpersonal conflicts, terrorize domestic partners and women in general, as well as establishing small youth gangs to control, protect, or expand turf. The use of police terror is then simply a way to instantiate the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate criminals. Nothing else.

Political Populism and Police Nihilism

In the cases I examined, the police executed citizens on behalf of powerful personas in the parish, manifesting what scholars have called "elite violence." In both cases, policemen were sent to defend a deeply unstable and unequal property regime, which requires ongoing protection through terror, reinforcing dread, silence, and enshrining traditional hierarchies. Indeed, the more liberalized and global the illicit economy, the more opportunities it offers for aspiring agents and smaller, new, actors, the more terror is required. JCF special squads were established to cater to business elites. The stories undermine well-entrenched popular wisdom, which explained police killings as "vigilantism," resulting from police frustration in the face of rising rates of crime, corruption, and an inefficient justice system. The cases reveal beyond doubt that the police are mobilized by powerful agents, who finance them as a quasi-private security force, to protect property in a context where the legitimacy of wealth is physically and symbolically challenged.

Both the Kraal killings and the extended death squad case reveal continuations and path dependencies in the use of organized terror. The use of death squads is not new in Jamaica but extends back at least to the 1970s, and their use seems to have become enshrined in institutional memory. The police force has experience in using murder as a tactic, in colluding with criminal groups to source weapons, ammunition and information, to manipulate scenes of killings and tamper with the evidence, to report incidents in conventional ways, intimidate witnesses, and destroy evidence. Institutional knowledge, passed from generation to generation in an informal manner, instructs policemen how to act and how to behave. A system of punishments and rewards, both formal and informal, conditions compliance and silences skeptics, while also normalizing and routinizing killings as "how things are done around here." Related agencies, especially the prosecution and the larger justice system, have also become accustomed to protecting senior policemen, and presumably everyone else they could take down with them. Whereas individual policemen may be occasionally reprimanded, even penalized, for illegal behavior, state agencies largely protect each other and themselves from more serious damages.

Both cases begin as modes of "elite violence," wherein the police protect the interests of wealthy citizens and multinational firms, themselves likely pursuing illicit profits. However, they differ dramatically in how they became subsequently framed. Reneto Adams, fighting tooth and nail to clear his name after the Kraal incident, himself adopted the language of "elite violence" to justify himself and clear his name. As he tells it, crime is perpetrated through cooperation between local and foreign power mongers, who, because they wish to continue profiting from crime, take down dedicated "crime fighters":

> Crime! Politicians involve, government involve, business involve in it! And the gun thing from America too. right? You gonna tell me that a place like America that has all the means of investigation and the power of investigation with all the tech and all that find one hundred and plus gun come into Jamaica and they don't know who was planning that? Hahahaha! [laughs, kisses teeth to express disaffection:] It's just because, if it was the wrong person, you would have heard. But if it is part of the syndicate, it dies out.

Adams presents organized crime as a conspiracy, what he calls a "syndicate." For example, if the powerful syndicate fails to stop guns from entering Jamaica, it is not due to its powerlessness but because it has vested interests. The syndicate is marked in terms of race, and class, representing the rich, light-skinned elites and their foreign collaborators. Against this aristocratic conspiracy, the black police are structurally weakened:

> Only the peasants join the police force. So we have no Jews, we have no Arab, we have no gentiles... and you know all the ethnic group you can talk about. There is no

> policeman in Jamaica who could have the audacity now […] to go and search Mr. Matalon house. Even if you have the audacity, you don't have the will, and circumstances do not allow you to do that.

Race and class differences are explicitly spelled out in this statement: There are no Jews, Arabs, or "gentiles" in the JCF. There are only peasants who are overwhelmingly black. How can this black police force dare to enter Mr. Matalon's house—Matalon being a prominent Jamaican Jewish family, whose many descendants are businessmen and political insiders?[8] Furthermore, Adams added: "It takes money to fight crime, so in Jamaica is not easy to deal with the big criminals because we don't have the resource and we don't have the technology even if you have the will." Adams correctly points out that a police force built to target street criminals and enforce order upon the masses is inadequate for addressing sophisticated white-collar crimes, such as money laundering. He is also obviously correct that "it takes money to fight crime," and, as we have seen, contributions that augment police capacity beyond its formal budgets are used by donors to "fight crime" as they see fit. Finally, Adams is crystal clear about the disparities and injustices built into Jamaican law enforcement:

> If you start investigating, the bank manager will call Mr. Issa and tell him the police start investigating, get your act together. The small man now, police can just go kick down him door and go in the house and do what him wan do and pick up and even if him complain and bawl […] the next day you don't hear anything more about it.

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[8] The Matalons are descendants of a Jewish family that came to Jamaica at the the turn of the 20th century Levantine migration. Beginning as merchants, the family came to own many businesses and has been noted as one of the 21 families at the helms of the Jamaican economy in the 1970s. Some of its prominent descendants include Mayer and Eli Matalon. Mayer was the director of the ICD Group of Companies, deputy chairman of the Bank of Nova Scotia Jamaica, chairman of the Jamaica Telephone Company, among other companies. His brother, Eli, served as mayor of Kingston, Senator, Minister of Education and Minister of National Security and Justice under Manley's Democratic Socialist Government (during the years 1972-1976). Mayer's son, Joseph, inherited his chairmanship of the ICD Group of Companies. He also served as president of the Private Sector Organisation of Jamaica in 2010.

It is perplexing to hear Adams express sympathy for "the small man," who can be terrorized by the police. It is strange to hear a man like Adams present himself as an incorruptible champion of the people. How does he square the contradiction between what appears as an authentic concern about social and racial justice with his deadly violence against lower-class black men? If he is convinced that "big men" are perpetrating crime and violence, why does he only target "small men"? When I asked him this question, Adams said:

> I went after many big men [too], but one thing with big men is that they are well protected out here [...] But when I was there, we had to deal with many of the small men, and that goes down to logic. If you are stung by a bee or a mosquito, what is the first thing you do? You don't want to go look for the mosquito's grandfather and grandmother. It's the actual one you caught, the one that is piercing you skin, that you are now going to… [slaps his wrist], no so?

Adams begins his explanation by repeating his analysis of crime as beginning from the top of the pyramid, from powerful "big men." But he says that, ultimately, the deep causes of crime do not matter for the punishment to be just and effective. The police cannot go looking for "the mosquito's grandmother" or to dry the swamp where mosquitos lay eggs. That is, it cannot limit itself to treating the deeper causes of crime in society. What it can and must do is to "make the small man worry about his security and safety, by briskly and decisively responding to any infraction. The police have the right to expand justice wherever crime raises its ugly head. No amount of critical sociology can undermine "logic"—the commonsensical and intuitive demand for retribution and vengeance.

I call this "police populism" because it is a form of discourse the clearly caters to public sentiment, the desire to find satisfaction in instantaneous retribution against "criminals." Adams effectively uses critical language that resonates with the masses, giving the impression that his murders—which he admits were commissioned by "corrupt politicians"—were anti-elitist actions of utmost dedication to the nation. Thus, just like a populist demagogue, he trades in misrecognition, conjuring phantasmatic figuration of enemies, who both represent and misdirect rage against the elite and the system.

With a small leap, Adams reproduces the myth that the JCF is killing "criminals" and protect the people from conspiracy. But the myth would not be so powerful if it were not based on real experience and in the affective need to reconcile intolerable contradictions. Adams is reflexively conscious of the theatrical nature of his public performances, as evident in his constant allusions to himself in the third person: "Reneto Adams" the character and social personality, separate from his self, Reneto Adams, the person. Adams built himself as a character and cultivated his reputation as "a radical policeman." His ability to embody contradiction—the state and the anti-state, the status quo and revolutionary power, the police and its critics, the law and vengeance—may be one of the sources of his outstanding popularity. It is almost as if he gives a face and a language to contradictions in the people's desires that cannot be contained if considered abstractly. And isn't this precisely the state effect? A magical effect that makes private interest appear universal, and crime appear as law?

The Clarendon death squad investigation had a completely different effect. Despite the much larger scope of the operation, the investigation and trials received far less public attention than the Kraal case. It was by no means a secret. The Jamaican media used the term "so-called death squad" to report about the investigation. News channels and papers provided detailed accounts on Collis Brown's trial, even calling him "the alleged killer cop" on several occasions. The links between Brown and the "drugs for guns" dons were reported, as were the claims made by INDECOM and confirmed by the judge and the jury, concerning widespread collusion between policemen and criminals, running up to the top echelons of the police force. But the facts did not seem to resonate or to register. No one denied the involvement of senior commanders, politicians, and businessmen in the killing campaign. No one tried to explain or to justify it either. Senior members of the JCF high command, who surely knew what was happening in Clarendon, made no statement on the matter. The Police Commissioner was not asked to explain anything to the public. Local and national politicians and the Minister of National Security were not invited to television studios to give answers, and no one even mentioned the involvement of local businessmen. No one bothered asking them about their generous contributions to the May Pen station and Clarendon police division.

Perhaps the findings were too disturbing to explain. Perhaps they were too obvious. Perhaps there was no longer any position left to speak from, for this was no longer a case of the police acting as police, whether in line with or outside of the law, but the state and the anti-state, the law and illegality collapsing into each other and becoming indistinguishable. Who was the state in this series of events? The murderous police or the Commission of Investigations? The elite, in bed with criminal agents, or the DPP, who prosecuted the cops while defending senior officers and those who sent them?

The Clarendon death squad began as an elite venture. In this case, as in Kraal, residents of Clarendon distinguished "ordinary" police killings and what they called police *murders*. They appear to have identified the use of extra-judicial killings in the parish not as means used to achieve any "legal" end, like the protection of the people and state, but instead as a technique to further the private interests of whomever. I quote from Brown's questioning:

> Investigator: you said citizens suggested finding out that perhaps the shootings were not murders but police killings.
>
> Brown: Yeah, no. No, they say is murder, but being done by the police.
>
> Investigator: Yeah. Do you say it is murder being done by the police? Did you see it as that? Did you understand it as murder?

Brown: Yeah.

Investigator: Yeah. But you believed it was authorized to do that?

Brown: No.

Investigator: By Henry?

Brown: No man, we got instructions. (C. Brown 2013, 72)

According to Brown, residents recognized the murders as part of an organized campaign. By calling the police killings murders, they seem to have suggested that these are simply criminal acts—economically motivated—carried out by policemen. I other words, they distinguished these acts from executions supposedly used to control crime or as a punitive measure.

Brown's responses to the investigator are also telling. He wavers between responding yes and no to the question, finally settling for the answer: "they say is murder but being done by the police." A curious statement. In answering the following questions, Brown suggests that although he knew these were murders—unlawful and premediated—he did not execute them because *he* was excessively motivated. "We got instructions," he said. "We got instructions" is a common, even predictable, line of defense of the state terrorist. The policeman simply followed orders given to him by his superiors. The orders were clearly to go out and murder specific men, in specific times and places. Obviously, we are very far away from any conversation about police frustration or vigilantism. This is exactly the opposite: the police doing what it is told, by those in power, in secret and without much fanfare.

In contrast to what happened in Kraal, in the Clarendon death squad series, there was little to no attempt to imbue the murders with any political meaning. Apart from his trial testimonies, Collis Brown did not make any public statements. He did not address the Jamaican public as Adams did, and did not present himself as a "crime fighter" saving the nation from criminal anarchy. Having approached INDECOM, Brown did not appear to the people as a national here, nor even as a whistleblower, but as an "informer" who "called out the names" of colleagues and superiors, and who was himself a criminal. And suppose it is true that the Clarendon death squad really escaped the control of those who initiated it, as it appears. In that case, it suggests another dark twist in the attitudes of Jamaican policemen. In my many conversations with members of the JCF throughout my fieldwork, I often encountered attitudes that were a mix of melancholy and cynicism, sometimes bordering on nihilism. I heard things like:

- With money in Jamaica everything goes, you can easily get away with murder. Some places in Jamaica, the police can't go, it can't enter certain premises, [or else] they will be fired. What you think would happen if a police try to do a search in home of someone strong and powerful? Unofficial part will affect you —the person is in charge and rich and famous, it might result in your transfer or affect your promotion, allowances you should be able to get, you will be denied. I think there is an attempt to change this, people say that a different Commissioner come, and people say they won't be influenced, but personally speaking, I really don't see the change.
- Don controls the community, politician control the don, and every don have him police friend that tell him when an operation going on. You feel like crime and violence never gonna stop, every year it gets worse and worse. Every government trying to fight it for a whole, but can't be stopped, maybe it can be controlled but I doubt it.
- Politicians a tief, everyone a tief, and we a tief too.
- There is no political will to deal with crime because crime is a business. All over the world. The police is the sacrificial lamb, you have to provide solutions that aren't there. I'm not willing to sacrifice myself for the country or the people. I will not do something outside the ambit of the law. I don't argue again. I take it easy, come to work, don't take up my

> M16, because the person learn over the years. When the problems come you know you are on your own. No one wants to talk to you. So, you have to stay calm, not get too emotional. I cannot be blamed for the ills of society. It is not incumbent only on me to fix the problem.

What I call here "police nihilism" could be understood, like the aforementioned "police populism," as responding to political impasse and loss of agency.[9] However, rather than nostalgically reenacting authority in a performative and excessive fashion, the police nihilist submits himself to forces of destruction and meaningless, which he identifies all around him. The nihilist sees corruption, immorality, and decay everywhere, and cannot think of any way to resist the system, which swallows and neutralizes any force set up against it. He is convinced that nothing can change for the better and is therefore wont to immerse himself in the senseless present, radicalizing its implosive tendencies and waiting for the apocalyptic moment of the end. The last quote in the sequence above suggests that the two are interchangeable. The quoted cop was part of the CMU, and now presents himself as having resigned from all duties as an acting policeman (we could argue that in this case, the retreat is preferable). In the Clarendon Death squad series, the policemen did not become passive and did not decide to passively "surrender." Instead, they pushed terror even further. This did not create a political effect, but destroyed meaning and the political itself.

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[9] Without going deeply into intellectual history and genealogy of the term, I use nihilism here in the rather conventional sense of "the radical negation of all forms of authority, whether of God, the human sovereign, or moral values."(Lebovic 2015). Nitzan Lebovic argues that in our time— after "the end of time", the literal or metaphorical "death of the sovereign", when only "a shade of legitimate power is left"— nihilism "represents a desperate confrontation with the frozen time, by striving for an absolute new beginning and assuming the inevitability of a substantial destructive act." (ibid. 2) Lebovic identifies the resurgence of nihilism in the West in the radical elements of the Anti-Globalization movement and in anarchist collectives, which recognize the futility of political action in the present. Citing, for example, Parisian group Tarnac 9, which in their 2009 *The Coming Insurrection*, exclaimed: "the era of states, nations and republics is coming to an end… there's nothing more to say, everything has to be destroyed." He also finds a similar theme in popular culture, where nihilism is related to the apocalyptic vision of the end time, promising to end stasis by inflicting catastrophe on its surrounding. Where the present situation feels like of dead-end, devoid of sense or value, nihilism confronts meaninglessness with ever more extreme meaningless destructive gestures.

Jean Baudrillard (1989) famously related contemporary nihilism to late-modern "immense process of destruction of meaning" and "abandonment to the violence of interpretation" (160). In a world defined by hyper-symbolic reality and a surplus of signification, "the dialectical stage, the critical stage is empty. There is no more stage." "Theories float," but analysis remains uncertain (161). Paradoxically, the result of hyper-signification is an energetic impasse, inertia—nihilistic drives devoid of mythic force, pathos, nostalgia, seduction, or drama. "The hope of balancing good and evil, true and false, indeed of confronting some values of the same order" is gone. "Everywhere, always, the system is too strong." (ibid. 163). In the face of an invincible system, the desire to resist takes the form of micro ironic gestures or destructive terror. The nihilist terrorist carries "the unbearable limit of hegemonic systems, this radical trait of derision and of violence." In so doing, he exposes the system itself as nihilistic, throwing everything into indifference (ibid.). But the terrorist falls prey to the system also, for in its wake, the dead too "are annulled by indifference." Death no longer has phantasmic or political significance, a stage on which to represent itself, to play itself out, to become enshrined in ceremony, to be signified or become meaningful. And there is no longer any stage "for either mental or political solidarity" with the dead (ibid.)

One policeman put it quite well, I think, when he said: "You go back to some of the things you have heard and known make you doubt certain political figures. These people were behind the biggest gun find in the history of Jamaica on the year I joined the JCF." He argued that what Jamaica needs to begin dealing with its "crime and violence problem" is not better trained or better equipped policemen, but what he called a "trust and reconciliation" process, starting with confessions of members of the elite, especially politicians. Drawing on the experience of South African Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, he said:

> These people have to speak. Invite all parties, citizens, and all around, cover what happened in the 70s and 80s and what is happening now. It would prove to me that

> you are sincere, that we are sorry for our actions, there we are saying […] we want to clear the air between reality and perception. If I am projecting myself as a good person, I have to come out and say I have sinned. We have to put the things behind us and move forward. In Africa, at least da man dem did talk. It bring back trust in the reality. This is the biggest challenge we face, trust between the people who lead and the people who are being led.

These words help tie together much of what was discussed in this chapter and gives voice to those who, while certainly involved in various ways in state violence, are seeking a way out. This policeman suggestion of "trust and reconciliation" seems to me like an attempt to restore meaning through a symbolic process, a ritual, a theater, or a spectacle, which will allow the nation to move forward. The process is about "clearing the air between reality and perception," which means clearing the air from the ambiguity and murk of terror, to restore some trust between the governing and the governed. And note, that this policeman speaks indirectly of "them" or "you", but also directly in the first person. "I have to come out and say I have sinned." A few weeks after we had this conversation, I met with him again. He told me that he got transferred to an administrative post, where he "sit all day and move paper." He promised that when he finally retires, a few years from now, he will give me some documents that will help me complete my investigation.

Conclusion

No matter how we choose to interpret Reneto Adams's beliefs and his statements, when Adams explained what he did in Kraal, as well as his approach to policing more broadly, he did so in political terms, using notions of class, race, law, justice, and the state, and by mobilizing binary oppositions between friends and enemies, us and them. He made a fuss, he created an event, and he animated the state by openly denouncing it. The content of what he said was less important than the fact that he made state appear, albeit and even through myriad contractionary manifestations. He portrayed an image, he gave meaning, he endowed a secret "syndicate" with fantastic powers—to be shunned, desired, or feared, to be outraged and alarmed. In this sense, Adams embodied the paradox pointed out by many anthropologists: The denouncement of the state is precisely what endows it with solidity and brings it, quite literally, into existence.

If the Kraal killings could still, in some sense, be understood in political terms, then by the end of the decade, this was no longer the case. Even if nothing changed on the material level, there seems to be a shift in the imaginary. "The state" could no longer emerge as a position from which to make sense of what was happening. It had become so fractured and intertwined with its "other" that it was hard to think it could have agents, operating on its behalf at all. Now all state violence, all violence claiming to be political and speaking in political terms, appears as nothing but a sham, criminal and opportunistic. The political as such had disappeared.

It is not just violence and dread that led to the disappearance of the political. It is not only the magnitude and intensity of the system of terror and its offshoots—overdetermined and multilayered and terrifying in their institutionalized and derivative forms, it is the fact that terror was not given an idiom. No one spoke for it, but no one spoke against it either. The state did not cease to function, it did not fail, and it did not become especially empowered. Instead, things operated more or less "as usual," as they "normally" do in Jamaica: The elites set out to kill "criminals," the police obliged and colluded, politicians knew and participated, the judicial system covered up, the media reported, and the Independent Commission of Investigations probed, even bringing one policeman to court. But no one explained to the public what had happened, or what the killings were about. No one even bothered to lie about it. The killings were no secret, but they were "uneventful," and what failed was not the state but the state imaginary. No one spoke for the state, and no one spoke against it. The state lost or had forsaken its symbolic role and its performative capacity. Perhaps more than in other cases, this led to utter destruction of meaning and loss of a sense of reality.

After this loss or abandonment, what remained is far more ideological precisely because it presents itself as nothing at all: not a cult, not a religion, not a party, not a nation, just sheer economic interest, which is supposedly natural and universal. The economic motive itself is a-political. Capitalism is not a political idea or an ethic; it is just the way of the world. Then terror has nothing to do with the constructed and reconstructed hegemonic of capital on a global scale. It is only an overzealous pursuit of a goal that is entirely legitimate and widely celebrated. Indeed, it seems like we are left with two options: Either some form of populism, which centers on the immorality and corruption of elites, or some form of anti-political nihilism. We are left with these two options because we cannot name capital as a regime of ordinary terror, committed by people who, without having to believe in anything at all, believe in Mammon, nonetheless.

In the Kraal case, it didn't matter what was said, it mattered that something was said at all. An openly populist discourse translated elite violence into state spectacle. It completely distorted the facts of the case and helped to make it appear as if it was police exacting vengeance on behalf of the people. In this sense, it helped maintain the idea that the Jamaican police kill criminals as a kind of vigilante action, which, as shown in the previous chapter, masks the use of murder as social management. The politicization of the case did not lead to justice, not to mention any form of meaningful change, but violence was given an idiom—however grabbled, contradictory, and ludicrous. In the Clarendon death squad series, terror was not politicized, though it was obviously political to the depth. It was the terror of capital, of Babylon as such, terror of a multiheaded beast, with multiple titles and names, a kind of terror that follows from having cut off the king's head (Foucault 2003; Neal 2004). Something that Foucault, in his memorable depiction of the execution of the regicide turned into disciplinary normalization may have not anticipated. Business-terror as usual. Terror utterly unspectacular.

Arrested Freedom: Authority, Independence, and Autonomy in the Jamaican Community

The walls of the Community Safety and Security Branch (CSSB) office at the Kingston Downtown Division are covered with thank you notes and tokens of appreciation from nearby schools, churches, community groups, and local businesses. The office is a small space serving a team of eight policemen and policewomen drawn from different branches to make the city's model community policing unit. The unit's commander is Deputy Superintendent Rosalie Williams, a university graduate who joined the Force after working for several years in the banking industry. Her right hand, sergeant Parnell Scott, is a veteran intelligence officer with 30 years of experience with a guarded demeanor. Next are corporals Akeem Thompson and Terrence Reid, who, in addition to being policemen, are also practicing pastors. Two motorcyclists, constables Rohan Gordon and Shane Reid, are the newest addition to the bunch. At the very end of the line, in terms of formal rank, stands District Commissioner (DC) Wickham Daley, a stubby man in his sixties. All the letters attached to the wall are addressed solely to him.

To be sure, Mr. Daley is not the only cop in the crew to receive certificates and letters of appreciation. As I learned by following the team, exchanging tokens and trophies is a common and apparently important way of oiling relationships between the police and community members. But Mr. Daley cherished and treasured each note and every letter. He carefully framed and hanged them while reciprocating the senders with plaques engraved to order. A short, grizzled man, with kind eyes piercing out of their sockets, Daley worked the precinct for over twenty-five years before the JCF announced the arrival of community policing to the island. Never ascending beyond the rank of DC—a relic of the rural police whose members receive only minimal training and a salary lower than an ordinary policeman—Daley had no regard for formalities or strict organizational hierarchies. He would commonly disappear with the unit's only car (and one of only four police cars serving the entire

Division), to carry out various self-assigned missions, leaving his superiors very annoyed and, quite often, bewildered.

Ms. Williams, head of the CSS unit, joined the Force through a program of accelerated promotions for recruits with academic degrees and private sector experience. The idea, Williams explained, was to recruit men and women who will remain "sterile," that is, removed from the corrupt culture of the Force and who could serve as "change agents." Her goal, she said, is to contribute some of her experience to improve police workflows and procedures, and influencing her team to become more "dynamic" and "service-oriented" in their interactions with citizens. This plan, which she pursued with diligence and determination, nevertheless demanded dealing with men like Daley, who could not be further removed from the world of business-inspired nouveau-policing ideologies. Williams admitted that her position is difficult— "you have the rank but not the experience"—and expressed a secret wish to work with police who are more "controllable."

Daley spent his days driving around, sometimes accompanied by other team members but often by himself, through the nine communities that make up the Divisional area. He would speed through the main avenues, shouting and honking at pedestrians, and drive slowly through the denser lanes, blurting caustic pleasantries at friends and neighbors. Every now and then, he would stop by a group of men or women congregating on the corner, tell a few dirty jokes and ask a few casual questions. His patrols were often planned around picking up and delivering people and things, letters, packages, meals, and medicines. For example, when a local school held a fish fry to fundraise for their summer camp, he stopped to collect two meals in takeaway containers, quickly delivering them to two young mothers, one of whom he called his girlfriend.

There may have been something "pettily corrupt" about the way Daley borrowed and collected small favors, using his position as a cop to take things without offering or being asked to pay for them, but these minor predations, though nagging, appeared to be generally accepted. Perhaps because everyone regarded Daley as a "good man," committed to caring for the poor and the needy, especially women and children. It's hard to say he was loved or, in any meaningful way, respected, but his participation in local chains of charity, minor patronage, and sharing made people accept him as a community member, despite being a policeman. In turn, Daley could do as he pleased and get away with it because he provided the unit with something very rare and precious: People confided in him, sharing news and valuable information. Information that his teammates—no matter how forthcoming and pleasant—were simply incapable of getting.

Williams admitted she had a much harder time gathering information from communities. Growing up in a rural area, she sometimes found it hard to understand what these Kingstonians were all about, as well as what they were saying. "The culture here is different," she ruminated, telling me that during her first few months on the job, she kept a small diary to write down new terms and phrases she picked up. "Did you know Clarks means guns? I didn't know that!" she volunteered an example.[1] Undoubtedly, Williams' ethnographic penchant and her little diary bring up the affinity between anthropology and policing—two disciplines that seek to know the "community" while being foreign to it. But cultural difference was not the only problem Williams encountered in her new position. As a woman and a recent recruit whose rank did not match experience, she often felt excluded by seasoned officers, who treated intelligence like it were scared knowledge, keeping it from anyone they considered an outsider. "I go sit under the talking tree—that's how we call the tambourine tree out there—and listen to their conversations to find out what's happening."

Ms. Williams was not overly fazed by the surrounding machoism, however. She and her CSS team enjoyed the unconditional support of Deputy Superintendent Nathan Mitchell, the commanding officer of the Division. Mitchell is a towering man in his fifties, exuding equal measures of toughness and approachability. He grew up in a garrison in West Kingston and worked hard to climb up the ranks of the JCF, achieving a modicum of social mobility. His position in the Force allowed him to move his family to a middle-class neighborhood, pay his children's private school tuition, and complete a bachelor's and master's degree in management and business administration. His subordinates adore him, especially the younger detectives and the men on special operations, probably because he treated them like police warriors, always flattering their manliness. Mitchell also attracted the respect of administrative staff and ordinary patrol policemen, who, I think, appreciated being treated fairly by their superior. Indeed, Mitchell is a model policeman in what was presented to me as the JCF's model division: Professionally trained, university-educated, tough but approachable, incorruptible, and disinterested.

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[1] Revealing the meaning behind the famous dancehall riddim by Vybz Kartel and Popcaan

One cool evening in March, the unit hosted the Divisional Police Youth Club debate competition at the Community Resource Center (see below) in one of the Division's most volatile districts. The festive gathering, which aimed to promote peaceful coexistence among community members, ended unhappily when the losing team—convinced the judges were biased—physically grabbed the trophy out of the hands of the celebrating champions. Several community policemen immediately jumped in to intervene, fearing that even a tiny skirmish could lead to a "flare-up" of violence—a cycle of retaliatory attacks and counterattacks that might engulf several neighborhoods for months, even years. Mr. Daley, who had his way with the youths and heard all the gossip directly from neighborhood teens, jumped into the middle of it all and quickly managed to send everyone home on the promise that he will personally look into it. But rather than commending him for his skillful intervention, Mitchell reprimanded Daley for what he considered irresponsible and careless behavior. "Your duty was to take Ms. Williams out of the situation, not to stay there and get all mix up in the mess!" He blurted angrily at Daley as everyone returned safely to the station.

"Don't you think Mr. Daley is a good cop?" I asked Mitchell the next day, when he invited me to his office to chat, as he would sometimes do when he wanted to be amused, while conducting tedious administrative tasks. "I understand how hard it must be to work with a cop that doesn't take orders and doesn't listen, but you've got to admit he gets things done, even if his means are unconventional." Mitchell looked up at me from the pile of papers he was manually and tediously shredding and said, "Men like Daley are one of our biggest problems," with their "old policing style," they prevent the Force from "making progress."

In recent decades, community policing has become the flagship project of Jamaica's internationally sanctioned police reform campaign. It stands for transforming an outmoded, colonial, paramilitary, and politicized Constabulary Force into a modern, rational, unbiased Police Service.[2] Community policing is the strategy of choice to rebuild trust in law enforcement agencies, which aims to bolster public cooperation in preventing crime and sharing information on offenders and infractions. It encourages policemen to become "embedded" in their local communities through various mechanisms, such as attending and hosting community events, church services, and sporting activities, conducting regular foot patrols to engage directly with citizens, and encouraging community participation in "problem-solving". (JCF 2008)

No doubt, Daley was practicing some form of community policing. Yet, as probably evident to the reader, it was very different from what reformers had envisioned. Through his reciprocal exchanges of gifts, news, and favors, Daley was drawing on an established repertoire of community relations in Jamaica. A mode of policing that is by no means limited to urban garrisons but is also common in many rural areas. As a family of farmers in rural St. Mary explained to me, for example, "everyone here loves the police, the sergeant is a Big Man. When a farmer's crop come in, he makes sure the police get them share. You can't have any function in the community without inviting the sergeant." The family agreed that, sometimes, the police go too far with their "begging," literally stripping the farmers of large portions of their salable produce. When this happens, cops are condemned as being corrupt and "licky licky" (greedy). But exchanges are expected, even necessary, to establish good relations.

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[2] As a strategic review of the JCF commissioned by the Ministry of National Security in 2008 confirmed: The implementation of the JCF's Corporate Strategy has been supported by the UK, US and Canadian Governments. While reform efforts have focused on many areas including HR development, traffic management, witness management and the establishment of a professional standards capability, the majority of the JCF's efforts have been directed towards establishing divisional primacy (which is now rolled out in all 19 divisions), establishing community policing and increasing intelligence and investigative capacity (MNS 2008, 19).

Similarly, Daley became embedded in the community through reciprocal networks of exchange. He sustained relations over time in ways that proved more important, or at least more useful, than his formal rank. For Mitchell, though, Daley's behavior was unacceptable because it breached formal hierarchy of command and represented the risk of "mixup" and corruption with unsavory elements in the community, such as gangs. For Mitchell, Daley's way of working with the community was "old fashioned," quite different from what is taught in training schools, manuals, and international conferences. But ultimately, even Mitchell—who openly favored Western-type reform-minded policing—resorted to "old-fashioned" modes of projecting authority when needed. For example, when confronted with opposition, Mitchell exclaimed at his subordinates: "I am the don in [this part of] Kingston!"

In this chapter, I take a historical and ethnographic look into diverse traditions of "governing through community" in Jamaica. Like other ethnographers of community policing reforms in the Global South, I too became quickly aware of certain discrepancies between "local" and "foreign" or "Jamaican" and "Western" ways of understanding community policing concept and practice (Brogden 2002; Julia Hornberger 2011; Jauregui 2016; Kyed 2018). But things are even more complicated because the Jamaican community has a multivalent history as an institution, social process, and vision. I am not speaking here only of the relatively well-known formation of the "garrison community," so prominent in the literature on Jamaican crime and policing, but rather on the concept of community as it developed through diverse attempts to deal with the emancipated black peasantry and the urban milieu that descendent from it. I distinguish two broad Jamaican traditions, one more authoritarian and the other pastoral and humanistic, which in the 1990s were superimposed with neoliberal notions of community, which are again quite different. These distinct ideas about community produce some frictions and everyday conflicts, such as those negotiated by Williams, Mitchell, and Daley.

I don't simply describe this complexity or rehearse difficulties surrounding "cultural difference" and local specificity. Partly because, as I will show, there is not one but several Jamaican conflicting traditions. And partly because I want to bring another voice to bear on the question of community security and policing—the voice of residents or of "the people." In the last part of the chapter, I relay a demand I heard often from residents of ghetto and garrison communities, who insist they wish to police themselves—against the state and the police. Instead of treating community "self-help" as inherently illegitimate because it defies the rule of law or serves "dons" and "criminality," I want to hear what members of community defense groups have to say about what they are doing, and why they believe they will do a better job than the cops. As we shall see, the quarrel that many Jamaican "community members"—that is, the black poor—have with the police has little to do with how kindly and professionally they perform their role, but precisely what role that is.

The Meaning of Community in Jamaica: Preliminary Observations

The line of inquiry presented in this chapter progressed over time and unfolded through a series of encounters. I began by studying community policing ethnographically, as an ideology, and as a practice in the Kingston police division introduced at the opening of the chapter. I then conducted fieldwork with a community-based organization, Peace Management Initiative (PMI), that, in its work on violence prevention and conflict management is engaged in what I call "para-policing." During this period, I had numerous informal conversations with community activists, residents, social workers, academics and interviewed reform and development experts. The inquiry also passed through archives of Jamaican social sciences, which, especially in the late colonial and early independence period, were quite concerned with the problem of "community" and how precisely to develop it. Along the way, I began asking about the role played by anthropology in making "garrison communities," given that of the central architects of the garrison form, former Prime Minister Edward Seaga, was a trained anthropologist and committed ethnographer.

As I realized over time, in Jamaica, "community" is an incredibly supple concept, which significance extends far beyond the notorious institution of "the garrison." A few months into my research, I began to see that Kingston is not so much a city made of neighborhoods but, as it were, a collection of many urban villages. What I mean by this is that, at least in sociologically "downtown" areas, communities are not simply collections of individuals and households which happen to live in proximity. Communities are rather basic social units, often comprising several extended families, where central functions—economic, social, and political—are performed and embedded. Indeed, as we have seen in the Buil' N' Kill chapter, communities are units of production and reproduction, which remain central to the sustenance of families and individuals.

The community is the locus of important social and economic activities, from self-defense to self-help, through child-rearing and labor exchanges. In the community, people are expected to look after their neighbors and ensure they are fed; not only out of altruism, but because they will expect the same from their neighbor in time and in turn. Politically, many communities have undergone "the process of garrisonization" (Figueroa and Sives 2002). Even communities that are not fully-fledged garrisons express high degrees of unanimous voting in exchange for jobs and basic services. Due to this clientelist modality of distribution, communities are prone to compete over scarce benefits, a dynamic that imposes internal cohesion, often undemocratic and coercive. Over time, communities also develop robust historical narratives and collective myths, recounted orally, and represented in murals of fallen heroes and distinguished local personalities.

Communities are, quite as important, the main sites where citizens encounter "the state," not only through policing but, additionally, as the numerous institutions of neoliberal governmentality. Many, if not most, social services—from health to education to welfare—are allocated per community and distributed within the community setting. This happens, for example, through periodical "community services fairs," where local government agencies, national ministries, tax and population registration authorities, public and private health providers, NGOs, and poor-relief agencies, offer their wares and seek to engage residents in their natural habitat, as it were. More recently, community development and policing became more strongly integrated into the Zones of Special Operations (ZOSO) policy, examined closely in the next chapter.

Jamaica's Social Development Commission (SDC) is today one of the country's leading development agencies. It operates under the common but generally unquestioned assumption that development in Jamaica should advance on and through the medium of "community." In recent years, the SDC has created detailed profiles of each of the 783 communities where it operates. Attempts to "see the community" reflect the urgent need to produce adequate modes of representation—data, maps, and quasi-ethnographic descriptions— that institutionalize the community as a primary unit of governance (SDC 2020).

How have these 783 communities been counted? How were their boundaries adjudicated? These questions arise because community boundaries indeed do not correspond to administrative or electoral borders, found anywhere "on the books," i.e., in administrative and legal documents. The division also doesn't overlap with how the police count communities for its own purposes. According to the JCF, community policing is active in 900 communities across the island—another count that appears somewhat random. Indeed, the difficulty of adjudicating where precisely a community begins and where it ends is part of the reason why community-based modes of development need to constantly remain attentive to subjective understandings—how residents themselves conceive of space and place.

From residents' perspective, however, community boundaries are both stiff, fluid, and overlapping. Stiff, because histories of conflict and ongoing turf wars make them often very dangerous to cross, particularly during times of open hostilities. Fluid, because borders change through war, peace, and informal alliances, that can sometimes change quite rapidly. Overlapping, because different designations of community, from different times and for different purposes, are often cobbled on top of each other, reflecting distinctive modes of association. For example, Gordon Lane and Sunlight Street, two tiny roads off Maxfield Avenue in Western Kingston, have been presented to me by their residents as a part of Greater Trench Town, a section of Arnett Gardens, a part of the South St. Andrews electoral division, and as a section known as "Zim" (Zimbabwe) but also confusingly known as "Mexico." Sunlight Street proper also flaunts its own local patriotism, recording its heroic history since the 1970s. Despite, and perhaps even because, determining community boundaries is so problematic, the interaction between state policies and the autonomous actions of residents—which are plenty— makes "the community" in Jamaica into a fundamental, though often taken for granted, total social fact.

Community as Technology: Authoritarian and Missionary Variants

To understand the ideas and practices of community policemen, it is crucial to look into the Jamaican history of the concept, richly and concretely mediated. I can only give a brief outline of the main turning points and events, and to make things a little more sensible, I broadly distinguish two "streams" or orientations in community theory and practice: One, the authoritarian and conservative tradition that descends from the plantation and which most obvious 20th-century manifestation is "the garrison." Two, the pastoral-humanistic tradition, which grew out of Christian missions, free villages, and then linked with the progressive national movement in the 1920s. The distinction is analytic, and, obviously, we are dealing with a spectrum. Again, atop this complex configuration, the North Atlantic neoliberal reforms introduce the "standard best practices" notion of community policing today.

The authoritarian tradition views community as a domestic household domain, akin to estate or plantation, which barracks not workers but, crucially, dependents. The community is ruled by paternal power—today usually politician or don— who disciplines "his" dependents and makes sure they are taken care of. This tradition is linked to the reconstituting of patron-client relations after the abolition of slavery, and therefore directly to the mode of development of Jamaican dependency capitalism. By contrast, the pastoral humanist tradition is concerned with developing collective spirit, self-reliance, and independence, based on education, cultivation of "good habits," and the reconstruction of kinship, cooperation, social solidarity, and later, nationalism. In very broad terms, the former tradition can be linked to the Jamaican white merchant-planter class, which includes Arabs, Jews, and Chinese. In contrast, the decond tradition is more closely associated with the brown professional middle class. The two streams became intertwined with the development of garrison communities in the mid 20th century.

As discussed in the first chapter, after abolition, most of the emancipated sought to escape the plantations and continue developing as a "proto-peasantry," cultivating crops for local subsistence (Mintz 1989). In the 1830s and 1840s, Afro-Jamaican and British Baptist congregations pioneered the concept of "free villages," which were established on lands purchased by the missions to circumvent the planters' cartel decision not to sell land to the freed. The free villages—there were a hundred in total—provided security of tenure and were based on consolidating family land, which formed the basis of kinship and inheritance. The villages were usually established around a central church and designed to model civilized freedom based on hard work, investment and saving, and the respectable middle-class vision of Victorian domesticity. The villages ultimately became the place where Jamaican Myal and Revival religions developed during the wave of evangelist awakening around 1860-1861 (Besson 1984; Jean Besson 2002; Hall 1993)

Despite the desire to flee the plantations and the strong impetus of freedom, most peasants remained tied to the plantation complex for various reasons. Land scarcity resulting from plantation encroachment and enclosures, as well as the quick parceling out of family land (since all descendants had claims to it regardless of age and gender), meant that many small farmers remained dependent on temporary labor, especially since they required cash to buy imports and pay taxes. Even those farmers who sought to establish their independence often relied upon merchants-agents to sell their products to international conglomerates. This was evident especially, initially, in the banana sector (Best 1968; Thompson 1966; Holt 1991).

For this reason, relations between merchant-planter and peasants retained much of their customary characteristics from the days of slavery. Indeed, according to Thompson, although the slaves were classified as stock, treating them as such "was not in practice possible." Instead, "the slave-owner, as a matter of convenience, wrapped the hard points of slavery in a web of customary rights and expectations." (Thompson ibid. 24). This included tenancy rights in subsistence plots that were often respected, as evident in planters compensating their slaves monetarily when they required them to move off their lands. In addition to customary paternalism, which manifested itself in certain "virtues" associated with being a good estate owner—allowing peasants to collect firewood, draw water from springs, and collect fruit on the estate, helping with education or carrying the poor to one's doctor—relations were often cemented by the peasants need of protection, and the planters need for labor. For peasants, the rich patron served as an "insurance plan" against various calamities—drought, tropical storms, economic downturn, as well as conflict mediation and security (ibid.).

In the 1920s, the budding national movement led by Norman Manley—who will become the founder of the PNP—began organizing banana cultivators in rural areas in cooperatives. The basic idea was to create some collective leverage vis-à-vis American financial fruit conglomerates. The result was the formation of Jamaica Welfare, "corporate social responsibility" *avant la letter*. [3]After 1945, the Colonial Office took over the limited company as part of a consolidated cross-imperial Welfare program.[4] Jamaica Welfare grew rapidly in the years preceding independence, from working in 10 villages in 1938, to 229 in 1949. It carried out mass education programs, inculcating habits like nutrition, hygiene, home economics, and basic literacy and skills training. The agency sought to cultivate those "essential qualities for good fellowship" and "that spirit of 'community' which is fundamental to welfare work." This was predicated on the idea that "the community must learn to "regard itself as a unit for better social organization and action" (Report by Island Supervisor, LC Pinnock cited in Francis 1969, 46).

Read in the context of rural social surveys of the 1940s and 1950s (Simey 1946; Clarke 1956; Seaga 1955; M.G Smith 1956), the community development movement reveals anxiety concerning the prospects of "social integration" and "social solidarity" in Jamaica. Many scholars have shown similar anxieties concerning forms of black kinship after slavery and their translation into social policies directed to fix the "dysfunctional" black "matrifocal" family (R.T Smith 1990; Spillers 1987; Thomas 2011). An equivalent argument can be made about the practice and ideology of community development, which was deeply informed by modernist social sciences, especially ethnography. Ethnography was critical because, even more so than kinship, the boundaries of community are rather elusive and hard to determine objectively and because peasants' participation was not always forthcoming. In many villages, farmers "were not being sufficiently involved, participation was superficial, and the qualities of self-help and responsibility were not being developed." (Paper on the role of community councils, 1963, cited in Francis, ibid.).

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[3] The Limited company, funded from a small charge on every stem of banana exported from Jamaica, was established as a result of negotiations between Jamaican cooperative producers and the United Fruit Company. It engaged in several village improvement schemes throughout the 1930s (training farmers, establishing cooperatives, development of cottage industries, and educational campaigns encouraging "thrift and study", community meetings and cultural activities). These efforts took place in the context of the global economic recession, which, in Jamaica, precipitated the rise of Garveyism and Rastafarianism, and exacerbated social tensions. In those years, community development was informed by the African Mass Education Movement aiming to lead Africans "to productive and positive ends" as well as from North American "Negro Education" schemes like those advanced by Booker T. Washington (Francis 1969).

[4] From an imperial perspective, community development in rural areas of the colonial world was supposed to modernize and industrialize the population and to solve problems of infantile mortality, malnutrition, and juvenile delinquency, that were becoming burdensome. By the early 1950s, the Secretary of State for the Colonies had "recognized community development as an important part of colonial administrative policy" (Batten 1951, 322). It was seen as an important tool for elevating the standard of living in overseas territories and dependencies, by contributing to economic progress "by its own efforts and initiative." Indeed, "if communities can be encouraged to participate in development work by voluntarily providing free labour and materials from their own local resources, the enormous problem of financing the desired speedy and general development from inadequate resources may be considerably eased." (ibid.)

M.G Smith's study of several rural villages in pre-independence Jamaica was explicitly devised to further governmental intervention, addressing, heads on, the problems faced by previous attempts to organize community councils in rural areas. The trouble, Smith argued, derived from a misconstruing the boundaries of the community, which may geographically extend beyond, or indeed constitute only part, of a village. Because "The village is or *should be* a community […] we must enlist the support of those persons who are the leaders of […] established groups; or if no groups have yet been established, we must establish ours with those persons who would normally have been leaders of such groups." (M.G Smith 1956, 309-310). Or noting that villagers express no interest in joining special committees and associations established for them by the experts, Smith argued, "we must […] think of general grouping free to develop, define and pursue their own purposes, and based on locality and common community membership." (311).

Yehudi Cohen, a Yale anthropologist who studied a village he called Rocky Roads in central Jamaica in the same period, was even more extreme. He reported that, among peasants, neighborly bonds are so tenuous that the village "almost defies designation as a community, for the connotations of reciprocity, cohesiveness, and “togetherness” implicit in the word "community" are absent.” (Cohen 1954, 131). Cohen’s fascinating study describes the peasants’ behavior as highly individualistic and centered around competitive hoarding of cash. Despite an official ideology of kinship and reciprocity, most relations—even the most “natural” and intimate, like between spouses or between parents and children—were mediated by money transactions. Rocky Roaders were relatively well-off peasants. Over 90% said they could satisfy their own needs, and over 60% had surpluses. But for Rocky Roaders, having money meant being independent, not only from material want (“sickness”) but from domination by any kind of authority or master. Indeed, the dissolution of community into quite extreme market relations was related by the villagers—including and perhaps especially women—with a desire to flee employers, fathers, husbands, preachers, and landowners. As the abstract force of society in general, money allowed them to escape all forms of personal domination, with the result being that, in Rocky Roads, everyone was struggling “to be more independent than anyone else” (ibid. 114).[5]

The peasants’ flight from authority and the apparent absence of social solidarity troubled social scientists, who found “no formal and systematic mechanisms by which the individual may be forced to behave in a prescribed manner or desist from certain activities” (119). “Culture makes little provision for the training of personality types to assume roles of leadership […] the desire and ability to control others”, in turn, there was “no apparent propensity by the people to form a “followship” (123). The villagers studied by Cohen had little interest in recently established “community councils” and left the initiative to "strangers"—government administrators, colonial bureaucrats, and businessmen from Kingston.

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[5] The association of money and markets with freedom was also constituted under slavery, where public markets provided the enslaved periodic respite from the plantation’s disciplinary terror. A long and established tradition in historical anthropology of Jamaica and the broader Caribbean has shown how markets shaped black peasant subjectivity and have shown how the market figured as a concrete materialization of freedom, especially for women (Mintz 1974, Bush 1985, Besson 1993, Besson 2002, Sweeny 2019, 197).

Among the social scientists conducting rural surveys was one Edward Seaga, a student of anthropology who would become one of Jamaica's most distinguished, if controversial, politicians. Edward Seaga was born in 1930 to a family of upper-middle-class 'Syrians,' and in 1948, at the age of 18, left to Harvard, where he studied at the recently formed Department of Human Relations, then under the direction of Talcott Parsons. Following his return to Jamaica, Seaga secured a small grant to study folk healing and later became a fellow at the Center for Social and Economic Studies at UWI. Over 42 months of ethnographic research, Seaga studied folk life and healing, first in the free village of Buxton Town, St. Catherine, and later in West Kingston. The latter will become his electoral constituency, which he reigned in for over 40 years.

Seaga is generally credited as the architect of the garrison community form, although he surely did not develop and implant it alone. As discussed in chapter 2, Seaga established Tivoli Gardens in 1963, when he became Minister of Welfare and Housing. Based on his studies, Seaga argued that he would develop Tivoli into a "model." The model embodied a vision of urban revival based on culture, religion, and strong discipline and reconstituted the paternal-authoritarian tradition.

Seaga didn't publish much of his fieldwork. Still, in a series of papers, the former Prime Minister presented black Jamaicans as aggressive, impulsive, unruly, with a tendency for idleness and overindulgence. Based on his study of rural and urban communities and families, he argued, for example, that "contradictory" and "inconsistent" parenting patterns in black families made black children insecure, submissive, and prone to lower levels of achievement, with a tendency for aggressive responses and irrepressible penchant for competition. But he also believed that Jamaican "informal, indulgent, un-regimented life experience is the wellspring of all art forms" and that these could be harnessed under responsible guidance—a stern paternal hand—could be harnessed to achieve productive economic goals. (Seaga 1997, 94)

For Seaga, community development (in fact, garrisonization) was intimately linked with the conservation of black 'folk' culture. He had begun his career studying African religions (regarded until then as 'cult') and, as a conservative, firmly believed in the reconstitution of tradition—mainly in the creative arts, family life, and religion. In this context, he developed many of the nation's African cultural institutions. By appealing to the poor black, Seaga contested the hegemony of brown elites, mostly associated with the PNP, in the cultural sphere, from which he felt excluded. Certainly, he felt much more at home among the peasants and slum dwellers who called him "Massa Eddie" and looked up to him with veneration. "I fell in love with the real Jamaica," he told me, admitting a hint of exoticizing lure that always drew him to blackness (see: Seaga 2005).

Seaga took it upon himself to "peel away some of the layers of self-denial and dependency" among descendants of slaves by restoring to them the knowledge of their own spiritual practice and their music, "which was all they had left." Tivoli was his primary field of experimentation. He gathered funding from the private sector to equip the community with a community center and a mother-child complex. promoted performing arts groups, sports clubs, and visual arts like sculpting and painting. Bringing Jamaica Welfare under the control of the Ministry, Seaga developed Tivoli as his extended household domain, ruled by him personally (Seaga 2010).

Seaga was not ashamed to admit—he actually took pride—in his paternalistic attitude towards the poor black people of Jamaica. In my travels with him, I observed Seaga openly and unabashedly address Jamaican citizens like children (to be fair, he treated almost everyone around him in this demeaning way, including me, his staff, and even the acting Prime Minister—perhaps the force of a habit). Seaga believed that most Jamaicans are still too "uneducated" to participate in democratic elections. "They can't understand the implications of their choices," he said when we were traveling through communities one polling day. He sat in the black SUV, with peeled-down windows, waving silently at the masses that threw themselves at the car, professing their love and pleading for blessings.

> People feel I am a father to them. They call me father, uncle, elder, boss. And I admit that I am paternalistic. People need a father to discipline them. They would come to me with a little boy, [and say] 'beat him up fi me, sir!' This is not something I was trained to do; it was something I evolved into […] like a benevolent dictator […] In Jamaica, you have to mix benevolence with the right level of discipline, that is what is called compassion. The people loved me because the women were not on the streets and the pickeny haffi something fi eat, and the community was kept orderly.

The garrison form replicated authoritarian and paternalistic mode of rule among politicians, dons, policemen, prison wardens, and even in business. On the ground level, where communities are policed, there is much confusion about what community policing actually means. Of course, every policeman knows to recite the widely circulated manuals prepared by USAID, but in practice, policemen draw on the whole repertoire of "local" and "foreign" traditions.

Among policemen, the authoritarian style of policing associated with "crime fighters" who are not shy of killing is part of a "community policing model." [6] As Paul Chevigny related already in the late 1980s, notorious policemen "famous for having killed many people" were also community benefactors who financed local dances and activities, and, like "area leaders" and politicians, participated in paternally governing sections of the inner city. In turn, the policeman would often receive gifts from community members, usually imported commodities, “to remain in his good graces.” (Chevigny 1990, 413)

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[6] In their evaluation of post-2010 policing in Jamaica, Rivke Jaffe and Tracian Miekle argued that JCF divisions in Kingston adopted measures previously utilized by dons, particularly Christopher 'Dudus' Coke of Tivoli Gardens. Their study demonstrated how the police became more invested in "dispute resolution, social provisioning, and symbolic assertions of authority… which reflect the JCF's recognition of the efficacy of security and legitimization strategies popularized by dons" (2015, 75). However, what Jaffe and Miekle describe is not a new development. Rather, policemen in Jamaica have long practiced modes of clientelist and paternalist power, combining harsh "disciplinary" coercion with the distributive largess of "big men". This mode of authority has deep roots in patron-client relations, which have been central to the very meaning of "community" in Jamaica.

However, the pastoral humanistic tradition was also manifest. For example, the 1993 report of the National Task Force on Crime (the Wolfe Committee) focused significantly on the “root causes of crime”. It strongly advocated the restoration of persons and communities (Wolfe 1993, 6). The report urged the government to “focus on people,” providing education, health, housing, transportation, and employment, and offering citizens “opportunities for self-actualization”—"creating the kind of human being for whom crime has no attraction.” (ibid. 7)

The Task Force stressed that crime will not be curtailed until people stop feeling they are discriminated against and until law enforcement pursue white-collar criminals “with the same zeal and energy that we use to flush out the perpetrators of gun crimes.” Among the major causes of violent crime, it listed: Lessening respect for authority and changing moral values, family disorganization, reduction of positive role models and their replacement by criminal personalities, garrisonization, increased inequality in income distribution, endemic unemployment, increase in gun trafficking, abuse of drugs and narcotrafficking, and the general effects of globalization on lifestyles and values, rising materialism and individualism, and media glorification of extreme violence. (ibid. 15) It recommended integrating NGOs, schools, and churches into the effort of rebuilding the community’s fabric. Community organizations were expected to take a leading role in a program of “resocialization of the Jamaican people… the process should stress decency, discipline, respect for each other, respect for life, non-violent solutions to conflicts” (ibid. 20). The panel also recommended economic rejuvenation activities such as skills training and small business entrepreneurship. Although the term community policing is only mentioned in passing, the Task Force recommended expanding Crime Stop and Neighborhood Watch programs and improving police training towards de-militarization. Currently, it protested, "more time is spent teaching the young recruits to use a baton than in teaching community relations." (ibid. 24). Responding to these recommendations, in 1995-96, the JCF launched two pilot projects in community policing, overseen by its Community Relations Unit (CRU), which officers still recall whenever it is implied or suggested that community policing was imported to Jamaican from "the West."

The Jamaican Community and Neoliberal Community Governance

In the 1990s, as part of the advent of the reform police, another modality of thinking and governing the community was brought in. This liberal, or rather neoliberal modality of community, is rather familiar. It generally assumes that the community is an aggregate of individuals, at best families, which happen to live in proximity and therefore share some basic resources, which should be governed not so much "in common" but through formal mediation of private interests. The 1998 Corporate Plan, promising to "take the JCF into the new millennium," pledged to accord community policing "a high priority as a means of effecting a transition a more service-ordinated and consensus-building style of policing better anchored in democratic values of participation, accountability, responsibility and legality." (JCF 1998, 4)

By 2000, it was realized that community policing values should become the Force's new mission and guide the practice of all policemen (Chambers 2014). In 2006, the Community Safety and Security Branch was established. In 2008-9, it was reinforced through the program for recruiting international police officers (IPOS) discussed earlier and the production of new training materials by foreign consulates and development agencies. After two decades of experimentation, community policing is now fully operational across 19 police divisions in Jamaica. Still, it remains mostly externally funded by agencies such as UNDP, USAID, DFID, Global Canada (formerly CIDA), and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB).

The JCF manual on community policing—co-authored by local and international policing experts and published by USAID —explains that community policing is a philosophy and a strategy that promotes "partnership" between the people and the police and which seeks to involve citizens in solving problems of crime, disorder, and quality of life (JCF 2008, xxii). The objective is to create "confident and safe communities," where people and businesses are secure, through collaboration with "stakeholders" on "problem-solving" (ibid.) The booklet also emphasizes the need to build on "grassroots creativity," drawing on "the wealth of knowledge that exists in the community." (ibid. 8) The point here is not only to draw on ways of doing things that are conventional and legitimate but also to make the community more legible and amenable to be ruled, as we shall see.

The booklet emphasizes that community policing is not about improving the Force's image but is a "proactive intelligence-driven crime control strategy" (ibid. 14-15). This is supposed to convince those who regard community policing, as several policemen put it, as "just being nice to people." The roles of the police officer, in addition to traditional law enforcement, include protecting vulnerable persons, mediating conflicts, implementing violence interruption strategies, organizing community events, launching police youth clubs and neighborhood watch forums, leading school programs, collecting intelligence through patrols and interactions with citizens, liaising with witnesses and victims, and reassuring the population exposed to serious crime and combative police operations. The policeman is required to pay attention and preemptively treat various sources of "disorder," from the classic "broken windows" to sex work ("prostitution"), drugs, and trafficking in persons. The manual seeks to encourage policemen to become a community resource, "referral facilitators, mentors, role models and mediators." (ibid. 28). To further community development, policemen should also work with local government and development agencies (ibid). I focus more specifically on this integrated approach to security and development in the next chapter, but there is a point I must highlight here. The manual states that it is within the duties of community policemen to develop "community profiles," which shall include:

> A description of the population, an estimate of the community's size, description of the state of roads, lanes and alleys, community assets, social infrastructure, government agencies and buildings, Justices of the Peace (JP), teachers, Parent Teacher Associations (PTA), service clubs, location of residences, health facilities, and places of business.
>
> The community profile should also include a map showing all the out districts for which the station is responsible. The map should show the location of residences, places of business, health facilities, office of JPs, government buildings, as well as vulnerable and hotspot areas.
>
> One should analyze the economic base, the cultural aspects or ways of life, the social organizations, the official functions and the methods of handling crises in order to get a "feel" of the community life and the practical problems they face on a daily basis. This information should be updated from time to time as the need arises. (ibid. 23)

These thick descriptions (profiles) should also build on the policemen's understanding of the community's history, its past and current conflicts. It should include data collection on unemployment and the economic activities of different age groups and sectors. It should also be followed by an analysis of relations among the various sections of the community and their interests. As evident, the police are here tasked with making the community visible, legible, and amenable to be governed (J. Scott 1999; Mitchell 1988). This highlights the fact that while communities are the basic unit of development and governance, they nevertheless remain somewhat opaque to the apparatus of governance. Many economic activities are informal, many births are unregistered, squatting is prevalent, and people use a double naming system, using their "Babylonian" name only in formal contexts and being generally known by their alias or another chosen moniker. So, as we saw with Ms. Williams in the introduction, the policemen must become ethnographers, who provide detailed data and analysis of the community as a holistic social and economic process. It is not for nothing that when I first told Mr. Mitchell about my research, he smiled and said, "ah, we are the real [anthropologists], you are the trick."

Still, if we now return to the local setting where the community is actually policed, we see that in practice, policemen and policewomen are drawing on an extensive and uneven repertoire of ideas and tactics, and that they model their own police personas by drawing on diverse models of authority. Mitchell, as we saw earlier, is quite supportive of professional, 'Western-style,' community policing, and especially enjoys the position of being a "role model" for ghetto youths who can look up to him and see that "they have options" and "can become something." But he also draws on established forms of macho-militarism, partly because this is what he thinks the people and his subordinates expect of him. Williams, in turn, is very professionally driven. While she may appear, at first, as somewhat of a bureaucrat, she is a committed ethnographer, patiently and quietly collecting information about the communities, their histories, and their culture. She leaves most of the moral guidance and education work to corporals Thompson and Reid, which makes sense given that they serve as pastors and ministers.

On their patrols, community policemen would sometimes catch a group of youths who appear to them "idle." Instead of sending them back to school, they would often bring them to the station to "rough them up." I never saw them use any physical violence, and I doubt this was only a result of my presence. These were no callous policemen. Mostly, they were interested in lecturing: "Why yuh a use this cake soap?" [skin bleaching cream] "It shows you don't appreciate yourself. You have one color God give to you." "When yuh last trim?"; "fix up your back, walk up straight"; "make up your clothes, tuck in your shirt." After the whole charade was over and the youths appeared sufficiently neat, the officers would give them a *bula* (a kind of bun cake) and send them off. On Fridays, Mr. Scott, the veteran intelligence officer, would administer a boy scout club in one of the elementary schools. Activities included detailed inspection of the children's uniforms—haircut and shoes included—followed by paramilitary drills in the school courtyard, under the scorching sun at noon. Scott had no sadistic inclinations; of this I am certain. His attitude reflected his belief that inculcating discipline was a central role of the good community policeman.

Policemen often complained about political interference and even in some cases argued that "the politicians dem run the community like it a dem yard"—a statement that indicates they were critical of the "domestic" model of garrison paternalism. Policemen also recognized they are positioned to wield personal power over the communities they "serve":

> As an officer in the Force, you have great authority and power. If you're in charge of a police division, it is *almost like you are a politician* — certain things must come through to the officers, you want to have a function, a march, music, economic activities, giving licenses, you don't enforce [or] you do enforce. Say a man wants to open a bar, [he] has to come through the police super[intendent]. The Super can say that because of the crime situation, it is not advisable. We call the shots.

Policemen understand how crucial their decisions are for the community. And this goes far beyond the ordinary problem of police discretion in liberal society. The poor in Jamaica are dependent on minor economic activities that often take place within their own communities. Things like vending, operating small stores, bars, restaurants, as well as community street dances, are subject to the approval or discretion of the police superintendent, who thereby assumes direct control over residents' livelihood. Social events, such as football matches, birthday bashes, funeral processions, or the "nine nights" wake—central to inner-city sociality—can also be interrupted or prohibited by the police, more or less arbitrarily. In recent years, as part of the effort to introduce more "order" and regulation into the ghettos, many activities that were once conducted informally now require a permit. During times of war in or between communities, the economic hardships already suffered by residents due to intense violence and insecurity are often compounded by police decisions to disallow events and dances, and vigorously enforce against modes of informality. Additionally, in Jamaica, references from local police superintendents are often demanded by potential employers for various forms of vocational training and in applications for labor exchange programs.

Policemen I spoke to often complained that community policing had become a catch-all term that allows the state to transfer the governing of poor communities entirely to them. They repeatedly protested that they are responsible for a variety of social services that other agencies should have distributed. For example, in the absence of reliable ambulance service—there are only three public ambulances serving the whole Kingston Metropolitan Area, police are often called to deliver residents to the hospital or even deliver babies. Another member of CSS told me that, while he understands why the absence of social services and lack of opportunities contribute to involvement in crime and violence, "your primary role [as a policeman] is supposed to be law enforcement, but the police end up taking the role of social workers." He said he agrees that "the police must be at the forefront of violence prevention," but "too much falls to the lap of police. That can't work."

The Division I observed was considered lucky because it received a Community Resource Center, built with USAID funds in one of the more "volatile" districts. The Center was created with the idea that "re-introducing the state" at the very local level could help stabilize the community and improve relationships between police and residents. As Ms. Williams explained, "the center will allow police to know the residents, help with job creation and community projects, involve the police in social activities, provision of services, promoting trust and goodwill, and diffusing tensions." The

Center consisted of two portable buildings perched on a gravel surface. It had a small computer room, where residents could access the internet, a small space used by the local Community Development Commission (CDC), and another area designed as a police post to be manned by community officers. The shaded space between the structures could be used for public meetings, services fairs, and social events. When I started my fieldwork, the police and NGOs used the space to celebrate a whole year without any murders, but within a month or two, the situation reversed. Two separate wars erupted, one at the top of the community, one at the bottom. Each war was a series of attacks and retaliations and involved intimidation and assault of unaffiliated ordinary citizens living in opposite areas.

Most residents of Kingston ghettos don't easily travel to other communities, where, as strangers, they might become easy targets for assaults and robberies. So, there was no question of residents from the eight other communities in the Division coming to the Center to access services. But because of the war, even most members of the so-called "community" in question could not get there because it involved crossing borders, which were unsafe. The two policemen who were supposed to man the post, according to the agreement between the JCF and USAID, basically refused to go, admitting they were scared. Ms. Williams thought they had a point and that going to the Center without reinforcement was potentially dangerous. She also believed it is a terrible waste of time and money to let two cops sit in a post all day, virtually doing nothing. Ultimately, even this woman, who typically shied away from conflicts and avoided criticism, divulged that the Resource Center wasn't "such a great idea" and that it is "really a shame CSS was not consulted" before it was built by "whoever it was."

At the Criminal Investigation Branch (CIB), the detectives' office, I listened to a conversation about how they might address the wars in the area. "Do you think there's anything that can be done to rectify the situation?" the commander asked, and everyone in the room straight out laughed. They agreed that they don't have enough "operational proactive response measures" to make a substantial security intervention. They suggested they might instead increase their searches for guns and ammunition, basically more of the same. The detectives said they had no clue how the Resource Center was supposed to help them. "It's a public relations center" that "provides internet to gangs."

Instigated by the arrival in the 1990s of reform police, there has been much talk about the "cultural specificity" of Jamaican community policing. ACP Steve McGregor, head of the Community Safety and Security Branch and an innovator of "post-Dudus policing" in West Kingston (Meikle and Jaffe 2015), often speaks publicly about the need to adapt community policing to local conditions. In an interview, he explained that the police need to undergo "cultural change" to replace the "garrison type of policing" but that the new model ought to reflect "our own culture and our own norms that have been showing over time." The result, as shown by Rivke Jaffe and Tracie-Ann Miekle, was adopting a model of community policing that replicates the policing systems implemented by dons informally (ibid.)

Former Acting Commissioner Novelette Grant, considered locally as one of the authorities on community policing, told me that the introduction of endless foreign models does little to solve the deep problems resulting from poverty and, especially, squatting. She said that the poor are "victims of their environment," which is disorganized and misgoverned and that ample research has shown that severe emotional and psycho-social problems—from deep-seated anger to low self-esteem and low achievements—compound the multiple degradations of food deprivation and limited access to services. One of the more interesting things she told me was that "It would be impossible to work with communities until they become autonomous. Today they are totally autonomous but misdirected. They have to become autonomous in another way."

Because the meeting was brief, I did not get a chance to probe further about what Grant meant by "autonomous" communities and why she finds current autonomy misdirected. I think she hit the nail on the head with the comment, pointing directly to the question no one dares to ask: If community policing—in its various local and transplanted forms—is ultimately about "making communities police themselves," how does community policing differ from the ways communities are already policing themselves today?

From Policing to Politics: Community as a Demand for Autonomy

Rose Town, a garrison in West Kingston, has been engulfed by intermittent warfare since the 1960s. Historically, the war was between the top section—aligned with the PNP—and the JLP affiliated bottom. A large barren field in the middle of the community marks the no man's land surrounding what was once the border between the two areas. Today, however, the shift from "political" warfare to more opportunistic power politics transformed local geopolitics. Borders have become less stable than before. They proliferate inside each section and shift with the formation and dissolution of alliances, some determined locally and others in national and international conflicts.

Sheldon was born in the area and lived in the community through cycles of warfare. He once drew me a historical map of the area's geopolitics, telling me about the times some lanes united in a strategic alliance and when some factions and "corners" betrayed, rebelled, or absconded. Though they sometimes later regrouped, forming new coalitions under the pressure of need or opportunity, each round of hostilities left soar wounds, pain, anger, and guilt. What to make of an enemy who was once a friend and a friend who has become a bitter rival? Despite the multi-scalar nature of the conflict, enemies live very close to each other, sometimes only a few houses apart.

The current war began in 2017, after what residents describe as nearly a decade of peace. Following a bloody conflict between 2005 and 2008, several warring communities came to a ceasefire agreement. Yet, as Earl Allen, a resident and community leader, told me, "it took the police and politicians dem six months to mash up the peace maintained for ten years." We were standing in the shade of a little kiosk on Maxfield Avenue, a rare occurrence since the Avenue is today the main frontier, and residents usually try to avoid it. Maxfield Avenue is one of the main roads connecting downtown to the Half Way Tree Transportation Center, but residents, who fear they will be targeted, cannot stand on the road to wait for a bus or a taxi. They either wait in one of the nearby yards, peering through holes in the fence until their ride approaches, or they take much longer routes to reach their destinations. War makes daily life extremely difficult, almost bringing it to a halt. The constant threat of assault and raids, the fear of being hit by a stray bullet, is compounded by the risks of traveling out of the area. Going to school or going to work, getting food from the market (the area could probably be called a food desert), or visiting family or friends are incredibly fraught and dangerous. The war spares no one. There are no arrangements for "humanitarian passage." Women and children are often fair game, as are non-combatant men and the elderly.

Sheldon explains that during wartime, the border is constantly watched by residents. No one can come into the community without being closely inspected. During the day, women and children often sit outside and casually but intently observe the perimeter. Later in the evening, men—often members of the community defense crew—keep watch and listen. There are designated ways to alert that the enemy is nearing and even signaling how distant he is from the boundary. [7]

Residents clearly distinguish war and crime and in a fairly conventional manner. They define crime as opportunistic activity, usually economically but sometimes psychologically (pathologically) motivated. Crimes are carried out by robbers, thieves, rapists, and especially by "gunmen." In contrast, war is a conflict over territorial control and governing autonomy, understood as the community's right to self-rule and protection against subjugation by a foreign power— a gang from another area. Crime is sometimes the cause of war, such as when, for example, the leader of a neighboring community allows his "subjects" to transgress against their neighbors. Communities that are at peace with each other are expected to maintain efficient internal policing and respect the sovereignty of their allies. If and when local "law enforcement" appears to be lacking, an affected community may seek retaliation which, from this perspective, responds to the breakdown of peaceful "international relations." But crime may also be the doing of random criminals or gunmen who are not affiliated with any known enemy and are considered harbingers of mayhem, precisely because they are "loose" men.

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[7] I was obviously watched as well, but my presence was seen, I think, more as a curiosity than a threat. Curious or not, I came to Rose Town quite often during my fieldwork, compelled to understand the dynamics of war which, rather than strange, appeared quite familiar. The war which the residents were enduring—a war which shaped every aspect of their daily lives and therefore also their consciousness—is obviously very different from the conflict I grew up in, in Israel/Palestine, but the similarities were striking also. Despite very different political justifications and markedly different scales (not to mention the difficulty of calling the occupation of Palestine a "conflict" in any meaningful sense), the war in Rose Town reminded me of home and pushed me to reflect on some anthropological questions of warfare: The condition of enmity, the intimacy of identity and difference, fears of death, violation and subjugation, the role and dynamics of vengeance, and the gendered dimensions of war, its relation to violence against women. All of these issues are obviously massive concerns, which cannot be treated here in a satisfactory manner. In what follows, I therefore only try to relate some of what I learned from the residents about how they see war, crime, policing and peace in their area.

The distinction between crime and war relates to important distinctions between different types of "gangs" and the legitimacy of violence exercised by different actors. As sociologist and activist Horace Levy has shown, "community gangs" or "defense crews" are part of inner-city life in Jamaica, organized for protection rather than for the pursuit of illicit profits. Emerging from the years of intense political warfare, first in garrisoned areas, these groups unite to protect their community from crime and belligerent attacks, in lieu of adequate police protection—or worse when "the police themselves are the crime." Local defense crews usually lack a formal organizational structure or hierarchical command. They tend to be egalitarian—a band of friends who bond around sharing food, drinks, and other forms of mutual assistance. They set up during war and disintegrate in peace when they go back to being social fraternities. "Defense is a community thing," writes Levy, and as we have started to see, it involves women in supporting roles as well as children and the elderly (Levy 2012)

Levy admits that the difference between community crews and criminal gangs may become blurry, as local crews sometimes graduate into conducting illicit business—for example, establishing an extortion racket to collect protection money from bus drivers—which allows and compels them to establish more enduring governance structures.[8] But even today, when technological advances and the proliferation of guns supposedly allow every youth to launch an international criminal operation, in practice, youths are often denied entrance to lucrative illicit markets by much stronger players. Furthermore, young men tend to see participation in community defense as their obligation, and war, however dreadful, is conceived as a manly virtue. Crime, though tolerated and sometimes justified as "what we must do to survive," is seldom seen as something to be proud of.[9] Members of defense crews are not criminals. Rather, they are soldiers.

Defense is a "community thing" in another sense as well. In war, the entire community is—or at least experiences itself—as a collective. In garrisoned areas, because of the clientelist manner of allocating material goods and services, communities will often have an interest in maintaining a level of cohesiveness—especially during elections—to preserve their power as "bargaining units." Winning or losing elections may be consequential for each resident's access to jobs, training, grants, medical services, fixed roads and functioning utilities, educational enrichment, and community development activities. Wars, in this sense, are campaigns to secure the community's immediate material interests, mediated through the control over electoral turf. Even when politics does not play an official role, the community may be interested in defending itself against foreign occupation. Maintaining autonomy allows the community to devote its space for economic activities—formal and informal—without paying tribute to any foreign entity and negotiating rights and concessions (for example, to secure labor) with business owners operating in the area. Furthermore, as Sheldon explains:

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[8] Levy makes the point that defense crews are not a serious threat to national security, as is often suggested, but a social problem and that they should be treated with social intervention and community development, rather than though harsh security policing and strict "anti-gang" policies.

[9] Among young men today, being a "scammer" for example, commands very little respect, despite lotto-scamming being very lucrative. This relates to the distinction between more or less honorable lawbreaking, where, traditionally, thieving is considered least respectful. Scamming, because it involves deception and because it targets supposedly rich and powerful Americans (though in practice, mostly lonely pensioners), is sometimes seen as an updated manifestation of 'Anansism' (after Anansi the trickster), but "scammer" is also used against competitors and enemies, implying they are not men enough to stand behind their actions and fail to follow codes of virtue and morality.

> Sometimes the people dem nuh waan the war but dem nuh know waa deh other side a go do. Dem might think seh dem [on the other side] is very evil in terms of dem a go kill anybody 'round here so. So they try fi say, "Yo, yuh cyaan [can't] let the man dem come ova ...yuh see? Sometimes the next side, when dem a take over the turf, when dem win the turf, dem come and do whole heap of tings, like they rape all the gyals, do whatever tings to dem without dem will. Or they might think seh me is connected to the person deh [...] that a certain person is connected to the gang by friend or family, so they might want to run dem out, they might want to burn dem house, they might want to treat dem unfairly.

As Sheldon says, violence or war are rarely what people prefer, but often, they don't see a choice and understand the war as self-defense. As in most belligerent conflicts, their reasoning is grounded in a specular relation with "the enemy," whose actions cannot be fully anticipated but are assumed to be imminent and "very evil." Sheldon mentions two significant fears as causes of protective attacks, to prevent the "next side" from "coming over": Fear that the enemy will "kill anybody 'round here so," and fear that "when dem win dem turf… dem will rape all the gyals." These fears of transgression, immediately given a sexual idiom, are related to the fear that the enemy might retaliate against the whole community, assumed to be "connected to the gang by friend or family." Given the history of inter-communal violence in Jamaica, fears of being expelled from one's home or being subjected to unfair treatment are reasonable.[10] But reasonable or imaginary as the threat may be, one's personal agreement or disagreement with the war is less important than one's purported identity, which makes them complicit anyway. In this sense, community warfare in Kingston resembles ethno-national conflicts everywhere.

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[10] It is true that many communities exhibit intertwined kinship structures, somewhat akin to large extended families. But it is also true that kinship lines extend beyond community boundaries, sometimes even into enemy territory.

This is also why the killing of a community member during war or as a criminal act of aggression calls for organized retaliation. As a member of a defense crew from another community explained, avenging a murder is strategically necessary to send a message that an assault against one's people will not be tolerated. The legitimacy of local protectors depends on them providing security, which is anticipatory and preventative. Indeed, although vengeance is often thought of as retribution for a crime in retrospect, in fact, it is much more appropriately understood as a forward-looking gesture, which often perpetuates the war it is supposed to prevent.

Speaking about vengeance killings in Jamaica requires proceeding with caution and awareness. Currently, the proportion of retaliatory killings is estimated at around a third of all recorded murders (Ward et al. 2018) and have understandably become a major focus of violence prevention programs by the police and NGOs. Social workers regularly visit victims' homes to offer grief counseling, hoping that better processing of pain and anger may curb the urge to avenge and prevent at least some murders. The results of such methods are mixed, at best, because the right to exact retribution is seldom renounced or forgotten, and even when intervention manages to delay retaliations, they hardly ever manage to prevent them (ibid.)

Presenting revenge as capricious, irrational, and savage is a conventional way of legitimating state intervention and the superiority of legal rationality (Menke 2018). This is true even when the law and the police, as we saw throughout this dissertation, are no less vengeful and not more rational than the citizens left to themselves.[11] But revenge is seldom capricious and often quite calculated. One area leader told me that even when he would personally prefer to "lef it," he is pushed to retaliate by "mi people dem." He is expected to right the wrong committed by injuring the perpetrator or his associates and would have a hard time maintaining his authority if he fails to do so.

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[11] Menke follows Benjamin in thinking about the affinity, even direct continuity, between law and vengeance. He claims that for law to be more than mere retaliation, it has to become a law capable of reflecting upon itself.

Furthermore, revenge is usually not exacted immediately but much delayed. Often, until after the funeral, which in Jamaica—due to backlog in postmortem examinations and the time it takes a family to collect money for the funeral and wake—often happens several months after the death. When I asked the same area leader about the reason for deferring retaliation, he explained that this is a way of "buying time," as it were. Until they avenge, the side aligned with the victim is relatively safe—the ball is in their hands while the other side is waiting in anticipation. "This way," he said, "we can keep the funeral, have our food and drink, and dance." Peace is the time that stretches anxiously between one attack and another.

The dynamics of vengeance echo everything we know about ethno-national conflicts. Thus, it is also worth observing how the community—just like a modern nation state— draws boundaries by appropriating and subjugating women, while claiming to protect them (Yuval-Davis 1997; Das 2006). In Sheldon's quote above, the threat of war is associated with rape and the violation of women, which come to represent transgression and subjugation of the whole community. As implicit in this statement, protecting women and children is a common justification of war. A community's reputation depends on whether it is perceived to harbor rapists and sexual predators. In many ways, rape is a litmus test for the virtues of the fighters, and communities will openly protest when they feel that their name was damaged by bad press and unfair speculations.

Ideologically, women are to be protected, and they should take no part in actual fighting or strictly military matters. Another defense crew member tells me that only men participate in devising the community's military strategy "because no man a go listen to no 'oman when it come to security." Further, he says, "it hard to trust females, 'coz yuh neva know who dem a link up with, if dem might be hugging up de enemy." Women are excluded from community political decision-making on two counts, I hear. One, that they lack the military expertise that men are apparently born with. Two, they may be related, through various sexual and transactional relations, to other men—enemies or policemen. Women are also considered "chattier" than men. As they move around, they supposedly "carry news" and distribute information. Because of this perception, women are often at higher risk of being labeled as informers, a crime sanctioned by murder. Under no condition are women "exchanged" to form alliances or treaties. Women are free to transact themselves, and that is what makes them dangerous from the point of view of "the community."

Without glorifying the community's ability to self-organize and self-police, there are still reasons to listen to what residents are saying about why they prefer to "do it themselves." The voices I bring are obviously limited to those I spoke to and those I happened to meet, but they are nevertheless worth considering, even as a thought experiment. I already pointed out earlier that Earl blamed "the politicians and the police" for destroying a long-lasting peace and instigating war in the community. He also accused the state of disrupting community self-policing efforts, which proceeded informally and included, for example, residents setting up streetlights in the community, abstracting power in the interest of public safety. This was done during the war, as an urgent act, aiming to reduce fears of walking on the street at night and protect the community from constant raiding. However, as Earl reported, the police quickly came in to destroy the lights and sought to charge those responsible:

> People can you believe it? The strife zone of Maxfield Avenue, you have police who are complaining about the lights people erect in the community… the lights are there because the place is very dark and some police are complaining about the lights. Police yu nuh live in a di area! suh if you think dat you can come and tek dung di light wi a go report yu.

In this short statement, Earl is reversing the relationship between the people and the police. "If you think you can come and take down our lights," he threatens the police, "we will report you," claiming our right to security. Community members were also upset when the police, supposedly to protect their safety, introduced 8 pm curfews—preventing them from effectively securing their homes. Raquel, a woman in her thirties, told me that the police come into the community under the pretext of controlling violence and arresting men wanted for murder. In reality, they "pick up" whoever they want, whenever they want, on various allegations. This further undermines community safety, as these men may be crucial to defense efforts. She also told me that this community "got rid of rapists long time" and that "the police dem tell lies" to make it easier for them to break the community and prey on its residents, extorting them for "protection."

As providers of protection or "private security services," police operate in various degrees of symbiosis and competition with gangs and area leaders as a quasi-state taxing authority. However, unlike gangs, which rely for their legitimacy on at least some level of community support, the police are said to rely simply on the formal authority of the law. While taking from the people, they provide little in return in terms of services, welfare, and protection. They are therefore despised as thieves, the lowest type of criminal considered not bold enough to stand behind their actions and assume responsibility for their consequences: "When dem come collect money wi get call… every time they come shots get fire, but when people get shot police leave, they are never there when they're needed." Raquel added, "most crime cyaan solve inna Jamaica because the police a deh criminal. So it work: Mi do something bad and investigate you pon it!"

Sheldon called me one evening to report he had just been released from 24 hours in custody. He said he was in his yard, just about to leave for work, when a police team patrolling through the community decided there was something suspicious about him. He was not surprised, but angry. "Dem say mi a bridge light and arrest me fi dat, but even my light bill is legal, dem have nutin' pon mi but dem tek mi anyway." He then added bitterly, referencing earlier experience, "at least dem didn't get me fired this time, so mi deh yah [I'm here], back pon deh slavery…" Sheldon knew that police harassment can be entirely random but can also result from grudges "against me as an individual." He explained:

> At times people tend to just be selfish and just link with the police, and just... dem have a self-centered hate against me or yuh as an individual, dem a police contact, dem call the police and say "yes, that person is involved," and because the law so slack, dem [the police] willing to take yuh up quick-quick-quick and lock yuh up, and charge yuh for something where they have no evidence, and somebody say "yeah, a dat person deh."

Here we begin to see how the police sow conflict in the community. For it is not entirely accurate that police don't receive information from residents in inner-city communities. They often receive tips, but these are often driven by some ulterior motive. Quite often, the police are used by citizens to "resolve" interpersonal conflicts, which often means to retaliate against a neighbor or a business competitor. These interventions sometimes result in killing. An INDECOM investigator explains:

> When police "act on information," on what is called "intelligence," people will always doubt and speculate where this intelligence come from. Was the person they kill connected? Who gave the information, and why did they want this specific man dead? In the ordinary scenario, police are briefed that a wanted person is in the premise… That there are gunmen in the house and illegal firearms and ammunition. But the police may operate on malicious allegations. The neighbors called the police and said gunmen are in the place because the two families were in a feud. People will always have an ulterior motive for giving information.

Arguably, all or most of these problems relate to bad history, bad "culture" of policing, which the current wave of reforms is eagerly trying to fix. But note that Earl does not speak only of the police, he also mentions the politicians. From the perspective of him and others I spoke to, the problem is not simply the extent of daily violence and predation they suffer in the hands of criminal policeman—though this is certainly not a small thing. Instead, as citizens emphasized time and time again, the problem is that law enforcement is "corrupt from the head." The state, the elites, or "uptown people" have no genuine interest in curbing crime, since "that is their business." All they want is to prevent poor people's "crime and violence," which they portray as one lump of barbarity without distinction. As shown earlier, residents certainly want to control crime and often reject it vehemently. To them, the system perpetuates crime to make profits, whereas bad policing is just a side effect of this economic process.

A resident of Jones Town, a garrison in downtown Kingston, published a letter to the PNP that relates this issue. In the letter, 'Roh Per' recovers the history of the garrison from the 1960s, noting that, at the time, party stalwarts were necessary to protect the communities from attacks launched from Tivoli. But in the 1980s, after the PNP lost the elections and many of its combatants were killed or forced to migrate, crime raised its head. "Many persons who were armed started to rob and do other things in order to maintain the lifestyle they have grown accustomed to. Some persons within the stronghold had also decided to abuse the rights of their own neighbours and this created much hatred and anger." Responding to this predicament, "a new community leader emerged," who chased the criminals out of the community, and "became loved by the people… [staying] there in the community along with his brother defending the rights of the people and continue to play their role as die-hard community activists, not criminals."[12]

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[12] The statement was written in the context of an internal party battle by some of the named MPs against party leader, Portia Simpson Miller, after the loss of the 2016 elections. It aims to mobilize Simpson Miller's power base against

The community, he says, managed to ward off the threat of crime and social deterioration by self-organizing, giving power and legitimacy to a new area leader (who, note, he does not call "the don"). But then, "a new set of politicians…crept up in the party" and sought to advance their personal ambitions by "dismantling the garrison." Roh Per argues that in contrast to much of the talk about dismantling garrisons to make way for a formally organized community, the process really supports the replacement of the old community garrison with a new garrison "that gravitates towards money and things of great material value, fueled by a spirit of betrayal and ungratefulness." This involves the displacement of committed community activists by "this new breed of politicians" who have strategically placed themselves in key communities and build their power by "rejecting and criminalizing the hardcore base that makes up the garrison." The statement continues:

> You cannot turn your back on us and win; we have buried the culture of senseless killing. We have become mature. We will not be quick to shed blood unless it is in defense of our own life. You cannot criminalize us, you cannot declare us as irredeemable, since it is the Blood of the Lamb that was shed for our redemption, who dare you say we are irredeemable?

Here, the garrison appears in an entirely different light than how it is portrayed in mainstream discourse, media, reports, and academic literature. Here, rather than a dysfunctional social form "breeding crime and violence," the garrison is represented as upholding a proud barrier against crime and all forms of self-serving opportunism, a mode of self-organizing for defense and protection. The community has shed enough blood to know the difference between sometimes necessary self-defense and "senseless killing." It will not stay silent while being criminalized.

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contenders and critics. However, it also reveals the power and agency garrison activists have within the party, which allows them to challenge politicians by denouncing them as opportunists, self-serving, and disloyal.

Organized violence in the community is the other side of organized peace. Not pacification campaigns launched by the authorities, but an effort from below, to unite the people. In chapter 2, I recalled the unprecedented but fragile peace agreement ushered by gangs in 1978, that was quickly destroyed when its leaders were ambushed by police and executed. The moment, though long passed, has not been forgotten and is referred to as a model for all peace agreements in ghettos and garrisons. Residents understand peace to be in their interest—an interest quite different and even antagonistic to that of the system. As Earl put it, "at the end of the day, if this madness don't stop the police are gonna be the winners like in 2005-2008, cause dem a go come kill who dam feel like and nothing don't come out of it. Mi want to know how some people fool so them not seeing the future." For Sheldon:

> I can say I will continue to encourage peace in every way I can, as I have been doing. War seems to be always occurring; however, the cry for peace is always needed because only through peace comes joy, development, and prosperity. This war will not end if steps continued to be made and retaliation continues. No one is winning, jus losing because all the areas involved are losing out on great development opportunities, entertainment, and most of all, human life.

Sheldon here certainly speaks the language of peace and development, which indicates his involvement in NGO peace-building efforts, but he is also adamant that the police and "the system: are the main problem: "Everything is a problem for them [the police and the politicians]. That's why we must live good and let them stop win. A we the citizens a give them the power to do what they feel like." Peace among the people is a condition—as well as a manifestation—of warding off the state as a source of violence, crime, disorder, and disintegration. In another conversation, he went much further, and explicitly said the people should police themselves:

> Let me tell yuh man, there are many tings, many tings me a nuh talk about, tings dem might believe mi nuh know. Because yuh know, when those stuff are coming out, the knowledge will be a threat to dem. So when mi ready fi bring out the knowledge is that mi ready fi war, in a revolutionary type of way. In times of making change. Is that something wrong? That no something wrong. People want to see a better life. Yuh say yuh a live a better life, why is it for yuh alone? Why not fi other persons? This is our solution, you have tried so many solutions according to you, to give you a better life, and instead we see it as a worser life. So let us get our chance. So me believe that is revolution. Give us our chance to choose a better life. And make we create a force for ourselves to protect ourselves coz the police nuh a protect we.

This powerful quote condenses several issues, which will continue concerning us in the next chapter. First, Sheldon says there are things he knows and understands, which the powers that be are unaware of. He keeps this knowledge close to his chest until he is "ready fi war, in a revolutionary type of way." The undertone recalls divine judgment, which will appear in the final hour, allowing long covered truth to be finally uttered. Then, what the people know will become a weapon. It will no longer be used to perpetrate injustice by presenting it as necessary, as "how it must be" and "what we must accept." There is also an interesting, if subtle, reversal of positions between the one who knows and the ignorant. Here, it is "dem," the rich and powerful, and perhaps even the system itself, that doesn't know and doesn't even suspect that the poor know about them more than the other way around. The poor are not stupid and not unaware of what is taking place. On the contrary, they pretend to be ignorant to trick those who trick them. They will "bring out the knowledge" when they are ready to strike back.

Sheldon justifies this revolutionary approach ("is that something wrong? That no something wrong!) by the simple desire for a better life, for a life like the one "you have." That is, by an unmistakable demand for equality ("why for you alone? Why not fi other persons?"). He claims that "you… tried so many solutions" which were meant "to give *you* a better life" and made *our* life worse. So many solutions that, even if genuinely aimed to improve the community's condition, ended up wreaking havoc. He says it is time that the poor get a real chance to choose a better life, which they will make themselves, trying their own ways, using their own knowledge and life experience. Including, significantly, the chance to create a force for self-defense, "coz the police nuh protect we" and because they will, supposedly, do it better.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I sought to provide a historical and ethnographic account of the concept and practice of community in Jamaica. Looking through the lens of community policing and the mundane conflicts and quandaries surrounding its idea and implementation, the Jamaican community came into focus as a potent concept, site, and technology of governance. Jamaican ideas about community and its development initially emerged to comprehend, order, and manage the emancipated black peasantry, whose modes of life and self-organization seemed uncivilized, and wanting in "social solidarity." There are at least two established traditions of governing through community in Jamaica—one more authoritarian and paternalistic, the other missionary and humanistic. The first recuperates modes of domestic governance, characteristic of plantations and, later, of clientelism. In this tradition, the stress is on hierarchy and strict discipline, alongside fatherly care to his subordinate dependents, who are not treated as citizens. The missionary-humanistic tradition descends from Baptist missions and the free villages and is driven by an urge to humanize the former slaves through education—secular, moral, religious, and civic—uplift them spiritually, and make them economically independent respectable members of society. Both traditions informed, and continue to inform, Jamaican ideas about community policing. It is therefore quite futile to oppose a "Jamaican" and "foreign" model as if this was a simple opposition. It is more useful, I think, to consider what is meant by "community" in each case, and how different visions, ideas, and practices are superimposed, come into conflict, or articulate. Though divergent and even oppositional, the authoritarian, missionary-humanistic, and neoliberal traditions all approach the emancipated as a problem to be governed. They all treat community as a technology of ordering, socializing, civilizing, and managing the people.

Thus, while both public debates and academic literature on policing spend time arguing the merits and demerits of "cultural specificity" in community policing, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that the communities that are being policed have their own ideas about community and see things quite differently. As historical studies and ethnographic records sporadically reveal, Jamaican emancipated classes tried to maintain their relative autonomy vis-à-vis governing power. This is not to say that Jamaican peasant or their descendants completely escaped the various modes of governmentality through community, since they didn't. Their organization into garrisons in the 20th century, in particular, made them become invested in their communities individually and collectively. However, there remains an irreducible and indestructible element of freedom that continues to push through various modes of ruling, containing, and taming the people's freedom. Jamaican peasants, whose foundational experience was the opposition between freedom of the market and unfreedom of plantation, cherish their individual freedom—against all forms of personal masters. It is this freedom, fundamentally, that governing through community seeks to arrest.

As community policing continues to draw on established traditions, as well as on new developments, voices "in the community" remind us that the question is not the means but the ends of policing. Is policing really geared to make communities safer? To stop crime or to build peace? Residents openly question these suppositions by showing that they are perfectly capable of distinguishing crime from self-defense and understand the difference between genuine peace among the people and campaigns of pacification. They are no longer willing to be criminalized by the state, politicians, or the ruling classes in general. They suggest that if the state were truly interested in fighting crime, it would support—or at least not repress—the autonomous organizations of the people for their security and survival. While I don't think we should glorify or romanticize popular militias—there are many difficulties with popular violence, not least, in relation to women—I do think it would be wise to listen to the distinction drawn by residents between crime control and policing. For what they seem to be saying is that the people might gladly participate in the former, while they resent being subject to the latter. To them, policing is about maintaining the status quo, which is criminogenic, whereas genuine interest in crime fighting will direct its efforts not to them, but to much more powerful agents. In making these suggestions and in asserting their desire to rule themselves, in their own ways, the emancipated begin to lay out a path from community policing to community politics.

"Dem a Tell Lies Pon Wi": Disciplinary Warfare Meets Pedagogical Refusals

In the summer of 2017, against the backdrop of mounting rates of murder, the Government of Jamaica announced a novel policing measure called Zones of Special Operations. "ZOSOs," as they quickly became known, are areas designated by the order of the Prime Minister to become sites of intensive police-military operation combined with a concentrated effort of community and social development. The ZOSO legislation (formally, The Law Reform Act—Zones of Special Operations; Special Security and Community Development Measures—2017) empowers the security forces to carry out operations aiming to rid the area of illegal weapons, ammunition, and other contraband; to search a person, vehicle or place without a warrant, and to establish cordons and curfews, and immediately after that to promote social and economic development through collaboration between Government, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations. Grounds for declaring an area as a Zone include "rampant criminality, gang warfare, escalating violence and murder and the threat to the rule of law and public order." (ibid).

ZOSO is a state-of-the-art security and development technique, which combines a range of tactics from the arsenal of colonial warfare, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism with "broken windows" policing to restore state control over supposedly ungovernable margins. The policy aims to wrest the governance of slums and ghettos from the hands of dons and gangs, which have taken over public security and welfare functions. "To out administer the enemy," in counterinsurgency parlance, and to undermine the environmental, social, and economic conditions that make communities into hotbeds of "crime and violence."

As explained by the commander of the JCF Community Safety and Security Branch, ACP Steve McGregor, "ZOSO's goal is to disperse the gangs, moving them out of their comfort zones, mak[ing] them more vulnerable to be caught." The idea is to push gangs into disarray by removing their members from the environment that allegedly supports their operation and where they can easily defend themselves in the midst of the population. Note that the goal of the operation is not so much to capture criminals, prosecute and deter them, but rather "to regulate deviant behavior, pushing toward behavioral changes among community members… to impact their direction, to become consistent, honest, genuine, to influence the culture of the people in all areas." With his background in the JCF Operations Branch and known for his severe policing style, McGregor insists that "ZOSO, like community policing, is not about being nice to people. It is an active crime reduction strategy crafted to address all cultural behaviors and the people's mentality."[1] A similar sentiment was echoed to me by a member of ZOSO's Joint Command in Montego Bay, who explained: "ZOSO is not about punishing criminals" but about fostering "effective change through appealing to the psychology of our people…changing what the person wants and what he desires."

The first ZOSO came into effect on September 1, 2017, in Mount Salem, Montego Bay. I watched the declaration on the evening news on Television Jamaica (TVJ). The Prime Minister, Andrew Holeness, accompanied by heads of the JDF and the JCF, announced that the security forces are currently moving into the area, marking the boundaries where checkpoints will be located. Implicitly addressing concerns that ZOSO will become "another Tivoli, but this time in a legal way," Holeness advised residents to stay calm and cooperative, reassuring them that every policeman and soldier operating in the Zone had been trained in the use of force, human rights, and "social intervention." The aim of the strategy, he explained, was to reconnect the community with the state as a legitimate provider of law, order, and services and foster economic and social development in areas that have long been neglected.

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[1] For example, after Dudus was removed from Tivoli Gardens McGregor declared himself "the new don in West Kingston." He also took over some of the security measures implemented by Dudus, such as evening curfew for youths, enforced by ordinary civilians (see previous chapter). The program, which he first implemented in 2014 in the capital city, has been integrated into ZOSO in Mount Salem and August Town, where "curfew monitors" operate under the guidance and authority of the police. (JSIF 2018)

If the aim of the Government was to exude authority, as demanded by the declarative occasion, then its performative posture dissipated rather quickly, as the announcement became shrouded in controversy and speculation. First, there was the question of why Mount Salem was chosen over seemingly more volatile districts—was this a political decision, or one swayed by business interests? The Government explained it had chosen Mount Salem, located not far from the center of the tourist capital, because it recorded 54 murders from the beginning of the year and houses 12 active gangs. But according to residents, there were no more than 15 murders in the community over the same period, and the number of gangs was much lower than presented (Frater 2017).

As they moved in to conquer the area, the security forces failed to arrest any wanted men or recover any weapons. This evident fiasco led some commentators to suggest that local gangsters were tipped, allowing them to flee with their guns before they could be captured. But perhaps the strangest challenge to State authority occurred when, at some point during the special newscast, the security forces began abandoning their checkpoints, seemingly withdrawing from the Zone just at the moment of its pronouncement. Reporters on the ground were perplexed and at a loss for explanations, as the security forces communications officers were nowhere to be found. The host interrupted the broadcast to plead that if anyone succeeds in getting in touch with Stephine Lindsay and Basil Robinson from ZOSO Communications, they should tell them to call the Evening News desk immediately.

Perhaps to wait out this odd blockage of information, the newscast broke for a sequence of public service announcements. It opened with a story about a blind woman from some remote village who launched her own "bag juice" business with the aid of HEART Trust, Victoria Mutual Bank, and food conglomerate Grace Kennedy. Following this was a message sponsored by the private Northern Caribbean University to promote road safety. Then, a poppy but rather severe commercial publicizing the dangers of skin bleaching. The commercial condemned this widely popular practice, urging citizens to "love your skin… because black is beautiful!" The break ended with a direct appeal from the Jamaica Information Service: "Stay tuned as we continue to inform and educate you!"

With their usual didactic tenor, public service announcements added a layer of absurdity to the State's unconvincing theater of authority. "The state speaks," I wrote in my journal, "but its pronouncements sound hollow." For just when it was expected (or attempting) to assert itself as the highest legitimate power, the State was revealed as lacking the knowledge and competence to govern. Sure, ZOSO had legally come into effect as a result of the formal declaration, but the performative gesture remained "infelicitous" (Austin 1975) in the sense that it failed to produce the miraculous effect whereby the sovereign self-grounds himself by uttering a prerogative. In the wake of this expected-unexpected fiasco, the State's moralizing appeals to "inform and educate" the nation echoed across the airwaves more ludicrous than ever.

Neoclassical Economics of "Crime and Violence"

The immediate context for the advent of ZOSO was the rising number of violent crimes, particularly murders, and even more specifically, the reversal of a downward trend sustained between 2010 and 2015, which was noted in previous chapters. To recall, in 2015 and 2016, the rate of murder was over 50 per 100,000. In 2017, the year ZOSO was announced, was particularly terrible, with 1,647 murders in total, or 4.5 murders a day on average. In Montego Bay, a town of fewer than 100,0000 residents, there were 335 murders. This raised the alarm across many sectors such as residents of garrisons and ghettos, who were begging for intervention, the middle classes, watching not-so-safely from the sidelines, and a large part of the private sector—led by Montego Bay's Tourism Board and Chamber of Commerce—worried that the social implosion will disrupt their business.

ZOSO was specifically designed to treat "the high crime situation" while minimizing "the negative impact on Jamaica which could likely occur if a declaration of a state of public emergency was made." (Law Reform 2017, 49). Note that this is not any "limited state of emergency" and not "emergency without end," but rather a kind of "emergency without emergency"—a mode of executive government that seeks to maintain economic activities to the greatest extent, even while warlike operations are actively taking place. The justification is, of course, that without economic growth, the situation will become much worse.

Like all areas of "public management," crime and violence are also approached with the tools of neoclassical economics. In Jamaica, an oft-cited study by the Inter-American Development Bank estimated that crime costs "the economy" over 4 percent of the GDP annually. Crime is understood as the main impediment to economic and social development. It reduces "investor confidence," dampens the "investment climate" since it increases risks to property, and imposes higher costs on business operations (bribes, protection, and security expenses). Crime also imposes constraints on the free movement of labor (that is, people cannot easily travel from their homes to neo-plantations when shots are fired). Further, compounded injury and trauma "erode the development of human and social capital" and deplete the county's stock of high-skilled labor. The general thrust of the argument, circulating widely in the media, is that crime and violence are among the main (if not *the* main) factors impeding economic growth in Jamaica (Inter-American Development Bank 2017; World Bank and UNODC 2007).[2]

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[2] Some arguments have been suggested to the contrary, pointing out that crime does not seem to deter investment where other favorable conditions obtain, but they are now marginal to the conversation (Robotham 2004)

The economics of crime argument highlights the circular relationship between crime and development. Crime, they say, is a consequence of protracted growth and deeply entrenched poverty, but it also contributes directly to their reproduction by preventing growth through business development. At the same time, economists and security experts are versed in theories of complexity. They understand that "crime and violence" have multiple causes and are, as anthropologists might say, "overdetermined." Hence there can be no "quick fix" for the situation, and there is an urgent need to develop "integrative models" (Clayton 2016), capable of addressing various underlying problems simultaneously. This framework not only legitimates but calls for enlarged public investments in growth and job creation and sees the development of "human capital" as a crucial area of state intervention.

Conceptually, human capital theory differs from ideas about simple reproduction of "abstract" labor power in stressing workers' cumulative skills and capabilities, beginning from early childhood development and persisting over the individual's lifelong trajectory. It takes into account education as well as psychosocial skills of citizens as potential workers, encompassing a variety of competencies necessary for suitable integration into the job market—from the ability to follow orders as well as think creatively, deal with stress, and remain "resilient" in the face of instability and uncertainty (ibid.). Ideally, a country should be able to develop a stock of human capital that fits its specific "niche"-how it is integrated into the competitive global market.

In Jamaica, much effort is put into "responsibilizing" the population through "the production and allocation of assets" (Calyton 2016). While there is certainly a significant emphasis on "re-socializing youths into patterns of work" (ibid), i.e., on labor discipline, poverty is increasingly understood as a condition of lacking assets. People who have "nothing to lose but their chains," that is, who own nothing, are unreliable parts to economic and social contracts, for they cannot post any collateral. They are a security threat to the extent that they cannot participate in securitizing. The process of constructing assets, like the process of developing human capital, is long term. As a first step, security operations must focus on "dismantling criminal organizations," which hinder the process by competing with the state over governance, as well as over associated types of rents, including taxes.

Global Pacification Packaged and Repackaged

ZOSO is an attempt to satisfy both the popular demand for decisive, strongarmed police and military action, with the prevalent understanding that crime is "a complex, multifaceted phenomenon" (Memorandum to Law Reform, 59). The policy is sometimes presented as the Jamaican variation of the Rio de Janeiro favela pacification policing (UPP). In the Rio scheme, perfected for the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics, specially trained police battalions were used to reconquer favelas, drive out drug dealers, and introduce social programs that aim to restore governing to the state. This "full-throated community policing," as described by some advocates (Jamaica Gleaner 2016), was implemented in 270 communities in Rio, allegedly contributing to a significant decrease in the murder rate, from 37.8 in 2007 to 18.7 in 2016—the lowest in 25 years. Jamaican decision-makers, thus far unable to remedy an ever-escalating rate of murder and the seemingly endless proliferation of gangs, hope to achieve similar results on the island.

Notwithstanding Brazilian inspiration, JCF Commissioner Anthony Anderson (former JDF Chief of Staff, and at the time of our interview Jamaica's first National Security Adviser) explained that the ZOSO approach was already implemented in Jamaica in the early 2000s. Under the leadership of Admiral Hardley Lewin, between 2003-4, the JDF carried out this kind of pacification campaign in Hannah Town and Denham Town, West Kingston. There, "the JDF did not act merely as an occupying force. Soldiers worked with government agencies, NGOs, and the private sector to support people involved in enterprise or seeking education and training." The program was considered successful but was short-lived. The Jamaican Defense Force could no longer fund social intervention from its own budget, and the initiative was discontinued.

I mention this minor controversy about the origins of Zones of Special Operations to highlight the mystifying effect of policy expertise, especially in the realm of security and development. Plans like ZOSO respond to a desire for "science-backed," "evidence-based," or "data-informed" governance. They are discursive artifacts that travel globally, carried by experts, advisers, academics, and consultants. Recently, the Government of Jamaica even announced that it would commission a study of the policy experiment, not to evaluate its work so it could do better, but rather to "repackage" and "export" it to other nations (Ferguson 2020). The claim to novelty is a function of the (very small) security expertise industry that produces income for a handful of practitioners in academia, NGOs, and private consultancies (imagine Jamaica solving its crime problem—it will be rich). In reality, the various elements combined in ZOSO have been tried many times before. The supposedly innovative combination of paramilitary policing with the provision of social service to influence behavior is the very essence of counterinsurgency warfare, revamped in the age of the global war on terror.

Critics of the Brazilian favela pacification have already argued at length that the policy "shares some characteristics with US counterinsurgency doctrine and strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq" (Freeman 2014; Fisher 2014). To understand ZOSO, one could easily cite Patricia Owens, for example, who theorized counterinsurgency as sociological warfare, which employs metaphors of household management to domesticate colonial peoples into submission (Owens 2015). Like many others in recent decades, Owens quotes American and French military advisors who describe counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaigns as "armed social work" encompassing "community organizing, welfare, mediation, domestic assistance, economic supply—under conditions of extreme threat." Campaigns where the soldier "become[s] a propagandist, a social worker, a civil engineer, a schoolteacher, a nurse, a boy scout." (cited in Ownes, ibid. 10).[3] Owens uses Arendt to convey her claims, but one could easily apply a Foucauldian framework to similar ends. Critics of UPP argued that the policy aims to transform favela residents "bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct and way of being" through biopolitical administration of "health, modes of subsistence and habitation, living conditions, the whole space of existence… providing an impetus for individuals to become self-regulating subjects who willingly reproduce mentalities and behaviors that support existing structures of power." (Fisher ibid., see Foucault 2009, 144). More broadly, UPP and ZOSO can be situated within "the securitization of development" which is the other side of widespread integration of humanitarian assistance, biopolitical calculation, and social reconstruction into military campaigns (Larzillière 2012; Lazell 2016; Sukarieh and Tannock 2018).

Globally, we are certainly witnessing a governmentality of warfare—a global regime wherein war encompasses military and non-military, bloody and bloodless instruments and which uses war not only to subject populations but to *subjectivize* them as well. Today, the governmentality of war appeals to an analysis that understands major threats to global order—conflict, crime, terror, and migration—as resulting from "pockets" of exclusion, where warlords, gangsters, smugglers, and pirates flourish. "Borderland barbarism" (Duffield 2001; 2013) on the geographical or social margins of the state, calls for effective expansion of capitalist relations, which cultivation requires working on the physical and social environment, with combined efforts by security personnel, development agencies and experts, government ministries and NGOs, and of course "the private sector."

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[3] "Sociological warfare" because it aims to make populations governable by identifying sociological and anthropological causes and remedies for political conflict. Drawing on Arendt, she suggests "the social" is counterinsurgency's terrain of warfare, operating as "distinctly sociocratic household rule… creating or shaping units of rule in which populations were to be domesticated" (35). Treating revolt and insurgency in terms of maladjustment to modern society, or the pathologies of societies in transition, this form of warfare-cum-pacification evokes sentiments and images relating to the household, justifying despotic rule by patriarchal authority over depoliticized dependents.

The policemen I spoke to were quite cynical about ZOSO's novelty and even more skeptical about its ability to achieve its objectives. "People hide behind talking about the police being corrupt, unprofessional and reh reh reh, but all the things of ZOSO are in place already. It's just a psychological strategy directed towards the people who feel something has to be done", one sergeant told me. This policeman alerted me implicitly to the fact that ZOSO is just another one of those expertly concocted "policy solutions" or "crime plans," which often turn the police into culprits and present the government as capable of doing something to affect a situation that is (to a lesser or greater extent) beyond its capacity to control, at least as things stand. "Notin' wrong with social intervention but it alone cyaan solve [the crime problem], when you have guns coming into the island day and night and no real jobs for the youths dem." Further, he argued, "community meetings are preaching to the converted, preaching to men that go church and go school, but they don't really make a dent in the crime situation. How Tivoli a fall? The whole nation had to take a stand." To him, ZOSO is "just another PR stunt [resulting from] political necessity."

Dynamic Intervention: Affective Subjectivity in the Making

ZOSO begins from the realization that the war on crime will not be won by incarcerating or killing every gunman on the island. Gangs are symptoms of a deeper social and economic problem. They emerge from ungoverned territories, which provide them with a conducive environment to grow, and in turn, maintain these territories out of reach of state and market control. A form of sociological warfare is therefore called for, which will manage to affect the relational nexus between gangs and "their" communities and relink residents with formal institutions: "A key objective […] is to ensure that the community is reconnected to the key agencies of government that deliver each programme thus engendering sustainability and credibility among the citizens that their government is the legitimate provider of support services." (GOJ 2020, 2)

Rather than crushing and eliminating the enemy, ZOSO is a form of intervention that "conducts the conflict as a type of argument" (Alliez and Lazzarato 2016, 334). It aims to persuade the population that its interest lay not with gangs and dons but with state and market. But its approach to the population is ambiguous, which perhaps helps explain why the policy is not doing so well on the demagogic front of the campaign. On the one hand, ZOSO aims to conquer territories controlled by gangs and "liberate" their residents from terror and intimidation. On the other hand, it treats residents as would-be enemies by implication. The result is that normally residents are presented as suffering from Stockholm syndrome, that is, as captives identified with their captors. Like so many other contemporary security campaigns, ZOSO discourse tends to conflate "combatants" and "civilian population," seeing they are embedded in a shared milieu, the terrain of "the community" in Jamaica.

The ZOSO mode of operation follows the counterterrorism strategy of "clear, hold, build." Clearing refers to the security forces moving into a community to displace gangs and retrieve weapons, ammunition, and contraband. Subsequently, holding is about security forces maintaining a heavy and visible presence in the area. Building, finally, consists in allowing authorized state and non-state agencies—NGOs and legitimate businesses—to step in and replace the gangs as providers of goods, jobs, and services. Holding and building activities may extend over several months or years. They are administered by a designated Social Intervention Committee (SIC), responsible for evaluating the social and physical conditions of the community and addressing issues relating to health, environment, social improvement, infrastructure, education, economic development, and creating opportunities for work and entrepreneurship. [4]Thus far, the strategy has been implemented in four communities: Mount

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[4] Each local SIC is comprised of members of the JCF and JDF, and the Ministries of National Security, Social Security, Health, Education, and Economic Growth. They also involve representatives of the Social Development Commission (SDC) and the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PSOJ), the Water Commission, Land and National Works Agency (NWA), "bona fida community groups", and residents (Law Reform 2017)

Salem in Montego Bay, Denham Town, August Town and Greenwich Town in Kingston, but the plan is to extend the campaign to dozens of other communities throughout Jamaica over the coming years (JIS 2020)

The nearly complete fusion between militarized policing and social development is evident in a Ministry paper, which described how the policy was being rolled out: "Support [to the Zones] was "deployed" in a "dynamic approach" in two stages. In the first stage, the State moved in to carry out standard government services, such as regular garbage collection and health services. In the second stage, it administered capital projects, namely investments in infrastructure and renovation of schools, clinics, police stations, and community centers. The interpenetration of the two logics is even more amplified in the notion of "intervention," which connotes both military campaigns and therapeutic intercession. Despite the seemingly surgical connotation of the term "intervention," ZOSO policy, as we have begun to see, is designed to be rather long-term. It understands that transforming behavior, attitudes, habits, and even identities, take time—perhaps even a whole generation.

"Social intervention" is the title used in Jamaica for various types of activities that aim to develop the psychosocial, affective, and behavioral transformation of the poor (or, more properly, the proletariat—understood as the class devoid of assets, including human capital). The notion originates from the discipline of social work and has its roots in early 20th-century mass psychology. Today, it largely converges with what some scholars call "therapeutic governance" (Pupavac 2001), social risk management, and the growing modality of governing through discourses of trauma and resilience (Fassin and Rechtman 2009). In Jamaica, hunger and material deprivation have been largely substituted by trauma as *the* major harm resulting from conflict, as well as the most reliable predictor of violence to come. The lives of urban poor and slum dwellers are seen as consisting of many "risk factors," key among them is the exposure to interpersonal violence, which is theorized as a public health hazard, a communicable disease akin to an epidemic (Ward et al. 2018). The epidemiological uptake is that violence cannot be addressed by altering individual behavior directly. Individual behaviors—dietary habits, smoking and drinking, attending school, or beating your spouse—show steady positive correlations with "bad" social environments, that is, poverty and degradation. Why? Because "the environment" conditions individual choice and constrains it. Put differently, the all-encompassing ("holistic") approach to crime prevention through social interventions grows out of many years of social science research into the alleged causes of delinquency and deviance. Crime, in this framework, is not the simple result of want and material deprivation. Rather, and fare more significantly, poverty is a total social condition of exclusion, trauma, exposure to violence, and unhealthy living conditions, that induces bad habits like short-term thinking and impulsiveness, and the inability to reason and negotiate conflict. The poor are not born criminals—that would be racist. It is their living conditions that make them deviant and in urgent need of transformation. The poor are seen, and taught to see themselves, as victims ruined by multiple and complex trauma, who will, in time and in turn, become perpetrators if not brought into mainstream society.

With ZOSO, various forms of intervention—military-police, psychosocial environmental, educational—address the diverse risks that arise from poverty and informality, and are by design preventative and anticipatory. The ZOSO approach to community transformation is called "seven pillars." The pillars—here comes empty technocratic language—are "underpinned by the *strategic theoretical framework* including the *Theory of Change (TOC)*" (GOJ 2020, 3–4). The seven pillars are:

1. Transformation of the physical environment
2. Land Tenure (land regularization)
3. Community Safety (improvement of citizen perception)
4. Human and community development and employment (livelihood and skill development)
5. Business and economic development

6. Spiritual and faith-based intervention; and

7. Leadership

Further: "The transformation of the community, to achieve reduced crime and sustainable development is rooted in the following *constructs*":

1. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)
2. Crime Prevention through Social Development (CPTSD) (ibid.)

Like a caricature of police utopias from the 17th century (Foucault 2009), the seven pillars seek to affect nearly every aspect of life in the community, from physical infrastructure to moral and religious instruction through economic policies and labor. ZOSO periodical reports to parliament, mandated by the legislation, describe the activities conducted under each pillar, which include anything from garbage collection and gully clearing to providing skills training to "at-risk" youth and providing dental services and courses in home economics. Many of the social programs currently delivered through ZOSO have been implemented in the past in the same areas, but the hope is that they will now be integrated and sequenced, followed through in a more rounded and deliberate fashion.

Civilizing Subjects: Designing the Environment

ZOSO's two "strategic constructs" to crime prevention are grounded in the understanding, which became common in criminology and policing research since the 1960s, that classical law enforcement—the focus on crime detection, deterrence, and punishment—is limited in its ability to affect the general rate of crime in society. Both approaches grew out of the social movements of the 1960s, which emphasized the social and contextual determinants of crime over and above individual psychology or malice. They shift the focus from treating the offender in retrospect—after a crime was committed—to preventative intervention in the milieu or the environment, especially among groups "at-risk" of developing undesired behaviors. Both approaches emphasize the need for long-term efforts over "quick fixes," aiming to create conditions that are less conducive to crime and violence, empowering communities to "police themselves" informally. This, again, will be achieved by shaping behaviors, tastes, preferences, identities, and priorities indirectly through altering the environment purposefully. Now, I will treat each in turn briefly, commenting on the specific ways they come to be understood and practiced in Jamaica.

Crime Prevention through Environmental Design is an approach in urban planning that suggests environmental and architectural design can be used to reduce crime and increase the perception of security among residents. The focus is designing the urban environment so that the incentive to commit certain types of crime—such as breaking-and-entry or theft—will be reduced by increasing opportunities for informal surveillance and, as such, the chance of getting caught red-handed. This involves not only clearing paths, allowing for more visibility as well as easier access to the security forces—though this is certainly an important aspect. More broadly, the paradigm is informed by Jane Jacobs' urbanism, which defined "good cities" as characterized by a level of safety and security one feels walking on the street. Jacobs is known for offering several principles that foster such cozy feelings, including clear demarcation between public and private space, constant pedestrian traffic, and "eyes upon the street" from locals or "natural proprietors" (Jacobs 1992; Crowe 2000; de Goede and Randalls 2009). I will not perform a critique of this fashionable theory of urbanism here (it is very popular among the gentry), but it's easy to see that Jacob's principles are structured around property.

The approach also draws heavily on "broken windows" policing, which as well known, prioritizes addressing urban blight— abandoned buildings, littering, loitering, vacant lots—that "signal" disorder and attract crime (Wilson and Kelling 1982; Sampson and Raudenbush 2004). The goal is to change spaces characterized by anonymous and poorly maintained structures with tidy and secure proprietorship, based on the clear demarcation of boundaries. In other words, to use environmental cues embedded into built forms, to influence behavior and social interactions that are conducive of respect to private property. It might be worth pointing out, once again, that property crime is not the problem in Jamaica—these have been steadily dropping since the 1970s. The problem is violence, specifically murder (Gray 2007, 9; Harriott 2009; 2016). Still, one JCF Deputy Superintendent and Crime Officer explained the rationale of crime control through environmental design to me as follows:

> We are moving away from force to power. Power is the ability to communicate, getting something you want without using violence. Some policemen think we are losing the grip on crime because we are no longer tough on crime, still there are new ways: tackling crime and preventing crime through environmental design, addressing the mental through the physical landscape, how communities look and how they are organized. This means we take down zinc fences and build concrete walls, tear down all the structures that prevent police from seeing and interacting, *where people are hiding*… low trees and low structures that obstruct traffic. We put in sidewalks. We involve the community in redesigning through Labor Day projects. The absence of clarity is the destruction of the rule of law!

We already saw in the previous chapter that the state wants to see its subjects in their communities. Under ZOSO, citizens are encouraged to produce birth certificates, issue national IDs and Tax Registration Number (TRN), and join the National Insurance Scheme (NIS) or the National Housing Trust (NIH) so they could "become aware of their benefits" as citizens. But the quote above also reveals the extent to which behavioral, subject-oriented notions of power—the "conduct of conduct" (Foucault 1982, 790), rather than disciplinary authority and the use of force—are beginning to influence (at least the formal) police discourses. The policeman I quote is obviously conversant in new modes of crime prevention through urban planning and community engagement and is also aware of criticisms of this policy emanating from some sectors of society. He implicitly responds to the belief that social intervention is an inadequate solution, which causes the police to lose grip on crime and violence. The motto at the end of the statement reinforces the belief, central to the whole operation, that spatial, legal, and social order are absolutely one and the same.

The environmental approach to crime prevention also derives from an "environmental" or ecological view of the criminal adversary, indistinguishable from his milieu or deeply embedded in it. Environmental intervention intervenes in the milieu of poverty. According to 2018 World Bank data, the percentage of *urban* residents living in slum conditions in Jamaica is 57% (compared to 16% in Brazil, for example) (UN-HABITAT and World Bank 2018). The figure represents about 25% of Jamaica's population. Another related data point indicates that about 25% of Jamaica's population currently reside in informal settlements. From a governmental perspective, informal and unplanned settlements produce many social and environmental hazards, from deforestation to the absence of sewage treatment and solid waste removal. Squatter communities lack access to basic services, including social services and education, and are characterized by low school attendance and high drop-out rates. Combined with unstable and insecure occupancy and tenure, squatter communities are seen as major harbingers of gangs and criminal activities (USAID 2016; Tindigarukayo 2017).[5]

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[5] The Government of Jamaica has a separate policy to deal with squatting, which interacts with ZOSO to the extent that the latter emphasizes regularization of informal settlements. Squatting, or what is known as the practice of "capturing land", evolved after abolition as the emancipated claimed for themselves the freedom of occupancy and subsistence farming. It is further rooted in the formation under slavery of what Sidney Mintz (1974) called "proto-peasantry". To cheapen the reproduction of labor, planters allocated small plots to slaves on which they grew foodstuff for subsistence and, gradually, for sale. Slums also have a long history in Jamaica (Lloyd George notably called the West Indies "the Slums of the Empire"). Urban slums expanded with every slump in the rural agricultural economy, dominated by Sugar, and grew significancy in the last decades of imperial rule, despite the construction of social housing by the colonial government after the 1938 labor rebellion. Between 1943 and 1960, the population of Kingston grew by 86 percent, when it was estimated that about one-third of Kingston's inhabitants lived in dilapidated dwellings. The number nearly doubled again by 1970, when a decade of political violence led to waves of expulsion and resettlement.

We saw that in the 1960s and 1970s, government investment in public social housing became quickly absorbed into "the process of garrisonization," which was in the main an exchange of free housing, utilities, and services for voting.[6] After the demise of Manley's Democratic Socialism in 1980 and the advent of Structural Adjustment Plans (SAPs), the Jamaican state halted all investments in public social housing and (like many other countries governed by the IMF) altered the mandate of the National Housing Trust (NHT) from providing affordable housing to those most in need to a contribution-based scheme used mainly to finance housing construction and mortgages for the middle classes. The Trust's funds are also often diverted to cover the government's sovereign debt servicing (Smith and Klak 1998).

As we have seen, ZOSO is intent on creating assets and collateral. This progresses through surveys conducted by The National Land Agency, which aim to record and ultimately register property titles, giving people ownership over the land they already occupy. It does not, however, involve the construction of new social housing. In this sense, ZOSO remains squarely within the neoliberal framework, which understands private homeownership as one of the primary tools that "stimulates the attitudes of independence and self-reliance that are the bedrock of a free society" (cited in Hughes and Cranshaw 2019). Or, per Thatcher, sees public housing as "breeding grounds of socialism, dependency, vandalism, and crime" (ibid.).

Residents are encouraged to learn to respect private property in many ways as well. Most explicitly, perhaps, in habituating them to pay for privatized utilities and services. As in many other countries in the Global South, abstracting electricity is both a common practice and a central object of moral concern in Jamaica. Here, it not only symbolizes rampant criminality among the lower classes but is also seen as a remnant of "the politics of entitlement"—one of the detrimental social impacts of garrisons (Robinson 2014). According to recent estimations, about a quarter of the electricity produced in Jamaica gets siphoned off by unpaying customers. And while abstracting is a criminal offense that can even lead to imprisonment, police enforcement is often arbitrary and haphazard, much to the dismay of Jamaica Public Service (JPS)—the national electricity firm re-privatized in 2001. In the past, the firm disconnected entire communities from electric service as a form of collective punishment against siphoning, but after the courts determined this practice to be illegal, the company invests in public education campaigns, currently under the catchy title, "fight for fairness." The campaign frames electricity theft as a crime and as a danger to life and property. JPS also launched its own "social intervention" effort "to help educate and empower persons to receive legal supply." Through its programs, JPS flowers on, "persons are being reminded to set the right example for their children and to do their part to make Jamaica a better place for families and businesses alike." (JPS 2021)

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[6] As Don Robotham (2003) and Deborah Thomas (2019) have shown, the formation of garrison housing projects was not unrelated to pursuit of British and American interests in the Caribbean, in the late colonial period and during the Cold War—and so violence came with them. Robotham argued that "the British were seeking to divide the nationalist movement and the corruption of the delivery of social services was one way to achieve this" (Robotham 2003, 131, cited in Thomas ibid.), whereas Thomas found evidence that USAID grants for housing, city planning, and urban community development in Jamaica were intertwined with American plans to place military bases in the Caribbean (ibid.)

The campaign offers a clear illustration of the state and capitalist interest joining forces to re-educate and "empower" the people to respect private property; enticing them, through promotional campaigns, to want to become "included" in the market. Again, the issue is not simply to recover lost profits but also to uproot the "sense of entitlement" handed down from generation to generation since time immemorial, perhaps since the plantation. The very same sentiment was relayed to me by one ZOSO officer, who said: "Their light is illegal, their water is illegal, and they're not being made to answer for any of that. They did not grow up paying bills. The issue is not money but motivation. You have to explain to them, so they see the benefits, the opportunities it gives them."

The statement begins as a moral reproach, but midway through turns into a plea and then into a sales pitch. This reflects, I think, a certain ambiguity in deciding how to treat the population. We already began to see that, from a counterinsurgency and security point of view, the population are both potential criminals and "hearts and minds" to be captured. Here, another dimension of the population emerges, where it is treated as an untapped market. From needy "clients" of the state, residents are turned into customers, who, while being moralized (repressed), need to be treated as people with desires, which would be better satisfied by formal service providers rather than criminal and informal ones. The residents, as customers, need to be able to appreciate their "opportunities" and benefits" and weigh them against other options they have to choose from. This does not mean they are treated as rational individuals, however. On the contrary, the strategy draws on marketing in its effort to manipulate affect. Hence, there is a strong connection between the affective governance of psychosocial units in their milieu and the attempt to make citizens into consumers of market goods and services.

Rational Choice Between Work and Death

Because ZOSO continues to deal with the inescapable problem of a growing "surplus population" that does not subsist on formal wage labor, there are some contradictions between the new affective form of governmentality and very old modes of disciplinary power. The residents of a ZOSO are, therefore, hybrid consumers and workers. They must also come to realize that, when it comes to income generation, the formal market offers better choices, opportunities, and benefits. This happens in a global context where Jamaica faces serious difficulties competing already. As the largest English-speaking country in the Caribbean, Jamaica can offer a pool of valuable workers to multinationals in the customer services sector. The Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) sector is a large employer of semi-skilled workers who specialize in the affective labor of customer service and marketing. However, the minimum wage in Jamaica (around $200 US/month) is still higher than in India (as low as $60US/month depending on the state) (World Bank 2019), which also offers a much larger pool of workers. Jamaica's competitive advantage here is geographical and cultural proximity to the US, which some American firms prefer (less costly to travel and supervise the work, Americans are familiar with the Jamaican accent, which they identify as Caribbean and not US black). Tourism and the logistics and operations sector, which the Government seeks to create, are more site dependent. Still, overall, Jamaica, as a medium income country with a relatively unskilled labor force, fits very awkwardly into the global labor market. Wages must be actively repressed to attract multinational firms.

And yet, even in this context, and despite the demise of local production described in previous chapters, labor force participation in Jamaica is very high. Before COVID-19, it stood at 71.38%, compared to 63% in the US. Unemployment stood at around 9% (STATIN JA 2019). These figures are important to keep in mind as we encounter endless complaints about resistance to work and "idleness." Racist charges that go all the way back to the 19th-century post-abolition era. As Camilo and Maziki Thame pointed out, Jamaica had full employment during slavery, so perhaps this is not the best indicator for social development (Thame and Thame 2019).

From a social intervention point of view, however, the purpose of getting youths to work has little to do with exploiting their labor in any significant way. The idea is to intervene in the economy indirectly by reducing crime, as discussed earlier. Youths, especially "at-risk" young men, are the main addressees of social intervention, although unemployment among young women is significantly higher than among young men (26.5% and 17.9%, respectively).[7] The reason appears self-evident. Young men are the pool of gang recruits explicitly called "violent producers" by experts and NGOs in

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[7] The data pertains to January 2019, before the COVID epidemic. At the time, youth unemployment rate stood at a total of 21.8%—a significant decline from 37.5 percent in 2013, but still one of the highest rates in Latin America and the Caribbean (STATIN JA 2019)

Jamaica. Instead of "producing violence," they should become "productive members of society," that is, to be employed by capitalist businesses.

One of the NGOs I observed throughout my fieldwork is a longstanding actor in community development. Among other things, it carries out outreach work, specifically developed to reach even the most "high-risk" young men, those already actively involved in gangs, "badmen," and "shottas" in local parlance. The organization aims, as one of my interlocutors explained, "to give them something to do with themselves" while "drawing them away from the dons, so they [the dons] lose power." He added that "violence become so normal these days. We want to show there's a way out, an alternative." Now, obviously, outreach workers know how hard it is to compete with what association with gangs offer these youths in terms of both monetary gain and, however momentary, protection: "At the end of the day these youth are moved by the belly… Someone from abroad will offer them a million dollar, and they take it. We cyaan compete with that", one outreach worker lamented in a staff gathering. "Yes, this is what we are up against," replied her colleagues, "but life as a shotta is short-term… and what we are offering is long-term opportunities. We have to explain this to them."

Consider the underlying morbidity of this statement. If gangsters are prone to be killed at a young age, what the NGO can offer—their competitive advantage— are "long term opportunities," which are probably (maybe) preferable to death. Some of the young men recruited by the organization are offered remedial schooling, things like literacy and mathematics, sometimes classes to prepare for the CXC, the Caribbean matriculation exams. Others are referred to governmental agencies and private institutions that offer vocational training, primary among them is HEART (Human Employment and Resource Training), which offers more than 100 training programs across the island, many of them for unskilled or very low skilled work or for jobs that are in high supply. Popular courses are customer service, tourism and hospitality, electrician, welding, cosmetology, and other simple trades.[8] Under these conditions, it's hard to blame the youths for choosing other ways to make ends meet. Further, even if they are trained, many of these youth will not find work because it doesn't exist or because no one will hire them due to their criminal record or simply who they are and where they live.

This is where "idleness" figures into the story as the main cause of crime, violence, and disorder, and here we also witness neo-Victorianism, emerging nearly unchanged. In one "time management" workshop I attended, the lecturer asked participants "to think what it would feel like if you were the boss," hoping that by this feat of imagination, the youths will understand what it means to become valuable workers or responsible small business owners, who don't have time to make trouble. They are invited to become their own internal boss, that is, to assume a protestant ethic. The coach reminded the teens that "in the US and Canada, being late to work is unacceptable. Money is time, and time is money!" Another social worker explained:

> It's a culture thing. A lot of youths have high school diploma, they even have Subjects [have completed CXC exams] but they refuse to leave their environment. They refuse to be independent. They don't have any voice in their head telling them what to do, what others think, what their family would say. They don't have 'what ifs', and that's what we have to deal with.

This very short quote condenses several ideas that are commonly repeated. First, there is "a culture thing" relating to labor. Culture, as we saw in the reform police chapter, is a major concern in Jamaica and is constantly under inspection and correction by diverse local and foreign agents, who hope to change culture by training, preaching, and educating. Here, the issue is the cultural objection to wage labor, which some (myself included) would see as one of the more inspiring and praiseworthy elements of the Jamaican black emancipatory tradition. The speaker quoted above clearly does not see things this way but rather argues that the youths refuse "to leave their environment" and "to be independent." The message is clear: The ghetto/garrison is an environment that promotes "a culture" of dependency so that even youths who have the formal skills to get themselves a job refuse to do so. This is, again, because "they don't have a voice inside their head." Which is to say, they have not internalized the voices of family and of society that make wage labor into a super-ego injunction, carrying indisputable moral worth. The youths do not concern themselves with "what ifs." They managed to escape the disciplining anxiety of the protestant ethic.[9]

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[8] Jamaica suffers from a labor training trap. Skilled workers, many of whom graduate the public training colleges and universities, leave the island in large numbers due to uncompetitive salaries. The problem is acute in the field of nursing, for example, but also in policing, as the JCF loses many of its recruits each year to other jurisdictions (mainly in the Caribbean) where they are offered higher salaries. The result is that the state invests considerable public resources in training a labor force that "goes global". My landlord, Kennedy, once suggested to me that rather than viewing this situation as a predicament, Jamaica should rather turn it into an official strategy. In a global economy, he says, the government should invest in training exportable labor, which will send back remittances. The proposition makes some sense given that, today, remittances are the second largest source of foreign exchange in Jamaica (around 20%), after tourism.

Acknowledging the difficulty of attracting youth to their programs with a vague promise of unattractive labor, this NGO (like many others) promotes entrepreneurship and small business development. They provide training and some seed money for small community operations like cookshops and goat and pig farms, for example. They also run a culture group that trains youths in music production, video and sound engineering, recording, and promotion. The organization here relied on the established historical tradition of the black peasantry for self-reliance and informal trades, where working without a boss—as a farmer, an independent craftsman, or "buy and sell," is preferable. It releases you from often exploitative and degrading labor relations and gives you control over your own time. This is one of the reasons why entrepreneurship is popular in Jamaica. But, as already intimated, the trap of petty enterprise today is reminiscent of the trap of subsistence farming in the 19th century. It is incredibly hard for any small producer or salesman to compete with large conglomerates. Consider that even the local bourgeoisie fails to establish and maintain local businesses, so how could a youth from the ghetto withstand the competition?

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[9] It is true that prolonged experience with precarity have led, in Jamaica as elsewhere, to what may be called "disillusionment from labor." I met many youths in Jamaica, including some of my lower-middle class housemates (more or less respectable, more or less formally educated), who simply do not understand why they would want, or even need, to work. They scoffed at the idea of a nine-to-five job, as well as the proposition that education is a path to social mobility. These youths are lured not by the supposedly phenomenal proceeds of drug trade and lotto-scamming but by the fantasy of becoming social media personalities and "influencers", models or DJs. As most of their (our) generation, they convey a sense of being betrayed: "Mi climb and climb but mi neva a go reach deh so." More crucially, as we shall see later, many believe that "the system" is actively thwarting their chances of becoming rich and successful, by criminalizing them for profit and/or presenting hard and unrewarding labor as their sole alternative.

Outreach workers are clearly aware of the state of the Jamaican economy and job market, especially as it pertains to unskilled workers, must bracket this information when addressing the youths, possibly to keep themselves motivated and to continue giving the youths a feeling that not all is lost, that there are still "opportunities" out there for them. If one reads generously, as I think we should, one can still sense an underlying Christian missionary spirit that is concerned with humanizing the slaves. This attitude is not uncommon among Jamaican social workers and has an important place in the management of poverty, as shown in the previous chapter. Thus, when some of those quoted above speak of knowing who you are, having dreams, developing self-confidence and identity, they are not simply rehearsing neoliberal apologias like "anyone can make it", but truly believe in the inherent value of personal development.[10] Consider the following collection of quotes from outreach workers concerning what they see as the goals of youth engagement:

> To teach them financial literacy, budgeting, saving, parenting, how to get a bank account, how to get a pension plan, soft skills, job readiness, leadership, team building, identity, how to dress, how to speak with your boss, how to behave at work.
>
> To bring them to a level that they are accepted and presentable. To teach them that they need to bathe using soap and brush their teeth. That they should not smoke weed

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[10] I emphasize this because I met many outstanding and devoted social workers and educators—many of them members of Black Baptist missions and congregations—who make it their life's work to touch one soul at a time, without being deterred by the enormous task. They are perhaps the only element in respectable society that treats the poor as humans (even if humans who need to be saved). Observing them, one can easily understand why the missions become so popular in Jamaica. Christianity not only offers a narrative of suffering and redemption, it treats people as humans, as persons, a divine creation and therefore respected.

> before going to an [job] interview, or at least shower to take out the smell and use cologne.
>
> We work on their demeanor, deportment, mannerism, and attire. To comb their unruly hair, press their [school] uniform. We tell them not to bleach their skin. Bleaching isn't good for you! This is about comportment but also about identity, self-esteem. Most of them can't answer the question, "who am I?" this is where it all begins.
>
> Getting them ready for the outside world, job interviews, and personal development… remedial reading, self-esteem, believing that *they can*! Advocate on their own behalf, represent themselves, things like that. Not many of them have a dream or a desire, self-identity, or drive for personal development.
>
> Dress code! They need to dress modestly. They need to learn how to speak, how to answer questions, how not to move around like a posse. 'Cause when they go into a new space, they always need someone to watch their back for security, it's the trust factor - they don't trust people they don't know, so they move with their gang from the corner.[11]
>
> They don't know who they are. They are just surviving. They need better communication skills, to work on the psychosocial aspect, money management, life skills, careers, sustainable development, and reading… cause especially the men are illiterate.

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[11] It is hard to exaggerate in expressing how difficult and dangerous it is for some of these youths to move around town. They fear retaliatory attacks from other gangs, police harassment (especially when they are "out of place"). Still, they are asked here not to move around with their "posse" even if they are scared for their personal safety and have developed ways to protect themselves when traveling out of their relatively (very relative) safe space.

The approach, again, does not blame the youth for their problems but sees them as victims of exclusion, trauma, and faulty upbringing. These are not inherently corrupt but "only" socially damaged. But even if we remain very generous, it is hard to ignore the mission underway: Using soap to shower daily, combing one's "unruly" hair, working hard, saving and planning, expressing willingness, even desire, to work. Hence, preparing for the job market, the statements suggest, means completely surrendering to Jamaica's entrenched labor market discrimination. They thereby reproduce racism. Whatever counts here as deportment, proper ways of speaking, dressing, and behaving, are simply ways of teaching the youth to accept the hierarchical constitution of labor, which has nothing to do even with suspect theories of "human capital."

Let us take bleaching as an example. In contemporary Jamaica, bleaching is both widely practiced by all classes and publicly condemned by 'upstanding' members of society, who mobilize (as noted in the introduction) affirmative slogans "black is beautiful" as well as pseudo-scientific evidence that bleaching causes diseases like skin cancer (Charles 2003; Brown-Glaude 2007). It is commonplace to argue, as implied in one of the quotations above, that bleaching reflects identity loss, self-hatred, and the desire to be white because whiteness is associated with higher social value. Of course, if it were not so, the rich would not go through the trouble of "brightening" their skins in upscale and discrete salons. But what may be called "bleaching in plain sight," that is, bleaching that it is easily detectable, is a paradoxical marker of lower-class blackness. It is worn not to appear "natural" but like a mask—as made patently clear in dancehall artist Vybz Kartel in his many ironic comments on the practice. To refrain from bleaching, in this context, means precisely to stop looking so black (Hope 2011).

One outreach worker told me, after sending thirteen youths to a job interview at Juicy Patties, a fast-food chain offering minimum wage jobs to youth-at-risk as part of its corporate responsibility campaign: "I wouldn't hire any of them to be honest. There wasn't enough time to prepare them.

They had bad attitudes. One boy come with ripped jeans and Mr. Roberts said he looked like a [lotto] scammer. We tried to get him pulled out of the interview at the last minute. Really, it was so embarrassing. You know, so many of these boys are not prepped for the job market, so many [of them are] unqualified, and so many don't want to work. I wonder if anything at all can be done for them." There was something very honest about this unfiltered reflection. It expressed exasperation with social intervention that tried to compete with gangs by offering marginalized youths an opportunity to work in lousy jobs, for minimum wage or less, and for which they are nevertheless required to completely shed their social identities. This outreach worker knows that the NGO she works for has very little to offer the youths it seeks to engage. Indeed, social intervention as currently conceived cannot compete with the gangs because they operate on the very same capitalist premise and do not offer a substantial alternative. They do not propose the youths develop their intellectual, spiritual, physical, and practical development for their own sake or in the context of a different vision of social relations. They simply want to convince them it is better to be slaves than to be dead.

"A Trick fi Do Dem Business": Crime and Race/Class Antagonism

Robin lives in a concrete one-story house in a garrison in West Kingston, which is surrounded by a large yard, where he tends fruit trees and cultivates a small vegetable garden. The house was built in the 1940s, in the Caribbean style, when the area was still occupied by lower-middle-class residents and before it became engulfed by expanding slumland. Robin's father captured the house in the late 1970s after it was firebombed by political gangsters, and the occupants fled the area. Marks of the fire are still evident today, as the house was never renovated. Without running water, Robin and his family—like all of their neighbors—must carry water in jerricans from the standpipe at the end of the lane.

A couple of years ago, Robin decided to become, he laughs, "a law-abiding citizen" and start paying his light bills. He also began making regular contributions to NHT in the hope of eventually being able to buy land in 'country.' More recently, he got a job at one of those Business Process Outsourcing centers (BPOs), which he calls "a glorified call center," and where he works especially night shifts in providing customer service for Audible. At the same time, inspired by the entrepreneurial campaigns around him, he is trying to launch some kind of drop-shipping operation right from his garrison home in Kingston. Yet, he knows that from the point of view of "the system," he is still a criminal:

> The system seh [says] everybody here-so is a criminal, don't? And we born a criminal. And me nuh know how Christian can be existing in the garrison. Coz a Christian would not break laws. And Christians are born here, breaking laws! Because all poor people bridge light, which is a criminal act, because we cyaan pay the light bill. All people get free water, most of we, because we can't pay water bill. We live pon capture land that dem say we a squatter. So all of we, how can we escape? So even the Christian dem a live a lie of trying to live in a perfect world. Yuh understand me?

The system sees us all as "born criminals," hereditary delinquents, and in some sense, *we are* because informality is a condition of our existence. Even the Christians in the garrison are born sinners. But they too will be condemned by the system as if one could live "in a perfect world" where choices are made freely. Note the difference between "capturing land" and "squatting": What for us is a legitimate, or at least necessary, way of living, is for them yet another piece of evidence to convict us. The police and the laws, he says, "are made fi de rich," who, to paraphrase Anatole France, prohibit squatting and abstracting electricity "for the poor and the rich alike."

Robin is a community activist of sorts. Once involved with the community's defense crew (see chapter 6). Today he is mostly busy promoting peace in his area by working with various NGOs on peace and community development efforts that, with meager salaries, come and go. Yet Robin is quite critical about social intervention. He thinks that despite claims made by the government about seeking to treat the root causes of crime and violence, ZOSO is another way of treating "the surface" rather than the depth of the problem. He uses the metaphor of sickness to convey the point:

> So, for instance, if a man have some internal kinda illness, that he need to get into the system to maybe fix that organ or whatever, yuh have to know, as a doctor say, bwoy, yuh cyaan just patch up the man and say everything a heal up. Coz that not the solution, that not the real treatment. Yuh have to go real down inna de ting to really solve it. So this what the system is doing. Just like how I'm talking about healing the surface of the injury, not the depth of it.

Robin not only considers social interventions superficial solutions to an underlying illness but goes further to treat much of the discourse around what he calls "implementation" as a scam that not only papers over crime but perpetrates it:

> Mi a live inna deh garrison for 34 years, yeah? And every time mi listen to budget mi hear seh a crime is one a major tings inna Jamaica, and it is from the garrisons, the garrisons breeding criminals and reh reh reh... And mi hear about how much work and how much implementation is gonna take place and make dem ting happen. I don't know, mi never see one ting yet happen inna my community. So, it obviously means that they are telling us, as garrisons yutes, seh listen, "this is how the system is: we tell lies pon you to make money, and we come, and we make you believe as if life is so impossible for you to reach up there, and this is what certain steps you haffi [have to] do to reach there. Yuh understand me? And one more spin on that: Politicians will then give you a part-way [shortcut] to reach there, by being dem top-man or dem don,

> they will supply you with money and certain things, yeah? And tell you fi reach there in this way.

Based on his life experience, Robin is skeptical about promises made by both development agencies and politicians. If, for decades, endless talk about "work" and "implementation" fails to make any significant changes in the supposedly "crime breeding" garrison, then one must suspect (or rather consider the obvious) that this ongoing chitchat has other goals and effects. It conveys a message to youths in the garrisons about how the system works: "we tell lies pon you to make money." How do lies enrich the politicians, according to Robin? The fact that money supposedly allocated for development never arrives at its destination insinuates corruption or embezzlement. But more fundamentally, he says, the discourse of crime is surreptitiously and deceptively used not to fight crime but rather to perpetuate it. By telling garrison youths that "life is impossible for them," it furnishes generation after generation of young men who believe their only way to "reach [up] there" is to work for politicians as dons or "top men." The discourse of crime is a source of criminalization, which means the actual social process (rather than simply the stigma) of reproducing criminals. The system works by telling lies, that is, by convincing youth—indirectly, by offering them work that isn't there—that crime is their fate. Compare Robin's words to the lyrics of *The System,* by popular dancehall artists Popcaan (2013)

> Sad to say, but
> White people a bawl [cry]
> Indian people a bawl
> Black people a bawl
> Chinese people a bawl
> System, design fi set we up
> Dem give we di guns and dem same one come wet we up

The song begins by listing ethnic groups in Jamaica in what appears to be descending chronological order – from the first rulers (the whites), through the Indian and black to the Chinese today. All groups, in their turn, "a bawl" (cry, protest) crime and violence, but though the ethnicity and color of those at the helm changes, the system "design fi set we up"—to scam and fool us forever. "Dem"—the third person pronoun, specific but impersonal—first give us guns and then come to "wet we up." That is, kill us. "Sad to say, but" this is how things are—a scam. This is how the system "set we up": by crying and murdering at the same time. The accusation takes on an even more explicit class antagonistic tone when Popcaan exclaims:

> Dem nuh waan' me fi build mama house
> Don't waan' mi fi own no assets
>
> […]
>
> Dem waan' we fi dead pon di road
> Dem nuh waan' we fi mek billions

"Dem" don't want us to build homes for our mothers (ideally, providing for one's mother economic security and 'retirement plan' is the first major investment of a virtuous young man of the lower class). "Dem" prefer us "dead pon the road" than "making billions" or "owning assets"—note how owning money and assets, rather than, say, being an employer, takes the fore as the main indicator of class conflict. A similar point is made perhaps to an even greater effect, in Mavado's *Fresh Cash* (2018). The song encourages youths to "spin" their dollars (invest), in spite of "dem" who "nuh waan ghetto youth mek so much money." Unlike Popcaan, who ends his song by lamenting having to go to the cemetery again, Mavado asks, "why the fuck mi fi watch [listen to] dem?" and advises his supporters as well as his detractors: "If you[r] money dutty [dirty], better a go wash dem." Again, a clear suggestion that those who prevent ghetto youths from making money are themselves criminals, who need to go launder their cash. Robin believes part of the reason "dem" try to undermine garrison youths is that they fear the competition:

> Sometimes, dem sacred of we, in terms of giving us the opportunity to prove ourselves. In a lot of ways, we a do it better than dem, yuh see me? I mean we are great economists, the way how we use money certain ways, certain money to survive and to find food fi eat. Yuh don't know how to run your own business and you want economic growth? We are under so much pressure; we deal with pressure better. a lot of things we know how to deal with better, you understand me? Because this is why Jamaicans are like that you know. Because they say like some of the strongest slaves end up here, yeah? And through struggles human mind and human spirit, human entire force tend to grow, evolve to another level [...] The uptown people dem so 'fraid, they are so afraid to come into the garrison.

Robin was actively educating me. He often stopped to ask, "you understand me?" It was crucial for him to teach, and his teaching was explicitly addressed as a refusal to be educated. The content of the statement openly says that the poor should be teaching "uptown people," who have been failing at their plan of producing economic growth, how to run the common household. This is what the rich are afraid of, according to Robin. As Diane Austin-Broos has shown, although over 90 percent of the Jamaican population can trace their ancestry to enslaved Africans, the poor claim to be their inheritors and are sociologically identified as black. The specter of slavery also suggests that the rich may fear rebellion (Austin-Broos 1994). Note, however, that when Robin brings up the collective body of slaves—that myth about "the strongest slaves being brought to Jamaica"—he is not at all presenting it as the reason for crime and violence but of struggle, which promotes the development of mind, spirit, and body. Simply put, the emancipated are more evolved humans than those who claim it is their sacred right *and duty* to rule over them, and morally educate them.

> To dem all a we a loggerheads, yeah? Is like, dem inna de class, yeah? it is like dem inna de class, not even a class, inna exam room, right? and they are doing a test and they are so confident after the exam saying that 'listen, this lickle poor boy deh might never pass,' but in the end, the poor boy is the one that get the Ones [top grade] and all that, right? So it's just how dem see tings, but that's not the reality of life. Because me a tell yuh, if garrison youth fi get opportunity as dem a get, we have done maybe a hundred and twenty time more effective in terms of all of dem a do.

"To dem" we are stupid and incompetent. "Dem say" we will likely finish last in every test we take. But what if that's not really the case? What if we actually excel? What if we come first? What if we get "the [same] opportunity dem get"? What will "dem" say if we end up showing we can do everything they do "a hundred and twenty times" better? Robin's choice of metaphor of classroom or exam is not coincidental. It invokes the competitive nature of social relations, where one class is consistently prevented from getting a fair start. But it also points directly to the feeling that relations between classes in Jamaica are framed as a classroom encounter, where the poor are constantly being instructed and examined by their self-proclaimed social superiors. Perhaps the sense of superiority is sustained by a kind of didactic relation of misrecognition, wherein the rich must teach the poor lies—that is, to inculcate among them a flawed image of themselves—to maintain their privilege. Well, isn't this precisely how racism works? For Robin, the discourse of the ruling classes is full of lies and "stigmatization," and that the poor, as descendants of slaves, must strive to develop autonomous, emancipated, consciousness:

> The system… tend to put us inna mental slavery,[12] in terms of believing this is how it is supposed to be. This is what we suppose to accept. Accept all dem lies, accept dem

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[12] "Mental slavery" is an idea used by Marcus Garvey in a speech in 1938, where he discussed the central importance of learning African history for the process of black liberation. Garvey insisted, "we are going to emancipate ourselves from

> wickedness and say "yeah, we come from bad place and we really haffi try leave there and try to get a better address. Coz if we really have the same address, we really nuh get no good job and we no gonna get deh so [there].

Robin is adamant about rejecting all the lies and wickedness the ruling class is saying about people like him. The lies are, essentially, ideology. They portray a deceptive image of the world and seek to convince us that this is how it is and always was. “Dem a tell lies pon we,” asking us to take responsibility and blaming us for coming from a “bad place” and suggesting that in order to make any advance in life we must leave the garrison. To move away from our community, our home, our family, and our friends—if not physically, then at least socially, emotionally, and mentally—and “get a better address.” But even if we do our best to prove that we are “different,” they continue to assume we are “bad” or “connected to the badness”:

> Well, dem full of marginalization and stigmatization in terms of how they pree [see] we. Like all a we bad, all a we support negativity, and even, for instance when me go uptown and look a work in a particular place, dem look pon deh address. One main speculation dem have, [is] even if me nuh bad, me have someone connected to badness. And to dem this is a trick fi do dem business.

Again: the lies, marginalization and stigmatization are “a trick fi do dem business.” That is, intimately connected to how rich people make money. They are also rooted in a kind of “speculation” about garrison people and their nature:

> Alright, let me tell yuh the way how mi see dem speculate. Yuh ever see a dark black bag? It is zipped up, right? And there are a lot of things inside of it. But all the uptown

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mental slavery because whilst others might free the body, none but ourselves can free the mind […] The man who is not able to develop and use his mind is bound to be the slave of the other man who uses his mind.” (Garvey 2013)

> persons would just do in that case: dem see a mango come out of it and dem just say it's just straight mango inna deh bag. They […] don't know what other fruit is inna deh bag, but they just speculate. So that's how dem see deh garrison. They just say, alright, a tief [thief] come from there, everyone from down there is tief. Dem look a mango come out of the bag and say it's all mango. Dem just waiting! And not just that. I believe they are so devious and deceptive because even if dem see another fruit come out, they tend to say, "something is behind that fruit still. Some mango is a part of it."

The opaque fruit bag metaphor used by Robin in this quotation is remarkably similar to Karen Field's theorization of "racecraft," the operation of racism to construct "race" through appeals to "invisible ontology." Contrary to conventional wisdom, which views racism in terms of overemphasis/overdetermination of noticeable differences of the body (skin color, etc.), Fields argues that racism is most characterized by looking for hidden clues and hints—supposed causes—of sensible social outcomes (Fields 2014). Etienne Balibar (Balibar 1991) argued a similar point when he claimed that racism is most concerned with the assimilation of "the other" who infiltrates our society by secretly passing as the same. In Robin's terms, "uptown people… speculate", they begin by assuming that all people who come from the garrison are the same, but they become even more suspicious when they see someone who does not fit their stereotypical template. It is as if they are waiting for the moment when they could finally reveal the secret lurking in the "black bag." And even when they find someone who looks exactly "the same," they will still be convinced there is some undetectable difference, "some mango is a part of it."

Speculative Violence: The Stocks and Murder Correlation

The poor are not stupid. They know and see very well many forms of speculation taking place all around them. Speculation about who they are and the kinds of dangers they must harbor, but also other types of speculations, frauds, and scams. Robin's comments were replete with allusions to tricks, scamming, and deception. He explicitly said, "dem tell lies" on ghetto youths "to make money." Thus far, we have considered these allegations as offering several interrelated critiques of crime-fighting polices, especially ZOSO and social intervention: One, that social development is used to rally political support while "implantation" funds are stolen. Two, that racism furthers criminalization, serving to effectively exclude poor black people, mainly residents of garrisons and ghettos, from getting jobs and more broadly advancing through life. It was also pointed out by Robin that this process of criminalization creates the conditions for "recruiting" dons by politicians. This is a completely different analysis of the situation that fosters "crime and violence" than the one we find in official policy formulations. Three, as evident in the dancehall lyrics I cited, the poor understand class antagonism in terms of owning assets and in terms of "spinning dollars," that is, as financial leverage. And they are certainly on to something.

In contrast to economists and security experts, who go on and on about the costs of crime to the economy, Jamaicans of the lower classes often say that "crime is a business." What they presumably mean by this is that crime creates streams of income for politicians and businessmen involved in illicit operations, which creates a vested interest against change. From this perspective, the "cost of crime" analysis belies the fact, often admitted separately, that crime is a major source of income for many, sharply unevenly but across social classes and that crime is economically necessary for a country that suffers from many structural constraints, that make formal economic development incredibly difficult, if not impossible.

Illicit markets have complex and multifaceted effects on local economies, which cannot be simply reduced to costs and benefits. Proceeds are also notoriously hard to estimate, and data is scarce. UNODC figures, although dated, give some indication of the contribution of illicit markets to the Jamaican economy. In 2000-2001, it was estimated drugs market accounted for 7.6% of the registered economy (UNODC 2001, 7; see also: 2005). Other illicit activities in Jamaica produce large revenues as well—human trafficking and lottery scamming are two notable examples. There are also spillover effects into other sectors, such as real estate and finances, as well as wholesale and retail (Felbab-Brown 2017). People I spoke to also pointed out, quite often, that crime creates a lot of work for the security sector, generating income for public and private security personnel, specialists, consultants and experts, producers, importers and distributors of security-related implements and technologies. And this is before taking into account the informal market for protection, which Anthony Harriott called the "market for violence" (Harriott 2009, 4).

The most glaring indication of the speculative profits that can be made from "crime and violence" are given by the Jamaican Stock Market. In 2018, the small Jamaican Stock Exchange ranked first among 94 world burses tracked by Bloomberg. Over 12 months, its main index gained 35 percent, while total earnings over the past five years surged at over 300 percent—four times the next-best performing market. The market rose by more than 588 percent since October 2014, precisely when murder rates began to climb up again. To put this in perspective, over the same period, the S&P 500 rose by 57 percent "only." This was while the average growth rate hovered around 1% and predictions of future growth remained conservative. Of 34 companies listed on the stock exchange, about half are financial intermediaries, and the rest are small ventures with limited expansion prospects (Jamaica Stock Exchange 2019).

What makes Jamaican stocks so attractive? One possible explanation would be that stocks are bought in the process of money laundering and repatriation of capital. This hypothesis suggests itself in light of simultaneous growth in real estate and construction and sales of luxury items, especially high-end cars (STATIN JA 2019). Yet, Jamaica is not the most attractive jurisdiction for money laundering. According to UN estimates, most money laundering activity occurs in the USA and in American, Dutch, and British territories that facilitate private offshore banking (UNODC 2019).

Another possible explanation concerns changes in the financial sector itself. The Jamaican financial sector emerged in the 1990s as an outgrowth of an outstanding national debt when P.J. Patterson's PNP government increased the sale of treasury bonds and raised the interest rate to 30% in an effort to curb inflation. At the same time, rapid deregulation and government sponsorship gave rise to a large "indigenous" financial sector, where merchant banks and building societies competed in offering fantastical interests of up to 60% on deposits. The scheme obviously led to a crash, which cost Jamaica 44% of its GDP and doubled the national debt from $70 billion US before the crisis to $142 billion in 2000 (Persaud 2006). In the decade following the crash, debt servicing ate up close to half of non-grant government revenue each year, or some 13% of the GDP—compared to 3% spent on health, welfare, and education. Credit-rating agencies confirmed Jamaican bonds were of "speculative rating," noting sluggish growth and economic vulnerability. This meant that the Government had to continue offering very high-interest rates on treasury bonds, which remained as high as 28%. The attractive offer diverted all funds that could potentially serve for productive investment and gobbled up the state's budget, now largely devoted to repaying debt. The IMF made sure that Jamaica maintains "the most austere budget in the world," keeping primary surpluses at 8%, to ensure liabilities can be immediately redeemed in US dollars, that is, in metropolitan goods and services (by comparison, at the height of the Euro Crisis, Greece was required to maintain 4.5% primary surplus, and this was deemed by economists "politically unsustainable") (Hudson 2006; Johnston and Montecino 2011; Johnston 2015).

For creditors, the national predicament became a very profitable venture. So much so that the IMF itself began to worry that high-interest rates prevent the economy from growing ("crowding out investments")—which puts its part of the debt at greater risk. Thus, it forced Jamaican creditors and government into a debt-exchange agreement that reduced the interest paid on treasury bonds and delayed their maturation, but without touching the principal. At the same time, also under the influence of the IMF, the REPO market for short-term trading in government paper became much more tightly regulated, pushing money out of government financing and into the nearly non-existent private sector. The stock market boom, about as speculative as it gets, seems to indicate "excess liquidity." That is, money desperately searching for profitable investments.

As for the IMF itself, somewhat ironically, Jamaica has already repaid the IMF more than it loaned from it. In 2013, the figures were 19.8bn repaid against 18.5bn that had been loaned, with the "balance" of $7.8bn still owned as interest (Johnston ibid). In 2020, just before the COVID pandemic precipitated another economic downturn, Jamaica finally managed to reduce its debt below 94.8% of the GDP and was celebrated by the IMF as its grand and "improbable" success story (Wigglesworth 2020). As I write, in August 2021, it had climbed back up to 110% (BOJ 2021). But, as could be understood from the above, what for some is a worrying prediction, for others may be cause for celebration. Interest paid on government paper is a safe and lucrative way of extracting rentier profits.

The extractive class relation is accentuated by an exceptionally uneven tax burden, falling disproportionately on the lower classes. Jamaica's income taxes are relatively high for low and medium incomes and relatively low for the wealthy (Jackson 2014). High indirect taxes on consumptions of basic goods and services are a cause of ongoing distress, while corporate taxes are low, and tax breaks and other incentives are used to attract foreign investments (Bahl and Wallace 2007). Property taxes are collected on undervalued land, meaning they do not take land development and use into account in calculating tax, and compliance is as low as 50% and even 30% in some parishes (Wynter and Oats 2018; 2019). Senior tax officers attest of a general practice of not enforcing against some large landowners: "In Jamaica, the big men don't pay taxes," and therefore they "target small taxpayers because they know it is collectable." (ibid. 2019, 201).

Given these circumstances, claims about the high cost of crime and violence appear even more troubling. Is crime really the main cause of Jamaica's development trap, and are the lower classes really those who should take most of the blame for it? Are the lower classes those who need to be heavily policed, subjected to endless supervision and surveillance, incarcerated in masses, moralized, educated, and sent to work? Or is it rather that the state, supported by foreign experts and creditors, adopted ideas that were once relatively progressive and is now implementing them in unending sociological warfare? And let us not forget that ZOSO itself also needs to be financed, thereby producing even more debt that can be bought, sold, and speculated upon.

Conclusion

In late 2020, the Prime Minister of Jamaica concluded the process of rolling out ZOSO in Mount Salem with a celebratory statement:

> We have removed zinc fences […], we have repaired roadways, we have cleared drains, we have regular waste collection in the area, we have given the citizenry access to critical services and amenities [...] The mindset in Mount Salem is changing [...] they see that the Government is investing in transforming not just their community but transforming their lives. The citizen of Mount Salem today is not the same person five years ago, and that is the ultimate level of transformation (Jamaica Observer 2020)

As I tried to show in this chapter, government declarations allow us to observe the rise and fall, as well as the constant recycling and repackaging of forms of knowledge/power. They allow us to see what is new and what is very old about how the state treats its citizen and the kinds of subjectivities it seeks to promote among the populace. It is easy to see that ZOSO is only the latest iteration of a longstanding project of trying to make the Jamaican proletariat more productive and docile, using the entire arsenal of didactic disciplinary and moralistic discourse as part of a sociological onslaught. Here, certain shifts in policing tactics obviously relate to a much longer history of domination and of struggle that this dissertation was only able to illuminate in moments and in parts.

ZOSO announces itself almost like a war of liberation, which will free the people from being captives of gangs and dons and lead them to be independent members of world society. It seeks to convince the people residing in squatter communities, slums, and ghettos, that they will be better served by the state and the formal capitalist markets if only they give it a chance. At the same time, it recovers very old ideas and tactics of disciplinary governance that seek to turn wage labor into a moral virtue or, at least, a super-ego formation. Given the very limited success of such methods in the past, I highly doubt that they will be effective today. The Jamaican black proletariat has more than one reason to reject ZOSO both in form and in content, especially as no real alternative is suggested, far less promoted. As we have seen, the black poor are incredibly preceptive observers, more than capable of identifying trends in politics, economy, and society, and articulating sophisticated critiques of what they justifiability call "dem lies." Perhaps it is time, as Robin so eloquently suggested, that instead of being constantly moralized and taught, they will become the educators?

Robin and my many other interlocutors have taught me, among other things, to look beyond what is being said, beyond discourses and declarations. Even beyond what appears like genuine efforts of implementation. They impelled me to look more closely at some of the speculations that are hardly ever discussed in relation to "crime and violence" in Jamaica. Some of the questions they helped me raise in this chapter seem even more pressing today, as we observe a global shift from austere neoliberalism to economic policies based on quantitative easing and the accumulation of government debt. In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, many governments worldwide reversed the scared prohibition on public spending and began "printing money" to support "the economy" and mostly financial markets. This was done partly to protect jobs and household savings but evidently and acutely increased economic, and therefore political, disparities. Taking on debt, governments propelled the redistributing wealth upwards, enriching the very top of the capitalist ownership class. Over the next years, maybe decades, many countries will likely find themselves in a situation quite like that which we see in Jamaica: Financial bubbles growing at the expense of any real investment in production and innovation, stock prices soaring as the rest of the economy plummets, and ever-widening gaps between property owners and workers. Such development will surely call for a state that provides some form of basic social maintenance (e.g., universal income) combined with militarized policing to keep a docile labor force ready to slave for multinational corporations. Get ready for the Zones of Special Operations.

Conclusion: Alienated Violence and Decolonization

That the police are defenders of the social order is commonplace. Ethnographies of policing usually begin from this premise and proceed to ask questions about how police carry out their role, the types of resistance they encounter, their self-understanding, their relationships with the public, and how they justify the use of force or their institutional culture. These, among many other lines of investigation in police research, help to illuminate this puzzling and even enigmatic institution of modern society, which is everywhere rife with contradictions and tensions. In this dissertation, I sought to do something different by substituting figure and ground. Instead of understanding the police through the social order, I used the police as an analytic device—a kind of lens that, if kept constant, allows one to chart processes of institutionalization and transformation of the state within a global political economy. The ambitious task, which this dissertation has only begun to tackle, was to theorize what is conventionally referred to as "state violence," without treating the state as a subject and without resorting to simplistic notions of "exception" and "sovereign power" that abstract the political from economy and society. The uptake of such theorization, which I will return to at the end of my concluding remarks, is to relaunch a conversation about violence and decolonization beyond the critique of power.

The dissertation could be read as composed of two sections. The first three chapters dealt with the *political* alienation of violence, by which I mean how the Jamaican people are divested of their rights and of their ability to organize social life and the state democratically. The next four chapters, which lay out the political economy of police extra-judicial killings and the police technology of community-policing-and-development, focus on the *social* alienation of violence through the reconstitution of frontier and plantation. Both sections are grounded in an analysis of the broader economic context, namely, the way Jamaica was historically integrated into the world market. I aimed to show how this dependent mode of integration continues to condition and constrain the development of Jamaican institutions, modes of political subjectivity, and avenues of collective action. All chapters also aimed to highlight contestations to the current state of affairs, opening small breaches in a system that appears all-encompassing. Briefly stated, the findings of this research suggest that violence in Jamaica has become politically and socially alienated, reflecting and embodying the persistence of colonialism as a global political system and as a resulting localized social relation. The double alienation of violence, which is acutely experienced, implores me to rethink decolonization in the post-Fanonian Caribbean.

Political Alienation of Violence

In the first part of the dissertation, I drew on the work of plantation school economists, especially Lloyd Best, to theorize the particular mode of integration of Jamaica into the world capitalist system, explain the specific political and economic institutions formed and conditioned by this mode of integration, and discuss the difficulties of reform that result from this rigid set up. As a nearly "pure plantation economy" (Best 1967), Jamaica is acutely dependent on the world market and on metropolitan capital for its reproduction. This involves a two-sided dependency: Producing staple commodities for export and, in turn importing most needs, including capital, technology, fuel, basic foodstuff, and expertise. While this mode of integration was formed in the era of capitalist mercantilism and chattel slavery, subsequent shifts to global *laissez faire* and the introduction of "free labor" did little to transform this foundational predicament for several reasons. The rigidity of the plantation as a complex economic and political institution, its anachronistic organization of production and distribution, its resulting competitiveness vis-à-vis new production locations, and in relation to industrial developments in the metropole. The plantations sank in debt to metropolitan creditors and remained dependent on imperial concessions and special political arrangements, both to market their product and to shield them from cyclical bouts of the global economy. The economy had to maintain large stocks of foreign currency against liabilities to creditors and to finance imports.

Economic dependency was, and remains, mirrored in culture and society in many ways, some of them incredibly mundane. For example, some basic ingredients of Jamaican cuisine—such as rice and saltfish—are imported. Dependency, however extends to taste across "low" and "high" culture and across classes, which reveal preference for metropolitan things—ideas, status symbols, and commodities. Macro-economic dependence on the world market also shapes social and political dependency on the local level, such that even those emancipated peasants who managed to acquire land in order to produce independently remained tied to merchants and brokers for marketing. And this was the relatively well-off section of the black peasantry, most of which continued to depend on seasonal labor on plantations, if only to earn cash to buy imports and pay exorbitant taxes—carrying the burden of debt accumulated by their former masters. This is the source of Jamaican political clientelism. This political phenomenon reflects deep-seated economic conditions and is not, as argued in large chunks of the literature, the simple result of postcolonial corruption or the inadequacy of ruling elites.

In the first chapter, I used the introduction of modern policing to Jamaica in 1834, on the eve of the abolition of slavery, to describe the multiheaded state apparatus. By discussing Jamaica's "forgotten police," which preceded the formation of the JCF in 1867, I tried to show that the full-fledged distinction between metropolitan and colonial institutions and the formation of what Partha Chatterjee called "the rule of colonial difference" were not given. Rather, in Jamaica at least, the racist distinction developed from the failure of the experiment of free labor, which contemporaries—ignoring the political economy of Jamaica altogether—attributed to racial and cultural differences. I also located the transformations within the history of British reform movements, as they were explicitly concerned with Jamaica as a counterpoint and backdrop. I sought to explain the organization of violence that emerges through trans-Atlantic class conflict and accommodation, explaining the difference between the army, which remained associated with the Crown, and the police, which was fought over between foreign and local ruling classes. I also showed how a third force of quasi-institutionalized violence could be mobilized to further political goals in the context of a dependent colonial and deeply racialized economy. Peasant mobilizations could be harnessed by proto-national leaders, as happened in Morant Bay, or to circumvent political barriers on trade and commerce by developing networks of smuggling.

Within this incredibly complicated colonial and imperial context, mostly black rank and file policemen, recruited locally, found themselves trapped in a web of contradictions—between the conflicting demands of imperial and local ruling class and between the emergent creole state and the incipient black nation. This was the point of departure for the second chapter, where I used the nearly improbable notion of "black police power" to discuss the politicization of Jamaican policemen and their gradual radicalization since the 1940s.

I briefly mentioned Claude McKay's tragic poem, "hatred within and hatred without," written when he was still a police constable in Jamaica, as reflecting this multisided alienation felt acutely by policemen. "Hatred without and hatred within" can refer to several levels of internal and external loathing. The relation between the black people and the black policeman ("my own black skin"), colonial hostilities and animosities among the people, external domination, and local conflicts. The sentiments expressed by McKay in 1919, along with his call to arms and fraternity, achieved their political expression in the 1940s police struggles as labor.

Acute subjective contradiction, class and race radicalization, and political affiliation with the PNP, created the fertile ground for the identification of policemen with black power mobilizations in the late 1960s and the rise of a significant contingent within the JCF that supported Manley's Democratic Socialism (1972-1980). Using oral history interviews and documentary evidence, I sought to reconstruct this political moment from the point of view of the police force. I found policemen deeply versed in radical social and political analysis, who convincingly argued that in the 1970s, they were invested in reimagining policing within the broader context of decolonization and overcoming dependency. This entailed an elaboration of a mode of political policing that emphasized curbing the power of the plantocracy in the name of the people. External and internal campaigns of destabilization, as well as political inconsistencies, ultimately toppled democratic socialism, but not before spreading violent crime and social insecurity, thereby creating a strong (and not unfounded) association between lumpen crime and imperialist counterrevolution among policemen. After its collapse, the fragments of the political policing experiment were reworked into a form of police populism, to which I returned in later chapters.

The demise of democratic socialism indicated the reimposition of foreign debt and, with it, the foreclosure of emancipatory political horizons, the abortion of the promise of decolonization. Subsequently, the demise of main exporting sectors and the local subsistence economy, alongside the expansion of illicit drug markets in the Caribbean, furthered the empowerment of political brokers, known today as "dons," first introduced through the spatialization of political clientelism in the "garrison." The internationalization of Jamaican Posses since the 1980s prompted the gradual return of metropolitan security experts to Jamaica, now in the capacity of police reformers.

In chapter three, the reform police, I examined the paradoxical reconstitution of imperial governance, carried out with the stated aim of modernizing the JCF and overcoming its "colonial culture." Noting uncanny analogies between this contemporary campaign and 19th-century imperial reform movements, I probed whether, and in what ways, the reform police is seeking to carry out a "second abolition" in Jamaica. Several interrelated conclusions emerged. First, as the chapter details, a broad coalition of interest, forces, and motivations— humanitarian, political, and economic, foreign, and local—push for reform. Some of these need to be understood by reference to neoliberal transformations, including the "indigenization" of sovereign debt since the 1990s and relative dispossession of metropolitan middle classes during the same time.

Reform police is ultimately a process governed by creditors under the title of "stakeholders". It involves replacing democratic legitimacy and control over the institutions of public force furthered through avowed commitment to protect human rights and claims to managerial competence. Today, the Jamaican state and, especially, its security apparatuses are "co-managed" by local and foreign "partners." Without disregarding the success of agencies like INDECOM to significantly reduce police extra-judicial executions, the process as a whole raises serious questions about the fate of democracy in Jamaica. Furthermore, as patently evident by reformers' persistent appeal to "culture" to explain Jamaican policing and reform resistance, there are still few attempts to understand Jamaica's political and social institutions by reference to political economy. Hence, just like reforms in the 19th century, race and culture serve as a pretext for structural constraints maintained by dominant global powers. Today, just as in the past, the local ruling class is ultimately protected by the imperial army, which was never allowed to become corrupted and tainted by "Jamaican culture."

Many threats to the Jamaican people emanate well beyond state borders. This includes, most fundamentally, the constant flood of American guns upon Jamaican shores. The Jamaican Government, however, has little to no power to affect American gun laws—the mere idea seems preposterous. Obviously, the Jamaican Government can do even less to affect economic policies that affect global trade and is effectively barred even from national economic and social policymaking by foreign creditors led by the IMF.[1] The result is what I call the political alienation of violence: A process whereby one of the central aspects of political organization—the institutionalization and control of public coercion—is divested from the people. The meaning of this divestment is not simply the loss of the political sovereignty of the nation state, but more fundamentally, it makes it clear to the people that resistance is futile because the current situation is favored and maintained by powers that they cannot possibly challenge, far less overcome. And let it be noted that the Jamaican popular classes, like the majority of people living in the Global South, cannot rely on international solidarity in metropolitan locations to further their struggles. This is not to say that social action is entirely impossible, but that the constraints on local agency are tremendous, given the global context.

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[1] This became evident, recently, in US attempts to topple Venezuela's left-wing government, which undermined PetroCaribe agreement with Jamaica. The agreement, signed in 2005, allowed Caribbean states to purchase oil on

After the failure of democratic socialism and the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s, the foreclosure of emancipatory horizons left a political void. Brian Meeks used the term "hegemonic dissolution" to describe the protracted impasse (Meeks 2000; 2018). On the one hand, the ruling classes have lost their legitimacy, "their 'natural' right to rule" (ibid.), but they still hold onto power (largely, by the thread of foreign support). Resistance from below takes many forms and is particularly expressed in the cultural domain but has yet to bring about a transformative emancipatory project. It also doesn't help that the dominated view the ruling classes as corrupt and criminal, which some certainly are. It doesn't help because many Jamaicans have come to regard the reign of individual interest, greed, and corruption as "just the way things are." Individual interest and personal power struggles motivated mainly by the desire to be rich seem to be inherent to all politics and perhaps even to all social relations. This brings me to the second form of alienation: The social alienation of violence.

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preferential payments conditions—a mechanism that allowed the government to offset debt and invest the money in education and social services.

Social Alienation of Violence

I took extra care studying the phenomenon of police killings in Jamaica, which is highly mediatized and often sensationalized. It seemed to me that human rights organizations, the police, and the dominant classes, participate in propagating the myth that police killings are, in the main, about extra-legal law enforcement; excessive, justified, or desperate means of controlling crime, as it were. My study has led me to conclude that they are not. Instead, as I began to argue in the 'Buil' N' Kill' chapter, police killings are often targeted assassinations commissioned by powerful individuals in politics, business, and the state apparatus, that perform a managerial function within the neo-plantation setting of the garrison. Beyond beginning to show how, precisely, the Jamaican garrison community maintains forms of clientelist dependency and conditions collective action, I also pointed out that the institution of the garrison and, therefore, the way it organized violence is gradually being dissolved by global economic processes.

In my discussion of the police death squads on Clarendon's new frontier, I continued to argue that police executions do not seek to eradicate criminality as such, but to prevent competition from below, that is, to prevent the poor from usurping the masters-frontiersmen's mode of excessive individualist pursuit of profit. Perhaps, these are just the same actions understood in different terms. However, today, the state imaginary, which under "normal" conditions maintains the distinction between crime and politics, has been fractured by multiple predations, internal and external. The state has been demystified. It is no longer experienced as standing above society, but appears as what it is: A large extortion racket (Tilly 1985).

Should critical theorists revel at the demystification of the state, rejoice while observing "the real" pierce through state ideology? I am afraid not, because what supposedly hides behind the veil of political ideology is just more ideology. And it is an ideology worse still—that of capital brought into its own: The very idea of free reigning individuals who are naturally self-interested egoists from the day they are born. Of course, there is nothing natural about the Hobbesian condition of "war of all against all" because there is nothing natural about individual equality. Individualism is a social and political construct, not something given naturally. The human is "an animal which can individuate itself only in the midst of society" (Marx 1973, 84). Only the most advanced relations of production can give rise to individuality and the forms of independence—both positive and negative—that it affords.

I highlighted two responses to the loss of the state imaginary, or the vanishing of the political. The first is populism, which seeks to reassert the existence of political relations by identifying concrete enemies, even if this is done in a way that is entirely bogus. This response certainly recreates a sense of order by naming the culprits and dividing society into two mutually opposed camps. But this response is limited precisely because it emerges in response to a situation where individuals already appear entirely interchangeable. No one really believes that *these* people are outstandingly immoral. When Jamaicans talk about "the system" and take care not to "call out names," they do this not only because they are afraid of the repercussions but also because they know that only replacing the people in power does not make much of a difference after all. Remember, they have seen the changing nationalities and colors of people at the top. Thus, populism only marginally defers the rise of nihilism, which is the violent embrace of the destructive and lethal logic of the system itself, brought to its necessary conclusions.

Ultimately, I argue that what we see in Clarendon, and the force that "captures" Jamaica more broadly, is not this or that ruthless elite—though I certainly have no intention of defending those who commission murders for profit—but a social relation that has become autonomous. A social relation producing alienated individuals who come to regard their own individuality and that of others as something natural, taken for granted, and believe that to maintain their freedom, they must assert it over and against others. Jamaicans are by no means unique in holding this belief, for they are, of course, not the only nation captured by capital. They just happen to find themselves on one of the frontiers of capitalism, where the most extreme forms of alienation have reigned for several centuries and where money always seemed to offer a way to become human, to become free in a particular way.

In the introduction, I mentioned Harriott's claim that violence in Jamaica has become "self-perpetuating" (Harriott 2009, 5). Jamaica, he said, has "a full-spectrum crime problem, with American-type Ponzi schemes, Nigerian-like 419 confidence rackets, Italian Mafia-style entrepreneurship and the full range of steel crimes" but most of all, "we have a problem of violence on steroids" (ibid. 4):

> Violence is a business. It is organized and marketed to yield a result return as in the case of extortion and protection rackets. Violence brings social success. Violence validates and elevates status. Violence brings political success. It may be used to acquire and consolidate political power as "safe seats" in the parliament. It has therefore become self-perpetuating. (ibid.)

I tend to agree with Harriott that violence in Jamaica has taken on the shape of capital, but not simply because it is, itself, a commodity that is bought and sold on the market. Rather, violence has become self-perpetuating because it expresses alienated social relations among individuals, which has escaped and even demolished the constraints once imposed on it by politics. The trend is, I think, not dissimilar to what scholars working in other Latin American and Caribbean contexts called "the democratization of violence," the violence that came after the demise of authoritarian governments. But unlike most of these scholars, I don't see "new violence" as simply opportunistic, economic, and therefore "apolitical." Instead, I see it as an expression of the politics of capital.

Throughout this dissertation, I often referred to different modalities of organizing social violence, which is one of the main, if not *the* main, task of the state, or of any political order for that matter. There are arguably many different, though perhaps not endless, ways of instituting the political, some worse than others. But the dissolution of political hegemony and the state in our times does not occasion the end of politics. Social violence is still organized. It is just not organized through purposeful activity of human subjects. Rather, it is self-organizing and self-moving like capital: a force that has become quasi-autonomous, escaping individual will and human control; A force that subsumes and captures the agency of individuals, turning them from subjects to objects. It is, in short, alienated violence, and is experienced as such.

One of the first events I attended upon my arrival to Jamaica in 2017 was Harriott's public lecture entitled "The Dudus Effect." In the lecture, Harriott argued that regardless of what policymakers had hoped, the 2010 Incursion into Tivoli Gardens did not achieve the expected result. Dudus was captured and Tivoli was, in a sense, reconquered, but the operation—while leaving a traumatic mark—did not become "a focusing event." Presenting data showing that the downward trend in murders has reversed since 2014, Harriott argued that if the operation was to be judged as a state show of strength vis-à-vis criminal elements, then it was not successful (Harriott 2017).

The murder rate continued to rise, breaking records. In 2017, the murder rate was 55.8 per 100,000 and over 300 per 100,000 in some areas. In 2018, 2019, and 2020, the rate of murder declined to around 47 per 100,0000, but this was while the three largest population centers—Kingston, Spanish Town, and Montego Bay—were kept under intermittent States of Emergency. I repeat these figures here because I want to stress that, in Jamaican public debates, the rate of murder is taken as a sign of prolonged catastrophe or looming apocalypse. In this vastly Evangelist nation, the End Time is a lived reality, a reality experienced and sensed. Isaac, who we met in the first chapter, told me: "The bible is very serious in telling us: [in the End Time] men's hearts will be very cold towards one another. The enemy of mankind will be all around, roaming, trying to entrap people" […] "Lucifer came down from heaven, he studied closely human behavior, and slowly, over the generations, learned to change it.

[What is happening in Jamaica is] grand spiritual warfare between God's angels and the devil", the latter being served by "human beings possessed with demons." A commonly expressed sentiment is that evil spirits are haunting the island, causing people to commit murders.

But even those who do not adopt a religious explanation of the catastrophe often express their feeling that violence is unstoppable. NGOs work to halt the cyclical spiraling of retaliatory killings, speak of violence as a contagious epidemic that is communicable (Ward et al., 2018). Violence appears as a force of nature, escaping the will of its agents. A similar idea is expressed in the idiom of being "caught up in the badness," often used to explain why someone was murdered. Another serious concern is "bad mind," usually translated as envy, and historically associated with obeah and malignant spiritual capacities (Cassidy 2009, 82) Badmind can be used as a verb ('him a badmind mi'). Yet, its more common use ("bad mind all bout yah so") implies a form of power that spreads and takes over people, even against their will. The notion that badmind can only be cured by being "beaten out" of a person ("dem a beat all the bad-mind outta mi") also conveys an affinity between bad mind and other forms of possessive spirits that take hold of people's minds and bodies.

A recent poll found that over 70% of Jamaicans consider "bad-mindedness" as one of the most troubling features of their collective existence, and as a main source of violent crime, equal only to corruption (Broadie 2017). Jamaican blogger Kenia Afreeka considers badmind "a superpower," pointing out its positive and negative facets: "badmind leads to innovation," but as a hyper-competitive and aggressive tendency, it unleashes many dangers and especially violence. She counted 99 Jamaican dancehall riddims explicitly mentioning bad mind in their lyrics (Afreeka 2018). Given the stress on contest and innovation and the strong association between dancehall and consumer capitalism, there is little doubt that bad mind reflects concern about the violence unleashed by capitalist competition.

The terms used by Jamaicans to express their predicament recall René Girard's famous theory in Violence and the Scared (Girard 1979), which begins from mimetic rivalry or, indeed, from envy among equals (paradigmatically brothers or even twins). Girard argues that violence leads to a "sacrificial crisis"—experienced and expressed in metaphors of fire, epidemic, and flood—which can only be resolved by channeling accumulated aggression outward onto a scapegoat. It should be noted that Girard too begins with the assumption of equivalent individuals as if humans are thus given in nature. It is also interesting to observe that his theory of crisis and restoration of order is homologous to the process whereby financial crisis destroys (sacrifices) excesses of accumulation value. Indeed, despite presenting itself as "philosophical anthropology," true for all societies and all historical cases, Girard's is ultimately a reflection of capitalist social relations projected backward.

In Jamaica, however, not only are the metaphors used to describe alienated violence similar to those discussed by Girard's anthropology, but also the feeling that it would require "a focusing event"—some kind of ritual, material, or symbolic sacrifice—to break the cycle of violence. A ritual seems to be required because conventional approaches do not seem to work. In one of the public forums on crime and violence I attended in Kingston, this point precisely was made by one woman in the audience. Following a series of presentations on different attempts to curb the murder rate, she took up the microphone and said: "OK, we are all anthropologists now, we all have plenty of data, but where is this data going? I am asking this as a citizen, how does all this data help us solve Jamaica's crime and violence problem?" What this woman was expressing, in her terse and poignant comment, was suspicion and deep-seated concern that "evidence-based" public policy is less reliable than casting a spell. A few weeks later, around mid-2017, a new citizens group formed under the title 'Do Supm!' (Do Something). I came to hear them present their agenda and was struck by the combination of anxious urgency and complete exasperation. By all signs, the group seems to have quickly dissipated.

Demystification and the Knowledge of Emancipation

My ethnographic and historical investigation led me to argue that the frontier and the plantation form a dialectical matrix that shaped political processes and continues to mold governmental practice in Jamaica. These two colonial institutions, which are intrinsically related to each other and to the world market, form a structure that remains rigid and constraining, despite undergoing significant transformations over time. Whereas some transformations are externally imposed, others are generated by the tension between two intertwined but distinct institutional grammars, which give rise to specific forms of subjectivity and collective agency.

The plantation, I argued, is an institution designed to reproduce, materially and symbolically, the master-slave relation *after* the knowledge of emancipation had already been obtained—even if not yet realized in practice. The plantation, more specifically, emerges against the forms of individual freedom compelled by the frontier, imagined as open, lawless, and waiting to be discovered and appropriated by hyper-individuals. The frontier is the paradigmatic space of modern liberal freedom, which at the limit manifests itself in the prerogative to murder others with impunity and to turn humans into things. The plantation, no less governed by this extreme form of alienation, is a total institution which purpose is double. Economically, to turn the frontier into a space of industrial accumulation—to produce profits consistently and not only through one-off plunder—exploiting the normative and legal void of colonial racial slavery. Politically, the plantation is a police state, where the distinction between law and its execution is completely obliviated. It develops in this way precisely in order to differentiate free masters-frontiersmen and absolutely unfree slaves. In other words, the plantation sets out to prevent "frontier freedom" from spreading to all universally, with the tacit knowledge that freedom thus pursued can never become general.

As discussed in chapter six, Arrested Freedom, the Jamaican community is a police technology devised to counter the centrifugal forces of the frontier, which are said to lead to social disintegration. It embodies distinct traditions of race and class control, which are quite distinct: One, an explicitly authoritarian tradition, which seeks to restore paternal power over dependents, alongside all forms of "traditional" hierarchies and harsh discipline. The other, dating back to missionary free villages and evolving within the progressive stream of creole nationalism, was more concerned with humanizing the emancipated, making them independent householders, habituating them to respectable middle-class lifestyles and awakening their collective sentiments. While the two traditions should not be reduced and certainly differ substantially, both reproduce disciplinary "classroom like" relations between those who teach and those who need to learn, those endowed with superior reason and expertise and those who are thoughtless and ignorant. Both use the community as a policing pacifying technology, in contrast to residents who speak of community to make a political claim to govern themselves.

Marx reports in the *Grundrisse* that after the abolition of slavery the emancipated blacks of Jamaica refused to return to work on plantations: "They have ceased to be slaves, but not in order to become wage laborers, but, instead, self-sustaining peasants working for their own consumption […] As far as they are concerned, capital does not exist as capital, because autonomous wealth as such can exist only either on the basis of direct forced labor, slavery, or indirect forced labor, wage labor. Wealth confronts direct forced labor not as capital but rather as relations of domination." (Marx 1975, 326)

Marx understood (somehow, by reading the newspaper against the grain) that the emancipated were able to see capital, not as a mystical force, that is, as "self-valorizing value," but for what it is, a relation of domination between persons. Their unalienated relation to wealth meant two things within this framework. One, that they continued regarding it as a use-value, to be consumed and enjoyed, as a luxury, or as free time spent as leisure. Two, and more crucially from Marx's perspective, that without the mystification of capital "general industriousness" could not be obtained. His point was, again, not concerned so much with understanding Jamaican peasants, but with making the general argument that the expansion of material plenty, created as a byproduct of the process of capital accumulation, could not take root in this a place where social relations were seen as mere relations of domination.

The Jamaican peasantry sought small landholding and self-reliance in relative autonomy from governing power and, as much as possible, away from the plantation. This made them, as amply shown, an obstacle in the way of land-hungry estates, as well as those who considered "general industriousness" the only path to development. The black peasantry and their descendants have been, therefore consistently corralled back into labor, disciplined, and moralized to contribute their share to the collective effort. The plantation is, in this sense, a recurring attempt to block the process of independent black settlement in an "open frontier" area and to replace an ethos of autonomy and self-reliance with the wage-labor/capital relation.

Judging by the rate of labor force participation, which, as shown in the previous chapter, are incredibly high in Jamaica, the plantation emerged victorious. The black peasantry has been nearly decimated through waves of appropriation and, in recent decades, by trade liberalization and environmental degradation that make self-subsistence impossible. But the ethos of the peasantry lives on. Many Jamaicans appear to remember the secret revealed to their ancestors, that wage labor is not naturally or divinely ordained, not a moral precept, not itself a value, but simply a mode of reproducing domination, of accumulating power. The Jamaican emancipated—the class of those who continue to identify themselves and be identified by others as descendants of slaves—know very well that the authority of those who rule over them is based on nothing but sheer power, on groundless domination. They understand rule to be affected through the power of wealth, the power of guns, the power of imperial armies, and the Euro-Dollar system of exchange. This knowledge sustains their steadfast resistance to the plantation complex, in all its shifting incarnations, and in turn, compels the endless attempts of recapturing them into labor.

In the community policing chapter, I discussed at some length evidence from the ethnographic records that suggest the centrality of money to the conception of individual freedom among the emancipated. The point was to show that although the Jamaican peasantry clearly expressed its interest in self-subsistence and "use value," it was not untouched by the money relation and became invested in the forms of freedom it allows. On this point, my argument diverges from Sylvia Wynter, who, following Marx , argued that the principal dialectic in Jamaican society is that of the plantation and the plot. Wynter argued that subsistence plots allotted to slaves to cheapen their reproduction as labor formed the basis of an "indigenous autochthonous" (S. Wynter 1971, 96) cultural system, based on a direct relationship between humans and nature. Though never entirely detached from the plantation complex, this plot system—the ground of free peasant holding—created a space for practicing Afro-centric traditions, which played a crucial role in "cultural guerrilla" resistance to plantation capitalism. While Wynter admits that "there is no question of going back to a society, a folk pattern whose structure has already been undermined by the pervasive market economy" (ibid. 100), she nevertheless suggests that the plot provides "a point outside the system where the traditional values can give us a focus of criticism against the impossible reality in which we are enmeshed." (ibid.).

The merit, as well as possibility, of "returning" to social relations based on use-value is debatable. As we have seen, the introduction of money—exchange value—breaks up "traditional" communities by introducing a measure of equality. It destroys the basis of any authority claiming to be "natural": Father over household, husband over wife, parents over children, old over young, men over women, master over servant, white over black, and so on. As described by Cohen (1954), this is why the peasants associated having money with being independent and shunned all forms of authority. His findings are in line with a whole body of literature on Jamaican peasant markets—rather than only plots—as foundational to the formation of subjectivity of the enslaved and the emancipated, particularly women (Mintz 1989, Besson 2002). So much so that, recently, Shuana Sweeny coined the term "market marronage" (Sweeny 2019, 197) to argue that during slavery, thousands of black Jamaican women escaped the plantations, which turned their bodies into reproductive machines, and made their way to public markets, which were spaces of relative freedom. By stating things thus, I do not mean to glorify the capitalist market as a space of liberation. I am perfectly aware of the endless forms of unfairness, violence, and racial and sexual domination that reproduce themselves in and through markets. However, I do wish to stress two important implications of this reading.

One, that the crucial importance of money in Jamaica results not only from the relatively recent global trends of "conspicuous consumption" often associated with Americanization and postmodern capitalism, but also the strong association between money with freedom. Jamaicans long understood that while money might not change one's skin color, it can buy a measure of humanity. They keep being reminded of this daily. Money buys one access to water and other basic services, a home in a relatively safe neighborhood, with a flushable toilet and a metal gate—the ability to send one's children to a good school or to receive adequate medical care. Money buys the ability to drive safely in a private vehicle, rather than riding crammed buses and route taxis, or worse, treading along roads that have no pavement and therefore exposed to the elements. Having money means you are far less likely to lose your loved ones to violence, to wait endlessly to see justice done in your case, and to be taken as a citizen in the full sense of the term. This is why killing for money, in some ways, makes sense. Money marks the difference between freedom and slavery, between human life and social death. In other words, money mediates race to a significant extent, serves as a symbolic leveler, and, as such, maintains rebellious consciousness against traditional hierarchies.

Second, just as money mediates race it also mediates gender. One of my closest confidants in Jamaica is a woman named Michelle who worked as "buy and sell" her whole life, traveling long and incredibly dangerous journeys across borders purposefully designed to arrest her. She spent several years in prison in the UK before being deported back to Jamaica in 2006, bearing many insights along with many scars, some of which she graciously shared with me. Michelle made it abundantly clear that she has no interest in restoring some traditional unity with nature in the framework of limited community life. She was, and wanted to remain, a modern cosmopolitan woman, not a 'folk' of any kind. She desired the freedoms of individual liberty, freedom of movement, freedom to express and transact her sexuality as she pleases, freedom to become and to unbecome whoever she is. She wanted universal freedom, the freedom of universal exchange. She endlessly tries to escape "the community," but because she is black and poor, she cannot. I say this to warn against sometimes simplistic notions of community, circulating among well-meaning middle-class reformers and activists. Community can be a rather oppressive mode of living, especially for sexual minorities and women. It is always crucial to ask whether community is used as a measure of police or of politics (or both at the same time).

Violence and Decolonization after Fanon

In Jamaica, violence has become doubly alienated: First, as the state is taken over and undemocratically governed by the managers of global capital, and second, by the movement of capital as such, which turns violence into an ever-expanding, self-perpetuating, supposedly "apolitical" phenomenon. Colonialism is by no means a "cultural relic" or "institutional inheritance" but an actual living structure of economic, political, and social relations that exists firmly in the present and is reproduced through transformations. Further, "large-scale organized crime" is not a force standing in opposition to the state. It *is* the state. Addressing it demands political transformation, decolonization, not more advanced security operations, and moralizing anti-corruption and human rights training. However, as widely acknowledged and patently evident, the project of decolonization has been blocked since the 1970s, not only in practice but also in the imagination.

Fanon already understood the pernicious interaction of diverse and interlocking forms of colonial violence in the heydays of decolonization struggles. In *Wretched of the Earth* ([1961] 2004) he described the multiple forms of colonial violence—interpersonal, 'tribal,' criminal, and political, dispensed by direct agents of the foreign power as well as their local brokers, to sustain colonial rule through terror, in the name of colonial reform, and to further counterrevolutionary affronts. Against this background of constant and multidimensional violence that destroys colonized society and individuals, Fanon described decolonization as a process of turning alienated violence into politics and ultimately sublating it in national culture. Decolonization, "always a violent event," according to Fanon (ibid. 1), involved at least three interrelated processes of reorganizing violence. First, and most immediately, the deflection of colonial violence in the war of independence, which both demystifies the colonial relation and channels cooped up aggression, which was previously directed at one's intimates and equals. Two, gradually subduing the violence of war by engaging the masses in movement, refining the analysis of political, social, and economic relations, and engaging in critique and self-critique. This gives rise to national culture, which, according to Fanon, reflects movement and popular consciousness. Third, and on this basis, individual traumas of both colonized and colonizer, victims and perpetrators (sometimes, the very same person) can start being repaired.

Fanon speaks of decolonizing the nation, not about taking over the state. Yet, he operated in an international context that was very different from the one we now confront. Given momentous transformations of the global political economy, the development-statist path to decolonization is nearly inconceivable. No state can today separate itself from the global market, if indeed this was ever possible, and the prospects of developing a strong national economy on the basis of import substitution—no matter how radical—is both impossible and, for many, undesirable. Does this mean that nothing can be done save hope for changes in the metropole, that doesn't appear to be forthcoming? Does this mean that there is ultimately no room for local and national political agency in Jamaica or in other locations that suffer similar predicaments?

I take very seriously, and have the utmost respect for, Jamaican activists, social reformers, and public intellectuals who insist on local agency and national responsibility. Most of them understand very well, probably better than I ever will, the constraints imposed by persistent imperialism. They know, and they nevertheless maintain that conscious, concentrated actions can bring about some changes. For example, a plan for urban redevelopment that seeks to creates common assets, to counter the prevalent frontier ethos, and while involving dons and communities in planning and management; programs developed by Jamaican feminists to restore black women's power and leadership, thereby rebuilding families and communities; and many other initiatives—both more established and very small—to transform lives and communities, to carry out changes that the people can be proud of and recognize as their own.

These efforts convince me that we need to be very creative about pursuing decolonization within rigid frameworks. Neither putting our hopes in grand revolutionary gestures nor yielding to colonial dictates and the pessimism and nihilism it spreads. Within this limited space, could we not begin to consider the reorganization of violence as a major avenue of decolonization? Could we not bring Fanon's insights into the present and begin elaborating what it would mean—and what it would require—for the Jamaican people to bring under their control alienated colonial violence? Could the institutions of organized violence—the police in particular—not be radically rethought and reconfigured democratically by the people? Why does the crucial conversation about police reform consistently take place over the heads of those most immediately concerned—first and foremost the communities suffering police aggression and brutalization, but also the policemen themselves? To use the language of reform: How would policemen ever become "owners" of the reform process if they are, very patiently, not? And who's to say that Jamaican communities cannot be involved in policing themselves within some overarching democratic framework? It seems that given the number of guns currently found on the island, this might be the most effective solution to violence.

By raising these questions, I don't mean to suggest a particular course of action, a particular modality of organizing violence democratically—it is certainly not my place to make any recommendations to that effect. My point is rather to argue that there might be ways to latch onto and radicalize police reform efforts that currently use a discourse of decolonization to further foreign domination. The rather empty and even insincere discursive framework could, perhaps, be reappropriated and filled with some content. That would be a start. Perhaps decolonization cannot, and should not, proceed today as a violent *event* but rather by meticulously and democratically working out of the reorganization of violence, keeping the goal of liberation firmly in sight.

Further Implications

The state, particularly the postcolonial and neoliberal state, has been dissected, criticized, and disparaged to no end. We generally understand its many faults, particularly today, when we seem to be globally entering a new capitalist dispensation. Part of what this dissertation tried to show is that every cycle of reform within capitalism signifies an attempt to contend with divisive contradictions in social relations, recuperating bits and pieces of criticism and draws on insight generated through struggles. Conversely, social movements are always of their time. They reflect the possibilities of their era, which emerge from ongoing transformations in economy and society, technological advances, and the rise of new groups and classes. To change dramatically, not simply superficially, the ways our societies are governed, demands that we become reflexive about the position of our thought and action within unfolding historical processes. Failing to do so, we risk having our well-founded objections coopted, redirected, and channeled to renew and reinvigorate the very powers that we seek to counter.

In my discussion of political policing and police reform, I hoped to contribute to contemporary debates about decolonizing and defunding police forces, as well as more radical campaigns for abolishing the police. I am no expert on North American policing, which manifests very different forms of racism and embodies a different type of terror than the police in Jamaica. Nevertheless, as I think the reform police chapter made clear, decolonization and even abolition can easily become other names for reconstitution—not necessarily because reformers are insincere but because they emphasize institutional culture rather than structural conditions. It is nearly impossible to radically transform one element of the social system while leaving the system itself intact. Police reflect the social and economic order, not only reinforce it, and should be treated as such. Further, as the Jamaican case reveals, defunding the police or limiting its functions can imply privatization and de-democratization that undermine public control over the administration of violence.

The issue is not only how much violence, as opposed to "softer" forms of power and governmentality, though this question is obviously not negligible. It is also violence by whom, under whose authority, on whose behalf, and for what purpose? Violence to what social, economic, and political end—to upend social hierarchies or to further entrench them. Those who seek to escape these questions because they see violence as such, as repugnant, set themselves up for failure. They also abandon communities that need to be able to deal with real harm, especially those perpetrated by the ruling classes.

In most places, critical analysis of state violence remains a crucially important task. But critique should also serve, I think, as a negative path for identifying and crystalizing more substantial demands, not only to be governed less (Foucault 2009) but to be governed otherwise. The constant struggle to actualize democracy— the struggle to govern ourselves in the multitude of our commitments and affiliations across uneven locations—is the condition for transforming police into politics. This dissertation sought to make a small contribution in this direction by problematizing the Jamaican police within a broader architecture of violence, both formal and informal, localized and global, as they undergo historical transformations. On this basis, I hope we might ask questions about how socialized violence, a central dimension of any state, could possibly be organized in a different way, which would hopefully be more democratic.

This work emerged out of nagging dissatisfaction with many strands of critical theory and action that by only criticizing violence, rather than understanding it as part of what politics seeks to consciously organize, leave the stage open for "law and order" conservatives to market their wares as the only solution to "crime" and for capitalist social implosion more broadly. Replacing crude violence with seemingly more benign forms of subjectivizing power may be important but is unfortunately inadequate when crime—not only criminalization and moral panics—has become a conventional mode of reactionary governance, especially in peripheral locations and postcolonial societies. In other words, this dissertation sought to seriously engage the problem of organized and organizing violence instead of shunning it and leaving it to the discretion of "responsible adults." To reiterate, I by no means argue that there is one way to organize violence or, indeed, of instituting the political. On the contrary, I claim that implanting institutional models that everywhere look, or are supposed to look, the same, is one of the manifestations of the alienation of violence and the violence of alienation by capital, which prevents human communities from imagining their own institutions and making their own political life.

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